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Reports AUFS Reports are a continuingseries on international affairs andmajor global issues of our time.Reports have for almost threedecades reached a group ofreaders--both academic and non-academic--who find them a usefulsource of firsthand observation ofpolitical, economic, and social trendsin foreign countries. Reports in theseries are prepared by writers whoare full-time Associates of theAmerican Universities Field Staffand occasionally by persons on leavefrom the organizations and univer-sities that are the Field Staff’s spon-sors.

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THE AUTHOR CHARLES L. STANSIFER, Professor ofHistory at the University of Kansas andDirector of the Center of Latin AmericanStudies, has concentrated his researchand writing on Central America and theCaribbean for more than two decades.After receiving his B.A. and M.A.degrees from Wichita State Universityand his Ph.D. from Tulane (1959), Dr.Stansifer taught at the University ofSouthwestern Louisiana before joiningthe Kansas faculty in 1963. His mostrecent research in Latin Americafocuses on Costa Rica, El Salvador, andespecially on Nicaragua.

1981, American Universities FieldStaff, Hanover, NH

1981/No. 6South America

by Charles L. Stansifer[CLS-1-’81]

THE NICARAGUAN NATIONALLITERACY CRUSADE

The Nicaraguan National LiteracyCrusade, completed in August 1980,was one of the most successfulmovements on behalf of educationin the history of Latin America or theThird World. Like other successfulliteracy campaigns in Latin Amer-ica-in Mexico in the 1920s and inCuba in 1961--the Nicaraguan cam-paign followed a revolution liber-ating the country of a hated dic-tator. (Revolutions, it appears, arenecessary to prepare people forsacrifice and extraordinary effort forthe common good.) Not even thecampaigns in Mexico and Cuba,however, involved such a high per-centage of a nation’s people as wascommitted to the Literacy Crusadein Nicaragua.

Considering the country’s under-development and the recent waragainst the Somoza dictatorship,the Nicaraguan crusade was care-fully prepared and skillfully pro-moted. Nicaraguan leaders deliber-ately chose the term crusade to de-scribe their effort and they chosemilitary organization to accomplishit. Tens of thousands of youths,marching in uniform to long-ne-glected corners of the country,cheerfully accepted the terms andbowed to the discipline and atten-dant privations, Theywere the Popu-lar Army of Literacy Instructors (Ejer-cito Popular de Alfabetizadores), andthey received the support of virtuallythe entire population--governmentofficials, teachers, parents of school-children, and after hesitation, the illit-erate workers and peasants whowere the object of the crusade. Tobe sure, critics and grumblersappeared, but the overwhelmingpopularity of the crusade sweptthem aside.

Officials claim that in the 5-monthcrusade Nicaraguan illiteracy wasreduced from 50 to 13 percent.UNESCO officials, upon announcingthe Nadezhda K. Krupskaya Inter-national Literacy Award to Nica-ragua September 8, 1980, did notquestion this astounding numericalconquest. Even if the figures areexaggerated, as they must be, thecrusade certainly did achieve itsmajor goal of drastically reducingthe Nicaraguan illiteracy rate.Whether the results are permanentand whether the crusade accom-plished its secondary goal of politi-cizing the masses remain to be seen.From a political perspective, thenew government in this crusade didsuccessfully channel revolutionarypassion into a beneficial cause andwon internal political support andinternational recognition.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle, dictatqrof Nicaragua from 1967 to 1979,contributed unwittingly to the kindof unity that allowed such a cam-paign to succeed. Brutal govern-mental repression of rebel action inthe mid-1970s led to a full-scale waragainst Somoza and his NationalGuard during 1978 and 1979. ByJuly 17, 1979, when the dictatorfinally fell, perhaps as many as50,000 persons had lost their lives inthe war, and practically every Nica-raguan citizen had been affected bythe revolution and the ruthlessattempts to crush it. The cost inblood was high but the widespreadrepression forged an unparalleledunity of Nicaraguan classes againstthe Somoza regime and in favor of

Lberac=onthe Frente Sandinista deNacional (FSLN), Marxist vanguardof the revolution. Shared sufferingdating to the mid-1930s, when

Somoza’s father established theregime, accentuated a rebirth ofNicaraguan national pride when thedynasty collapsed. With the warover, energies previously tapped forpurposes of destruction or survivalwere released. How would the Gov-ernment Junta of National Recon-struction capitalize on this uniquemoment in Nicaraguan history?

The answer came even before thejunta took power. In the proclama-tion "Somewhere in Nicaragua"dated June 18, 1979, the juntapromised to initiate a "national cru-sade which would mobilize all theresources of the country to bringabout a total eradication of illit-eracy."! Two leading Nicaraguaneducators living in exile, CarlosT{Jnnerman Bernheim and Miguelde Castilla Urbina, had prepared abrief on the need for a massiveliteracy effort in early 1980. Fifteendays after taking office, the juntaconverted the T{Jnnerman-de Cas-tilla proposal into a firm commit-ment by giving the promisedcrusade the highest priority andbegan to assemble a special staffand to consider methodology. TheNational Directorate of the FSLN,consisting of nine commanders ofthe revolution, gave its assent,insuring total government supportfor the effort to wipe out illiteracy.

Objectives and By-products of theCrusadeAfter intensive discussion of goalsand priorities, the crusade leadersagreed on the following principalobjectives of the crusade:

1. To eradicate illiteracy in Nica-ragua;2. To conscientize and politicize theilliterate population;

2/CLS-1-’81

3. To conscientize Nicaragua’syouth on the life and problems ofthe rural population;

4. To prepare the foundation of theVice-Ministry of Education forAdults to follow up the crusade;

5. To strengthen the organizationof the masses;

6. To deepen national integration.2

These objectives did not differ indetail from the concepts discussedby T{Jnnerman and de CastillaUrbina before the Sandinista tri-umph. To avoid conflict with therevolutionary government’s goal ofreactivating the economy, crusadeleaders had to agree to conductliteracy lessons only two hours a dayand on weekends. They also agreedto emphasize agricultural produc-tJon in the literacy workbook and tourge literacy instructors to helpcampesinos (peasants) in the fieldsin order to create time for classes.The campaign slogan, whichappeared in the government news-paper Barricada, exemplified thisdual approach: La meta del briga-dista" levantar la producci(n durantela alfabetizacin (The goal of theliteracy instructor: raise productionduring the literacy campaign).

To ward off the inevitable desires ofother ministries and interest groupsto share the glamour of the crusadeand dilute its impact, the crusadeleadership decided on a list ofacceptable by-products that couldbe gathered without interfering withthe principal objectives. These wereas follows:

1. Eradication of malaria;

2. Collection of examples of floraand fauna from the different regionsof the country;

3. A census of work, unemploy-ment, agrarian systems, and landdistribution;

4. Collection of folk legends andregional popular songs;

5. Inspection of possible archaeo-logical and mineral sites;

6. Collection of oral histories of therecent war;

7. Improvement of sanitation. 3

Some brigades, usually made up ofuniversity students, were specifi-cally trained to accomplish the sec-ondary purposes of the crusade, but

all groups received some instructionon methods to achieve the by-products.

Crusade LeadershipOverall supervision of the crusadewas handed to T{Jnnerman, whobecame the new Minister of Educa-tion. As a respected rector of theNational Autonomous University ofNicaragua (UNAN), author ofscholarly books and articles onhigher education, and former presi-dent of the Union of Latin AmericanUniversities, Tinnerman brought tothe ministry administrative skills,intellectual brilliance, and a wealthof international educational con-tacts. He also had been a member ofthe Group of Twelve, who from itsCosta Rican base maintained closetouch with the FSLN during the lastyear of the war. De Castilla Urbina, aformer professor at UNAN andNicaragua’s leading student of thecountry’s primary and secondaryeducation problems, became Vice-Minister of Education. Juan BautistaArn’en, a former Jesuit priest andformer rector of Nicaragua’s Catho-lic university, the Universidad Cen-troamericana, became Vice-Ministerof Education in charge of planning.The Crusade’s coordinator--a spe-cial, temporary post which endedwith the crusade--was Father Fer-nando Cardenal. Better known forhis moral stature and his vocalopposition to the Somoza regimethan for any administrative or edu-cational experience, Father Cardenalwas expected to use his oratoricalabilities and sympathy for the

Giant literacy scorecard showing in-creaSes in literacy rates in Nicaragua de-partments, Plaza 19 de Julio, Managua.

humble to stir enthusiasm and towin support from religious organiza-tions, workers, and youth groups.Sonia G. de Chamorro of the influ-ential Chamorro family took a keyposition as head of the section onfinancial promotion. In general thestaff consisted of FSLN militants,priests, social democrats, and tech-nocrats, united in their hatred ofsomocismo and in their dedicationto free Nicaragua of illiteracy.

These individuals had close connec-tions with the junta, other govern-ment ministries and agencies, thepress, and Nicaraguan privateorganizations. With the country insuch disarray following years ofcorruption and bad government, inaddition to the disruption of war,individual and family ties were usedto cut through the emerging revolu-tionary bureaucracy. Fernando Car-denal’s brother Ernesto, also a priestand Nicaragua’s most famous livingpoet, became the Minister ofCulture. Sonia Chamorro’s hus-band, Xavier, had become the editorof La Prensa, Nicaragua’s leadingnewspaper, upon the assassinationof his brother Pedro Joaqun inJanuary 1978.4

Comparisons with CubaFrom the beginning, the crusadeleadership had the benefit of Cubanexperience. As early as August1979, Radl Ferrer, head of the Cubanliteracy campaign in 1961, was in

CLS-I-’81

Figure

NICARAGUA: ILLITERATES OVER TEN YEARS OF AGE, PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERACY,AND PROBABLE NUMBER OF INSTRUCTORS BY ZONES AND DEPARTMENTS

Zones/Departments

Population Illiterates Illiteracy Rates Personsover 10 over 10 over 15

years of age years of age Total Urban Rural who agreedto teach

Ratio ofinstructor t

illiterate

NICARAGUA 1,439,474 722,616 50.20(% 30.04 (%) 74.92 (%) 266,501

Pacific Zone 857,406 354,822 28.06 26.35 65.80 199,599Chinandega 116,795 57,707 49.41 82.88 66.43 21,827Le(n 152,034 71,698 54.34 32.17 76.77 20,047Managua 398,016 109,888 27.61 21.65 55.80 104,788Masaya 93,312 43,770 45.91 36.42 60.78 15,445Granada 62,847 26,702 42.89 30.21 63.19 11,349Carazo 49,745 19,765 39.73 24.53 61.60 11,025Rivas 54,178 25,292 47.56 36.34 60.63 10,198

North CentralZone 399,735 266,812 66.74 43.95 80.26 51,103Chontales 51,747 31,769 61.39 34.25 79.48 3,380Boaco 49,116 34,843 70.94 40.11 82.59 5,239Matagalpa 95,432 68,011 71.24 58.07 85.06 8,831Jinotega 36,607 39,702 70.14 33.84 81.19 6,527Esteli’ 52,860 27,671 52.34 32.78 68.86 10,169Nueva Segovia 53,346 36,818 69.02 42.40 81.00 6,740Madriz 40,627 27,998 68.91 43.32 79.48 5,217

Atlantic Zone 140,934 100,482 78.07 33.41 82.64 15,888Rio San Juan 16,682 12,593 75.49 33.87 83.40 1,962Zelaya 124,252 83,384 71.76 29.97 81.33 13,926

1/3

1/21/31/41/21/31/31/21/3

1/61/41/71/81/71/31/61/6

1/91/71/9

Source: Encuentro (Universidad Centroamericana, Managua), No. 16 (1980), p. 28.

Managua as a UNESCO advisor. Hewas accompanied by several Cubanassociates. The Nicaraguan cru-saders learned from Ferrer’s experi-ence and Cuba’s mistakes. Therewere obvious similarities betweenthe Cuban and Nicaraguan literacycampaigns such as mass mobiliza-tion, the role of student, worker, andpeasant groups, and the military-likeatmosphere, slogans, and parapher-nalia.5 Certainly both campaignsconsidered literacy education a pro-foundly political rather than simply apedagogical problem and, like theCubans, the Nicaraguans put em-phasis on getting city youth into thecountry with the purpose of break-ing down city-country antipathy;however, these similarities may bedue less to the Cubans’ influencethan to the fact that Nicaragua’s

needs in 1979 were similar to thoseof Cuba in 1961.

There were also major differences.Nicaragua’s task was more formi-dable: the 1980 illiteracy rate wasabout 50 percent, Cuba’s in 1961was23 percent. Nicaragua began itscampaign immediately after therevolution; Cuba took two yearsbefore getting its campaign underway. Castro’s charismatic person-ality motivated Cuban literacy in-structors, but Nicaraguans sacri-ficed for the revolution and its mar-tyred heroes. Further, the CatholicChurch and other religious organiza-tions played a more important role inthe Nicaraguan campaign than inthe Cuban. The biggest difference,however, was Nicaragua’s use ofthe Paulo Freire method of con-

scientization in literacy teachirThe Freire method had alreadyspired worldwide admiration, anduse in Nicaragua elicited intnational acceptance rather than tfear aroused by Cuba’s strideefforts to politicize its people in tearly 1960s. Freire’s prestige wsuch in 1979 that early discussionmethodology in the NicaraguNational Literacy Crusade centeron Freire’s texts, o

Literacy CensusThe last census in the Somoyears, that of 1971, showed apercent illiteracy rate, but the figuwas suspect owing to the assumtion that anyone who had cowpleted one year of school was lit{ate. Furthermore, the disastroearthquake of 1972 and the war

4/CLS-1-’81

Figure 2

Nicaragua: Departmental Illiteracy Levels

HONDURAS

ueva Se

Chinandega

Le6n

ManaguaMasaya

GranadaCarazo

Jinotega

Matagalpa

Boaco

hontales

COSTA RICA

Zelaya

OVERALLNATIONAL FIGURE: 50.2%

Chinandega 49.4%LeSn 54.3%Managua 28.1%Masaya 46.9%Granada 42.5%Carazo 39.7%Rivas 47.6%N. Segovia 69.0%Madriz 68.9%Esteli" 52.3%Jinotega 70.1%Matagalpa 71.3%Boaco 70.9%Chontales 61.4%Rio San Juan 75.5%Zelaya 71.4%

Source: George Black and John Bevan,The Loss of Fear: Education in Nica-ragua before and after the Revolution(London: Nicaragua Solidarity Cam-paign and World University Service,1980), p. 75.

1978-1979 undoubtedly preventedgains after 1971. Officials of thecrusade decided that, despite thedifficulties, a fresh literacy censuswas necessary, not only to deter-mine the number of illiterates butalso to determine the zones most inneed and to locate people willing toparticipate as instructors. Withhastily trained volunteers theNational Census and Statistics In-stitute launched the literacy censusin October 1979, the rainy season,perhaps the worst time of the yearto conduct a census. The resultsdiffered little from earlier records. Of1,439,474 persons over 10 years ofage, 50.20 percent (722,616) ad-mitted they could not read or write(Figure 1). Some of these were con-sidered unlikely to learn to read andwrite, leaving a target group of592,059. In a late November pressconference, Minister TUnnermanraised the total number of illiterates

to 869,276 but did not comment onthe size of the target group. 7 Addi-tional information brought in by thefirst instructors in early 1980 raisedthe total to over 900,000. Thecensus also confirmed that a suc-cessful literacy campaign dependedon mobilizing volunteer instructorsfrom the Pacific coastal region,where literacy levels were highest,and transporting them to the moun-tain and Atlantic coastal regionswhere literacy levels were lowest(Figure 2). Happily for the crusadeleaders the October census showedthat for every three illiterates con-sidered apt to learn there was oneliterate person willing to be an alfa-betizador, or literacy instructor.

Organizational ProblemsWhile awaiting the results of theliteracy census, crusade officialsnevertheless had to make decisionson an array of organizational and

political problems. When should thecrusade begin and when should itend? If the crusade were to takeplace during the school year, whatwould happen to the regular schoolsand primary schoolchildren? WereIndian languages to be included?How far should conscientization bepushed? Would the illiterate agreeto be educated? What aboutparents’ fears for the safety andhealth of the young alfabetizadores(instructors) in the mountains andborder areas? What roles should begiven to the militant but still organ-izing and largely untested groups ofyouth, women, workers, andpeasants? What role would the re-ligious groups have? Assuming thatlocal resources were insufficient fora crusade of such massive propor-tions, crusade officials knew theyhad to prepare tidy budgets on thebasis of sketchy information andplans in process for presentation to

CLS-1-’81/5

the international aid community.And all these decisions had to bemade in a country where food andmedicine were short, housing hadjust suffered the most disastrouslosses in the history of the country,entrepreneurs and professionalswere considering taking themselvesand their money out of the country,and a new, inexperienced govern-ment was still organizing.

Hastily, crusade leaders assembledtheir organization. On October 11,1979, when the National Directorateof the FSLN officially declared waron illiteracy, the organization of thecrusade was ready (Figure 3).

Mass OrganizationsThe formal organization chart

faithfully represents the distributionof technical and administrative re-sponsibilities. It does not, however,show the influence of the massorganizations that sprung up soquickly during and after the revolu-tion and were represented on theNational Literacy Commission(Figure 4). Because the crusade wasto be carried out primarily by secon-dary school students, the JuventudSandinista, or Nineteenth of JulySandinista Youth (JS 19 de J), hadconsiderable weight. The movementincreasingly raised its voice in behalfof socialism and anti-imperialismand contested power with theNational Association of NicaraguanEducators (ANDEN), which pro-tected the interests of teachers.ANDEN repeatedly rose to thedefense of its members to fightrumors and public charges of con-servatism and, worst of all, Somozacollaborationism. The campesinounion (ATC) and workers federation(CST) also played important roles,as did the new women’s andparents’ organizationS (Asociaci(nde Mujeres NicaragJenses LuisaAmanda Espi,noza, or AMNLAE, andConfederaciSn de Padres de Familia,or CPF).

Without adequate educational infra-structure to carry out such amassive task, success of the cru-sade had to depend on the ability oflocal membership of these groups toaccomplish (on a voluntary basis butunder great pressure from the

"’Commander in Chief Carlos Fonseca,the Teachers have completed their mis-sion. ANDEN (Asociaci6n Nacional deEducadores Nicaragenses).

FSLN) recruitment, assignment, andmaintenance. The Juventud San-dinista took responsibility for re-cruiting literacy instructors, dividingthem into brigades by age and sex,and assigning them to departments.It also insured that instructors faith-fully attended training sessions.ANDEN organized teachers forworkshops and for assignment as"technicians" to brigades. To theATC fell the not inconsiderable taskof finding lodging in the country forthe instructors. Continuing thecensus work and finding classroomspace for night-worker studentswere tasks divided among theSandinista Defense Committee(CDS), CST, and AMNLAE.

Because of the independent politicalstrength of the FSLN-dominatedmass organizations, the NationalLiteracy Commission never exer-cised much control over the cru-sade. After the first few weeks thecommission ceased to meet regu-larly. The departmental and munici-pal literacy commissions, set upwith the help of Cuban advisers andunder FSLN domination, took onmuch more responsibility than en-visioned by the organizers of thecrusade. Indeed, this de facto de-centralization had much to do withthe crusade’s success. That themunicipal and departmental com-missions took the idea of the cru-sade and made it a reality furtherproves the depth and breadth offeeling in Nicaragua in favor of theliteracy campaign.

The Army of Cultural LiberationThe process of recruiting, organ-izing, and preparing the instructorsbegan in September and October,even before anyone knew howmany would be needed. Instructors(alfabetizadores or brigadistas, asthey were sometimes called) weredivided into two groups. The largergroup, recruited mostly from sec-ondary schools, was formed into thePopular Army of Literacy In-structors (EjSrcito Popular de Alfa-betizadores, or EPA). TEinnermanand Cardenal repeatedly insistedthat participation was voluntary butthe atmosphere was such thatyoung people aged 13 to 19 facedconsiderable pressure to participate.Rumors ot penalties for nonparti-cipating secondary school studentshampered recruitment at first, butwhen it became known that briga-distas would be given academiccredit in two or three subjects theyhad failed earlier, recruitment im-proved. 8 Secondary school officialstook the initiative in forming col-umns of about 120 students. Acolumn was divided into foursquads. All the columns assigned toa particular municipality formed abrigade. Each squad had a chief (a"responsable"), a second in com-mand, and one to three teachertechnicians. Ideally, a teacherknown to the student brigadistasaccompanied the squads. Eachbrigadista was equipped with a lan-tern, mosquito net, first aid kit, uni-form, and backpack, in addition tothe necessary school supplies. Extra

6/CLS-1-’81

Figure 3ORGANIZATION CHART OF NICARAGUAN NATIONAL LITERACY CRUSADE

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

NATIONAL LITER-ACY COMMISSION

NCI ADVISORY COUNCILADVISORY. C0 Ci, [IITERcY OFFIcECO(RDINATOR’S INTERNATIONAL

COORDINATOR i ..., ..IADMI COORDINATORTECHNICAL MATTE"S "..." ".:"’" NISTRATIVE MATTERS

IPRODUCT,ONI 4PUBL,,TyI .J PROMOTION LIBRARY ANDIAND PROJECTS DOCUMENTATION

FORMATIONOF PROJECTS

DEPARTMENTALLITERARY COMMISSION

DEPARTMENTALCOORDINATOR’S OFFICE

MUNIClPAkLITERACY COMMISSION

TECHNICALSECTION

"""suPPCYIIITRANSPORT

!t4--A,NTENANCEI

MUNICIPALCOORDINATOR’S OFFICE

eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

TECHNICALSECTION

Source: Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade.

CLS-1-’81/7

Figure 4

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

JS-19 INRA FENEC EPS INDE UPN MBS CDS MBS CDS

N CiF DN-iSLNANDEN CST FES ATC

NATIONAL LITERACY COMMISSION

Guide to what the initials mean=

JS-19 Sandinista Youth 19th of JulyINRA Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform InstituteFENEC Nicaraguan Federation of Catholic

TeachersEPSINDEUNAN

UCACENERNMCMIMBS

Sandinista Popular ArmyNicaraguan Journalists UnionNational Autonomous University of

NicaraguaCentral American UniversityNicaraguan Episcopal ConferenceRadio Schools of NicaraguaMinistry of CultureMinistry of the InteriorMinistry of Social Service

CDSANDEN

CST

FESATCAMNCPF

Sandinista Defense CommitteeNational Union of Teachers of

NicaraguaSandinista Trade Union

FederationSecondary Students FederationAssociation of Rural WorkersAssociation of Nicaraguan WomenParents Confederation

DN-FSLN FSLN National DirectorateMS Ministry of HealthMP Ministry of PlanningMTOP Ministry of Transport and Public

Works

Source: Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade

food was provided to avoid burden-ing their peasant hosts.

The second group, the Popular Lit-eracy Instructors (AlfabetizadoresPopulares, or AP), consisted ofworkers, professionals, and house-wives who maintained their regularworking schedules but taught part-time in the afternoons or evenings.In the final offensive from June toAugust 1980, more Popular LiteracyInstructors were recruited to organ-ize neighborhood night schools asUrban Literacy Guerrillas (GUA).Other groups, such as the literacyinstructors of the workers’ militiaand the Army, organized themselvesto conduct literacy classes withintheir own ranks. Special squadswere organized for literacy instruc-tion in braille; and even prisoners,many of them former members of

the National Guard, conductedclasses (occasionally with the helpof prison guards) for inmates.

The Nicaraguans used terminologyborrowed from Cuba to identify thetwo groups of literacy instructors,but there was otherwise little com-parison. Nicaraguan brigadistas, byreason of their recruitment, prepa-ration, and mission to the country-side, were subjected to a moreintense politicization than were theAlfabetizadores Populares.

Participating teachers, received theirregular salaries but, regardless ofspecialty, were required to serve astechnical advisers. Few teachersactually taught reading and writingto illiterates; their role was to teachthe instructors how to teach. Nordid the teachers participate much in

political indoctrination. That washandled by the FSLN mainlythrough the mass organizations.

Altogether the Army of CulturalLiberation would eventually com-prise approximately 180,000 in-structors and technicians. Fivesquads of 16 brigadistas eachformed the vanguard for the Armyof Cultural Liberation. In late 1979these squads, hastily prepared in a15-day workshop, went to the fieldin a pilot program to test theFreirean method and to gain expe-rience. Upon their return these 80brigadistas, using the intensiveworkshop method, trained 560literacy instructors who in turntrained 7,000. By March 1980, the7,000 were ready to train the remain-ng 180,000.9

8/CLS-1-’81

For purposes of the crusade, theleaders divided the country into sixfronts identical to the military frontsof the insurrection. Each of thefronts was named after one of thefallen heroes of the FSLN; for ex-ample, the Northern Front (Jino-tega, Esteli’, Matagalpa, NuevaSegovia, and Madriz Departments)bore the name of Carlos FonsecaAmador, after one of the foundersof the FSLN. Brigadistas also namedtheir columns and brigades afterFSLN heroes and battles.

Revolutionary enthusiasm alonecannot account for the high numberof volunteers. Many had alreadybeen committed to improving theliteracy rate for years. Although fewgovernment officials could be ex-pected to admit in the Nicaraguanrevolutionary atmosphere of late1979 that anything good could havetaken place under the Somozaregime, the fact is that as many as20 specific Nicaraguan groups hadbeen working since the 1960s toeradicate illiteracy. Because of therelative weakness of the Ministry ofEducation in the 1970s and itsheavy focus on primary education,other ministries such as PublicHealth and Agriculture undertookadult education programs. Half thenongovernmental groups had re-ligious affiliations, but private devel-opment groups such as the Nica-raguan Development Foundation(FUNDE), and charitable institutionssuch as the Red Cross also con-tributed. Workers’ unions alsoorganized literacy programs. As thedecade wore on, moreover, literacyprograms involving conscientizationtechniques gradually replaced the

traditional and developmentalistprograms.

All these diverse efforts, of course,had merely kept the illiteracy ratefrom growing in the 1970s (no meanaccomplishment given their under-financing and the 3.5 percent annualpopulation growth rate of Nica-ragua). What was missing was acombined effort, a national commit-ment, and a sense of urgency.]OThese the crusade provided.

Use of the Freire MethodAdoption of the Freire method,which involves political orientation,or conscientization, as an essentialpart of literacy education, was logi-cally consistent with the revolution-ary ideology that helped secure theJuly 1979 victory. The war againstthe Somoza dictatorship had raisedthe political consciousness of theNicaraguan people to a new, highlevel. It was necessary only to solid-ify this sentiment and channel it forspecific, revolutionary purposes.The crusade planners took it forgranted that the literacy workbookwould include social and politicalcommentary and that the instructorswould receive political as well astechnical preparation. The work-book, E1 amanecer del pueblo(Awakening of the People), provedto be a moderate document of socialand political commentary, not en-tirely conforming to Freirean prin-ciples. There is no mention of theUnited States (or any country butNicaragua) in the lessons and theycontain no reference to capitalism,socialism, or communism. It is notMarxist-Leninist. Its condemnationof Somoza’s National Guard and

"’From our trenches the literacy in-structors salute the first anniversaryfreeing Nicaragua of illiteracy. We con-quered in the Insurrection. We willconquer illiteracy." Sandinist Youth19th ofJuly.

praise of the FSLN as the people’svanguard are hardly subjects ofcontroversy. Heroes of the strugglefor liberation, Sandino and Fonseca,are important in the workbook; butonly one living FSLN figure is me,n-tioned, Toms (presumably TomasBorge). There is no mention of elec-tions, ,political parties, or PedroJoaqun Chamorro. It is a simple,direct, pro-FSLN nationalist work-book.

The Nicaraguan literacy campaigndeviated from Freirean principles intwo respects, both underscoring thenationalistic orientation of itsleaders. Instead of attempting tocreate a workbook for each villageor region of Nicaragua, as Freirewould have preferred, the programdeliberately focused on national,revolutionary subjects. Also, insteadof developing a dialogue around asingle word, as Freire suggested, theNicaraguan crusade selected aphrase or slogan. ]]

Freire insists that conscientization isa two-way street and this the Nica-raguans accepted. Thus, in prelimi-nary workshops, which were halfpolitical and half methodological,crusade leaders emphasized theneed to listen to campesinos and tolearn from them. Alfabetizadoreswould live with the campesinos andshare their work and living condi-tions.

Paulo Freire came to Nicaragua onOctober 24, 1979, for a 9-day visit.True to his philosophy that everyteacher must also be a learner,Freire announced that he had comenot as a wise man but as a man whowanted to learn. At the end of hisvisit he gave his blessing to thecensus, the organization and, mostimportant of all, the progress of con-scientization. ]2 Six weeks laterAmadou-Mahtar M’Bow, DirectorGeneral of UNESCO, also com-mitted to the Freire method, cameon a short visit to Nicaragua. Hiskind words about the Nicaraguaneffort, along with Freire’s blessings,promoted international acceptanceof the crusade. ]3

CLS-1-’81/9

A nationwide publicity campaignparalleled and reinforced the literacymovement. The Sandinista TVSystem (SSTV), the only televisionsystem in the country, remindedlisteners every hour that 1980 wasLiteracy Year and broadcast otherliteracy slogans as did private andpublic radio stations. All radiostations set aside the same 45minutes twice a day for literacy pro-grams called "Pu6o en alto," fromthe crusade slogan, "Pu6o, en alto,libro abierto" (Fist high, book open).Literacy postcards, buttons, decals,lottery tickets, matchboxes, stamps,and T-shirts bombarded the senses.Sophisticated posters and billboardsproliferated in the wealthiest dis-tricts, and homemade cloth andcardboard signs appeared in poorerbarrios. Graffiti praising the secondor cultural war of liberation coveredwalls built after the first war of liber-ation. Ceremonies and parades con-tributed to the military atmosphere.Junta members, FSLN com-manders, and crusade officialsappeared at countless gatherings toexhort workers to participate or togive money. And, just as Sandi-nistas held up banks to finance theinsurrection, groups of youthsharassed passers-by and motoristsfor donations. Some governmentagencies threatened to dismissworkers who failed to give part oftheir salaries. Not to participateunder such circumstances was torisk being labeled counterrevolu-tionary.

Support of Church and PrivateOrganizationsAs the outlines of the crusadeagainst illiteracy became known,

Sandino portrait on the front ofManagua’s ruined Cathedral

"’Sandino yesterday, Sandino today,Sandino always." CDS (Committee ofSandinist Defense).

and as pressure built up for involve-ment, church organizations faced aserious dilemma. Provocative state-ments by FSLN leaders and mem-bers of the Junta de Gobiernoseemed to threaten family relationsand presage conflict between Marx-ism and Sandinism and Christianity.Junta leader Sergio Ram’rez, afterreferring to the contributions ofNicaraguan youth to the war, said:"It is difficult to conceive today howthe simple opinion of a parent isgoing to stop a young person withrevolutionary ideals.., from incor-porating himself in the literacy cam-paign." 14 Bayardo Arce, in a speechNovember 15, 1979, at the Universi-dad Centroamericana, did not putthe blame for the failures of Nica-raguan education on somocismo; heplaced it squarely on the bour-geoisie. ]5 Given that the secondaryschool students who were to makeup the largest group of literacyinstructors were sons and daughtersof middle-class parents, such re-marks were discomfiting. Rumors

10/CLS-1-’81

of forced participation also broughtparents’ complaints.

While the FSLN leadership took theposition that Christianity wasnot in conflict with Sandinism andcertainly had nothing to fear from aliteracy crusade, repeated attackson the old political system from aMarxist perspective, along with theoft-stated goals of politicizing thecampesinos, workers, and youth,did little to reassure conservativeChristians. Such goals worried anyChristian who saw Marx as anti-thetical to Christ. Furthermore, therevolutionary slogan "Sandino ayer,Sandino hoy, Sandino siempre"(Sandino yesterday, Sandino today,Sandino forever), chanted in cru-sade gatherings and elsewhere, boretoo close a resemblance to the oldChristian battle cry, "Cristo ayer,Cristo hoy, Cristo siempre," to dis-pel the Christians’ anxiety. A giantportrait of Sandino hanging over theentrance of the ruined Managuacathedral served as a stark reminderof revolutionary Nicaragua’s newdirection.

Confronted with the alternative ofparticipation or nonparticipation inthe crusade, all church organizationschose participation. Nonparticipa-tion meant loss of prestige and likelycharges of counterrevolutionaryismand somocismo. Evangelical groupsin particular had invested too muchtime and money in the rural areasbefore 1978, especially in theAtlantic coastal area, to risk exclu-sion. Besides, many of the evangeli-cal groups were already committedto education for revolutionarychange.

The Catholic Church, of course, hadan even greater role to play. Despiteindividuals’ reservations, the churchand its lay organizations marshalledtheir forces. Archbishop MiguelObando y Bravo lent his consider-able prestige, gained in the struggleagainst Somoza, to the crusade;Nicaragua’s bishops officially en-dorsed it. Parishioners, who hadalready contributed at home and atthe factory and in the office, con-tributed cash to the crusade inspecial red and black (colors of theFSLN) collection boxes circulated inthe churches. The Junta de Gobiernojourneyed to Rome tO receive theblessing of the Pope. In his speechat the reception for the junta thePope said:

I consider that an initiative aimed attaking the bread of culture to everycitizen without discrimination is initself deserving of every praise, aslong as it is programmed and carriedout with full respect to the rightsand religious convictions of thepeople and also in agreement withthe parents of the [participating]students. This respect for the rightofparents and the Catholic family toan education in conformity with thereligion which they profess excludesthe imposition of concepts contraryto their faith. 16

Doubtless, the junta would haveliked a stronger endorsement, butthe Pope’s cautious statement,which became the policy of Nica-raguan Catholic authorities, wassufficient to insure the cooperationof Catholic organizations. Accord-ing to the Nicaraguan EpiscopalConference, some 597 members ofreligious orders participated as tech-nicians and 4,489 served as briga-distas. 17 Church groups contributedtheir own posters and slogans,though emphasizing, to be sure, theadvantages of literacy to achievereligious goals.

Private development groups withpre-1978 experience in adult literacyprograms also offered their coopera-tion. The Nicaraguan DevelopmentInstitute (Instituto Nicarag[iense deDesarrollo, INDE) contributed$33,000 in cash to the crusade andalso donated equipment and facili-ties for meetings and classes. INDEhad representatives on most de-partmental and municipal literacycommissions. Like the CatholicChurch, INDE prepared its own pro-crusade propaganda campaign,concentrating its efforts on ruralcooperatives set up with its aid. 18

The Rear GuardGradually, as preparations wentforward, crusade leaders realizedthat with so many teachers andteen-agers on the battlefront therewould be a problem for those under12 or 13 years of age. Consequently,a rear guard plan was formulatedand slowly put into action. Physicaleducation, art, and music teacherstook assignments at primary schoolsand at Popular Cultural Centers (information) to keep primary school-children amused and pumped withrevolutionary fervor. During thecrusade, the rear guard graduallyadded activities such as gardening

and crafts. An association of Sandi-nista children, named after LuisAlfonso Velsquez, a 9-year oldFSLN militant killed in action in1979, organized additional rearguard activities.

Launching the CrusadeTwo weeks before the crusade wasto begin Minister T[Jnnerman closedall schools by government decree inorder to use them as final stagingand training areas for the briga-distas. Brigadistas received last-minute lessons in literacy training,sanitation in rural areas, camping,and additional political orientation.On Sunday, March 23, the crusaderswere ready for battle. They gatheredin plazas all over the country toswear to exterminate ignorance andto hear last-minute exhortations bycrusade spokesmen. They departedfor the trenches the following day.Miraculously, most teaching mate-rials were ready and had been dis-tributed. Transportation, mostlytrucks and buses furnished byvarious agencies, was provided,although it took as long as ten daysfor some instructors to reach theirpositions. Pictures of brigadistasmarching in uniform, fully equipped,were somewhat misleading: some ofthe backpacks, berets, Coleman lan-terns, and clothing did not get dis-tributed in time.

Theoretically, every squad knewwhere it was going. Male squadswere to go to the most inaccessibleareas; female squads were to remainclose to the larger towns. Brigadesfrom departments such as Managuawith a higher ratio of literacy in-structors to illiterates were to go tonorthern departments where illit-eracy was more prevalent. Reserveswere to remain in Managua tohandle newly discovered illiteratesand to substitute in case of diffi-culty.

The reality was different. Somebrigades failed to find their transpor-tation. Many brigadistas had towork out ad hoc arrangementswhen they found themselves injurisdictional disputes with otherbrigadistas. Some could not locatetheir assigned areas. Others foundthat the arrangements for lodgingmade by the teams in charge oflogistics were inadequate or for-gotten. Nevertheless, most reportsindicate that the groups got through

CLS-I-’81/11

the early confusion with a minimumof desertions and disillusionment.

The brigadistas were not withouthelp. Many parents escorted theirchildren to their assigned areas. Cru-sade officials handled emergenciesthrough an amateur radio networkand had five helicopters on loanfrom the Mexican government incase evacuations were necessary.(The United States had refused tocontribute helicopters for this pur-pose on grounds of excessive andunnecessary cost.) Minister T{Jnner-man made available a telephone"hotline" for worried parents ofbrigadistas.

Campesinos, after a period of hesi-tation, accepted the youthful inva-sion. In general, they shared theirmeager lodging and food, as theyhad been accustomed to do in timesof earthquake and war when Nica-ragua’s citydwellers fled to thecountryside. Adverse reactionoccurred most often when politicsappeared to override literacy instruc-tion and when brigadistas directlyattacked religion. Some campe-sinos, perhaps at the urging ofbrigadistas of no strong revolu-tionary orientation, perhaps as aresult of excessively crude efforts atpoliticizing them, resisted conscien-tization.

Campesinos reacted differently tothe efforts of brigadistas to pursuesome of the secondary purposes ofthe crusade. In general, they yieldedto malaria prophylaxis, vaccinations,and to suggestions for improve-ments in sanitation. However, theytended to resist answering the ques-tions about agricultural productionthat the brigadistas had been in-structed to ask. Many peasantscountered that, if the new govern-ment wanted to help the campe-sinos, its agents would ask whatthey wanted, not what they had.The agrarian census, which wasquestionable anyway from theFreirean point of view, was quietlyshelved. Campesinos happily sharedstories, legends, and songs, but theinitial collection of flora, fauna,tools, toys, and ornamental objectswas done unprofessionally, the re-sult of too little training. This situa-tion improved when special MobileCultural Brigades, staffed by univer-sity students, were organized totake charge of this activity.

One of the most unusual andperhaps the most successful sec-ondary purposes was the collectionof oral history. Over 200 universitystudents, trained in oral historytechniques by Mexican specialists,fanned out over Nicaragua to recordthe history of the insurrection. Theytoo had to overcome the campe-sinos’ initial reluctance to recounttheir experiences, but the students’willingness to share meager quartersand primitive conditions and acommon enthusiasm for the revolu-tion eventually produced results.The History Commission, a sub-division of Nicaragua’s Ministry ofCulture, now has custody of 7,500cassettes recording interviews withparticipants in the revolution.

Obstacles and DisappointmentsProblems, minor and major, inter-fered with the crusade. Brigadistasfound that to enable the campesinosto have time for classes they them-selves had to work longer in thefields than they had been led toexpect. Many brigadistas had diffi-culty adjusting to food, fiestas, andillness. Parents often insisted onbringing sons and daughters home.A total of 56 brigadistas died duringthe campaign; most of them bydrowning or in transport accidents,but 7 were killed, presumably byextremist elements opposed to thenew government or to the literacycampaign. Desertion,, said juntamember Sergio Ram=rez, was lessthan one percent, but one reportadmitted 4.6 percent, entirely attrib-uted to illness. 19 Still, homesick-ness, physical illness, lack of food,boredom, and parental concern tookits toll, if not in desertion, at least ininattention to responsibilities.Paperwork proved also to be a head-ache. Brigadistas were supposed tokeep a field diary. Few did. Briga-distas had instructions to give inter-mediate and final exams to showproof of literacy conquests. Manywere forced to rely on their owndevices when the exams were notdelivered on time. These failuresunderstandably frustrated regionalsupervisors in charge of collectingdiaries and statistics on the progressof the crusade. As soon as crusadeleaders realized they could not relyon brigadistas or "responsables" tosupply census and other informa-tion, they recruited students fromthe universities and from schools of

commerce as record-keepers. Stu-dent volunteers went to eachmunicipality collecting informationon new alfabetizados (literates) andnewly discovered illiterates. Thisinformation was supplied to crusadeheadquarters in Managua so thatthe publicity staff could report onprogress. It is intended that theserecords will be available, in aMuseum-Archive of the GreatNational Literacy Crusade, as proofof Nicaragua’s successful effort andfor postliteracy planning. 20

As reports came in from the record-keepers, the number of illiterates inNicaragua was revised upwardfinally "to over 900,000." TheOctober census of workers at theMercado Oriental (Eastern Market)of Managua, for example, turned up600 illiterates; a second census, inMay 1980, listed 1,000. 21 Accord-ingly, the target group of educableilliterates increased to approximately700,000. Whatever the exact num-bers, the situation required the re-serves, which were called up, andmore recruits. During the crusade,the mass organizations were con-tinually pressed to provide morebrigadistas.

Perhaps the biggest disappointmentto the crusade organizers during itsfirst two months was the doubtfulsuccess of conscientization. Cam-pesinos in many areas resisted thepolitical content, and many of thebrigadistas were not wholeheartedlybehind the effort. Teachers, it is safeto say, had not completely revolu-tionized their old methodology orlearned the new methodology. Allinvolved in the crusade were sup-posed to participate in the SaturdaySandinist Workshops (TalleresSabatinos Sandinistas), but the evi-dence is strong that these werepoorly organized and poorlyattended. Given the circumstancesof haste, the relative newness of theFreire method to Nicaragua, and theinexperience of the brigadistas, littleelse could be expected. At thehighest level of the crusade therewas much discussion of conscienti-zation and dialogue; at the lowestthere was stumbling, lecture insteadof discussion, and even rote learn-ing.

Evaluation and ResultsHalf way through the crusade theleaders paused to gauge progress.

12/CLS-1-’81

Following municipal and depart-mental meetings, a national con-gress convened in Managua June9-11, 1980. While the workingsessions exposed the early prob-lems, the tone of the speeches ofgovernment officials was resoluteand certain of success. The assassi-nation of brigadista GeorginoAndrade, who was killed in May bycounterrevolutionary assailants,gave speakers the opportunity todemand even greater efforts in theremaining weeks of the campaign.FSLN commanders, recalling thevictorious drive against Somoza theyear before, exhorted brigadistas toa last supreme effort to eradicateignorance and rekindle political con-sciousness. International delegatesin attendance--including RailFerrer of Cuba and Margaret Grape-Lantz, representative of the Swedishunions which had promised a gift of50,000 Coleman lanterns--wereobviously moved by the Nicaraguaneffort in the face of considerableindifference and skepticism on thepart of the outside world. Grape-Lantz apologized for the fact thatnot all the lanterns had arrived inNicaragua. She blamed the delay on"capitalism, which is dying," andwhich "could not be compared tothe enthusiasm and commitment ofthe recently born Nicaraguan revo-lution. ’’22 Buoyed by emotional ora-tory the crusaders girded for thefinal offensive.

Media coverage intensified in thelast few weeks. Once a municipalityreached a level of 95 percent literacy(counting only educable adults) itwas entitled to declare itself offi-cially a "territory free of illiteracy"(sometimes modified by the over-zealous to "territory free of ig-norance"). Banners, speeches,awards, and abundant radio, tele-vision, and newspaper publicitywere accorded the new "freezones." Factories and offices suc-cessful in reducing illiteracy heldsimilar ceremonies. Photocopies ofthe first letters written by recentalfabetizados, usually directed toBorge, T[Jnnerman, or Cardenal,appeared in newspapers. When thebrigadistas returned en masse onAugust 12, the country held agigantic celebration of victory at thenewly finished Nineteenth of JulyPlaza in Managua. To the cheers oftens of thousands of brigadistas andthe applause of distinguished for-eign visitors, Nicaraguans raised a

Figure 5

REDUCTION OF ILLITERACY RATES IN NICARAGUA BY DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT ILLITERACY RATE(%)

October ACTUAL REDUCTION1979 August 1980

1. Rama 75.33 12.72 62.612. R’o San Juan 96.32* 36.17 60.153. Nueva Segovia 69.15 12.89 56.264. Madriz 67.82 14.25 53.575. Puerto Cabezas 75.33 21.88 53.456. Estel’ 51.67 4.85 46.827. Chinandega 47.76 2.23 45.538. Jinotega 70.98 25.71 45.279. Len 53.01 8.06 44.9510. Chontales 59.05 14.13 44.9211. Bluefields 75.33 31.58 43.7512. Rivas 47.43 5.51 41.9213. Granada 41.71 5.49 36.2214. Matagalpa 71.94 36.55 35.3915. Carazo 41.92 10.63 31.2916. Masaya 47.09 15.88 31.2117. Boaco 62.08* 32.97 29.1118. Managua 27.24 6.79 20.45

Nicaragua 50.35 12.96 37.39*Inconsistency with Figure apparently represents later recounting.

Source: Segundo Congreso Nacional de la Alfabetizaci6n, "Documentaci(n delcongreso: informe de la Comisi(n B."(September 5, 1980).Unpaginated mimeo-graphed, report.

Note: According to official statistics, 406,056 illiterates had been taught to read.Another 43,000 were expected to complete the lessons in September. The pro-gram to educate 60,000 persons from the Atlantic coast whose first languagewas not Spanish began in September 30, 1980. It is clear that the 12.96 per-centage of illiterates is not accurate. Assuming a population of approximately1,500,000 Nicaraguans over 10 years of age, and accepting the figure of 406,056new literates, the only way to arrive at the 12.96 percentage is to assume thatapproximately 100,000 more people would learn to read in the two months afterthe campaign was over and to leave out 100,000 as uneducable.

banner proclaiming the entire coun-try "free of illiteracy." Crusade offi-cials solemnly reported that Nica-ragua’s illiteracy rate stood now at12.96 percent (Figure 5), puttingNicaragua alongside Cuba, Uru-guay, and the United States as themost litererate nations in theWestern Hemisphere. To CarlosFonseca, martyred hero of theFSLN, who had inspired the crusadeby his words, "Also teach them toread," brigadistas responded withbanners reading, "CommanderCarlos. We have completed thismission. What are your nextorders?"

At the second and final LiteracyCrusade Congress held at theTeatro Ruben Daro n ManaguaSeptember 5-6, 1980, there was

further self-congratulation but also agreater opportunity for evaluation ofmistakes and shortcomings than atthe first congress. Debates recog-nized the standard problems oflogistics, inadequate training, andthe insufficient motivation of manybrigadistas. Delegates took less noteof the strategic error of delayinginstruction in the Miskito andEnglish languages on the Atlanticcoast--workbooks in those lan-guages were not ready until Sep-tember-meaning that the revolu-tionary government had failed tofulfill its promise of incorporatingthe peoples of the Atlantic coastinto the national life. Altogether, thedelegates seemed satisfied thatrevolutionary breakthroughs in edu-cation had been achieved. The con-gress itself was characterized by

CLS-1-’81/13

Figure 6

FOREIGN DONATIONS RECEIVED AS OF AUGUST 15, 1980(In cordobas: 10 cordobas one dollar)

AUSTRALIA C9,631.30AUSTRIA 193,130.60BELGIUM 1,497,161.60BRAZIL 8,000.00CANADA 2,065,030.88CHILE .184.00COLOMBIA 67,100.00COSTA RICA 47,537.50CUBA 112,463.90CZECHOSLOVAKIA 28,000.00DENMARK 720,000.00DOMICAN REPUBLIC 10,300.00E. GERMANY 14,000.00ECUADOR 105,126.30EL SALVADOR 243.50ENGLAND 3,646,782.00FRANCE 1,202,280.80GUATEMALA 32,286.00HOLLAND 9,726,143.80HONDURAS 13,755.00HUNGARY 750,000.00ITALY 2,380,000.00MEXICO 253,212.70PANAMA 25,100.00PERU 380,000.00PUERTO RICO 6,220.00SPAIN 193,077.80SWEDEN 10,100,000.00SWITZERLAND 10,788,168,00U.S 22,675,163.66U.S.S.R 5,250.00VENEZUELA 679,332.00WEST GERMANY 13,872,491.00YEMEN 20,000.00YUGOSLAVIA 9,000.00CENT. AM. BANK OF ECO. INTEGRATION 100,000.00EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 2,476,756.00ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 1,866,070.13UNESCO 390,000.00UNICEF 200,000.00

Source: La Cruzada en Marcha, No. 15 (August 1980), p. 3.

sloganeering and safe politicalspeeches rather than criticism anddialogue. Captives of their exag-gerated statistics, the delegatesemphasized Nicaragua’s obligationto the underdeveloped world to passon the lessons of the literacy cru-sade to other nations in process ofliberation.

International AidDelegates at the September con-gress also gave recognition to inter-national assistance to the crusade.Of the nations sending volunteerinstructors, Cuba was by far themost generous with approximately

1,200. The next largest group was aSpanish brigade of 56, followed by agroup of similar size from theDominican Republic. In mid-crusadethe Costa Rican government agreedto send 200 retired teachers, butonly 50 arrived. The InternationalFederation of Students, based inPrague, organized a group of 20European students. Mexico, Colom-bia, Peru, Guatemala, Chile, Hon-duras, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina,Uruguay, El Salvador, Angola, NorthVietnam, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,France, and the two Germanies con-tributed small numbers. 23 The cru-sade turned away most North

American volunteer teachers; nomore than three or four such partici-pants could be identified by the cru-sade offices.

International donors played a sig-nificant role in the success of thecrusade. By the time the crusadegot under way in March 1980 some$1,500,000 had been contributedfrom abroad. This amount, added tothe $500,000 collected in Nicaragua,totaled approximately one-tenth ofthe expected need. Although farfrom enough, it gave the Nicara-raguans faith to carry out theirplans. As Father Cardenal repeat-edly said, "It was necessary to goahead as if the money were there."

Figures released at the end of thecrusade showed a total of $8,668,574in foreign contributions (Figure 6).By far the largest contributor wasthe United States, which con-tributed 25 jeeps (worth about$190,000) and $2,650,000 in food.The latter was in response to anurgent call from the Nicaraguan gov-ernment in mid-crusade, noting thatthe brigadistas were short of food.United States Agency for Inter-national Development (AID)officerswere not happy at the prospect ofexplaining the phrase, "Yankees,enemies of humanity," whichappears in the FSLN anthem and isprinted in the literacy workbook, toU.S. congressmen, but they swal-lowed hard and approved the grant.Sweden, Switzerland, and Hollandeach contributed approximately$1,000,000, mainly through inter-national church organizations.Freire’s influence as Special Con-sultant to the Office of Education ofthe World Council of Churcheshelped. The Nicaraguan govern-ment also advertised for aid. "Wehave inherited a country in ashes.An appeal to the British public,"headed one request in Britishnewspapers; similar appealsappeared in West European coun-tries. The entreaties, backed up bythe organization of Solidarity withNicaragua groups in WesternEurope and the United States,brought in additional funds. Theonly substantial contributor fromthe Eastern bloc nations was Cuba,which contributed advisers andteachers, but only $11,000 in cash.The Soviet Union sent $525.

Crusade Follow-upNicaragua’s educational planners,fully aware of the difficulties of

14/CLS-1-’81

maintaining Nicaragua’s literacyrate, carefully prepared for thetransition from the crusade tonormal conditions. Creation of theoffice of Vice-Minister of AdultEducation, announced in Septem-ber 1980 but planned from the be-ginning of the crusade, was the firstmajor step in the transition. It is thevice-minister’s responsibility to con-vert the instruments of the success-ful literacy campaign into a perma-nent program. Plans call for con-version of nonformal schooling unitsinto Popular Centers of Education(CEP) with experienced brigadistasas coordinators. Literacy commis-sions, with the same mass organi-zation representation and atnational, departmental, and munici-pal levels, will become adult educa-tion commissions. The adult educa-tion section of the Ministry of Edu-cation has responsibility for carryingthe crusade to non-Spanish speak-ing Nicaraguans and for reducingthe illiteracy rate still further. 24

ConclusionsIt would be a mistake to judge theliteracy crusade’s impact on Nica-

NOTES1. Primera proclama del Gobierno deReconstrucci&n Nacional (June 18,1979), p. 15. Translations are by theauthor.

2. Cruzada en Marcha, no. (February1980), p. 7.

3. Gran Cruzada Nacional de Alfa-betizacln (Managua, 1980), p. 6.

4. Though personal differences led toXavier’s withdrawal from La Prensa andhis founding of the Nuevo Diario in April1980, La Prensa remained in the handsof another brother, Jaime, and PedroJoaqun Chamorro Cardenal’s son,Pedro Joaqui’n Chamorro Barrios. Stillanother son of Pedro Joaqufn ChamorroCardenal, Carlos Fernando ChamorroBarrios, is editor of the governmentnewspaper, Barricada.

5. For an excellent analysis of theCuban literacy campaign see Richard R.Fagen, The Transformation of PoliticalCulture in Cuba (Stanford, Cal.: Stan-ford University Press, 1969), p. 33-68.

6. Of Freire’s numerous publicationsperhaps his Pedagogy of the Oppressed(New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), isbest known. For a convenient summaryand analysis see Thomas G. Sanders,"The Paulo Freire Method," AUFS

ragua solely from the basis of statis-tical accomplishments. They are im-pressive enough, even if we do notaccept the exaggerated officialfigures. It would also be a mistake tojudge the literacy crusade solely onpedagogical grounds. Given thatrecent literates, especially in remoteareas, may have little opportunity touse their reading and writing skillsand recognizing the budgetary prob-lems faCing the administrators ofNicaragua’s adult education pro-gram, the outside observer mayreadily question the depth andbreadth of literacy education. It iseven possible to question the valueof literacy to Nicaraguan citizenswho subsist through agriculture andfishing. Instead, the ultimate suc-cess of the literacy crusade willdepend on its ability to sustain therevolutionary momentum originat-ing in the "first" war of liberation. Ifthe crusade has revolutionized theattitudes of citydwellers towardNicaragua’s rural areas, as Nica-raguan leaders claim, 25 the year1980 could be pivotal in the trans-formation of Nicaragua’s politicalculture.

Reports, West Coast South AmericaSeries, Vol. XV, No. (1968).

7. La Prensa (Managua), November20, 1979.

8. Nuevo Diario (Managua), Septem-ber 16, 1980.

9. La educaci6n en el primer ano de larevolucnpopularsandinista Managua:Ministerio de Educaci6n, 1980), pp.168-69.

10. Edgard Mac[as G6mez, "An&lisis dela estructura .y funcionamiento delsistema nacional de educaci6n deadultos," in Miguel ’Obandoy Bravo, etal., Educacio’n y dependencia: el caso deNicaragua (Managua: Instituto de Pro-moci(n Humana, 1977), pp. 131-87.

11. George Black and John Bevan, TheLoss of Fear: Education in Nicaraguabefore and after the Revolution (Lon-don: Nicaragua Solidarity Committeeand World University Service, 1980), pp.63-64.

12. La Prensa (Managua), October 25,November 2, 1979.

13. Open letter by Amadou-MahtarM’Bow, Paris, January 25, 1980, inEncuentro, no. 16 (1980), pp. 66-68.

14. Ibid., p. 64.

During the years of revolutionarywarfare, Nicaraguans forged a newsense of unity. In 1980 Nicaraguatook a giant step toward nationaldignity and national pride by makinga massive effort to make its peopleliterate. The acts of sacrifice of tensof thousands of Nicaraguans helpedbridge the traditional gaps betweenrich and poor, between rural andurban, and between coast and in-terior. Common sacrifice for thegood of all under determined, effec-tive national leadership gave theFSLN an opportunity to consolidaterevolutionary gains in other fields.Politically, the crusade was asuccess. It is not likely that anyother Nicaraguan national campaignin the next few years will involve somany Nicaraguans so intimately.Hopes for the consolidation of theNicaraguan revolution rest heavilyon the lessons learned and the senseof unity created by the crusade.

December 1980)

15. Ibid., p. 78.

16. Ibid., p. 72.

17. Conferencia Episcopal de Nica-ragua, "Compromiso cristiano en laCruzada Nacional de Alfabetzacon(mimeographed report, January 8, 1980).

18. "’El Instituto NicaragLiense de Desar-rollo (INDE) y sus programas FUNDE yEDUCREDITO han desarrollado lassiguientes actividades en pro de la Cam-papa de Alfabetizaci6n" (mimeographedreport, March 1980).

19. Patria Libre: Organo del Ministeriodel Interior, I, no. 6 (Managua, August 6,1980), p. 7.

20. La educacn en el primer afio, p.173.

21. La Prensa (Managua), May 28, 1980.

22. A complete report of the congress isin Nuevo Diario (Managua), July 3,1980.

23. La educacn en el primer ao, p.171

24. Ibid., pp. 191-92.

25. Nuevo Diario (Managua), August30, 1980.