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Tunnels and Underground Incidents

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Tunnels and

Underground Incidents

Agenda

• Part 1 –

• Introduction to the work of the Tunnel and Underground

Incidents National Project Group

• Tasks and Actions

• Malicious Action Plans – Proposal

Part 2 –

• Major project update – HS2

• Questions

15 Workstreams• Safe Working at height

• Nuclear and Radiation

• Transportation – Air

• Transportation – Rail

• Transportation – Road

• Transportation – Marine

• Hazmats

• Firefighting Media

• Animal Rescue

• Tunnels and Underground Incidents

• RPE

• Rural Firefighting / Wildfire

• Flood Response and Water Rescue

• HS2 Workstream

• Drones

Technical Response

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

The aims of the group are to:

• support the development of the NFCC’s Annual Plan;

• deliver agreed priorities and projects within the agreed project

plan;

• support the development of professional expertise and

guidance;

• provide advice and speak on behalf of the fire sector in the

specialist areas within the remit of tunnels and underground

incidents;

• share good practice, evaluation and learning between fire and

rescue services and appropriate partners to encourage the take

up of new and innovative schemes that deliver positive

outcomes for communities;

• engage and influence key stakeholders; and

• collaborate to deliver beneficial outcomes where appropriate.

Priorities

• Tasks and actions

– Major project register

and work plan

– Project outlines

– Meeting programme

and schedule of work

and events

– Developing project

group and partner

network

– Highlight reports to

OCC

– NFCC Workplace

access and use

Work Plan for 19/20

31/08/2019 30/06/202001/10/2019 01/01/2020 01/04/2020

13/03/2020

Project Group

10/10/2019

Project Group

16/01/2020

Project Group

11/10/2019 - 16/01/2020

Continue to Develop Major Projects Register

13/03/2020 - 30/06/2020

MARP Introduction

16/01/2020 - 12/03/2020

Develop Final MARP approach

16/01/2020 - 06/05/2020

Review NOG Guidance

28/06/2020

Conference?

• Completed

– Initial Project Register

• <30 Major infrastructure projects

planned or under construction

• Significant risk of variance in

operational approaches, i.e. PDAs

– Outline work plan

• Risk management

• Guidance review

• Threat to underground sites

(MARP proposal)

– Workplace info sharing

– Comment on Active consultations,

i.e. Proposed Standards in Road

Tunnels

– Strong links with HS2 project

group

• In Progress

– Background review of operational

guidance

• Prep for formal review

– Further development of

comprehensive risk register

– Planning of knowledge sharing /

conference events for 19/20

– If agreed, role out of MARP

Progress

Context

Woodsmith Mine Tunnel

Malicious Action Response Plan - MARP

Hierarchy of Risk Information

MARP Concept

Tactical Plans

MARPS

Site Specific Risk Info (SSRI)

NOG JESIP JOP LEGACY

COMAH Plans

Event-based

Generic

What is a MARP?

• Plan for where malicious INTENT incident has occurred

• Enhanced level of emergency actions

• Involving different responding agencies

• Potential for a Counter Terrorism element

• Generic concept to be applied to any location

• Response and planning measures underpinned by JESIP

principles…

• Developed in conjunction with LRF partners and site

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Principles

• Multi Agency Response Planning

• Share to prepare

• Section 1

Initial Incident Management

• Section 2

Further Incident Management

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2 – Project Overview

• Route overview Construction

• General Fire Objectives of HS2 Operational Intervention

• Key Engagement Principles Questions

• Fire Engineering Process

• Infrastructure

HS2 Overview

345 miles of High Speed track

£55.7Bn budget

48 high speed trains an hour

Around half the population able to access the High Speed Network

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Key Railway Characteristics• Trains will travel up to 360 km/h – dependent on route alignment and infrastructure

• Powered by OLE – 25Kv

• HS2 will be an all ticketed service and passenger numbers will be limited to 550 persons for a 200m

train and 1100 for a 400m train.

• 18 trains/hour in each direction.

• 8 planned new stations

• Tunnels – Bored or cut and cover

– 9 tunnels on Phase 1

– 7 tunnels on Phase 2

• Numerous viaducts – 0.5 - 4+km

• The trains will be managed by a Network Integrated Control Centre located at Washwood Heath,

Birmingham

• Only electric rolling stock will be used for revenue operations.

• There will be no hazardous freight on HS2.

• Maintenance trains may be diesel or electric - fire suppression fitted if diesel.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Key Elements• Tunnels

– Cut and cover or bored

– Intervention/ventilation shafts

– Tunnel portals

• Stations

– Phase 1 – Euston, Old Oak Common (Acton), Birmingham Interchange (NEC) and Birmingham Curzon Street

– Phase 2 – Manchester Airport, Manchester Piccadilly, East Midlands Hum (Toton, Nottinghamshire) and Leeds

• Depots

• Phase 1 – Calvert (Bucks), Washwood Heath

• Phase 2 – Crew, Staveley (Derbyshire), Leeds

• Network Integrated Control Centre – NICC – Washwood Heath

• Open Route

– Bridges and viaducts

– Rail system compounds

– Cuttings/Embankments

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

General Fire Objectives

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

General Fire Objectives• The overarching fire objectives are the protection of;– The infrastructure occupants – passengers, operational staff, railway

workers, maintenance staff, visitors, members of the fire and rescue service (FRS) and other emergency staff.

– Infrastructure and associated assets – property protection

– Business of providing high-speed rail services – business continuity

– The environment.

• As Statutory Undertaker HS2 are not required to pass through the normal Building Control process, therefore a Qualitative Design Review (QDR) process for consultation and assurance for building design, construction and trial/operation will be utilised to seek a position of no objection/agreement with the FRS.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

Key Engagement Principles

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Key Engagement Principles• HS2 has provided a single and central coordinating function for

engagement with the FRS and to act as single point of contact between Contractors and FRSs - HS2 FRS Liaison Manager

• The FRS will provide a central group - HS2 Fire Service Liaison Group to aid coordination.

• Route wide design features (tunnels, shafts, portal buildings, open route, construction etc) will be principally agreed by the HS2 Fire Service Liaison Group.

• Location specific features will be agreed by FRS Local Group(s) but engagement managed via the HS2 central function.

• Process for resolving route wide and local issues established – HS2 FRS Resolution Group.

• Liaison and Local Groups will reach a position of agreement/no objection on design, construction and testing/operational stages of the project.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

QDR Development and DeliveryHS2 FRS Resolution Group

NFCC HS2 Lead

DCO WarwickshireHS2 FRS Liaison Lead

Ian Parkhouse

NFCC Rail Lead

Dave Bulbrook

FRS Liaison Group

HS2 FRS Liaison Lead

Ian Parkhouse

London Fire

BrigadeContractor

Herts FRS Bucks FRSOxfordshire

FRSNorthants FRS

Warwickshire

FRSW. Midlands

FRS

Staffordshire

FRS

Cheshire FRS GMc FRS Notts FRSLeicestershire

FRSDerbyshire FRS

S. Yorkshire

FRS

N. Yorkshire

FRS

FRS Local

Group

• HS2

• Local FRS

• Contractor

FRS Local

Group

• HS2

• Local FRS

• Contractor

FRS Local

Group

• HS2

• Local FRS

• Contractor

FRS Local

Group

• HS2

• Local FRS

• Contractor

FRS Local

Group

• HS2

• Local FRS

• Contractor

FRS Local

Group

• HS2

• Local FRS

• Contrctor

W. Yorkshire

FRS

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

Fire Engineering Process

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

Infrastructure Design

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Phase 1 Tunnels

• A short tunnel between Euston station and the main Euston tunnel (250m).

• A long tunnel between Euston and Old Oak Common Station (OOC) containing 2 shafts (7.6 km).

• A long tunnel between OOC and West Ruislip containing 4 shafts (13.2km);

• A long tunnel under the Chiltern area containing 5 shafts (16.3 km).

• 5 shorter mostly, cut and cover tunnels to Birmingham 0.7 – 1.3

• 6 km tunnel underneath Birmingham containing a single shaft.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Phase 2 Tunnels

• 9 tunnels on Phase

2a & 2b.

• 7 short tunnels

• One long tunnel at

Manchester with four

shafts (12.7km)

• One long tunnel at

Crewe with two

shafts (6km)

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Tunnels 1• All tunnels longer than 300m are

mechanically ventilated.

• Tunnels between 100m and 300m may be naturally or mechanically ventilated

• Tunnel diameter depends on the length and train speed.

• Bored tunnels are 7.55 – 9.1m diameter

• Cut and cover tunnels are - 8m x 7m.

• All tunnels > 300m have two separate bores.

• The average depth is 15 to 20m and the deepest depth - 55m

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Tunnels 2• Mechanical ventilation provided via jet fans located in tunnel.

• Cross passage doors provide at 350 – 500m intervals with sliding escape

doors

• Escape walkways provided in all tunnels for evacuation and FRS intervention

• Damp (pre-charged) horizontal main with twin outlet landing valves (60m)

provided for firefighting.

• Radiating cable for FRS Channel 5 provided in all tunnels.

Bored tunnels at Euston, Northolt, Long Itchington Wood, Bromford, Crewe and

Manchester

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Tunnels 3

• Tunnels in excess of 3.3km provided with intervention

and ventilation shafts

• For use by the FRS for emergency intervention, tunnel

ventilation and rail systems equipment.

• Provided at up to 3.3 km spacing for longer tunnels.

• Pressurised fire fighting stairs/core and motorised

trolleys at base of shaft.

• Down coming main in each shaft with multiple inlet point

and outlets on each level.

• Emergency water supply provide either via Hydrant or

tank supply

• In most cases a dedicated area at ground level greater

than 550 m2 that allows parking for multiple vehicles,

due to urban restrictions a minimum of 300m2 provided

at some locations- urban realm can also be used.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Portal firefighting points• Tunnels in excess of 3.3km provided with intervention

and ventilation shafts

• For use by the FRS for emergency intervention, tunnel

ventilation and rail systems equipment.

• Provided at up to 3.3 km spacing for longer tunnels.

• Pressurised fire fighting stairs/core and motorised

trolleys at base of shaft.

• Down coming main in each shaft with multiple inlet point

and outlets on each level.

• Emergency water supply provide either via Hydrant or

tank supply

• In most cases a dedicated area at ground level greater

than 550 m2 that allows parking for multiple vehicles,

due to urban restrictions a minimum of 300m2 provided

at some locations- urban realm can also be used.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Open Route• Comprises of:

• Plain line rail

• Viaducts and bridges (150) – 0.01 – 4.3km

• Cuttings and embankments

• Rail system compounds

• Eight (phase 1) ‘safe’ emergency stopping locations in addition to stations

• Open air

• Facilities for emergency evac – 500m2

• Emergency vehicle access, parking, RVP and information

• EWS

• Additional access;

– Vehicle access and parking (within 10m) at rail system compounds – every 5km

– Emergency services access (on-street parking and foot access) – every 2.25km

– Level walkways 0.8m wide along entire route –access or evacuation

– Most of open route behind an enclosed fence -fence type dependent on location.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Viaducts

• Specific FRS access will be provided to at least

one end of any viaduct between 0.75 km and

1.5km long.

• Longer than 1.5 km long, access will be

provided with FRS access at both ends.

• Viaducts more than 3.0 km long will have

additional maintenance access that could be

used for FRS intervention.

• Where practicable, viaduct access will be at

track level, however where this is not practicable

the FRS will be required to use an open

staircase to walk circa 15m up to the viaduct

• 550 m2 at each end of each viaduct longer than

0.75km.

• Emergency walkways (0.8m) with parapets on

each side.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Network Integrated Control Centre – NICC

• Located at Washwood Heath –W.Mids.

• Provide remote operational management of HS2 infrastructure and trains, including emergency incidents.

• Hardened security - CNI?

• Direct link to bronze commanders via dedicated comms systems at strategic locations.

• Control Centre and office accommodation – expected fire safety standards – fire safety systems, MoE, compartmentation, FRS access and facilities etc.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Depots

• Located at Calvert and

Washwood Heath, Crewe

and leeds

• Large maintenance sheds

– 400 x 120m

• Significant extended

access and egress

distances – BS7974 or

BS9999 where conforming

• Compartmentation, fire

safety systems, FRS

access and facilities (damp

fire main)

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Stations • Phase 1 – Euston, OOC, Interchange and Curzon Street

– Euston and OOC - Sub surface stations.

• Phase 2 – Manchester Station and Piccadilly, East Midlands Hub and Leeds

• Multiple interfaces with other transport providers at all stations – Network

Rail, Crossrail, London Underground, Tram Services etc.

• Platforms 400m+ in length

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Stations Facilities Mechanical and natural ventilation

provided for smoke extraction.• Sprinklers provided in basements.

• Access to perimeter varies between sites due to existing buildings and layout.

• Pre-charged fire main with multiple inlets/outlets located throughout sites.

• Firefighting shafts, lobbies and lifts with mains outlets where required.

• 3 FRS platform intervention points provided at every station.

• Horizontal fire main with outlets located at 60m intervals along all platforms.

• Outlets valves to be located within firefighting cores and in open concourse areas

where required.

• Station Operations Room (SOR)/Fire Control Centre provided at every station to assist

incident management.

• Fire suppression provided in waste storage and treatment areas.

• Dedicated FRS communication system between shafts, platform levels and SOR.

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

Construction Fire Safety

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

Construction Fire Safety Guidance Document

• Document produced providing fire safety requirements for Contractors during construction.

• Drafted referencing existing standards and using learning from previous projects.

• Drafted in parallel with BS9992 - Fire safety in the design, management and use of rail infrastructure -Code of practice.

• Document details;– Systemwide and local engagement process during construction.

– Technical Requirements and good practice guidelines

– Fire safety compliance and emergency operational planning

– Facilities for firefighters (Temporary & permanent provisions)

– Fire safety during construction

– Preparation Works – Including temporary accommodation buildings

– Tunnel boring/cut and cover construction (BS:6164)

– Station and shaft construction (compartmentation, MOE, firefighter

• facilities/access)– Tunnels fit out (loco/plant risks)

– Testing and trial running phases.

– Assurance process

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

FRS Tunnel Intervention

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

FRS Operational Intervention Tunnels – 1

Shaft 2Shaft 1

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

FRS Operational Intervention Tunnels – 2

Shaft 2Shaft 1

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

FRS Operational Intervention Tunnels – 3

Shaft 2Shaft 1

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

FRS Operational Intervention Tunnels – 4

Shaft 2Shaft 1

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

HS2

FRS Strategic / Tactical Considerations?

Tunnels and Underground Incidents

FRS Operational Considerations• Access – cuttings, embankments, tunnels and open route.

• Potential delayed response and intervention

• Effective communication – FRS, NICC and emergency services.

• Minor/major Incident?

• Resource requirements – Local, 13 & 16, Regional and National

(NR).

• LRF – Multi agency response plan?

• JESIP

• Exercising for specific infrastructure.

• Training, operational competence and preparedness.

• 7.2.d) and enforcement inspections.

Any Questions?

Managing Risk for UK Major

InfrastructureDavid Bulbrook NFCC Transport-Rail

Dave Harold London Bridge Associates 12th March 2019

UK Projects- Examples

• HS2

• Crossrail/ Crossrail 2

• Hinckley Point C

• Woodsmith Potash mine / mineral

transport tunnel

• Trans-Pennine route upgrade

• Tideway

• Lower Thames Crossing / Silvertown

Tunnel

UK Projects – Impacts

Challenges

• Limited research studies

• Limited pool of knowledge

• Isolated FRS with limited competency

• Public and firefighter safety

• Recording of issues & decisions

• Additional Training requirements

• Scrutiny of FRS capability

Opportunities

• NFCC role supporting UK infrastructure

• Opportunity to influence standards and set policy

direction

• Pooling knowledge to support / challenge major

developments

• Primary Authority model?

• Wider sector support

• FRS officers embedded into major projects (cost

recovery / invest in engineering)

Project Engagement

Informal Engagement

Formal Engagement (QDRs 1-2 years)

Planning (FRS capacity/capability)

During Construction (1-10 years)

During Operation (25-150 years)

Sector Requirements

• Wider agreement

• Efficient and effective arrangements

• Payback period short term v long term

• Succession Planning

• Funding

• Next steps?

Any Questions?