Planning for a Volatile Industry—

Tourism and Development in Kenya

Petra Doan, John Harris, and Kate Wilson

Department of Urban and Regional Planning

Florida State University

Planning for a volatile industry— tourism and development in Kenya

Abstract

Tourism as an economic sector has seen exponential growth over the past 60 years. In Africa there has also been rapid growth, but there has been considerably more variability due to local and regional instability. This paper considers the case of Kenya, where in recent years tourism has become the leading source of foreign exchange. The world wide decline in tourism due to the financial crash of 2008 is likely to have an even more profound effect on Kenya because of its recent history of ethnic violence. Arrivals in 2008 were estimated to be between 30 and 40% lower than the previous year, and there is not much hope for a strong recovery in 2009 given the current world economic situation. After earlier experiences with volatility the government of Kenya engaged in costly marketing efforts to entice tourists to return. The paper considers whether a return to a demand-focused strategy is likely to be sufficient and suggests that a different strategy may be warranted. In the circumstances a strategy that incorporates community based tourism planning with a focus on investments geared to support local level tourism infrastructure would enable greater local level participation and in doing so generate longer term benefits by reinforcing local planning capacity for tourism and other critical sectors, such as infrastructure. The paper also addresses the feasibility of the administrative reforms which this strategy would entail.

Key words: community-based planning, tourism recovery, Kenya, ethnic violence

1

Planning for a volatile industry— tourism and development in Kenya

Over the past fifty years the world wide travel and tourism industry has experienced very

rapid growth. According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization, the number of

tourist arrivals climbed from 25 million in 1950 to 807 million in 2005 and tourism receipts have

similarly climbed from $2.1 billion to 683 billion during the same period (WTO, 2009). As a

result, the tourism sector now accounts for a dominant share of employment, capital investment,

and influence on the people and locations which are the locus of tourism (Hall, 2000). While the

overall growth of this sector at the world and regional level has been strong and steady, for

particular locations, there is a great deal more variability due to local and regional instability.

These country-specific fluctuations can cause havoc for policy-makers concerned with decisions

about infrastructure and social development spending needed to support the industry. Models

that predict tourist demand and the propensity to travel internationally (Pearce, 1987) are useful

for broad regional estimates, but in the face of localized instability can cause over-estimates of

actual tourist flows. The consequences of over-predicting tourist arrivals can have significant

consequences for local investors and the long term prospects for tourism within a country (Doan,

2006).

The financial crisis which began in 2008 and continued into 2009 has had a powerful

effect on the tourism industry throughout the developing world. The WTO has suggested that

during 2009 overall tourism may fall by as much as 2% (WTO, 2009a). As with all WTO

projections this predicted decline may be steeper and hit harder in some countries than in others.

Still the UNWTO General Secretary has suggested that

“this situation puts unrelenting pressure on our customers, our employees, and our markets, driving us to radically alter our existing policies and practices….….The complex, interconnected and dynamically unfolding nature of this crisis makes it unpredictable. The future operating patterns for global economies will be vastly different from the past: the very nature of consumerism will change and so will our markets and our prospects. It is the time to revisit our existing structures, policies and practices. It is time for innovations and bold action.” (WTO 2009b)

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What kinds of changes are needed for tourism industries to thrive? Will increased

spending on tourism promotion and marketing be sufficient to turn the dismal forecasts around?

Are there are other kinds of stimulative investments that need to be made to ensure the long term

health of the industry? This paper considers the case of Kenya, where in recent years tourism has

become the leading source of foreign exchange. The world wide decline is likely to have an even

more profound effect on Kenya because of its recent history of ethnic violence. Arrivals in 2008

were already down between 30 and 40%, and the industry needed a good year in 2009 to begin

recovery (WTO, 2009). In light of the current dismal world economic situation, such a recovery

seems unlikely for the near term. After previous periods of volatility the government of Kenya

has spent large sums on major marketing efforts to entice tourists to return. The question

addressed by this paper is whether a return to such a demand-focused strategy is likely to be

sufficient or whether a focus on investments geared to support local level tourism infrastructure

would be more appropriate. Alternatively, the paper considers whether a strategy that

incorporates community based tourism planning would enable greater local level participation

and in doing so generate longer term benefits by reinforcing local planning capacity for tourism

and other critical sectors, such as infrastructure. A critical corollary is whether central and local

governments in Kenya are willing and able to facilitate more intensive community participation.

Context of Community based tourism planning

Calls for greater community involvement in the tourism sector are not new. Murphy

(1985) first suggested community based tourism as a more sustainable approach to developing

tourist facilities. Taylor (1995) warns that because communities in touristic areas are not

necessarily homogenous, efforts to encourage community involvement may be complex.

Brohman (1996) has argued that “a more appropriately planned tourism development process is

needed which would both spread the costs and the benefits more equitably and more sensitively

to its social and cultural impacts.” There is a pressing need for a “new” approach to tourism

planning that understands the tourism development process as a nexus of global and local forces

(Milne and Ateljevic, 2001).

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“Community-based approaches are central to many tourism development plans around the world and there is a growing realization that localized cooperation, trust, and networking are essential ingredients in providing the right mix for tourism development outcomes. (Milne and Ateljevic, 2001, p. 174)

Teye (1999) argues that the complexities of tourism planning require both investment in

basic tourism facilities, and also in human capacity to ensure the participation of a variety of

stakeholders including community residents. Gössling (2001) suggests that tourism development

without significant local input in Zanzibar has resulted in ecosystem degradation and a

deterioration in local quality of life. Diagne (2004) suggests that in Senegal when tourism

development occurs in top down fashion, the results are rising land prices, environmental

degradation, and the growth of prostitution and drug abuse; accordingly he calls for a new type

of “integrated tourism” in which local residents will participate in the planning process at all

levels. Hasse and Milne (2005) also highlight the importance of participatory approaches to

tourism development and suggest that the integrating the use of GIS can result in significant

improvements in community interactions.

Tosun (2000) indicates that a limiting factor of community participation is the fact that

government officials are hesitant to leave the planning of such an important economic sector –tourism - to

others. While many developing nations of sub-Saharan Africa lack the political and social infrastructure

to carry out meaningful participatory processes, it is also acknowledged that these constraints contribute

directly to underdevelopment. The capacity of local governments in Africa is quite variable and faces

significant challenges on a number of fronts (Oluwu and Wunsch, 2004), but when critical industries such

as tourism are planned entirely by the central government without local input, that local capacity is further

undermined. A key question is at what point can community based tourism planning be successfully

integrated into local government planning so that both are mutually reinforced. Tosun (2005)

suggests that developing nations go through several stages as they seek to establish meaningful

community participation in tourism planning. The first step in meaningful community participation is

pressure from both external sources and local citizens who must call for more openness. The second and

third stages in this process include an emerging political commitment to open participatory processes and

the subsequent reshaping of local and national administration to include greater participation in the

planning and executing of tourism policy.

4

Tourism in Kenya – Growth and Volatililty

The tourism industry in Kenya is perhaps the oldest and best established in Sub-Saharan Africa. It

has enjoyed the fruits of great colonial era investment in transport infrastructure; in particular, the Kenya-

Uganda Railway opened up the interior of Kenya to tourism long before many other Sub-Saharan

destinations had that capacity. Likewise, there was an early commitment to policy planning for the

industry that encouraged promotional efforts, land and wildlife conservation, and public and private

investment in the country’s hospitality infrastructure (Ondicho 2000).

This enthusiasm for the industry carried through the advent of independence. The Kenyan

Tourism Development Corporation, a government affiliated organization, and the Ministry of Tourism

and Wildlife were both established shortly after independence to promote tourism, create new investment

initiatives, and formulate government policy for the industry (Akama 1999). In this context, selected sites

- mostly limited to Nairobi, Mombasa, Maasai Mara, Amboselli, and Tsavo - received the lion’s share of

investment and thereby the bulk of tourist visits to the country. Simultaneously, Kenya was from

independence until the late 1980’s an island of political stability and continuity in a region where war and

political unrest was common. Kenya’s stability served its image as a premier, if adventurous, tourist

destination. It also helped establish Nairobi as a sort of regional capital, hosting the headquarters of many

international organizations and regional business interests (Gimode 2001). The post colonial era was a

period of great expansion in the global tourism industry, and Kenya enjoyed an average annual sector

growth rate of 10% from 1960 to 1988 (Kenya 1991, quoted in Ondicho 2000).

Beginning in the late 1980’s, the tourist industry in Kenya transitioned from one of stable

sustained growth to one of volatility and stagnation. This change is largely a reflection of upheaval in

Kenyan society itself. In the mid and late 1980’s Kenya began to experience a significant increase in

incidents and brutality of criminal activity. Analysts have given several possible reasons for this including

rapid urbanization, neo-liberal economic policies, police and government corruption, grinding poverty,

and an increase in refugees and arms from hitherto more violent neighboring countries (Gimode 2001).

Regardless of the contributing factors, by the mid-to-late 1990’s, Kenya’s once peaceful and inviting

image had been replaced with images of car-jackings, home invasions, street muggings, and roadside

banditry. Other observers have noted the pernicious effects of prostitution and drug use on residents of

heavily used tourist areas along the coast (Beckerleg and Hundt, 2004). All of these factors contributed to

a major down turn in the quality of life for Kenyans, and had a profound effect on the tourism industry,

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since many of the violent episodes seemed to specifically target foreign nationals and tourists, resulting

in frequent travel advisories from European and North American governments. (Gimode, 2001).

Additionally, at a time when Kenyan society was experiencing this increase in criminal behavior,

its political context was transforming from a one-party dictatorial rule to a pluralistic and multi-party

democracy. The emerging political parties were, and still are, largely based on traditional ethnic loyalties.

In this context, political feuds based on long standing regional and ethnic animosities have resulted in

frequent outbreaks of “politically instigated violence” (Akama 1999). In addition to frequent episodes of

violence in the Rift Valley, in August of 1997, violence erupted near the major tourist destination of

Mombasa. Armed men carried out raids targeting individuals and businesses belonging to non-local

ethnic groups. The incident lasted weeks; 104 were killed, 133 were injured, and 100,000 were displaced

(Human Rights Watch 2002).

At least part of the trouble appears to have been tribal tension between inland tribes who had

managerial jobs in hotel facilities and local populations who felt kept out of the lucrative tourist trade and

deeply resented this “foreign” incursion. Kibicho (2004) reports that residents who were employed in

tourism had a more positive outlook than the majority who were not able to find jobs in tourist facilities.

This disparity has led to considerable tension and eventually to the outbreak of violent inter-tribal

conflicts. Kareithi (2003) suggests that the informal sector providers of handicrafts were hit especially

hard by the downturns in 2002. The larger and better connected traders (usually Kikuyu) were able to

shift locations and seek out places where there were tourists, but smaller local entrepreneurs were often

forced out of the tourist trade and returned to subsistence agriculture. This finding suggests that the

inequitable distribution of the benefits of the tourism industry at the local level may have been a

contributing factor to the rise of ethnic tension.

In spite of these difficulties, tourism has become Kenya’s leading economic sector, outpacing

agricultural exports like tea and coffee for the first time in 2004 (see Table 1), planning for the sector has

largely occurred by the central government in concert with donors (primarily the Japanese International

Cooperation Agency) other than the World Bank and private sector investors. There continues to be little

local level planning involvement in the tourism sector. A recent review of World Bank involvement in

the tourism industry (Hawkins and Mann, 2007) indicates that the lack of local level planning was part of

the problem with the tourism sector in Kenya.

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A project completion report (World Bank 1990) for a Wildlife and Tourism Project in Kenya implemented between 1976 and 1985 acknowledged improved foreign exchange earnings and the contribution of the wildlife viewing product, but emphasized that little attention was given to improved planning, management, and conservation of these natural endowments. (Hawkins and Mann, 2007, p. 355)

The results have been over-crowding and environmental degradation, as well as an uneven distribution of

the benefits of tourist investments.

Table 1 about here

At the same time that Kenya was experiencing volatility in society and its leading industry,

government policy was focused on increasing foreign investment in the tourism sector. The government’s

emphasis was on promoting large scale projects that were mostly owned and managed by foreign or

multinational companies, resulted in foreign dominance in the industry with over 50% of all hotels under

foreign ownership, management, and control (Sindiga,1996) . For instance in Malindi a surge of tourism

investment by Italians has resulted in a high proportion of the facilities in that city are owned by Italians.

At the same time, the large numbers of Italian tourists visiting the region patronize the Italian facilities,

spending very little in locally owned facilities (Akama, 1997) and contributing to a leakage of tourist

revenues back to Italy.

This all had a profound tarnishing effect on Kenya as a tourist destination. From 1990 to 2003

tourist arrivals in Kenya have ranged from as low as 782,000 arrivals in 1992 to as high as 928,000

arrivals in 1994 with no real gains until after 2003 (WTO). Over the same time period, the hospitality

industry saw a contraction in available bed-places as hotels slashed their prices and many went out of

business (WTO, Sindiga 1996). As indicated in Table 2, the number of bed-places reached a high for the

decade of the 90s in 1995 with 34,211 places, but this number dropped precipitously so that by 2002 there

were just 21,276.

Table 2 about here

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Kenyan Volatility in the Context of Tourism Demand Mechanics

While it may be intuitive that tourists will stay away from an area with a violent image, it is an

area that has not been well researched. The typical model used to estimate international tourism demand

focuses on three factors: income of the sending country, transportation costs incurred by tourists, and

tourism prices in the receiving county. Besides being well placed within economic theory, these variables

are consistently empirically important (Lim 1999) and capture important global macroeconomic factors

such as exchange rates, fuel prices, and the ebb and flow of international economies.

Clearly though, other factors become important as individuals make tourism consumption

choices. As seen in the experience of the unstable tourism industry in Kenya between the late 1980’s and

2003, the threat or perceived threat of instability or violence is eminently important to individual tourists

(Ryan, 1993; Richter, 1999; Lepp and Gibson, 2003). While threats to tourists in Kenya are real, in that,

tourists have been mugged or even killed on occasion, the perception of risk is paramount to the industry

because it influences present and future travel choices. Perceived risk is an individual’s assessment of a

negative experience associated with a purchase or experience (Dowling & Staelin 1994). An individual’s

perception of risk, when making tourism consumption choices, is usually based on demographic

characteristics of the individual. The categories of risk commonly identified include health and well-

being, criminal harm, transportation performance, travel service performance, travel and destination

environment, monetary concerns, and property crime (Simpson & Siguaw 2008). Within these categories

of risk, issues of personal safety are always of the highest priority to potential tourists ((Reisinger &

Mavondo 2005, Simpson & Siguaw 2008).

Neumayer (2004) conducted an expansive quantitative study on the effect of various forms of

political violence on tourism. The study found evidence that human rights violations, conflict and other

politically motivated violent events have important affects on tourist arrivals. Likewise the study found

evidence that local violence in one nation can cause tourists to substitute trips to neighboring countries

that offer similar destination amenities. There seem to be both short term (a few months after a violent

episode) and long term (lasting even years after a conflict) effects of political violence where spikes in

violence in a country reduce arrivals by as much as a third. The finding that the effect of violence on

arrivals is magnified in countries that are even “mildly dependent on tourism receipts” (Neumayer, 2004,

p. 277) is critically important for Kenya as well as other developing countries dependant on tourism as a

major source of income and foreign exchange. The Neumayer study underscores some previous work that

shows the importance of tourism-dependent countries’ ability to manage their image in the minds of

potential tourists.

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Intensive Marketing as a Response to Crisis

Sönmez (1998) details the great lengths that counties have gone to improve international

perceptions after an experience of terrorism or political violence. This review highlights the need to

“manage” violence in the public eye as a crisis in the tourism industry. Nations that can effectively

conduct “recovery marketing” can reach out to potential travelers who have not yet fully formed negative

attitudes toward a county following a violent episode or period in history. This approach can be seen

clearly in Kenya during the tourism sector’s lauded recovery from 2003-2007. The Tourism Trust Fund

was established in 2001 as a joint venture between the Government of Kenya and the European Union.

Among the many objectives and programs launched by the TTF, the Tourism Recovery Management

Plan(TRMP) began in 2003. The core of the plan involved simultaneously working with the international

diplomatic core to address concerns of tourist-sending nations and to provide substantial resources for an

international direct-to-consumer marketing campaign in 10 European markets designed shed the negative

image of the 1990’s. (Beirman 2008, TTF 2006) The recovery seen between 2003-2007, where tourist

arrivals met or exceeded the 10% annual growth rate experienced in the sector prior to the late 1980’s, is

largely credited to this program and other ongoing and similar efforts (Beirman 2008, TTF 2006).

This recovery suggests that Kenya was quite successful in re-imaging itself to international

travelers and as a result enjoyed a steady expansion in the performance of the sector. However, the focus

on stimulating demand neglected to provide resources to maintain the high quality of the Kenyan tourist

product. While the tourism sector in Kenya owes a great deal of its success to early investment in

transport infrastructure and policy planning, these arenas have been largely neglected. The great

expansion of tourism in this period was accomplished without clearly laid out regulations and procedures

related to location, environmental protection or distribution of facilities (Akama 2002). Likewise, the

transport infrastructure in Kenya is well known for its state of disrepair.

Although most planning in Kenya is highly centralized, in the case of tourism there is a tendency

to rely on foreign experts to develop master plans for the sector. The most recent master plan for Tourism

was no exception as it was conducted by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The

resulting product is theoretically sound, but lacks clearly defined implementation mechanisms for

financing and local plan implementation (Akama, 2002). The projected growth rate of 11% is ambitious

at best, and in the light of recent events seems a near impossibility. Figure 1 indicates the projected

growth rate as well as the actual level of arrivals to Kenya (data for 2007-2009 are based on estimates).

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Figure 1 about here

Unfortunately the image change did nothing to address the key elements in the tourism sector that

are part of the underlying problem in Kenyan society. The long lasting ethno-political strife remains a

significant problem. The post election violence experienced in Kenya in early 2008 is a continuation of

the same problems seen in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. During the first six months of 2008 the tourist

industry experienced disastrous short term consequences. The civil unrest resulting from the contested

elections at the end of December 2007 resulted in tremendous upheaval with as many as 1500 deaths and

as the massive relocation of 600,000 people of the Luo and Kikuyu tribes (Gettleman 2008). The impact

on tourism has been immediate and extensive. Marete (2008) estimates that initially tourist arrivals

dropped by 90% and tourism revenues are expected to drop by $84 million (BBC News, Feb 12, 2008).

The WTO Tourism Barometer estimates that as of October 2008 tourist arrivals were down 40% from the

previous year and hotel occupancy rates were 28% lower than the previous year (WTO, 2008).

While it seems Kenya is gearing up for another re-imaging campaign similar to the TRMP of

2003, the magnitude of negative press reports about Kenya have been staggering. Figures 2 and 3

respectively illustrate the sheer volume of negative publicity generated in two key markets (New York

and London). With such intensive coverage of this gruesome violence, a marketing campaign would need

to be on a massive scale that would drain resources badly needed to maintain the supply of basic tourist

amenities and infrastructure.

Figures 2 and 3 about here

Community Participation as a Vehicle for Renewed Investment

While the marketing campaign aimed at fostering the recovery of the international tourist industry

in Kenya following the post election violence of 2008 is likely warranted given the importance of the

sector and the success of past similar efforts, it is possible that an overemphasis on the marketing effort

would lead to missed opportunities to strengthen the long term viability of this volatile industry. Because

the post election violence resulted in very large volume of negative images associated with the country as

a result, the subsequent global economic downturn has greatly exacerbated the problem. While this

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unfortunately means that a speedy recovery of the sector is less likely, it may offer a chance to retool and

reorganize some of the foundations of the industry and tackle some of the persistent thorny issues that are

at the root of industry volatility.

The Kenyan tourist industry owes a large part of its existence to early substantial transport

infrastructure investment seen in the colonial era. This gave Kenya a leg up relative to many nations with

similar amenities, who only began to capture significant regional market share years and often decades

after Kenya had come to enjoy substantial growth in the tourist receipts. In recent history, however, the

overall condition of infrastructure, especially the national road network, is frequently listed as a major

limiting factor to expanding the industry. As mentioned earlier, the road network neglect generally began

in the 1990’s and since then it has largely fallen into disrepair. It is estimated that current spending cannot

maintain the existing roads even as they are today and that it would cost approximately 9% of GDP to

clear the current backlog of maintenance (World Bank 2008). The condition of the road network, in

addition to being a barrier to growth in other sectors of the Kenyan economy, hinders Kenya from

developing high value chain tourism products that attract the most affluent travelers (World Bank 2007).

Typical safari packages have higher end price tags, but the Kenyan industry has and will have difficulty

diversifying into luxury packages without a functioning transport system that allows visitors ready access

to attractions and high end accommodation when they get there. As it is, some of the most popular sites,

for instance Maasai Mara, are only accessible by terrible, often impassable roads or by charter plane. Both

options drive up the cost for potential tourists to visit the site. Additionally, the state of infrastructure in

Kenya hinders foreign investment in the tourist sector as the private cost to produce some basic amenities

make investment cost prohibitive (S&P 2006).

Past economic downturns have afforded many governments the chance to make significant public

sector investments that may not be feasible for practical or political reasons at other times. For Kenyan

purposes, the global economic downturn coupled with the sector losses associated with the post election

violence, could provide an opportunity to make significant public sector investments. To do this,

however, there will likely need to be a break from the past in terms of local infrastructure financing.

Frequently, local tourist infrastructure is predicated on local tourist receipts. To continue the Maasai Mara

example; during the last crisis in the tourist sector prior to the recovery in 2003, the local Narok County

Council oversaw the maintenance of the transportation links around the park. The funds used to carry on

these activities were generated from park entry fees. As tourist revenues dried up, so did the Council’s

ability to maintain the roads. This compounded the economic downturn as local businesses were unable to

cope without ready access to supplies (Kareithi 2003). During a downturn in the tourism sector, public

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infrastructure funding will need to be supplemented by central government funds to ensure continuity in

basic infrastructure needed to support tourism.

Readiness for Community Participation in Tourism Planning

At this point it is useful to apply Tosun’s (2005) stages in establishing meaningful community

participation in tourism planning to the Kenyan context. To reiterate Tosun argues that meaningful

community participation is dependent on: 1) pressure for both external sources and local constituents, 2)

an emerging political commitment to participatory processes, and 3) the re-shaping of local and national

administrative functions to permit greater participation in planning and executing tourism policy.

The assessment of Tosun’s first criteria, that there are external and local sources of pressure for

greater participation, must be considered a mixed bag. Unfortunately the World Bank has moved away

from supporting tourism initiatives (Hawkins and Mann, 2007). However, there is certainly external

interest in the sector from other donors. The European Union appears ready to play a key role in

promoting economic recovery for the tourism industry. As a part of the partnership, the EU could put

pressure on the Kenyan authorities to include more meaningful community participation in their tourism

planning as they retool for growth in the future. Other donors such as USAID and the JICA could also

play important roles in the re-establishing tourism investments at the local level and supporting tourism

planning on a more sustainable basis. But concrete steps to apply such pressure are not yet visible.

Pressure from local citizens for a greater role in community based tourism planning is also not yet

in place. Smoke (2008) suggests that local level planning has been hindered by weak participatory

mechanisms because local civil societies are not well developed. The task for community based planning

will be to reinvigorate such institutions. Akama (1997) calls for increased community involvement in

planning and management of Kenya’s tourism industry as the solution to excessive leakage of the tourism

revenues out of the country. There should be local participation in the design, implementation, and

management of tourism projects in their communities. Manyara adds that within indigenous communities

private sector development institutions will be needed in the tourism sector to ensure the diversification

and development of small and medium sized enterprises and prevent leakage of tourism revenues out of

the economy (Manyara et al 2006). Kenya will require a broad effort to empower locally based tourism

stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process for tourism infrastructure and other

development investments, but this has not yet happened.

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Tosun’s second criteria, a political commitment to wider participation, also remains to be

demonstrated in the Kenyan context. The Kenyan government’s continued reluctance to allow greater

local participation in planning in part due to fear of continued ethnic unrest (Smoke 2003). However, the

current high levels centralization in Kenya did not prevent the terrible ethnic conflicts of 2008. It would

appear that a different strategy based on local participatory processes might be an important means of

reinvigorating the tourism sector. The recent spate of violence and inarticulate mob expression of

dissatisfaction has clearly applied pressure for real change; it remains to be seen if this pressure is

sufficient. Furthermore as Kenya emerges from the election violence of 2008 with its coalition

government, it is unclear whether such a state will be willing to change directions and encourage more

participatory development.

In this kind of post conflict situation there are clear benefits to a new and more participatory

planning approach. Brinkerhoff (2005) argues that attention to basic infrastructure and services is an

important means of re-establishing trust at the local level.

Rebuilding effectiveness has to do, first and foremost, with the functions and capacity of the public sector. Good governance in this area means, for example, adequate and functioning municipal infrastructure, widely available health care and schooling, provision of roads and transportation networks and attention to social safety nets….. Particularly when coupled with ethnic tension, weak states’ inability/unwillingness to do so can be an important contributing factor to state failure and the eruption of renewed conflict. (Brinkerhoff, 2005, p. 6).

Brinkerhoff (2005) goes on to suggest that that decentralization can help to heal ethnic conflicts by

creating more local autonomy, establishing mechanisms to resolve conflicts over resource distribution and

local service delivery, and setting up a virtual laboratory within which skills for resolving ethnic and

political conflicts can be developed.

Tosun’s third criteria, the re-shaping of administrative functions to facilitate local level planning

is not yet met, but might be considered in process. In Kenya since independence there has been a long

process of centralizing political power to the detriment of many local government functions and the

evisceration of local planning capacity (Wallis, 1990). There have been numerous attempts by donor

agencies to reinvigorate local level governance and promote wider participation with only modest

success. Efforts such as the District Focus for Rural Development Strategy (DFRDS) provided the patina

of a genuine local development effort, but has not yet reduced the trend of centralization of local authority

and control by the Ministry of Local Government (Wallis, 1990, Southall and Wood, 1996). Smoke

(2004) argues that one key to effective decentralization in the Kenyan context is local fiscal reform since

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for many years local governments have had very little control of locally collected revenues and have not

had the authority to assess additional revenues.

Conclusions

While Kenya may not yet meet all of Tosun’s criteria for broad-based community tourism

planning, many of the elements are at least in play. Furthermore given the nature of the ongoing economic

crisis, funds for an intensive tourism marketing program may be scarce. In the mean time, rather than

letting the crisis go to waste the government could seize the moment and take steps to reinvigorate local

planning and governance capacity.

There are opportunities provided by the current downturn and the ongoing visioning process. For

instance, Kenya is attempting to develop its cultural tourist offerings while also maintaining its major

attractions. Tosun (2001) states that tourist do not merely visit attractions, but communities. In Kenya,

this will increasingly be the case with the development of cultural tourism. There will be effect, positive

and negative on host communities. Community participation on an appropriate scale would help to

mitigate the negative and expand the positive in these instances. Likewise, it could be politically viable.

Clearly long term solutions to these problems need to be a top priority of the government. That

said, there could be opportunities to involve long term tourism sector planning in those efforts. The First

Medium Term Plan 2008-2012 of the Vision 2030 document lays out significant goals and objectives for

the tourism sector for the next few years. These include upgrading road network infrastructure, the

development of at least one of three proposed new resort cities, upgrading facilities at existing but

underutilized sites and parks throughout Kenya, and the promotion, through training and awareness

campaigns, of local tourism entrepreneurship. Additionally, it lays out goals of diversifying the tourist

offerings in Kenya to include cultural sites and experiences in addition to the typical beach and safari

tours.

A document like this is always a grand vision with a wish list of projects and programs. As such,

it is unlikely to be completed in full or on time. However, it does suggest a continued commitment to and

reliance on the tourism sector regardless of the exact projects or programs selected to foster growth. As

with major infrastructure investments, the down turn also affords time and opportunity to Kenya to adjust

its tourism planning. Projects such as those suggested by the Vision 2030 document and any eventual

projects will likely rely on foreign expertise and investment and be oriented to the business interests

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associated with the project. Having said that, there is a real opportunity to use a participatory planning

process to not only address the long term prospects of the tourism sector and the expansion of economic

benefits to more people, but also the underlying conflict within Kenyan society. Once the mechanisms

for sustainable tourism planning are put in place, it will be time for an extensive marketing campaign. By

this point the world wide recession may have eased, and tourists will once more be looking for

opportunities to explore new landscapes and new communities.

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Table 1 Comparison of Foreign exchange earning (KSh 000) between Tourism, Tea and Coffee

Year Horticulture % Tea % Tourism % Total

2000 13900 10 35150 26 21553 16 134527

2001 20200 14 34485 23 24239 16 147590

2002 26700 16 34376 20 21734 13 169283

2003 28800 16 33005 18 25768 12 183154

2004 32600 15 36072 17 39200 18 214793

2005 38800 16 42291 17 48900 20 244198

Source: Statistical Analysis of Tourism Trends, Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, 2006

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Table 2 Tourist Arrivals in Kenya (overnight visitors), bed-nights, international tourism receipts from 1990-2006 and estimates for 2007-2009 as indicated

Tourist Arrivals (Overnight visitors) Bed-Nights*

International Tourism Receipts

(Thousands) (Thousands) (US $ Millions)

1990 814 5827 466

1991 805 6118 432

1992 782 6424 442

1993 826 6745 413

1994 928 7082 627

1995 896 7436 447

1996 925 7808 465

1997 907 8199 385

1998 792 8609 290

1999 862 9,039 485

2000 899 9,491 500

2001 828 9,966 536

2002 825 10,464 513

2003 927 10,987 619

2004 1193 11,536 799

2005 1536 12,113 969

2006 1644 12,719 1182

2007**

1760 NA NA

2008**

1056 NA NA

2009**

1035 NA NA

Information from the World Tourism Organization’s Compendium of Tourism Statistics

* Bed-Nights = bed-places times occupancy times 365.

** 2007 estimates only assuming same growth as 2006-2007, 2008 Estimate from WTO Tourism Barometer October 2008, 2009 estimates from January 2009 WTO Economic Crisis memo projecting a highly optimistic 2% drop worldwide

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Figure 1 Actual and estimated versus predicted (11%) growth rate of tourist arrivals in Kenya 1984-2009

Tourist Arrivals 1981-2007, Estimated (2007- 2009) and Predicted (11% Growth from 1997)

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Predicted 11% growth rate based upon the National Development Plan for Kenya from 1997-2001 which predicted tourist arrivals to increase at 11% per year.

2007-209 estimated as follows: 2007 assuming same growth as 2005-2006; 2008 assuming 40% Kenyan tourism reduction, (WTO Tourism Barometer, October 2008); 2009 estimated 2 % worldwide tourism decline for 2009 (WTO Press Release Jan 27, 2009)

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Figure 2 Media References in the New York Times for Kenya and Violence or Terrorism from 1981 to 2008

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New York Times search for Kenya and Violence conducted November 3, 2008

New York Times search for Kenya and Terrorism conducted November 7, 2008

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Figure 3 Media references in the BBC for Kenya and Violence or Terrorism from 1998 to 2008

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BBC search for Kenya and Violence conducted October 27, 2008

BBC search for Kenya and Terrorism conducted October 28, 2008

20

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Notes on Contributors

Petra Doan is an associate professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at Florida State University who teaches in the Planning for Developing Areas specialization. Her research interests include development planning in the Middle East and Africa, decentralization, community partiucpation, tourism planning, and gender and development.

John Harris is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban and Regional Panning at Florida State University. He spent two years based in Kenya with the Mennonite Central Committee with primary responsible for Southern Sudan.

Kate Harris is a master’s student in the Department of Urban and Regional Panning at Florida State University. She is a participant in the Master’s International Program with the US Peace Corps and will begin her volunteer service as an urban planning advisor in September of 2009.

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