tordoff on decentralization

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Decentralisation: Comparative Experience in Commonwealth AfricaAuthor(s): William TordoffSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 555-580Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161564 .

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TheJournalof ModernAfricanStudies,32, 4 (I994), pp. 555-580Copyright ( 1994 Cambridge University Press

Decentralisation: ComparativeExperience in CommonwealthAfrica

by WILLIAM TORDOFF*UNTIL the late i98os, decentralisation experiments in sub-SaharanAfrica tended in the majority of states to reinforce central controlrather than enhance local autonomy. However, recent moves towardspolitical pluralism have brought a switch in emphasis to moremeaningful types of local participation. These have taken the form ofpolitical decentralization, understood in the sense used by PhilipMawhood to denote the devolution of powers to representative localcouncils, each with its separate legal existence and its own budget, andwith the authority to allocate resources and to carry out multiplefunctions.1 However, a number of African regimes also intend totransfer power from the centre to officials of the central government inthe field. They therefore attach a broader meaning to the concept ofdecentralization, using it to cover both political devolution and thedeconcentration of administrative authority. The two processes are, infact, often complementary rather than separate.2

Decentralization can be justified on many grounds. These includethe belief that popular participation is essential if projects are to berealistic and receive local support. There is also the conviction thatcentralised making of decisions and over-tight controls are inherentlyinefficient, especially in conditions where communications and trans-port facilities are poor, the levels of poverty and illiteracy are high, andthe people are sharply divided along linguistic, ethnic, and culturallines.3 As a member of India's Constituent Assembly stated in I947:

* Emeritus Professor of Government, University of Manchester.' Philip Mawhood, 'Decentralization: the concept and the practice', in Mawhood (ed.), LocalGovernmentn theThirdWorld: heexperiencef decentralizationn TropicalAfrica Pretoria, I993 edn.),P. 9.2 There is also likely to be functional decentralization to parastatal or non-governmentalorganisations such as marketing boards.3 Nelson Kasfir, 'Designs and Dilemmas of African Decentralization', in Mawhood (ed.), op.

Cit. p. 29.


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556 WILLIAM TORDOFF'Too much centralization produces anaemia at the extremities andapoplexy at the centre'.4

It must be remembered that many countries in the Third Worldexperienced some form of decentralization before becoming inde-pendent. In many parts of Africa, for example, authority was delegatedfrom the centre to administrative officers in the field; they enjoyed widediscretionary powers and, in the terminal stages of colonial rule, co-ordinated the operations of specialists in agriculture, veterinary affairs,health, and education. While the French preferred a prefectural systemof administration and regarded local government as a projection orinstrument of the centre, the British not only conferred administrativeauthority on district officers but also devolved political power to localinstitutions enjoying some autonomy - first, from the I920S, to nativeauthorities operating under a system of indirect rule and then, fromthe I940S, to representative local authorities containing an increasingnumber of elected members.

The corollary of decentralization, whether political or administrativeor a combination of both, is obvious. As functions are transferred toprovinces and districts, the number of tasks to be performed at thecentre will be reduced: they will relate to policy-making and overallsupervision and control. It follows that qualified personnel will thenneed to be redeployed to provincial and district levels, together withsufficient financial resources to enable the functions transferred to beproperly discharged.

THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCEIndependent anglophone and francophone states sought to build

upon the local government systems which they had inherited. InFrench-speaking Africa these continued to be based on the fundamentalprinciples of French administrative law and organisation. The emphasiswas on the central control of local government, with local authoritiesregarded as 'branches of the state', responsible for the organisation ofthose public services which were local in character. In the urban areas,the essentials of the pre-independence communal structure topped bya mayor and municipal council were retained despite many changes inthe size, character, and problems of the towns and cities beingadministered. The responsibilities of the urban authorities and thelarger prefectoral units overlapped, and the mayor/administrator

' Quotation provided by R. L. Watts for joint report with William Tordoff on 'Central-Provincial Government Relations in Papua New Guinea', Port Moresby, April 1974.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 557became subject to close supervision by the prefect.5 Shortly afterindependence municipal officials in Senegal, Guinea, and Coted'Ivoire, for example, ceased to be elected and were appointed by thecentral regime. In the rural areas, representative local government wasvirtually non-existent, except in Cameroon. Though the basicstructures were preserved there, increasing centralization deprived therural communes of their autonomy.'

Anglophone African states sought to adapt the English model of localgovernment to the post-independence situation, making such modifi-cations as the leadership believed the changing political scenedemanded. For example, chiefs and traditional authorities had theirpowers reduced or removed entirely, though their influence oftenpersisted and their support was needed to implement local developmentprojects. The results were mostly disappointing. In Ghana, for example,before the i966 military coup, elected local authorities were subject tofrequent changes in area and functions, as well as interference at thehands of politically-appointed district commissioners. Many councilsproved inefficient and corrupt and, with inferior salary scales andpoorer promotion prospects than those obtaining at the centre, couldnot attract staff to match the quality of entrants to the civil service.Moreover, supervision of the local authorities was barely adequate,despite sound institutional devices such as the inspectorate systemestablished after independence.7

Ghana was not alone in its failure to develop a viable system of localgovernment. Thus, in Kenya the county councils were stripped of theirthree major mandatory functions (responsibility for primary education,health, and secondary roads) in January I970, while in Sierra Leonethe district councils were suspended in I972 after a chronically weakperformance over several years. In Nigeria the post-independencerecord of the southern states was one of stagnation and corruption inlocal government. Those in the north performed much better - theywere able to draw upon the extensive experience of the native authoritysystem, albeit over-dependent on the traditional rulers.8 In Zambia the

5 Michael A. Cohen, 'Francophone Africa', in Donald C. Rowatt (ed.), International andbookon LocalGovernmenteorganization:ontemporaryevelopmentsWestport, CT, i980), pp. 4I5-22.6 Philip Mawhood, 'Applying the French Model in Cameroon', in Mawhood (ed.), op. cit. pp.

I87-2 10.7 Alan F. Greenwood, 'Ten Years of Local Government in Ghana', in Journalof AdministrationOverseas London), I, i, i962; J. K. Nsarkoh, Local Governmentn Ghana(Accra, i964); andWilliam Tordoff, 'Ghana', in Rowatt (ed.), op. cit. pp. 379-80.8 Alex Gboyega, 'Local Government Reform in Nigeria, in Mawhood (ed.), op. cit. pp.

235-56.


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558 WILLIAM TORDOFFrural local authorities long exercised minimal functions at the cost ofconsiderable sums of public money (city and municipal authorities hada better record).9

Nevertheless, the period from the early I970S to the early i980s sawrenewed interest in decentralization by third-world governmentsgenerally; they drew on a wider range of models than their colonialpredecessors. In Africa, deconcentration of authority was favoured,marking a shift in emphasis from representative local government tolocal administration. Where elected local authorities still existed, theytended to be subjected to tighter central control.

They were paralleled by government-controlled development com-mittees. These initially, though dominated by the central regime's fieldstaff, included a number of politicians and local authority officers/members, and often a sprinkling of representatives of non-governmentorganizations such as marketing boards, traditional authorities,churches, and business firms. The experience was that the effectivenessof these committees declined as they increased in size. The subsequenttendency has therefore been to restrict their membership to technicallyqualified personnel, sometimes (as in Botswana) transferring widerrepresentation and debate to an annual national district developmentconference. Most development committees still lack executive auth-ority. They were often retained by incoming military leaders, whousually dissolved local government councils and replaced them with'management committees'

In the late I 980s this centralizing trend was checked as African statesbecame subject to a 'democratic' wave sweeping across the continent- Benin and Zambia being the pace-makers in francophone andanglophone Africa, respectively. A combination of internal andexternal pressures resulted in the removal of authoritarian one-partyand no-party regimes and the institution of experiments in politicalliberalization; as noted above, the latter included a commitment toincreased participation through various forms of decentralization.

This article reviews the historical and contemporary patterns ofdecentralization in most of Commonwealth Africa. It begins by lookingat the centralizing trends in seven states in West, East, Central, andSouthern Africa. The focus throughout is on rural (particularlydistrict-level) government, with only incidental references to urbanareas.

9 William Tordoff, 'Local Government in Zambia', in W. B. Vosloo, D. A. Kotze, andW.J. O.jeppe (eds.),LocalGovernmentn Southernfrica Pretoria,974), pp. 271-9I.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 559THE CENTRALISING TREND

I. GhanaFollowing a transitional period when the National LiberationCouncil (I966-9) established civil service-dominated management

committees at district level and Kofi Busia's Progress Party Govern-ment (i 969-7I) shaped 'the local government system to its ownpolitical advantage ',10 the National Redemption Council (I972-5)decided that a new structure should be implemented from I974onwards. The Mills-Odoi report of i967 provided the fundamentalprinciples of reform. It found that the machinery of government wascharacterized by 'excessive centralization of authority and resources inAccra', and' an almost completely ineffective local government system'based on non-viable units. It recommended radical decentralizationand the creation of a single, unified public service, which would absorbthe existing local government service. Government, it said, should beregarded as 'a single operation wherever and by whom carried out'.11The military regime headed by General Ignatius Acheampongaccepted most of these proposals, and also took account of therecommendations made by the Akuffo-Addo and Siriboe commissions,both of which had reported in I968.

Under a decree issued in May I974, the NRC proposed to establishan integrated structure comprising four tiers: (i) regional, (ii) district,(iii) area, municipal, urban, and local councils, and (iv) town andvillage development committees. As many as 62 district councils wereset up,12 initially on a non-elective basis and with a strong traditionalelement. Each was monitored by the district chief executive - a civilservant who combined the functions of order, control, and developmentwith those of the former district administrative officer, clerk of council,and, for some three years, council chairman. The regional commissionerfulfilled a powerful prefect-like role, and was the regime's main agent ofdevelopment in the field.

These reforms were not fully implemented because of the economiccrisis and political upheavals which characterized the second period ofAcheampong's rule (October I975 toJuly I978), when the NRC was

10 David Harris, 'Central Power and Local Reform: post-Nkrumah Ghana', in Mawhood(ed.), op. cit. p. 2I7.11 Report of the Commissionchaired by Mr Justice G. C. Mills-Odoi] on the Structure ndRemunerationf the PublicServicesn Ghana,1967 (Accra-Tema, i967), pp. 3-4.12 Harris, loc. cit. p. 2i9, notes that earlier in I974 the number of district councils had beenfixed at 58. This is possibly an example of the discrepancy which frequently occurred at this timebetween the intended local government framework and the structure actually established.


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560 WILLIAM TORDOFFtransformed into the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The upperand lower tiers of the new structure never became operational, and theproposed merger between the district council and central governmentinstitutions at district level did not occur. The military leaders underboth Acheampong and his deputy, Lieutenant-General Fred Akuffo,who removed him in I978, regarded the administration as the mainagent of development (as in Kenya), and placed much more emphasison the managerial rather than the representative aspects of reform.13Hilla Limann's civilian Government (I979-8i) was firmly committedto 'decentralize the administrative machinery to the Regions anddistricts',14 and the I979 constitution stipulated the establishment of athree-tier structure of regional and district councils, and town, village,and area committees. Regional councils, headed by regional ministers,and a Local Government Grants Commission were to be establishedwithin six and twelve months, respectively. However, in the verydifficult circumstances inherited by the leaders of the People's NationalParty, the revised structure was little more than an empty shell; thefinancial position of the district councils was particularly weak.

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), headed byFlight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, removed Limman's regime at theend of i98i. It shared its military predecessors' distrust of electedcouncils, and in March I 982 they were formally dissolved and replacedby management committees made up of two-thirds nominated andone-third traditional members - a variant of a popular Ghanaianformula first used under the Local Government Ordinance of I95I.The PNDC began an agricultural drive and, possibly drawing uponthe experience of Libya, established a country-wide network of people'sdefence and workers' committees (PDCs and WDCs) to enlist masssupport and guard against black marketeering and excessive ruralprices. 5

2. NigeriaThe divisional administrative system introduced in the East Central

state in I 97 I, and adopted with minor modifications in the Cross River,Rivers, and Bendel states, amounted to an exercise in decentralization,with effective authority transferred from representative local authori-ties, which had a purely advisory role, to civil service Residents. In theWestern states an American-type of managerial system was adopted,

13 Ibid. pp. 2I1-32, and Tordoff in Rowatt (ed.), op. cit. pp. 38i-9.14 Harris, oc. cit. p. 227. 15 Ibid. pp. 227-30.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 56iwith councils being subjected to 'excessive bureaucratic control'exercised by the Ministry of Local Government. These various reformmeasures were largely ineffective, not least because of inadequatefinancial resources, and 'By I975 when the military government ofGeneral Gowon was toppled there was no part of the country that hada satisfactory local government system'. Very few local authoritiescould pay the salaries and wages of their employees regularly, orundertake any capital development.'6

3. KenyaFollowing independence in I963, the new Government maintained -

as in the colonial period - 'an effective network of control andcommunication between the centre and the districts'."7 While the civilservice provincial commissioners, and district commissioners underthem, were responsible for implementing and upholding (rather thanmaking) government policy, they had no powers over the directlyelected local authorities set up in I963, since the latter came under theauthority of the Ministry of Local Government rather than the Office ofthe President. From the outset county councils, which provided partyleaders with significant channels of influence and patronage, facedserious problems of staffing and finance.

Though they benefited from the larger amounts collected when, inI965, the provincial administration relieved them of responsibility forcollecting the newly-instituted graduated personal tax, the financialposition of a large number of county councils (as distinct from themunicipalities) remained precarious. As noted previously, in JanuaryI970 they were deprived of their three major functions - education,health, and roads - which together accounted for some 8o per cent oftotal expenditure. Since the transfer of these functions to the centre wasaccompanied by the transfer of resources, the ironical effect was todeprive the councils of their main source of revenue. From the mid-I970s, most of them operated very large deficits, and this added to theirdifficulty of attracting good quality staff.'8In the meantime, under the republican constitution of I 964, thecentral administration recovered many of the powers which it had lostunder the quasi-federal independence constitution of I963. During

16 Gboyega, loc. cit. pp. 239-245.17 Cherry Gertzel, ThePoliticsof Independentenya,1963-8 (London, 1970), p. 37.18 Walter Ouma Oyugi, 'Local Government in Kenya: a case of institutional decline', inMawhood (ed.), op. cit. p. I36.


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562 WILLIAM TORDOFFI965 the provincial commissioner again became the head of theadministration in his province, and the overall coordinator ofgovernment activities at provincial level. He was the President'spersonal representative in the field and, as from December I 964, wasdirectly responsible to the President's Office rather than to Parliament.Additional responsibilities were transferred progressively, and by I968the scope of the provincial administration had been greatly enlarged.As the agent of the executive, it provided strong central governmentthroughout the country being responsible, inter alia, for security(together with the police), the promotion of development, and thecontrol and transfer of land.

As the role of the provincial administration became more political,administrative officers clashed with MPs belonging to both the rulingKenya African National Union (KANU) and the opposition, as well aswith councillors who sought to safeguard the autonomy of theircouncils. This was no easy task since increasingly the institution of localgovernment was 'treated by the centre as though it were just anothergovernment department"9 - virtually a branch of the state, after theFrench pattern. With a strong central apparatus, a rather weakpolitical party in KANU, and a closely controlled local governmentsystem, Kenya underJomo Kenyatta, its first President (i964-78), hadmany of the characteristics of an administrative state.20

4. TanzaniaThe decentralisation measures introduced in I972 were designed,

according to President Julius Nyerere, to 'end bureaucratic domi-nance' and 'give power back to the people'. In fact, the oppositeoccurred. The former district councils were abolished and replaced bydistrict development councils (DDCs), each of which was chaired bythe area chairman of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union(TANU); they comprised officials and people's representatives in equalproportions, and were supported by a district development andplanning committee. But civil service regional and district developmentdirectors (RDDs and DDDs) and their staffs constituted the hub of thenew system. As James Finucane commented: 'The administrative orbureaucratic approach to development has dominated in Tanzania'. 21The decentralisation measures led to a deterioration in relations

19 Ibid. p. I28. 20 Gertzel, op. cit. pp. i66-70.21 James R. Finucane, RuralDevelopmentndBureaucracyn Tanzania: thecaseof MwanzaRegion(Uppsala, I974), p. I84.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 563between TANU and the civil service, and resulted in periodic clashesbetween the political regional commissioners and the new, powerfulRDDs.

5. UgandaPolitical decentralization had been rapidly eroded following the

dismemberment of the kingdom of Buganda in i966. The situationdescribed by a central government spokesman in I969 persistedthroughout the I970s and beyond: 'district councils ... [are no longer]local governments but local administrations and as such have to pursuethe policies of the government'. 22

6. ZambiaPresident Kenneth Kaunda took two large bites of the decentral-

isation cherry. Under reforms initiated in I969, he appointed aCabinet minister, subsequently replaced by a member of the centralcommittee of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP),to head each of Zambia's provinces, and a political appointee wasnamed as district governor to take charge of each of the country'sdistricts. It was, he explained, a decentralized system which would notsacrifice central control in any way. These arrangements, however,failed to achieve rural development and did not satisfy unpaid localUNIP officials.23

Major reforms were introduced as a result of the Local Admin-istration Act of 1980, whereby party and governmental organs atdistrict level were to be merged in order to create an integratedadministrative structure, called a district council, in each of Zambia's55 districts. Each council was to act through a district secretariat,comprising former central field staff and local government officersconstituted into a single national public service, and party officials. Itwas to be chaired by the district governor (a political appointee) andmost of its members were to be party officials, prominent among whomwere the UNIP regional secretary (the 'district political secretary')and the UNIP chairmen of ward committees in the district.24 This

22 UgandaArgus (Kampala), I5 February i969, p. 3, quoted by Kasfir, loc. cit. p. 3I.23 William Tordoff, 'Rural Administration', in Tordoff (ed.), Adminstrationn Zambia(Manchester, I 980), ch. 8.24 Bornwell C. Chikulo, 'Reorganisation for Local Administration in Zambia: an analysis ofthe Local Administration Act, i980', in PublicAdministrationnd DevelopmentLondon), 5, i985,

PP. 73-8I.


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564 WILLIAM TORDOFFnew local administrative structure, which underpinned the power ofthe ruling party at the local level, was unpopular and never fullyimplemented. Its effective working was seriously undermined by theresulting politicization of the administration, and by the shortage offinance and high-calibre manpower.

7. BotswanaThough representative local government was in a healthier condition

in Botswana than in a number of other countries, various weaknessessoon emerged and several changes were made.25 First of all, the qualityof staff serving the nine district councils established under legislationpassed in i965 varied widely, probably inevitably given the enormousdifference in the latter's geographical size and population. Thearrangement whereby all staff responsibilities were delegated to thelocal authorities favoured the larger, better-off councils; the CentralDistrict was easily the best served, though here as elsewhere there wassevere shortage of skilled manpower.

In I974 a centrally directed Unified Local Government Service(ULGS) was formed and made responsible for the recruitment,posting, transfer, promotion, and discipline of local authority (and landboard) staff other than industrial-class employees. While the previousarrangements had worked to the detriment of the smaller districtcouncils and were open to nepotism and other abuses, the councilsresented the over-centralisation of power in the hands of ULGSheadquarters' staff who, they alleged, had limited field experience andwere not sufficiently aware of their problems or sufficiently responsiveto their needs.

The second major problem - that of finance - was directly linkedto the functions of the authorities, which spent a high proportion oftheir revenue on primary education to the neglect of other services,particularly in the rural areas. Eventually in I976, after protracteddiscussion with a number of ministries, central government assumedresponsibility for paying teachers' salaries. This enabled the councilsboth to give more attention to the quality of school buildings andequipment, and to provide a wider range of local services.

The Botswana Government was committed to strengthening thelocal authorities but did not seek to create a single, integrated public

25 William Tordoff, 'Local Administrationin Botswana', in ibid. 8, 2, i988, pp. i83-202, andWyn Reilly, with updating from I 98i by William Tordoff, 'Decentralisation in Botswana- Mythor Reality?', in Mawhood (ed.), op. cit. pp. I44-86.


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566 WILLIAM TORDOFF2. Uganda

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) ruled through a broad-based government which contained members of various oppositionparties that were not allowed to operate openly. Since assuming powerin I986, Yoweri Museveni has created an institutional frameworkcomprising the National Resistance Council (NRC), which serves asthe country's parliament, at the apex of a pyramidal and hierarchicalstructure of regional councils and resistance committees, extendingfrom village to district level and responsible for indirectly electingmembers of the NRC. Under a radical programme of decentralizationannounced in January I993, the 38 district councils acquired primeresponsibility for policy, administration, and taxation in their districts.28

A district secretariat has been established and some financialdevolution has taken place, though many of the districts (increasedfrom I6 at independence as a result of ethnic rivalries and local powerconflicts) have small populations and minimum access to revenues,administrative infrastructure, and skills. Top local-authority officialscontinue to be appointed centrally. They are employed and supervisedby national ministries, which also manage all donor-funded projectsand will probably seek to retain the wide range of power now vested atthe centre. These considerations, and Museveni's strong preference forno-party rule, make the future of this experiment in 'bottom-up'democracy uncertain.29

3. ZimbabweThe Government headed by Robert Mugabe has faced the uphill

task of uniting rural councils - which had serviced the needs of thewhite commercial farming community before independence - and the55 district councils which were the post-I980 successors of the former243 under-resourced African councils.30 Union was easier to achieve insome cases - Mazoe rural council and Chiweshe district council, for

28 AfricaResearchulletin: oliticaleries Exeter), -3I January I993, p. io85ic; also E.A.Brett, 'Building a Bulwark Against Return to Years of Strife and Destruction', in The Guardian(London), Uganda Special Report, 22 January I993, and 'Rebuilding Organisation Capacityin Uganda Under the National Resistance Movement', in The Journalof ModernAfricanStudies(Cambridge), 32, i, March I994, pp. 53-80.29 See Amii Omara-Otunnu, 'The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda', in The JournalofModernAfricanStudies, 0, 3, September I992, pp. 443-63.30 C. G. Karase and D. Sanders, 'The Amalgamation of Rural and District Councils: someissues and problems', in The District CouncilJournal (The Association of District Councils ofZimbabwe,Harare,n.d.), pp. 8 and I I-I3.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 567example - than in others; a general difficulty was to decide on theviable size of a new council in area and population. Land ownershipwas a related political issue of importance for all sections of thepopulation and all ethnic groups. Zimbabwe's dependence on efficientagriculture for its economic prosperity, coupled with the severedrought which affected the whole of Southern Africa in I992, helps toexplain why the Government has been slow to implement landdistribution under the terms of the I992 Land Acquisition Act.3

4. SouthAfricaIn South Africa, too, it is proving difficulty to implement the African

National Congress (ANC) policy of 'farms for the landless'; foreconomic and other reasons, the post-apartheid Government has onlymodest plans for land reform. Tom Lodge notes that 'The main thrustof the ANC's strategy of land distribution is to allow market forces tobankrupt marginal commercial farms and then buy up the land forrelease to black peasants'.32 Despite its inheritance of considerablepolitical devolution - to provinces and homelands - the approach ofNelson Mandela's Government has also been circumspect in thissphere. The newly-created nine regional assemblies have been givensome powers and grants, but have access to only modest sources ofindependent revenue. Many of the tasks facing the ANC regionalgovernments are undefined and unfunded - relevant national legis-lation has not yet been passed; in the Western Cape and Natal theproblem is compounded by tensions between the ANC and the rulingparties.

Moreover, though negotiating forums exist, a presidential com-mission on local government has not yet been appointed. Boundarydisputes must be settled and voters' lists drawn up before localgovernment elections, scheduled for April I995, can be held. In themunicipalities, rates fall mainly on suburban households rather thanindustry and commerce; company tax is low and unlikely to beincreased because of the desire to attract foreign investment. Since theypay most rates, whites are at present generously represented in urban

31 For the continuing controversy over the fact that the i992 Act empowers the Governmentto acquire land and other immovable property compulsorilyin certain circumstances,see GinoJ.Naldi, 'Land Reform in Zimbabwe: some legal aspects', in TheJournalof ModernAfricanStudies,3I, 4, December I993, pp. 585-600.

32 Tom Lodge, 'The ANC in the New South Africa', Department of Political Studies,University of the Witwatersrand, I994, p. 8. This section is based on ProfessorLodge's perceptivepaper and my discussions with him in Johannesburg, August I994.


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568 WILLIAM TORDOFFlocal government. This may well change - it would in Johannesburg,for example, if a contentious proposal by local ANC representatives toamalgamate the different centres of the Witwatersrand region in threehuge municipalities were to be adopted.5. 1Nsamibia

The South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) Governmentinherited a country in March I990 that had been divided by the SouthAfrican Administration into Io population groups ('homelands')defined on a racial and ethnic basis. The Swapo leaders scrappedarrangements which had worked to the considerable advantage of thericher groups - the Coloureds to an extent, but above all the whites -and set about devising a new system of government for a country largein area, but thinly and unevenly populated. This was difficult enough,but the challenge facing the capital, Windhoek, with its white-dominated council, was even more daunting. Hence the proposedcomplex institutional arrangements for its integration into an expandedcity council area that would include the African township of Katutura,heavily populated by mainly Owambo immigrants from the populousbut underdeveloped north, and the Coloured township of Khomasdal.33

FURTHER DECENTRALISATION EXPERIENCEI. Kenya

In September I982 the Government adopted a strategy that entailedmaking the district the centre for the planning, implementation, andmanagement of rural development. If one of the objectives of the new'District Focus' was to raise the efficiency of rural administration,another was clearly political - decentralization was a means ofrestructuring the social base of the Kikuyu-dominated state whichDaniel arap Moi had inherited from Jomo Kenyatta. It gave thePresident an opportunity to increase the flow of resources to the less-developed regions populated by other ethnic groups (including hisown, the Kalenjin), and entailed enlarging the power and role of theprovincial administration and politicians in these regions, whilemarginalising the Central Province, Kenyatta's former political base.

3 Ahmed Abdallah, William Tordoff, Robert Gordon, and Sulayman Nyang, Report n theSecond nd Third TierAuthoritiesWindhoek, UNDP, i989), chs. 3 and 7, pp. 8-io, and DavidSimon, 'Decolonisation and Local Government in Namibia: the neo-apartheid plan, I977-83',in TheJournalof ModernAfricanStudies, 3, 3, September i985, pp. 5I3-8.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 569Although the decentralization process was assured of strong

presidential support,34 what came to be know as budget rationalizationduring i984 strictly limited expenditure on on-going projects andtightened the central control of resources. As explained byJoel Barkanand Michael Chege:At the centre, ministrieswere required to prioritisewhat they wanted to spendduring the forthcoming fiscal year, and to do so in a manner consistent withthe current five-year plan. At the district level, the [District DevelopmentCommittee], assisted by the [District Development Officer], was required toprepare an Annual Annex indicating all anticipated expenditures in thedistrict for the coming year, as well as a Forward Budget for the followingthree [years]. These documents coupled the planning processto the budgetaryprocess and [should have] greatly raised the stakesof district planning. In onestroke, the activities of the D.D.C.s and D.D.O.s became significant in a waythey had not been before.35Barkan and Chege maintain that the knowledge that governmentfinance for a project would not be forthcoming unless included in theAnnual Annex and Forward Budget encouraged MPs, the chairmen ofdistrict and town councils, and other leading politicians to take anactive part in DDC meetings. But what really led them to attend wasthe rural development fund (RDF), which grew in the mid- I98os, andother district-specific funds. The standing of the DDC (which continuedto be based on government directives rather than statute) alsoincreased in the eyes of civil servants posted to the districts. Districtdepartmental heads from each ministry served on the district executivecommittee which, under the chairmanship of the district commissioner(DC), coordinated their efforts.

The technical capacity of the DDC to engage in planning andbudgeting had already been strengthened through the establishment ofa district planning unit headed by a DDO from I978, supported by anassistant DDO and a district statistical officer from I988 (though not inall districts). Subordinate development committees were formed at thedivision, location, and sub-location levels, the intention being that allproposals for government-funded projects would be initiated at thegrass-roots and processed upwards. From I986 all development projectssubmitted to the DDC required the prior approval of the divisionaldevelopment committee.36 Local government planning was subject togreater control by DDCs, but the serious understaffing of countycouncils meant that the number of worth-while projects they were able

34 Joel D. Barkanwith Michael Chege, 'Decentralising the State: district focus and the politicsofreallocation in Kenya', in The ournalof ModernAfricanStudies, 7, 3, September i989, pp. 434-8.3 Ibid. p. 444 36 Ibid. pp. 443-6.


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570 WILLIAM TORDOFFto submit was limited. The more successful local authorities carried outabout half of the projects which they proposed, while the average rateof implementation for the country as a whole was about 20 per cent.37The District Focus has helped Moi politically, but its economicimpact should not be exaggerated. While the district budgetary processhas in theory been strengthened, the proportion of the national budgetover which the districts have total control remains small, beingconfined to the micro-projects funded by the European Communityand the small towns infrastructural development programmes, as wellas the RDF. Set up initially in the mid- I970s to finance small-scaleprojects out of block grants provided by the central government, theRDF had grown by i987-8 to K/6,goo,ooo, only some o05 per cent ofKenya's development budget. Basic policy is still made in Nairobi bycentral ministries, most of which have been reluctant to disaggregatetheir sectoral budgets on a district-by-district basis: they did sorelatively widely in i984-5 and i985-6, but less and less thereafterbecause of the increasing unreliability of revenue. It was above all theflows of funds from the centre to the districts that improved (by cuttingout the former provincial bottle-necks) and not the budgeting process.Accounting skills in the district treasuries were enhanced, and auditingwas made more effective.

Decentralisation to the district level in Kenya has resulted in thedeconcentration of administrative authority rather than in politicaldevolution to elected local authorities. The autonomy of the latter, andof the county councils especially, has been further reduced under theimpact of persistent over-centralisation - what John Cohen hasidentified as 'hierarchical, monopolistic, and bureaucratic control'. Heurges the need to reduce the size of the public service, professionalise itssenior levels and eliminate corruption; consolidate ministries and cutout duplication; and increase budgetary allocations to operating andmaintenance funds in support of existing infrastructure and investment.Moreover, despite the threat of donors to withhold aid, Cohen is notoptimistic that President Moi will 'implement the highly politicalpublic service reforms that are so urgently needed '.38

If this assessment is accurate, over-centralisation will persist. For hispart, Malcolm Wallis accepts that 'all the indications point to lessautonomy, not more' for local government in Kenya, and that 'theresource base is very unlikely to improve other than marginally'.

3 Malcolm Wallis, 'District Planning and Local Governmentin Kenya', in PublicAdministrationand Development, io, 1990, pp. 445 and 449.

38 John M. Cohen, 'Importance of Public Service Reform: the case of Kenya', in Thejournalof Modern African Studies, 31, 3, September 1993, pp. 449-76.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 57IHowever, he believes that local government will not only survive butthat the District Focus strategy may even enable it to play a moremeaningful planning role than previously through DDC scrutiny of itsproject proposals. He also points to other forms of local participation(especially through community development) which partly compensatefor the erosion of formal local government.39

2. TanzaniaIn I982 the predominantly elected urban and rural councils were re-

established, the ward development committees were revived, existingvillage governments were incorporated into the district network, theaforementioned DDCs were replaced by advisory committees, andregional development committees were given a co-ordinative andconsultative role. While the revival of representative local governmentsignalled a renewed experiment in political devolution, the retention ofessential features of the I972 decentralized system underlined thecontinuing importance which central politicians attached to thedeconcentration of administrative authority.

From the outset the new district councils have suffered from thecentralising trend of the I970s. Although the Government reinstitutedthe former unified local government service and gave early attention tostaff training, the councils were required to employ all the staff whohad served in the parallel authorities in the decentralizationn' era, andthis meant that they were 'saddled with an inflated and under-qualified bureaucracy'40 Competent local treasurers were scarce,resulting in losses through embezzlement or theft. A survey completedin I990 and covering the previous five years found that only I4 out ofioi local authorities had their accounts up-to-date, while 34 couldproduce no accounts at all. The lack of finance was no less serious,especially since the Government was unable to honour its initialcommitment to meet the full costs of major local functions, notablywater supply, educational and public health services, and themaintenance of district-grade roads. The district councils themselvescould not make up the shortfall from local sources of revenue, whichincluded a poll tax and a produce cess. Concurrently, urban councilswere hard hit by the loss of all property valuation rolls, and by the factthat publicly-owned premises, which used local services, no longercontributed to local revenues.

39 Wallis, loc. cit. pp. 449-51.4 Philip Mawhood, 'The Search for Participation in Tanzania', in Mawhood (ed.), op. cit.p. 105.


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572 WILLIAM TORDOFFThus, Tanzania's renewed experiment in representative local

government has not been particularly successful or, to judge from thelow turn-out in the I988 council elections, particularly popular. Apartfrom acute problems of staffing, finance, and reliable equipment, theexperiment has been bedevilled by the persistence of 'enormouslypowerful' centralizing forces.4" These were reflected in the retention ofthe regional directors of development, who constituted the hub of thedecentralized system of the I970s, and who control regional localgovernment officers and other administrative staff at that level.

3. NigeriaIn August I976 the military regime published 'Guidelines for Local

Government Reform', which proposed the establishment of rep-resentative authorities with substantial functions and the means, inboth staff and finance, to exercise them. A nation-wide, but largelyunsuccessful attempt was also made to define the functional role oftraditional rulers in relation to local councillors.42

The I979 constitution guaranteed the system of representative localgovernment, and the right of the local authorities to a share of nationalrevenue - to be paid to individual states for disbursement to councils.The capacity of the latter to deliver services was undermined by thefragmentation of their size by the civilian regime - their numberincreased from 30I to over goo during the Second Republic (I979-83),though none was directly elected during this period. Other handicapswere the withholding by some state governments of the federalstatutory allocations to which the local authorities were entitled,coupled with the decline in traditional sources of council revenue; therewas also a shortage of experienced and well-qualified staff.

The military leaders who took over in December I 983 believed thatthe structure of local government established under the I976 reformswas sound, but took steps to improve its working. More far-reachingreforms were undertaken from i988, including (i) the politicization ofthe office of local authority secretary (designated 'head of personnelmanagement' in October 1990), to be appointed by the councilchairman; (ii) the application of the principle of separation of powersat the local level, with the council restricted to closely definedlegislative functions; (iii) the stipulation that the federal statutorygrant, which increased from IO to I5 per cent of national revenue in

41 Ibid. p. ioi. 42 Gboyega, loc. cit. pp. 239-54.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 573I990 and to 20 per cent in I992, should in future be sent directly to thelocal governments; and (iv) action to prevent further fragmentation ofthe latter. In I992 the Federal Government announced the abolition ofthe Local Government Service Commission in order to give the localauthorities greater control over their staff. However, recent events -notably the military's subversion in I993 of the democratic process -retarded the consolidation and institutionalisation of this probablypremature act, as well as other 'reforms'.

4. ZambiaThe economic incompetence of Kaunda's increasingly authoritarianregime, beset since the mid-I970s by worsening terms of international

trade, led to demonstrations and strikes during i990-I in favour of amulti-party system of government, undoubtedly encouraged byexternal events, notably the rejection of dictatorship, communism, andthe command economy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In theensuing presidential and parliamentary elections in October-November 1991, Kaunda and UNIP were heavily defeated byFrederick Chiluba, a prominent trade unionist, and the Movement forMulti-Party Democracy (MMD). When the new Zambian Govern-ment approved the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) inMarch I993 it committed itself to:... Strengtheningthe management of local authoritiesby devising mechanismsto facilitate deconcentration of certain functions to Provinces and devolutionof selected functions to Local Authorities, as their management capacitiesimprove and in order to provide for and facilitate democratic Governance atthe Local Authority level.44This political commitment was very important because, as DennisRondinelli has emphasised, without a 'solid base of political support',decentralization cannot be successfully implemented.

At provincial level, several ministries - Health especially - anddepartments have already gone some way in deconcentrating theirfunctions. They should benefit from the creation (where these do notalready exist) of provincial development coordinating committees(PDCCs) and corresponding technical committees at district level

4 Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, 'The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia',in Reviewof AfricanPoliticalEconomySheffield), 54, 1992, pp. 75-83.4 Reproduced in British High Commission Press Release (Lusaka), 19 March 1993.4 Dennis A. Rondinelli, 'Decentralization of Development Administration in East Africa', inG. S. Cheema and Rondinelli (eds.), Decentralization nd Development: olicy implementationndevelopingountriesBeverly Hills, 1983), p. 119.


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574 WILLIAM TORDOFF(DDCCs). Though an on-going process, the deconcentration ofadministrative authority to provincial level has been slowed down bystaff shortages, lack of financial resources, and defects in theorganisation of the provincial accounting control units (PACUs).46The announced decision of the MMD Government to devolveselected functions to local authorities 'as their management capacitiesimprove' means that a phased approach to decentralization has beenadopted. This is a sensible and realistic approach, given the fact that allcouncils - city, municipal, and district - are heavily indebted andchronically short of both money and equipment, making it impossiblefor them to discharge the full range of their existing functions, let aloneassume any new responsibilities.47

The Local Administration Act of I980, which led to the politicizationof district administration and the abuse of power by UNIP officials, wasrepealed by the Local Government Act of I99I. Although amended byChiluba's Government this Act is still operative and provides for aflexible and multi-faceted local government system. In the electionsheld in November I992 the MMD swept the board, except in theEastern Province where UNIP retained considerable support. Thecouncils (which number 6I) can appoint, promote, and discharge theirown officers, subject to confirmation by the Local Government ServiceCommission, established under the Act.48

The financial difficulties facing councils are a legacy of UNIPmaladministration in the i980s, which saddled the MMD Governmentwith a very heavy burden of debt. They were compounded in I992-3by delayed payments (or non-payments) from the centre of amountsdue in respect of local sales tax, beer surtax, and special grants,including one in lieu of rates. Not only was distribution uncertain andhaphazard, but councils were also not informed of the amounts thatthey could expect from these important sources of revenue. Localbudget formulation and forecasting were therefore both extremelydifficult and unrealistic. The financial plight of councils was madeworse because they had to bear the brunt of certain decisions takenunilaterally by central government, including a national agreement inI992 which entailed a substantial increase in the wages and salaries of

46 William Tordoff and Ralph A. Young, Republicf Zambia:unctional nalysisforecentralisedgovernmentFinchampstead, Berkshire,MASDAR (UK) Ltd and Harrold, Bedfordshire,PMTCInternational Ltd, 1993), pp. 37-56. For an abbreviated discussion by the same authors, see'Decentralisation and Public Sector Reform in Zambia', in Journal of SouthernAfricanStudies(London), 20, 2, June I994, pp. 285-99.47 Tordoff and Young, Republic f Zambia,1993, pp. 56-80. 4 Ibid. pp. 8i-7.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 575their staff. The capacity of the smaller, weaker district councils to taplocal sources of revenue is strictly limited, making dependence oncentral government support inevitable in the foreseeable future.49

Steps to remedy these defects are being taken. Though the process islikely to be a slow one, there does appear to be firm commitment tobuilding up strong, elected local authorities which will become thefocus of development in their areas. A start is being made by creatingeffective accounting units within the district councils.

5. MalawiThe country's single-tier system of I 2 urban authorities and 24

district councils was established as long ago as I965. They differ widelyin size, availability of land, scope of responsibility, financial turn-over,and quality of staff. The four largest councils - the cities of Lilongwe,Blantyre, and Mzuzu, and the municipality of Zomba - provide awider range of services than the town and district councils. The latterare particularly hampered by the shortage of finance and inadequatestaffing, and have lost certain functions to central government agencies,including aspects of primary education, forestry conservation, and theupkeep of minor roads.

Though a Local Government Service Commission exists and a unifiedlocal government service (ULGS) has been established, nearly all seniorofficers are civil servants seconded to the councils, sometimes for verylong periods, with their salaries paid by the central government. Thispractice is being gradually phased out. The number of vacant posts ishigh, particularly at senior and middle management levels, and in thetechnical sphere. District councils receive a small proportion of aminimum tax collected by the central government, and both they andthe town councils receive only I5 to 20 per cent of their budget in theform of a central grant, mainly for recurrent expenditure (thiscompares with over 8o per cent for district councils in Botswana). Theyreceive no payment in respect of government buildings in their districtseven though they provide certain services for central ministries/departments and their employees. (Local authorities in Zambia areonly a little better off since the MMD Government's grant-in-lieu ofrates by no means reflects the extent of its property holdings within agiven locality.)

In furtherance of the Malawi Government's 'Statement on Devel-Ibid. pp. 24-36.


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576 WILLIAM TORDOFFopment Policies, i987-96', both the Department of DistrictAdministration and Rural Development (Dard) in the Office of thePresident and Cabinet (OPC) and the Ministry of Local Government(MLG) are committed to the promotion of development at district andsub-district levels. Each is in favour of existing programmes which, withdonor support, seek to strengthen local infrastructure. However, inI992-3 the two sides were divided over the best way to implementdecentralization. The Dard-OPC favoured a variant of the Kenyanmodel which a number of Malawian officials had studied in i99i: theywanted substantial deconcentration of administrative authority to thedistrict commissioner, to the district development committee (to beestablished on a legal basis and supported by a district fund), and tofield officers of the line ministries. On the other hand, the MLGemphasised the importance of building up strong, elected localauthorities on the ground that virtually all the existing councils (exceptfor the four largest) were chronically short of staff and finance, and thatthey needed to be strengthened in order to play a meaningfuldevelopment role, either on their own account or in partnership withthe district administration. The lack of clear national policy guidelinesas to how decentralization should be implemented also affected theapproach of the line ministries. Although Health and Works, forexample, were in the process of implementing aspects of decen-tralisation, there was little consistency of approach in the planning andimplementation of their efforts.50

6. The GambiaThe real decentralization of the i980s in this small West Africancountry has been 'the rapid growth of NGOs', according to DanielDavis, David Hulme, and Philip Woodhouse.5" The Gambianexperience is worth reviewing because it underlines the important rolewhich non-government organizations can come to play in rural Africa.In the early i990S the formal structure of local government in TheGambia revolved round a deconcentrated system of provincialadministration, area councils- exercising mainly regulatory functionsand lacking skilled and experienced personnel - and often ineffective

50 Republic of Malawi, Decentralisationolicy and Processand FinancialManagement f LocalGovernmentLilongwe, UNDP, i989), passim. As a UNDP consultant in Malawi, I was primarilyresponsiblefor compiling the first report and substantially revised the second.5 Daniel Davis, David Hulme, and Philip Woodhouse, 'Decentralization by Default: localgovernance and the view from the village in the Gambia', in PublicAdministrationndDevelopment,14, 1994, p. 265.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 577village development committees. The ruralprovinceswere divided intofive divisions, each headed by a divisional commissionerappointed bythe President but without the authority and resources to implementgovernment policy; they were supported by traditional chiefs andvillage headmen who operated within a complex local structure. Themain line ministries were severely overstretched at rural level; theirfield staff were closelycontrolled fromBanjul and their activities poorlycoordinated. As noted by Davis and his co-authors:VillagersperceivedNGOs to be the key agencies n the developmentprocessatvillage evel.Thismaywell bebecauseofthe weakand overstretched atureof government ervicesby the early i99os. Creditschemes,day-carecentres,adult iteracy lasses,killsdevelopmentnitiatives,waterpumps,horticulturalprojects nd other ncomegenerating ctivitiesoperatedby NGOs are usuallythe most obviousdevelopmentnitiativesn a village.52NGOs operated as neutral bodies outside established political patron-age networks.This situationwas not without its dangers.The fact that many of theNGOs were international or externally assisted raised the question ofsubstainability in the longer term, not least because there has beenlittle co-ordination with government agencies at the divisional level.Moreover, some NGOs 'poached' skilled personnelwho were alreadydoing other importantjobs, and probablyweakened local participationby creating a dependence syndrome among villagers.Reform measures proposed before the July I994 military coupcentred on the role of the divisional commissioner,who would chair adivisional development committee responsiblefor formulating and co-ordinating development plans, and on the upgrading of personnel,training, and budgets by the area councils (the latter, however, wereregarded by villagers as moribund). The effect of these changes, whichemphasisethe deconcentration of administrativeauthority rather thanpolitical devolution, would be to reduce the autonomy of NGOs andthus increase the existing tension and mistrust between them and thegovernment sector.53

CONCLUSIONSFirst, clear policy guidelines and firm political backing are essentialto advance the processofdecentralization.The latter is most meaningfulwhere there is a strong commitment to democratizationn' and wherethis amounts to something more than the establishment or revival of

52 Ibid. p. 260. 5 Ibid. pp. 253-69.


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578 WILLIAM TORDOFFmulti-partypolitics.Every effortmust be made to securethe agreementof key ministries to the proposed measuresbefore any attempt is madeto implement them. However, some may still be lukewarm in theircommitment to decentralization;thus, in Kenya a numberof ministriesfailed to disaggregate their sectoral budgets on a district-by-districtbasis, and this made it difficult for the DDCs to implement planningand budgetary procedures.Ministries may also be reluctant to redeploystaff and transferfunds to the districtcouncils, as in Zambia under thei980 Local Administration Act. As Nelson Kasfir points out, centralpoliticians and bureaucratsare unlikely to devolve meaningful powersto local communities unless they are satisfied that this will notundermine their own position.54Secondly, experience in all the countries surveyed suggests that theextent of decentralisation and the speed at which this can beimplemented is related to the availability of trained manpower andfinance. A phased approach to decentralisationmay yield better resultsthan radical departures which are not realistically grounded inavailable resources.In Zambia, for example, the effective working ofthe district councils established under the I980 Act was seriouslycurtailed not only by the politicizationof the administration,but alsoby the shortage of high calibre manpower, finance, housing, officeaccommodation, transport,and fuel. These requirementshad not beenadequately investigated in advance.In the third place, sub-national planning and budgetary controlsneed to be improved, as under the deconcentration measuresintroducedin Tanzania from I972 and in Kenya from I982. However,basic sectoralpolicy in these countries,and in Botswana,was still madein the national capitals by the central ministries,and responsibilityforimplementing major projects in the districts remained the primeresponsibilityof departmentalheads. Only in Kenya were DDCs givenexecutive authority to fund and implement small-scale projects; this,and the establishment of these committees on a legal basis, is underconsideration in Malawi. Kenya, however, never sought to achievewhat a May I972 working party in Zambia describedas 'an essentialfeature of decentralizedadministration', namely 'the preparation bythe province of its own capital and recurrent estimates for all theactivities of sectoral ministriesand departments which will now comeunder provincial rather than Lusaka-basedcontrol'.55

5 Kasfir, loc. cit. pp. 35 and 44.5 Report f the Working arty [chaired by Alan J. F. Simmance] Appointedo Review heSystem fDecentralised dministrationLusaka, Cabinet Office, 1972), pp. 65-6.


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DECENTRALISATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 579Such a major undertaking raises important issues of accountability.It was not achieved in Zambia in the i98os, when executive authorityremained substantially at the centre. But with the focus on the district

rather than the province, it is today a main objective of the country'slocal government champions. What may turn out to be a significantstep in this direction has been taken in the Central Province, wheresuccessive provincial permanentsecretarieshave delegated theirpowersas controlling officers to the district councils. The possibility is nowbeing considered of giving legal backing to this process, and ofextending it to other provinces in Zambia.Fourthly, there is a danger that administrative decentralizationmayreduce the autonomy of local authorities.The county councils sufferedsuch a fate in Kenya, while in Tanzania the I972 exerciseentailed theabolition of the districtcouncils. These were restoredin the early I98osin order to operate alongside elements of the RDD/DDD structureinthe belief that something more than the deconcentration of admin-istrative authority was required to promote meaningful politicalparticipation. In Ghana, the I 992 constitution reaffirmed the non-partisan nature of the elected district assemblies that had been earlierset up by the PNDC, but took no account of the difficulties likely toarise by the creation of a partisan central government, such as thatformed by Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress followingthe I992 presidentialand parliamentaryelections.56Botswana has alsopersisted in its commitment to political participation, and canreasonably claim to have one of the best decentralization records inAfrica, although the local authorities remain over-dependent oncentral government for their recurrentexpenditure.In the fifth place, the local government lesson - nowhere clearerthan in Malawi - is that if representativeauthorities are to have morethan a symbolic development role, they must be strengthened in bothstaffing and financial resources. In the interests of autonomy,champions of local government in several African states firmly rejectthe Mills-Odoi solution of a single, unified public service into whichlocal government personnel would be incorporated. The great majorityof local authorities themselves would prefer that their officers shouldbelong to a unified local government service (ULGS) rather than to anational service controlled, as in Ghana, by a single public servicecommission.Although some of the authorities in Zambia would like to

56 See Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of I992', in AfricanAffairs(London), 92, 368, July 1993, pp. 33i-66.


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580 WILLIAM TORDOFFappoint, promote, and discipline their own senior staff (as localauthorities did in Botswana before the ULGS was established in 1974),the leaders of the local government workers' union are afraid that suchpowers might be abused. Many local government officers believe thatthey could identify new sources of revenue if the central governmentwould agree to sanction them (for example, a cattle tax in Botswana).In Nigeria, the 1992 constitutional provision guaranteeing localgovernments a share in national revenue will not necessarily erode theirfinancial autonomy; however, this is a danger to be guarded against if(as is likely) a decline in the importance of traditional sources of localrevenue results.

Sixthly, experience in The Gambia, and elsewhere for that matter,suggests that while non-governmental organizations can make animportant contribution by promoting development in Africa's ruralareas, there are also attendant dangers in this process. NGOs need torecognise that while they 'can do many good things ... they cannotsubstitute for the state at the local level on a national scale'.57 Theirrole should be to assist rather than replace local government.

Finally, the establishment of an effective development structure atsub-district level has proved to be a major problem in all the statesreviewed in Commonwealth Africa, though Kenya is reported to havemade some progress in this direction under its District Focus strategy.The lack of any resources at this level may prove to be the criticalfactor, but some are essential if people are to decide for themselves whatdevelopment projects their community needs, and what steps should betaken to implement them. A district development fund designed tosupport projects initiated by non-government organisations might givea substantial boost to local development in almost every country.

5 Davis, Hulme, and Woodhouse, loc. cit. p. 268.

tordoff on decentralization

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