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MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert Author’s Name: Andrew Lucero Address: 7235 Island Lake Falls Road, Duluth MN 55803 Phone Number: 218-721-4034 Fax Number: 218-721-3764 E-mail Address: [email protected] Recommendation to Industry: Consideration of Actual Field Conditions in Determination of Facility Ratings I. Introduction The Northeast Blackout of 2003 was a widespread power outage that occurred throughout parts of the Northeastern and Midwestern United States and Ontario, Canada on Thursday, August 14, 2003, just before 4:10 p.m. EDT. It was the third most widespread blackout in history, after the 1999 Southern Brazil blackout and the 2012 India black out. The blackout affected an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight U.S. states. The map below shows the areas affected. In February 2004, the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force released their final report, placing the causes of the blackout into four groups. First, that FirstEnergy (FE) and its reliability council "failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of FE’s system, particularly with respect to voltage instability and the vulnerability of the Cleveland-Akron area, and FE did not operate its system with appropriate voltage criteria". Second, that FirstEnergy "did not recognize or understand the deteriorating condition of its system". Third, that FirstEnergy "failed to manage adequately tree growth in its transmission rights-of-way".

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Page 1: Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert - UMN CCAPS · NERC Regional Entities with SERC highlighted. SERC was not actually part of the 2003 Blackout affected areas. On October 7, 2010

MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert Author’s Name: Andrew Lucero

Address: 7235 Island Lake Falls Road, Duluth MN 55803

Phone Number: 218-721-4034 Fax Number: 218-721-3764

E-mail Address: [email protected]

Recommendation to Industry: Consideration of Actual Field

Conditions in Determination of Facility Ratings

I. Introduction

The Northeast Blackout of 2003 was a widespread power outage that occurred throughout parts of

the Northeastern and Midwestern United States and Ontario, Canada on Thursday, August 14,

2003, just before 4:10 p.m. EDT. It was the third most widespread blackout in history, after the

1999 Southern Brazil blackout and the 2012 India black out. The blackout affected an estimated

10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight U.S. states. The map below shows the

areas affected.

In February 2004, the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force released their final report,

placing the causes of the blackout into four groups.

First, that FirstEnergy (FE) and its reliability council "failed to assess and understand the

inadequacies of FE’s system, particularly with respect to voltage instability and the

vulnerability of the Cleveland-Akron area, and FE did not operate its system with

appropriate voltage criteria".

Second, that FirstEnergy "did not recognize or understand the deteriorating condition of

its system".

Third, that FirstEnergy "failed to manage adequately tree growth in its

transmission rights-of-way".

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MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

Finally, the "failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to provide

effective real-time diagnostic support."

The report states that a generating plant in Eastlake, Ohio (a suburb of Cleveland) went offline

amid high electrical demand, putting a strain on high-voltage power lines (located in a distant

rural setting) which later went out of service when they came in contact with "overgrown

trees". The cascading effect that resulted ultimately forced the shutdown of more than 100 power

plants.

II. NERC FAC for Actual Field Condition vs. Design Standards

In part the Northeast blackout and the reasons behind it, but mostly due to spot check results on

an entity in SERC Reliability Corporation (SERC), where a vegetation contact by a Transmission

Owner identified actual field conditions that varied significantly from design assumptions to

the point where some facility ratings were considered inaccurate or in question. Where the

follow-up resulted in the conclusion that this situation was not restricted to one entity or

region and resulted in NERC’s issuance of an Alert (Recommendation) to proactively identify

other such conditions and promote corrective actions. The map below shows all eight of the

NERC Regional Entities with SERC highlighted. SERC was not actually part of the 2003

Blackout affected areas.

On October 7, 2010 NERC provided a Recommendation to Industry entitled “Consideration of

Actual Field Conditions in Determination of Facility Ratings” and was updated on November 30,

2010. NERC recommended to the Transmission Owners and Generator Owners of bulk electric

system facilities a review of their current facility ratings methodology for their transmission lines.

This was intended to verify the methodology used was based on actual field conditions and

determine if their ratings methodology would produce appropriate ratings when considering

differences between design and field conditions. If entities have not previously verified that the

facility design, installation, and field conditions are within design tolerances when the facilities

are loaded at their ratings, entities are required by January 18, 2011, to describe its plans to

complete such an assessment of all its transmission lines, with the highest priority lines assessed

by December 31, 2011, medium priority lines by December 31, 2012, and the lowest priority by

December 31, 2013. At the conclusion of each year, each Transmission Owner and Generator

Owner must report to its Regional Entity a summary of the assessments and identification of all

transmission facilities where as-built conditions are different from design conditions, resulting in

incorrect ratings, and their associated mitigation timelines. Remediation is expected within one

year from identification of the issue or on a schedule approved by the Regional Entity if longer

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than a year. Owners are also expected to coordinate with their respective operating and planning

organizations to coordinate interim mitigation strategies.

III. Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) Response

The MRO, one of NERC’s Regional Entities covering the upper Midwest and two Canadian

provinces, has 25 distinct Transmission Owners who fall under the Alert’s Recommendation.

In July 2011 the MRO, received the first reports from the Transmission Owners on their findings

from the review of clearances of their “High Priority” transmission lines. In January 2012 the

final findings were due. In the MRO, 1381 discrepancies were reported over the 6497 miles of

High Priority transmission lines which encompass 309 circuits. A discrepancy is defined as a

single span not meeting clearance requirements.

The table shown below contains the July 2011 updated detailed finding in the MRO region for the

16 Transmission Owners who reported regarding High Priority lines.

Transmission Owner HP Miles

HP Circuits

HP Discrepancies

# Lines De-Rated

Mitigation Complete

Mitigation In Process

Mitigation Not

Started

1 284.32 27 10 8 7 3 0

2 825.19 3 0

3 0.00 0 0

4 0.38 1 0

5 560.17 6 42 1 42 0 0

6 682.50 55 714 35 506 208 0

7 130.50 18 22 0 21 1 0

8 74.00 1 4 0 0 0 4

9 610.00 79 5 2 2 3 0

10 7.79 1 0

11 288.00 6 0

12 273.20 9 58 3 0 43 15

13 422.00 11 0

14 453.80 27 199 17 90 109 0

15 309.31 3 13 5 13

16 1576.00 62 314 29 129 145 40

6497.16 309 1381 100 797 525 59

In July 2012 the MRO received the first reports from 14 Transmission Owners on their findings

from the review of clearances of their “Medium Priority” transmission lines. The table below

reflects the findings to date; final findings are due in January 2013. In the MRO, more than 207

discrepancies were reported on over the 9515 miles of Medium Priority transmission lines which

encompass 306 circuits.

The table shown below contains the July 2012 details of the finding in the MRO region for

Medium Priority lines.

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MRO has granted several Transmission Owners extensions to either complete their assessments or their

mitigation efforts based on their specific needs or circumstances.

Transmission Owner

MP Miles

MP Circuits

MP Discrepancies

# Lines De-

Rated Mitigation Complete

Mitigation In Process

Mitigation Not

Started

1 197.98 6 6 4 1 5 0

2 577.44 30 0 0

3 0.00

4 523.40 23 128 3 7 121 0

5 699.40 45 9 4 9 0 0

6 0.00

7 208.27 2 7 0 0 0 7

7 1092.67 19 7 0 7

8 807.05 20 50 4 50

9 336.00 0 0

10 165.60 49 0

11 482.16 13 0

12 0.00

13 3822.36 48 0

14 603.00 51 0

9515.33 306 207 15 74 126 7

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IV. NERC Wide Data

The next few pages include NERC’s data from the February 2012 graphs for the High Priority

lines as well as data from the August 2012 graphs for the Medium Priority lines, showing the

aggregate of findings across the NERC (some are depicted by Regional Entity) foot print with all

NERC Regional Entities reporting. These graphs are fairly self explanatory.

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

15%

25%

30%

27%

21%

26%

19%

31%

% of High Priority Circuits with Discrepancies

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MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

3% 6%

15%

9%

18%

2% 5% 5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

% of Medium Priority Circuits with Discrepancies Through July 16, 2012

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MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

6%

22%

19%

32%

29% 31%

40%

24%

38%

1%

7%

11% 9%

15%

12%

3%

42%

61%

44%

39%

52%

32%

22%

50%

0% 0%

14%

1% 1% 0%

9%

0%

14% 15%

7%

15%

9% 10% 11%

18%

HP Discrepancy Category Breakdown by Region

Clearance to Underbuild Conductor -Conductor Clearance Ground / Structure Clearance

Other (explain in detail field) Transmission crossing

Page 8: Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert - UMN CCAPS · NERC Regional Entities with SERC highlighted. SERC was not actually part of the 2003 Blackout affected areas. On October 7, 2010

MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

2% 2% 1%

17%

10%

61% 61%

2%

59%

0% 0%

4% 1% 0%

14%

0%

36%

92%

47%

70%

79%

29%

18%

82%

0%

5%

29%

0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1%

3% 2% 0%

10%

1% 3%

0% 1%

16%

6%

10%

0% 0%

13%

0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0%

6%

0% 0% 0%

4%

0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

MP Discrepancy Breakdown by Region

Clearance to Underbuild Conductor-Conductor Clearance

Ground / Structure Clearance Other

Transmission Crossing Underbuild

Uneven Terrain Various Discrepancies Types

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0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

88%

66% 73% 76%

86% 86% 83% 87%

% of Mile Assessed for High Priority Lines

37%

46%

52%

60% 60%

53%

67%

58%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

% of Miles Assessed for Medium Priority Lines Through July 2012

Page 10: Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert - UMN CCAPS · NERC Regional Entities with SERC highlighted. SERC was not actually part of the 2003 Blackout affected areas. On October 7, 2010

MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP TRE WECC

7%

32%

65% 62% 66%

21%

39% 26%

25%

65%

23% 32% 26%

57%

40% 61%

68%

3% 11% 6% 9%

22% 21% 13%

Remediation Status by Region

Complete In Progress Not Started

Complete 38%

In Progress

52%

Not Started

10%

Medium: Remediation Status Breakdown

Page 11: Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert - UMN CCAPS · NERC Regional Entities with SERC highlighted. SERC was not actually part of the 2003 Blackout affected areas. On October 7, 2010

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LiDAR / PLS-CADD 59%

Field Inspection 15%

LiDAR, PLS-CADD, Field Inspection

14%

Ground Survey 6%

Survey, LiDAR /

PLS-CADD

6%

High: Top 5 Inspection Type

Field Inspection

9%

Ground Survey

13%

LiDAR / PLS-CADD 58%

Combination of Methods

20%

Medium: Top Inspection Types

Page 12: Title: NERC Facility Ratings Alert - UMN CCAPS · NERC Regional Entities with SERC highlighted. SERC was not actually part of the 2003 Blackout affected areas. On October 7, 2010

MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

Raised Transmission

Structure 28%

Underbuild Lowered

22%

Derated 21%

Increase Conductor to

Conductor Clearance

17%

Other (explain in detail field)

12%

High: Top 5 Remediation Category

Combination of Remediation

Types 56%

Removed Object or Graded

18%

Raised Transmission

Structure 17%

Transmission Structure Installed

5% Derated 4%

Medium: Top 5 Remediation Categories

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Complete 42%

In Progress 44%

Not Started

14%

High Remediation Status Breakdown

Complete 38%

In Progress

52%

Not Started

10%

Medium: Remediation Status Breakdown

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MRO/Lucero Consulting LLC

In conclusion, overall, the MRO is on schedule and on par with the other Regional

Entities in NERC for this NERC Alert.