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Tim Fredrick March 2010 NCAR/ACD/NESL Computing The Mebroot/Torpig threat UCAR Malware incidents

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UCAR Malware incidents. The Mebroot / Torpig threat. What we’re up against. Infections in ACD. Attempted compromise of a Linux machine visiting a newspaper site Successful compromise of a 2 Windows XP, 1 Vista machine Multiple infections of UCAR systems – all Windows PC’s - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: UCAR Malware incidents

Tim FredrickMarch 2010

NCAR/ACD/NESL Computing

The Mebroot/Torpig threat

UCAR Malware incidents

Page 2: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

What we’re up against

Page 3: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Infections in ACD• Attempted compromise of a Linux machine visiting a newspaper site• Successful compromise of a 2 Windows XP, 1 Vista machine• Multiple infections of UCAR systems – all Windows PC’s• One UCAR system re-infected after it was reformatted/reinstalled• All were variants of TORPIG – all detected by monitoring network activity

Cost of Infections• TIME: Security staff, System Administrators, End-user• Systems must be reformatted/reinstalled. (in ACD we’ve used new disks)• Each System must remain down for forensics for approx 1 week• In one case, a staff member complained personal information was

removed from his/her control.

Page 4: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

What is infecting us…• TORPIG/MEBROOT

• MEBROOT is a “root kit” (aka Sinowal or Anserin)• TORPIG is a keystroke logger

What does TORPIG do?• Scans for credentials• Keystroke logging – sends to evasive but known collection sites• Knows about hundreds of banking sites; captures credentials• RSA researchers estimate TORPIG has stolen more than 300,000

bank accounts• Motivation: Financial• A problem among personal computers as well as corporate networks

Page 5: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

How does TORPIG get in?

Page 6: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

How does TORPIG get in?

“Malware community”Buys ads – look legitimate

when viewed by Google, but inject scripts when viewed by

other browsers

Page 7: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Drive-by download

• Uses scripting (Javascript, Flash)

• Intelligence built into the script• Looks legitimate except for the “target” audience• Avoids certain environments (Linux, MacOS)

• Must find a vulnerable application• Looks for dozens of vulnerabilities• Browsers• Java plugins• Media players (video, audio)• Adobe PDF applications

Page 8: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

The Mebroot “root kit”

• The vulnerability is exploited and a “rootkit” is injected

• What is a rootkit?• Software to give an intruder access to a machine• The software defends itself

• against detection• against removal

Page 9: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

The Mebroot “root kit”

What is the Master Boot Record?• A machine’s BIOS passes control to the MBR at boot time• 512 bytes of code• Holds the partition table• Bootstraps the OS

Page 10: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

The Mebroot “root kit”

What does Mebroot do?• Replaces the MBR• Intercepts network and disk I/O• Mebroot passes the original MBR to the OS for any disk I/O

• Making it invisible to all programs including Antivirus• “Hides” Torpig in the same way – hides hooks into the OS• Code is evolving: Much more evasive than it used to be• Mebroot can be used to “hide” future malware

• Symantec Antivirus may detect the hooks – it cannot detect Mebroot

Page 11: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Our best defense: block scripts

“Malware community”Buys ads – look legitimate

when viewed by Google, but inject scripts when viewed by

other browsers

HTMLcontent

Stop Scripting, Java andMedia incl Flash

Page 12: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Blocking scripts: NoScript

• NoScript is a browser plugin for Firefox

• Blocks by default:• JavaScript• Java• Flash• Silverlight• Some other plugins

• Whitelist• Allows you to select scripts to run for a session, or always allow

• Sites may also be blacklisted with NoScript

Page 13: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

NoScript: All good things have a cost

“My web page looks different!”

Page 14: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

NoScript: Decisions…

9news.com scripts:• google-analytics• coloradonewshome• revsci.net• brightcove• gannett-tv.com• others…

Statistic gathering

Advertising(potential malware)

Multimedia provider

Page 15: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Rules of thumb

Allow a minimum of what will make a site useful to you

Sites without marketing can be trusted more (UCAR, NASA, Paymentnet, etc.)

Don’t allow advertising:• Prevents drive-by downloads• Speeds up web page loading• Google analytics and Google Adsense may always be blocks by NoScript

Feel free to delete cookies

Page 16: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Online banking

• Online banking is the specific target of TORPIG• Over 300,000 known credential thefts related to banking• Even small banks are being targeted

Page 17: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Online banking: Recommendations

• USE a dedicated SEPARATE BROWSER for online banking• Better yet, a separate computer that does no other browsing• Virtual machines might work

• Use only one machine from one IP address for banking. Makes it easier to investigate incidents involving banking fraud.

• Use strong passwords

• Convince your bank to use a one-time password token

Page 18: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

PC/Windows recommendations

• Plan so your work may continue in the event of a compromise• Be ready to use a secondary machine or laptop

• Reduce your risk• Keep applications updated• Install and use the Secunia Software inspector

http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ • Be wary of fake antivirus or other popups

• Report anything unusual• We’ll do our best to protect your privacy but need

information to help investigate virus incidents

Page 19: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Mac/Linux recommendations

• MBR malware can just as easily compromise Linux• Macs use Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) to boot – less vulnerable

• Currently TORPIG detects Mac or Linux and doesn’t allow itself to download software to exploit vulnerable applications

• Situation may change:• Adobe and Java vulnerabilities affect Mac and Linux versions as well• A growing Macintosh market may make it worth exploiting

Page 20: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Mebroot/TORPIG are only our current threat…

Page 21: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

39

2621

17 1713 12

7 6 5

051015202530354045

Top 10 Malware Dec 2009

Oregon Top 10

Torpig & Conficker have low detect rates because of new

stealth technology like Mebroot

Social networking

virus

We see this often at NCAR

Page 22: UCAR Malware incidents

Malware Presentation 2010

Demonstrations

• NoScript plugin

• Secunia Software Inspector (if there’s time)

Page 23: UCAR Malware incidents

Tim FredrickMarch 2010

March 17, 2010