Canadian Slavonic Papers

The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism,1919-1929 by Alexander J. Motyl; Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth,Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationality Policy by Kenneth C. FarmerReview by: O. W. GerusCanadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1981), pp.356-358Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40867926 .

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356 I Revue Canadienne des Slavistes Septembre 1981

Nevertheless, Shevchenko and the Critics, 1861-1980 should be welcomed as a milestone in western Shevchenkology . The book provides a scholarly introduction to what is generally considered the greatest cultural treasure of the Ukrainian nation, and it ought to be not only on the shelves of public and university libraries, but in classrooms as well.

Yar Slavutych, University of Alberta

Alexander J. Motyl. The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919Ί929. Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1980. 212 pp.

Kenneth C. Farmer. Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationality Policy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. 241 pp. 70 guilders.

Ever since John Armstrong rescued the subject of Ukrainian nationalism from the mire of polemical histrionics, it has been steadily attracting the attention of serious scholarship. The two books under review exemplify this interest. Motyl examines the roots of interwar integral nationalism, while Farmer undertakes the more ambitious task of analyzing and conceptualizing modern Soviet Ukrainian nation- alism.

Ukrainian integral nationalism was born in exile - in the aftermath of the defeat of Ukraine's liberation struggle at the hands of Soviet Russia and Poland- among those emigres who refused to accept that defeat as final. The democratic and socialist forces, which had led the unsuccessful drive for independence, were discredited and widely blamed for the failure. The nationalists saw them as romantics who were blind and insensitive to the complexities of power. New attitudes and methods were deemed necessary for the attainment of the goal of an independent and united (soborna) Ukraine. Thus in their enclaves in Eastern Europe the Ukrainian emigres, mainly students and war veterans, generated a stream of nationalist ideologies that rejected the democratic and humanistic traditions of the pre-1917 intelligentsia in favour of militant totalitarianism. Its foreign locale notwithstanding, Motyl argues that integral nationalism was an in-

digenous Ukrainian phenomenon indebted to its conservative and right-wing traditions rather than to non-Ukrainian fascist movements.

The year 1923 was a turning point in the fortunes of Ukrainian nationalism. Until then many Ukrainians had believed in the possibility of at least a Ukrainian Galician state. However, the fateful decision of the League of Nations (the Council of Ambassadors) to legitimize the Polish occupation of Galicia ended that hope. It also destroyed the credibility of the Galician government-in-exile, thus opening the way for the nationalist factions to launch their drive for the total control of Ukrainian political life among the emigres and in Galicia. The nationalists' un-

compromising outlook and militancy (including terrorism) strained their relations with the legal Ukrainian parties in Galicia. The latter, without abandoning the goal of Ukrainian independence, nonetheless chose a conciliatory path in their relations

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Vol. xxiii, No. 3 Book reviews | 357

with Poland. Motyl retraces the steps of the process which ultimately led to the creation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The key part in the process was played by the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), which was formed in Prague from the remnants of the Ukrainian army (Sichovi Striltsi) and led by Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The UVO's political and guerilla activities in the 1920s enjoyed a degree of Lithuanian and German support, including financial aid and intelligence and military training. Hence the future Nazi connection. The book concludes with a brief discussion of the OUN ideology, drawn extensively from the writings of Dmytro Dontsov stressing the notion of peasant pre-eminence in the future socio-political structure of Ukraine.

While it is legitimate to trace the history of an idea, it may be asked whether the study of such a complex phenomenon can be complete without reference to economic developments in Polish Ukraine and their impact upon Ukrainian social and political thought. It would seem that the Polish policies of colonization and economic discrimination not only radicalized the population but made the Nation- alist ideas of self-reliance and militancy popular. Furthermore, MotyFs efforts to keep Ukrainian nationalism as free as possible of Western fascist connections tend to blind him to the existence of important similarities between Ukrainian national- ism and its East European counterparts. A chapter on such nationalist organizations as the Croatian UstaSe, the Slovak Hlinkavites, the Romanian Iron Guard, and the Polish National Radical Camp would have placed the Ukrainian movement in a broader and more relevant historical context. Finally, the research of the subject does not appear to have been exhausted. For example, the important Ko- novalets Archive in Winnipeg was not consulted.

Farmer approaches the subject of Ukrainian nationalism from the widely held position that the Soviet Union has been unable to resolve its chronic and potential- ly dangerous nationalities problem. He concentrates on the period 1957-72 (Khrushchev's consolidation of power to the fall of Shelest) to examine the inter- action between Moscow and Ukraine, the barometer of minority nationalist dis- content in the USSR. Furthermore he develops and employs a conceptual frame- work that he believes may be useful for the study of nationalisms other than Ukrainian.

Drawing on the abundant literature on the dissident movements in Ukraine, Farmer essentially restates in detail the popular view that contemporary Ukrainian nationalism differs dramatically from its inter-war predecessor. Current Ukrain- ian activists see themselves as guardians of their "national moral patrimony." Fiercely patriotic, they have rejected the Russification of Ukrainian culture and have been conducting a seemingly suicidal campaign against the Soviet state. To the extent that Russification has become synonymous with national oppression, contemporary Ukrainian national self-assertion is based on roots similar to the nationalism of the Third World.

A more original, albeit on occasions frustrating, section of Farmer's study deals with the various symbols and myths associated with the two conflicting forces. While the nationalists exploit the myths and symbols of national self-determination the regime has been equally resourceful in supplementing coercion with selective manipulations of Ukrainian patriotism. Thus the charge of "bourgeois nationalism"

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358 I Canadian Slavonic Papers September 1981

has been associated by the regime with every evil force from wartime collaboration to contemporary Maoism and Zionism. This tactic, however, is not a recent development as Farmer seems to think, but rather a continuation of Stalinist practices dating from the 1930s. In fact, it even bears a striking similarity to the tsarist attitude when everything Ukrainian was stigmatized as "Mazepism" and harshly suppressed.

Farmer's application of fresh approaches to existing sources has illuminated many known facts by placing them in more revealing perspectives. However, his heavy reliance on the ever changing vocabulary of political science and social psychology combined with lapses into extraordinarily long sentences detracts from the readability of the book. The book is free of major flaws, although Farmer is wrong in stating that Western Ukraine had never been under Russian rule before 1939 (the Russians occupied Galicia and Bukovyna in 1914-15). Furthermore, the alleged sending of the OUN troops to Khabarovsk has never been convincingly substantiated. His characterization of V. Moroz as the foremost exponent of modern Ukrainian nationalism must be reassessed in the light of Moroz's state- ments since his release. They strongly suggest that he is a throwback to the integral nationalism of the 1930s rather than a representative of contemporary thought. Finally, the study abounds with inconsistent transliterations of "i" and "y." Reservations notwithstanding, both books are definite contributions to Ukrainian history.

O. W. Gerus, University of Manitoba

Ota Hora. Svëdectvt o puai: ζ boja proti komunizaci Ceskoslovenska. Toronto: Sixty-Eight Publishers, 1978. 594 pp. $10.00

Hora's work is undoubtedly the best analytical study so far published of the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Hora believes that the Communist Party based its strategy upon operations carried out on two levels. On the first level the agreement on co-operation concluded by the Com- munists with Social Democrats in September 1947 entrenched the left wing within the latter party to such an extent that this prevented its ministers from tendering their resignation during the critical days of the February crisis. Hora is convinced that had the Social Democratic ministers joined the twelve ministers from other parties who resigned in the initial stages of the crisis-and so brought down Gott- wald's cabinet - President Bene§ could have refuted Gottwald's argument that he commanded majority support in the cabinet, resisted his demand for the formation of a new cabinet without these ministers, and insisted upon the solution of the crisis on the basis of accommodation among the existing members of the cabinet or, failing this, by calling fresh elections. Although two Social Democratic ministers did resign eventually, Hora is convinced that this came too late to affect the course of events, because the President had in the meantime accepted the new cabinet and thus legitimized the Communist takeover. He argues that the President should not have signed even under these circumstances and, instead, should have mobilized the armed forces, called upon Sokol, students, Legionaries, and youth groups to

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