un convention on the law of the sea 1982 and the 21st century concept of piracy
TRANSCRIPT
SWANSEA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND TRADE LAW
UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1982 AND THE 21ST CENTURY
CONCEPT OF PIRACY
by
GUNASEELAN KUPPUSAMY
Supervisor : Dr Richard Caddell Student ID : 749925 Academic Year : 2013/2014 Date of Submission : 30th September 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
1. THE CONCEPT OF PIRACY ............................................................................ 2
1.1 An Act of Violence, Detention or Depredation Committed for Private End 5
1.2 An Act of Violence, Detention or Depredation on the High Seas or in a
Place outside the Jurisdiction of Any State ........................................................ 9
1.3 An Act of Violence, Detention or Depredation by the Crew or Passengers
of a Private Ship or Aircraft, Against another Vessel or Persons or Property
Abroad ............................................................................................................... 11
2. THE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR THE SUPRESSION OF PIRACY
................................................................................................................................ 14
2.1 The Human Rights Implications of Prosecuting Piracy Suspects .............. 15
2.2 Bilateral Agreements for Prosecution of Piracy Suspects .......................... 18
3. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF PIRATICAL ACTIVITIES ................................................. 21
3.1 Regional Cooperation for the Suppression of Piratical Activities ............. 21
3.2 The Suppression of Piratical Activities through International Institutions
............................................................................................................................ 22
3.2.1 The Role of UN Security Council ............................................................. 23
3.2.1.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1816 ............................................... 23
3.2.1.2 UN Security Council Resolution 1846 ............................................... 25
3.2.1.3 UN Security Council Resolution 1848 ............................................... 25
3.2.1.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1851 ............................................... 26
3.2.2 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation ..................................................................................... 27
3.2.2.1 Geographical Limit ............................................................................ 28
3.2.2.2 Broad Range of Offence ..................................................................... 28
3.2.2.3 Ship-Boarding Procedure .................................................................. 30
3.2.2.4 Jurisdictional Criteria ........................................................................ 30
3.2.2.5 United States v. Shi ............................................................................. 31
4. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES ............................................................. 34
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 36
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 37
1
INTRODUCTION
At present time, international peace and security on the oceans are faced
with variety of threats in form of maritime crimes and disorders such as piracy,
slave trading, armed robbery, hijack and other violence on the sea, which greatly
endanger the security of sea communication, the welfare of seafarers and the
principles of international law. In addressing this concern, the provisions under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (hereinafter UNCLOS
1982) has provided a clear obligations for the security and peaceful uses of the
ocean, namely through the Article 301 which states:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
Piracy and the slave trade are the only instances of universal rights to
board vessels suspected of involvement in an offence defined at international law.
That is, any duly authorised public vessel of any state, irrespective of whether it is
directly affected by the vessel’s conduct, may interdict upon suspicion of piracy
or slaving.1 However, these rights are quite limited and ambiguous, and below, we
will examine how sufficiently and appropriately the current concept of the law of
piracy as codified on the provisions of UNCLOS 1982 has contributed to meet the
demands of Twenty-first Century problems at sea.
1 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 77
2
1. THE CONCEPT OF PIRACY
Piracy was once thought to be principally of historical interest. However,
there is a renewed concern in maritime safety bodies amidst fears that
contemporary terrorist organisations may use hijacked vessels as weapons against
ports or international commerce.2 Modern piracy is changing from sporadic
‘smash-and-grab’ crime to a highly developed organised crime. Traditionally
pirates have been considered outlaws, hostes humani generis or ‘enemies of all
mankind’. The suppression of piracy can therefore be considered as a common
interest of the international community,3 thus, the exclusive jurisdiction of flag
states does not obtain.4
The international law of piracy is set out in Articles 100 to 107 and 110 of
the UNCLOS 1982. For present purposes it seems necessary and sufficient to
recall the provisions concerning the definition of piracy and action against pirates,
because the ‘piracy’ acts punished by the municipal laws does not constitute
‘piracy’ in the international law and causes some confusion on the definition of
piracy.5
According to Article 101 of the UNCLOS 1982, piracy consists of “any
illegal acts of violence or detention, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed… on the high seas against 2 Ibid 26 3 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 354 4 A Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 24 5 Dissenting opinion of Mr Moore, The Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), PCIJ 1928 Series A/10, p.70
3
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft”.6 As such the pre-requisite elements to constitute an offence of piracy
under the UNCLOS 1982 are:7
(1) an act of violence, detention or depredation;
(2) committed for private ends;
(3) on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; and
(4) by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, against another
vessel or persons or property aboard.
Article 100 of the UNCLOS 1982 provides that all parties have a duty to
co-operate ‘to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy’. Under
Article 110 a foreign-flagged vessel can be visited by the public vessel of any
state on suspicion of piracy, and under Article 105 a pirate vessel may be seized
and its crew prosecuted under the seizing vessel’s national law.
These provisions reproduce the relevant articles of the Convention on the
High Seas 19588 and have their origin in the work of the Harvard Research
Committee’s codification project of the 1930’s, also known as Harvard Draft 6 Article 101of UNCLOS 1982- Definition of piracy Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b) 7 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 27 8 Articles 13–21 of the Convention on the High Seas 1958
4
Convention. It is sufficient to quote the Harvard Draft’s definition for comparison
with the UNCLOS 1982 definition set out above.
Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state:
(1) Any act of violence or of depredation, committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends
without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right …
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship.
(3) Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this Article
Evidently, much of this language was retained verbatim in what has
become Article 101 of the UNCLOS 1982.9
The definition of piracy under Article 101 causes several long-standing
misconceptions about piracy, including criticisms that this definition is narrower
than the customary rule10. It does not provide further precision with regards to
types of violence which constitute piracy, and also the scope does not cover
attempts to commit illegal acts on the seas. Acts preparatory to piracy and other
acts of violence not directly linked to piracy are not included in the definition.11
9 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 30-31 10 Ibid 26 11 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399
5
1.1 An Act of Violence, Detention or Depredation Committed for Private End
Unlawful actions must be committed for ‘private ends’, which accordingly
creates two different views; firstly, any illegal acts of violence for political
reasons are automatically excluded from the definition of piracy,12 in other words,
acts are tested on the basis of the motives of an offender.13 However, this view is
debatable. On 10th November 1933, in the case of Re Piracy Jure Gentium,14 the
following question was referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
for their hearing and consideration; "Whether actual robbery is an essential
element of the crime of piracy jure gentium or whether a frustrated attempt to
commit a piratical robbery is not equally piracy jure gentium”. When it is sought
to be contended, as it was in this case, that armed men sailing the seas on board a
vessel without any commission from any State could attack and kill everybody on
board another vessel sailing under a national flag, without committing the crime
of piracy unless they stole, say, an article worth six pence, their Lordships are
almost tempted to say that a little common sense is a valuable quality in the
interpretation of international law.15
A similar approach is required in assessing claims that the ‘private ends’
requirement excludes politically motivated acts. On the historically context, the
Harvard Draft Convention, and the Convention on the High Seas 1958,16 which
12 M Shaw, International Law, (6th edn, CUP 2010) 615 13 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 355 14 [1934] AC 586 15 Anonymous, ‘In Re a Reference under the Judicial Committee Act, 1833, In Re Piracy Jure Gentium’ (1935) 29 AJIL 140 16 Article 15 of Convention on the High Seas 1958 - Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
6
was the foundation on which the UNCLOS 1982 was based on, included the
words ‘for private ends’ with the express intent of excluding ‘recognised civil-
war insurgents’, that is, insurgents whose actions on the high seas were limited to
attacking vessels of the government they were attempting to overthrow enjoyed a
limited exception from being classed as pirates. The exemption could be
understood as not being about motive but the class of vessel attacked, being those
that are legitimate targets for insurgents in the course of a civil conflict.17
Nevertheless, the exception for insurgents would be easiest to justify if it
could be claimed that inherently insurgents cannot meet the definition of piracy so
long as they attack only the ships of their own government, and any other class of
vessel, be it foreign-flagged or not, would not be a legitimate targets in a civil
war. The logic behind this proposition is that a state’s form of government may be
internally reconstituted by civil war; thus an insurgency may represent, in
embryonic form, a future effective government. Insurgents can thus be
distinguished from both pirates and terrorists on the basis that they have the
recognised capacity at international law to become a lawful government. Piratical
acts against private vessels are clearly beyond the limited ‘powers’ of an
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
a. On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
b. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article. 17 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 33
7
insurgency and cannot subsequently be clothed in state immunity merely because,
if the insurgency succeeds, they may also attract state responsibility.18
The second view is that all acts of violence that lack State sanction or
authority are acts undertaken ‘for private ends’. The test of piracy lies not by
reference to the political or subjective motives of an actor, but in the lack of
public sanction for his or her acts, or in the case of the historical exemption
sometimes accorded insurgents prior to the law’s codification, by whether the
attacked vessel was a legitimate target for an insurgency. The essence of a
piratical act is that it neither raises the immunity which pertains to state or
governmental acts nor engages state responsibility. To put it simply, the term ‘for
private ends’ must be understood broadly; all acts of violence that lack state
sanction are acts undertaken ‘for private ends’, and it is undesirable to permit the
collateral motives or purposes of an offender to control the matter of state
jurisdiction.19
The view, expressed above, that subjective motives are irrelevant is
supported by the case of Castle John v NV Mabeco20, concerning Belgian
Greenpeace protesters who took violent action against a Dutch vessel in
international waters to draw attention to its polluting activities. In the 1986 case,
the Belgian Court of Cassation ruled that the actions of Greenpeace activists
boarding, occupying and causing damage to two Dutch vessels engaged in
18 Ibid 35-36 19 Ibid 36-38 20 (1986) 77 ILR 537
8
discharging noxious waste into the sea, were committed for personal ends and
consequently, Greenpeace had committed piracy.21
Similarly in Institute of Cetacean research and Others v. Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society and Watson,22 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, by interfering with the
Cetacean's whaling operations, including using smoke bombs and butyric acid for
the purpose, had met the test for piracy, observing that “…the perpetrators
believe themselves to be serving the public good does not render their ends
public”. This is the only approach to take considering the rule against piracy
exists to protect the freedom of navigation and the safety of persons upon the high
seas. This function is not served by reading the definition as inherently excluding
acts with a subjective ‘political’ motive.23
The words ‘for private ends’ simply emphasise that the violence involved
lacks state sanction or authority. This lack of authority is a question that may be
tested objectively and without reference to subjective motives. The only possible
exception is a limited one for insurgencies attacking the government vessels of
their state of nationality. Even so, the test is not the subjective motivation of the
21 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 356 22 720 F. 3d 572 (2012 US App) 23 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 38
9
insurgents, but turns on the objective questions of its status as an insurgency at
international law and its choice of targets under the laws of war.24
1.2 An Act of Violence, Detention or Depredation on the High Seas or in a
Place outside the Jurisdiction of Any State
The definition of piracy under the Article 101 of the UNCLOS 1982 is
rather narrow, as it includes only action on the high seas. So forms of violence
conducted in the territorial sea such as violent activities against ships off the
Somali coast sometimes take place in whole or in part in the territorial seas, thus
often remaining outside the scope of the definition of ‘piracy’ in the UNCLOS
1982.25 As such, while all states have jurisdiction over piracy, that jurisdiction
only exists where the prohibited acts are committed on the high seas or ‘outside
the jurisdiction of any State’. This exclusion of areas within territorial jurisdiction
from prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over piracy raises the question of
piracy within the contiguous zone and Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter
EEZ). Such areas are not ‘outside the jurisdiction of any State’ in the sense that no
degree of coastal state jurisdiction exists; however, the limited jurisdiction
granted over such waters does not extend to repressing piracy.26
The ambiguity is compounded by Article 86 of the UNCLOS 1982, which
provides:
24 Ibid 42 25 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399 26 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 43
10
Application of the provisions of this Part27
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters
of an archipelagic State.
While this might be taken to exclude the high seas regime from applying
in the EEZ, it is better thought of as preventing any assumption that it applies
automatically and in its entirety. The drafting was intended to reflect the unified
character of the oceans (in particular the EEZ and the high seas) and to embody
the proposition that the regime of the high seas applied in the EEZ, except with
respect to coastal state’s sovereignty over resources. This view is reinforced by
Article 58(2) of the UNCLOS 198228, providing that so far as it is not
incompatible with the rights apportioned to the coastal state, the regime of the
high seas applies in the EEZ. Thus the residual application of the high seas regime
of the law of piracy enforcement to the EEZ and contiguous zone should not be
controversial.29
27 Part VII of UNCLOS 1982 consist of Article 86 - 120 28 Article 58 of the UNCLOS 1982 - Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone 1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to
the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 29 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 44
11
This appears consistent with discussion in the M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2)30 case,
where the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rejected arguments that
coastal states could claim additional heads of subject matter jurisdiction over their
EEZ beyond those enumerated in UNCLOS 1982 by reason of a pressing ‘public
interest’. While UNCLOS 1982 does not preclude new customary coastal state
rights arising in the EEZ, there is little practice supporting any rule of exclusive
and general coastal state criminal enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ.31
1.3 An Act of Violence, Detention or Depredation by the Crew or Passengers
of a Private Ship or Aircraft, Against another Vessel or Persons or Property
Abroad
The definition of piracy also includes only action undertaken by one ship
against another ship. So forms of violence conducted without the involvement of
two ships, such as, for instance, the violent taking of control of a ship by members
of its crew or passengers, even when the follow-up consists of holding to ransom
the ship and its crew and passengers, are not included.32 Several incidents and
cases had exposed this inadequacy of the definition of ‘piracy’ in the UNCLOS
1982, as illustrated below.
The taking of control by hijackers embarked as passengers on the
Portuguese ship Santa Maria in 1961, were not considered to be piracy as there
30 (1999) 38 ILM 1323 31 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), Judge Vukas (Separate Opinion), 1402 32 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399
12
were no two ships or aircraft involved. In this incident, Captain Galvao, the leader
of a Portuguese political dissident, seized the Portugal flagged ship in an attempt
to overthrow Dictator Salazar of Portugal. The flag state, namely Portugal,
designated the seizure of the vessel as piracy, but Captain Galvao and his
followers were given asylum in Brazil. While this seems to suggest that illicit acts
by organised group for political purposes cannot be characterised as piracy,33 it is
also in line with the current definition of piracy which requires action undertaken
by one ship against another ship, and the taking of control by hijackers embarked
as passengers does not constitute an act of piracy.
Similarly, in the Achille Lauro affair in 1985, four members of Palestinian
group, the PLF34, aboard the Italian passenger ship, the Achille Lauro, hijacked
the ship, threw a wheelchair-bound American Jew overboard and demanded
release of Palestinian prisoners. However, as the offenders had already boarded
the ship, this affair involved hijacking of the ship, and not piracy. It is worth
mentioning here that the language of the UNCLOS 1982 includes no reference to
terrorists or terrorism, and the definition of piracy does not cover hijacking.35
The violent activities against ships off the Somali coast more rarely do not
involve the presence of one or more other ships, as usually very fast skiffs are
used, coming from bases on the mainland or from ‘mother ships’ at sea.36 This
33 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 355-356 34 Palestine Liberation Front - is a Palestinian militant group 35 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 356-357 36 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399
13
method of conducting violent acts against ships clearly fall outside the scope of
the definition of piracy as provided under Article 101 of the UNCLOS 1982 as
there were no “act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation…
committed by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,
and directed… against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft” in this scenario. Again this illustrates how a clear act
of violence which greatly endanger the security of sea communication and the
welfare of seafarers, could be let slip by the absurdly narrow definition of piracy
as provided in the UNCLOS 1982. It could also be underlined here that acts
preparatory to piracy and other acts of violence not directly linked to piracy are
not included in the definition.37
37 Ibid
14
2. THE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR THE SUPRESSION OF
PIRACY
Article 105 of the UNCLOS 1982 spelled out the actions which may be
taken by States against a pirate ship; apart from the right of warships of all states
to exercise the right to visit aimed at ascertaining whether a ship is engaged in
piracy as follows:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a
ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to
the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
Under Article 105 the flag state of the seizing ship enjoys very broad
powers. These consist of the right to arrest persons and to seize property, and,
through the abovementioned rights, to decide upon penalties and on action to be
taken with regard to the ship, aircraft and property, the right to submit the persons
arrested and the property seized to judicial proceedings. In other words, the
universal jurisdiction of the seizing state’s courts is supported by international
law.38 However, according to Article 106, where seizure of a ship or aircraft on
suspicion of piracy were made without adequate grounds, the State making the
38 Ibid
15
seizure is liable to the flag State of the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage
caused by the seizure.39
The language of Article 105; “…every State may seize a pirate ship or
aircraft…” seems to indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction by the seizing state’s
courts is a possibility, not an obligation, notwithstanding the ‘duty’ to cooperate
in the repression of piracy set out in Article 100 of the UNCLOS 1982.40 The rule
in Article 105 does not, however, establish the exclusive jurisdiction of the
seizing state’s courts. Courts of other states are not precluded from exercising
jurisdiction under conditions which they establish. Thus the international law
rules on action to be taken against pirates permit action, but are far from ensuring
that such action is effectively taken.41
2.1 The Human Rights Implications of Prosecuting Piracy Suspects
It is not uncommon that seizing States are reluctant to prosecute pirates
owing to the expense involved, legal complexities in criminal proceedings,
concern relating for instance to evidence, concerns inherent in criminal
proceedings to be held far away from the place where the alleged crime was
39 Article 106 of UNCLOS 1982 - Liability for seizure without adequate grounds Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure. 40 Article 100 of UNCLOS 1982 - Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State. 41 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399
16
committed, and, perhaps especially, by the human rights implications of
exercising jurisdiction.42
The capture and detention at sea of criminals later brought to trial in courts
far away of the state of the arresting vessel have been referred by those captured
for the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR).
This was illustrated in the case of Medvedyev v. France.43 On 10 July 2008,
where, the French authorities interdicts Winner, a Cambodian vessel suspected of
drug smuggling, on 13 June 2002. Cambodia had granted its consent to France to
"intercept, inspect and take legal action against the ship" on 7 June 2002. The
interdiction occurred in waters off Cape Verde, several thousand kilometres from
France. The suspect crew were confined aboard the vessel during the 13-day
voyage to a French port, with the exception of one suspect, injured by a
ricocheting bullet, who was medically evacuated and later died of his injuries. The
delay in reaching port was due to the fact the Winner could not proceed to port
faster than 5 knots, given its poor state of repair and prevailing weather. The
vessel arrived in Brest on 26 June 2002, where the suspects were handed over to
police and brought before an investigating magistrate the same day. The suspects,
who were later convicted in France of drug-smuggling offences, had brought
proceedings before the ECtHR challenging the legality of their detention at sea
and the delay involved in bringing them before a court under Articles 5(1)44 and
42 Ibid 43 (2010) Application no. 3394/03 44 Article 5 of European Convention on Human Rights Right to liberty and security
17
Article 5(3)45 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).
An earlier ECtHR case, Rigopoulos v. Spain 46, similarly involved a Spanish high
seas interdiction of drug smugglers and a 16-day voyage to port. In both cases the
Court held that such delays, where materially impossible to avoid, did not violate
ECHR Article 5(3).47
However, in Medvedyev, a violation of Article 5(1) of the ECHR was
found. Moreover, it was claimed that the French mission was ultra vires since
Cambodia was not party either to UNCLOS 1982 or to the UN Narcotics
Convention 1998. The difficulty for France arose from the fact that its domestic
legislation covering drug interdictions at sea at the time was designed only to
implement interdictions authorised by a flag State pursuant to the UN Narcotics
Convention 1988. The only legal basis for the French action was an exchange of
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
45 Ibid 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 46 (1999) Application No 37388/97 47 D Guilfoyle, ‘Current Legal Developments European Court of Human Right’ (2010) 25 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal L. 437
18
diplomatic notes. France appealed to the Grand Chamber, and the Grand Chamber
in 2008 held that that detention was arbitrary as the invoked provisions of French
and international law both failed to “regulate the conditions of deprivation of
liberty on board ship, and in particular the possibility for the persons concerned
to contact a lawyer or a family member… Nor do they place the detention under
the supervision of a judicial authority”. 48
An optimistic reading of the Medvedyev case suggests that the standard to
be met for Article 5(1) of the ECHR is something close to the piracy provisions of
the UNCLOS 1982. Indeed, the Grand Chamber laments that the international
community has not concluded a general instrument providing for an exception to
flag State jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction over drug smuggling in similar
terms to the law of piracy. European States conducting counter-piracy operations
might thus feel reasonably confident that they have legal authority to detain
suspects and have more than usual latitude in bringing such suspects "promptly"
before a judge.49
2.2 Bilateral Agreements for Prosecution of Piracy Suspects
The difficulties met in surrendering captured piracy suspects raise
significant questions about their arrest, detention and transfer to a State willing to
try them, especially for State parties to the ECHR. Great efforts since have been
48 Ibid 49 Ibid
19
directed at getting piracy suspects to trial50. Kenya had emerged as the venue of
choice for the prosecution of the piracy suspects51 following bilateral agreements,
mentioned in the media but not made public; between Kenya and the United
Kingdom, the United States, the European Union and Denmark, which seek to
ensure respect for the human rights of these individuals, as they surrendered to
Kenya for prosecution in the Kenyan courts.52
Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula clarified after signing one of
such agreement with the United States, saying that "We have signed a
memorandum of understanding with the U.S. and UK (United Kingdom) where in
practical situations pirates captured at the Indian Ocean shipping line area can
be tried in Kenyan courts. But it would be dealt with on a case by case basis. It is
not an open door for dumping pirates onto Kenya soil because it will not be
acceptable. We have a bill in parliament that is coming up and it is going to
strengthen the punishment against piracy, from the current legal provision of 10
years in jail to life imprisonment. And I believe it will provide some form of
deterrence".53 These memoranda seems to consist of agreements between the
states whose ships are patrolling the waters off the coast of Somalia and countries
willing to take custody of pirates to place on such ships law enforcement officers
50 D Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 142 51 Ibid 52 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399 53 J Butty, ‘ Kenyan Foreign Minister Shed Light on US-Kenya Piracy Agreement’ (Voice of America, 2 November 2009) <http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-01-28-voa4-68711597/409566.html> accessed 6 August 2014
20
from the latter countries, in particular countries of the region, to facilitate the
investigation and prosecution of persons detained.54
While this practice under these agreements permits the jurisdiction of
Kenya to be based on the fiction that it is a seizing state, in other cases the
connecting factor is the nationality of the victim ship or of the victims. So
reportedly the Netherlands has signed an agreement with Denmark to extradite
five Somali pirates who attacked a Netherlands-Antilles cargo vessel in the Gulf
of Aden and were captured by Denmark.55
54 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399 55 Ibid
21
3. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF PIRATICAL ACTIVITIES
As discussed above, due the inadequacy of the international law of piracy
as codified under the UNCLOS 1982, international cooperation for the
suppression of piratical activities had been developed in recent years.
3.1 Regional Cooperation for the Suppression of Piratical Activities
At regional level, the Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery (hereinafter ReCAAP) against Ships in Asia was
concluded in 2004. This Agreement aims to prevent and supress piracy and armed
robbery against ships at the same time, and it is notable for its Article 4 which
establishes an Information Sharing Centre in Singapore with the view of
managing and maintaining expeditious flow of information relating to piracy and
armed robbery against ships among the Contracting Parties.56
In 2009, a similar multinational regional agreement, the Code of Conduct
Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, also known as the Djibouti Code of
Conduct, was adopted by 21 governments.57 The agreement allows one signatory
country to send armed forces into another signatory country's territorial waters to
pursue pirates and, in some cases, to jointly conduct anti-piracy operations. The
56 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 359 57 Ibid
22
nations have also agreed on the creation of piracy information centres to be set up
in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen, and an anti-piracy military training centre to be
established in Djibouti.58 The signatories also undertook to review their national
legislation with a view to ensuring that there are laws in place to criminalize
piracy and armed robbery against ships and to make adequate provision for the
exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations and prosecution of alleged
offenders.59
3.2 The Suppression of Piratical Activities through International Institutions
At the international level, various international institutions such as IMO60,
NATO61, the European Union and the United Nations are currently engaged in
counter-piracy operations. One of such operations launched by the European
Union is Operation Atlanta off the Somali coast on 8 December 2008. NATO
commenced a counter-piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield on 17 August
2009. IMO adopted two documents, namely ‘Guidance to Shipowners and Ship
Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships’ and ‘Recommendation to Governments for
Preventing and Supressing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’. The
58 A Ryu, ‘Nine Countries Sign Agreements to Combat Africa Piracy’ (Voice of America, 2 November 2009) < http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-01-30-voa33-68666897/408554.html> accessed 6 August 2014 59 ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’ (International Maritime Organization) < http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx> accessed 6 August 2014 60 International Maritime Organization - a specialized agency of the United Nations, IMO is the global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping 61 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization - also called the Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949
23
UNDOALOS62 also provide assistance to States in the uniform application of the
provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 concerning the repression of piracy.63
3.2.1 The Role of UN Security Council
The UN Security Council plays a key role in the international counter-
piracy operation by adopting a series of resolutions dealing with piracy and
related issues. These Resolutions, however, always mention “armed robbery”
together with piracy. “Armed robbery” is not defined. It is a term routinely used
within the framework of IMO, and may be understood to include all acts of
violence the purposes of which are identical or similar to those of piracy but are
not covered by the conventional definition of ‘piracy’, in particular because they
may be perpetrated without using a ship against the target ship.64
3.2.1.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1816
UN Security Council Resolution 1816 first used powers under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter to authorise foreign military and law-enforcement action in the
Somali territorial sea to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea over an initial
six-month period65. Operative Paragraph 7 of the Resolution 1816 provides:
62 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 63 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 359-360 64 T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399 65 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 61
24
…that for a period of six months from… [2 June 2008], States cooperating with the TFG66 in the fight against piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary
General, may:
(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner
consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law; and
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.
The words ‘all necessary means’ commonly associated with a general
authorisation to use military force and is one of the few occasions when the
Council has authorised interdiction operations in a state’s territorial sea.67
However, the restrictions upon these powers are readily apparent. First,
this initial grant of authority would have expired on 2 December 2008, and it was
only renewed on that date by UN Security Council Resolution 1846, which will
be discussed below. Second, only states named by the TFG to the Secretary-
General as ‘co-operating’ with it may act under Operative Paragraph 7.68
Authority to use ‘all necessary means’ is further conditioned by the
requirement that such action must occur within Somalia’s territorial waters and be
‘consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy’. This
66 Transitional Federal Government – is the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Somalia until 20 August 2012, when its tenure officially ended and the Federal Government of Somalia was inaugurated 67 R McLaughlin, ‘United Nations mandated naval interdiction operations in the territorial sea?’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 249 68 D Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 65
25
presumably limits action to pursuing and boarding a pirate vessel, seizing it and
arresting those aboard. So limited, the words ‘all necessary means’ cannot
encompass striking at pirate command centres on land or arresting pirates after
their return to shore. Such action will still require the TFG’s specific
authorisation. Finally, the repeated words of limitation, “in a manner consistent
with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy”, require scrutiny.
International law has little to say about the manner in which piracy may be
suppressed. Rules governing the conduct of high-seas interdictions remain
embryonic, found in a limited case law and inferences from treaties.69
3.2.1.2 UN Security Council Resolution 1846
Upon the expiry of the grant of authority under the Resolution 1816 on 2
December 2008, it was renewed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1846.
The Resolution 1846 re-enacted the key elements in Resolution 1816. The
wording of Operative Paragraphs 7, 9, 11 of Resolution 1816 is repeated mutatis
mutandis as Paragraphs 10, 11, 14 of Resolution 1846, therefore adds nothing
notable to the substantive law governing piracy.70
3.2.1.3 UN Security Council Resolution 1848
A notable additions to Resolution 1816 is in the UN Security Council
Resolution 1848. Paragraph 9 of the Resolution 1848 calls upon states and
regional organisations with the capacity to do so “to take part actively in the fight 69 Ibid 66 70 Ibid 68
26
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia”, in particular
by deploying appropriate military assets and “through seizure and disposition of
boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy
and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, or for which there is reasonable
ground for suspecting such use” in a manner consistent with the resolution and
international law. It is possible, although not entirely clear, that this creates a
novel preventive power to seize and dispose of a vessel or weapons simply on
‘reasonable suspicion’ of involvement in piracy irrespective of the general
international law duty to compensate vessels mistakenly interdicted on such
grounds.71
3.2.1.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1851
More dramatically still, the Security Council passed on 19 December 2008
the Resolution 1851, and decided in Paragraph 6;
…for a period of twelve months from [19 December 2008] … States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General may undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, pursuant to the request of
the TFG, provided, however, that any measures undertaken pursuant to the authority of this paragraph shall be undertaken
consistent with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.
This Resolution 1851 grant authority to conduct counter-piracy operations
on Somalian soil, subject to TFG’s consent. The resolution may be construed as 71 Ibid 69
27
acknowledging that some Somali pirates may also be civil war insurgents and in
those cases any international counter-piracy forces on land may be best
considered forces intervening in an otherwise internal conflict at the invitation of
the government. Resolution 1851 also calls on states involved in counter-piracy
efforts to set up a common centre to co-ordinate their efforts and on all UN
member states to help strengthen Somalia’s operational capacity to bring to
justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake
criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.72
3.2.2 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation
In 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (hereinafter SUA Convention) was concluded
under the auspices of IMO in order to fill the legal vacuum in the provisions of
UNCLOS 1982 which was discussed above. This comes as a direct response to
the Achille Lauro incident. The SUA Convention provides a multilateral
framework for the suppression of unlawful offences at sea which are not regulated
by the international law of piracy. After the September 11, 2001 attack in the
United States, the SUA Convention was revised by Protocol of 2005 (hereinafter
the 2005 SUA Convention). Four main features of the Convention is the
72 Ibid 69-70
28
geographical scope, a broad range of offence, ship-boarding procedures and
jurisdictional criteria.73
3.2.2.1 Geographical Limit
Article 4(1) of the SUA Convention provides that the Convention applies
if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or lateral limits of its
territorial sea with adjacent States.74 As such, the SUA Convention covers acts of
unlawful offences committed in the territorial seas, the archipelagic waters,
international straits and the EEZ.75
3.2.2.2 Broad Range of Offence
The SUA Convention applies to persons who seek to; seize a ship,
perform acts of violence against a person on board, destroy a ship, place on a ship
a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, destroy or seriously
damage maritime navigational facilities, or communicate false information
endangering the safe navigation of a ship.76
73 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 361 74 Article 4 of SUA Convention 1. This Convention applies if the ship is navigating of is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States. 2. In cases where the Convention does not apply pursuant to paragraph 1, it nevertheless applies when the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party other than the State referred to in paragraph 1. 75 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 361-362 76 Article 3 of SUA Convention 1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
29
Under the 2005 Protocol, the scope of offences was further widened.
Article 3bis criminalised, inter alia; using against or on a ship or discharging from
a ship any explosive, radioactive material or BCN77 weapons in a manner that
causes or likely to cause death or serious injury or damage, discharging from a
ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other HNS78 in such quantity or concentration
that causes or likely to cause death or serious injury or damage, using a ship in a
manner that causes death or serious injury or damage, transporting any explosive
or radioactive material knowing that it is intended to be used to cause death or
serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or
compelling a government or international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act, and transporting BCN weapons. The Convention does not apply to
warship or ship owned or operated by a State79 and the offences under the 2005
SUA Convention are not limited to an act against another ship.80
1. seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation; or 2. performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 3. destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger
the safe navigation of that ship; or 4. places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
5. destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
6. communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
7. injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).
77 Biological, Chemical and Nuclear 78 Hazardous or Noxious Substance 79 Article 2 of SUA Convention 1. This Convention does not apply to:
1. a warship; or
30
3.2.2.3 Ship-Boarding Procedure
The 2005 SUA Convention adopts ship boarding procedures by non-flag
States, which clearly seek to efficiently apprehend offenders. Under the Article
8bis (5), a State Party can take appropriate measures, including boarding a foreign
ship located seawards of any State’s territorial sea if authorised by the flag State,
to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board. The ship-boarding procedures are
particularly important in order to reconcile the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag
State and the need for the effective apprehension of offenders.81
3.2.2.4 Jurisdictional Criteria
Where offences had been committed, there is a need to establish
jurisdiction to prosecute offenders in an effective manner. In this regard, Article 6
of the SUA Convention sets out a two-tier system. The first involves compulsory
jurisdiction over offences set forth in Article 3 when the offence is committed
against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the offence is
committed, or in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea, or by a
national of that State.82
2. a ship owned or operated by a State when being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes; or 3. a ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid up.
2. Nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes 80 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 362 81 Ibid 362-363 82 Article 6 of SUA Convention 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the of- fences set forth in article 3 when the offence is com- mitted:
31
The second is an optional jurisdiction, in which a State Party may
establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when it is committed by a stateless
person whose habitual residence is in that State, or during its commission a
national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed or it is committed in
an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act.83 The
adoption of such broad jurisdictional criteria aims to close possible jurisdictional
gaps concerning unlawful marine offences.84
3.2.2.5 United States v. Shi
The 2005 SUA Convention had received minimal judicial attention to
date. The first prosecution brought under the Convention was United States v.
Shi,85 which was heard in the United States, under the statute codifying US
obligations under the Convention. The Court of Appeal held that the Convention,
which was designed to counter international terrorism, can also be applied to
ordinary crimes. Shi revives and shows the flexibility of that moribund treaty at a
time when an epidemic of piracy makes it especially relevant. 86
1. against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the offence is committed; or 2. in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or 3. by a national of that State.
83 Ibid 2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
1. it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or 2. during its commission a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed; or 3. it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act.
84 Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 363 85 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2008) 86 E Kontorovich, ‘United States v. Shi’ (2009) 103 AJIL 734
32
The defendant was a young Chinese national working as a cook on the
fishing trawler Full Means No.2. It was apparently his first time at sea. He claims
that the officers beat and mistreated him. In response to one such incident, Shi
stabbed the captain and first officer to death with kitchen knives. The defendant
went to the bridge and ordered the crew to sail to China; he wanted to go home.
Two days after the murders, however, the crew overpowered him and locked him
in a storage compartment. In a peculiar twist, the crew, including the two
engineers, claimed that they did not know how to operate the radio, which
prevented them from contacting the owners for instructions. Instead, they did
what must have seemed the next best thing, and sailed for Hawaii. A few days
later, the Full Means was stopped by a Coast Guard cutter sixty miles from
Hawaii. The crew explained what happened, and after having received a waiver of
jurisdiction from the Seychelles, the ship was brought into harbour. A few weeks
later Shi was indicted for violating 18 U.S. Code S2280, which implements the
SUA Convention in the United States’ national law.87
The prosecution of Shi, who posed no danger to international commerce,
contrasts sharply with the U.S. practice of not prosecuting Somali pirates for their
attacks on foreign ships which threaten one of the world's densest maritime
channels. This contrast suggests that various practical and legal difficulties have
87 Ibid
33
prevented the United States and other countries from using universal jurisdiction
against serious international threats.88
88 Ibid
34
4. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
Apart from the regional and international cooperation in supressing
piratical activities, the shipping industry, in an effort to protect the interest of
international trade, has begun outsourcing to private security companies to help
vessels travel safely through the dangerous passageways that their governments
have failed to secure.89
The costs to the shipping industry have been especially high and continue
to grow as pirates become more aggressive and demanding. In many cases, the
only solution for shipping companies is to pay the pirates' demanded ransom.
Paying high ransoms, paired with the increases in insurance costs and money lost
through substantial delays, has cost commercial shippers millions. Shipping plays
a vital role in facilitating global trade, and thus the commercial shipping industry
needs to find a solution that will allow it to protect its vessels, cargos, and crews
without substantially slowing international commerce.90
Private security companies can provide shippers with the training, the
technology, and the man power needed to ward off attacks from pirates. On the
other hand, this reliance on private industry to serve as a police force on the high
seas and in unprotected territorial waters carries with it its own set of risks and
raises questions as to what law governs these private actors. To address this gap in
89 D Parsons, ‘Protecting the Booty: Creating a Regulatory Framework To Govern Increased Use of Private Security Companies in the Fight Against Pirates’ (2010-2011) 35 Tul. Mar. L.J. 153 90 Ibid
35
international law, several states signed on to the Montreux Document, a
nonbinding framework that highlights the responsibilities both of states and
private security companies when engaged in armed conflict. This shows states are
beginning to work together to develop an international framework for addressing
the legality of private security use by governments. Adoption of these practices by
states will go a long way toward increasing accountability among private security
companies and will aid commercial shippers in making responsible choices about
increasing security on board their vessels.91
91 Ibid
36
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 are inadequate to
address the problems posed by modern maritime crime and disorder effectively.
In order to protect international peace and security on the oceans, various
bilateral, multilateral, regional and international cooperative measures had been
developed in recent years. Even private initiatives by the shipping industry to
protect its interest, such as outsourcing to the private security companies had
come into the fold. It must be admitted that there is a pressing need for reforms of
the UNCLOS 1982 in order to provide more clarity on universal jurisdiction for
the suppression of piracy and armed robbery on the sea, and to close the gaps
within the international legal framework for more effectively meet the demand of
the Twenty-first century problems at sea. However, the complexity that could
entail a reform initiative is another question.
Total number of words: 7,472 (excluding table of contents
and footnotes)
37
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
• Cassese A, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003)
• Guilfoyle D, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009)
• Shaw M, International Law, (6th edn, CUP 2010)
• Tanaka Y, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012)
CASE LAWS
• Castle John v NV Mabeco (1986) 77 ILR 537
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Society and Watson 720 F. 3d 572 (2012 US App)
• Medvedyev v. France (2010) Application no. 3394/03
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• Rigopoulos v. Spain (1999) Application No 37388/97
• The Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), PCIJ 1928 Series A/10
• United States v. Shi 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2008)
38
LEGISLATIONS
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (and the Protocol of 2005)
• Convention on the High Seas 1958
• European Convention on Human Rights
• UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
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25 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal L. 437
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39
Enforcement in the Southern Ocean’ (2007) 22 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal
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• Kontorovich E, ‘United States v. Shi’ (2009) 103 AJIL 734
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• Treves T, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off
the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 EJIL 399
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