maritime piracy

Copyright© 2009 by Kendall Hunt Publishing Company. Must be cited as: Shane, J.M. and Lieberman, C.A. (2009). Criminological theories and the problems of modern piracy. In M.R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassell (2009), Maritime Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Challenge of Piracy for the 21st Century. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company.

Criminological Theories and the Problems of Modern Piracy

By

Jon M. Shane, Ph.D. and Charles A. Lieberman, Ph.D.

June 5, 2009

John Jay College of Criminal Justice


1

Introduction

Piracy and other maritime attacks have occurred nearly as long as there have been vessels on

the waterways.1

People living in this environment develop a disposition (motivation) to act in a criminal

manner as a means to fulfill basic human needs.

Among the many criminological theories, environmental and ecological theories are

most appropriate to explain the origins and opportunities for piracy. When society’s norms and

institutions breakdown because of conflicting expectations, corruption, and political instability,

social control becomes ineffectual. Local institutions—schools, churches, government—lose the

ability to exert control over people and geographical areas. When social controls wither and

conventional traditions disintegrate, society loses the ability to regulate itself, which gives way to a

culture that begins to identify with deviant behaviors that become normalized. This reversion to a

“state of nature” enables criminal groups to rise and propagate in an environment dominated by a

survivalist ideology. Criminal factions supplant conventional institutions and exert an influence over

the denizen that fosters tolerance for criminal behavior because the inhabitants have lost the

capacity to exercise control. Living in this environment produces social isolation, where there is

little or no contact with mainstream society. As a result, crime and violence are seen as a near

inevitable consequence of life.

2

1 May, 2008.

Piracy is predicated on rather crude operating

methods that bring offenders into contact with valuable targets that are easily converted into cash.

Because piracy typically takes place in vast ocean waters, the targets are largely unprotected. When

someone sufficiently motivated by social circumstances (e.g., inherited traits, hunger, poverty,

unemployment and lack of conventional lifestyle) comes into contact with durable goods that are

easily converted to cash and often insufficiently protected, piracy becomes a viable economic


2

pursuit. Fortunately, there are ways to disrupt the intersection of motivated offenders, suitable

targets, and capable guardians that can reduce the likelihood of a piracy occurring.

Piracy Defined

In 1981, in response to increased maritime crime, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),

a quasi-governmental organization of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was created.

The IMB was designed to combat all types of maritime and trade crime, including documentary

credit fraud, charter party fraud, cargo theft, and piracy. According to the IMB, “piracy is the act of

boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity

to use force in furtherance of that act.”3

Piracy is distinguished from simple hijacking in two respects: first, an act of piracy requires

that two vessels are involved in the incident; second, an act of piracy requires that the crime has

been undertaken for private, not political, purposes.

4

The Nature of Piracy

The IMB's definition covers actual or

attempted attacks, whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded unless

the thieves are armed. This definition seems quite practical for today's needs and is broad enough to

cover the widening variety of types of attacks being seen today. Commercial crime is growing

quickly, as is evidenced the IMB’s Weekly Piracy Report. The nature of piracy has changed

significantly since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Today’s pirate is often more barbaric and

better prepared, due to the implementation of technological advancements, to fight than ever

before.

2 Maslow, 1943. 3 ICC IMB, 1998. 4 McDaniel, 2000.


3

The days of the swashbuckler swinging on a chandelier, brandishing a trusty cutlass, are long

gone. Disguised by a patch over one eye, oversized hoop earrings, and a puffy shirt, the pirates’

outfit of yesteryear has given way to the modern pirates’ accouterments: high-powered weapons,

vanguard communications, and the ominous black balaclava. It is sophistication and celerity (the

swiftness of small motorized vessels) that enable the modern terrorist-pirate to ply their trade,

making the shipping industry more and more vulnerable to attack. The 2008 IMB Annual Report

revealed 1,845 actual or attempted acts of piracy occurred worldwide between 2003 and 2008. In

addition, an IMB report for the first quarter of 2009 provides a comparison for first quarter attacks

from 2004 through 2009 (See Table 1).5

Table 1: Actual and Attempted Attacks, 2003–2008

Year Total Attacks Year Jan–Mar Attacks

2003 445 2004 79 2004 329 2005 56 2005 276 2006 61 2006 239 2007 41 2007 263 2008 49 2008 293 2009 102

2003–2008 1,845 2004–2009 388 ICC IMB 2008 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report ICC IMB 2009 Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March, 2009

During the period 2003–2008, there appeared to be a downward trend in actual and

attempted attacks despite a slight increase in the number of attacks in 2007–2008 (Figure 1). This

trend is primarily due to the high number of attacks (N2003 = 445) in 2003, compared with the

declining numbers in the subsequent three years (N2004 = 329; N2005 = 276; N2006 = 239).

5 ICC IMB, January 2009; ICC IMB, April 2009.


4

Figure 1

Based on the numbers for 2007 and 2008 (N2007 = 263; N2008 = 293), the downward trend

indicated by an analysis of the IMB 2008 Annual Report appeared to be reversing. In addition, the

IMB report for the first quarter for 2009 suggests an upward trend, as the number of attacks for the

first quarter of 2009 (N1stQ2009 = 102) is nearly double the average (N1stQavg2005-2008 = 51.75) of the

prior four years (Figure 2).


5

Figure 2

An examination of recent attacks provides a picture of the types of ships most frequently

targeted by pirates. Tankers tend to be most often targeted (NTanker = 85), accounting for more than

one-third of all attacks in 2008, and the numbers for the first quarter of 2009 project a 46 percent

increase.

Table 2: Attacks by Vessel Type

Vessel 2008 Jan–Mar 2009 Projected 2009

Container 49 16 64 Bulk Carrier 48 32 128 Chemical Tanker 39 12 48 General Cargo 38 10 40 Tanker 30 11 44 Tug 16 1 4 Product Tanker 16 4 16 Total 236 86 344

The depiction of maritime attacks by vessel type in Figure 3, comparing the numbers for

2008 with the projections for 2009 based on the first quarter of 2009, provides some insight into the

decision-making process among pirates. For most of the vessel types, the projection of attacks for

2009 remains fairly consistent; however, there is an upward trend for attacks on bulk carriers. This


6

increased targeting of bulk carriers may be due to the size and speed of the vessel, as they tend to be

very large, therefore easily identifiable from a distance, and relatively slow, especially in comparison

to the speedboats employed by many pirates. Another factor that could have an impact on the

increased targeting of bulk carriers, which account for approximately one-third of all cargo vessels, is

their increased usage in maritime trade since their inception in the 1950s.

Figure 3

Attacks like the one in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002, when the French tanker Limburg

was rammed by a boat packed with explosives, are difficult to prevent. "No shipboard response can

protect the ship in these circumstances."6

6 ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 2003a.


7

Figure 4

An unsettling trend in maritime attacks is the significant increase in hostage taking. The

number of hostages taken in 2008 is triple the average number of hostages between 2003 and 2007

(Figure 4). One possible explanation for this upward trend is the realization that hostages provide

greater leverage during negations and the potential for higher ransoms. In April 2009, Somalia

pirates seized the Maersk Alabama and her crew and held them for ransom. Captain Richard Phillips

was held for several days before U.S. navy snipers shot and killed three of four pirates; the fourth

was brought to the United States for prosecution.7

An examination of the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report—Annual

Report 2008, provides evidence that the overwhelming majority of attacks took place against ships

either anchored or steaming, with only 6.5 percent of the attacks taking place against berthed ships.

Attacks against anchored ships accounted for 35.5 percent, with 104 attacks. Attacks against

steaming ships accounted for 58 percent, with 169 attacks. However, only approximately half of

those attacks against steaming ships were successful, with 87 successful attacks and 82 unsuccessful

7 McFadden and Shane, 2009.


8

attempts. The size of a commercial vessel can make it a “soft target,” as the crew simply cannot

maintain an adequate watch while underway. Vigilant anti-piracy measures still remain the best

deterrent to illegal boarding.8

Nexus to Criminological Theory

The social conditions associated with piracy typically include poverty, hunger,

unemployment, poor housing, and political instability. Those who exploit the vulnerabilities created

by social disorganization are doing so in response to the strain and frustration that manifest from a

lack of life’s basic necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing. In these regions of the world, there

is a subculture willing to support individual criminal behavior, operating in an environment too

corrupt to stop it.

Political instability, which results from a weak or non-existent central government, produces

a social phenomenon known as anomie.9 Anomie is a condition in which social and moral norms are

weak, conflicting, or simply absent. Emile Durkheim (1893) proposed that the lack of norms—a

state of normlessness—creates deviant behavior and ultimately social upheaval. For example,

Somalia, where piracy is prevalent, has been without an effective central government since President

Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991.10 The country suffers from widespread fighting among warring

militias, famine, and disease that has eroded the social and moral norms that regulate behavior

plunging the country into lawlessness. Somalia and countries like it represent a regression to a “state

of nature”—a hypothetical social state similar to anarchy that existed before the rule of law and the

state’s monopoly on the use of force.11

8 ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2003b.

Similar conditions exist in Indonesia, where the sprawling nation of 13,000 islands was thrust

9 Durkheim, 1893. 10 BBC News, 2009. 11 Hobbes, 1651.


9

into social and political upheaval when former President Suharto resigned amid a mounting

economic crisis in 1998. It is widely accepted that when pirates strike in the Straits of Malacca, they

will easily evade detection by taking refuge among the numerous island hide-outs away from a

government too corrupt to care. Piracy has gained a foothold in Indonesia due to the country’s

economic instability, which poses threats to other developing areas of Asia as well.

As conditions persist and government structures weaken, opportunities for criminal activity

arise. Opportunities exist because international commerce relies on ports and waterways that are

adjacent to economically and politically unstable countries. Since there is no domestic force (i.e.,

police or viable military) to stop the pirates in these countries, they can easily set upon unguarded

vessels passing through international waters, seize the crew and their cargo, return to land, and

liquidate the goods. Opportunities for piracy can be explained from three perspectives that

converge into a single explanation known as opportunity theory: first, the routine activities

approach;12 second, the rational choice perspective;13 and third, crime pattern theory.14

Opportunity Theory

This approach to controlling crime consists of three opportunity-reducing principles: first,

directing crime control measures at highly specific forms of crime; second, managing, designing, or

manipulating the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible; and third,

increasing the perceived risk or effort to commit a crime, or reducing the rewards or removing the

excuses for committing a crime.15

Routine Activities Approach. The routine activities approach suggests crime is more likely

to occur when three conditions are satisfied: 1) the presence of a motivated offender; 2) the

12 Cohen and Felson, 1979. 13 Cornish and Clarke, 1986. 14 Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984. 15 Clarke, 1997: 4; see also Felson and Clarke, 1998.


10

presence of a suitable target; and 3) the absence of a

capable guardian (Figure 5).16

Suitable targets are those that exhibit these four qualities: 1) value, 2) inertia, 3) visibility, and

4) access.

The presence of a

motivated offender is a given; the theory assumes an

offender is predisposed to acting on his or her

criminal inclinations, for without an overt act there

would not be a crime. Motivation for piracy is the

oppressive social and moral foreground pirates are

subjected to in their homeland, including poverty, unemployment,

political and social strife, and economic deprivation.

17

The last segment of routine activities is the absence of capable guardians. The motivation to

commit an act of piracy follows Travis Hirschi’s line of thought that crime occurs in the absence of

controls.

Pirates typically go after targets that are easily converted to cash; however, some targets

may be symbolic. Inertia refers to the target’s weight and how easily it can be carried away or

disposed of. Visibility refers to the target’s sightlines. A large seagoing vessel such as a tanker or

container ship can be easily spotted from the shore line or from a boat used by pirates to scout the

waters. Lastly, pirates must have access to the target. Pirates can pull up alongside a vessel and

board it by using a grappling hook or similar climbing device.

18

16 Felson, 1998.

When temptations are high and controls are low, a motivated pirate can strike more

easily. A guardian is not necessarily a formal agent (e.g., police officer, soldier, teacher) but anyone

who can serve as a reminder that someone is watching. The lynchpin is “capable.” Since most high

17 Felson, 1998: 54-55. 18 Hirschi, 1969.

Suitable Target Motivated Offender

Absence of Capable

guardians

Crime

Figure 5


11

seas piracy is an armed takeover, pirates can easily force an unarmed crew into submission and

render them incapable of defending the ship. In this sense, even though a crew of able-bodied

adults is aboard, they are no match for the overwhelmingly force applied by armed pirates.

Crime Pattern Theory. Crime pattern theory suggests people are intertwined with their

environment and crime is a product of how they move about and converge in time and space.19

Rational Choice Perspective. The rational choice perspective focuses on offender

decision making. The premise is that offenders weigh the costs (i.e., pain and punishment) and

benefits (i.e., pleasure and gain) before committing a crime. Except, their decisions are never perfect

and they rely on information that constrains their decisions, which results in flawed outcomes (i.e.,

arrest, injury, death, monetary loss).

This theory is useful for understanding how opportunities are concentrated at particular times in

particle places. Pirates that embark from developing countries may seem to lack the technical

wherewithal to hijack a ship. Admittedly, their operations are crude; however, through corruption

or basic reconnaissance they gain access to information about what type of cargo may be aboard,

what routes the ships sail, the ships’ port of call, when the ships will sail, and how often ships pass

through certain regions (i.e., time of day, day of week, season). Armed with this knowledge, it is

easy to recognize patterns of shipping and to intercept the ships along their primary travel route.

20 Because the conditions in the pirates’ homeland are so

oppressive, the pleasure associated with seizing a ship’s cargo and converting it to cash outweighs

the pain associated with capture. The profile of the typical pirate operating in the Straits of Malacca

is one of an “opportunist, who is perhaps working from a local village, or a local community. He

may have had military training and he is doing it basically for his own gain and advantage.”21

19 Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984, 1991.

Other

20 Cornish and Clarke, 1986. 21 Bateman, 2001.


12

reported cases involve juveniles who have been kidnapped and forced into piracy.22

Together, routine activities, crime pattern theory, and rational choice, form “opportunity

theory,” which suggests specific situations, environments, and products can be intentionally

manipulated to reduce crime. That is, interventions can be specifically constructed to “design-out”

crime.

Liquidating

stolen goods may involve cooperation from local officials who use the proceeds to further corrupt

already destabilized governments.

23 There is a large body of historical and contemporary research24 supporting this theory

through a wide range of criminal behaviors including delinquency25, deceit26, burglary27, and auto

theft.28

Despite the problems plaguing certain developing regions and the propensity of pirate youth

to use violence to achieve their goals, a ship’s master may unwittingly precipitate their own demise

through the routine activities of shipping. Vessel security is dependent upon the activities of the

crew and the master’s itinerary. The route traveled, the season, the port of call, the regulations that

govern shipping, the time of departure and arrival, and the nature of the cargo, among the many, all

contribute to the routine of shipping. In the interest of time, inasmuch as time is money, ship

masters rely on the familiar; that which has saved time and effort in the past is likely to do so in the

future, thus keeping deliveries on schedule. Deliveries that are on-time are dependable and cheaper,

The consistent premise of this line of inquiry is that increasing risk or effort and reducing

the benefits of crime—dimensions that can be intentionally controlled by industry, government, and

individual citizens—has much to do with someone’s decision to commit or forego criminal activity.

22 Zambito, Boyle and Connor, 2009. 23 Felson and Clarke, 1998; Jeffrey, 1971; Newman, 1972, 1996. 24 Visit the Center for Problem Oriented Policing (www.popcenter.org) for more than 1,000 examples of problem-oriented projects by police departments, as well as a collection of problem-specific guides and other resources on situational crime prevention. 25 Burt, 1925. 26 Farrington and Knight, 1980; Hartshorne and May, 1928. 27 Brantingham and Brantingham, 1975; Reppetto, 1974; Scar, 1973.

http://www.popcenter.org/�


13

dependability and low cost ensure higher profit, irrespective of crew safety. The quickest shortest

route known to the master may also be known to the motivated pirate.

Once patterns are established, they become predictable. Predictable patterns breed

complacency and complacency breeds vulnerability. The opportunities for pirates to strike

generated by routine shipping activities eventually create “hot-spots”—areas that produce a

disproportionate amount of crime. Some of the “hot-spots” for piracy today are Southeast Asia, the

Horn of Africa, and Indonesia. With an understanding of how opportunity theory works, it is useful

to describe the structure of opportunity.

Reducing Opportunity

Clarke’s (1997) description of opportunity structure includes victims, targets, and facilitators

(Figure 6). The target is the commodities aboard the ship (e.g., palm oil, lumber, textiles, and

household goods). The victim is the ship’s crew or the ship itself, and the facilitators are the means by

which piracy is carried out (i.e., speed boats, heavy weapons, communications). The source of

targets and their nature is a product of (i) the physical environment including the (e.g., design and size of

the ship), and (ii) the routine activities of the shipping industry including patterns of trade among

nations, season, weather, supply and demand of commodities, number of crew, speed of travel, and

ocean currents, which can affect guardianship. The physical environment, routine activities and the

broader socio-demographic structure (i.e., poverty, unemployment, disaffection) sets up a complex

interaction that may induce sufficiently motivated offenders into acting while concurrently reducing

guardianship, which makes piracy more likely.29

28 Wilkins, 1964.

29 Clarke, 1997: 12-13.


14

Victims

The ship;The crew

Physical Environment

Topography, Size and Design of the Ship

Routine Activity

trade among nations, supply and demand of commodities, number

of crew, speed of travel, and ocean

currents

Socio-Economic StructureDemography; Geography

Poverty/Government/Law Enforcement/Topography

Targets

Cash;Commodities

Facilitators

Guns;Speed boats;

Communications

Lack of guardianship

Crime Opportunity Structure

Potential Offenders

Numbers;Motivation

Subcultural Influences;Social Control;Government,

Law Enforcement;Societal Structure

(i.e., traditionalcriminological theory)

Lack of enforcement/regulation

Unfettered movement("Unchecked" offender)

Search/Perception

Information/Modeling

Adapted from R.V Clarke (1995). Situational crime prevention

Identifying the routine activities associated with shipping and analyzing the situational

factors surrounding each act of piracy contribute to the body of knowledge known as environmental

criminology. From this analysis, the practical application of situational crime prevention can be

undertaken (i.e., vessel security practices). Clarke (1997) identifies several opportunity-reducing

techniques, some of which have already been incorporated into the shipping industry’s practices;

twelve techniques appear here.

Figure 6


15

Table 3: Opportunity-Reducing Measures for Vessel Security Increasing Perceived

Effort

Action Taken

Increasing Perceived

Risks

Action Taken

Reducing Anticipated

Rewards

Action Taken

Removing Excuses

Action Taken

Target Hardening

• Using containers instead of bails or loose cargo

• Fortified/ reinforced bridge and engine room

• Storing money in hidden safe

Entry/Exit Screening

• Embarking/ disembarking procedures

• Proper I.D. • Proper ticketing

of passengers • Captain’s

interview of crew members

• Certificate validation

Identifying Property

• Unique owner-applied numbers to the containers or to cargo (DataDots©)

• Requiring containers to be registered

Rule Setting

• International legislation against piracy and terrorism

• Written vessel security plans and procedures

• Maritime regulations

• Regulating the sale of certain merchandise

Access Control

• SecureShip© electrified fence

• Ship-board security measures to control sensitive areas (the bridge, the engine room, the gangway)

Surveillance by Employees

• Vigilant anti-piracy watch by crews while underway

• CCTV while berthed or anchored

• Perimeter patrols

• Hand-held radios

Reducing Temptation

• Destroying pirate hideouts

• Creating secure anchoring areas

• Carrying little or no cash

• Establishing “no slowing” zones/minimum speed limit

Stimulating Conscience

• Posting anti-piracy warnings

• Publishing results from piracy arrests/ prosecutions

• Public service announcements against piracy

Deflecting Offenders

• Sailing farther from coastline of source countries (Somalia)

• Buffer zones for ships (Yemen 3,000 meters)

• Escorts to open waters

Formal Surveillance

• ShipLoc©

Satellite Monitoring

• IMB Piracy Reporting Centre

• IMB Rapid Response Investigative Service

Denying Benefits

• Ink merchandise tags

• “No cash” sales or transfers of merchandise

• Merchant agreements not to vend except with established clients

Facilitating Compliance

• Clearly marked shipping lanes preventing wrong turns

• U.S.C.G./U.S. military to train foreign governments in anti-piracy

• Creating incentives • Adopting a foreign

policy

The international and dynamic nature of the maritime shipping business and services

provided makes the shipping industry more vulnerable to security lapses than most other

industries. The number of variables involved in protecting a ship are, by far, greater than protecting

a stationary building. With a comprehensive security program a company can limit access to both

the ship and the terminal or port facility the vessel is calling on. Shipping companies can review the

content of the policies, plans, and procedures in their management systems to verify they adequately

address elements, such as training, communications, key procedures, and emergency preparedness,


16

that apply to security issues. Clarkson (2003)30

1. Gangway Security—A vessel’s gangway is the easiest point of access to a vessel when she is moored at berth. Too often, the crew member assigned to monitor gangway access is not given clear instructions for boarding procedures and when to call for the assistance of an officer. Furthermore, decreased staffing levels on ships often result in the gangway watchman taking on additional responsibilities that require leaving the gangway unattended for periods of time.

identifies some improvements of a comprehensive

management system for shipboard security, which includes access control, entry/exit screening,

surveillance by employees, and rule setting, all aspects of situational crime prevention:

Vessel operators need to emphasize the security aspects of the gangway watchman in procedures and training. Items to be addressed should include Embarking/Disembarking procedures (for crew, guests, and contractors), communication procedures (internal and ship-to-shore), Stores and Package Receiving procedures, and Security Equipment (lighting, CCTV's, hand-held radios, etc.)

In many ports, the terminal or a third party provides a security officer. In such cases, the vessel should have procedures to familiarize the security officer with his responsibilities to the vessel. In all cases, the master of the vessel must ensure that this security is adequate and that security personnel know and understand shipboard requirements and procedures.

2. Modified Pre-Departure Checklists—Most shipping companies have a

pre-arrival/pre-departure checklist for entering and leaving port. Sometimes these checklists are forms that must be completed and filed for verification purposes.

Others act as guidelines and the recording mechanism for completion is a log entry stating that the items on the checklist were inspected and/or tested and in good working order. Companies should review these checklists to verify they provide adequate attention to security related issues. Items like stowaway search and securing restricted access spaces are examples.

3. Modified Vessel Familiarization Tours—A standard requirement for ISM

Code compliant safety management systems is a familiarization tour for crew members new to the vessel. Security requirements such as the conduct of a proper gangway watch, security rounds, recognition of an intruder alarm, and station bill duties for an emergency involving an intruder or hostage situation need to be included in the orientation process.

30 Clarkson (2003).


17

4. Certificate Validation—One of the most difficult processes to carry out aboard a vessel is validation of a crew member's certification. Forged and illegally obtained documents are widespread and must be dealt with through a cooperative effort from several sources. Validation procedures should include input from the vessel, vessel management, manning agencies or unions, and, in some circumstances, flag-state administrations.

5. Captain’s Interview of Crew Members—Ship’s masters should conduct

one-on-one interviews with each new member of the crew as they sign on. A thorough interview will give the master insight to the capabilities and attitude of the crew member and provide the opportunity to immediately establish policy and expectations aboard the vessel.

6. Security Tours and Contingency Plans—Crew members’ rounds, both at

sea and in port, should always include elements of security. Tours and inspections throughout the vessel can include checks for intrusion and piracy, lock and key control, and adherence to limited access spaces. Also, vessel management systems should be examined for content of their Emergency Response Plans. Most vessels have plans for emergency items such as pollution events (hazmat, oil spills), medical emergencies, fire, abandon ship, man overboard, and many others. However, few vessels have contingency plans for bomb threats, dealing with intruders, or hostage situations.

One of the first tasks that must be undertaken when designing security responses is to

analyze the universe of incidents. Naturally, before any analysis can occur there must be accurate

reporting and indexing of the offenses, preferably in some sort of a central repository. Outrage in

the shipping industry at the alarming growth in piracy on the world’s oceans prompted the creation

of the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre in October 1992 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Piracy

Reporting Centre responds immediately to acts of piracy to collect and analyze data as well as

evidence for law enforcement agencies and is a form of formal surveillance. Rapid reporting by

shipping companies has been credited with many foiled piracy attempts and multiple victim vessels

being recovered. The IMB has been moving forward to create a variety of public and private

programs designed to combat piracy.


18

One program about to be launched by the IMB is the “Rapid Response Investigative

Service.” Teams of trained anti-pirate investigators will mobilize within hours of an incident to

complete criminal investigations that often require many days on the part of poorly trained port

officials. The program is not only designed to bring more criminals to justice, but also will hopefully

address the problem of under-reporting.

Conclusion

Controlling piracy has as much to do with improving social conditions in politically unstable

regions of the world as it does with manipulating the immediate environment. A multi-faceted

effort will include international government participation in destabilized regions of the world31 and

maritime industry security improvements of the type defined by situational crime prevention. In the

international community, the United States will have to convince the governments in regions most

affected by piracy that it is in their long-term economic interest to adopt more proactive measures

against piracy, dismantle corrupt maritime forces, and secure their ports and waterways from the

threat of piracy or risk economic sanctions.32 This will require some measure of nation building33

31 Rand, 2003.

from the industrialized democracies of the world, which will remove the excuses for piracy.

Removing military regimes and corrupt governments such as the one that exists in Somalia is a long-

term endeavor, but as part of a multi-prong anti-piracy effort it is worth the investment. The more

immediate and less distant response to high-seas terrorism rests with the shipping industry. On a

daily basis shippers are confronted with the realities of piracy. Only through consistent, vigilant,

proactive security measures, such as those outlined previously, will the shipping industry reduce the

rewards and incentives for pirates to strike.

32 Dillon, 2000. 33 Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008.


19

The international trend is clearly towards defense collaboration driven by political, economic,

and military factors. States ignore this trend at their own peril. It remains to be seen whether Asian

States will replicate the trend of international defense collaboration; however it is doubtless in their

best interest. Yemen, for example, announced new restrictions for vessels traveling to that country.

The restrictions are for vessels approaching commercial ships without authorization and

[they] will open fire on any ship violating the restriction. Other craft must maintain a

distance of 3,000 meters from any tankers and 250 meters from any general cargo ship.

Fishing boats are to be licensed for the first time and the government has banned the

unauthorized transport of boats by land. This latter restriction follows Yemeni declarations

that the boat that rammed the Limburg was transported over land on a trailer with foreign

license plates.54

John Mo of Sea Grant Law and Policy Digest concurs that the most effective means to

controlling piracy is international cooperation. Mo argues that “. . .government cooperation

involving most of the governments of the Southeast Asian region is the best way to combat

maritime piracy, although it is not an easy task due to various political, economical, and historical

reasons. A unilateral and expedient arrangement by one or a few governments to combat maritime

piracy may be convenient but may also encounter resistance or raise suspicion from other

governments.”

In order for the maritime community to realize substantial security gains, anti-piracy must

have at its foundation state-sponsored support. Piracy must be thought of as terrorism for two

reasons: first, although there is not a consensus among researchers, there is a nexus to established


20

terrorist organizations; second, the proceeds from piracy may be used to finance terrorist operations.

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States is developing a foreign policy on

terrorism. The logical corollary is for that policy to extend to piracy.

Terrorists [and pirates] are ruthless but not numerous. They control no territory

permanently. If their activities are harassed [and disrupted] by the security forces and

administrative organs of all their potential victims—if no country will harbor them—they

will become outlaws, increasingly obliged to devote their efforts to their own survival. . . .

The key to antiterrorism strategy, therefore, is to eliminate safe havens. . . . The

overwhelming majority of safe havens occur where a government closes its eyes because it

sympathizes with at least some of the objectives of the terrorists—as in Afghanistan, Yemen,

and Somalia. [The United States must create] incentives for the sharing of intelligence.

Security cooperation [must be] improved, designed to interrupt the flow of funds, harass

terrorists communications, and subject the countries that provide safe havens to pressures,

including, in the extreme case, military pressure.34

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is best poised to assume the leadership role

necessary for disparate (and suspicious) governments to work cooperatively on this important

international issue. The IMO has already made recommendations for a concerted international

effort:

1. Inviting governments to cooperate in the interests of safety of life at sea and

environmental protection by increasing their efforts to suppress and prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

2. Inviting governments to develop, as appropriate, agreements and procedures to facilitate cooperation in applying efficient and effective measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

34 Kissinger, 2001.


21

3. Encouraging governments to apply the provisions of international instruments aimed at improving safety of life at sea and the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.35

Piracy will stop when individuals believe there is a greater risk of being captured or killed (pain)

than getting rich (pleasure), as the result of committing an act of piracy. The world’s democracies

should seize the opportunity presented by the IMO and combine anti-piracy efforts with

counterterrorism initiatives. A unified force will be a significant achievement; it will signal the

opening engagement of a continuing worldwide campaign of improving life at sea.

35 Parritt, 2002.


22

References

BBC News. 2009. Country profile: Somalia. April 23, 2009. Retrieved April 29, 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm.

Bateman, S. 2001. Piracy on the rise. Correspondents’ Report. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved March 15, 2003, from http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/s326347.htm

Brantingham, P. and P. Brantingham.1984. Patterns in Crime. New York: Macmillan. Brantingham, P., and P. Brantingham.1975. “The spatial patterning of burglary,” Howard Journal of

Criminal Justice, 14, 11–23. Brantingham, P., and P. Brantingham, eds. 1991. Environmental Criminology. Prospect Heights, OH:

Waveland. Burt, C. 1925. The Young Delinquent. London: University of London Press. Clarke, R. V. 1997. Situational Crime Prevention. 2nd ed. New York: Harrow and Heston. Clarkson, J. S. 2003. Security is synonymous with safety: Integrating security processes into the

safety management framework. Modern Maritime Inc. Retrieved February 20, 2003, from http://www.modernmaritime.com/SecurityisanAspectofSafety.doc

Cohen, L. E. and M. Felson. 1979. Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. American Sociological Review, 44: 588–608.

Cornish, D., and R. V. Clarke, eds. 1986. The Reasoning Criminal. New York: Springer-Verlag. Durkheim, E. 1893, reprinted 1933. The Division of Labour in Society. Trans.by George Simpson. New

York: The Free Press. Dillon, D. R. 2000. Piracy in Asia: A growing barrier to maritime trade. Heritage Foundation.

Retrieved April 29, 2009, from http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1379.cfm

Farrington, D. P. and B. J. Knight. 1980. “Stealing from a ‘lost’ letter,” Criminal Justice and Behavior, 7: 423–436.

Felson, M. and R. V. Clarke. 1998. Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical theory for Crime Prevention. London: Home Office. Retrieved May 1, 2009, from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fprs98.pdf

Felson, M. and R. V. Clarke. 1998. Crime and Everyday Life, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Fritz, V. and R. Menocal. 2007. Understanding state-building from a political and economic perspective: An analytical and conceptual paper on processes, embedded tensions and lessons for international engagement. Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved on May 3, 2009, from http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1340.pdf.

Hartshorne, M., and M. A. May. 1928. Studies in the Nature of Character, vol. 1, Studies in Deceit. New York: Macmillan.

Hirschi, T. 1969. Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hobbes, T. 1651, reprinted 1994. Leviathan. Edited by E. Curley. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett

Publishing.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm�

http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/s326347.htm�

http://www.modernmaritime.com/SecurityisanAspectofSafety.doc�

http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1379.cfm�

http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fprs98.pdf�

http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1340.pdf�


23

ICC International Maritime Bureau. 2009, April. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2009.

ICC International Maritime Bureau. 2009, January. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 1 January – 31 December.

ICC-International Maritime Bureau. 1998, The return of the pirates (N. Ryan, ed.). ForeignWire.com. Retrieved February 16, 2003, from http://www.foreignwire.com/pirates.html

ICC-International Maritime Bureau. 2003a. High seas terrorism alert in piracy report. Retrieved February 9, 2003, from http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/piracy%20_report_2002.asp

ICC International Maritime Bureau. 2003b. ICC commercial crime services: A division of the international chamber of commerce. Retrieved February 9, 2003, from http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_bureau.asp.

Jeffery, C. R. 1971. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Kissinger, H. 2001. Does America need a foreign policy? Toward a diplomacy for the 21st Century. New York:

Simon and Schuster. Maslow, A. H. 1943. A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4):370–396. May, L. 2008.. History of piracy on the high seas. The Independent, November 18, 2008. Retrieved

May 1, 2009, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/history-of-piracy-on-the-high-seas-1023701.html

McDaniel, Esq., M. S. 2000. Modern high seas piracy. Retrieved April 9, 2009, from http://cargolaw.com/presentations_pirates.html

McFadden, R. and S. Shane. 2009. In rescue of captain, Navy kills 3 pirates. New York Times, April 13, 2009.

Mo, J. 2002. Options to combat maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. Ocean Development and International Law. 33: 343–358. Found at Sea Grant Law and Policy Digest 1(1): 22. Retrieved March 16, 2003, from http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/Digest/Digest.pdf

Newman, O. 1996. Creating Defensible Space. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development: Washington D.C.

Newman, O. 1972. Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design. New York: Macmillan. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2008. Concepts and dilemmas of state

building in fragile situations: From fragility to resilience. OECD Discussion Paper, Journal of Development, 9(3). Retrieved May 3, 2009, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf.

Parritt, B. A. H. 2002. The transnational threat from piracy and smuggling. Presentation for the National Defense University Pacific Symposium. February 20, 2002. Retrieved March 16, 2003, from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2002/parrittpaper.htm.

Rabasa, A. and J Haseman. 2003. The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power. Chapter 12: Strategic scenarios for Indonesia and their implications. Rand. Retrieved March 16, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599/MR1599.ch12.pdf

http://www.foreignwire.com/pirates.html�

http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/piracy%20_report_2002.asp�

http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_bureau.asp�

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/history-of-piracy-on-the-high-seas-1023701.html�

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/history-of-piracy-on-the-high-seas-1023701.html�

http://cargolaw.com/presentations_pirates.html�

http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/Digest/Digest.pdf�

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf�

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2002/parrittpaper.htm�

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599/MR1599.ch12.pdf�


24

Reppetto, T. A. 1974. Residential Crime. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

Scar, H. A. 1973. Patterns of Burglary, 2nd ed. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

Wilkins, L. T. 1964. Social Deviance. London: Tavistock. Zambito, T., C. Boyle, and T. Connor. 2009. Somali pirate’s smile turns to tears; charged with crimes

that could send him to jail for life. Daily News, U.S./World News, April 21, 2009. Retrieved April 29, 2009, from http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world.

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world�

maritime piracy

Documents