FERTILITY TRENDS IN EUROPE:Is below-replacement fertility an inevitable outcome of the

Second Demographic Transition?

VUB Colloquium on “Demographic challenges for the 21st century,” Brussels, February 15-16, 2007

Tomáš Sobotka

VIENNA INSTITUTE OF DEMOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION (I)

Three ‘stylised facts’ on European fertility

• Fertility rates in Europe are very low and further declining

• Current low fertility will necessarily lead to a rapid population ageing and to a decline in population size

• These trends are unsustainable in the long run and constitute serious threats to economy, labour market, welfare system, and thus also to the foundations of European societies

INTRODUCTION (II)

Renewed fears of “fertility implosion,” “baby deficit” and population decline

• 1920s and 1930s: spreading concerns about low birth rates and their consequences

• 1970s-?: renewed fears of declining fertility, rapid population ageing and declining population size

– J. C. Chesnais (2001): population implosion in the 21st century may be particularly pronounced in Europe

– Pope Benedict XVI (Christmas 2006): Europe “…seems no longer wants to have children” (…)and “seems to be wishing to take its leave of history”

• Increasing political concerns & pronatalism

– The “Green Paper” (European Commission, 2005): low birth rate is a “challenge for the public authorities”; “return to demographic growth” is one out of “three essential priorities”

TOPICS & HYPOTHESES (I)

Aims of this presentation:• Outline the recent shift towards low & late fertility in Europe• Discuss selected determinants of fertility• Future prospects: Implications of current fertility & migration

for long-term population trends in the EU

TOPICS & HYPOTHESES (II)

Main Hypotheses Extremely low period fertility rates are linked to fertility

postponement and are likely to be temporary

Pronounced regional differences are likely to prevail

Second Demographic Transition is not necessarily linked to below-replacement fertility

Immigration can substitute most or all of the births ‘missing’ due to below-replacement fertility

Very low fertility and the prospects of population decline do not constitute an all-European problem

and, therefore

The fears of European population implosion seem exaggerated

ANALYSIS (1): ‘QUANTUM’: The shift to low and lowest-low fertility

Period Total Fertility Rate in Western, Northern, and Southern Europe (1950-2005): rising regional differences

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2.40

2.60

2.80

3.00

19

50

19

55

19

60

19

65

19

70

19

75

19

80

19

85

19

90

19

95

20

00

20

05

Per

iod

To

tal F

erti

lity

(TF

R)

...

..

Europe

Northern Europe

Southern Europe

German-speakingWestern Europe

McDonald (2006): Dividing line: TFR below 1.5 (need for policy interventions?)

Period Total Fertility Rate in Central-Eastern Europe (1950-2005): decline to the very low levels

Data sources: Council of Europe (2006), EUROSTAT (2006), and national stat. offices

NOTE: Data are weighted by population size of given countries & regions

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.001

95

0

19

55

19

60

19

65

19

70

19

75

19

80

19

85

19

90

19

95

20

00

20

05

Per

iod

TF

R

Europe

Central Europe

South-eastern Europe

Postsoviet republics

The spread of “lowest-low fertility” in Europe(Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002)

EUROPEAN FERTILITY CRISIS?

Data sources: Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2006)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Nu

mb

er

of

co

un

trie

s

Countries with TFR<1.3

Countries with TFR<1.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f E

uro

pe

an

po

pu

lati

on

(%

)In countries with TFR<1.3

In countries with TFR<1.5

The shift to very low fertility is often linked with the spread of one-child family model

(Important exception: German-speaking countries)

Data sources: Council of Europe (2006)

Share of first births on the total births (%)

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

19

85

19

90

19

95

20

00

20

05

Sh

are

of

firs

t b

irth

s o

n t

ota

l b

irth

s (

%)

Bulgaria Spain

Ukraine Norw ay

To understand low fertility trends and differences it is crucial to look at parity-specific fertility

Parity-specific differences manifested in fertility ‚recuperation‘ at higher reproductive ages

Lifetime probability of having a(nother) child among women aged 30

0,00

0,10

0,20

0,30

0,40

0,50

0,60

0,70

0,80

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002Year

p 0

-1 a

t ag

e 30

Spain

Sweden

childless women

0,00

0,10

0,20

0,30

0,40

0,50

0,60

0,70

0,80

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

Year

Pro

bab

ilit

y o

f ad

dit

ion

al c

hil

d

1st to 2nd child (p12)

Sweden Spain

Spain

Sweden

2nd to 3rd child (p23)

Data sources: Council of Europe (2006), EUROSTAT (2006), and national sources

ANALYSIS (2): ‘Tempo’: The shift to an ever later family formation

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Mea

n a

ge

at f

irst

ch

ildb

irth

(ye

ars)

Spain

Western & northern Europe (8 countries)

Russia

Central-eastern Europe (9 countries)

United States

Pushing the age limits: Increase in first-time motherhood at very late reproductive ages

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f fi

rst

bir

th (

inc

ide

nc

e)

rate

s

rea

lise

d a

t a

ge

s 4

0+

(p

erc

en

t)

Austria

The Netherlands

Sweden

Finland

Spain

Italy

Slovenia

Czech Republic

Hungary

United States

Proportion of first birth rates realised at ages 40+ (%)

Data sources: computations based on Eurostat (2006), CBS Statline, Statistics Austria and NCHS (2006)

…and increasing ‘polarization’ in first birth timing

England and Wales: Age when a given proportion of first birth rates realised

1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 10% 18.4 18.9 18.8 18.8 18.7 25% 20.3 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.3

Median age 23.0 24.4 25.2 25.9 26.3 75% 26.2 27.7 29.1 30.0 30.7 90% 29.7 30.8 32.6 33.6 34.5

Interquartile range (75-25%) 5.9 6.5 7.8 8.6 9.4 Interdecile range (90-10%) 11.3 11.8 13.8 14.8 15.7 Source: Own computations based on data estimated by Smallwood (2002)

ANALYSIS (3). ‚Tempo‘ vs. ‚Quantum‘: The link between fertility postponement and lowest-low fertility

• CONSENSUS on tempo distortions: The shift to later childbearing distorts commonly used indicators of period fertility, especially the TFR which is ‘deflated’

– Possible misinterpretations of trends and cross-country differences in the TFR: apparent cross-country differences may be caused by different pace of fertility postponement

– This may lead to erroneous projections of the future period & cohort fertility

– Tempo distortions may affect the TFR for many decades (thus, also the gap between the period TFR and the cohort CTFR may persist for 30-40 years)

ANALYSIS (3). ‚Tempo‘ vs. ‚Quantum‘: The link between fertility postponement and lowest-low fertility

• LACK OF CONSENSUS: How to measure the ‘underlying’ period fertility levels – There is no unambiguous alternative to the TFRTwo major approaches:

– Shift to the more sophisticated, parity-specific measures (life table indicators based on age & parity or parity & duration since the previous birth)

– Adjustment approach: Attempts to correct the period measures for tempo distortions (Bongaarts-Feeney, Kohler-Ortega, Kohler-Philipov); not universally accepted

• How to interpret these indicators?• Do they come closer to the corresponding cohort measures?• Do they indicate the likely future extent of the ‘recuperation’ of postponed

fertility and of the future TFR?

More sophisticated measures (1): Period Average Parity (PAP), based on parity progression ratios

1.20

1.30

1.40

1.50

1.60

1.70

1.80

1.90

Jan-

1984

Jan-

1985

Jan-

1986

Jan-

1987

Jan-

1988

Jan-

1989

Jan-

1990

Jan-

1991

Jan-

1992

Jan-

1993

Jan-

1994

Jan-

1995

Jan-

1996

Jan-

1997

Jan-

1998

Jan-

1999

Jan-

2000

Jan-

2001

Jan-

2002

Jan-

2003

Jan-

2004

Jan-

2005

Jan-

2006

Per

iod

fer

tili

ty r

ate

.

..

Period Average Parity (PAP)

TFR

Period TFR and PAP in Austria, 1984-2006

Mean values 1984-2006:

TFR: 1.429

PAP: 1.630

CTFR (cohort 1966): 1.68

More sophisticated measures (2): adjusted TFR in Europe, 2002-2003 (Bongaarts-Feeney adjustment)

Population size,

millions (2002)

TFR (2002)

AdjTFR (around

2002-2003)

Tempo effect

adjTFR (1995-2000)

Western Europe 149.3 1.75 1.92 -0.17 1.88 Northern Europe 24.3 1.70 1.96 -0.26 1.94 German-speaking (AT, SW, D) 97.8 1.32 1.53 -0.21 1.52 Southern Europe 120.4 1.28 1.43 -0.15 1.59 Central-eastern Europe 77.6 1.25 1.66 -0.41 1.74 South-eastern Europe 43.7 1.33 1.64 -0.31 1.67 Eastern Europe 205.8 1.25 1.45 -0.19 1.46

EUROPE EU-15 378.6 1.49 1.67 -0.18 1.70 EU-12 new (2004 & 2007 accession)

104.1 1.24 1.63 -0.39 1.67

EU-27 482.6 1.44 1.66 -0.22 1.69 Europe 722.0 1.39 1.61 -0.22 1.63

Tempo-adjusted measures: Main conclusions

• Different size of tempo effects across Europe: some cross-country differences in the TFR linked to tempo effects

• Fertility ‚quantum‘ recently stable in most regions in Europe – surprising stability in the adj. TFR

• There is no reason to consider the TFR of 1.5 as a threshold, below which countries fall into a low-fertility trap (McDonald)

• No country with the lowest-low fertility (TFR<1.3) also has the lowest-low adjustedTFR

– Lowest-low fertility appears to be a temporary phenomenon, caused by tempo effects

ANALYSIS (4): Insights based on completed cohort fertility

• Cross-country variation; long history of sub-replacement fertility• Some countries of Northern & Western Europe likely to retain

completed CTFR close to replacement threshold

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2.40

2.60

2.80

1900

1905

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

Birth cohort

Co

mp

lete

d c

oh

ort

TF

R

...

Czech Republic Austria

Sweden Spain

Denmark France

Germany

Huge swings in the period TFR often have only a small impact on the period TFR

Period and cohort TFR in the Czech Republic; 1900-2005

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

Year

Birth cohort

To

tal f

erti

lity

...

Birth cohort 1900Birth cohort 1966

Cohort TFR

Period TFR

Delayed childbearing and completed fertility

• Individual-level data: strong association between the timing of first birth and completed fertility

• Aggregate-level data: conflicting evidence on the impact of delayed childbearing on completed fertility rates

0,000,100,200,300,400,500,600,700,800,901,00

22 24 26 28 30 32

Mean age at childbearing at given birth order

Pa

rity

pro

gre

ss

ion

ra

tio

First birthsSecond births

Third births

Mean age at childbearing by birth order and parity progression rates to first, second, and third birth among Swedish women born in 1940-65

Childless societies? Childlessness is on the rise in almost all advanced societies

In many countries record-high levels of childlessness reached among women born around 1900

Germany stands out for the highest childlessness in Europe

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

1885

1890

1895

1900

1905

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

Birth cohort

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f c

hild

les

s w

om

en

(%

)

Czech RepublicPolandSlovakiaAustriaGermany (West)

Projection (lower bound)

Cohort progression rates to second birth

• The main differentiating factor for the overall completed fertility rates

0,60

0,65

0,70

0,75

0,80

0,85

0,90

0,9519

40

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

Birth cohort

Pro

gre

ssio

n r

ates

to

th

e se

con

d

bir

th

Sweden

Italy

The Netherlands

Spain

ANALYSIS (5): Changing family context of childbearing

Rapid rise in non-marital childbearing in all parts of Europe

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Pro

po

rtio

n e

xtra

-mar

ital

bir

ths

(%)

..

... .

Northern Europe

Italy & Spain

Western Europe

EU-25

Central Europe

Eastern Europe

...but vast cross-country differences

No East-West divide in non-marital childbearing; history and diverse cultural and institutional factors matter most

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Pro

po

rtio

n e

xtra

-mar

ital

bir

ths

(%)

..

. ..

.

Sweden

East Germany

WestGermany

France

Bulgaria

Greece

Russia

EU-25

Non-marital childbearing in east and west Germany: no convergence after the Unification

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Pro

po

rtio

n e

xtra

-mar

ital

bir

ths

(%)

..

. ..

.

Sweden

East Germany

WestGermany

EU-25

In most countries, non-marital childbearing first spreads among the lower-educated people

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1990 1995 2000 2005

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f n

on

-ma

rita

l b

irth

s (

%)

.

....

....

Primary Lower secondaryHigher secondaryTertiaryTOTAL

Czech Republic: non-marital births by education of mother, 1990-2005 (%)

Distribution of non-marital births in England and Wales by the recognition of father (%)

...and takes place within increasingly diverse living arrangements, especially in cohabiting unions

Source: ONS 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2005

Ex

tra

-ma

rita

l b

irth

s (

%)

..

..

Joint registration (partners living at the same address)Joint registration (partners living at different addresses)Joint registration (total)Sole registration by the mother

Discussion (1): How are declining marriage rates, rising cohabitation and partnership

instability linked to fertility?

• Macro-level associations: reversal of the previous patterns in the 1990s (Billari and Kohler 2004)

– Divorce rates and non-marital ratio became positively associated with the TFR, first marriage rates show slight negative association

– Countries with the highest fertility rates also have high divorce and partnership dissolution rates, low marriage rates, high prevalence of cohabitation and high frequency of extramarital childbearing

• Micro-level analysis: less conclusive, many different factors play a role– Eckhard (2006): Shorter, less stable partnerships and increasing

‘partnerlessness‘ may partly explain declining cohort fertility in Germany

– But: Kravdal (1997): many Norwegians deliberately enter prenthood even if their partnership situation is uncertain

– Moreover: Women and men entering their second union have a strong motivation to have a shared child with their new partner -> positive effects of stepfamily fertility, especially on third births (Vikat, Thomson, Hoem 1999 and other studies)

Billari (2005: 80): “If the rule is one child per couple, the only way to reach replacement is to have individuals experience two couple relationships“

HOW MANY CHILDREN WITH HOW MANY PARTNERS?Multipartner fertility among Danish men born in 1960

Of which having children with Number of children

Proportion of men 1 woman 2 women 3+ women

0 24.5 x X x 1 17.0 100.0 X x 2 38.3 92.9 7.1 x 3 15.8 78.4 20.0 1.5 4 3.6 60.8 32.0 7.2 5+ 0.8 44.0 36.0 20.0 Total 100.0 67.6 7.3 0.6 Total fathers 75.5 89.5 9.7 0.8

Notes: • Data recorded for the period through 2003, some men have not completed their ‘childbearing‘ • No records about fathers are known for ca. 2-3 percent of childrenSources: Own comptations from the Danish registry data

Discussion (2): Is the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) ‘good‘ for fertility?

Three main links between the SDT concept and fertility trends (van de Kaa 1987, 2001, Lesthaeghe 1995):– SDT linked to a massive postponement of parenthood

(facilitating role of modern contraception emphasised)– SDT leads to a marked rise in non-marital childbearing– SDT leads to a decline of period and eventually also

cohort fertility rates below replacement level• Period fertility may eventually recover a bit (‚recuperation‘), but

not enough to bounce back to the replacement level (van de Kaa 1997 & 2001: an ideal scheme of 15 stages of the SDT)

• Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002): long-term subreplacement fertility one of the more recent characteristics of the SDT

• Some studies simplistically equal SDT with very low fertility

Macro and micro-level associations: • Coleman (2004: 18): surprisingly, “SDT has nothing to do

with low fertility on a cross-national basis today“• Van de Kaa (2001, individual-level data): in 1992,

postmaterialism and subjective well-being did not show any association with fertility intentions

• Lesthaeghe and Neiderd (2006): – regional-level TFR in the US negativelly associated with SDT

factor on a county level (3141 units)– small, but positive correlation on a state level (50)

• HOWEVER: The positive link between divorce rate, non-marital births, and the TFR suggests that some aspects of the SDT in Europe may be positively linked to fertility

Analysis of the SDT-fertility link

Indexes capturing different dimensions of the SDT:• Index SDT1 (demographic factors in 2004):

– mean age at first birth, first marriage, teenage fertility, non-marital ratio, total divorce rates, total first marriage rate, prevalence of cohabiting unions; 34 countries

• Index SDT2 (ideational & value factors around 2000); based on the European Values Study in 29 countries– 8 questions: Family values, non-conformism, permissiveness, secularism

• Both indexes and their components can range from 0 (= no STD) to 10 (=max. score on STD factors)

• A combination of the mean values of the SDT1 and SDT2: SDT-C index

Results (1): SDT-TFR association

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

1 1.5 2TFR

Ind

ex

SD

T-C

.

r=0.71

Ireland

IcelandFrance

Sw eden

Romania

DenmarkThe Netherlands

LUX

Finland

UK

UkrainePoland

Belarus RussiaCroatia

AustriaGermany

Slovenia

Czech Rep.

Lithuania

Spain EstoniaItaly

Hungary

LatviaBGSlovakia.

Greece

This association remains identical if only the values- dimension index SDT2 is used

Results (2): Does the association hold if the TFR is adjusted for tempo effects?

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

1 1.5 2adjusted TFR

Ind

ex S

DT

-C

.

r=0.58

Adjusted TFR computed for the period 2001-2003

Results (3): Does the association hold also for the intended family size?

Mean intended family size computed from Eurobarometer 2006 data (Testa 2006)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

1.5 2 2.5 3mean intended family size (women aged 25-39)

Ind

ex S

DT

2

...

r=0.30

Discussion (3): The multifaceted impact of immigration on childbearing and population

trends

Two dimensions analysed:• Impact of immigration on childbearing trends

and patterns

• ‘Replacement migration‘: Impact of immigration on population size

Focus: regions with large immigration streams in the last 2-3 decades (western, southern, northern Europe)

1) Impact of immigration on childbearing

Lack of comparative cross-country data; few studies (Coleman 1994; Schoorl 1995; Haug, Compton and Courbage 2002)

Definitions: (all) immigrant women (men), foreigners only, first vs. second and third generation, legal vs. illegal

• The use of data for foreigners problematic, especially in countries with high rates of naturalisations

• TFR may be problematic as well (Toulemon 2004, Andersson 2004)

Analysis: Childbearing of legally resident immigrant (foreign) women; 1st generation:

• Proportion of births to immigrant women

• Fertility differences between immigrant vs. ‚‘native‘ women

• ‘Net impact‘ of immigrant women on the TFR

Country Period Type of data

Births to immigrant women (%)

TFR 'native' women

TFR immigrant

women

Net impact of migrants on the TFR

Source

Austria 2004 F 11.5 1.33 2.04 0.09 Kytir 2005 Belgium (Flanders)

2003-4 F 12.4 (F), 23.01) (I)

1.51 3.07 0.10 Van Bavel and Bastiaenssen 2006; Vlaams Agentschap 2007

Denmark 1999-2003

I 13.5 1.69 2.431) 0.075 Statistics Denmark 2004

England and Wales

2005 I 20.8 1.6 (2001)

2.2 (2001) 0.07 (1996)

ONS 2005, Coleman et al. 2002

France 1991-98 I 12.4 1.65 2.5 0.07 Toulemon 2004 The Netherlands

2005 I 17.8 1.65 1.97 0.078 CBS Statline 2006

Spain 2002 F 15.0 (2005)

1.19 2.12 0.08 INE 2006, Vila and Castro Martin 2005

Sweden 2005 I 19.5 1.75 2.01 0.053 Statistics Sweden 2006

Switzerland 1997 F 26.3 (2005)

1.34 1.86 0.14 Swiss Statistical Office 2006, Wanner 2002

Births and fertility among immigrant women, 9 countries

I: immigrant women, F: foreign women only

2) Replacement migration: can immigration substitute ‚missing‘ births?

• UN report (2000): Replacement migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing poplation?

• Often misinterpreted; different concepts of ‚replacement migration‘

• CONSENSUS: migration cannot stop population ageing; only modest impact on slowing-down the process

• BUT: Can immigration substitute most of the births ‚deficit‘ even in the countries with very low fertility?

Measuring replacement migration

• Importance of immigration: need to rethink the traditional concepts of replacement fertility (Calot & Sardon 2001, Smallwood & Chamberlain 2005)

• Measuring longer impact of immigration by combining period & cohort measures:

• GRE (=Gross REplacement rate)– tracing the change in the relative cohort size of females from

their birth through their prime reproductive periodAt birth: GRE(t) = GRR(t) (Gross Reproduction Rate) = = TFR * (female live births / all live births)At age 30 (final GREF)GREF(t) = PF(t+30)/PF(t) * GRR(t)

Advantage, interpretation

Switzerland: a textbook example of very low fertility combined wih replacement migration

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

1.10

1.20

Birth 4 9 14 19 24 29Age

Gro

ss r

epla

cem

ent

rate

.

. 1970

1972

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

The GRE of selected cohorts by the time elapsed since birth (age)

GRE: A crucial contribution of ages 20-30

Switzerland: GRE at the time of birth (GRR) and at the duration (age) 20, 25, and 30

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

1.10

1.20

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990Birth Year

Gro

ss r

epla

cem

ent

rate

.

...

GRR at birth

20

25

30

Cross-country comparison: different combinations of fertility and migration levels

5 countries: GRE for 1978 (1984 for Spain)

0.70

0.75

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

1.00

1.05

Birth 5 10 15 20 25Year interval (age)

Gro

ss r

epla

cem

ent

rate

(G

RR

)

.

...

Spain (1984)

Switzerland

Norway

The Netherlands

Austria

By age 27, GRE up to 0.90-0.98

Younger cohorts: further decline in the GRE at age 0 and faster subsequent increase

Conclusions:

(1) Very low fertility is not an all-European problemNew heterogeneity and new cleavages in Europe (also van de Kaa 1999)

• ‚High fertility belt‘: Nordic countries + North-western Europe (Benelux, FR, UK, IRE)

– TFR 1.7-2.0, adj.TFR and cohort CTFR around 1.9, replacement or above-replacement migration

• Low fertility-high migration: Southern Europe, Switzerland, Austria, Western Germany

– Very low fertility (adj. TFR 1.5) combined with replacement migration

• Low fertility-emigration: dangerous mix; negative population momentum, rapid population decline (East Germany, Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Russia)

– In these regions, very low fertility may seriously undermine social dynamic and prosperity

Conclusions:(2) SDT is positively linked to fertility• Advanced SDT does not necessarily imply sub-replacement

fertility (France, Sweden, Norway)• Especially the close association with the values dimension

(SDT2) surprising• Cautious interpretation necessary (ecological fallacy)• Can STD in its later stage become positively liked to fertility?

– Advanced SDT countries may be transformed into more gender-equal, child-friendly, women-friendly and family-friendly societies, which give individuals more freedom to better realise their childbearing plans alongside their competing aspirations (Strong enabling role of welfare policies?)

– This interpretation may change our perspectives on the likely future fertility trends in Europe

Need for more sophisticated research!

Conclusions:(3) Family instability appears positively linked to fertility(4) Replacement migration may occur even in societies

with sustained very low fertility rates (Spain, Switzerland)

• Immigration continent: EU25 has recently attracted more immigrants than the US

• Substantial immigration now seen as a part of the SDT (van de Kaa 1999, Lesthaeghe and Neiderd 2006)

• The importance of immigration: A combination of high immigration, younger age structure and higher fertility rates of immigrants

• Dalla Zuanna (2006): sustained low fertility-high immigration cycle in Northern Italy.

– Low-skilled migration mixed with high aspirations for social mobility of migrants‘ children, leading to their fertility reduction

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Selected reasons why a modest fertility increase may take place in many countries

• End of tempo distortion, modest recuperation• More family friendly policies, accomodated to the SDT

context• More immigrants coming from higher-fertility settings• Improvement in assisted reproduction• Further advancement in the SDT?• More family instability?• Increase in religiosity?

(Many reasons to expect further decline; better known – e.g. Lutz 2006)

FUTURE OUTLOOK: European population implosion postponed?

Eurostat (2004) projection: main scenario – EU population decline after 2025 (also other projections)

BUT: higher fertility and higher immigration may postpone the EU population decline well after 2050 (also projection by Alho et al 2006)

What about European global demographic and economic marginalisation?

• It may not have sense to compare continents with fragmented geopolitical units. – More meaningful is an EU-US comparison– EU territorial expansion enabled it to surpass the US in

population growth and to keep pace with its economic power

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Po

pu

lati

on

(m

illio

ns)

. EU-15

United States

EU (actual border)

Population: US vs. EU-15 and EU (actual borders)

Economy: GDP in PPP; US vs. EU (actual borders)

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10000

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

GD

P (

bill

ion

s U

S D

olla

rs, P

PP

, 199

6 p

rice

s)

. ..

EU (actual boundaries)

United States

Sweden: Most stable fertility level in Europe:

Completed cohort fertility among women born 1735-1963 Cohort fertility of Swedish women

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

5,0

1735

1750

1765

1780

1795

1810

1825

1840

1855

1870

1885

1900

1915

1930

1945

1960

Birth cohort

Nu

mb

er o

f ch

ildre

n b

orn

Source:Statistics Sweden

• Country-specific and parity-specific differences in the extent of ´catching up´ at higher reproductive ages

• First birth probabilities increasing after age 30 in almost all countries

Future outlook (2):Will the end of fertility postponement bring an increase in the period fertility rates?

0,50

0,55

0,60

0,65

0,70

0,75

0,80

0,85

0,90

0,95

1,00

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000Year

TF

R o

f or

der

1

22,00

23,00

24,00

25,00

26,00

27,00

28,00

29,00

30,00

Mea

n ag

e at

firs

t bi

rth

Mean age 1st birthCohort CFR1 (cohorts 1942-1966)

TFR1 = 0,63 (1982-83)

tempo effects

Stages of fertility postponement and ´recuperation´: the case of first births in the Netherlands