the travesty of a common m. de moor ghent university [email protected] presentation for wow3...
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The Travesty of a Common
M. De MoorGhent University
[email protected] for WOW3
June 2-6, 2004, Bloomington
The management and use of a common in a changing Flanders (18th-19th Century) put into the European historical perspective
M. De Moor
Differences in approach Historians
concentrate on dissolution of commons commoners as groups of users
Insufficient attention for strategies of commoners Other social sciences (sociology, economy,...)
concentrate on PROBLEMS caused by: Functioning in groups
(intra-personal conflicts) Behaviour of individuals within groups (free-riding)
Insufficient attention for context and path dependency
M. De Moor
A 3-dimensional approach to researching commons as social-ecological systems
As a resource -> comprising a complete range of different resources -> USE of a Common Pool Resource
As a property regime -> to delimit the type and number of people allowed to use the common -> USERS of a Common Property Regime
As an institution -> to organise the interaction between resources and users -> MANAGEMENT as a Common Pool Institution
M. De Moor
ORIGINS OF COMMON LAND
POSITIVE VIEW NEGATIVE VIEW
Capable to function - dynamic institution
Important aspect of the agricultural economy
Equal distribution and equal rights of speech
Attract poverty and create poverty
Free-riders principle is main strategy of users – system is doomed to fail
Insufficient exploitation – no relevance for the economy
CAUSAL EXPLANATION EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION
MANAGEMENT OF COMMON LAND
Dissolutions are PRIMARILY caused by STRUCTURAL factors Dissolutions have INTERNAL causes
CPI
CPrR
Structuring the debates
CPR
M. De Moor
Criteria for the evaluation of the functioning of commons
Efficiency Utility
Equity
M. De Moor
Central research questions How did the use and management of
commons evolve INTERNALLY (equity, utility, efficiency)and in relation with STRUCTURAL FACTORS (demographic changes, agricultural development,…)?
Which problems did they encounter? Were these solved and if so, how?
M. De Moor
Case-study in Flanders, 18th-19th c.
Near Bruges: Gemene and Loweiden Meadow along a river Rights to the common were
hereditary Primarily used for
cattle grazing Management by the users but
period of external control and management (1862-1882) by local government
And…. Still a “common” today Excellent archives Possibility of in-depth-research
based on resolution books, lists of commoners, bookkeeping, marriage registers….
Torhout
Wingene
Oedelem
Oostkamp
Gits
Pittem
Beernem
Ruiselede
Koekelare
Gistel
Ichtegem
Aartrijke
Sijsele
Zedelgem
Ruddervoorde
Zwevezele
Moerkerke
LichterveldeKortemark
Aarsele
Houtave
Tielt+Schuiferskapelle
Loppem
Eernegem
Egem
Sint-Andries
Sint-Kruis
Klemskerke
Zarren
Bredene
Moere
Jabbeke
Damme
Vlissegem
Zuienkerke
Stalhille
Oudenburg
Handzame
Werken
Kanegem
Snellegem
Varsenare
Koolskamp
Ettelgem
Meetkerke
Assebroek
Zandvoorde
Zerkegem
Koolkerke
Sint-Michiels
Sint-Joris
SnaaskerkeRoksem
Westkerke
Oostende (Ostende)
Waardamme
Bekegem
Bovekerke
Sint-Pieters-op-de-Dijk
Brugge (Bruges)
Gemeenten in 1846Brugse VeldzoneGemene en Loweiden
M. De Moor
Changes of use, users and institution
Participation of commoners in the system: number of participants, their participation intensity, participation strategy
Exploitation: evolution of exploitation level, use of price mechanism
Organisation: origins of income and expenditures, financial balance
M. De Moor
Changes in participation of commoners
Growing group of persons entitled to use under influence of population growth
BUT from end of 18th c. onwards: Declining relative participation level from
Until 1790: 70-80% of subscribers participated
1840: 50% Exclusion process and more control of use Less and less farmers, more and more wage
labourers
M. De Moor
Changing user-profile
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
1796
1806
1816
1826
1836
1846
1856
1866
1876
1886
1896
Year
Ave
rag
e ag
e
Average age at first marriage in the Province of West Flanders (men only)
Average age at entry in common
Average life expectancy (men only)Average age at entry in common (per 25 years)
M. De Moor
Interpretation of changes
Commoners adapted their participation strategy to the changing place of the common in agriculture and to changes in the professional structure
=> Did the commoners’ changing strategy influence their actual use of the common?
M. De Moor
Changes in the level and mode of exploitation
0
50
100
150
200
250
1699
1704
1709
1714
1719
1724
1729
1734
1739
1744
1749
1754
1759
1764
1769
1774
1779
1784
1789
1794
1799
1804
1809
1814
1819
1824
1829
1834
1839
Horses (P) Cow s (K) Pigs (Z)
Cattle Units Users 10 per. Zw . Gem. (Cow s (K))
10 per. Zw . Gem. (Users) 10 per. Zw . Gem. (Horses (P)) 10 per. Zw . Gem. (Cattle Units)
M. De Moor
Interpretation of changes
Decision to privatise the use of the common in the 1840s AND was caused by the declining utility of the common for the commoners
- > But why didn’t they privatise the management too?
M. De Moor
Changes in financial management
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1699
1709
1719
1729
1739
1749
1759
1769
1779
1789
1799
1809
1819
1829
1839
1849
1859
1869
1879
1889
1899
Year
Fran
ks
Receipts
Expenditures
Balance
Balance per 10 years
Zero profit Optimal profitMarginal profitsNo dataNo data
Marginal profits
M. De Moor
Interpretation of changes
The management was not aimed at commercialisation of the goods (cfr. exploitation level) but at the changing needs and advantages of the users
Private use, common management Private profit, common costs
M. De Moor
ConclusionsChanging agricultural system (and demografic and
professional changes)
Changes in the income strategy of the commoners
Affects the utility of the common for commoners
Participation strategy of commoners towards the common
Commoners changed the mode of exploitation of the common to their needs