Chapter 4

The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950- 19 5 7

Ernst B. Haas*

Community and Integration

Two major opposing trends have come to characterise international rela tions at the end of the Second World War: while some twenty new states have made their appearance since 1945, with every indication that the process will gain even more momentum, a network of interna­tional organisations has sprung up countering the full impact of this multipl ication of sovereignties. Whether in the realm of political rela­tions or specific functional tasks, whether at the universal or the regional level, contacts and associations among governments, private groups and individuals have been institutionalised as never before. Whereas the trend in Africa and Asia is toward the evolution of ever more political groupings aspiring to statehood, the process in Europe and in the Atlantic area tends toward the limitation of sovereign inde­pendence, the growth of more rather than less formal bonds among national communities and perhaps toward the su bstitution of a new federal organism for the present nationa l state.

New states may grow up as the result of the splintering of an existing political community - or an empire - as well as from the merger of hitherto distinct and independent entities. In both processes the evolu­tion of 'national consciousness' is held to be the crucial factor. Loyal ty to the established font of authority wanes as a feeling of separate iden­tity takes po session of the group clamou ring for new forms of polit­ical organisation. Y t we know little about the constituents of this process. While it is possible fr quently to specify the content of the

• Reproduced from Erns t Haas (1968) The Unitillg of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, 2nd edn . (Stanford, CA: Sranford University Press ), chapter 1, trep roduction by the kind permiss ion of Peter HaCls). The text has been slightly edited, as indicated, to fit the format of this volume. References have been changed to H arvard citarion ,ryle wherever possible. Some per ipheral footno tes have been omitted .

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106 The Uniting of Europe

new doctrine of na tiona l consciousness it is far more difficult to explain who originates, propagates, expands and accepts it. M ore diffi­cult still is the question of why the doctrine originates and why it gains - or fails to gain - acceptance. How and why does national loyalty tend to coincide with the territorial boundaries of the state? Is it inherent in poli tical e olution that it must be so? Is it natura l and inevitable that India , Ghana or Belgium are characterised by a s nse of national identity which extends to their frontiers but not beyond?

The process of development of a political community, therefore, is but little understood in terms of the analytical tandards and cri teria of observation with which the social scientist today works. While much work is being done in the study of this process among the nascent political entities in underdev loped ar as, much less attention has been paid to the reverse process of comnllmity formation through imerna­tional organisati n, among we tern industrial states. Thi is true in all fields of trans-state activity, whether intergovernmental at th level of formal diplomacy, intergovernmental at the level of informal discus­sion by experts, 'supranational' or federal. Each of these is a device to arrive at collective decisions by means other than unlimited action by a national government. Each is a means for peacefully unifying diverse groups in common action. Yet de tailed data on how - if at all - cohe­sion is obtained through these processes is lacking.

International rela tions in contemporary western Europe provide a living laboratory of these processes at work. The Organisation for European Economic Co- peration (OEEC) at the I vel of intergovern­mental contacts, the Council of Europe as an inter-parl iamentary forum, the system of Scandinavian co-op ration and the Western European Union as a mixture of the two, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a quasi-federal government in two eco­nomic sectors, provide landmarks in the process of substituting collec­tive action for decisions by governments acting in isolation. It is time that these efforts be examined to judge if and how 'political commu­nity' resul ts from measures of politica l integration'.

Basic Definitions: Political Community

The systematic study of the process of community formation through organisations of th is type necessita tes the explicit sta ting of an ideaJ type appropriate to the known institutional setting of western Europe. Here, the exi ring national states are poli tical communi ties. While they seem to enjoy the unquestioning 'loyalty' of their citizens - with the exception of dedicated Commwlists as distingui hed from the mass of Communist voters - they are by no means monolithic units. Pluralism of groups, values and institutions is the hallmark of western European

political indicate existenc boundar exis ting 1 to sp ak preordau

'L ya] must be said to bl and pre authority tions. In J ularity of and in pa perceptiol surveys (5 a conditiQ to their authorit >

space. In process of

Group ( nations ur result of d the nati n display th will assum units as we competing political pa ideologies success or I

If group so is the e:o; opposition ficient degr to civil W aJ

in this stud process of body of g group conf! for settling can be achi vant to the

Ernst B. Haas 107

political life. Nor, as past history and contemporary developments indicate, are these existing states immutable entities. Belgium came into existence in 1830; Germany federated in 1870; the bloody history of boundary changes is well remembered by the present generation. The existing political communities are neither so homogeneous internally as to speak with one united voice on national or international issues nor preordained historically as to constitute 'natural' units.

'Loyalty' was singled out as a crucial term in this definition and it must be specified further in operational terms. A population may be said to be loyal to a set of symbols and institutions when it habitually and predictably over long periods obeys the injunctions of their authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important expecta­tions. In part the existence of such sentiments can be tested by the reg­ularity of popular compliance with fundamental government decisions; and in part it is subject to verification by the kind of attitude testing of perceptions of mutuality of aspirations made familiar by post-1945 surveys (see Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Political community, therefore, is a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space. In this study, this condition will be the one toward which the process of 'political integration' is supposed to lead.

Group conflict is a given and expected form of conduct in the nations under study. French, German or Italian poLcy emerges as the result of this conflict. Hence a larger political community, composed of the nations now still separate and distinct, may well be expected to display the same traits. Hence our ideal type of community formation will assume group conflict as given on the level of the present national units as well as in the larger community which may emerge. In fact, the competing activities of permanently organised interest groups and of political parties are singled out as the significant carriers of values and ideologies whose opposition, identity or convergence determines the success or failure of a transnational ideology.

If group conflict is one central characteris tic of political community so is the existence of a commonly accepted body of belief. Despite the opposition of ideologies and their adherents, consensus exists to a suf­ficient degree in the contemporary national units to preclude recourse

-to civil war and revolt. The ideal type of political community implicit in this study assumes, therefore, that the condition toward which the process of integration is expected to lead is one in which a sufficient body of general consensus imposes limitations upon the violence of group conflict. These limitations are the basic agreement on the means for settling differences, even if consensus as to ends of political action can be achieved only at such high levels of abstraction as to be irrele­vant to the analysis of political conduct. Stated in constitutional terms,

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108 The Uniting of Europe

the agreement on the means of pol itic, 1 action i equivalent to the aim acceptance of the doctrine of re pect for the r ule of la w. Official deci­ cen sion , once made according to procedural rules accepted as bind ing by con all, are carried out . ide:

For purpose of this discus ion , the beliefs common to otherwise arr' antagonistic groups will be labelled the 'na tionalism' of a given commu­ ill ni ty, while the doctrines peculiar to a group w ill be referred t a 'ide­ m r o logy.' Na tionalism is compo ed of values and claims acceptable to the of L

great bulk of the population while also setting "t apart from th values on and claims of other po litical communiti es. At the socio-cu ltural level o f i la l attitudes and beliefs our political community is held toge tber despite the re [ internal strife of the constituent groups by the general acceptance of ua l national identity, of nationalism, w hich manifests itself primarily in the rnJ consensus on the means for achieving agreement on policy. can

rHo T his picture of political community diflers in some e sential respect que

from the kindred concept of 'security communi ' propo ed by some fit contemporary students of nationalism and c mmunity f rma tion n >jt (Deutsch 1953a, 1954; van Wagenen 1952) . In both formulations, the H absence of violence a a means of political action among the partici­ defi pati.ng groups is gi en a centra l place. Deutsch 's concept, however, does Clat not insist on the pr ence of a specified in "ti.tmional structure, contenti ng i ti itself with the consecration o f non- iolent means f achieving social lmil change as the maj or criterion differentiating 'commun ity' from rd inary 50VI internati nal rela tions. The scheme here used, by cOlltra t, makes the beel existence of political institu tions capa ble of translating ideologies into sect law the cornerstone of the defini tion. W hile the co-existence of conflict acln and harmony within th same social ystem can no doubt be achieved tiOIl without the attributes of a single statehood, the deliberate creation and COlI perpetuation o f a new national can cio usne s can hard ly be expected to rity come about itho ut the presence of formal governm ntal institution obe and practices. Since the possession of su h a consciousness i considered (De a criterion of olitical community, the tech niques for realising nd main­tain ing it m ust be posited as nece ary to the ideal type. H

T hese are the centra l characteristics of pl uralistic nations in contem­ a e porary western Europe and at the same ti me the earma rks of our wh) model of political community. In clearly positing an extreme scheme, pia rather than an in termedia te one permitting of violence-free cond uct thar short of the attainment of statehood by the entities under study, it i of intended to furn ish a p rec ise yardstick for the analysis of governmental to [ and group con duct i.n western Eu rope in the effort to determine now to act w ha t extent th condi tion of political community ha been or is likely o to be reach d.

1. IPolitical community, as here defined, need not p resuppo e the emer­gence of a federal sta te, tho ugh th is i one possibility and certa inl y the

. -. •I

Ernst B. Haas 109

aim of many contemporary European statesmen and thinkers. While a centra l government is essential institutionally and a collective national conscioLlsness socially, the consti tutional form which will qualify for the ideal type may be that of a unita ry, a federa l or even a confederate arrangement . . . . Norm, Ily the type of confederation represented by in ternati na l organisations in w hich only states are subjects and govern­ments are vested wi th a power of eto does not approach our definition of community. A structure co uld em rge, however, in which a compul­sory and binding judicia l y tern is combined with a majoritarian leg­islat ive device, supervi ing the work of a central ad ministration of restricted powers but w ith direct jurisd iction over groups and individ ­ua ls, whi le many maj or deci ions are sti ll made at the level of intergov­ernmental negotiations. If in such a system governments negotiate and compromi e so that one or several everely modify their position in the effort to arrive at a binding common agreement of profound conse­quence, the resulting habitua l pattern of reaching consensus could well fit into the defin ition of political community, tho ugh representing neit her the typica l unitary nor federa l categories of constitutions.

Hence the institutio nal criteria of 'politica l communi ty' as here defined combine the separate fea tures posited by Deutsch and h is asso ­ciates. T hey analyse in terms of two types: ' m algamated ' and 'plural­istic' secur ity communities. The former correspond essentially to unitary or federa l sta tes while th latter comp rise rela tionships between sovereign states from which the possibi li ry of recourse to force has been banished . . . . While my definit ion wo uld exclude 'pluralistic security communities' of this type becau e of the absence of judicial, admini tra tive and legis lative ties and becau e of the sca rcity of institu­tiona lised rela tions amo ng private groups, our concept of 'political community' is neve rtheless broader than Deutsch's 'amalgamated secu­rity c mmunit ' because it includes the possi bil ity of a constant flow of o bedience to centra l decisions made by intergovernmental agencies (Deutsch et a I 195 7: 3-21) .

Ha ving stated the ideal type of political community, our task is the assessment of empirical data in an effort to determine whether and why developments leading to the evolution of a community are taking p lace. General estimates of the existenc or a bsence o f loyalty other than ro the national state do not suffice. Hence a num ber o f indicators o f community sentim nt will be d iscussed here, applica ble specifically t the study of how interest groups, pol itical partie and governments act in a supranational setting.

Communi ty sentiment would be ons idered to flouri h if:

1. Interest grou ps and p olitical parties at the national level endorse supranatio nal action in preference to action by the ir national gov­

110 The Uniting of Europe

ernment, or if they are divided among themselves on this issue. Only the case of unanimous national opposition to supranational action could be considered incompatible with community senti­ment.

2. Interest groups and political parties organise beyond the national level in order to function more effectively as decision-makers vis-a­vis the separate national governments or the central authority and if they define their interests in terms la rger than those of the separate national state from which they originate.

3. Interest groups and political parties, in their efforts at supranational organisation, coalesce on the basis of a common ideology, sur­passing those prominent at the nationalleve!'

4. Interest groups and political parties, in confronting each other at the supranational level, succeed in evolving a body of doctrine common to all, or a new nationalism (i.e., 'supranationalism').

5. Interest groups, political parties and governments show evidence of accepting the rule of law in fai thfully carrying out supranational court decisions, administrative directives and rules even when they oppose these, instead of obstructing or ignoring such decisions; furthe r, whel1 opposing federa l policy, they channel their objections through the legal avenues provided instead of threatening or prac­tising secession.

6. Governments negotiate with one another in good faith and gener­ally reach agreement, while not making themselves consistently and invariably the spokesmen of national interest groups; further, com­munity sentiment would seem to prevail if governments give way in negotiations when they find themselves in a minority instead of insisting on a formal or informal right of veto.

Clearly, only a collection of saints could be expected to display posi­tively aU these indicators of community sentiment at the outset of a process of integration. In order to qualify as a true political commu­nity, however, all the above indicators must be positively established before the condition defined in our scheme has been met. Given a series of pluralistic assumptions, any establishment of sentiment con­fined to parties alone, or to interest groups, or to governments consid­ered in isolation from their subjects, would fall short of the final condition posited .

Basic Definitions: Political Integration

Our definition of political community relies not so much on 'objective criteria' as on an assessment of the conduct of groups, individuals and

Ernst B. H aas 111

governments. On a more abstract level, the criteria singled out as crucial to the definition result from habitual behaviour patterns: they are not superimposed by the observer upon the social scene. The same rule governs the definition of the second key term used in this study, 'poli tical integration.' Conceived not as a condition but as a process, the conceptualisation relies on the perception of interests and values by the actors participating in the process. Integration takes place when these perceptions fall into a certain pattern and fails to take place when they do not. If pluralism is considered an inherent part of the ideal type of political community, pluralistic processes of decision-making and interest perception, naturally, are considered equally essential attrib­utes of the process of political integration.1

Before a firm definition or scheme can be stated, it must be recog­nised that integration in Western Europe has thus far been essentially confined to economic measures. Hen e it is necessary to establish the meaning of 'economic integration' as that term is generally used in the nexus of European politics. Following Gehrels and Johnston (1955), the possible general defini tion as ' the presence of important economic links between a group of count ries' must be rejected as too vague oper­ationally. The development of such links can and does result from organisations, such as OEEC, which do not pretend to represent or aim at pol itical community. Economic aspects of integration, if rele­vant to the evolution of community, must possess these characteristics: (1) agreement for gradual but complete elimination of tariffs, quotas and exchange controls on trade among the member countries; (2) abandonment of the right to restore trade restrictions on a unilateral basis for the dura tion of the ag eement, regardless of difficulties that may arise; (3) joint action to deal with problems resulting from the removal of trade barriers within the community and to promote more efficient utilisation of the resources of the area; (4) some degree of har­monisation of national policies that affect price structures and the allo­cation of resou rces (for example, social security and agricultural programmes) and of monetary and fiscal policies; and (5) free, or at least freer, movement of capital and labour.

But economic integration, however defined, may be based on polit­ical motives and frequently begets political consequences. The exis­tence of political motives is a matter for empirical research and, in western Europe, is clearly established. More hypothetical formulations are required to deal with the problem of political consequences. Thus it may be posited that economic integration unaccompanied by the growth of central institutions and policies does not necessarily lead to political community ince no pressure for the reformulation of expecta­tions is exercise. Free trade, the efore, cannot be automatically equated with political integration; nor can the interpenetration of national markets be so considered. If economic integration merely implied the

112 The Uniting of Europe

removal of barriers to trade and fails to be accompanied by new cen­trally made fiscal, la bour, welfare and investment measures, the rela­tion to political integration is not established. If, however, the integration of a pecific section (e.g., coal and steel), or of economics generaUy (e.g., the 'General Common Market') goes ha nd in hand w ith the gradual extension of the scope of central decision-making to take in economic pursuits not initially 'federated', the rela tion to the growth of political ommunity is clear. It must be stressed, moreover, that the degree of 'success ' achieved as measured by purely economic standards - growth in the value and volume of trade, business earnings, wage levels, etc. - is not necessarily an index of political success. Economic dissatisfaction may go hand in hand with demands for more federal political action. Unequal di rribution of economic benefits may give rise to political opposition wh re none existed before. Hence the measure of political success inherent in economic integration lies in the demands, expectations and loyalties of the pol itical actors affected by the process, which do not logically and necessarily follow from statis­

2tical indices of economi uccess.The decision to proceed w ith integration or to oppose it rests on the

perception of interests an d on the articulation of specific values on the part of existing political actors. Rather than relying on a scheme of integration which posits 'altruistic' or ' idealistic' motives as the condi­tioners of conduct, it seems more reasonable - assuming the plural istic basis of politics here used - to focus on the in terests and values defended by the major groups involved in the process, experience showing that these are far too complex to be described in such simple terms as ' the desire for Franco-German peace' or the 'will to a United Europe'. As th process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that values will undergo change, that interests will be redefined in terms of a regional rather than a purely national orientation and that the erst­while set of separate national group values wi ll gradually be super­seded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs.

The scheme, finally, assumes that the process of integration will yield a new national consciousness of the new political community, uniting the rstwhile nations which had joined. If the content of nationalism at the level of the former nation had been posited as the overlapping and agreement on principle of the multitude of separate group ideologies, the same conception applies at the level of the new community. As the beliefs and aspirations of groups undergo change due to the necessity of working in a transnational institutional frame­work, mergers in values and doctrine are expected to come about, uniting gro ups across former frontiers. The expected overlapping of these group aspirations is finally thought to result in an accepted body of 'nationa l' doctrine, in effect heralding the advent of a new nation­alism. Implied in this development, of course, is a proportional

Ernst B. Haas 113

diminution of loyalty to and expectations from the former separate national governments.

Shifts in the focus of loyalty need not necessarily imply the imme­diate repudiation of the na tional state or government. M ultiple loyal­ties have been empirica Uy demonstrated to exist, either because no conflict is involved between various foci or because the political actor manages psychologically to ignore or sublimate a conflict even if it does exist 'objectively.' In fact some psychologists suggest that attach­ment to new foci of loyalty, such as international or supranational organisations, may come about by a threefold process in which attach­ments to the new centre exist side by side with continued deference to the established foci. New loyal ties may come in to existence as end values, i.e., the new order is desired as an end in itself. Secondly, new loyalties may develop merely in response to a pressure for conformity exercised by the new centre of power. Thirdly - and most importantly for the study of political integra tion in a tramework of consensus ­new loyalties are thought to grow haphazardly in their function as intermediary means to some ultimate end, perhaps the same end also fought for in the context of the stablished national loyalties. Groups and individuals uncertain of their ability to realise political or eco­nomic values in the national framework may thus turn to suprana­tional agencies and procedures, without being attracted by 'Europeanism' a su h. If the process of developing dual loyalties via this mechanism continues for a sufficiently protracted period, the new central institutions may ultimately acquire the symbolic significance of end values.

A process of political integration, stated in these general terms, is susceptible of detailed investigation only if a set of specific indicators is provided as well. Integration being a process over time, certain iden­tical questions can be raised for purposes of analysis at regular inter­vals. Care must be taken that indicators of integration are designed with specific reference to the scope of activity of the organisation studied: the reactions of groups concerned with the production, pro­cessing, manufacturing and marketing of coal and steel in the instance of the ECSC.

Put in terms of questions, these indicators are proposed for a peri­odic analysis of development toward the end of political community:

1. What is the position of key interest groups, political parties and governments toward the proposal to integrate a given sector or to federate, or to the treaty fo rmalising such a step? Can the position taken be correlated with the economic expectations of the actors, their political fears or hopes, their satisfaction or dissa tisfaction with the national poli tical context, their ideologies or their notion of the national interest?

114 The Uniting of Europe

Having established the initial positions of these groups, the next step in the process of establishing indicators is to sort out the pat­terns of agreement, opposition and convergence. At the national level, groups may favour integration because they agree in their def­inition of interests on the basi of identical valu s: the case of iden­tity of aspirations. They may also agree on the ends of a policy of integra tion, arriving at this stage, however, on the basis of different values and interests. This constitutes the case of convergence of interests. Finally, groups may oppose integration, either for iden­tical or convergent reasons. Accurate analysis demands that we esta blish cI arly the starting positions as the process gets under way.

2. After the advent of new centra l insti tutions, can shifts in position among political parties, interest groups and governments be noted? Shifts for more integration as well as in opposition thereto must, of course, be considered. The indicators would include the same range of questions posed in the effort to define the characteristics of polit­ical community. How can shifts be correlated with the ideologies and expectations listed above? .. .

However, the fram ework of analysis shifts in the second step. While positions taken at the national I vel still require attention these must be contrasted with claims made at the level of the new institutions. If new patterns of identities, convergence or opposition are in evidence, the effort must be made to determine whether they originate at the national or the 'supranational' levels.

3. Periodically, the basic question of whether the conditions identified with political community have been realised must be raised. The question can be answered in terms of the indicators for political community presented above.

Such conclusions can be reached only on the basis of again sorting out group values and political demands and structuring them in terms of points of identity. By relating the findings back to earlier positions defended and correlating these with political activity within the frameworks of national govern ment and federa l institutions, more definite conclusions with respect to the impact of specifi measures of integration on the evolution of ideology and nationalism can be advanced.

We can now state a fo rmal d finition of political integration, as used in our ideal type. Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of poli tical integration is a new political community, uperimposed over the pre-existing ones.

Ernst B. Haas 115

Before a formal analysis can be made, however, it is essential to specify who the political actors are. It is as impracticable as it is unnec­essary to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys, or even to surveys of specific interested groups, such as business or labour. It suffices to single out and define the political elites in the par­ticipating countries, to study their reactions to integration and to assess changes in attitude on their part. In our scheme of integration, 'elites' are the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually partici­pate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties. They include the officials of trade associations, the spokesmen of organised labour, higher civil servants and active politicians.

The emphasis on elites in the study of integration derives its justifica­tion from the bureaucratised nature of European organisations of long standing, in which basic decisions are made by the leadership, some­times over the opposition and usually over the indifference of the general membership. This gives the relevant elites a manipulative role which is of course used to place the organisation in question on record for or against a proposed measure of integration.

A further important justification for the elite approach to the study of integration lies in the demonstrable difference in atti tudes held at the leadership levels of significant groups, as contrasted with the mass membership ...

Having so far focused on the perceptions and activities of politically significant groups and their elite , it remains to state the role assigned to institutions and structured belief patterns in our ideal type of polit­ical integration. Groups put forward interdependent sets of values ­ideologies - in their struggle with other groups for political promi­nence. In a given political community, these ideologies merge and overlap to permit the existence of a set of beliefs held by almost all citi­zens. But since group action at all levels of political activity hinges around action by governmental institutions, the relationship assumed between beliefs and institutional conduct must be made explicit.

During the initial stages of any process of political integration, the nationalism established in each of the participating countries is still supreme. The decision to join in or to abstain from the proposed steps of integration is defended in terms of national values by each interested group. Once the institutions associated with the step of integration are established, however, a change is likely to take place. The ideologies defended by national groups are likely to influence - and perhaps shape - the values and ideology of the officials manning the new insti­tution. Certainly no effort wi ll be spared to make the attempt at shaping. However, a reverse process of gradually penetrating national ideologies can also be supposed to get under way. Decision-makers in

116 The Uniting of Europe

the new institutions may resist the effort to have their beliefs and poli­cies dictated by the interested elites, and advance their own prescrip­tion. Or the heterogeneity of their origins may compel them to fashion doctrines and develop codes of conduct which represent an amalgama­tion of various national belief systems or group values. A two-way process is likely to result in any case: influence originating from national sources seeking to shape 'fed ral' or 'supranational' decisions and efforts to make nationa l groups conduct themselves in accordance with doctrines origina ting from the new central institutions. If per­mitted to operate for any length of time, the national groups now com­pelled to funnel their aspirations through federal institutions may also be constrained to work within the ideological framework of those organs. Eventually, the transformed doctrines will again be utilised to influence the federal decision-makers, who in turn will have to react in one or both of the approaches sketched above.

It is evident, therefore, that a complex pattern of interaction between national ideologies on the one hand and the beliefs of the office­holders in the central institutions on the other will come about. The eventual changes p roduced at the national level will constitute one of the indicators of the degree of integration as the process continues, while the analysis of this interaction is one of the crucial pr blems of this study - and of any study of political integration ...

Notes

1 See Deutsch et al. 1957 for the use of 'objective criteria' in the discussion of community and integration, such as the volume of economic transaction, the volume of social commu­nication and the adequacy of the communications nerwork to carry the 'integration load' . These devices are developed as indicators of the potentiality inherent in certain communi­ties in the effort to integrate, in Deutsch 1953a.

2 Fur a thoughtful exploration of the relation between political federalism and economic integration ee Diebold 1955. Diebold stresses that federalism does not of itself imply a specific economic po licy leading to integration of separate economies. Nor is federation a sine qua nOli for the achievement of economic integration. However, the attainment of specific welfa re standards in a larger market would almost automatically compel some kind of central action even if the initial plan of economic unity did not provide for it. It is demonstrative of the close link between political and economic motives in contemporary western Europe that the draft treaty for the establishment of the European Polit.ical Community also included a provision for the establishment of a General Common Market within ten years. Later developments saw the shelving of the political scheme but the resus­citation of the economic plank with the expectation that it would lead eventually to more political centralism.