the libertarian response

the incompatibility argument

1) Determinism is true.2) If Determinism is true, then none of

our actions are free.3) None of our actions are free.

the incompatibility argument

1) Determinism is true.2) If Determinism is true, then none of

our actions are free.3) None of our actions are free.

The Universality of Causation: Everything has a cause which precedes it in time.The Sufficiency of Causation: Causes determine their effects, in the sense that the effect is necessary, given the cause (and the laws).

the incompatibility argument

1) Determinism is true.2) If Determinism is true, then none of

our actions are free.3) None of our actions are free.

The First Libertarian Analysis: An action is free iff it is not determined.

[I]f it is a matter of pure chance that a man should act in one way rather than another, he may be free but he can hardly be responsible. And indeed when a man’s actions seem to us quite unpredictable, when, as we say, there is no knowing what he will do, we do not look upon him as a moral agent. We look upon him rather as a lunatic.

-A.J. Ayer

The Second Libertarian Analysis: An action is free iff (i) the person chooses to perform that action and (ii) the person’s choice is not determined.

But now we must ask how it is that I come to make my choice. Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. If it is an accident, then it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to hold me morally responsible for choosing as I did…

-A.J. Ayer

The Third Libertarian Analysis: An action is free iff (i) the person chooses to perform that action, (ii) the person chooses on the basis of reasons, and (iii) person’s choice is not determined.

But now we must ask how it is that I come to make my choice. Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. If it is an accident, then it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to hold me morally responsible for choosing as I did. But if it is not an accident that I chose to do one thing rather than another, then presumably there is some causal explanation of my choice: and in that case we are led back to determinism.

-A.J. Ayer

How can we determine what we will do without our actions being determined?