Victory Liner vs. Race (2007)

Summary Cases:

Victory Liner vs. Race G.R. No. 164820

Subject:

The Supreme Court is not a Trier of Facts (Factual Findings of Quasi-Judicial Bodies are Accorded Respect But Not when the findings of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter are Contradictory); Employee is Given a Period of 4 years from the Time of Dismissal to Institute the Case; The Prescriptive Period Starts to Run from the Time of Unjust Termination of Employment; Respondent must be Considered Unjustly Terminated in January 1998; There was No Abandonment on the part of the Respondent; Employer-Employee Relationship Could not Have been Extinguished in 1994; The Law Mandates that Employers Observe the Requirement of Substantial and Procedural Due Process in Dismissing an Employee; Petitioner Miserably Failed to Comply with the Procedural Due Process

Facts:

Respondent Pablo Race was employed by Victory Liner as a bus driver for the Alaminos-Cubao evening route. On August 1994, the bus which was being driven by Race met an accident. As a result, he suffered a fractured leg and was confined in the hospital until October 10, 1994. Exactly a moth after, he was again confined for one more month. All of the medical expenses were shouldered by Victory Liner.

On January 1998, Race reported for work but was informed that he was considered resigned and he was offered consideration, which he rejected. Before Christmas of 1998, Victory Liner reiterated that he was considered as resigned. He was offered a bigger amount of money, which he rejected.

On June 30, 1999, Race sent a letter to Victory Liner demanding employment-related claims but he received no response from the latter. He then filed a complaint on September 1, 1999 before the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and holiday premiums, service incentive leave pay, vacation and sick leave benefits, and 13th month pay, excessive deduction of withholding taxes and SSS premiums and payment of moral and exemplary damages.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case. It ruled that the prescriptive period for filing the case for illegal dismissal was four years from the dismissal of the employee and that since Race only filed the complaint on September 1, 1999, despite having been dismissed since August 24, 1994, his cause of action had already prescribed. Race was also adjudged to be a mere field personnel. He was then not entitled to receive the money claims.

The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that Race’s cause of action accrued in January 1998, when the respondent reported for work but was rejected by the petitioner. Thus, the respondent's filing of complaint was well-within the prescriptive period. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Held:

The Supreme Court is not a Trier of Facts (Factual Findings of Quasi-Judicial Bodies are Accorded Respect But Not when the findings of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter are Contradictory)

1. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court.

2. Where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this case, the Supreme Court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.

Employee is Given a Period of 4 years from the Time of Dismissal to Institute the Case

3. In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of his dismissal within which to institute a complaint.

4. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years.

5. When one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four years. (Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines)

The Prescriptive Period Starts to Run from the Time of Unjust Termination of Employment

6. The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from the time the employment of the worker was unjustly terminated.

7. Thus, the four-year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of the employee's dismissal up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment.

Respondent must be Considered Unjustly Terminated in January 1998

8. The respondent must be considered as unjustly terminated from work in January 1998 since this was the first time he was informed by the petitioner that he was deemed resigned from his work.

9. It was only at that time that the respondent's cause of action accrued. Consequently, the respondent's filing of complaint for illegal dismissal was well within the four-year prescriptive period.

There was No Abandonment on the part of the Respondent

10.Two factors must be present in order to constitute an abandonment: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship.

11.The second factor is the more determinative factor and is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. Mere absence from work does not imply abandonment.

12. It is apparent that respondent did not abandon his work. His absence from work for a long period of time was obviously due to the fact that he was still recuperating from two operations on his fractured leg.

Employer-Employee Relationship Could not Have been Extinguished in 1994

13.There are four tests in determining the existence of employer-employee relationship: (1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control.

14.The so-called "control test" is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.

15.The employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent continued even after the latter's discharge from the hospital. Respondent had reported for work to the petitioner after his release from the hospital in December 1994. Subsequently, respondent was also granted a 120-day sick leave and disability leave. Respondent also availed himself of the services of the petitioner's physician on two occasions after his release from the hospital. These circumstances clearly manifest that petitioner exercised control over the respondent and that the latter was still under the employment of the petitioner even after December 1994.

The Law Mandates that Employers Observe the Requirement of Substantial and Procedural Due Process in Dismissing an Employee

16.The Labor Code mandates that before an employer may legally dismiss an employee from the service, the requirement of substantial and procedural due process must be complied with.

17.Under the requirement of substantial due process, the grounds for termination of employment must be based on just or authorized causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

18.The petitioner, as an employer, is burdened to prove just cause for terminating the employment of respondent with clear and convincing evidence, and that petitioner failed to discharge this burden. The Court then held that respondent was dismissed without just cause.

Petitioner Miserably Failed to Comply with the Procedural Due Process

19. In the termination of employment, the employer must (a) give the employee a written notice specifying the ground or grounds of termination, giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; (b) conduct a hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and (c) give the employee a written notice of termination indicating that upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

20.Petitioner miserably failed to comply with the foregoing requirements. There was nothing in the records which evinces that petitioner had sent a written notice to the respondent informing him of the ground or grounds of his termination or the reason why he was deemed resigned.