Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith by Andrew WilsonReview by: J. BirchThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 76, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 556-557Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212701 .

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556 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

Wilson, Andrew. Ukrainian Nationalism in the I99OS - A Minority Faith. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. XVii + 202 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?45.00; ?15.95: $59.95; $I9.95.

UKRAINE can match Russia's status as an enigma in so many ways. Numerous writers have tackled the vexing question of why it did not successfully follow the Baltic republics, Poland and Finland into independence at the collapse of the Russian empire in 19I 7/ I 8. Often we have been told that it was not yet ready variously because it lacked the appropriate levels of economic development; it was predominantly an illiterate peasant society; it lacked a sufficiently large and articulate middle class to generate and popularize ideas of independence; much of its urban population was heavily Russified in terms of religion, language and culture; and so on. Once again, in the I940S and early I950s, thousands of citizens of this same semi-state entity within the Soviet federation fought with tremnendous ferocity for its independence and failed. And yet, in I 99 I, it attained this goal with almost indecent haste. If it was not ready in I 9 I 8, nor in the 1940s, how did this come about in the I 990S when the nationalism was hardly of the same level of unity and coherence as that in the Baltic republics, Georgia or perhaps even Moldova. In what ways was it now ready, or was readiness really not the key factor? Was the break with Russia more an act engineered from above by communist and ex- communist leaders eager to take over the reins of a collapsing empire's centre? Were the pressures from below at best only partly nationalist in origin and character, confined predominantly to the western provinces, and rather more directed at economic autonomy? How do we explain the widespread support given by ethnic Russians in Ukraine to the independence referendum of I 99 I ? Clearly they were not voting for some integral nationalist vision of a new Ukraine.

It is the essence of this contribution to the generally excellent Cambridge series of monographs on Russia and Eastern Europe that Ukraine has always had a weak identity (albeit stronger than its Belarusian neighbour). This inhibited it from gaining independence in any substantial form until I99I. The book goes on to show the relative weakness of Ukrainian nationalism even after the separation from Moscow.

This, it has to be said, is not a particularly new or original hypothesis. Earlier work along these lines has been published by the present writer on Ukrainian nationalists in the I960s, by Serhiy Tolstoy on the ethnic vote and J. Mariyniuk on the demographics of party support (both from I993), by Sven Holdar on the regional factor in contemporary Ukrainian politics (I 995), and by Sarah Birch in various pieces on cleavages revealed by the referenda and the parliamentary and presidential elections of the I99Os. Interestingly, none of these merit mention in Wilson's bibliography. Where this work carries the study forward is in expanding on the articles with a full book length analysis, and in updating the coverage still further to suggest that in the Ukraine of 1997 nationalism takes, as elsewhere, a number of different forms and variations. It remains a fairly weak force wherein integral nationalism -its most virulent form plays a rather minor part. Wittingly or unwittingly this study does thus build upon the earlier work and fills out our picture of a

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REVIEWS 557

Ukraine so often unjustly and excessively tarred by the nationalism of its collaborators with the Nazis in World War II. Recent referenda, elections and opinion polls have consistently revealed Ukrainian ethnic consciousness to be both limited in support and even somewhat peripheral to the interests of very many in Ukraine. That the more overtly nationalist parties and groups have not received as much support as many expected, both during and after the period of transition to independence, is well worthy of being emphasized. This is not to say that nationalism can be, or should be, written out of the script of Ukrainian politics entirely. There was a distinctly nationalist agenda, con- cerned with the attainment of cultural, linguistic and political goals, behind the events of I99I. Equally nationalism remains a significant factor in the formerly Polish, Slovak and Romanian controlled areas of the country, where nearly fifty years of internationalist education and Russificatory Sovietization failed to eliminate the grievances created by subservience to an imposed ideology and system. If, as in Anderson's view, nationalism consists of identification with imagined communities, could one conceive of anything more contrived than the Soviet identity, or such a failure to have it accepted? It is notable how similarly contrived identities failed to hold together Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Ukraine is, and will almost certainly remain, more a state of nations than a nation state for the forseeable future. Identification within it will be more to a geographical area than to some ethnically undiluted homogeneous society with the possible exception of the western periphery where minorities are mostly small. Ukrainians are as divided among themselves historically, culturally, politically and in terms of religion, almost as much as they are divided from the Russians, with whom they share quite a lot in common. Such is the position of most modern states and their peoples following the ever greater population movements of the last two centuries. Wilson provides much useful material, largely based on Ukrainian sources, to flesh out our understanding of this newly independent player on the world stage.

Department of Politics J. BIRCH

University of Sheffield

Saarikoski, Vesa. KeskustajidAki Aarne Sihvo. Ndkikulma aseellisen voiman ja yhteiskunnan vuorovaikutukseen itsendistymisen murroksesta paasikivildiseen toiseen tasavaltaan. Bibliotheca Historica, 25. Suomen Historiallinen Seura, Helsinki, I997. 421 pp. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. FIM I20.00.

FINLAND'S modern army was created from the victorious White Army of the Civil War of i9 I8. The White Army was led by officers from the old Finnish army (disbanded by the Russians in I 90 I), Finnish officers from the imperial Russian army,, a few volunteers from Sweden, and by over a thousand young Finns trained in Germany in a Prussian jdger battalion during World War I. One of these jagers was Aarne Sihvo (i 889- I 963). His career and influence on the development of the Finnish army and his interaction with Finnish politics form the subject of this biography by Vesa Saarikoski.

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