THE THEORY OF LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL:

A CRITIQUE AND RESPONSE TO WILLIAM HASKER

A Research Paper

Presented to

Dr. Greg Welty

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

PHI 7640A: Philosophy of the Mind

Kevin P. McAloon

Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary

December 2, 2011

1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of both philosophy and Christian theology, perhaps one of the most

painstakingly debated subjects has been that of the nature of freedom possessed by the human will. Today’s

academic arena is no exception, and the mainstream contenders continue to battle along the same general

lines of libertarianism vs. compatibilism. Although perhaps more known for his theories concerning open

theism and middle knowledge, Dr. William Hasker is undoubtedly one of those contenders who advocates

the former, and, like others, sees the possession of a libertarian free will as being central to both human

worth and experience. He discusses these matters in a number of books and journals, and this paper will

primarily, although not exclusively, focus on his discussion on the will set forth in his book, The Emergent

Self.1 Through interacting with his material, I will be arguing that Dr. Hasker’s theories concerning the will

are primarily a result of a faulty epistemology, and may be shown to be false once a true and reliable

foundation for knowledge is established in its place. Because so much of this discussion will depend upon a

firm understanding of the objective world that we humans are inescapably a part of, as well as the real

awareness of Dr. Hasker’s—as well as all thinking human beings’—limitations as subjective products and

interpreters of this world, I have set out first to take time to establish some preliminary groundwork that I

believe is absolutely necessary towards properly interpreting his reasoning and why he reasons in such a

way. I wish to be emphatic about the fact that what follows is in no way an ad hominem attack. It is an

inconvenience that some of the most philosophically pertinent factors in these sort of discussions are those

which, when brought down to earth, become the most personal. That being said, let the reader please keep

in mind why some “personal” issues may be addressed, and to realize that they only serve to illustrate a

faulty epistemic foundation and the errors which are its products.

1 William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Some other

works by Hasker’s that were consulted are Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (New York:

Routledge, 2009);“Theological Incompatiblism and the Necessity of the Present: A Response to Michael

Rota,” Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (April 2011): 224-229; The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for

a World of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008).

2

PROLEGOMENA:

TRUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE REALITY WE CANNOT ESCAPE

Since this is a philosophical discussion as opposed a theological one, I will attempt to argue from

as much reason as possible without exhaustive appeal to Scripture or Church History; however, since this is

also a Christian reaction against arguments made by one who gladly identifies himself as a brother in

Christ, some appeal must be made to an authority both parties recognize in common—without a

philosophical treatise on the validity truths such as the reality of an omniscient God, inspiration of

Scripture, etc. This section will focus on our limitations as finite creatures in autonomously deriving truth

from our surroundings; why God’s revelation is necessary for our quest for true knowledge about our

world; and what God’s written revelation declares about man’s current state and its effects on his

interpretations and reasoning. Hopefully as we then place Hasker and his arguments under this microscope,

we will be in a better position to clearly see any flaws that may be contained therein.

To begin with, it is detrimental to understand our situation as finite and created beings and the

limitations of pure autonomous scientific/philosophical inquiry in general. Most philosophers, including

Hasker, derive their theories either from rationalism, empiricism, or some sort of combination of both.

Reymond addresses the futility of these methods and sets forth man’s inescapable plight as secondary and

created beings:

For the finite knower to begin from himself alone with any datum, whether that datum be

subjective or objective, ideal or material, mental or nonmental, and to seek to understand it

comprehensively and exhaustively must inevitably lead him to other data, but being finite he

cannot examine any datum or all possible relationships of that one datum comprehensively or

exhaustively, not to mention examine all the other data in the universe. Furthermore, there is no

way he can be assured that the next datum he might have examined at the point at which he

concluded his research in his finiteness would have accorded with all that he had concluded to that

point. The only way to escape the force of this fact is to avoid the entire question of epistemology.

The entire history of philosophy up to more recent times may be summarized as precisely

man’s rational effort, beginning with himself and accepting no outside help, to ‘examine’ enough

of certain chosen particularities of the universe… To be somewhat more specific, men have

attempted to come to knowledge and then to the justification of their claims to knowledge via the

epistemological methods of rationalism and empiricism.2

Although perhaps objectionable to many modern thinkers—and hopefully by the end of this essay the

reader will understand why these truths are the oftentimes objectionable—the fact of the matter is that

human beings are creatures who are dependent upon the benevolence of a higher Authority and Knower to

2 Robert Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 2nd ed. (Nashville, TN:

Thomas Nelson Inc, 1998), p. 111-112.

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share with man that which He alone autonomously “knows” in Himself. Reymond expands on this

elsewhere:

Every fact that is enjoys its existence by virtue of some activity of God and thus carries with it its

“interpretation,” placed upon it by God Himself by virtue of His creative activity, His providential

care, and subsequent special revelation. For a man truly to know a fact would mean and that his

interpretation of a given fact, discerned by whatever methods are available to him, would of

necessity have to agree with God’s prior interpretation and we learn something about God’s prior

interpretation of everything from Scripture. True knowledge would then be “receptive

reconstruction,” that is, thinking God’s thoughts after Him, rather than “creative construction,”

that is, interpreting for the first time by man’s “sciences” the “brute” facts of the universe.3

These are vital truths to keep in mind when approaching any philosophical discussion. Man is not

simply a rational creature who can determine with his own fallible and finite abilities that which is

infallibly true apart from Divine revelation. Not only this, but every thinker is also driven by inherent

presuppositions that are latent within his mind before he even sets out to reason and interpret any fact;

especially in regards to those topics which are most personal and dear to him. This is why, as Reymond

says, inasmuch as what any man regards as “factual” is inevitably governed by a more basic “philosophy of

fact”: value-governing, possibility-determining, religiously motivated presuppositions and starting points.4

Greg Bahnsen correctly notes:

All argumentation about alternate issues eventually comes to rest at the level of the

disputants’ presuppositions. If a man has come to the conclusion and is committed to the truth of a

certain view, P, when he is challenged as to P, he will offer supporting argumentation for it, Q and

R. But of course, as his opponent will be quick to point out, this simply shifts the argument to Q

and R. Why accept them? The proponent of P is now called upon to offer S, T, U, and V as

arguments for Q and R…. But all argument chains must come to an end somewhere. One’s

conclusions could never be demonstrated if they were dependent upon an infinite regress of

argumentative justifications, for under those circumstances the demonstration could never be

completed. And an incomplete demonstration demonstrates nothing at all.

Eventually all argumentation terminates in some logically primitive starting point, a view or

premise held as unquestionable…. In the nature of the case, these pre-suppositions are held to be

self-evidencing; they are the ultimate authority in one’s viewpoint, an authority for which no

greater authorization can be given.5

This may explain why, as Hasker confesses, that after centuries of debates between libertarians and

3 Robert Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed

Publishing Co, 1976), p. 68

4 Ibid. p. 71.

5 Greg Bahnsen, A Biblical Introduction to Apologetics (Tyler, TX:Fairfax Christian Bookstore,

1976), p. 33-34; quoted in Ibid. p. 71.

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compatibilist, to this day neither side is able to persuade the other.6

I am stressing these points because they are inescapable factors when approaching any thinking

person’s interpretations and logic. Reasoning is not done in an objective vacuum; on the contrary, our

fundamental and prior commitments shape our assessment of evidences and premises. As John F. Frame

has stated, we are, in every sense, epistemically situated—historically, culturally, socially—and we lack a

God’s eye view of the world. Regrettably, no method exists for rising above our conditions that effects our

thinking so that we may see the world apart from our filters of beliefs and values.7 Dr. Kelly James Clark

also sees this limitation of human thinking when he says, “What people reason from determines the kinds of

inferences that it is rationally permissible for them to accept.”8 My question for Hasker and the reader will

be whether or not there are any ingrained beliefs or values that may prevent him from noticing problems in

his premises, and from accepting truths from opposing views in regards to the human will.

Given this situation of man’s limitations and need for an objective revealer of truth, we may now

correctly see the importance of grounding ourselves upon an objective revelation greater than ourselves,

which also, as we recognize our helplessness and surrender our epistemic autonomy to it, is able to correct

our presuppositions and provide us with a firm foundation to reason from.9 I may also add that this

revelation is sufficient enough to reveal reasons why we may hold some erroneous presuppositions and

why men are slow to correct them.

As Christians who have been enlightened by the Logos and Spirit of the ultimate Authority and

Knower, we believe that He has graciously given us the objective epistemological legging we need in His

written Scriptures. They have provided a solution to man’s need for an infinite reference point in order for

knowledge to become a reality. Since there is comprehensive knowledge with God, real and true knowledge

is possible for man, since God who knows all data exhaustively in all their infinite relationships can impart

6 William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers

Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008), p. 154.

7 John M. Frame, “Classical Apologetics: A Presuppositionalist’s Response,” in Steven B. Cowan,

ed., Five Views on Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000), p. 85.

8 Kelly James Clark, “Reformed Epistemology Apologetics,” in Ibid. p. 283.

9 This is in reference to material and propositional means of knowledge that may be observed by

all men equally. There is no room here to discuss the more important and subjective role of a Divine Spirit

and His method of illumination and revelation in regards to both natural and special revelation.

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any portion of that true knowledge to man; and He has done so through His word.10

Therefore, since this is

a philosophical treatise I will now appeal to the only reliable foundation of knowledge in order to receive

reliable premises—as opposed to those derived from opinions or desires—from which I may interact with

Hasker and see whether or not he has done the same.

God has revealed that man was originally created as a finite and dependent being with God as His

sovereign and benevolent Source and Creator (Gen. 1-3; Lk. 4:4; 1 Cor. 4:7), whose worth was a derived

worth by virtue of the One in whose image he was made (see Gen. 9:6, where bloodshed is wrong not

because man is intrinsically valuable, but rather because he is made in the image of Another who is); but at

some point man wanted to become like God, abandon his childlike dependence, and claim autonomy and

knowledge apart from Him (Gen. 3:1-7). He went from being, like the rest of creation, God-centered in his

dependence and purposes, and instead he has rebelled against this Sovereign and laid claim to his own

supposed sovereignty, intrinsic worth, and beauty (Gen. 3:5-6; Ps. 2, Isa. 2:11). In a universe created by and

for God, the centrum of authority for man shifted from God to himself. He demanded that he become his

own “god” and authority, determining for himself what is true and what is false. Man continued to employ

reason, but now man became his own standard. It became his nature to suppress God’s personal revelation

to him. He did this by being preoccupied with his own ideals, purposes, and sin.11

The result was, and is,

that all men are now born by nature haters of God and incapable in themselves of truly submitting to Him

rationally and volitionally because of their rebellion (Gen. 6:5; Ps. 58:3; Jer. 17:9; Jn. 3:19; Rom. 3:10-18,

8:7; 1 Cor. 2:14 Eph. 2:23). Even true believers who have been regenerated are capable of living and

reasoning in the flesh (Rom 6:19; 1 Cor. 3:1-3; Gal. 5:16-17).

These truths are especially pertinent and must be acknowledged when discussing man’s ability to

interpret the world. To exempt logic from the effects of sin is to deny the biblical premises which clearly set

forth the extensiveness of human depravity. Observation is not a purely passive, objective process, but

rather, as previously stated, includes a subjective element in which we very often see only what we want to

see.12

As sinners who strive to live apart from God, the natural man is inevitably going to want to see that

10

Reymond, A New Systematic, p. 115.

11

See Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, p. 19-20, 86.

12

Steven K. Moroney, The Noetic Effects of Sin: A Historical and Contemporary Exploration of

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which exalts man and diminish God and His reign over him. This effects our reasoning in all aspects of life

to varying degrees, as all aspects of life are intimately connected with our relation to God; and, as Brunner

points out, the more we a dealing with the inner nature of man , his attitude to God, and the way he is ruled

and determined by Him, it is evident that—apart from grace—sinful illusion becomes increasingly

dominant: “The nearer we come to the sphere of that which is connected with the personal being of God

and man, which can no longer be perceived y reason but only by faith [or reliance and trust in God rather

than ourselves] the more we shall see that the self-sufficient reason is a source of error.”13

And perhaps one

of the aspects of reality that is most connected to man’s relationship with God, which magnifies everything

that man is opposed to, and crushes every inherited illusion of godhood he has invented, is the subject of

the freedom and/or inability of the human will; especially in regards to God’s sovereignty. If Dr. Hasker’s

libertarianism is false, and the traditional view of Christian compatibilism is true, then it would fly in the

face of everything the natural rebellious man desires by revealing his inferiority and God’s transcendence;

his subordination and God’s total sovereignty; his utter dependence upon God’s sufficiency and grace; and

the prerogative of God to do all things for His own glory because He alone contains all power and goodness

in Himself. In light of biblical truth, it would be negligent not to take these weighty and intimate factors

into consideration when analyzing one’s argument on the surface.

This does not prove any of Dr. Hasker’s arguments false, but I have rather attempted to appeal to

an authority higher than him or I in order to paint the picture of the world we are both inescapably a part of.

I will now go on to interact with the arguments directly, without a direct appeal to the particular biblical

texts that address these issues; and ask the reader to deeply consider what has been set forth thus far, and to

let these initial and foundational premises guide their thinking as they ask themselves: 1. What is Dr.

Hasker’s epistemology and what protection does he provide for himself to avoid the dangers discussed

above; 2. Is there a stark contrast between his acquisition of knowledge in these matters vs. the methods of

those who have shifted their authority from God’s interpretations to their own; 3. Are there any latent

presuppositions that guide his arguments and rejection of other positions; 4. In light of this reality, what

How Sin Affects Our Thinking (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2000), p. 30

13

Heinrich Emit Brunner, Man in Revolt (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946) p. 248; and The

Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics: Vol. II (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1952) p.

27; quoted in Ibid. p. 33.

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may be the foundational motivations and desires that drive his reasoning?

DIALOGUE WITH DR. HASKER

In “Free Will and Agency,” the fourth chapter of his book, The Emergent Self, Dr. Hasker puts

forth his case why physical and psychological determinism should be rejected in light of the more plausible

theory of libertarian free will. He defines libertarian freedom as such:

“N is free at t with respect to performing A= df It is in N’s power at t to perform A, and it is in N’s

power at t to refrain from performing A, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at t

which prevents or precludes N’s performing A at t. Here “prevent” applies especially to

circumstances that are causallyincompatible with N’s doing so.”14

He explains that this view of freedom seems to be more empirically satisfying than deterministic theories,

and this is a primary argument for his views.15

Contrary to most compatibilist theories, not only must an

agent be free to act according to his will, but also his very will itself must have power over itself and

influences upon it that may prevent or preclude it in choosing between alternatives. For libertarians, this is

the basis for all moral responsibility. Hasker states, “For them, responsibility is founded fundamentally in

one’s freely forming an effective intention (or, as it is sometimes called, a volition) to act in a certain

way.”16

In other words: the will is free to choose what it will will to choose. When confronted with the

question as to why a person chooses a certain alternative at a certain time, and why it seemed more

important to them at that time, Hasker says that the proper response for a libertarian is simply to reject the

demand for such a contrastive explanation. He believes that this demand is equivalent to asserting

determinism as an a priori requirement for successful explanation, which has no empirical basis.17

He goes

on throughout the chapter to discuss the Frankfurt counterexamples and various theories of libertarianism

that he finds, for the most part, unsatisfactory; however this section will be dedicated to focusing on the

above beliefs concerning libertarianism, their roots, and problems.

14

William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 66-67;

quoted in Hasker, Emergent Self, p. 85.

15

Hasker, The Emergent Self, p. 82, 83-84, 100, 104

16

Ibid. p. 91.

17

Ibid. p. 103-104.

8

Hasker’s Faulty Foundations

To begin, I would first like to appeal to the previous section regarding the nature of man and his

epistemic limitations in order to set the proper backdrop for interpreting Hasker’s arguments. It was

previously set forth why strict empiricism that is grounded upon man and his own experience and

subjective interpretations is an inadequate method on its own for acquiring true knowledge; however, as

previously stated, it seems as if empiricism is Hasker’s primary appeal against various notions of

determinism. In the very first sentence of the chapter Hasker states, “Empirically speaking, there is not

much of a case for determinism. The only direct empirical evidence for determinism is the existence of

consistent, reliable, and accurate predictions of individual events.” 18

Although obviously I do not wish to

base my responses to Dr. Hasker on empirical terms, I would here briefly digress and candidly state that I

do not believe that psychological and theological determinism could have more empirical validation for one

who was not predisposed to reject the datum. Could we really say that, apart from either natural or divine

intervention, a child who was raised all of her life by sadistic parents who taught her all of the supposed

evils and atrocities of a certain race of men, would not be psychologically predisposed and determined to

later choose those alternatives and actions which most agreed her ingrained dispositions?

Dr. Hasker goes on further to say that common human sense and experience of autonomous

libertarian freedom is sufficient enough to provide a reason for dismissing at the outset rational

philosophical arguments pointing out the incoherence of such a notion: “And when you are confronted with

arguments purporting to show that agent causation is somehow incoherent, ask yourself seriously whether

these arguments are so cogent as to warrant your giving up as unintelligible something that, absent special

philosophical assumptions, seems entirely coherent and reasonable.”19

Again, since we are subjective

interpreters of this world, as well as sinful interpreters who are naturally predisposed to seek our own

power and glory, this is an extremely dangerous line to take in any discussion concerning intimate matters

such as this. Atheists suppress the truth that there is a God and base their interpretations and experience of

the world in light of their rejection of Him; where would the apologist be if we substituted the term “agent

causation” with “atheism” and gave them the same epistemological advice? In light of section one, I would

18

Ibid., p. 81; for other appeals to empiricism, see p. 82-84, 100, and 104.

19

Ibid. p. 100, emphasis mine.

9

say emphatically that we indeed do need philosophical assumptions when discussing these matters—and

whether we realize it or not, we all already contain and reason from various philosophical assumptions—

however we must obtain them from the revelation given to us by an infallible Source and Knower. Dr.

Hasker does not seem to realize that he already does contains a multitude of philosophical assumptions, and

it is only because he is basing his interpretations upon these that libertarian notions seem coherent and

reasonable. This is why Cheung states:

The Bible is opposed to what sinful man thinks. Proverbs, as with the rest of Scripture, does not

teach common sense – it teaches against it. By both definitions of the term, the Bible rejects

common sense – "normal native intelligence" has been crippled by the noetic effects of sin, and no

Christian believes that the Bible teaches "the unreflective opinions of ordinary people." The

Scripture is divine verbal revelation, not common sense.20

As we have seen, presuppositions are a, if not the, determining factor in what drives a man’s

thinking and why he either accepts or rejects certain notions; thus they are important to consider when

weighing the arguments he makes. We also know, from the ultimate reliable source of true knowledge, that

as a result of the Fall natural man is sinfully predisposed to seek his own glory, merit, and worth instead of

the One who alone is worthy of all worship and honor. Consider the following statement from Dr. Hasker:

“It seems to me, also, that the sense of autonomy described by these philosophers [libertarians]—the sense

that we are, in a real sense, the architects of our own lives—is an important component of the intrinsic

worth and dignity that many of us want to ascribe to ourselves and other human beings.”21

I would soberly

ask: from where does this desire to esteem our own autonomous sovereignty, worth, and dignity come,

especially in light of the biblical reality previously established? Would not such a personal, intimate, and

inbred desire powerfully affect our ability to apprehend truth that may be contrary to it? I believe that this

may indeed be the case here. Also, not to be cheeky, but it seems as if the dependency and grace described

by many of the historical Christian theological compatibilists—the sense that, God is, in a real sense, the

Architect of our own lives—was an important component of the intrinsic worth, holiness, and right to

sovereignty that many of them wanted to ascribe to God.22

Epistemologically, Biblical texts must be addressed in order to determine which of these

20

Vincent Cheung, Renewing the Mind, http://www.vincentcheung.com/books/renewmind.pdf

(accessed November 21, 2011).

21

Hasker, The Emergent Self, p. 85.

22

I.e. Augustine, Wycliffe, Luther, Calvin, Knox, Edwards, Whitefield, Spurgeon, etc.

10

presuppositions are sound enough to build upon. To do so here is not the purpose of this essay, however it

may be pertinent to consider how Dr. Hasker has attempted to do so in forming his argument. The evidence

seems to indicate that he has not, but rather, occasionally appeals to certain texts that he believes support

the presuppositions he brings into the them.23

For instance, in The Triumph of God over Evil, when denying

divine sovereignty over the evil actions of men, Hasker mentions Matt. 23:37 and Hosea where God is

attempting to call out to men (I would interject, His people) because He is unable to directly influence their

wills or prevent the upcoming calamities.24

He does not seem to be interpreting these texts in light of the

numerous passages which declare that God is in fact the one who decrees and brings calamity, as well as in

a sense moves, opens, and hardens men’s hearts and wills (Ex. 4:21; Deut. 2:30; 2 Chron. 25:20; 1 Sam.

10:9; Prov. 21:1; Isa. 45:7; Lam. 3:37-38; Amos 3:6; Acts 16:14; Rom. 9:18; etc.). In Providence, Evil, and

the Openness of God, he appeals to the moral repudiation of the idea that God would be sovereign over the

horrendous act of a Nazi soldier attacking a Jewish girl; however, although this does not diminish the moral

atrocity of the former, he does not appeal to God’s decrees of far worse in the Old Testament; nor the

holocaust of Jerusalem in 70 AD that was decreed as God’s judgment against rebellious Israel; nor the

predetermination and sovereignty of God over the wills of the men who conducted the worst atrocity in the

history of creation: the crucifixion of Christ.25

I am not saying that Dr. Hasker does not have a right to be

uncomfortable with these texts, nor should abandon any and all senses of freedom and justice he has; but

rather I am saying that these texts upon which we are to build our structures of reality should shape our

thinking regarding these matters, and must not be discarded because of prior philosophical commitments. It

seems as if in regards to his views of libertarian free will, Dr. Hasker has done so.26

23

It must be noted that the scarcity of biblical texts in many of Dr. Hasker’s philosophical works

does not necessarily indicate a neglect of Scripture on his part, but rather may simply be a result of the

nature and demographic of the academic community he is interacting with. He is not to be faulted in this;

however, this brief discussion will focus on where he has actually used Scripture in support of his views.

24

Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil, p. 152

25

See Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, p. 163; and, among other texts,

specifically Acts 2:23 and 4:28.

26

For example, see Emergent Self, p. 85 where Hasker says, “How in reason can a person be held

responsible—whether for good or ill—for doing what she was ineluctably determined to do by forces that

were in place before she was born?” His notion of “forces” also includes psychological factors such as

desires and beliefs. This question is almost exactly that of those who opposed Paul’s notions of free will

and sovereignty, saying, “Why does He [God] find fault? For who can resist His will?” (Rom. 9:19).

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Problems with Hasker’s Theory

Among others, the primary problems with Hasker’s theory and argumentation arise from his

refusal to accept the notion that human dispositions and desires determine the will. The issue is not with his

views in regards to physical determinism—for even Christian compatibilists gladly assert that the freedom

of the will consists in a freedom from absolute physical necessity27

—but rather that he does not seem to

want to concede that the soul of the human functions holistically, with the will being no exception, and that

it is not an independent power or faculty functioning alongside the intellectual or appetitive faculties.28

This

refusal to accept this limitation of freedom leads to many inconsistencies and dilemmas for libertarians.29

For example, Dr. Hasker asserts that the libertarian view insists that for an action to be free, it is

not enough that a person be able to do what he most desires to do. Even if not subjected to external

constraints and influences, nevertheless even if he is controlled by his desires the person cannot be said to

really be free by libertarian definitions. It must be entirely within the person’s power to equally free to

choose one thing or the other.30

Edwards is correct in dissecting the implications of this statement when he

recognizes that in arguments such as these, libertarians are attributing liberty of choice to the very will

itself; however, will itself is not an agent that has a will: the power of choosing does not itself also contain a

power of choosing. The one who has the power of choosing is the man, not the power of volition itself.31

There must be something guiding the will which inclines it one way rather than the other, and this is where

libertarian arguments fall apart. Inevitably, by denying psychological determinism, the choices of the will

revert back to chance and blind contingence as their ultimate influences.

This becomes evident in Dr. Hasker’s discussion of agent causation. It must be said at the outset

that among much elaboration upon Dr. O’Conner’s agent causation theory, Dr. Hasker discusses to some

extent how he believes an agent may be properly said to act on these occasions, but he never answers the

27

For one example see Gordon Clark, God and Evil: The Problem Solved (Hobbs, NM: The

Trinity Foundation, 1996), p. 38-39.

28

Stephen A. Wilson, “The Possibility of a Habituation Model of Moral Development in Jonathan

Edward’s Conception of the Will’s Freedom,” Journal of Religion 81, no. 1 (Jan 2001): 55.

29

All of which cannot be covered here. For a detailed exposition of many such problems, see

Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will (Lafayette, IN: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2001)

30

Hasker, Triumph of God over Evil, p. 150.

31

Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 32.

12

very question that was supposed to be answered in the section: viz.,“If free will cannot be explicated neither

by causal necessary, nor by chance, nor by any combination of the two however subtle, then how are we to

explicate this crucial notion?”32

Despite this being the very purpose of the section he then actually goes on

to dismiss this entire question, which asks why do people choose as they do, by saying that the libertarian

should simply reject such a question because it implies notions of determinism!33

Frankly I was shocked to

see such a response, and believe that it is a result of Dr. Hasker’s absolute commitment to his position for

the reasons set forth above.

The truth is there is no satisfactory solution to this question in the libertarian scheme of things, and

it leads to all sorts of logical and moral dilemmas. For instance, right before this statement, Dr. Hasker

describes a person who has various reasons either for or against reading his chapter. He says that the person

may believe that, among alternatives, they chose the reason for continuing to read because it seemed more

important to them; however Hasker then goes on to say that it is important to see that the “greater

importance” only came as a result from the way the choice was first made, and that it was not a

“preexisting condition” which determined the outcome of the choice in advance.34

In other words, the

person first chose the reason; therefore it then appeared to him as more important and reasonable. Could

anything be contrary to experience and notions of rationality? If this be the true nature of choices, then

people do not actually have true motivations or desires, but rather they first arbitrarily choose actions,

which choices then result in their corresponding alternatives appearing desirable and important to their

choosers. For Hasker this must be the case, because we have seen that he has already dismissed desires and

motivations as determining factors in choices, and now he has dismissed reason as well. He goes on to say

that when the aforementioned person is asked why one alternative was chosen rather than the other, the

only sufficient answers for them to give would be to say “Well, that’s the way I decided,” or “At the time,

that’s what seemed most important.” Again, the question of why they chose one way, and why one seemed

more important than the other, Hasker totally dismisses as an unnecessary concession to deterministic

requirements; thus conveniently avoiding the entire issue entirely.35

32

Hasker, The Emergent Self, p. 99.

33

Ibid. p. 104. 34

Ibid. p. 103. 35

Ibid. p. 103-104.

13

Elsewhere Dr. Hasker attempts to dispose his readers towards being skeptical of deterministic

arguments when he encourages them to keep in mind that there is no apparent power or force compelling

them to continue reading at that very moment. There would undoubtedly be various other options and

reasons for putting the book down, and they could decide to break it off at any moment.36

However, the

question is not whether or not, if they so choose, they could cease reading; rather, the question that Hasker

fails to see, is whether or not they could decide to break it off given the same situation if they did not have

the superior desire to do so—that is, with all factors and reasons being exactly equal. I would hope that a

person would have desires and reasons for doing what they are doing. Even if the reader may have other

less prevalent desires and reasons for doing other things, at that exact moment these lesser considerations

are overcome by the desires and reasons that result in reading the book (even if the desires are indirectly

related to the action of reading, i.e. desires to find holes in Hasker’s arguments in order to write a

philosophy paper, do well on a test, obey God, etc.). Again, all of these factors being equal at that exact

moment of time, could a person actually decide to put down the book? What would be the non-

deterministic determining factor that would produce this choice other than blind chance?

We already have seen that Dr. Hasker simply avoids this enormously important question by

dismissing it as irrelevant. Even Dr. Swinburne, who is a fellow libertarian, recognizes the utter power of

desires upon our choices when he says that, “Desires are like a stream which carries us onward unless we

swim against it. And because desires are predictable, we find that much human action is predictable with

quite high degrees of accuracy,” and that, “Humans can only resist desire in so far as they believe it good to

do so.”37

These would be deterministic statements if pressed a little further. For the first, it should be asked

what would give the person enough strength to swim against certain desires? Could he do so if he did not

have a stronger desire to swim against any particular opposing desire? For the second, is the deciding factor

in resisting desire the belief that it is theoretically good to do so, or the desire to act upon that belief and to

do good? An obese person who is addicted to sweets may know theoretically that it would better for them

to abstain, but at the moment of temptation, without a stronger desire for the good that would result from

abstinence, the greatest apparent good at that moment to the person’s mind and will will be to indulge. As

36

Ibid. p. 100.

37

Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul . revised ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,

2007) p. 259 and 260, respectively.

14

Edwards notes, “the will always is as the greatest apparent good is… the word good, in that sense, includes

in its signification the removal or avoiding of anything evil, or that which is disagreeable and uneasy.”38

As compatibilists throughout the centuries have noted, by refusing to accept that volitions are

determined by a person’s desires, libertarians are left with chance as the only ultimate cause for the will’s

choosing between alternatives. They demand a freedom from even internal necessity, and by denying

desires and motivations any ultimate causal influence upon volitions, they are ascribing to the will a sort of

liberty of indifference such that, when all is said and done, it must ultimately be free from all antecedent

preponderation and inclination. As Edwards observes,

…if the will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its

inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its

choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of indifference, then it is not found in

a state of liberty for more self-determination. The least degree of an antecedent bias must be

inconsistent with their notion of liberty.39

The greater this indifference, the greater liberty the will has. This inevitably leads to a moral conundrum in

that, within this scheme of things, an action seems to be more free and therefore morally accountable only

if a person’s desire to do it did not casually influence their choice. Even psychological necessity must be

taken out of the equation for choices to be praiseworthy. Dr. Hasker has stated that a parent would rather

have a child who is free in this sense to love or obey the parent apart from a necessity upon the will.40

Is

this the case? Would a parent rather have a child who obeys strictly out of seemingly arbitrary choices not

necessarily produced or determined by the love and affection of the child toward the parent? Do we not in

fact need a necessity upon the will—i.e. good desires which casually determine good motives—in order for

an action to be truly virtuous? Is this not the hope of the Resurrection? Although this is not a theological

discussion, the fact that all orthodox Christians believe that God’s holy nature determines His holy will

seems to end the discussion here. God, the supreme moral Agent and Fountain of all agency and virtue, is

without this freedom which Dr. Hasker and others argue for. God is necessarily holy, and His will is

necessarily determined to that which is good. His choices are determined by who He is. This is the

Christian compatibilist position. To say that the will is determined by its strongest motive only means that it

38

Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 7-8.

39

Ibid. p. 73.

40

Hasker, Triumph of God over Evil, p. 155.

15

is not objectively self determined, but that in every rational volition the man is influenced to decide one

way rather than another by something within him, so that the volition is a revelation of what he himself is.41

To conclude, like all men I believe that Dr. Hasker’s presuppositions are the determining

foundations for his entire arguments, and the reasons why he cannot accept and avoids many of the rational

objections by his opponents. I also have not found any reason to believe that these presuppositions of the

importance of autonomous human sovereignty, worth, and dignity have been derived from Scripture; and in

light of divine revelation, I have reason to believe that such desires and presuppositions are in fact possibly

sinful manifestations of human pride and rebellion—things of which we are all prone to. I also do not

believe subjective empiricism to be adequate enough to judge these matters, even apart from the presence

of sin. As Dr. Clark points out, to empirically know for certain that a man had a libertarian free will, he

would need to eliminate every external and internal factor that might be influencing him, as well as

knowledge of every possible cause in both the past and present state of the universe.42

Dr. Hasker repeats an

argument similar to this in which Spinoza likens man to a stone, suggesting that if a stone, having been

thrown into the air were suddenly to become conscious, it would suppose itself to be the source of its own

motion, being then conscious of its actions yet unaware of the real cause of its behavior.43

Hasker simply

dismisses this as skepticism, and yet in doing so denies that this is the reality in men’s lives. We may

oftentimes observe in others their refusal to recognize the true reasons and causes for their actions, yet

because perhaps maybe of our desire for self-determination we are slow to do the same for ourselves. Like

a “stone in mid-air”, I would have never thought that the ultimate first cause for my moral failings was the

action of a remote ancestor who lived some 6,000+ years in the past. Thank God that He has not left us

with our own empiricism with which to fend for ourselves, and that there is more reliable and sure

foundation upon which to interpret our world. May Dr. Hasker, the reader, and all men seek to uphold this

gift, and seek to find whether or not it sets forth an alternative, more consistent, and God-glorifying view of

the human situation than that which has been argued against thus far.

41

D.A. Carson, “Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo,” Novum Testamentum

XXIII, no.2 (1981), p. 289.

42

Clark, God and Evil, p. 42-43.

43

See Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2nd

ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974),p. 57;

quoted in Hasker, Emergent Self, p.109-110.

16

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