Module -14Off-site Emergency Management Plan (OffSEMP)industrial Disaster Risk Management

Contents1. Planning Principles for an Emergency Plan (EMP)2. Intention of the module2.1. Off-site Emergency Management Plan (OffSEMP)

2.2. Approach for OffSEMP

3. Emergency control organisation and responsibilities 3.1. Need for Incident Response System (1RS)

3.2. Important Roles and Responsibilities of various stakeholders

3.3. Incident Response System (IRS)

4. Emergency Operation Centre (EOC)5. Coordination with NDRF and SDRF6. Coordination with neighbouring states7. Conclusion8. Annexure9. Glossary10. References

Main objectives of Off-site Emergency Management Plan (OffSEMP)The objective in emergency management planning is to ensure that everyone knows: what are the hazards and risk in the district what and how to do in the event of an chemical emergency; and preparations for potential and unexpected incidents in the industries located in the district.

The types of emergencies to plan for include fire, explosion, toxic releases, injuries and rescues in the event of hazardous substances.

OffSEMP improves local, district, state and national capacity to respond to disasters and public health emergencies, scaling up the actions with vulnerable communities in health promotion, disease prevention and disaster risk reduction.

As per our Indian regulations we have regulatory provisions that On-site Emergency Management Plan (OnSEMP) will be prepared by industrial units and Off-site Emergency Management Plan (OffSEMP) by District Collector for his/her respective District. Both modules have some overlaying parts hence where we feel to highlight the issues in the interest of readers those have been highlighted or repeated in both the Modules i.e.13 and 14.

The present Module 14 deals with the OffSEMP and Module 13 deals with the OnSEMP. We advice readers to read these two modules in conjunction to have an overall understanding of the on- and off-site emergency management plans.

The emphasis is given on what should be the response and command structure. It also provides new way of thinking for OffSEMP

The module does not cover multi-hazard analysis in terms of both natural and man-made and hence the earthquake and flood scenario consideration are excluded.

1. Planning Principles for an Emergency Plan (EMP)An OffSEMP covers designated actions that the civil administration must take to ensure the safety of deceased plant and local community from chemical fire and other emergencies. All civil local, district and state departments are required to establish an emergency action plan under regulations and guidelines developed by Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).

OffSEMP need different approach in comparison to OnSEMP. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ) has suggested this cycle in its "guiding principles for chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response" to address the wide range of issues that need to be dealt with, in order to ensure effective chemical safety, i.e., the actions that should be taken by industry (including labour), public authorities, communities and other stakeholders to:

Fig-1 Emergency/Disaster Management Cycle

minimise the likelihood that an accident will occur (prevention);

mitigate the consequences of accidents through emergency planning, land-use planning and risk communication (preparedness/mitigation/risk reduction); and

limit the adverse consequences to health, environment and property in the event of an accident (quick response/recovery).

It also includes lessons that need to be learnt from the experiences of past accidents and other unexpected events (follow-up) in order to reduce future incidents (prevention).

It is often difficult to clearly delineate which issues and actions come within each of these stages, and there is significant overlap among them. Therefore, the entire process is sometimes described as a "Safety Continuum" or "Emergency/Disaster Management Cycle" (see Fig - 1). In general, industrial disaster mitigation focuses on control at source of the causes leading to emergencies through prevention, preparedness and response so that response comes into play only if all efforts fail.

2. Intention of the moduleThe intention of this module is to help District collector in developing an effective OffSEMP with following:

(a) to develop an OffSEMP that should be concise and informative so that responsible person of the emergency control organisation should be able to quickly refer to the action plan to determine important functions that are being carried out;

(b) and not to use the OffSEMP just as telephone directory but should be able to manage an emergency and shall be made applicable

i. to prevent casualties - both on-site and off-site;

ii. to reduce damage to property, machine, public and environment;

iii. to develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an emergency and to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment, personnel) commensurate with the risk;

iv. to provide an off-site incident management organogram with clear missions and lines of authority (incident command system, field supervision, unified command) in line of Incident Response System;

v. to ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process (notification, standard operating procedures);

vi. to maintain good public relations;

vii. (v) to provide reliable and useful information in hazard and risk to civil authorities to help them in development of preventive and response mechanism;

viii. to help district authority in development of response in off-site incident management organogram with clear missions and lines of authority (incident command system, field supervision, unified command);

ix. to disclose the information to local community and coordination with NDRF.

2.1 Off-site Emergency Management Plan (OffSEMP)It shall be the duty of the concerned authority [District Collector or District Emergency Authority designated by the State Government, Chief Inspector of Mines appointed under the Mines Act, 1952, Chief Inspector of Dock Safety appointed under the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986, Chief Controller of Explosives appointed under the Indian Explosive Act and Rules, 1983, etc. ], as identified in MS and IHC rules, to prepare and keep up-to-date an adequate off-site emergency plan containing particulars specified in Schedule 12 (shown as annexure 1) of MS and IHC rules 1989 and detailing how emergencies relating to a possible major accident on that site will be dealt with and in preparing that plan the concerned authority shall consult the occupier, and such other persons as it may deem necessary.

For the purpose of enabling the concerned authority to prepare the emergency plan, the occupier shall provide the concerned authority with such information relating to the industrial activity under his control as the concerned authority may require, including the nature, extent and likely effects off-site of possible major accidents and the authority shall provide the occupier with any information from the off-site emergency plan which relates to his/her duties under rule.

The concerned authority shall prepare its emergency plan

(a) In the case of a new industrial activity, before that activity is commenced;

(b) In the case of an existing industrial activity, within six months of coming into operation to these rules.

The concerned authority shall also ensure that a rehearsal of the off-site emergency plan is conducted at least once in a calendar year. Mock drills provide opportunity to review the various aspects of the preparedness and response and it is advised to update the level of preparedness. However a paragraph in the present modules highlights the importance of the mock drills.

Disaster Management Act 2005 has been enacted and there are some provisions which are common for all types of disasters but for chemical (industrial) disaster management the provisions are made under Environment (Protection) Act 1986 through MS and IHC rules

and CA (EPPR) rules. The role of Factory Inspectorate and Labour Department should not be diluted rather State Crisis Group (SCG) and District Crisis Group (DCG) should play a role of advisor to State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) and District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) for chemical (industrial) disaster management issues.

The effort of the module is to provide a fresh view about the preparation of the OffSEMP, monitoring, enforcement of the effective prevention and response system. The Modules 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15 should be considered with this module for better understanding.

2.2 Approach for OffSEMPOffSEMP is made to prevent the disasters and if happen then to reduce the losses by quick post-disaster response. The Schedule 12 of MS & IHC is only a guideline but we are free to make OffSEMP more effective and that is only possible if pre- and post -disaster situations are visualised and are addressed professionally.

A. Pre-Emergency Planning Hazard identification1. The first step towards OffSEMP shall be to identify potential on-site and off-site

hazards such as gas leaks, spills, fire, explosion, transportation incident, pipeline ruptures, equipment failure, natural calamities, etc. and the types of damage caused by them. The hazard identification shall include:

(a) information on toxicological, physical, and chemical properties of the substances being handled in the format of Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS);

(b) identification of potential impact on downwind air quality or downstream water quality from an incidental release and possible danger to human, flora and fauna and animal health;

(c) hazards to the installation shall also include natural perils such as floods, earthquakes, cyclones or landslides etc.

2. The hazards identification can be done by the following steps:

In a district from chemical angle the following popular hazardous chemicals should be given priority as these chemicals are frequently being stored in bulk and used for various common purposes:

→ LPG , Propane (under pressure in liquid phase) -POL (Petroleum, Diesel, Kerosene, Lubricants, etc.) products -Ammonia (under pressure/refrigeration in liquid phase) -Chlorine (under pressure in liquid phase)

→ Hydrogen (under pressure in gases)

→ CS2 (Carbon disulphide)

→ CO + H20 + CH4 ( Blast furnaces, LD gases, etc)

However, there may be many other chemicals. They have to be assessed by the occupier in OnSEMP and reported to the authorities.

Identification of the parking areas of trucks transporting hazardous chemicals like, toxic gases, (Ammonia, Chlorine, etc.), inflammable gases (LPG, propane, hydrogen, etc.), POL (Petrol, Diesel, Kerosene, etc.). Parking places of tankers etc. as shown in Photo-1.

Bulk storage areas of hazardous chemicals like, toxic gases (Ammonia, Chlorine, etc.); inflammable gases (LPG, propane, hydrogen, etc.); POL (Petrol, Diesel, Kerosene, etc.) as shown in Photo-2a and 2b.

Photo-1 Parking Places of LPG Trucks

Photo-2a LPG bulk storage Photo-2b Bulk storage of blast furnace gases

Risk assessmentThe second step of the OffSEMP process is to determine the risk of an incident associated with each hazard (see also Modules-11 and -12). The basic procedure in a risk analysis shall be as follows:

(a) identify potential failures or incidents (including frequency);

(b) calculate the quantity of material that may be released in each failure, estimate the probability of such occurrences;

(c) evaluate the consequences of such occurrences based on scenarios such as most probable and worst case events;

(d) the combination of consequences and probability will allow the hazards to be ranked in a logical fashion to indicate the zones of important risk. Criteria should then be established by which the quantified level of risk may be considered acceptable to all parties concerned;

(e) after assessing the risk, the "maximum tolerable criterion" must be defined and above which the risk shall be regarded as intolerable;

(f) the risk should also be made "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP) and least impacting the neighbourhood.

The risk of disasters is either due to engineering failure or due to human failure or and due to sabotage and it can be done simply by identifying the following points:

i. What are the hazards and risk?

ii. What may go wrong?

iii. How it may go wrong?

iv. How likely is its occurrence?

v. What would be the impacts?

vi. What maintenance schedule would reduce its likelihood of occurrence?

All these steps should be performed by using the following logical sequence as shown in Fig-2.

Fig-2 Sequence to know the probability of accident risk

The security threats in the district should also be identified and risk reduction should be considered by proper intelligence. For example the high lands near to bulk storage of chemicals should be under the surveillance of the district administration for further action.

Photo-3 Security threatsPhoto-3: Area to be identified from security angle, the red circle shows the point which is threat to security and safety. A missile can target the bulk storage of LPG Horton spheres.

In addition to the above requirement, District administration should identify the areas where hazardous chemicals are stored or processed in bulk on priority because these places may cause major emergency. These areas may lead to challenges to the administration due to the release of the chemicals, which may lead to fire or and explosion or and toxic fumes generation. It may have the following consequences:

(a) The consequences of an incident may be confined within the premises or may spill off-site triggering escalating the effects.

(b) The consequences of an incident are fire explosion, deflagration, blast waves, fast spreading flames, BLEVE, UVCE resulting in direct effects like damage to buildings/ property, burns, fatalities. However, an incident in the neighbourhoods may sometimes cascade into an on-site emergency. It should be prevented or managed to avoid major emergency (Photo-4 and 5).

(c) The consequence of toxic release will lead to off-site if not controlled immediately. Smoke is also one of the toxic releases and is responsible for an off-site situation.

For OffSEMP the authority should identify the following facilities on priority for pre-emergency preparedness and should ensure that these hazardous industries have OnSEMP based on hazard and risk assessment with consequence maps (see also Module-12 “Consequence Analysis”):

Photo -5 Off-site vulnerable zone of incidence Places of bulk storages of LPG/Propane, example LPG bottling plants;

Fertiliser plants using Ammonia as raw material, example Urea fertiliser plants;

Bulk storage areas of Petrol, Diesel, and Kerosene, example POL depots;

Chlorine manufacturing and municipal water supply plants where Chlorine gas is used;

Paper and pulp plants, Staple fibres plant, Pharmaceutical plant, Pesticides plants;

Petroleum refineries, metallurgical (both ferrous and non-ferrous) plants;

Parking places of trucks engaged in transporting the hazardous chemicals;

Bulk transportation of hazardous chemicals by pipes;

Identification of pipelines is another task as these pipelines are causing the off-site emergency. Photo-6 shows the pipelines from big industry, these pipelines are the

most vulnerable places for release of chemicals leading to fire, explosion and toxic release.

The following reasons may lead to big disasters in the facilities discussed above:

Photo-6 Pipelines also creates disasters-Human errors, -Material and machine failure -Organisational failure -Natural causes

Road accidents (Photo-7) are another challenge to the civil administration (see also Module-2 “Safety in Transportation of Hazardous Substances by Road”). This may happen either due to the following reasons:

Condition of transport vehicle

Training and education of the driver

Road condition and speed of the vehicle

Training and education of first responders e.g. traffic police and regional transport officer (RTO)

Monitoring of risk assessment should be the first step by the civil authorities to reduce or control the root causes of the accidents at source. The review for the effective response mechanism should be the second step to minimise the effect of the disasters.

B. Emergency Mitigation MeasuresThe Civil Administration needs to review the following overall preparedness/mitigation measures of incidence prevention at all industries:-

i. health safety and environment (HSE) policy;

ii. proper layout and inter facility distances (the layout should not have any crisscross movement of men and materials);

iii. safety committees with fair participation of Union leaders and workers;

iv. safety audits and risk assessment should be carried out as per the Indian standard;

v. work permit system (including confined space entry permit);

vi. early warning alarm system in the installation (gas monitoring system, heat detection, high level alarms, low pressure/high pressure alarms etc.) especially in the vicinity of storage tanks, filling station, delivery points and along with periphery with the indication in the central control room;

vii. in-built safety interlocks system in design such as safety relief valves (SRVs), thermal safety valves (TSVs), non-returning valves (NRVs), remote operated valves (ROVs) and other various emergency trip systems in Installations;

viii. fire protection (preferably automatic) and HSE Management system;

ix. drill for visitors including assembly procedure and escape route, do's and don'ts written instructions before entry, etc;

x. setting up of safety MIS system and sending Exception reports to the head of organisations;

xi. all standby equipments should be tried and operated periodically and recorded. Similarly back up power for safety equipment and instrument should be checked periodically and observations be recorded.

Photo-7 Road accidents

C. Mutual AidSince combating major emergencies might be beyond the capability of individual unit, it is essential to have mutual aid arrangements with neighbouring industries. Consideration shall be given to the following while preparing mutual aid arrangements:-

(a) Written mutual aid arrangements are to be worked out to facilitate additional help in the event of Level-II emergencies by way of rendering man power, medical aid or fire fighting equipments, etc.

(b) The mutual aid arrangement shall be such that the incident controller of the affected installation shall be supported by neighbouring industries on call basis for the support services materials and equipments already agreed. Further, all such services deputed by member industry shall work under the command of the site incident controller of the affected installation.

(c) Mutual aid associations shall conduct regular meetings, develop written plans and test the effectiveness of their plans by holding drills. Drills are essential to establish a pattern for operation, detect weaknesses in communication, transportation and training. Periodic drills also develop experience in handling problems and build confidence in the organisation.

(d) To make the emergency plan a success, the following exchange of information amongst the member organisations of mutual aid association is considered essential: -

i. The types of potential hazards in each installation and fire fighting measures.

ii. List of all the installations or entities falling along the routes of transport vehicles carrying petroleum or petroleum products.

iii. The type of equipment that would be deployed and procedure for making the replenishment.

iv. Written procedures which spell out the communication system for help and response. This is also required to get acquainted with operation of different fire fighting equipment available at mutual aid members and compatibility for connecting at users place.

v. Familiarisation of topography and drills for access and exit details carried out by mutual aid members.

vi. Incidents involving road transport vehicles carrying hazardous chemicals shall be attended by the nearest installation on request of civic authorities even in absence of mutual aid agreement with the consignor.

D. Emergency Drills and Mock Exercises(a) To evaluate the thoroughness and effectiveness of an OnSEMP and or OffSEMP, it

is necessary to conduct periodic table top exercises full-scale or announced, and unannounced drills, also including the interface between OnSEMP and OffSEMP. Each site should hold drills in the night shifts, change shifts as well as during the day.

(b) Drills should present a variety of Emergency scenarios and designed to challenge each segment of the organisation. Limited scale drills are useful and should be used by Chief of each Support Service to train his/her own team. Plans should be made to have periodic mass casualty exercises. These exercises should attempt to simulate as closely as possible a fire, explosion, or toxic agent release and comparison of the prescribed time lines and the actual received.

(c) The warning system, first aid, evacuation procedures and the definitive treatment procedures should all be tested periodically.

(d) Drills should ensure the participation of neighbouring districts officials and agencies such as police, fire companies, ambulance service, civil defence organisations along with mutual aid groups.

(e) Testing and mock drills for on-site emergency plan and off-site emergency plan shall be carried out as per the regulatory provisions.

(f) These mock drills will enable the unit/location to assess the capability of the individual and performance as a group. The frequent discussions and drills will help in eliminating the confusion and shortcomings, if any.

(g) Each Mock Drill should be recorded with observations and deficiencies to be rectified.

Photo-8 Mock Drills

E. Training(a) The management of OnSEMP and OffSEMP shall be easier to use if training material

and general philosophy on emergency prevention and control are kept separate from the working plan.

(b) Training shall be imparted to all the personnel likely to be involved directly or indirectly in the emergencies including employees, contract workers, transport crew and security personnel.

(c) Contract personnel and contract labourer shall be allowed to start work only after clearance of attending and passing safety training.

(d) Refresher training shall be conducted at regular intervals to the district officials at all level. District Collector should put training in his/her priority list for periodic monitoring.

(e) The basic requirements of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 pertaining to dangerous or hazardous goods transport must be complied by the transporters. For this the loading station must conduct training of tank truck crew as per the requirement under Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Module-2 must be consulted.

District administration should ensure the monitoring of the above points. The best compliance is the pre-emergency preparedness or it can be designated as a part of prevention.

3. Emergency control organisation and responsibilities3.1 Need for Incident Response System (IRS)To respond an Emergency of Level III coordinated approach is required with various stakeholders of the district and nearby district or state some time, as shown in Fig-3.

Fig-3 Stakeholders supporting district administration

District administration with the help of the industry, regulatory agencies, fire brigade and health department should initiate the planning process to tackle these major emergencies by establishing proper coordination for pre- and post- disaster situations.

For various levels of emergencies (please see the Module-13) the response and command structure is different. District authorities will come in picture when the chemical (industrial) emergency is either of level II or level III. In either case district authorities can review the response and command of level I also. The core structure for all level is shown in Fig-4 the core structure doesn't overrule the IRS and IRTs as suggested by NDMA. The response Module-15 deals in details about the response mechanism in general.

Fig-4 Core administrative structure for all types of emergency

District authorities along with the industries should follow the protocol as shown in Fig-5 for monitoring the situation of Level I, Level II and Level III for effective management.

Fig-5 Emergency escalation

3.2 Important roles and responsibilities of various stakeholdersThe Chief Inspector of Mines appointed under the Mines Act, 1952, Chief Inspector of Dock Safety appointed under the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986, Chief Controller of Explosives appointed under the Indian Explosive Act and Rules, 1983, will be the main technical agencies, depending upon the situation, to support the District Collector in Off-Site Emergency Plans.

All the entities as shown in Fig-3 should support district collector in mitigation, rescue and rehabilitation.

a) The District Collector is responsible for the Off-site emergency plan and it shall be equipped with up-to-date information on emergency preparedness of Major Accident Hazard (MAH) units, website, control room etc., with provisions for monitoring the level of preparedness at all times. Regular meetings of various stakeholders of Chemical Disaster Management will be conducted by District Collector/District Disaster Management Authority to review the preparedness of Chemical Disaster Management. For further details on the responsibilities of the District Collector see Module-10 “Guide to the District Collector”.

b) The police will be an important component of all disaster management plans as they will be associated with investigation of incidents/disasters. Police take overall charge of the Off-Site situation on behalf of the District Collector for law and order and also in organising the various steps required by the District Collector.

c) The fire services are one of the first responders and shall be adequately trained and equipped to handle chemical emergencies. Fire services are to acquire a thorough knowledge of likely hazards at the incident site and the emergency control measures required to contain it.

d) In a chemical emergency, the revenue department shall coordinate with other agencies for evacuation, establishment of shelters and provision of food, etc.

e) When required for evacuation purposes in a chemical emergency, the department of transport should make transport promptly available.

f) The health department needs to assure that all victims get immediate medical attention on the site as well as at the hospitals/health-care facility where they are shifted. In addition, the department needs to network all the health-care facilities available in the vicinity for effective management and also take effective measures to prevent the occurrence of any epidemic.

g) Pollution control boards need to ascertain the developing severity of the emergency in accordance with responsive measures by constant monitoring of the environment. If and when an area is fit for entry will depend upon the results of the monitoring. A decontamination operation would be required to be carried out with the help of other agencies and industries.

h) The NDRF and SDRF are the specialised forces to manage these disasters in a longer run according to the severity and nature of the disaster. Their specialised training is an effective measure that needs to be built up and maintained with time for achieving a higher standard of preparedness. They need to coordinate with other local agencies such as the Central Industrial Security Force that is responsible for security at the industrial site.

For the documentation of resource mobilisation the annexure II should be used.

3.3 Incident Response System (IRS)The introduction of IRS will ensure that the response to disasters in future will definitely be swift, efficient and effective since every stakeholder / responder will be properly trained in the role he has to perform and will have a clear chain of command. National Disaster Management Guidelines on Incident Response System published in July 2010 should be referred by all level of Civil Authorities, i.e. National, State, District and Local levels.

However for effective response the following facilities may be required to be established at district depending on the needs of the incidents.

A. Incident Command Post (ICP)The ICP is the location at which the primary command functions are performed. The IC will be located at the ICP. There will only be one ICP for each incident. This also applies to situations with multi-agencies or multi- jurisdictional incidents operating under a single or Unified command. The ICP can be located with other incident facilities like Incident Base. For the initial location of the ICP, the nature of the incident, whether it is growing or moving and whether the ICP location will be suitable in size and safe for the expected duration of the incident should be taken into consideration. Larger and more complex incidents will require larger ICP.

Photo-9 Incident command postThe ICP may be located at Headquarters of various levels of administration of District like Sub-Division, Tehsil / Block. In case of total destruction or reasons of non availability of any other space, the ICP may be located in a vehicle, trailer or tent. It should however have adequate lighting, effective communication system and other such facilities so that one can function effectively. In such a situation the other components of IRT may function from a convenient location and the ICP should be in constant and regular touch with them.

General guidelines for establishing the ICP:

a) Position away from the general noise and confusion associated with the incident;

b) Position outside the present and potential hazard zone;

c) Position within view of the incident, when appropriate;

d) Have the ability to expand as the incident grows;

e) Have the ability to provide security and to control access to the ICP as necessary;

f) Should have distinctive banner or sign to identify location; and

g) Activation of ICP and its location should be announced via radio or other communications so that all concerned personnel are notified.

B. CampsCamps are temporary locations within the general incident area which are equipped and staffed to provide rest, food, drinking water and sanitary services to the responders. These are separate facilities which may not be located at the Incident Base. Camps may be in place for several days and they may be moved depending upon incident needs. The very large incidents may have one or more camps located in strategic areas. Each camp will have a Camp Manager assigned. The Camp Managers are responsible for managing the camp and for providing coordination to all organisational units operating within the camp.

Photo-10 Camp

C. Relief Camp (RC)All support services to the affected communities are usually provided in the Relief Camps (RCs). They will be established as per demands of the situation. The resources required for the establishment of RC will be provided. It may be established at the existing buildings like Schools, Community halls, Cyclone Shelters, etc. or tents may also be used for such

purposes. While establishing the RC, priority will be given for cleanliness of the RC. Each RC will have a Camp Manager assigned. After RC is established, additional personnel and support needs will normally be determined and requested for by the RC Manager.

Photo-11 Relief Camp

D. First Aid CampFirst aid camp should also be ensured with equipment and trained manpower.

Photo-12 First aid camp

E. Incident BaseAll primary services and support activities for the incident are usually located and performed at the Incident base. Normally base is the location where all uncommitted / out-of-service equipment and personnel to support operations are located. There will be only one Base established for each incident and normally it will not be relocated. It will be designated by incident name. In locations where major incidents are known to occur frequently, it is advisable to pre-designate possible base locations and plan their layouts in advance.

Overall objectives of an emergency control organisation shall be:

a) to promptly control problems as they develop at the scene.

b) to prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site.

c) to provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. The duties and functions assigned to various people shall include making full use of existing organisations and service groups such as fire, safety, occupational health, medical, transportation, personnel, maintenance, and security.

d) Employees must assume additional responsibilities as per laid down procedure of Incident Response Guidelines whenever an emergency alarm sounds.

e) In setting up the organisation, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organisation should have an alternate arrangement for each function.

F. Symbols for different IRS facilities

In the IRS, different symbols are used for identification of different facilities established for response management. They are as follows:

4. Emergency Operation Centre (EOC)District must have at least one EOC to tackle the chemical (industrial) disaster management and it should have the following for effective functioning:

a) One Sr. Administrative Officer as EOC in-charge having experience in DM with required assistants;

b) Representation of all concerned line departments with authority to quickly mobilise their resources;

c) Adequate space with proper infrastructure to accommodate the participating agencies and departments;

d) Communication facilities with last mile connectivity;

e) A vehicle mounted with HF, VHF and satellite telephone for deployment in the affected site to provide immediate connectivity with the headquarters and ICP;

f) A representative of central teams (NDRF, Armed Forces) whenever they are deployed to integrate their resources, expertise and to resolve conflicts that may arise during the response effort;

Photo-13 Emergency control centreg) Provision and plan for dovetailing the NDRF, Armed Forces communication

capabilities with the local communication set up. There will be proper plan so that all are able to connect with each other in case of large scale disasters or failure of the local communication systems;

h) Map depicting affected site, resources deployed, facilities established like Incident Command Post, Staging Area, Incident Base, Camp, Relief Camp, Helibase, Helipad, etc.;

i) DM plans of all line departments;

j) DM plans of the State and the District;

Directories with contact details of all emergency services and nodal officers;

Connectivity with all District headquarters and police stations;

Database of NGOs working in different geographical areas;

Demographic details of the State and Districts;

k) Socio-economic, demographic and land use planning;

l) Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)

m) Resource inventories of all line departments and connectivity with database of Indian Disaster Resource Network (IDRN), Indian Disaster Knowledge Network (IDKN) and Corporate Disaster Resource Network (CDRN).

5. Coordination with NDRF and SDRFFor the purpose of specialised response to a threatening disaster situation or disasters/ emergencies both natural and man-made such as those of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) origin, the DM Act, 2005 has mandated the constitution of a NDRF (see also Module-15 “Industrial Disaster Response”). The following battalions are made responsible for CBRN disasters.

Kolkata battalion, Arakkonam battalion, Pune battalion, Gaziabad battalion

In the support of NDRF, SDRF are the available forces at state level. In some state SDRF has not been created.

Photo-14 NDRF teams on missionBattalions are equipped to handle all types of the chemical emergencies. These battalions are trained at various places. In emergency the nearby teams should be called.

During the Off-site drills Districts Collector should call and involve the NDRF teams to assess the overall capacity to combat the emergency.

The location of various battalions is shown as in following table:

Location Area of responsibility for natural disaster Area of responsibility for CBRN emergency

Guwahati N.E. States Kolkata battalionKolkata West Bengal, Bihar, Sikkim, Jharkhand

Mundali Orissa, Chhatisgarh, North Andra Pradesh, ( Srikakulam, Vizianagaram,Vishakhapatnam)

Arakkonam battalion

Arakkonam Tamil Nadu, Kerala, South Andra Pradesh, Puduchery, A and N Islands, Lakshadweep

Pune Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa Pune battalionGandhi Nagar Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh,

Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and DiuBhatinda Chandigarh, Punjab, J and K, Himachal Pradesh Ghaziabad battalion

Ghaziabad U.P., Uttara Khand, Haryana, Delhi

Patna* Vijaywada*

*Patna (Bihar) and Vijaywada (Andra Pradesh) have also been approved in principle to locate NDRF battalions for natural disaster, and therefore, the area of responsibility will be readjusted once two NDRF battalions are made functional.

B. Coordination with neighbouring statesIn some cases the impacts of chemical (industrial) disaster escalates to neighbouring districts or states. In such situation the coordination with concerned DDMAs and SDMAs is required.

7. Conclusion

District Administration should review and study the provisions of Disaster Management Act 2005 and Environment (Protection) Act 1986 and establish a synchronisation for better preparedness. OffSEMP should have enough space to accommodate the following IRS format as has been finalised by NDMA

• Incident Briefing IRS Form 001

• Incident Status Summary (ISS) IRS Form 002

• Unit Log IRS Form 003

• Record of Performed Activities IRS Form 004

• Organization Assignment List IRS Form 005

• Incident Check-in and Deployment list IRS Form 006

• On Duty Officer List IRS Form 007

• Medical Plan IRS Form 008

• Communication Plan IRS Form 009

• Demobilisation Plan - IRS Form 01

8. AnnexureAnnexure 1 [SCHEDULE 12]

DETAILS TO BE FURNISHED IN THE OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN1. The types of accidents and release to be taken into account.

2. Organisations involved including key personnel and responsibilities and liaison arrangements between them.

3. Information about the site including likely locations of dangerous substances, personnel and emergency control rooms.

4. Technical information such as chemical and physical characteristics and dangers of the substances and plant.

5. Identify the facilities and transport routes.

6. Contact for further advice e.g. meteorological information, transport, temporary food and accommodation, first aid and hospital services water and agricultural authorities.

7. Communication links including telephones, radios and standby methods.

8. Special equipment including fire fighting materials, damage control and repair items.

9. Details of emergency response procedures.

10. Notify the public.

11. Evacuation arrangements.

12. Arrangements for dealing with the press and other media interests.

13. Longer term clean up.

Annexure 2RESOURCE MOBILISATION (MEN AND EQUIPMENT)

1. MAN POWER 2. FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES/EQUIPMENT/

-Regular employees- shift wise CHEMICAL-Security staff -Fire Tenders/ Fire fighting engines-Personnel trained in first aid -Water storage capacity-Others (Technicians/Helpers ) -Fire hoses

-Jet/Fog/Spray Nozzles-Foam Compound (KL)

3. SAFETY EQUIPMENTS 4. COMMUNICATION-PVC Suit -Walky-Talkie-Compressed air B.A. Set -Public Address System-Refill Cylinders for B.A. Set -Megaphone-Cascade B.A. Set-Fire Proximity Suit6. MISCELLANEOUS 5. TRANSPORT-Ropes (Metres) -Jeeps-Empty drums -Cars-Buckets -Ambulance-Sand bags -Trucks-Dewatering pump -Buses-Pneumatic pump -Tractors-Photo camera -Boats-Video camera -Mobile Cranes7. EQUIPMENTS AND 8. LIST OF EMERGENCY DRUGSCORPS DISPOSAL AND APPLIANCES-Light Metal Stretchers -Canvas Stretcher-Tarpauline 12"X 12" -Oxygen Cylinder-Rope fibre 3/8" -Sterlite Bandages-Bucket -Cotton Sterilised-Rubber gloves -Antibiotics, Analgesics, Sedatives

-Tetanus Toxoid-Dressing Instruments-Sterilisers-Autoclave for sterilising instruments, dressing-B.P. Apparatus, I.V. Set-Anti-shock drugs-Gluca Saline set, Gluca Saline Bottle

9. GlossaryIncident Response System: The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel,

procedure and communications operating within a common organisational structure, with responsibility for the management of assigned resources to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to an incident.

Incident Response Team: The incident commander and appropriate general or command staff personnel assigned to manage an incident.

Risk: Risk is the likelihood that a harmful consequence (death, injury or illness)

Risk assessment: The value judgement of the significance of the risk, identified by a risk analysis.

Risk Management: Action taken or required to achieve or improve the safety of the facility and its operation.

Site Incident Controller: means the person who goes to the scene of the emergency and supervises the actions necessary to overcome the emergency at the site of the incident;

10. References1. Manufacture, Storage And Import Of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989.

2. Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP)) Regulations, 2010.

3. Off-site Emergency Management Plans of Districts of India.

4. Information from www.hrdp-idrm.in

5. National Disaster Management Guidelines Chemical Disasters (Industrial), National Disaster Management Authority Government of India 2007.

6. Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). Guidelines for Use of Vapor Cloud Dispersion Models, Second Ed. New York: AIChE,

1996.

7. Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). International Conference and Workshop on Modeling and Mitigating the Consequences of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Materials, September 26-29, 1995. New York: AIChE, 1995.

8. Technical background document for offsite consequence analysis for anhydrous aqueous ammonia, chlorine, and sulphur dioxide, Chemical emergency preparedness and prevention office, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 1999