ORIGINAL PAPER

Transport policy planning in Germany - An analysis of politicalprograms and investment masterplans

Frank Fichert1

Received: 27 October 2016 /Accepted: 9 May 2017 /Published online: 17 May 2017# The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication

AbstractIntroduction In Germany, the most recent comprehensivetransport policy program of the federal government was pub-lished in the year 2000, followed by several sector specificprograms. Aims, strategies, and priorities specified in the dif-ferent governmental transport policy documents are discussedin the paper, with a particular focus on the modal split betweenroad and rail. Apart from the fiscal and the regulatory frame-work, themost important policy area for the federal governmentis the provision of transport infrastructure. In 2016, the federalgovernment enacted a new investment masterplan. Therefore,the experience with the former plan is described and key ele-ments of the new masterplan are presented. The overall invest-ment into transport infrastructure as well as the share of thedifferent modes of transport are analyzed in more detail.Methods Germany’s transport policy is analyzed based on theaims, strategies, and priorities which are expressed in the pub-lished programs (text analysis). Data on modal split and usercosts is used to assess transport policy developments. Theinfrastructure masterplans are analyzed based on the plannedallocation of investment for different modes of transport andtypes of investment. Moreover, for the past masterplan actualbudget data is used for the analysis.Results With respect to transport policy programs, a shift inthe priorities can be observed, closely linked to the changingpolitical majorities. Whereas the comprehensive program

published in 2000 stresses the importance of a sustainabledevelopment and calls for a modal shift, more recent programsfocus on the competitive situation of German transport serviceproviders. Moreover, more emphasis is put on the implemen-tation of specific measures. With respect to infrastructure pro-vision, in particular investment into road infrastructure wasbelow the planned values. The recently enacted plan allocatesmore funds to the maintenance and replacement of infrastruc-ture, and to inland waterways.Conclusions Although the priorities set by the government inpublished transport policy programs have changed, the effectson the overall traffic development remain rather limited. Withrespect to the federal transport infrastructure masterplan, anoverestimation of the number of projects which might be com-pleted within the given timeframe has been criticized severaltimes. Although the political progress is providing some in-centives to include a high number of projects in themasterplan, a more realistic approach appears to be suitable,also signaling the need for a larger budget. In the past, budgetincreases have been the result of macroeconomic consider-ations rather than of transport policy requirements. It remainsto be seen whether these deficits will be at least partially elim-inated during the lifespan of the recently enacted masterplan.

Keywords Infrastructure investment . Transport policy . Costbenefit analysis

1 Introduction

Transport policy provides several areas for long-standing de-bates. Especially in the second half of the twentieth century,many economists argued in favor of liberalizing the heavilyregulated transport sector (for Germany see [29]). Today, atleast in industrialized countries major transport markets are

This article is part of Topical Collection on The development of NationalTransport Policy

* Frank FichertFichert@hs-worms.de

1 Faculty Tourism and Transportation, Worms University of AppliedSciences, Erenburgerstraße 19, D-67549 Worms, Germany

Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2017) 9: 28DOI 10.1007/s12544-017-0247-7

competitive (or at least subject to tendering procedures, e.g.local public transport), leaving only limited opportunities forfurther deregulation. However, the fiscal framework (i.e. taxes,subsidies, and user charges) plays an important role for devel-opments in the transport sector, giving rise to several controver-sies. Moreover, almost the entire transport infrastructure is pro-vided by the state. Therefore, not only the overall level of in-vestment but also the allocation of funds between the differentmodes of transport and the resulting effects on the modal splitare key elements of debates on transport masterplans. Alreadyin 1953, the first comprehensive West German transport policyprogram called for a ‘harmonic sharing of tasks’ between thedifferent modes of transport ([18], own translation). Against thebackground of a growing importance of climate change policiesand differences in the specific CO2 emissions of road and railtransport, the debate on modal split developments is gettingmore intense over the last years (e.g. [4]).

Due to the country’s federal structure and the high impor-tance of the European regulatory framework, transport policyplanning in Germany is rather complex. Despite the integra-tion into the European transport policy framework, severaldecisions are still within the competencies of domestic policymakers, especially with respect to infrastructure provision andseveral elements of the fiscal framework. Whereas many re-cent papers on specific aspects of Germany’s transport policyexist, papers with a broader focus on Germany’s transportpolicy for the period after reunification are scarce (one excep-tion is [40], for an earlier comprehensive assessment see [5])and some of them were only published in German language.

In this paper, recent policy programs as well as themasterplan for investment into the federal transport infrastruc-ture will be discussed, giving particular attention to aims anddecisions related to the modal split, and concentrating on theperiod after reunification in 1990. The paper starts with a shortoverview of the allocation of transport policy competencies, thedifferent ‘historic’ phases of transport policy developments inGermany, and an overview of the current federal road and railinfrastructure provision (section 2). In section 3, recent policyprograms published by the government are analyzed, startingwith the integrated transport policy program published in 2000.Section 4 provides an overview of infrastructure investmentmasterplanning, concentrating on major controversies and ac-tual developments. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2 Basic information on transport policyand transport markets in Germany

2.1 Competencies for transport policy decisionsand infrastructure provision

In Germany the ‘vertical’ allocation of political competencieson the different levels of the state is determined by the

constitution (‘basic law’ - Grundgesetz). With regard to theregulatory framework, air transport and the federal railwaysare exclusively in the jurisdiction of the federal state (‘Bund’).Moreover, the federal state may decide to establish a uniformregulatory framework for maritime shipping, inland naviga-tion, road traffic (including user charges), and non-federalrailways. In practice, the regulatory framework for each ofthese areas is dominated by federal laws and regulations. Onthe other hand, the states (‘Länder’) are responsible for region-al and local public transport. Some states have furtherdecentralized these competencies, especially with respect toregional and local bus services. For most areas, regulationsand directives of the European Union provide a rather tightframework for transport policy decisions.

The responsibilities for infrastructure provision also de-pend on the mode of transport. Every road in Germany isclassified according to its user structure. The federal level isin charge of roads which are predominantly used for interstatetraffic, with a further differentiation between federal motor-ways (‘Bundesautobahnen’) and federal highways(‘Bundesstraßen’). Whereas all expenses for those federalroads are financed through the federal budget, the tasks ofplanning, building and maintaining those roads are assignedto the states, leading to some principal-agent-issues [36]. In2016, the federal government and the states agreed in principleon transferring some of these competencies to a new federalinfrastructure authority [20]. The states are solely responsiblefor roads which are important for interregional traffic(‘Landesstraßen’ and ‘Staatsstraßen’), whereas all other roadsof only local importance have to be provides by counties andcities, respectively.

Almost the entire railway infrastructure is owned and oper-ated by DB Netz AG, a branch of the federal railroad companyDeutsche Bahn AG (DB). DB is formally privatized but 100%owned by the federal state. Only small parts of the railroadinfrastructure with regional or local importance belong to rail-road infrastructure companies owned by states or local munic-ipalities. Also the largest part of the infrastructure for inlandnavigation has to be provided and maintained by the federalgovernment. With airports and seaports, the situation is morediverse. In 2016, 17 German airports served more than 1 mpassengers per year. Only four of them are partially privatized,one low-cost airport is almost completely owned by a privateinvestor. The other twelve airports are in full public ownership.Whereas the federal government is holding shares of the air-ports in Munich, Cologne-Bonn, and Berlin, all others airportsare owned by states and or municipalities in different combi-nations. The large German seaports are owned by the cities(taking into account that two of those cities, Hamburg andBremen, are states). In some cases the operators are partiallyprivatized. Inland ports are usually owned by cities.

On the federal as well as on the state level, competencieswhich are relevant for transportation usually are allocated to

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different ministries. The following two examples show(potential) conflicts within the government. Since the federalministry of finance is in lead for all decisions on indirect taxes,the federal ministry of transport’s opposition against theGerman air transport tax, introduced in 2011, so far has notbeen successful. On the state level, the ownership rights forairports are usually executed by the ministries of finance,whereas the state ministries of transport serve as economicregulators. Therefore, the decision of the ministry of transportin the state of Hessen, not to approve an increase of Frankfurtairport’s user charges for 2016 [31] might have some poten-tially detrimental effects on the state budget.

2.2 Historic phases of transport policy in Germany

Because of the large degree of path dependency in transpor-tation, the main historic developments of Germany’s transportpolicy are briefly sketched in this subsection [28]. TheGerman railroad system was already nationalized in the latenineteenth century, contributing with its profits to the statebudget. The upcoming of road haulage in the late 1920s ledto a severe economic regulation of this sector, intending toprotect the state-owned railway operator from the new inter-modal competitors.

After 1945 the system of limited entry (‘concessions’) andminimum prices for road haulage was sustained. With respectto aviation, Germany was not allowed to provide air transportservices for several years after the end of World War II. Theairline Deutsche Lufthansa was re-founded in 1955 as a stateowned company. The separation of Germany into two states in1949 led to severe challenges for infrastructure provision.Damages caused by the war had to be repaired, links to theformer capital Berlin were capped, and new connections be-tween the northern and the southern parts of West Germanyhad to be established. The rapid economic recovery(‘Wirtschaftswunder’ – ‘economic miracle’) made mass mo-torization possible. As a consequence, in the passenger trans-port markets the railway system as well as the local publictransport operators lost a large portion of their customers.Therefore, in the 1960s and 1970s huge investments into thefederal motorway and highway system (in order to reducecongestion) were paralleled by a demolishing of railroad linesin rural areas and tram systems in many cities. On the otherhand, commuter rail systems have been extended in denselypopulated areas since the 1970s.

In the 1980s the positive experience with deregulated trans-port markets in countries like the US and the UK as well as anincreasing pressure from the European Communities (EC) toalso open transport markets for firms established in other ECmember states led to a change in the German transport policy.The markets for air transport services as well as for road haul-age have been liberalized, following a step-wise approach.Deutsche Lufthansa was fully privatized. The implementation

of the European railway packages facilitated competition inrailway markets. According to the Rail Liberalization Index,only Sweden and the UK show a higher degree of liberaliza-tion than Germany [32, 33]. DB provides rail as well as sev-eral other transport services (regional and local bus transport,worldwide logistics via its branch DB Schenker). In 2015,DB’s market share was 61% (based on ton kilometers) in railcargo and 71% (based on train kilometers) in regional passen-ger rail transport [22]. There is hardly any competition in thelong-haul passenger market. Against this background, theMonopolies Commission (an independent advisory body tothe German government and parliament) recommends a fullvertical separation between infrastructure and operation in or-der to foster competition in the railway sector [38]. The pro-hibition of scheduled long-haul bus services, which had beenintroduced in the 1930s to protect the railroad operator, lasteduntil the year 2013 [23]. Since then, the market for scheduledlong-haul bus services has shown a tremendous growth [2].

German reunification in 1990was followed by huge invest-ments into the totally run down transport infrastructure in EastGermany as well as a resurrection of links between the easternand the western part of the country. Already before reunifica-tion, the environmental effects of transportation had gainedincreasing attention. Whereas the first measures basicallyaimed at emission reductions by improved technology (e.g.mandatory catalytic converters for new cars), towards the turnof the century also financial incentives have been used to agreater extent (e.g. increasing tax on fuel in 1999–2003 (‘ecotax’), see also section 3.1).

Also in the late 1990s financing of transport infrastructurebecame more challenging. In order to get closer to a balancedbudget, investments into infrastructure have been reduced ingeneral, but were increased during economic downturns, es-pecially in the year 2009 (see section 4). In 2005 a mileage-based user charge for trucks (heavy goods vehicles - HGV) onfederal motorways replaced the toll sticker introduced in 1995(see also section 3.1).

2.3 Key determinants for transport policy decisions

The following facts, political priorities, and developments arecrucial for understanding and assessing transport policy deci-sions in Germany:

& Germany is characterized by a high degree of motoriza-tion, also leading to a rather high political attention fortransport policy decisions affecting car users. As ofJanuary 2016, 45.1 m cars were registered in Germany(data source: [35]). Given a population of approximately81 m, this is a relation of 0.56 cars per inhabitant, which isabove the EU-28 average (0.49 cars per inhabitant in2013, data source: [24]). Amongst the five largest EUmember states (in terms of population), only Italy has a

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higher motorization than Germany. Since 2008, vehiclestemporarily registered as ‘off the road’ (e.g. convertiblesduring winter) are not included in the German registrationdata, reducing the reported number of registered cars bymore than five million in 2008 when compared to 2007.

& Not only because of its strong industrial basis but also dueto its geographic position, logistics and especially roadhaulage play an important role in Germany. Almost 5 mtrucks (light as well as heavy goods vehicles) are regis-tered in Germany (data source: [35]). A high and increas-ing share of trucks on German motorways is operated byforeign companies (40% of total mileage in 2015), espe-cially transporting goods between eastern and westernEurope, as well as between northern and southernEurope [3].

& For building new infrastructure, Germany has ratherstrict regulations regarding environmental protection.Furthermore, a participation of the citizens as well asof many Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) inthe planning process is required [17]. This typicallyleads to a rather long duration of planning processesas well as relatively high costs of providing infrastruc-ture. Also in other areas, e.g. night curfews at airports,German regulations are stricter than in many otherEuropean countries.

& Within the framework of European climate policy,Germany has set targets for reducing CO2 emissionswhich are above the European average [26]. Since thetransport sector is one of the largest sources of CO2 emis-sions, this political aim also affects transport policy.

& From a demographic point of view, the German popula-tion is aging and shrinking [27]. This process is far moreadvanced in rural areas than in larger agglomerations,where even population growth can be observed.Therefore, for rural areas the provision of public mobilityoptions is an important political aim

2.4 Key characteristics of federal road and railinfrastructure in Germany

In 2015, the entire road network’s length in Germany wasmore than 680,000 km. The share of the federal motorwayswas 1.9%, the share of federal highways 5.8%, and the shareof the state roads 12.7% [15]. Figure 1 shows that the networklength of federal highways increased by 20% since reunifica-tion, whereas the network length of the federal highways de-creased by 10%. Since the highway network is significantlylarger than the motorway network, the length of the entirefederal road network decreased by 3.3%. One reason is thedowngrading from federal highways to state roads, especiallyafter the construction of new motorways running parallel toexisting highways.

As many motorways were built in the 1970s and today’straffic volume exceeds by far the numbers which have beenforecasted in that period, significant parts of the infrastruc-ture are ‘worn out’. Therefore, an increasing share of infra-structure funding has to be allocated to repairing and replac-ing infrastructure rather than expanding it (see section 4).The ‘level of modernity’ for the entire road infrastructure(defined as the relation between the current asset value andthe acquisition values) decreased from 0.70 in 1991 to 0.66in 2015 [13, 15].

Since reunification, the total length of the federal rail net-work decreased by almost 20% (see Fig. 1). However, thequality of the rail infrastructure increased significantly, e.g.due to an increase of electrified segments by almost 25%. In2015, more than 60% of the federal rail network was electri-fied. In 1989, the first high speed trains began their services inWest Germany. Since the 1990s the high speed rail (HSR)network has been extended and the number of trains has beenincreased. Quite recently, cross border connections (e.g.Frankfurt-Paris and Frankfurt-Brussels) became part of theHSR network.

3 Governmental transport policy programs

3.1 Integrated transport policy program (2000)

Like in all other political sectors, transport policy programsreflect the aims of political parties and their representatives.Therefore, a change in the composition of the government islikely to influence political priorities. The federal elections in1998 led to a new government, replacing the coalition be-tween the Christian-democratic and the liberal party, whichhad had the majority in parliament since 1982. The gov-ernment elected in 1998 was formed by the social-democratic party and, for the first time in German history,the ‘green’ party.

Data sources: BMVI (ed.) 2015, BMVBW (ed.) 2000, own calculations.

70

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Fed. Motorway Fed. Highway Fed. Railway, total

Fig. 1 Development of federal motorway, highway, and railway networklength, 1991–2015 (1991 = 100)

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The 1998 government stressed the importance of reducingdetrimental effects of transportation not only by technologicalimprovements but also by shifting the modal split towardsmore environmental friendly modes of transport as well asby reducing (motorized) traffic. The overall target was a ‘sus-tainable’ transport sector, balancing economical, environmen-tal and social aspects. One new approach towards a moresustainable transport systemwas the integration of the former-ly separated ministries for transport, and for building and re-gional planning into one joint ministry, led by a member of thesocial-democratic party.

In 2000 the ministry published a transport policy programentitled ‘Transport report 2000. Integrated transport policy -Our concept for future mobility’ (BMVBW 2000, own trans-lation). This comprehensive document analyses past develop-ments, defines political targets, and describes ten key areas fortransport policy. Some of them basically update undisputedprograms like infrastructure reconstruction in East Germany,and further improvements in transport safety. Others show atthat time new priorities, especially the integrated approach ofland use planning and transport policy, and the general call fora more environmental friendly transport policy.

Although the program explicitly named some measuresand instruments, no quantitative targets were set. However,the government also commissioned a transport forecast whichincluded three different scenarios: (1) A ‘business as usual’scenario, assuming that the transport policy of the year 1997(i.e. before the change in government) remains unchanged, (2)an ‘excessive demands’ scenario which assumed a strong in-crease in user costs in order to achieve ambitious environmen-tal targets but appeared to be unrealistic from a political per-spective, and (3) an ‘integrated scenario’ which was based onthe government’s integrated approach towards transport poli-cy. The integrated transport policy scenario assumed on theone hand a slight increase in real user costs for road traffic(passenger and freight) as well as for air transport, and on theother hand reduced real user costs for railway services. Inorder to have a uniform measure, proposed regulatory chang-es, e.g. strengthening of working time limitations for truckdrivers, were transformed into cost increases. It is shown inTable 1 that still an overall traffic growth was assumed, butalso a slight change in the modal split as a result of the inte-grated transport policy approach.

Since the year 2000, Germany has seen three changes in thecomposition of the federal government. In 2005 the coalitionbetween the social-democratic and the green party was re-placed by the so-called ‘large coalition’ between theChristian-democratic party and the social-democratic party.The minister of transport was still a member of the social-democratic party. After the 2009 elections, the governmentwas formed by the Christian-democratic and the liberal party,succeeded in 2013 by another ‘large coalition’. Since the year2009 the minister for transport has been a member of the

Christian-social party (i.e. the Bavarian branch of theChristian-democratic party). In 2013, the structure of the gov-ernment was re-organized. The merger of the transport minis-try with the ministry of building and regional planning wasreversed. In the current government, the minister of transportis also in charge of ‘digital infrastructure’. The minister forenvironmental protection is also responsible for building andregional planning.

A comparison between the actual traffic development andthe different scenarios prepared for the integrated transportpolicy program might be used for assessing the overall effectof transport policy decisions over the respective period.Table 2 shows the growth rates of transport services providedand the changes in the modal split between 1997 and 2014(actual data)/2015 (scenario forecast published in 2000).Especially with respect to road traffic, the actual developmentof traffic growth rates comes closer to the integrated transportpolicy (INT) scenario forecast than to the business as usual(BAU) scenario forecast. However, the changes in the modalsplit are closer to the BAU scenario than to the INT scenario.Since the total amount of traffic is also determined by externalfactors (especially the overall economic development includ-ing the severe recession in the year 2009) the changes in themodal split are a better indicator for the effects of transportpolicy decisions.

At first sight, the targets of an integrated transport policy, asdetermined in the year 2000, have not been reached. However,there are several factors which have to be taken into accountwhen comparing the scenario forecasts with actual develop-ments. First, published data on car traffic (pkm) is derivedfrom passenger transport models. In 2002, these models wereupdated based on new data on transport behavior [34], reduc-ing the intertemporal comparability of this indicator. Second,although the government’s transport policy program pub-lished in the year 2000 has never been officially revoked,political priorities may have changed several times since theyear 2000 due to the changes in the government. For example,the coalition agreement between the parties forming the newfederal government in 2009 explicitly stated that the transportpolicy of the former coalition between the social-democraticand the green party ‘belongs to the past’ ([21]: 34, owntranslation).

The increase of user costs for road traffic, which was a keyelement of the integrated transport policy approach, was onlypartially supported by fiscal policy: The quantity tax on fuelwas increased five times between 1999 and 2003 (each timeby 3.07 ct/l, i.e. in total by 15.35 ct/l) but is constant since2003, leading to a real reduction of the tax rate after 2003.However, the rate of the user charge for trucks on the federalmotorway network was increased significantly in 2009 (theaverage rate increased from 12.4 ct/km to 16.3 ct/km, see [25])and the part of the network for which the user charge is leviedwas increased in 2012 and in 2015.

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In total, the costs of private car use increased by 28.9%between 2000 and 2015 (own calculations based on [15]:293), which is slightly above the overall inflation rate in thisperiod (24.7%; own calculations based on [41]). Between2005 and 2015 the increase in costs of private car use evenwas below the inflation rate (14.7% vs. 15.6%; sources asindicated above). On the other hand, the price index for pas-senger rail services increased by almost 50% between 2000and 2015 (own calculations based on [15]: 289).

For freight transport no data on the cost of service provisionis publicly available for the period 2000–2015. The producer-price-index (PPI) can be used as a proxy for cost develop-ments, however it only covers German transport service

providers, i.e. the large (and growing) number of foreigntrucks on German motorways is not included. Moreover, itis only published since 2006. In the period 2006–2015 thePPI for rail cargo services increased by 23.8%, whereas theincrease of the PPI for road haulage only was 11.5% ([42],own calculations).

3.2 Policy programs for freight transport and logisticsafter the year 2000

Official transport policy documents published after the year2000 only refer to specific market segments or particular modesof transport. Several policy documents focus on the cargo

Table 1 Transport services provided in Germany – Actual data for 1997, and two scenarios for 2015

Transport services provided (bn pkm/tkm) Modal split (%)

1997 2015 BAU 2015 INT 1997 2015 BAU 2015 INT

Passenger

- Road 750 915 873 79.6 79.2 72.8

- Rail 74 87 98 7.8 7.5 11.7

- Other public 83 76 86 8.8 6.6 8.8

- Air 36 78 73 3.8 6.7 6.7

Total 943 1156 1130 100.0 100.0 100.0

Freight

- Road 236 422 374 63.6 69.4 61.5

- Rail 73 99 148 19.6 16.3 24.3

- Water 62 87 86 16.8 14.3 14.2

Total 371 608 608 100.0 100.0 100.0

(BAU – business as usual and INT – integrated transport policy)

Source: BMVBW (2000), p. 25

Table 2 Comparison of actual transport developments and former scenario forecasts

Average growth rates (1997–2014/2015) Change in modal split (%-points)

Actual 2015 INT 2015 BAU Actual 2015 INT 2015 BAU

Passenger

- Road 0.7 0.8 1.1 −1.4 −6.8 −0.4- Rail 1.3 1.6 0.9 0.6 3.9 −0.3- Other public 0.3 0.2 −0.5 −0.7 0.0 −2.2- Air 2.9 4.0 4.4 1.5 2.9 2.9

Total 0.8 1.0 1.1

Freight

- Road 2.6 2.6 3.3 4.1 −2.1 5.9

- Rail 2.5 4.0 1.7 0.8 4.7 −3.3- Water −0.3 1.8 1.9 −4.9 −2.6 −2.5Total 2.2 2.8 2.8

(BAU – business as usual and INT – integrated transport policy)

Source: BMVBW [12], p. 25, BMVI (ed.) [15], own calculations

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segment and will be discussed in this subsection. Just like theintegrated transport policy program from 2000, the freighttransport and logistics masterplan from 2008 highlights theimportance of a sustainable development of the transport sector.The masterplan sets out six key objectives and for each of theseobjectives, specific measures are assigned. In contrast to theintegrated transport program, the masterplan was based on ex-tensive ex ante discussions with stakeholders. Table 3 providesan overview of objectives and assigned measures.

Comparing the Freight transport and logistics masterplanwith the integrated transport policy program enacted eightyears before, the masterplan puts more emphasis on the com-petitiveness of the German freight transport and logistics in-dustry. At the same time, more attention is given to workingconditions which might be attributed to the specific prioritiesof the social-democratic party, which led the ministry at thattime, but may also be a consequence of the intensified inter-national competition, especially by logistic service providersfrom Eastern Europe after the EU enlargement in 2004 and2007, respectively. Unlike the previous transport policy pro-gram the masterplan of 2008 names responsibilities as well asimplementation periods. In many cases, an immediate actionwas aspired. However, some of the measures refer to devel-oping concepts rather than implementing specific measures.

In 2010, the new government formed by the Christian-democratic and the liberal party issued an ‘action plan freighttransport and logistics’ [8], updating the masterplan publishedtwo years ago. According to its introduction, the priority of theaction plan, in comparison to the masterplan, is more on en-abling mobility and less on reducing mobility. Most measureshave been basically updated, some approaches, e.g. referring tothe internalization of external costs, have been abandoned,whereas other measures, e.g. enabling mega trucks (‘giga-lin-er’) on German roads, were added. Already in 2011, the min-istry published a first report on the implementation of the mea-sures covered by the action plan [9]. In 2012, the ministryreleased another intermediate assessment [10], claiming thatalready one fourth of the measures included in the action planhave been implemented andmost other measures are ‘on track’.

Another update of the action plan was published in 2015[16]. The ministry, still led by a member of the Christian-social party, claimed that many measures of the former actionplan have been successfully implemented. As a response tonew challenges, the ministry refers to (1) increased investmentinto infrastructure, based on a higher share of user fees, (2)promoting innovations like alternative fuels and (3) digitaliza-tion, e.g. automated driving.

3.3 Other transport policy programs after the year 2000and intermediate conclusions

Several transport policy programs have been developed afterthe year 2000with a focus on certain infrastructures or specific

modes of transport, e.g. the airport concept of the federal gov-ernment (2009, updating the first airport concept from 2000),the federal seaport concept (2009), the national plan for bicy-cle traffic (first version 2002, second version 2012), and theair transport concept (announced for 2017). As a particularity,the national plan for bicycle traffic specifies a ‘possible’ shareof bicycle traffic in 2020. However, it has to be taken intoaccount that the potential influence of the federal governmentwith respect to the promotion of bicycle traffic is rather small.

In addition to federal policy programs, some states pub-lished transport policy masterplans for their jurisdictions. Arather recent and comprehensive program was developed bythe state of Baden-Württemberg [37]. Thismasterplan is basedon several traffic forecasts and studies commissioned by thegovernment. The key target is a sustainable transport devel-opment. The masterplan describes several measures and pri-orities for the government’s transport policy, especially withrespect to investment into the state roads, public transportsystems, and Stuttgart airport. However, due to the allocationof competencies, in several cases the state government couldonly announce that it will try to influence the federal govern-ment to take certain measures. Moreover, the coalition be-tween the Christian-democratic and the liberal party in thestate of Baden-Württemberg was replaced in 2011, only sev-eral months after the publication of the masterplan. Since then,the prime minister as well as the minister for transport is amember of the green party.

To sum up, the development of transport policy programsover the last 20 years clearly shows varying priorities causedby several changes in the composition of the federal govern-ment. Whereas in 2000, a rather strong intention to influencetraffic developments and in particular to reduce transport ac-tivities and influence the modal split could be observed, amore pragmatic and industry oriented approach has beenestablished by subsequent coalitions. Although the implemen-tation of the measures laid down in the action plans is moni-tored rather closely, the overall target of a sustainable devel-opment allows for many different interpretations, making anassessment of the transport policies’ output rather difficult.

4 Federal transport infrastructure investmentplanning and financing

Investment into Germany’s federal transport infrastructure hasalways been controversial. On the one hand, the differentstates and regions within the states compete for a high sharein the overall budget (with the exception of some projectswhich are not wanted by some stakeholders). On the otherhand, the allocation of funds between the different modes oftransport has been disputed.

In the 1950s and 1960s, no formal procedure for the allo-cation of federal funds existed. Members of parliament from

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Table 3 Objectives and assignedmeasures from the federalgovernment’s freight transportand logistics masterplan 2008

Objective Assigned measures

Making optimum use of transport infrastructure –shaping transport to make it more efficient

1. Develop and deploy more traffic management systemson busy sections of federal motorways

2. Standardize and link up the traffic management systemson federal motorways nationwide

3. Speed up implementation of the BDevelopmentprogramme to increase the number of parking areas atservice stations and rest areas on federal motorways^

4. Continue and intensify the measures to tackle congestionby optimizing roadworks management

5. Provide traffic information and communications servicesfor heavy goods vehicles on the motorway network byusing toll information (value-added services)

6. Develop a strategy to speed up introduction of theEuropean Train Control System (ETCS) on freight cor-ridors in Germany

7. Develop a national ports strategy

8. Develop a national airports strategy

9. Take concerted action with shippers and the freighttransport sector to stagger freight traffic (extending ramptimes)

10. Create a focal point – the Fed. GovernmentCommissioner for Freight Transport and Logistics

Avoiding unnecessary journeys – ensuringmobility

1. Urban Logistics Initiative

2. Step up investment in innovative and capacity-enhancingtechnologies

3. Optimize transit traffic

4. Short sea shipping

Shifting more traffic to the railways and inlandwaterways

1. Review the regulatory framework for freight transport inintermodal competition

2. Increase funding for combined transport

3. Evolve handling technologies and organization incombined transport

4. Internalize external costs

Upgrading more transport arteries and hubs 1. Segregate freight and passenger traffic

2. Review the requirement plans

3. Press aheadwith the implementation of PPP solutions forthe speedy and efficient delivery of motorway wideningand motorway maintenance projects

Environmentally friendly and climate-friendlytransport

1. Develop a strategy to vary toll rates according to theroute driven and the time of day

2. Mitigate noise on the railways

3. Establish a financial assistance programme to encouragethe use of modern technologies to reduce the noisecaused by rolling stock

4. Optimize processes in the logistics chain taking greateraccount of environmental concerns

5. Further tighten environmental and safety standards(emissions reduction, noise mitigation, safetytechnology)

Good working conditions and good training inthe freight transport industry

1. Step up the enforcement of social legislation in the roadhaulage sector to improve road safety

2. Launch a basic and further training initiative

3. Hold regular summits on the subject of work and trainingin the freight transport and logistics sector

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different regions tried to influence the ministry, aiming atmaximum investment within their respective electoral dis-tricts. In order to allocate the budget for transport infrastruc-ture in a more efficient and transparent way, an intermodalinvestment masterplan for the federal transport infrastructure(Bundesverkehrswegeplan - BVWP) was introduced in the1970s [30]. This masterplan was updated several times. Thefollowing paragraphs focus on the development after Germanreunification in 1990.

The basic idea of the federal transport infrastructuremasterplan is to invest a predefined (projected) amount ofmoney into the most beneficial projects. Based on projectsuggestions from the 16 states, railroad operators, and otherstakeholders a cost benefit analysis (CBA) is conducted forpotential projects, following a uniform approach for all modesof transport. Usually, the masterplan’s timeframe is 15 years.Therefore, a 15 year traffic forecast serves as a basis forconducting the CBA. In addition to the CBA, in some areassupplementary studies have to be prepared, analyzing effectswhich are difficult to valuate (e.g. some environmentalaspects).

In order to be included into the masterplan, the benefits of aproject have to outweigh its costs. Moreover, priorities are set,differentiating between ‘urgent’ and ‘additional’ projects(with some additional classifications within these two catego-ries). ‘Urgent’ means that the project should be completedwithin the timeframe of the masterplan. However, themasterplan is not simply composed of the projects with thehighest relation between benefits and costs. First, from a po-litical perspective it would not be feasible to only invest intoinfrastructure located in few states, even if this would be themost beneficial option for the entire economy. Therefore, thefederal ministry has to make sure that an ‘appropriate’ share ofthe budget is spent in each state. Second, the allocation of thebudget onto the different modes of transport matters. Usuallysome parts of the budget are shifted from road to rail andinland waterway projects, avoiding a ‘too high’ share of

investment into the federal motorways and highways whichmay lead to an ‘unwanted’ change in the modal split.

The first masterplan after German reunification dates from1992 (BVWP 1992), basically including most of the largeinfrastructure projects which have been important for the eco-nomic recovery of Eastern Germany. In 2003 a newmasterplan was enacted (BVWP 11), covering all plannedinvestments until 2015 [11]. In March 2016 the governmentpublished a first draft of the updatedmasterplan. After a publicconsultation process, leading to some smaller changes, thegovernment enacted the masterplan in August 2016. Thetimeframe of the new masterplan is 2030. Again, the method-ology for the CBA has been updated ([44], for a critical dis-cussion see [39]).

Before construction, all infrastructure projects have to belegally approved, including a comprehensive consultation andparticipation process. If a project is classified ‘urgent’ in themasterplan, the states have the obligation to start (or continue)the approval process. However, even for projects with a veryhigh cost benefit ratio, difficulties in the planning process aswell as legal controversies might significantly delay or evenprevent the investment. Anecdotal evidence exists for projectswhich are part of the federal investment program for severaldecades but construction has not even started. The masterplanitself does not provide funds, this is done by infrastructureinvestment decisions made by the parliament (for roads usu-ally the decision of the parliament covers a five years period).

Infrastructure financing in Germany depends on the modeof transport. Apart from some pre-financing through Public-private-partnership models (for a critical assessment see [19]),the entire federal road infrastructure is financed through thestate budget. The two sources for funding are tax revenues andthe net revenues from the HGV user charge, the later beingincluded into the state budget and earmarked for road infra-structure investment. Also inland waterways are entirely fi-nanced through the state budget with rather small revenuesfrom user fees (the river Rhine as the most important

Table 3 (continued)Objective Assigned measures

4. Launch a lighthouse project to improve the internationalprofile of logistics courses in higher education

5. Monitor the working conditions in the freight transportand logistics sector as part of the market observationactivities of the Federal Office for Goods transport

6. Improve seafarers’ working and living conditions

Further measures to make Germany even moreattractive as a centre for logistics

1. Establish a freight transport and logistics network

2. Implement a marketing strategy to promote Germany asa centre for logistics

3. Security strategy for the freight transport and logisticsindustry

Source: BMVBS [7]

Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2017) 9: 28 Page 9 of 12 28

waterway in Germany is exempted from user fees since 1868).With respect to rail infrastructure, DB Netz AG collects userfees and is not only responsible for operation and maintenanceof the federal railway network but also contributes to the fi-nancing of investment projects. However, the largest share ofinfrastructure investment is financed through the federalstate’s budget, sometimes complemented by funding fromthe European Union or the German states. Therefore, totalinvestment into the railway infrastructure exceeds the valuesshown in the state budget and the infrastructure investmentmasterplans.

Past masterplans have been criticized in the literature – andalso in the political debate – quite extensively. A rather com-mon point of criticism, put forward especially by industryassociations and the chambers of commerce, refers to the in-adequate relation between the projected amount of financialresources and the number of ‘urgent’ projects. States, as theplanning authorities, might have an incentive to underestimatethe assumed costs of a project in order to improve its chancesto be included into the masterplan. Moreover, pastmasterplans did not consider inflation. Investment into thefederal road infrastructure decreased since the year 2006 whenincreasing costs for construction are taken into account [6].The only exception is the year 2009 when the governmentfought the recession by significantly increasing public invest-ment. If investment into the federal road infrastructure is re-lated to the German GDP, a very similar pattern arises. Thehighest percentage value can be observed in the year 2009(with a strong decrease in GDP and an increase in infrastruc-ture investment) whereas this indicator is decreasing after2010 and shows a minimum in 2015 (own calculations basedon federal budget data and GDP data). The share of roadinfrastructure investment in the overall federal spendingvaries around 2% with a maximum in 2009 and generallylower values in the period 2010–2014 when compared to theyears 2001–2008 (own calculations based on federal budgetdata and [43]).

Moreover, past masterplans underestimated the require-ments for replacements. Whereas new projects have been in-cluded into the masterplan and construction has been started,investment into replacements even stayed below the projectedvalues (again with the exception of the year 2009 – Source:[6]). As a consequence, large parts of the German federalroads require maintenance and replacement investments, thisis of particular relevance for bridges, leading to a specificpriority program for bridge maintenance and upgrading, setup by the ministry for transport. The new masterplan, enactedin 2016, names the maintenance and replacement of the cur-rent infrastructure as its top priority, allocating 69% of the totalfunding to this purpose [14]. In the previous masterplans theshare of investment into maintaining the existing infrastruc-ture was 56% (BVWP 2003) and 46% (BVWP 1992), re-spectively [11].

Whereas many transport economists as well as stake-holders from the industry criticize lacking funds for additionalinvestment into the transport infrastructure, other transporteconomists as well as environmental action groups call for afundamental adjustment of infrastructure masterplanning.According to this position, the focus should be on integratedapproaches replacing the ‘traditional’ orientation towards iso-lated projects. Additionally, more ambitious targets for chang-es in the modal split are advocated (e.g. [1]). Compared to theprevious masterplan, the share of planned investment intoroad infrastructure has been slightly reduced (from 52.1% to49.3%) and is significantly below the share of cars and trucksin the modal split. The share of planned investment into railinfrastructure also decreased (from 42.9% to 41.6%), accom-panied by a significant increase in the planned share of invest-ment into federal waterways (from 5.0% to 9.1%) (data source[11, 14]).

5 Conclusions

Although the federal government is responsible for setting theregulatory framework for transport markets as well as for in-vestment into large parts of the German transport infrastruc-ture, there is limited influence of transport policy decisionmakers. This is due to the fact that European regulations aswell as requirements from other parts of the government (e.g.ministry of finance) limit the discretion of transport policymakers. Moreover, the states have a strong influence at leastregarding road infrastructure investment, and legal controver-sies provide additional obstacles. Although the priorities setby policy makers in published transport policy programs havechanged, the effects on the overall traffic development remainrather limited. In particular, a shift in the modal split towardsmore environmental friendly modes of transport, which was akey feature of the integrated transport policy program of theyear 2000, has not been achieved. Whereas the integratedtransport policy program assumed increasing user costs forroad traffic and decreasing user costs for rail traffic, the actualdevelopment was different. Moreover, subsequent programs,especially the action plan freight transport and logistics, haveshown changing priorities.

With respect to the federal transport infrastructuremasterplan, an overestimation of the number of projects whichmight be completed within the given timeframe has been crit-icized several times. Although the political progress is provid-ing some incentives to include a high number of projects in themasterplan, a more realistic approach appears to be suitable,also signaling the need for a larger budget. In the past, budgetincreases have been the result of macroeconomic consider-ations rather than of transport policy requirements. It remainsto be seen whether these deficits will be at least partially elim-inated during the lifespan of the recently enacted masterplan.

28 Page 10 of 12 Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2017) 9: 28

Regarding themodal split, the newmasterplan is characterizedby a decreasing share of investment into the federal road in-frastructure and an increasing share of replacement invest-ment, thereby reducing the opportunities for a further expan-sion of the federal road network.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the CreativeCommons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to theCreative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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