The 'Surge Strategy': Political Arguments and Military Realities Jan 04, 2007

By George Friedman

U.S. President George W. Bush is preparing a new strategy for Iraq. According to

reports being leaked to the media, the primary option being considered is a "surge

strategy," in which U.S. troop levels in Iraq would be increased, particularly in the

Baghdad region. The numbers of additional troops that would deploy -- or that would

not be rotated home -- are unclear, but appear to be in the low tens of thousands.

This "surge" strategy is interesting in that it runs counter to general expectations

after the midterm elections in November, when it appeared that the president was

tied to a phased withdrawal plan. Instead, Bush seems to have decided to attempt to

break out of the military gridlock in which the United States finds itself. Therefore,

the questions now are why the president is considering this strategy and whether it

will work.

As we have discussed previously, the United States appears to have four strategic

options in Iraq:

1. Massively increase the number of troops in Iraq, attempting to break the back of

both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias and create room for a political

settlement.

2. Begin a withdrawal process that allows the Iraqis to shape the politics of the

country as they will -- and that leaves a huge opportunity for Iran to fill the vacuum.

3. Abandon attempts to provide security for Iraq but retain forces there, in a

redeployed posture, with the goal of blocking any potential Iranian moves toward the

Arabian Peninsula.

4. Attempt to reach a political accommodation with Tehran that concedes Iraq to the

Iranian sphere of influence, in order to provide guarantees against Iranian expansion

southward. This diplomatic option is compatible with all others.

Each of these options has strengths and weakness. The first option, the surge, rests

on the assumption that the United States has enough troops available to make a

difference on the ground in Iraq; it also would decrease the strategic reserve for

dealing with other crises around the world. The phased withdrawal option eliminates

the need for Iraqi Shia and Iran to engage in political discussion -- since, given time,

U.S. forces would depart from Iraq and the Shia would be the dominant force. The

blocking strategy puts the United States in the position of protecting Saudi Arabia (a

Sunni kingdom that doesn't want to appear to be seeking such protection) against

Iran -- a Shiite state that could, in that situation, choose the time and place for

initiating conflict. In other words, this option would put U.S. forces on a strategic

defensive in hostile areas. The fourth option, diplomacy, assumes some basis for a

U.S.-Iranian understanding and a mechanism for enforcing agreements. In short,

there are no good choices -- only a series of bad ones. But, for the United States,

doing nothing is also a choice, and the current posture is untenable.

The president appears to have chosen a variation on the troop surge. But it is a

variation with an important difference. He has not proposed a surge that would

increase the number of troops in Iraq by an order of magnitude. Indeed, he cannot

propose that, inasmuch as he does not have several hundred thousand troops

standing by -- and to the extent that forces are standing by, he cannot afford to strip

the strategic reserve completely. It is a big world, and other crises can emerge

suddenly. The surge the president is proposing appears to be on the order of around

10,000 troops -- and certainly no more than 20,000. Even at the upper limit, that is

not so much a surge as a modest increase. It is, however, the best that can be done

under the circumstances.

The Political Logic

The president's logic appears to be as follows:

While it is impossible to double the size of the force in Iraq -- for reasons of

manpower, logistics and politics -- it is possible to massively increase the force

available in the key area of Iraq: Baghdad. If this increase were to include a

reshuffling of forces already in-country in a way that would double the number

deployed to Baghdad, it might be possible to achieve a strategic victory there, thus

setting the stage for a political settlement that would favor American interests.

Behind this thinking is a psychological assumption. Over the past year, it has become

conventional wisdom that the U.S. strategy in Iraq has failed and that it is simply a

matter of time until U.S. forces withdraw. Under these circumstances, the United

States has been marginalized in Iraq. No one expects Washington to be able to

threaten the interests of various parties, and no one expects meaningful American

guarantees. The Iraqis do not see the United States as being a long-term player in

Iraq, or as relevant to the current political crisis there. Iran, Iraq's powerful Shiite

neighbor, seems much more relevant and important. But the Sunnis, not viewing the

Americans as a long-term factor in Iraq, cannot turn to the United States for

protection even if they fear the Iranians and the Iraqi Shia. The conventional wisdom

is that the United States has failed, knows it has failed and is out of options.

Unless the Americans are prepared to simply walk away, the assumptions of the

players in and around Iraq must change. From Bush's standpoint, the United States

must demonstrate that it does have options, and that the president's hands are not

tied politically in Washington. If he can demonstrate that he can still shape U.S.

policy, that the United States has the ability to increase forces in Iraq -- confounding

expectations -- and that it can achieve victories, at least on the local level, the

psychology in Iraq and Iran will change and the United States will at least be able to

participate in shaping Iraq's political future instead of being simply a bystander. If

the president can increase the forces in Iraq and not be blocked by the Democrats,

then the assumption that the Republicans' political defeat in November cripples

Bush's power on the larger stage would be dispelled. Therefore, surge the forces.

The Military Perspective

The plan has come under sharp attack, however -- particularly from the Army and

apparently from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan is primarily political in nature: It

would use U.S. forces as a lever to achieve a psychological shift and create a

particular political environment. Viewed from a strictly military standpoint, however,

it makes no sense. Now, war is about politics, but from the Joint Chiefs' standpoint,

the military weakness of the plan obviates potential political benefits. The generals

appear to have made the following criticisms:

• The size of the surge cannot achieve any meaningful military result. Even a

surge of hundreds of thousands of troops would not guarantee success in a

counterinsurgency operation. This surge is too little, too late.

• The United States already has surged forces into Baghdad, and the operation

was regarded as a failure. Counterinsurgency operations in an urban setting

are difficult, and the Americans are dealing with multiple Shiite militias, Sunni

insurgents, criminal groups and hostile neighborhoods in the capital.

Achieving military success here is unlikely, and the strategy would lead to

casualties without victory.

• Surging fresh troops into Baghdad would create major command-and-control

problems. The entire structure of areas of responsibility, intelligence

distribution and tasking, chains of command and so on would have to be

shifted in a very short period of time for the president's strategy to work.

Transitioning new troops -- who are not familiar with the area for which they

would be responsible -- into a counterinsurgency operation in a city of about

5 million would create endless opportunities for confusion, fratricide and

failure. A "surge" connotes "fast," and this transition should not be

undertaken quickly.

• The U.S. Army in particular is stretched to the limit. Failure to massively

increase the size of the Army has meant that the force that existed in 2003

has had to carry the load of this war through multiple deployments. The

president's strategy necessarily would increase the duration of several

deployments for Army and Marine forces. Between concerns about morale and

retention, maintaining equipment in the theater and simple effectiveness after

long periods of deployment, the United States is at the limits of what it can

do. Surging forces in an operation that is unlikely to succeed creates failure

throughout the military system. No increase in U.S. forces generally, if

committed to now, would impact the system for months or even years.

• There is little or no reserve available in practical terms. A 10-division military

force, deployed the way it is, means that five divisions are in Iraq at any

given time, and the other five are either recovering or preparing to go there.

The United States is already vulnerable should other crises crop up in the world, and a surge into Iraq now would simply exacerbate that condition.

What we have here, therefore, is a divergence between political reality and military

reality.

The Upshot

Politically, the Americans cannot leave Iraq unless Washington is prepared to allow

Iran to assume dominance in Iraq and the region. That is politically unacceptable. A

redeployment under the current circumstances would create a hostage force in Iraq,

rather than a powerful regional strike force. The United States must redefine the

politics of the region before it can redeploy. To do this, it must use the forces

available in one last try -- regardless of the condition of the forces or even the

improbability of success -- to shift the psychology of the other players. Too much is

at stake not to take the risk.

Militarily, even a temporary success in Baghdad is doubtful -- and if it can be

achieved, the gains would be temporary. They also would come at substantial cost to

the force structure and the American strategic posture. Any political success in Iraq

would be vitiated by the military cost. Indeed, the Iraqis and Iranians have a

sophisticated understanding of U.S. military capability and will understand that the

Americans cannot sustain a "surged" posture (and likely would pursue their own

strategies on the basis of that understanding). Thus, the U.S. operation at best

would lead to a transitory military improvement; at worst, it would inflict substantial

casualties on U.S. forces while actually weakening the U.S. military position overall.

If the military argument wins, then the United States must select from options two

through four. Politically, this means that Iraq would become a Shiite state under the

heavy influence of Iran. If the political argument wins, it means the United States

will continue with military operations that are unlikely to achieve their desired ends.

Neither option is palatable. The president now must choose between them.

He appears to have chosen a high-risk military operation in hopes of retrieving the

United States' political position. Given what has been risked, this is not an irrational

point of view, even if it is a tough position to take. It is possible that the surge would

lead to perceptions that the United States is an unpredictable player that retains

unexpected options, and that discounting it prematurely is unwise. The strategy

could bring some Shia to the table as a hedge, or perhaps even lead to a political

solution in Iraq. Even if the probability of this happening is low, the cost is bearable -

- and given what has already been invested, from Bush's standpoint, it is a

necessary move.

Of course, the problem every gambler has when he is losing is the fear that if he

leaves the table, he will lose his chance at recouping his losses. Every gambler, when

he is down, faces the temptation of taking his dwindling chips and trying to recoup.

He figures that it's worth the risk. And it could be. He could get lucky. But more

frequently, he compounds his earlier losses by losing the money for his cab ride

home.

We can divine the president's reasoning. Nothing succeeds like success and, indeed,

he might pull the winning card. If the strategy fails, the United States will have

added to its military weakness somewhat, but not catastrophically. But the question

is this: Will the president be in a position to get up from the table if this surge fails,

or will he keep pulling chips out of his pocket in the hope that he can recoup?

That is the question this strategy does not answer.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=282557

Geopolitical Diary: Emerging Details of the Surge Strategy Jan 10, 2007

2007 GMT

The details of U.S. President George W. Bush's plan for surging forces in Iraq are being

systematically leaked, as is the custom in Washington, ahead of Wednesday's speech. The

plan calls for the deployment of an additional 16,000 troops to Baghdad and about 4,000

soldiers to Anbar province, where they will be fighting Sunni insurgents. About two brigades

will be deployed immediately, with the rest following in the coming months. Most important,

the plan calls for turning over security to Iraqi forces by November 2007. These are interesting indicators.

Iranians in Iraq: Making a Complex Insurgency Even More So Jan 15, 2007

2007 GMT

The United States is in the process of interdicting the Iranian support network for Sunni

insurgents in Iraq. And a strange network it is. Given that a significant portion of Sunni

insurgents are Baathists and jihadists -- actors hostile to Iran -- Tehran has been careful to

back only those Sunni militants who are not part of the jihadist alliance and has tried to create

splinter groups by exploiting differences among jihadist factions and between jihadist and Iraqi

Islamists. Iranian support of the Sunni insurgency is only making a complex insurgency even more so.

Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran

January 16, 2007 22 55 GMT

By George Friedman

The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United

States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in

Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been

the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of

Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.

The United States has encountered serious problems in creating the coalition government. The

Iranians have been primarily responsible for that. With the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in

June, when it appeared that the Sunnis would enter the political process fully, the Iranians

used their influence with various Iraqi Shiite factions to disrupt that process by launching

attacks on Sunnis and generally destabilizing the situation. Certainly, Sunnis contributed to

this, but for much of the past year, it has been the Shia, supported by Iran, that have been

the primary destabilizing force.

So long as the Iranians continue to follow this policy, the U.S. strategy cannot succeed. The

difficulty of the American plan is that it requires the political participation of three main ethnic

groups that are themselves politically fragmented. Virtually any substantial group can block

the success of the strategy by undermining the political process. The Iranians, however,

appear to be in a more powerful position than the Americans. So long as they continue to

support Shiite groups within Iraq, they will be able to block the U.S. plan. Over time, the

theory goes, the Americans will recognize the hopelessness of the undertaking and withdraw,

leaving Iran to pick up the pieces. In the meantime, the Iranians will increasingly be able to

dominate the Shiite community and consolidate their hold over southern Iraq. The game

appears to go to Iran.

Americans are extremely sensitive to the difficulties the United States faces in Iraq. Every

nation-state has a defining characteristic, and that of the United States is manic-depression,

cycling between insanely optimistic plans and total despair. This national characteristic tends

to blind Americans to the situation on the other side of the hill. Certainly, the Bush

administration vastly underestimated the difficulties of occupying Iraq -- that was the manic

phase. But at this point, it could be argued that the administration again is not looking over

the other side of the hill at the difficulties the Iranians might be having. And it is useful to

consider the world from the Iranian point of view.

The Foundation of Foreign Policy

It is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of Iranian foreign policy. As

a general principle, this should be done with all countries. As in business, rhetoric is used to

shape perceptions and attempt to control the behavior of others. It does not necessarily reveal

one's true intentions or, more important, one's capabilities. In the classic case of U.S. foreign

policy, Franklin Roosevelt publicly insisted that the United States did not intend to get into

World War II while U.S. and British officials were planning to do just that. On the other side of

the equation, the United States, during the 1950s, kept asserting that its goal was to liberate

Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, when in fact it had no plans, capabilities or

expectations of doing so. This does not mean the claims were made frivolously -- both

Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had good reasons for posturing as they did -- but it does

mean that rhetoric is not a reliable indicator of actions. Thus, the purple prose of the Iranian

leadership cannot be taken at face value.

To get past the rhetoric, let's begin by considering Iran's objective geopolitical position.

Historically, Iran has faced three enemies. Its oldest enemy was to the west: the Arab/Sunni

threat, against which it has struggled for millennia. Russia, to the north, emerged as a threat

in the late 19th century, occupying northern Iran during and after World War II. The third

enemy has worn different faces but has been a recurring threat since the time of Alexander

the Great: a distant power that has intruded into Persian affairs. This distant foreign power --

which has at times been embodied by both the British and the Americans -- has posed the

greatest threat to Iran. And when the element of a distant power is combined with one of the

other two traditional enemies, the result is a great global or regional power whose orbit or

influence Iran cannot escape. To put that into real terms, Iran can manage, for example, the

chaos called Afghanistan, but it cannot manage a global power that is active in Iraq and

Afghanistan simultaneously.

For the moment, Russia is contained. There is a buffer zone of states between Iran and Russia

that, at present, prevents Russian probes. But what Iran fears is a united Iraq under the

influence or control of a global power like the United States. In 1980, the long western border

of Iran was attacked by Iraq, with only marginal support from other states, and the effect on

Iran was devastating. Iran harbors a rational fear of attack from that direction, which -- if

coupled with American power -- could threaten Iranian survival.

Therefore, Iran sees the American plan to create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad as a

direct threat to its national interests. Now, the Iranians supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in

2003; they wanted to see their archenemy, former President Saddam Hussein, deposed. But

they did not want to see him replaced by a pro-American regime. Rather, the Iranians wanted

one of two outcomes: the creation of a pro-Iranian government dominated by Iraqi Shia

(under Iran's control), or the fragmentation of Iraq. A fragmented Iraq would have two

virtues. It would prove no danger to Iran, and Iran likely would control or heavily influence

southern Iraq, thus projecting its power from there throughout the Persian Gulf.

Viewed this way, Iran's behavior in Iraq is understandable. A stable Iraq under U.S. influence

represents a direct threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does not. Therefore,

the Iranians will do whatever they can to undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in

Baghdad. Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it cannot -- on its own --

create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore, Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United

States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans leave, the Iranians can pick up the

chips on the table. Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in the end, they

will win. None of the Arab countries in the region has the power to withstand Iran, and the

Turks are unlikely to get into the game.

The Unknown Variables

Logic would seem to favor the Iranians. But in the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever

with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves.

Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the

revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on

the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in

Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge

casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian

regime.

The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution

occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world,

including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after

all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe

economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position:

In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.

The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in

predicting the behavior of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated

on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the

Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool,

all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other

American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly

dangerous.

These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who

see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a

gradual buildup of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They

point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all.

They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take

advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf.

The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues

that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears. The

United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the

western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into

Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent.

We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these

are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness;

the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself

unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or

internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.

The Historical View

Over time -- and this is not apparent from Iranian rhetoric -- caution has tended to prevail.

Except during the 1980s, when they supported an aggressive Hezbollah, the Iranians have

been quite measured in their international actions. Following the war with Iraq, they avoided

overt moves -- and they even were circumspect after the fall of the Soviet Union, when

opportunities presented themselves to Iran's north. After 9/11, the Iranians were careful not

to provoke the United States: They offered landing rights for damaged U.S. aircraft and helped

recruit Shiite tribes for the American effort against the Taliban. The rhetoric alternated

between intense and vitriolic; the actions were more cautious. Even with the Iranian nuclear

project, the rhetoric has been far more intense than the level of development seems to

warrant.

Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can drive responses. Therefore, the rhetoric

should not be discounted as a driving factor in the geopolitical system. But the real debate in

Iran is over what to do about Iraq. No one in Iran wants a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad,

and blocking the emergence of such a government has a general consensus. But how far to go

in trying to divide Iraq, creating a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and projecting power in

the region is a matter of intense debate. In fact, cautious behavior combined with extreme

rhetoric still appears to be the default position in Tehran, with more adventurous arguments

struggling to gain acceptance.

The United States, for its part, is divided between the desire to try one more turn at the table

to win it all and the fear that it is becoming hopelessly trapped. Iran is divided between a

belief that the time to strike is now and a fear that counting the United States out is always

premature. This is an engine that can, in due course, drive negotiations. Iran might be "evil"

and the United States might be "Satan," but at the end of the day, international affairs

involving major powers are governed not by rhetoric but by national interest. The common

ground between the United States and Iran is that neither is certain it can achieve its real

strategic interests. The Americans doubt they can create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad,

and Iran is not certain the United States is as weak as it appears to be.

Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and

confidence fuel war. In the end, a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, but

still providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula -- is emerging as the most viable available option.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=283014&selected=

Country%20Profiles&showCountry=1&countryId=59&showMore=1

U.S.-Iranian Tensions and an Abduction in Baghdad

February 06, 2007 23 55 GMT

By George Friedman and Kamran Bokhari

Iraqi officials said Tuesday that gunmen wearing Iraqi army uniforms kidnapped an Iranian

Embassy official in central Baghdad on Sunday. Jalal Sharafi, a second secretary at the Iranian

Embassy, was abducted from the Karrada district while on his way to a ribbon cutting at a new

branch of an Iranian state-owned bank.

According to witnesses and unnamed Iraqi officials, gunmen wearing uniforms of the Iraqi

army's elite 36th Commando Battalion -- part of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade,

an aggressive unit that specializes in counterinsurgent operations -- were involved in the

snatch. They reportedly used two of their vehicles to block Sharafi's car and then seized him.

During the ambush, nearby Iraqi police -- apparently suspecting a kidnapping was taking place

-- opened fire on one of the vehicles and brought it to a halt. The four gunmen inside -- all

with official Iraqi military identification -- were arrested.

The story did not end there, however. On Monday, individuals showing official Iraqi

government badges arrived at the police station where the gunmen were being detained and

claimed to have authority to transfer them to the serious crimes police unit. It was later

discovered that the suspects never arrived.

Iran has accused the United States of engineering the abduction through the Sunni-controlled

Defense Ministry; the U.S. military has denied any involvement in the matter.

Given the tactical details of the operation and the geopolitical backdrop, there are two possible

explanations for the incident. One is that Sunni insurgents are responsible: They have the

means and motivation to pull off such an operation, and any number of Sunni factions would

be interested in carrying out an abduction like this. But the United States has a motive as well.

It is important to note that Sharafi's position at the embassy is the kind of diplomatic posting

that frequently would be a cover for intelligence operatives. So if he were an Iranian Ministry

of Intelligence and Security operative of some importance, kidnapping him would disrupt

Iranian operations as the U.S. security offensive in Baghdad gets under way. Second, the

United States has been very public in saying it intends to become more aggressive toward

Iranian covert operations as part of its effort to bring pressure against Tehran. U.S.

intelligence has substantially ramped up the collection of information on Iran -- a move that

would serve whether the goal was to actually attack Iran, plan negotiations or just try to

figure out the mind of Tehran. The snatch of a second secretary would fit into this effort.

This is not the first incident of this kind. In January, U.S. forces arrested five officials from an

Iranian diplomatic office in Arbil, a northern city, and have been holding them ever since -- a

maneuver that fits with the Bush administration's strategy of demonstrating that Washington

has the ability to weaken the Iranian position in Iraq. In an act of apparent retaliation, Shiite

militants attacked the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in the southern city of Karbala on

Jan. 20, and after a 20-minute gunbattle, abducted five U.S. soldiers, who later were killed.

The operatives spoke English, had U.S. military uniforms and identification cards and arrived

in armored white GMC suburbans. Using their English-language skills, the gunmen were able

to arm themselves at a local police station and then penetrate multiple layers of security

before opening fire on a U.S. civil affairs team.

At this point, this much is clear: No matter who is actually responsible for the Sharafi

abduction, it will further heighten U.S.-Iranian tensions and could force Tehran to retaliate

against the pressure being generated by the United States. The Iranians will blame the

Americans under any circumstances. In the logic of the region, the Iranians will reason that

even if the perpetrators were Sunnis, the United States somehow manipulated them into

carrying out the operation. The Iranians are now as fixated on U.S. covert operations against

Iran as the United States has become on Iranian covert operations in Iraq and elsewhere

against U.S. interests.

Whatever the facts of this particular case might be, the United States has been transmitting

numerous signals -- official and otherwise -- that Iran is vulnerable and is placing itself at risk

by opposing U.S. interests in Iraq. The Sharafi abduction seems designed to enhance Tehran's

sense of vulnerability, and hence to fuel disagreements among those in Iran who feel the

United States is at a weak point and those who warn that the United States is most dangerous

at its weakest. The debate between these camps is about how to deal with the United States:

whether to retaliate against provocations, pursue negotiations or a mix of both. This is

precisely the kind of re-evaluation of its stance and options that the United States wants to

see from Iran. The Americans want the Iranians to view the United States as a dangerous foe,

and to moderate their appetite for power in the region. Therefore, even if the United States

didn't order the Sharafi operation, it still fits into a pattern of warnings that the Americans

have been issuing.

There are some factors that allow us to speculate -- and this remains speculation -- that U.S.

forces working with partners within the Iraqi Defense Ministry engineered the kidnapping.

More specifically, the 36th Commando Battalion, whose uniforms were worn by the gunmen in

the course of the kidnapping, is known to work closely with U.S. forces. Amid efforts to quell

the Sunni insurgency and contain the growth of Iranian influence in Iraq, the United States in

2005 began moving to bring the Baathists back into Iraq's political system, especially the

security forces. This policy has been central to the tensions between the Americans and Iraqi

Shia, but it is a tool the Bush administration is using to counter Iranian moves.

Another point to consider is that Sharafi -- as an official with diplomatic immunity -- could not

be held in detention for long under normal measures. The standard procedure for dealing with

foreign diplomats who are deemed undesirable is to declare them persona non grata and order

them out of the country within a matter of days. This is the course of action generally pursued

if the goal is to rid a country of potential intelligence operatives -- and it is a sign of escalating

tension between the diplomat's home state and the host country. In Sharafi's case, expulsion

would have been the prerogative of the Iraqi government. But since the Shiite-dominated

government has close ties to Iran, it is hardly likely that he would have been expelled.

In this case, the objective of the United States would not be simply to secure the Iranian's

expulsion, but given his position, to extract intelligence about Tehran's plans and operational

networks in Iraq. Arresting him and holding him for questioning would not be possible under

international law, let alone in the face of the scandal that would ensue if U.S. forces had done

this. Nevertheless, an opportunity to question him would be of real value to the United States.

Maintaining plausible deniability would be the key. But arranging for Sharafi's abduction by a

third party would be a feasible way of obtaining the intelligence sought by the United States.

It is therefore quite possible that this was a U.S.-authorized operation executed by

Washington's Sunni allies.

The Sunnis in Iraq -- both the nationalists and the jihadists -- have reasons of their own to

abduct an Iranian official, and hence could have seized Sharafi as part of a completely

independent operation. Sunni nationalists and jihadists feel that they are more threatened by

Iranian influence in Iraq than by the U.S. military presence, which most believe eventually will

come to an end. The Iranian-Shiite threat, however, is a permanent feature of the region and

poses long-term danger.

The Sunnis also recognize that they do not have the means to deal with Iran or its Iraqi Shiite

allies by themselves -- but the United States has the power to weaken the position of Iran,

and by extension, its Iraqi patrons. With tensions between Washington and Tehran at their

current heights, there is an opportunity to be exploited.

The Sunnis could exacerbate those tensions further by abducting an Iranian diplomat at a time

when the United States already has five Iranian officials in custody. No claims of responsibility

for the operation were issued, which means Tehran's suspicions of the Americans easily could

be fueled.

The timing is interesting in another way as well. In efforts to maximize its position in Iraq,

Tehran has been angling for negotiations with Saudi Arabia -- and this leaves Iraqi Sunnis

feeling nervous. As a minority group that occupies a region without oil, the Sunnis would be at

an inherent disadvantage: No matter what kind of support Riyadh might offer them, they

would find it difficult or impossible to escape the pull of Iranian and Shiite power. Neither the

nationalist insurgents nor the jihadists could accept such an outcome.

On the day of Sharafi's abduction, the al Qaeda-led alliance called the "Islamic State of Iraq"

issued a statement saying U.S. military action against Iran would benefit Islamist militants.

Therefore, it is entirely possible that the abduction was an attempt to provoke Iran -- which

already is demanding the release of the officials captured in Arbil -- into retaliation against the

Americans. The jihadists' hope would be that this could provoke a wider U.S.-Iranian conflict

and hence torpedo any U.S.-Iranian dealings.

The Iranians seem sincere in their conviction that the abduction was the work of the United

States. Their likely reaction would be to encourage their allies within the Iraqi Shiite militias to

strike at both U.S. and Sunni targets -- reminding Washington that Tehran is not without

options -- while at the same time pressing ahead on the diplomatic front. In other words, the

likely short-term outcome of this incident will be increased violence.

At the same time, the United States is engaged in a long-term process designed to convince

the Iranians that the risks incurred in destabilizing Iraq and blocking a political settlement in

Baghdad are greater than they might have imagined, and that the U.S. resolve to resist Iran is

sufficient to block Tehran's ambitions. From Washington's point of view, the primary hope for

any satisfactory end to the Iraq war rests in a change of policy in Tehran. Regardless of

whether this abduction triggers retaliation, if Iran comes to believe that Washington is

dangerous, it might come to the bargaining table or -- to be more precise -- allow its Iraqi

allies to come to the table.

An action like the Sharafi abduction allows the signal to be sent, while still falling short of

mounting overt military strikes against Iran -- something for which the United States currently

has little appetite or resources. A covert war is within the means of the United States, and the

Americans might hope that their prosecution of that war will convince Iran they are serious

and to back off. Therefore, even if the kidnapping had nothing to do with the United States

and Iran misreads the incident, it still could serve American interests in signaling American

resolve. Given the state of the U.S. position in Iraq, the strategy well might fail -- but once again, it is one of the few cards the United States has left to play.

Related Headlines

The 'Surge Strategy': Political Arguments and Military Realities Jan 04, 2007 Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran Jan 16, 2007 The United States and Iran: Intelligence Wars Mar 08, 2006

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=283998&selected=

Country%20Profiles&showCountry=1&countryId=59&showMore=1

Iraq: Jihadist Perspectives on a U.S. Withdrawal Feb 21, 2007

2007 GMT

The passage of a congressional resolution voicing disapproval of U.S. President George W.

Bush’s military strategy for Iraq is the latest event in a period of vigorous American debate

over the war. Though the internal U.S. debate focuses on important issues, the discourse

frequently fails to take into consideration another important perspective on the U.S.-jihadist

war: that of the jihadists. And as the public statements of al Qaeda leaders clearly show, U.S.

withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan long has been factored in to a much more far-reaching strategy.

Geopolitical Diary: The Lead-up to Public U.S.-Iranian Negotiations Feb 28, 2007

2007 GMT

Several recent events indicate that the United States and Iran are preparing to move their

negotiations over Iraq into the public realm. However, as we have seen in the past, a lot can

go wrong before the actual meetings take place -- and even once they begin, an accommodation over Iraq is far from assured.

Two Busted Flushes: The U.S. and Iranian Negotiations Mar 13, 2007

By George Friedman

U.S., Iranian and Syrian diplomats met in Baghdad on March 10 to discuss the future

of Iraq. Shortly afterward, everyone went out of their way to emphasize that the

meetings either did not mean anything or that they were not formally one-on-one,

which meant that other parties were present. Such protestations are inevitable: All of

the governments involved have substantial domestic constituencies that do not want

to see these talks take place, and they must be placated by emphasizing the

triviality. Plus, all bargainers want to make it appear that such talks mean little to

them. No one buys a used car by emphasizing how important the purchase is. He

who needs it least wins.

These protestations are, however, total nonsense. That U.S., Iranian and Syrian

diplomats would meet at this time and in that place is of enormous importance. It is

certainly not routine: It means the shadowy conversations that have been going on

between the United States and Iran in particular are now moving into the public

sphere. It means not only that negotiations concerning Iraq are under way, but also

that all parties find it important to make these negotiations official. That means

progress is being made. The question now goes not to whether negotiations are

happening, but to what is being discussed, what an agreement might look like and

how likely it is to occur.

Let's begin by considering the framework in which each side is operating.

The United States: Geopolitical Compulsion

Washington needs a settlement in Iraq. Geopolitically, Iraq has soaked up a huge

proportion of U.S. fighting power. Though casualties remain low (when compared to

those in the Vietnam War), the war-fighting bandwidth committed to Iraq is

enormous relative to forces. Should another crisis occur in the world, the U.S. Army

would not be in a position to respond. As a result, events elsewhere could suddenly

spin out of control.

For example, we have seen substantial changes in Russian behavior of late. Actions

that would have been deemed too risky for the Russians two years ago appear to be

risk-free now. Moscow is pressuring Europe, using energy supplies for leverage and

issuing threatening statements concerning U.S. ballistic missile defense plans in

Central Europe -- in apparent hopes that the governments in this region and the

former Soviet Union, where governments have been inclined to be friendly to the

United States, will reappraise their positions.

But the greatest challenge from the Russians comes in the Middle East. The

traditional role of Russia (in its Soviet guise) was to create alliances in the region --

using arms transfers as a mechanism for securing the power of Arab regimes

internally and for resisting U.S. power in the region. The Soviets armed Iraq, Syria,

Egypt, Libya and so on, creating powerful networks of client states during much of

the Cold War.

The Russians are doing this again. There is a clear pattern of intensifying arms sales

to Syria and Iran -- a pattern designed to increase the difficulty of U.S. and Israeli

airstrikes against either state and to increase the internal security of both regimes.

The United States has few levers with which to deter Russian behavior, and

Washington's ongoing threats against Iran and Syria increase the desire of these

states to have Russian supplies and patronage.

The fact is that the United States has few viable military options here. Except for the

use of airstrikes -- which, when applied without other military measures, historically

have failed either to bring about regime change or to deter powers from pursuing

their national interests -- the United States has few military options in the region. Air

power might work when an army is standing by to take advantage of the weaknesses

created by those strikes, but absent a credible ground threat, airstrikes are merely

painful, not decisive.

And, to be frank, the United States simply lacks capability in the Army. In many

ways, the U.S. Army is in revolt against the Bush administration. Army officers at all

levels (less so the Marines) are using the term "broken" to refer to the condition of

the force and are in revolt against the administration -- not because of its goals, but

because of its failure to provide needed resources nearly six years after 9/11. This

revolt is breaking very much into the public domain, and that will further cripple the

credibility of the Bush administration.

The "surge" strategy announced late last year was Bush's last gamble. It

demonstrated that the administration has the power and will to defy public opinion --

or international perceptions of it -- and increase, rather than decrease, forces in

Iraq. The Democrats have also provided Bush with a window of opportunity: Their

inability to formulate a coherent policy on Iraq has dissipated the sense that they will

force imminent changes in U.S. strategy. Bush's gamble has created a psychological

window of opportunity, but if this window is not used, it will close -- and, as

administration officials have publicly conceded, there is no Plan B. The situation on

the ground is as good as it is going to get.

Leaving the question of his own legacy completely aside, Bush knows three things.

First, he is not going to impose a military solution on Iraq that suppresses both the

Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias. Second, he has successfully created a

fleeting sense of unpredictability, as far as U.S. behavior is concerned. And third, if

he does not use this psychological window of opportunity to achieve a political

settlement within the context of limited military progress, the moment not only will

be lost, but Russia might also emerge as a major factor in the Middle East -- eroding

a generation of progress toward making the United States the sole major power in

that region. Thus, the United States is under geopolitical compulsion to reach a

settlement.

Iran: Psychological and Regional Compulsions

The Iranians are also under pressure. They have miscalculated on what Bush would

do: They expected military drawdown, and instead they got the surge. This has

conjured up memories of the miscalculation on what the 1979 hostage crisis would

bring: The revolutionaries had bet on a U.S. capitulation, but in the long run they got

an Iraqi invasion and Ronald Reagan.

Expediency Council Chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani already has warned the

Iranians not to underestimate the United States, saying it is a "wounded tiger" and

therefore much more dangerous than otherwise. In addition, the Iranians know some

important things.

The first is that, while the Americans conceivably might forget about Iraq, Iran never

can. Uncontrolled chaos next door could spill over into Iran in numerous ways --

separatist sentiments among the Kurds, the potential return of a Sunni government

if the Shia are too fractured to govern, and so forth. A certain level of security in Iraq

is fundamental to Iran's national interests.

Related to this, there are concerns that Iraq's Shia are so fractious that they might

not be serviceable as a coherent vehicle for Iranian power. A civil war among the

Shia of Iraq is not inconceivable, and if that were to happen, Iran's ability to project

power in Iraq would crumble.

Finally, Iran's ability to threaten terror strikes against U.S. interests depends to a

great extent on Hezbollah in Lebanon. And it knows that Hezbollah is far more

interested in the power and wealth to be found in Lebanon than in some global --

and potentially catastrophic -- war against the United States. The Iranian leadership

has seen al Qaeda's leaders being hunted and hiding in Pakistan, and they have little

stomach for that. In short, Iranian leaders might not have all the options they would

like to pretend they have, and their own weakness could become quite public very

quickly.

Still, like the Americans, the Iranians have done well in generating perceptions of

their own resolute strength. First, they have used their influence in Iraq to block U.S.

ambitions there. Second, they have supported Hezbollah in its war against Israel,

creating the impression that Hezbollah is both powerful and pliant to Tehran. In

other words, they have signaled a powerful covert capability. Third, they have used

their nuclear program to imply capabilities substantially beyond what has actually

been achieved, which gives them a powerful bargaining chip. Finally, they have

entered into relations with the Russians -- implying a strategic evolution that would

be disastrous for the United States.

The truth, however, is somewhat different. Iran has sufficient power to block a

settlement on Iraq, but it lacks the ability to impose one of its own making. Second,

Hezbollah is far from willing to play the role of global suicide bomber to support

Iranian ambitions. Third, an Iranian nuclear bomb is far from being a reality. Finally,

Iran has, in the long run, much to fear from the Russians: Moscow is far more likely

than Washington to reduce Iran to a vassal state, should Tehran grow too incautious

in the flirtation. Iran is holding a very good hand. But in the end, its flush is as

busted as the Americans'.

Moreover, the Iranians still remember the mistake of 1979. Rather than negotiating

a settlement to the hostage crisis with a weak and indecisive President Jimmy

Carter, who had been backed into a corner, they opted to sink his chances for re-

election and release the hostages after the next president, Reagan, took office. They

expected gratitude. But in a breathtaking display of ingratitude, Reagan followed a

policy designed to devastate Iran in its war with Iraq. In retrospect, the Iranians

should have negotiated with the weak president rather than destroy him and wait for

the strong one.

Rafsanjani essentially has reminded the Iranian leadership of this painful fact. Based

on that, it is clear that he wants negotiations with Bush, whose strength is crippled,

rather than with his successor. Not only has Bush already signaled a willingness to

talk, but U.S. intelligence also has publicly downgraded the threat of Iranian nuclear

weapons -- saying that, in fact, Iran's program has not progressed as far as it might

have. The Iranians have demanded a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces from

Iraq, but they have been careful not to specify what that timetable should look like.

Each side is signaling a re-evaluation of the other and a degree of flexibility in

outcomes.

As for Syria, which also shares a border with Iraq and was represented at Saturday's

meetings in Baghdad, it is important but not decisive. The Syrians have little interest

in Iraq but great interest in Lebanon. The regime in Damascus wants to be freed

from the threat of investigation in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister

Rafik al-Hariri, and it wants to have its interests in Lebanon guaranteed. The Israelis,

for their part, have no interest in bringing down the al Assad regime: They are far

more fearful of what the follow-on Sunni regime might bring than they are of a

minority Alawite regime that is more interested in money than in Allah. The latter

they can deal with; the former is the threat.

In other words, Syria does not affect fundamental U.S. interests, and the Israelis do

not want to see the current regime replaced. The Syrians, therefore, are not the

decisive factor when it comes to Iraq. This is about the United States and Iran.

Essential Points

If the current crisis continues, each side might show itself much weaker than it wants

to appear. The United States could find itself in a geopolitical spasm, coupled with a

domestic political crisis. Iran could find itself something of a toothless tiger -- making

threats that are known to have little substance behind them. The issue is what sort

of settlement there could be.

We see the following points as essential to the two main players:

1. The creation of an Iraqi government that is dominated by Shia, neutral to Iran,

hostile to jihadists but accommodating to some Sunni groups.

2. Guarantees for Iran's commercial interests in southern Iraqi oil fields, with some

transfers to the Sunnis (who have no oil in their own territory) from fields in both the

northern (Kurdish) and southern (Shiite) regions.

3. Guarantees for U.S. commercial interests in the Kurdish regions.

4. An Iraqi military without offensive capabilities, but substantial domestic power.

This means limited armor and air power, but substantial light infantry.

5. An Iraqi army operated on a "confessional" basis -- each militia and insurgent

group retained as units and controlling its own regions.

6. Guarantee of a multiyear U.S. presence, without security responsibility for Iraq, at

about 40,000 troops.

7. A U.S.-Iranian "commission" to manage political conflict in Iraq.

8. U.S. commercial relations with Iran.

9. The definition of the Russian role, without its exclusion.

10. A meaningless but symbolic commitment to a new Israeli-Palestinian peace

process.

Such an agreement would not be expected to last very long. It might last, but the

primary purpose would be to allow each side to quietly fold its busted flushes in the

game for Iraq.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=285692&selected=

Stratfor+Weekly

Geopolitics and the U.S. Spoiling Attack Mar 20, 2007

2007 GMT

The United States has now spent four years fighting in Iraq. Those who planned the conflict

never expected this outcome. Indeed, it could be argued that this outcome represents not only

miscalculation but also a strategic defeat for the United States. However, the same could be

said for other conflicts from the mid- to late-20th century -- and the degree of U.S. power

globally expanded during that era. This paradox must be explained.

Iran, Iraq: Tehran's Power Play on the Water Mar 23, 2007

2007 GMT

Iranian forces reportedly operating in Iraqi waters captured 15 sailors and members of the

British marines on March 23 in the Persian Gulf. This incident comes as the U.N. Security

Council is preparing to vote on a new resolution imposing additional sanctions on Iran for

refusing to halt its controversial nuclear activities -- meaning it likely represents an Iranian

attempt to underscore its resolve in the face of mounting international pressure. It also could complicate U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq.

Iraq: Sunnis Versus Shia in Tal Afar Mar 29, 2007

2007 GMT

The Iraqi government admitted March 29 that local police were involved in the massacre of

some 70 Sunnis in the northern Iraqi city of Tall Afar. Though Tall Afar has seen militancy of

various stripes in the past, this is the first case of sectarian violence in the city. This incident

gives Muqtada al-Sadr's movement an opportunity to exploit the situation to its advantage to counter the pressure it is currently under and advance its position.

The British Detainees: Reading Diplomatic Signals

April 03, 2007 21 42 GMT

By George Friedman

Last week, Iranian forces captured 15 British sailors and marines in the Shatt al-Arab area,

where the territorial distinction between Iraq and Iran is less than clear. The Iranians claimed

the British personnel were in Iranian territory; the British denied it. The claims and

counterclaims are less interesting than the fact that the Iranians clearly planned the capture:

Whatever the British were doing in the area, the Iranians knew about it and had plans to do

something in response. The questions are why, and why is this occurring now?

One explanation is that the British were on some sort of mission that the Iranians had to stop.

A rumor circulating is that the British were involved in extracting an Iranian defector, and the

Iranians were moving to block the defection. That's a possibility, but then the captured Britons

hardly appeared to be operating as a covert team -- and if there was a defection under way,

the secret had been blown a long time before, since the Iranians were able to amass the force

used in the capture.

It seems to us that the capture of the British had less to do with any particular operation than

with a more general desire on the part of the Iranians to capture the personnel and thereby

create an international incident. The important issue, therefore, is why they wanted an

incident, and why this particular sort.

By now, it is no secret that the Americans and Iranians are engaged in a complex negotiation

that is focused on Iraq, but which also involves Iran's future nuclear capability. U.S. and

Iranian officials met publicly in early March, and a further meeting is scheduled, but the most

important discussions have taken place in private venues. It also is clear that there is a debate

within Tehran, as well as within Washington, as to whether these talks should be going on,

how the negotiations should be carried out and the role of force in the negotiations. We

suspect that the capture of the British detainees had something to do with the U.S.

negotiations and with internal Iranian politics.

At this point, both sides in the negotiations are trying to impress upon each other not only

that they retain some options, but also that their moves cannot be easily predicted. Both want

to be seen as retaining the option of surprise. The capture of the British personnel, then,

should be read not so much as the trigger for an international crisis as a diplomatic signal. If

either the Americans or the Iranians believed it were possible to achieve their own ideal

outcomes in negotiations, either the capture or the U.S. military surge into Iraq would not

have come about. The game for each now is an effort to secure an outcome that can be lived

with -- not an outright victory.

U.S. Signals and Limitations

The U.S. approach to the negotiations with Iran has been multifaceted.

• First, by talking simultaneously with the Sunni insurgents, the Americans clearly have

been letting the Iranians know that they have not been trapped into dealing only with

the Iranians or Iraqi Shia when it comes to the future of Iraq.

• Second, Washington has tried to keep the Iranian nuclear issue separate from the Iraq

issue. Given that none of the world's great powers truly has an interest in seeing Iran

get the bomb, Washington has international backing on some aspects of the Iran

nuclear issue -- and does not want that confused with the question of Iraq, where

support for its position is much weaker. Washington does not want to provide the

Iranians with linkage between the issues; rather, it wants to maintain its ability to

extract concessions over Iraq in exchange for concessions on the nuclear issue.

• Third, and most important, the U.S. leadership consistently has emphasized that it has

no fear of Iran and is not constrained politically or militarily. The entire objective of the

U.S. surge strategy was to demonstrate that the administration retains military

options in Iraq and is capable of using them. At the same time, the United States has

carefully orchestrated a campaign to let the Iranians believe that it retains military

options against Iran as well -- and is considering using them. The exercises by two

U.S. carrier battle groups last week had been planned for quite a while and were

designed to give the Iranians pause.

• Finally, the United States has moved to arrest Iranian officials who had been operating

quasi-diplomatic entities in Iraq. (The Iranians said they were diplomatic and the Americans said they weren't, so we will term them "quasi.")

Rumors of imminent U.S. military action against Iran have swept the region. Totally

uninformed sources around the world have been speculating for weeks about the possibility of

unspecified U.S. action. The rumors suited the Bush administration perfectly. The

administration wanted the Iranians to feel endangered, so as to shape the Iranian negotiating

process. This has certainly been the case amid congressional action to set a deadline for a

withdrawal from Iraq. If the Americans are going to withdraw, then Iran has no motivation to

negotiate; it need only wait. The administration played off the congressional proposals to hint

that the possibility of a forced deadline increases the pressure for the president to act quickly,

rather than to wait.

The problem for the United States, however, is the issue of what sort of action it actually can

take. It is in no position to undertake a ground invasion of Iran. Iran is a big country, and

occupying it is beyond the capability of any force the United States could field -- at least, not

without a massive increase of ground forces that would take several years to achieve, and that

certainly is not under way at the moment.

The other option is an air campaign. And it is not clear that an air campaign would work. The

example of Israel's failure in Lebanon last summer weighs heavily. The Israelis chose the air

campaign option and failed to achieve a satisfactory outcome. The U.S. Army historically has

seen the air campaign as useful only if it is followed by an effective occupation. The most

successful air campaign, Desert Storm, worked in a much smaller battle-box than Iran, and

was followed up by a multidivisional ground force in order to defeat the defending Iraqi force

and occupy the territory. In Iran, the quantity of air power needed for an outcome similar to

that in Kuwait in 1991 is substantially greater than the United States has available, and as we

have said, there is no follow-on ground force capable of occupying Iran.

The Iranian Signals

The Iranians, like the Americans, also have found it necessary to demonstrate a lack of

intimidation. And for Iran, capturing 15 British sailors and marines was an excellent device.

First, it raised the specter in the United States of another Iranian hostage crisis, reminding

Bush of how the Iranians handled Jimmy Carter in 1979. Second, it showed that Iran is not

concerned about possible retaliation by either the United States or the United Kingdom --

which has no options independent of the United States and is not driving negotiations over

Iraq. Finally, the fact that action was directed against the British, rather than the Americans,

slightly deflected the intensity of the crisis; because Americans were not taken captive, there

was less pressure for the United States to do something about it.

But there is another dimension to this. The Iranians have shifted the spotlight away from

Baghdad and to the southern region of Iraq -- to the area dominated by Shia and held by the

British. The capture of the British personnel coincided with some fighting in the Basra area

among Shiite militias.

In this way, the Iranians have sent two signals.

The first was that while the United States is concentrating its forces in Baghdad and Anbar

province, Iran remains perfectly capable of whipping up a crisis in the relatively quiet south --

where U.S. troops are not present and where the British, who already have established a

timeline for withdrawal, might not have sufficient force to contain a crisis. If the United States

had to inject forces into the south at this point, they would have to come from other regions of

Iraq or from the already strained reserve forces in the United States. The Iranians are

indicating that they can create some serious political and military problems for the United

States if Washington becomes aggressive.

The second is a

statement about the

negotiations over Iraq.

While they are interested

in reaching a

comprehensive

settlement over Iraq, the

Iranians are prepared to

contemplate another

outcome, in which Iraq

fragments into regional

entities and the Iranians

dominate the Shiite

south. In some ways, this

is more than an

acceptable alternative.

For one thing, in holding the south, the Iranians would be in a position to impede or cut

U.S. lines of supply running from Kuwait to central Iraq. Second, their forces would be in

a position to bring pressure to bear on Saudi Arabia, unless the United States were to

redeploy troops.

In other words, the shift of attention to the south poses a worrisome military challenge to

the Americans. If the Iranians or Shia were to get aggressive in the south, the United

States could be forced to spread its troops even thinner, leaving operations in the north

severely weakened. The maneuver could help to collapse the Americans' position in Iraq

by overloading them with responsibilities.

Call, Raise -- Draw?

The Iranians have called the American hand and raised the stakes. Where the United

States has been trying to generate a sense of danger on the part of Iran with rumors of

airstrikes, the Iranians have signaled that they aren't worried about the airstrikes -- and

then raised the American bet by forcing the United States to consider what its options

might be if all hell broke loose in southern Iraq. Tehran is saying that it has more credible

options than Washington does.

There is obviously a political debate going on inside Iran. As we have argued, there is

deep consensus among Iranian leaders as to what outcome they want, but there is a

faction led by older leaders, like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, that does not

underestimate the resources of the United States. And there is a faction that argues that

the United States, at its weakest, must be pressured until it capitulates. The capture of the

British personnel could have been designed to enhance the power of the more aggressive

faction. But because Iranian politics are opaque, it could be argued just as logically that

the capture was designed to enhance Rafsanjani's position by setting up a game of "good

cop, bad cop." In other words, Rafsanjani now can ask for concessions from the

Americans to keep the other faction from going too far.

Whatever the inner workings of the Iranian elite, the move strengthens Iran's negotiating

position in a number of ways.

By holding the British captives, the Iranians are also trying to show the limits of Anglo-

American power to their own public. One of the motives behind the capture was to

demonstrate to Iranians that the Americans are incapable of taking action against Iran.

(The British were less important in this context because they never were viewed by

Tehran as being capable of or interested in decisive action against Iran.) The capture of

the detainees, then, solidifies Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's position by

revealing American weakness. If the United States and the United Kingdom don't rescue

the prisoners and don't take other military action, holding the detainees increases the

credibility of the Iranian leadership -- not only in relation to the Americans, but also with

the Iranian public.

The logic here would call for a rescue attempt. However, in order for the captives to be

rescued, the following elements are required:

1. Intelligence on the captives' location must be perfect, to the point of providing

information on their precise housing.

2. The hostages cannot be housed in multiple locations; otherwise, the operation becomes

both more complicated and more likely to fail, unless timing is perfect.

3. There must be time to rehearse the extraction, during which the prisoners must not be

moved.

4. There must be a light covering force protecting the direct guards. The involvement of

heavily armed, trained and dispersed troops at the battalion level and above, equipped

with anti-aircraft systems, makes a successful extraction very unlikely.

The Iranians are old hands at this game. We can assume that they have:

1. Obfuscated the location of the British by communications deception and other means,

while moving the detainees around.

2. Separated the detainees into at least three groups, one very small and remote from the

other two.

3. Obscured the sites where the British are being held, in order to make model

construction and rehearsals impossible.

4. Covered the detainees with an interior group of guards embedded in a multi-brigade

matrix, with heavy anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile concentrations.

Preparatory airstrikes by American or British forces would give away the extraction and

force an abort.

That leaves the United States with the option of either accepting the status quo or

initiating air operations against Iran. Now, the Iranian countermove -- creating chaos in

southern Iraq -- seems daunting, but the Iranians might not have the influence in the

region they would like others to believe: The Iraqi Shia are highly fragmented. But on the

other hand, the Iranians do not have to impose a stable regime in southern Iraq right now.

All they have to do is create instability there in order to weaken the Americans.

It comes down to the question of how lucky the U.S. leadership is feeling at the moment.

Given past performance, we'd say George W. Bush is not a lucky man. If it can go wrong,

it does go wrong for him. Symbolic airstrikes against Iran are conceivable, but an

extended air campaign designed to smash Iran's infrastructure simply does not appear to

us as a viable military option. Given Iran's size, the number of sorties designed to make a

dent would be enormous. The Americans would be banking on frightening the Iranians

into negotiation. Air power did that in Kosovo, against a country fighting for a peripheral

interest. In Vietnam, it failed. Iran seems more like Vietnam than Serbia.

Therefore, we expect the United States to signal military action against Iran but not take

it. We also expect the private talks between Iran and the United States to proceed with

some sobriety. The Iranians know they have a weaker hand than it appears. Taking 15

captives is, in the end, not all that impressive by itself, and the rest hasn't played out yet.

Thus, the saber-rattling will continue. That's what negotiations look like in the Middle

East.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=286754&selected=

Country%20Profiles&showCountry=1&countryId=59&showMore=1

Iraq, Turkey: An Impending Clash with No U.S. Umpire Apr 13, 2007

2007 GMT

Turkey plans to engage in cross-border operations against Turkish-Kurd separatist facilities in

northern Iraq, a Turkish weekly reported April 13. For both domestic political and security

reasons the Turkish military probably will take some form of military action against rebels of

the Kurdistan Workers' Party based in northern Iraq. Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq prevents the United States from doing much to prevent a clash between the Turks and the Iraqi Kurds.

The Iraq Security Conference: Hanging a Deal on Faulty Assumptions May 01, 2007

2007 GMT

Iran has announced that Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki will attend the May 3-4

conference in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, where Iraq's neighboring states

and major world powers will explore ways to stabilize Iraq. The Sharm el-Sheikh conference,

then, represents the launch of the formal process of hammering out a complex, multi-party

deal to piece together the Humpty Dumpty that is Iraq. Ultimately, however, the three major

players -- the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia -- are negotiating a security deal that rests

on the faulty assumptions that each side has enough sway over the various factions inside Iraq to actually make an agreement work.

Iraq: Iranian Intent vs. Capability May 09, 2007

2007 GMT

Iran has offered to help the United States develop an Iraq exit strategy. While Iran likely has

the intent to do this, it might not have the capability. The last four years of instability have

exacerbated an already deeply factionalized Shiite community in Iraq, which is why the

country is likely to enter another long and violent phase that might not be in keeping with any U.S. time table for disengagement.

Iraq: A Framework Settlement and Kurdish Concerns May 11, 2007

2007 GMT

While the Iranians are busy creating the framework for a comprehensive settlement with the

United States over Iraq, the Kurds have good reason to be worried.

The United States, Iran and the Iraq Negotiation Process

May 16, 2007 23 55 GMT

By George Friedman and Reva Bhalla

At long last, the United States and Iran announced May 13 that they will engage in direct

public bilateral talks over Iraq. From Washington, it was the office of Vice President Dick

Cheney and the National Security Council that broke the news. From Tehran, President

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad confirmed that the two sides will meet in Baghdad in a few weeks,

most likely at the ambassadorial level. That makes these talks as officially sanctioned as they

can be.

Already there have been two brief public meetings -- albeit on the sidelines of two

international conferences -- between senior officials from the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the

U.S. State Department in March in Baghdad and in May in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The

upcoming meeting in Baghdad, however, will be the first official bilateral meeting. After

months of intense back-channel discussions, both sides have made a critical decision to bring

their private negotiations into the public sphere, which means Tehran and Washington must

have reached some consensus on the general framework of the negotiations on how to

stabilize Iraq.

Why Now?

The U.S. political situation illustrates why both sides are willing to come to the table right now.

Both Iran and the United States are closely eyeing each other's busted flushes, and they

understand that time is not on their respective sides.

From the U.S. perspective, it is no secret the Iraq war has soaked up an enormous amount of

U.S. military bandwidth. With the 2008 presidential election fast approaching, the Bush

administration is left with little time to put a plan in action that would demonstrate some

progress toward stabilizing Iraq. It has also become painfully obvious that U.S. military force

alone will not succeed in suppressing Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias enough to allow

the government in Baghdad to function -- and for Washington to develop a real exit strategy.

But by defiantly sending more troops to Iraq against all odds, Bush is sending a clear signal to

Iran that it is not in the Iranians' interest to wait out this administration, and that the United

States is prepared to use its forces to block Iranian aspirations to dominate Iraq.

From the Iranian perspective, Tehran knows it is dealing with a weak U.S. president right now,

and that the next U.S. president probably will have much greater freedom of action than Bush

currently does. The Iranians learned that dealing with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter

would have been preferable to dealing with his successor. If you know negotiations are

inevitable, it is better to negotiate with the weak outgoing president than try to extract

concessions from a strong president during an increasingly complicated situation. The Iranians

also know that the intensely fractious nature of Iraq's Shiite bloc -- which Iran depends on to

project its power -- makes it all the more difficult for Tehran to consolidate its gains the longer

Iraq remains in chaos.

U.S. and Iranian Demands

And so the time has come for both Iran and the United States to show their cards by laying

out their demands for public viewing.

U.S. demands for Iraq are fairly straightforward. Our understanding of what Washington wants

from Tehran regarding Iraq rests on these key points:

1. The United States wants Iraq to be a unified and independent state. In other words,

Washington knows a pro-U.S. regime in Baghdad is impossible at this point, but Washington is

not going to permit an Iranian-dominated state either.

2. The United States does not want jihadists operating in Iraq.

3. The United States wants to be able to withdraw from security operations, but not

precipitously, thereby allaying Sunni Arab states' concerns.

Essentially, the United States is looking to create an Iraqi government that, while dominated

by the Shia, remains neutral to Iran, hostile to jihadists and accommodating to mainstream

Sunnis.

Iranian Demands

Iran's answers to these demands were publicly outlined in a paper at the Sharm el-Sheikh

summit. The Saudi-owned, U.K.-based daily newspaper Al Hayat established the details of this

paper in a May 5 article. The key points made in the presentation include the following:

1. Iran does not want an abrupt withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq for fear this would

lead to reshuffling the cards and redistributing power. Instead, there should be a fixed

timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. and British forces from Iraqi cities and relocation at bases

and camps inside Iraq, provided the Iraqi forces have reached the point at which they can

provide security. The Iranians also stated that they would extend all possible assistance so

that foreign forces could exit "honorably" from Iraq.

The U.S. decision to surge more troops into Iraq forced Iran to think twice about placing its

bets on a complete U.S. withdrawal. An abrupt withdrawal without a negotiated settlement

leaves more problems than Tehran can manage in terms of containing Iraq's Sunni, Shiite and

Kurdish factions, and Iran does not want to be left to pick up the pieces in a country that is

already on the verge of shattering along sectarian lines.

It is important to note that Iran is not calling for a complete withdrawal from Iraq, and

actually acknowledges that U.S. forces will be relocated at bases and camps inside the

country. Though this acts as a blocker to Iranian ambitions, the presence of U.S. bases also

provides Iran with a stabilizing force placating the Sunnis and Kurds. Moreover, the Iranians

are sending assurances to the United States that they are willing to cooperate so the Iraq

withdrawal does not look like another Vietnam scenario for the U.S. administration to deal with

at home.

2. Iran is "strongly opposed to all attempts to partition Iraq or impose a federal system that

allows for regional autonomy." No region should be allowed to monopolize the resources in its

territory and deprive other regions of the revenues from these resources.

Iran is essentially saying that Tehran and Washington have a common desire to see a unified

Iraq. The U.S. insistence on a unified Iraq takes into account Sunni concerns of being left with

the largely oil-barren central region of the country. Iran is signaling that it is not interested in

seeing Iraq get split up, even if such a scenario leaves Tehran with the second-best option of

securing influence in a Shiite-dominated, oil-rich southern autonomous zone.

3. Iran wants a plan, involving the Kurds and Sunnis, drawn up to root out the transnational

jihadist forces allied with al Qaeda in Iraq. Sunni tribes should also assume the responsibility

of confronting jihadists, whether they are Iraqi citizens or are from other Arab and Muslim

countries.

In this demand, Iran and the United States share a common goal. The jihadists will use every

attempt to sow sectarian strife in Iraq to prevent a political resolution from developing. The

United States does not want to provide al Qaeda with a fertile base of operations, and Iran

does not want its ideological nemesis gaining ground next door and working against Shiite

interests.

4. Iran clearly states that the negotiations over Iraq cannot be separated from other regional

issues and Tehran's nuclear file.

Stratfor has extensively discussed the nexus between Iran's nuclear agenda and its blueprint

for Iraq. Iran is trying to link the nuclear issue to its dealings with the United States on Iraq as

a sort of insurance policy. Iran does not want to reach an agreement on Iraq and then leave

the nuclear issue to be dealt with down the road, when the United States is in a stronger

position to take action against Tehran.

Iran basically is looking for a deal allowing it voluntarily to agree to freeze uranium enrichment

in exchange for political concessions over Iraq, but without it having to dismantle its program.

That would leave enough room to skirt sanctions and preserve the nuclear program for its

long-term interests. Washington is not exactly amenable to this idea, which is what makes this

a major sticking point. The United States already has made it clear that it is leaving the

nuclear issue out of the Iraq discussions.

5. Iran wants a new regional formula that would make Iraq a region of influence for Tehran.

While it does not appear that Iran explicitly stated this in its presentation, a majority of

participants at the conference got the message. Washington cannot afford to allow Iraq to

develop into an Iranian satellite, but it is looking for assurances from Iran that a U.S.

withdrawal will leave in place a neutral, albeit Shiite-dominated, government in Iraq.

Iranian Offers

The Iranian paper outlined several key concessions it would offer the United States and Iraq's

Sunni faction if its demands were met.

1. Iran would help the Iraqi government rein in the armed Shiite militias and incorporate them

into the state security apparatus.

2. The de-Baathification law can be revised to allow for the rehiring of former Iraqi army

personnel, the bulk of whom are tied to the Sunni nationalist insurgency. However, Iran wants

assurances that former Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and other former Baathists will

not be allowed to hold the position of prime minister when the time comes to replace current

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

3. Iran would be willing to see fresh parliamentary elections, the formation of a new Cabinet

and the amendment of the Iraqi Constitution to double the Sunni seats in parliament to 40

percent, with the Shia retaining 60 percent. Tehran has said nothing about what would be left

for Kurdish political representation, however.

4. Iran has proposed the "fair" distribution of oil revenues in Iraq to satisfy all parties,

especially those in "central Iraq," the Sunni-dominated, oil-deprived heart of the country.

Tehran's offers illustrate the Iranians' open acknowledgment that they are not going to be able

to have their cake and eat it too. Instead, they are going to have to guarantee Iraqi neutrality

by giving the Sunnis a much larger slice, leaving the Kurds to get screwed yet again.

Back in Washington, the Bush administration is looking at the Iranian withdrawal plan

skeptically. Right now, the United States wants assurances that a withdrawal plan worked out

with the Iranians does not simply leave a longer-term opportunity for Iran to gradually take

control of Iraq once the major roadblocks are out of the way. In other words, the United

States needs guarantees that, as it draws down its troop presence, the Iranians will not simply

walk in. The Iranian proposal to expand Sunni representation is a direct response to these

concerns, provided the relevant parties can actually deliver on their promises.

This is still highly questionable, though significant developments are already taking place that

reveal the United States, Iran and various Iraqi players are making concrete moves to uphold

their sides of the bargain. With Iran's blessing, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in

Iraq (SCIRI) has announced it will undergo a process of "Iraqization" -- a largely symbolic

demonstration that SCIRI will not operate simply as an Iranian proxy. Meanwhile, the Sunni

tribes and clans in Anbar province are increasingly broadcasting their commitment and

progress in combating transnational jihadists. And finally, numerous reports in the Arab media

suggest the United States would be willing to heed the Iranian demand that the Iraqi military

not have offensive capabilities allowing it to threaten its Persian neighbor.

The negotiations are moving, and it is becoming more and more apparent that a consensus is

emerging between Tehran and Washington over how the Iraq project should turn out. With

enough serious arrestors in play for this deal to fall through, it is now up to all players --

whether those players call Washington, Tehran, Riyadh or Baghdad home -- finally to put their money where their mouths are.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=288709&selected=

Country%20Profiles&showCountry=1&countryId=59&showMore=1

Iran, the United States and Potential Iraq Deal-Spoilers May 29, 2007

2007 GMT

The United States and Iran held their first high-level direct talks in Baghdad on May 28 to

negotiate a plan on how to stabilize Iraq. The idea of Washington and Tehran warming up to

each other and of the United States potentially regaining its military bandwidth in the not-too-

distant future is enough to put a number of serious actors into a frenzy. While Iran and the

United States evidently have come a long way since the spring of 2003, there are a number of spoilers in play that will ensure these negotiations face a very bumpy road at best.

Geopolitical Diary: Keeping U.S. Troops in Iraq May 31, 2007

2007 GMT

The White House on Wednesday compared the future U.S. troop presence in Iraq to that in

South Korea. This is not so much an announcement of a plan to create a specific force

structure or basing arrangement as it is a statement about the length and character of

Washington's commitment to Baghdad. The real underlying significance of the announcement is simple: the United States is not leaving Iraq any time soon.

Iraq: Sectarian Concerns and the High-Stake U.S.-Iranian Talks Jun 18, 2007

2007 GMT

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has criticized the U.S. backing of Sunni militias engaged in

fighting jihadists. Al-Maliki's comments highlight the concerns that the Iraqi Shia and Iran

have about the Sunnis' potential empowerment as an outcome of the ongoing U.S.-Iranian

talks on Iraq. However, these concerns are unlikely to derail the talks, given what is at stake for all the players involved.

Iraq: A New Offensive in Diyala Jun 19, 2007

2007 GMT

In one of the largest operations since the Iraq war began in 2003, the U.S. military led some

10,000 coalition troops into Diyala province June 19 as part of an offensive against al Qaeda.

Building on successes in Anbar province, the United States is attempting to take the fight to

the jihadists. But, like the U.S. troop surge, this offensive will not be short-lived, and success is far from assured.

Iran: Decoupling the Nuclear and Iraq Issues Jun 29, 2007

2007 GMT

A compromise over the nuclear standoff that has seen Iran continuously deny international

calls to suspend its uranium enrichment is in the works. Since Western negotiations with Iran

regarding Iraq cannot be carried out while the West simultaneously maintains a tough stance

on the nuclear issue, especially when the United States and the United Kingdom are taking the

lead in developing a new draft of harsher U.N. sanctions against Iran, Washington is

considering dropping its demand for a full suspension of Iran's enrichment process. Such a

compromise could allow both sides to avoid complicating talks on Iraq, but it probably will not yield any major breakthroughs on the nuclear issue itself.

Geopolitical Diary: U.S. Weaknesses Spell Possible Iranian Concessions over Iraq Jul 12, 2007

2007 GMT

U.S. President George W. Bush's my-way-or-the-highway policies appear to have eroded his

support among Republicans. Of the 49 Republican senators, by Stratfor's count, five long ago

left the president's camp on the issue of Iraq, and nine more have departed within the last

month -- seven of them this week alone. However, the weaknesses of the Bush administration

could lead Iran to make concessions over Iraq.

U.S.: Bush Prepares for September -- and Beyond -- in Iraq Jul 12, 2007

2007 GMT

In his July 12 press conference on the status of the war in Iraq, U.S. President George W.

Bush said a lot that surprised no one. But his most important goal at the conference was to lay

the groundwork for September's report on the progress of the troop surge -- and the strategy beyond. It will be a question of timing.

U.S.: Challenges to Al Qaeda in Iraq in the Homeland Jul 18, 2007

2007 GMT

The National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorism threat to the U.S. homeland released July

17 states that al Qaeda will attempt to use its Iraqi node to attack the United States. Though

al Qaeda in Iraq operatives are very proficient at operating in Iraq, the operational

environment there is far different from that in, say, Los Angeles or Washington and requires

different skill sets. Like fish out of water, al Qaeda in Iraq operatives therefore probably would

have trouble operating in the United States. They would be far more successful operating in places such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria or North Africa.

Iraq: U.S.-Iranian Negotiations, the Surge and the Future of the War

July 19, 2007 23 40 GMT

Top U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker

will present a progress report on the Iraq war to Congress as early as September. The report

will highlight military successes in the Sunni provinces of Diyala and Anbar as evidence that

the surge strategy is working after taking full effect in mid-June.

Progress in the war cannot solely be defined by military statistics, however, or by exaggerated

political advances like a rushed hydrocarbons law. The military indicators need to be viewed

against the backdrop of U.S.-Iranian negotiations over Iraq, which Stratfor has tracked

intensively since the lead-up to the Iraq war in 2003.

These negotiations have taken us on an interesting ride, encompassing everything from the

summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict to the 2007 British detainee incident in the Persian Gulf

to the ongoing saga over Iran's nuclear program. The U.S.-Iranian negotiations are

intrinsically linked to the U.S. surge strategy, and only when these two issues are analyzed in

tandem can we get an accurate picture of where this war is heading.

The Military View

The first surge brigade began to make itself felt in Baghdad in February. By the end of that

month, 15 joint security stations had been set up around the city. Since then, extrajudicial

killings in the Iraqi capital have dropped to nearly one-third of their January levels, when

some 1,500 such incidents took place.

U.S. and coalition fatalities climbed in accordance with operational tempo and increased

exposure. Now that the surge is at full strength and some of the security efforts have already

begun to be felt, the latest indicators show significant drops across the board. Major bombings

are down since April, and coalition fatalities have showed substantial decreases since May. It is

of course extremely early, and the effects of the full surge cannot yet be seen. But these initial

signs indicate the strategy has some chance of success.

Success in Anbar province has played no small part in disrupting the carnage that is the

hallmark of foreign jihadists, who play a major role in both suicide and large-casualty

bombings. Sunni tribal groups long ago tired of al Qaeda and foreign jihadists in their midst.

Although Anbar remained bloody in 2006, the tide began to turn at the beginning of 2007.

Operation Mawtini is now under way to keep jihadists on the run and prevent them from

planning and carrying out operations in the population centers of the province. There is no

more telling indicator of the success of the cooperation with domestic Sunni groups in Anbar

than the dramatic drop-off in coalition casualties in what has been Iraq's deadliest province.

But one of the more telling aspects of the surge has been the ability of the U.S. military to

carry out major operations outside the Iraqi capital while simultaneously maintaining security

efforts inside Baghdad. Operation Arrowhead Ripper began in June and sought to engage the

remnants of Sunni jihadist groups that slipped out of Anbar and Baghdad. Operation Marne

Avalanche began less than a month later, south of Baghdad, to interdict weapons and supplies

flowing into the city. While the impact of these new operations has yet to be felt, the initiative

appears to be with the coalition.

The ultimate results, of course, remain unclear. It is far too early to speculate about success.

Iraq remains -- at best -- the most daunting and intractable confrontation for the United

States since at least Vietnam. But the last few months have provided indications that the

coalition has arrested the downward spiral of violence. If this turns out to be a lasting trend, the single most important objective of the surge will have been achieved.

1. JAN. 10: U.S. surge strategy announced 2. JAN. 21: First surge brigade arrives in Baghdad 3. MARCH 10: U.S.,

Iranian and Syrian diplomats meet in Baghdad to discuss Iraq's future 4. MAY 3-4: An Iranian proposal for Iraq is delivered to the United States at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in Egypt 5. MAY 20-21: Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Iraq's most senior Shiite politician, travels to

the United States and Iran 6. MAY 25: Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr reappears and begins purging his militia 7. MAY 28: The United States and Iran hold their first high-level direct talks in Baghdad 8. MAY 30: Final surge brigade arrives in Baghdad 9. MAY 31: Clashes

between Sunni nationalist insurgents and jihadists spread to Baghdad 10. JUNE 13: Jihadists attack the Al Askariyah mosque in As Samarra 11. JUNE 13 and 24: Al-Sadr's political bloc and main Sunni political bloc boycott parliament 12. JULY 18-19: Al Sadr's

political bloc and Iraq's main Sunni political bloc end their parliamentary boycott

The Political View

Washington and Tehran

have reached a point in

negotiations where both

are under heavy pressure

to deal with each other in

order to avoid their worst-

case scenarios for Iraq. As

expected, we have been

hearing much bluster

about the United States

entertaining military

options against Iranian

nuclear sites and the Iranians warning Washington that Tehran has selected 600 targets in

Israel for ballistic missile strikes.

But this is all part of the negotiating game; our job is to discipline ourselves to see through

the rhetoric and focus intently on the meat of the negotiations -- namely, how much political

representation will Iran and the Iraqi Shia afford to Iraq's Sunni bloc, what real progress has

been made in dividing the jihadist and Sunni nationalist insurgencies, and to what extent Iran

will be able to consolidate its influence among a severely fractured Iraqi Shiite bloc.

When the surge was announced in January, there was a clear spike in suicide attacks (a

signature tactic of the jihadists) and multiple-fatality bombings against Shia. This was a sign

that Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi nationalist and jihadist, were attempting to undermine the

surge strategy by escalating attacks and encouraging sectarian violence throughout the

country. But right around the time when the first U.S.-Iranian meeting was held, in early

March, there began to be a drop-off of attacks against Sunnis and Shia, indicating a decline in

sectarian violence. That gradual drop-off continued in line with several other notable political

events, such as the U.S.-Iranian meetings that followed in May and the return of Muqtada al-

Sadr to Iraq to whip his militia into shape. Following al-Sadr's return to Iraq, there was a

notable decline in attacks targeting Sunnis.

When Iran presented the United States with its terms for Iraq at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit

in early May, the expectation was for evidence to start appearing that Iran and its Shiite allies

in Iraq were reining in militia activity against Sunnis, and for Saudi Arabia and the United

States to curb Sunni attacks. Naturally, there were spoiler attempts by the jihadists to derail

the talks, which led to a second spike in suicide attacks. But suicide attacks have declined

since April, which can also be attributed to the growing success of a strategy being pushed by

Washington -- and we presume to some extent by Riyadh -- to get the Sunni nationalist

insurgents to focus more of their attention on the foreign jihadists. These political

developments cannot be explicitly linked to the attack levels, but in conjunction with the

effects of the troop surge, a picture is gradually forming of what future progress in U.S.-

Iranian talks could spell for Iraq in the coming months.

Though there has been a bit of a lull in the talks since the much-heralded May 28 U.S.-Iranian

meeting in Baghdad, some signs of progress have come to light recently. Both Iran and the

United States are now talking about setting a date for another face-to-face meeting in the

near future to follow up on their proposals from the May 28 talks. Not coincidentally, radical

Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al Sadr's 30-member political bloc, as well as Iraq's main Sunni

bloc -- the 44-member Tawafoq Iraqi Front -- ended their boycott of parliament to pull the

Iraqi government out of paralysis July 18 and 19 respectively.

Moreover, a group of Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups that publicly have turned against al Qaeda

came forth with a plan July 19 to form a political front to negotiate with the United States in

anticipation of an early U.S. withdrawal. A spokesman for Iraqi Hamas spoke on behalf of his

group as well as the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the infamous Ansar al-Sunnah, saying they

would form a common front called the "Political Office for Iraqi Resistance" to help unite Sunni

insurgent groups to conduct political negotiations effectively.

Thus, a large segment of the domestic Sunni insurgents feel the time is right to begin playing

ball with the Americans and edge their way into the political process. Though Sunni nationalist

insurgent attacks presumably will drop as political negotiations progress, statistics on multiple-

fatality bombings can be skewed at first glance. Suicide attacks, a jihadist trademark, will be

used to derail the talks and probably will increase as the negotiations move forward.

The Road Ahead

When looking at the military and political analysis in tandem, Stratfor's progress report on the

Iraq war is mildly hopeful. U.S. boots on the ground have made reasonable progress in their

"clear and hold" strategy in and beyond the Iraqi capital, and the United States and Iran are

inching closer to a political settlement.

Of course, there are still a number of arrestors in play. Once the United States actually begins

drawing down troops, withdrawing from combat operations and handing more responsibility to

Iraqi security forces, the question comes to the forefront whether the relative stability that

resulted from the surge will hold long enough to allow the Iraqi government to function and

make good on any promises made in the political negotiations.

Internal Iraqi political negotiations also are bound to become increasingly complicated over

the contentious oil law and rising Turkish pressure on Iraq's Kurdish faction. Whether the

three big players (the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia) hold enough sway over the

various factions inside Iraq to make an agreement actually work also remains questionable.

With the Iraqi parliament insistent on taking its monthlong recess in August, it already looks

like the U.S. progress report could be pushed to November to allow Petraeus to deliver a

reasonable assessment of the war.

Iran also is watching closely how the U.S. withdrawal debate in Congress pans out, thinking it

can likely hold out for more concessions if U.S. President George W. Bush gets cornered

enough by his own government to withdraw. But playing the waiting game also carries its

consequences for the Iranians, who realize that they have 18 months to seal a deal while a

weak president remains in the White House.

The current military operations are now laying the groundwork for the political negotiations to

take effect. With an eye on both the military stats and the political developments, anything

that can be called progress involving Iraq in the coming months largely will turn on the

negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

Iraq: The Roadblocks to Implementing a U.S.-Iranian Deal Jul 25, 2007

2007 GMT

A day after the United States and Iran agreed during their second round of direct public talks

over Iraq to form a joint security committee, Tehran said it is prepared for higher-level contact

with Washington. This progress notwithstanding, both sides will face major hurdles in

implementing their agreements -- as the largest Iraqi Sunni parliamentary bloc demonstrated

when it threatened to pull out of the government. That the United States has accorded Iran

special recognition in its effort to stabilize Iraq will cause major problems for Washington in its

attempts to placate the Sunnis.

U.S.: The Delicate Diplomatic Dance with Iran Aug 06, 2007

2007 GMT

The United States and Iran held a third round of direct public-level talks Aug. 6 to discuss

ways to reach their agreed-upon goals for stability in Iraq. Motivated by the threats to their

national interests, both sides are moving forward in their negotiations, but Washington and

Tehran must still overcome many hurdles before implementing their plans to establish security

and stability in Iraq. Since the United States is representing the Sunnis in these talks, it will have to balance various Sunni factions' demands as it proceeds to deal with Iran.

The Major Diplomatic and Strategic Evolution in Iraq

August 07, 2007 19 34 GMT

By George Friedman

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker met Aug. 6 with Iranian

Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi Qomi and Iraqi National Security

Adviser Muwaffaq al-Rubaie. Separately, a committee of Iranian, Iraqi

and U.S. officials held its first meeting on Iraqi security, following up

on an agreement reached at a July ambassadorial-level meeting.

The U.S. team was headed by Marcie Ries, counselor for political and

military affairs at the embassy in Baghdad. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian,

who handles Iraq for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, led the Iranian

team. A U.S. Embassy spokesman described the talks as "frank and

serious," saying they "focused, as agreed, on security problems in

Iraq." Generally, "frank and serious" means nasty, though they

probably did get down to the heart of the matter. The participants agreed to hold a second

meeting, which means this one didn't blow up.

Longtime Stratfor readers will recall that we have been tracing these Iranian-American talks

from the back-channel negotiations to the high-level publicly announced talks, and now to this

working group on security. A multilateral regional meeting on Iraq's future was held March 10

in Baghdad, followed by a regional meeting May 4 in Egypt. Then there were ambassadorial-

level meetings in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24. Now, not quite two weeks later, the three

sides have met again.

That the discussions were frank and serious shouldn't surprise anyone. That they continue in

spite of obvious deep tensions between the parties is, in our view, extremely significant. The

prior ambassadorial talk lasted about seven hours. The Aug. 6 working group session lasted

about four hours. These are not simply courtesy calls. The parties are spending a great deal of

time talking about something.

This is not some sort of public relations stunt either. First, neither Washington nor Tehran

would bother to help the other's public image. Second, neither side's public image is much

helped by these talks anyway. This is the "Great Satan" talking to one-half of what is left of

the "Axis of Evil." If ever there were two countries that have reason not to let the world know

they are meeting, it is these two. Yet, they are meeting, and they have made the fact public.

The U.S. media have not ignored these meetings, but they have not treated them as what

they actually are -- an extraordinary diplomatic and strategic evolution in Iraq. Part of the

reason is that the media take their cues from the administration about diplomatic processes. If

the administration makes a big deal out of the visit of the Icelandic fisheries minister to

Washington, the media will treat it as such. If the administration treats multilevel meetings

between Iran and the United States on the future of Iraq in a low-key way, then low-key it is.

The same is true for the Iranians, whose media are more directly managed. Iran does not

want to make a big deal out of these meetings, and therefore they are not portrayed as

significant.

It is understandable that neither Washington nor Tehran would want to draw undue attention

to the talks. The people of each country view the other with intense hostility. We are reminded

of the political problems faced by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and U.S. President Richard

Nixon when their diplomatic opening became public. The announcement of Nixon's visit to

China was psychologically stunning in the United States; it was less so in China only because

the Chinese controlled the emphasis placed on the announcement. Both sides had to explain

to their publics why they were talking to the mad dogs.

In the end, contrary to conventional wisdom, perception is not reality. The fact that the

Americans and the Iranians are downplaying the talks, and that newspapers are not printing

banner headlines about them, does not mean the meetings are not vitally important. It simply

means that the conventional wisdom, guided by the lack of official exuberance, doesn't know

what to make of these talks.

There are three major powers with intense interest in the future of Iraq: the United States,

Iran and Saudi Arabia. The United States, having toppled Saddam Hussein, has completely

mismanaged the war. Nevertheless, a unilateral withdrawal would create an unacceptable

situation in which Iran, possibly competing with Turkey in the North, would become the

dominant military power in the region and would be in a position to impose itself at least on

southern Iraq -- and potentially all of it. Certainly there would be resistance, but Iran has a

large military (even if it is poorly equipped), giving it a decided advantage in controlling a

country such as Iraq.

In addition, Iran is not nearly as casualty-averse as the United States. Iran fought a war with

Iraq in the 1980s that cost it about a million casualties. The longtime Iranian fear has been

that the United States will somehow create a pro-American regime in Baghdad, rearm the

Iraqis and thus pose for Iran round two of what was its national nightmare. It is no accident

that the day before these meetings, U.S. sources speculated about the possible return of the

Iraqi air force to the Iraqis. Washington was playing on Tehran's worst nightmare.

Saudi Arabia's worst nightmare would be watching Iran become the dominant power in Iraq or

southern Iraq. It cannot defend itself against Iran, nor does it want to be defended by U.S.

troops on Saudi soil. The Saudis want Iraq as a buffer zone between Iran and their oil fields.

They opposed the original invasion, fearing just this outcome, but now that the invasion has

taken place, they don't want Iran as the ultimate victor. The Saudis, therefore, are playing a

complex game, both supporting Sunni co-religionists and criticizing the American presence as

an occupation -- yet urgently wanting U.S. troops to remain.

The United States wants to withdraw, though it doesn't see a way out because an outright

unilateral withdrawal would set the stage for Iranian domination. At the same time, the United

States must have an endgame -- something the next U.S. president will have to deal with.

The Iranians no longer believe the United States is capable of creating a stable, anti-Iranian,

pro-American government in Baghdad. Instead, they are terrified the United States will spoil

their plans to consolidate influence within Iraq. So, while they are doing everything they can

to destabilize the regime, they are negotiating with Washington. The report that three-

quarters of U.S. casualties in recent weeks were caused by "rogue" Shiite militia sounds

plausible. The United States has reached a level of understanding with some nonjihadist Sunni

insurgent groups, many of them Baathist. The Iranians do not want to see this spread -- at

least not unless the United States first deals with Tehran. The jihadists, calling themselves al

Qaeda in Iraq, do not want this either, and so they have carried out a wave of assassinations

of those Sunnis who have aligned with the United States, and they have killed four key aides

to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a key Shiite figure.

If this sounds complicated, it is. The United States is fighting Sunnis and Shia, making peace

with some Sunnis and encouraging some Shia to split off -- all the time waging an offensive

against most everyone. The Iranians support many, but not all, of the Shiite groups in Iraq. In

fact, many of the Iraqi Shia have grown quite wary of the Iranians. And for their part, the

Saudis are condemning the Americans while hoping they stay -- and supporting Sunnis who

might or might not be fighting the Americans.

The situation not only is totally out of hand, but the chance that anyone will come out of it

with what they really want is slim. The United States probably will not get a pro-American

government and the Iranians probably will not get to impose their will on all or part of Iraq.

The Saudis, meanwhile, are feeling themselves being sucked into the Sunni quagmire.

This situation is one of the factors driving the talks.

By no means out of any friendliness, a mutual need is emerging. No one is in control of the

situation. No one is likely to get control of the situation in any long-term serious way. It is in

the interests of the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia that the Iraq situation stabilize,

simply because they cannot predict the outcome -- and the worst-case scenario for each is too

frightening to contemplate.

None of the three powers can bring the situation under control. Even by working together, the

three will be unable to completely stabilize Iraq and end the violence. But by working together

they can increase security to the point that none of their nightmare scenarios comes true. In

return, the United States will have to do without a pro-American government in Baghdad and

the Iranians will have to forgo having an Iraqi satellite.

Hence, we see a four-hour meeting of Iranian and U.S. security experts on stabilizing the

situation in Iraq. Given the little good will between the two countries, defining roles and

missions in a stabilization program will require frank and serious talks indeed. Ultimately,

however, there is sufficient convergence of interests that holding these talks makes sense.

The missions are clear. The Iranian task will be to suppress the Shiite militias that are

unwilling to abide by an agreement -- or any that oppose Iranian domination. Their

intelligence in this area is superb and their intelligence and special operations teams have little

compunction as to how they act. The Saudi mission will be to underwrite the cost of Sunni

acceptance of a political compromise, as well as a Sunni war against the jihadists. Saudi

intelligence in this area is pretty good and, while the Saudis do have compunctions, they will

gladly give the intelligence to the Americans to work out the problem. The U.S. role will be to

impose a government in Baghdad that meets Iran's basic requirements, and to use its forces

to grind down the major insurgent and militia groups. This will be a cooperative effort --

meaning whacking Saudi and Iranian friends will be off the table.

No one power can resolve the security crisis in Iraq -- as four years of U.S. efforts there

clearly demonstrate. But if the United States and Iran, plus Saudi Arabia, work together --

with no one providing cover for or supplies to targeted groups -- the situation can be brought

under what passes for reasonable control in Iraq. More important for the three powers, the

United States could draw down its troops to minimal levels much more quickly than is

currently being discussed, the Iranians would have a neutral, nonaggressive Iraq on their

western border and the Saudis would have a buffer zone from the Iranians. The buffer zone is

the key, because what happens in the buffer zone stays in the buffer zone.

The talks in Baghdad are about determining whether there is a way for the United States and

Iran to achieve their new mutual goal. The question is whether their fear of the worst-case

scenario outweighs their distrust of each other. Then there is the matter of agreeing on the

details -- determining the nature of the government in Baghdad, which groups to protect and

which to target, how to deal with intelligence sharing and so on.

These talks can fail in any number of ways. More and more, however, the United States and

Iran are unable to tolerate their failure. The tremendous complexity of the situation has

precluded either side from achieving a successful outcome. They now have to craft the

minimal level of failure they can mutually accept.

These talks not only are enormously important but they also are, in some ways, more

important than the daily reports on combat and terrorism. If this war ends, it will end because

of negotiations like these.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=293618&selected=

Country%20Profiles&showCountry=1&countryId=59&showMore=1

U.S.: Upping the Ante with Iran Aug 15, 2007

2007 GMT

The United States has just significantly upped the ante in negotiations with Iran over Iraq by

threatening to designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist

organization. The thought of designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization has been floating

in the U.S. Congress for some time now, but Washington has a clear purpose in sending

strong hints to Iran that the decision is imminent at this stage of the Iraq negotiations.

Geopolitical Diary: Rethinking the Mission in Iraq Aug 24, 2007

2007 GMT

A new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq was issued Thursday. It made grim reading. It is

hard to imagine that the much-awaited report from Gen. David Petraeus is going to read much

different. And that will pose the fundamental question for the United States: What is to be done?

Endgame: American Options in Iraq Aug 27, 2007

2007 GMT

For a long time, we have seen U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq as a viable and even likely

endgame. We no longer believe that to be the case. If the goal of creating a stable, pro-

American Iraq no longer is possible, then the U.S. national interest is to limit the expansion of

Iranian power -- particularly the Iranian threat to the Arabian Peninsula. The new U.S. mission, therefore, likely will shift to blocking Iran in the aftermath of the Iraq war.

Move and Countermove: Ahmadinejad and Bush Duel Aug 29, 2007

2007 GMT

Statements by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and U.S. President George W. Bush

on Aug. 28 show how rapidly the thinking in Tehran is evolving in response to Iranian

perceptions of a pending U.S. withdrawal from Iraq -- and how the Bush administration is

shifting its focus from the Sunni threat to both the Sunni and Shiite threats. No matter how

many moves are made, the United States is going to have to define a post-Iraq strategy -- and that strategy must focus on preventing Iran from threatening the Arabian Peninsula.