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The Significance of the Buddhist 10-Membered Formula of DependentOriginationBart DesseinPublished online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Bart Dessein (2014) The Significance of the Buddhist 10-Membered Formula ofDependent Origination, Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions ofthe East, 24:1, 1-13, DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2014.867639

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The Significance of the Buddhist10-Membered Formula of DependentOrigination

Bart Dessein

The dynamic process of karmic activity is one of the key philosophical concepts of theBuddhist doctrine, and is traditionally explained as the operation of a chain of 12mutually interlinked members of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Textualresearch, however, reveals that a series of alternative chains of members of dependentorigination coexisted prior to the systematization of this earlier textual material into thestandardized list of 12 members. Such an alternative list consists of 10 members. Thisarticle examines the importance of this particular list of 10 members in the developmentof Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. This philosophy, the basic interpretation of the mun-dane world of which is that the world around us only xists as the working of the humanmind, i.e. the domain of perceptual consciousness (vijñāna), matured in the late fourth–early fifth century CE. This examination of the 10-fold formula of dependent originationalso adds to our knowledge of the region of origin of Yogācāra philosophy, and thus onthe geographical diversities within the development of Buddhist philosophy.

1. The Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination

According to MN I 140, the Buddha stated that his doctrine regards two things:suffering and its cessation. This doctrine of suffering and its cessation has traditionallybeen formulated as the Buddha’s four noble truths (āryasatya): the truth of suffering(duh: khasatya), the truth of its cause (samudayasatya), the truth of the extinguishing ofthe cause of suffering (nirodhasatya) and the truth of the path that leads to theextinguishing of the cause of suffering (mārgasatya), i.e. the famous eightfold path(āryās:t:ān

:gikamārga).1 Although the doctrine of the four noble truths is presented asthe core of the historical Buddha’s teaching in scriptural texts (Sūtra) and in texts withrules for monastics and regulations for the practical arrangement of the monastic order(Vinaya),2 and although the third of these four truths states that ignorance (avidyā)/

Correspondence to: Bart Dessein, Department of Chinese Language and Culture, Ghent University, Blandijnberg2, 9000 Gent, Belgium. Email: bart.dessein@UGent.be

Asian Philosophy, 2014Vol. 24, No. 1, 1–13, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2014.867639

© 2014 Taylor & Francis

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craving (tr:s:n: ā) is the cause of the process of eternal transmigration (sam: sāra) and,hence, of suffering (duh: kha), this fourfold truth does not give a technical explanation ofhow suffering is continued in this process of transmigration. This may explain theprominent role lists of members of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) attainedto explain that karmic activity and eternal suffering are caused through the functioningof the mutually interlinked members of these lists, and that liberation is attainedthrough bringing the functioning of these interlinked members to a halt. As suchlists explain transmigration and deliverance thereof, they can be claimed to representthe fundament of the Buddhist doctrine—suffering and its cessation—and to be ofequal importance as the list of four noble truths itself.3

The standardized list of 12 mutually interlinked members of dependent originationis the following: (1) ignorance (avidyā), (2) conditioning factors (sam: skāra), (3)perceptual consciousness (vijñāna), (4) psychophysical complex (nāmarūpa), (5) sixsenses (s:aḍāyatana), (6) contact (sparśa), (7) feeling (vedanā), (8) craving (tr:s:n: ā), (9)grasping (upādāna), (10) existence (bhava), (11) birth (jāti) and (12) decay-and-dying (jarāmaran: a). This enumeration, i.e. the so-called emanation series (anuloma)reflects the order in which the members were presented by the Buddha,4 and explainsthe conditioned origin of suffering as starting with ignorance (member 1): becauseone is ignorant regarding the four noble truths, one commits actions for the sake of a‘self’ (ātman). These actions are conditioning factors (member 2) that lead toperceptual consciousness (member 3), i.e. primary consciousness as first element ofa new life. It is the form of consciousness of a newly born child whose faculties arenot functioning yet. From this, the psychophysical complex, i.e. the whole of fivecorporeal (eye, nose, ear, tongue and body), and one mental (mind) faculty (member4) develops. When the faculties become active, they are called ‘six senses’ (member 5).Activity of the senses/faculties leads to contact with their respective object-spheres(member 6). Contact leads to either agreeable or disagreeable, or neutral feelings(member 7). Feelings cause craving (member 8). Craving causes grasping, i.e. attach-ment to the elements of existence (member 9). Grasping makes one perform actionsin function of one’s existence. In this way, one’s present existence (member 10) iscomposed. Through the law of karmic retribution, this present existence will lead to anew birth (member 11), that, in its turn, will be subject to decay-and-dying (member12), after which a new cycle will start. In reverse order, i.e. the so-called extirpationseries (pat: iloma), i.e. the order in which, according to tradition, the Buddha discov-ered the formula, it leads to Nirvān: a (Cox 1993, p. 126; Wayman, 1970–1971, p. 186and p. 139, note # 25). For liberation, therefore, the adept has to make sure that hispresent existence (member 10) is such that its karmic result will not project a newbirth (member 11). It is recognition of the four noble truths, i.e. attaining the stage ofknowledge (vidyā) that stops actions for the sake of a ‘self’ that will lead to this result.(Wayman, 1970–1971, p. 186, 1980, p. 280) The latter is related to the followingfamous teaching of the Buddha that denies the existence of a ‘self ’:

Then the Lord addressed the group of five monks, saying: ‘Body, monks, is not self[…] Feeling is not self […] Perception is not self […] Consciousness is not self […]What do you think about this, monks? Is body permanent or impermanent?’

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‘Impermanent, Lord.’ ‘But is that which is impermanent painful or pleasurable?’‘Painful, Lord.’ ‘But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent, painful, of anature to change, as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?’ ‘It is not Lord.’ ‘Isfeeling… perception…are the habitual tendencies…is consciousness permanent orimpermanent?’ ‘Impermanent, Lord.’ ‘But is that which is impermanent painful orpleasurable?’ ‘Painful, Lord.’ ‘But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent,painful, of a nature to change, as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self?’ ‘It is notso, Lord.’ ‘Wherefore, monks, whatever is body, past, future, present, or internal orexternal, or gross or subtle, or low or excellent, whether it is far or near—all bodyshould, by means of right wisdom, be seen, as it really is, thus: This is not mine, thisam I not, this is not my self.’ Whatever is feeling…whatever is perception…whatever are the habitual tendencies…whatever is consciousness, past, future,present […] Seeing in this way, monks, the instructed disciple of the ariyansdisregards body and he disregards feeling and he disregards perception and hedisregards the habitual tendencies and he disregards consciousness; disregarding heis dispassionate; through dispassion he is freed; in freedom the knowledge comes tobe: ‘I am freed’, and he knows: ‘Destroyed is birth, lived is the Brahma-faring, doneis what was to be done, there is no more of being such or such.’5

Although the list of 12 members gradually developed into an integrated part of theBuddhist doctrine, and came to the forefront to explain the actual process oftransmigration and eternal suffering, there is textual evidence that this 12-fold listis not original.6 From the Sūtra literature, it is evident that the 12-membered formulais a compilation of smaller series, the two prominent of which are a seven-memberedand a five-membered formula, i.e. a list starting with ignorance (avidyā) and leadingto feeling (vedanā), and a list starting with craving (tr:s:n: ā) and leading to decay-and-dying (jarāmaran: a).

7 As ignorance actually is ignorance about the four noble truthsand is precisely the reason why there is craving, these two shorter formulas, onestarting with ignorance and the other starting with craving, appear as historicallyredundant variants that were combined to one list only at a later stage. That the list of12 is a later construction may also explain why the list of 12 was first added to thebiographies of the Buddha as a kind of addendum.8

That the list of 12 is a later construction is also corroborated by the existence of alist that starts with ‘impurities’ (āsava), not with ignorance (MN I 54). In canonicalliterature, ‘impurities’ are often specified as forms of desire. This variant parallels theultimate aim of the Buddhist doctrine: attaining Nirvān: a through annihilation ofimpurity, i.e. desire.9 The Suttanipāta of the Pāli canon, one of the oldest scriptures ofBuddhism, further, does not mention the 12-membered formula, but has the notionsignorance (1), craving (8), grasping (9), existence (10) and decay-and-dying (12),which, however, are not presented as part of a systematized doctrine.10 TheSuttanipāta also has a list in which the members psychophysical complex (4), sixsenses (5), birth (11) and decay-and-dying (12) are absent (Suttanipāta, 1848, 728sqq). The importance of the latter list is related to the further development of thedoctrine as a result of rational inquiry. The list of 12 members explains that karmicactivity is the force that continues the cycle of transmigration; however, it does notexplain how karmic activity itself functions. This explains why an existing list of fourconditions (pratyaya) and a redundant list of six causes (hetu) were introduced to

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explain precisely how this karmic activity functions.11 Probably in order to preserveall transmitted words of the Buddha, the Sarvāstivādins combined these redundantlists of six and four elements to an explanatory pattern of causes (hetu) and sub-causes (pratyaya). Gradually, these six causes and four conditions, in their turn,became the main philosophical explanation of karman, and the 12-membered chainbecame the structure to explain a human being’s individual share of suffering. It isherein that lies the importance of the eight-membered list of the Suttanipāta men-tioned above. Compared to the 12-membered list, the four members that are absentin the eight-membered list are the essential elements that constitute a human being:the psychophysical complex, six senses, birth and decay-and-dying. Interpreted in thisway, the 12 members can be seen as an attempt to integrate an individual humanbeing’s life into the dynamic system of causal forces, and the concept of dependentorigination as it is expressed in the numerical list of 12 members can be explained intwo ways: on the one hand, it represents the mechanic process of retribution that is atthe core of the Buddhist doctrine, and, on the other hand, it represents an individualhuman being’s experiencing of suffering (Wayman, 1980, p. 275).According to Alex Wayman (1970–1971, pp. 187–196), the Vaibhās:ika

Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas are representative of what he called the ‘Western’interpretation of the formula of dependent origination, i.e. the region of Gandhāra andKaśmīra.12 According to the Western tradition, the 12 members of dependent origina-tion have to be interpreted as stretching over three time periods, whereby the first twomembers belong to the past, members (3)–(10) belong to the present, and the last twomembers belong to the future.13 These members can further be qualified as beingdefilement (kleśa), action (karman) or actual entity (dharma), and as being either acause (hetu) or a fruition (phala). In these qualifications, the earlier sub-series withseven members and with five members are respected as follows:14

Past

Former chain of dependent origination

(1) Ignorance defilement cause

(2) Conditioning factors action cause

Present

(3) Perceptual consciousness actual entity fruition

(4) Psychophysical complex actual entity fruition

(5) Six senses actual entity fruition

(6) Contact actual entity fruition

(7) Feeling actual entity fruition

Later chain of dependent origination

(8) Craving defilement cause

(9) Grasping defilement cause

(10) Existence action cause

Future

(11) Birth actual entity fruition

(12) Decay-and-dying actual entity fruition

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This means that ignorance of a former lifetime can be considered as the defilementthat has invoked conditioning factors of the former lifetime. These two are the cause—and thus prior to—perceptual consciousness of the present lifetime.15 Confined tothe original sub-series of seven members, the five members that are situated in thepresent lifetime are the actual entities, i.e. the dharmas that constitute this life.Craving of the present lifetime, i.e. the first member of the second sub-series of fivemembers can be qualified as the present defilement that leads to grasping, itselfobviously a defilement too. These two members of defilement materialize the presentexistence. This existence is qualified as ‘action’ that will have a karmic retribution inthe future lifetime. Therefore, the three members craving, grasping and existence ofthe present lifetime are qualified as the causes of the fruition that is the futurelifetime. Birth and decay-and-dying are the actual entities (the dharmas) that con-stitute this future lifetime.16

2. The 10-Fold Formula of Dependent Origination

A further variant of the formula of dependent origination enumerates 10 mutuallyinterlinked members. The difference of this list with the standardized list of 12 is thatthe members’ ignorance (member 1) and conditioning factors (member 2) are absent.This version that is found in DN II 56–57 thus starts with perceptual consciousness(vijñāna). DN II 63 has the following to say in respect to this formula: ‘Whenconsciousness (vijñāna) would not enter the maternal womb, how could nāmarūpa(i.e. the psychophysical complex) be formed?’ This statement makes vijñāna as firstmember of the 10-fold series the transition point to a new life. When perceptualconsciousness is the first member of the chain of dependent origination, this impliesthat, after death, the member decay-and-dying transforms to perceptual conscious-ness (vijñāna) as first member of the new cyclic series, and that, hereafter, perceptualconsciousness assumes a new psychophysical complex (nāmarūpa), the fourth mem-ber of the standardized list of 12, depending on the karmic result of the life that hasjust ended. This interpretation makes it impossible to maintain—as the Vaibhās:ikaSarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas do—that ignorance (member 1) and conditioningfactors (member 2) belong to the past. This leads to two questions: (1) how preciselyis death transformed to perceptual consciousness as first member of a new life? and(2) what are the implications for interpreting the two members ignorance (avidyā)and conditioning factors (sam: skāra) of the 12-fold formula? The last question can berephrased as follows: as, according to this 10-membered series, ignorance (avidyā)and conditioning factors (sam: skāra) would stand in between decay-and-dying (mem-ber 12) as last member of a given lifespan and perceptual consciousness (member 3)as the initiating moment of a new lifespan, and cannot belong to the past, does thensomething as an intermediate state (antarābhava) in between death and life, to whichignorance and conditioning factors pertain, exist?17

The existence of an intermediate state is accepted by, among others, the Vaibhās:ikaSarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas who are part of the ‘Western’ region of develop-ment of Buddhist philosophy.18 The acceptance of an intermediate state is

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reminiscent of the old Vedic and Hindu concept that transmigration to a new lifeoccurs in the form of a gandharva, a subtle-form being that has escaped from thecadaver and searches a new womb (Wayman, 1974, p. 231). In Buddhism, thisgandharva transformed into a being in the intermediate state (antarābhavastha)between death and the new conception. Depending on the type of being (god(deva), human being (manus:ya), animal (tiryagyoni), hungry ghost (preta) or beingin hell (naraka)) that is destined to be formed, this intermediate being comes intocontact with a couple consisting of a male and a female. Destined to become a maleperson, the gandharva feels pleasure and love for the female and hatred for the male.In its desire, it enters the mindset of its future father, and, based on the future father’smindset that is fixed on the sexual act; it takes possession of the organ of pleasure(sukhakāran: a). When it subsequently enters the mother’s womb, there is a newexistence. For the opposite sex, the opposite procedure is gone through (de LaVallée Poussin, 1913, pp. 38–39; La Vallée Poussin, [1923–1931] 1971, vol. 2, pp.36–45). This transformation to a new birth through a gandharva occurs in theintermediate state. This being so, is there a relation between the gandharva andthese two members that allow us to attribute these two members to the intermediatestate?In view of the development in the explanation how precisely causality and karmic

retribution function, it may not come as a surprise that also different interpretationsdeveloped on how, in the absence of a ‘self’, the karmic result of the present life iscontinued and transmitted to a next life (Dessein, 2008). According to the Vaibhās:ikaSarvāstivāda doctrine, a human being’s mindset is renewed instant after instant, and itis this series that can be conceived as ‘a kind of soul’.19 At the moment of death, thelast thought of the living person is followed by a thought that creates a body ofintermediate existence and that searches a womb to be reborn in. The actions doneduring the lifespan that has just ended have their fruition in this womb, after whichthe body of intermediate existence dies and a thought of rebirth arises (de La ValléePoussin, 1934–1935, p. 148). This process necessitates a twofold aspect in perceptualconsciousness (vijñāna) as (third) member of the chain of dependent origination: apart of consciousness that searches a womb in which the karmic fruition will occur,i.e. the ‘fruitional consciousness’ (vipākavijñāna or jīvitendriya) that is the vision ofthe parents in sexual union, and a part that looks forward to the new life.20 It is thusclear that the interpretation of the position of the first two members of the 12-foldchain of dependent origination by the Vaibhās:ika Sarvāstivādins was influenced bythe—in line with the Vedic tradition—acceptance of an intermediate state.This is also evident in the interpretation of the Sautrāntikas. A major difference

between this group and the Vaibhās:ika Sarvāstivādins is that they do not explain thetransition to a new life through the functioning of a thought that creates a body ofintermediate existence that develops into a thought of rebirth, but through thegermination of seeds (bīja) sown by the actions of the previous lifespan (de LaVallée Poussin, 1934–1935, pp. 150–152). In the Sautrāntika interpretation, theseseeds are assembled in the ‘appropriating consciousness’ (ādānavijñāna). From this

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concept, it is only a minor step to the Yogācāra concept of the ‘storehouse conscious-ness’ (ālayavijñāna) (Waldron, 1995).

3. The Yogācāra ‘Storehouse Consciousness’ and Liberation in One Lifetime

As mentioned above, the series of 12 members can also be interpreted as an extirpa-tion series, i.e. leading to Nirvān: a. In accordance with the birth stories relating to theBuddha according to which attaining Nirvān: a is so difficult that one needs manylifetimes to reach this goal, the interpretation of the 12 members as belonging to threetime periods is compatible with the extirpation series: when going through the 12members in reverse order, i.e. towards cognizance (vidyā), one, as it were, inverts thecyclic rebirths. When, however, recognizing, as the Mahāyāna does, that liberationcan be achieved in one (the present) lifetime, the 12-membered cycle that comprisesthree time periods, i.e. three lives, demands a reinterpretation. Based on a study oftexts of what he labelled as the ‘Eastern’ tradition, i.e. the tradition of the region thatstretches from Assam in the North to the valley of the Kr:s:n:ā River in Andhra Pradeshin the South, i.e. the region of early tantric Buddhism and the source of Mahāyānascriptures of the tathāgatagarbha (womb of the tathāgata) type, Alex Wayman(1970–1971, pp. 191–196) concluded that in the Mahāyāna, for arhats, pratyekabud-dhas and bodhisattvas, the 12-membered formula applies to a single life. Arhats,pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas have, in this present lifetime, eliminated cravingand grasping, and thus they do no longer establish an existence that will lead to afuture birth. While for worldlings (pr: thagjana), perceptual consciousness (vijñāna) isthe transition point to a new life, with these noble beings, vijñāna becomes a spiritualprinciple (de La Vallée Poussin, 1913, p. 12). Their perceptual consciousness in thepresent lifetime is not of the ordinary type, as it is brought about by purifiedconditioning factors that are, in their turn, projected by their correct understandingof the four noble truths, i.e. the elimination of ignorance. Therefore, for them, the‘former chain of dependent origination’, i.e. the first seven members of the 12-foldchain, relates to a superior kind of realm, i.e. a mental realm devoid of the mundane.The ‘later chain of dependent origination’, i.e. the last five members of the 12-foldchain, relates to a lower kind of realm. That is, taking account of the extirpationseries, the realm of their last physical birth.21 The differentiation into three timeperiods thus makes place for a dualistic structure (Wayman, 1970–1971, p. 192, 1980,p. 289). This interpretation also solves the problem of the position of the membersignorance and conditioning factors in between death and a new birth, as these twomembers now belong to that exalted realm. A logical consequence of this is that thesetwo members can no longer be interpreted as relating to a gandharva-like being thattransgresses from death to a new birth. The attribution of the members ignorance andconditioning factors to an exalted realm indeed explains why not all Buddhist schoolsaccept the existence of an intermediate state.22

In terms of the importance of perceptual consciousness (vijñāna) as the beginningof the cycle of transmigration, the Mahīśāsakas recognized an ‘aggregate that exists to

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the end of transmigration’ (sam: sārakot: inis:t:haskandha) (Bareau, 1955, p. 187). Thisaggregate has been labelled as the ‘forerunner of the ālayavijñāna of the Mahāyāna’by Alex Wayman (1980, p. 228).23 Indeed, it is especially in the Mahāyāna thatperceptual consciousness (vijñāna) attains a new interpretation as the key element forattaining Nirvān: a in one single lifetime. It is, in this respect, important that it is in thedomains of the above-mentioned ‘Eastern’ tradition that the development of theconcept of the tathāgatagarbha, i.e. the concept that explains why every humanbeing is able to attain Buddhahood as every human being possess the ‘womb of thetathāgata’ (tathāgatagarbha) has to be situated. It is this concept of thetathāgatagarbha that is reformulated as the Yogācāra concept of the ‘storehouseconsciousness’ (ālayavijñāna). The concept of the ‘storehouse consciousness’ impliesthat all volitional actions one does produce a seed (bīja) that is stored in this‘storehouse’. As a human being’s life is characterized by continuous volitional actions,the composition of this ‘storehouse’ is in constant change. Based on the Buddhisttheory that everything that is composed of elements (dharma) is void of self-nature(svabhāva), this implies that also this ‘storehouse’ is void. The defiled mind(klis:t:amanas), however, perceives this storehouse as real and, as a result, conditioningfactors and a karmic result are formed, i.e. new seeds are placed in the storehouseconsciousness. The origin of the future life thus is situated in the storehouse con-sciousness itself (Bronkhorst, 2000, p. 170; de La Vallée Poussin, 1934–1935, pp. 156–160; Schmithausen, 1987, vol. 1, p. 4 f. and p. 18, vol. 2, p. 244, notes # 12 f. and p.276, notes # 146 and 147). That is, the physical body is the support of consciousness,but it is through consciousness that it becomes physical (de La Vallée Poussin, 1934–1935, p. 165). This doctrine, as stated by Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1934–1935, p.167) is ‘nothing more than a perfected Sautrāntika idea’.24 It is the recognition of thefour noble truths that will stop all volitional actions, and will empty the storehouseconsciousness. Liberation thus is situated in the storehouse consciousness as much asrebirth is. The key to Nirvān: a and the key to Sam: sāra thus become situated inperceptual consciousness (vijñāna) as first member of the formula of dependentorigination, i.e. they are situated in this lifetime.25 This development again empha-sizes the importance of the 10-membered formula of dependent origination.In the Chinese tradition, Nirvān: a and Sam: sāra became interpreted as the function

of the essence that is the tathāgatagarbha. Huiyuan (523–592 CE), major exponent ofPure Land Buddhism whose ideas were later popularized by Fazang (643–711) of theChinese Huayan school, commented on this duality as follows:

Relying on the essence of the previously [discussed] tathāgatagarbha of ultimatereality, [both] Sam: sāra and Nirvān: a are produced through dependent origination.They (i.e. Sam: sāra and Nirvān: a) constitute its function. As the sūtras state,‘dependent origination in twelve members is a creation of the mind,’ and ‘thethree realms [of existences] are a creation of the mind’, and also ‘the transmigrationof the doctrinal body (dharmakāya) in the five destinies (gati) is called “sentientbeings” (sattva)’. This is Sam: sāra that is produced by [the tathāgatagarbha of]ultimate reality. Also, just as the sūtras [state], ‘the nature of the tathāgatagarbha

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reveals and establishes the doctrinal body’, a principle such as this (nature oftathāgatagarbha) produces Nirvān: a.

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4. Conclusion

Textual analysis reveals that the karmic law of causality was explained throughdifferent lists of mutually interlinked members of dependent origination. Eventually,a standardized list of 12 members was formulated. Perceptual consciousness (vijñāna),the third member of this list of 12, stands out as particularly important in theMahāyāna doctrine that liberation in the present lifetime is possible. This developmentof the Mahāyāna doctrine necessitated a re-interpretation of ignorance (avidyā) andconditioning factors (sam: skāra), the first two members of the standardized list of 12.This reinterpretation was influenced by the existence of an earlier list of 10 members ofdependent origination, the first of these being perceptual consciousness. Perceptualconsciousness as first member of the cycle was brought into the Yogācāra doctrine asthe concept of the ‘storehouse consciousness’ (ālayavijñāna). This happened in the‘Eastern’ region of development of Buddhist philosophy, i.e. the region in which alsothe concept of the ‘tathāgatagarbha,’ i.e. the concept that Buddhahood is embryonicallypresent in all human beings and explains why all human beings can attain liberation,developed. In its Chinese interpretation, Sam: sāra and Nirvān: a became interpreted asthe function of the essence that is the tathāgatagarbha.

Notes

[1] On the origin and probable original order of this list of four truths, see Bronkhorst (2000, pp.33–41).

[2] See MN I (Ed. Trenckner, [1888] 1964) 69, 72, 140, 380, II (Ed. Chalmers, [1898] 1960) 41,145; SN IV (Ed. Feer, [1894] 1960) 384; DN I (Eds. Rhys Davids & Estlin Carpenter, [1890]1949) 110, 148, II (Eds. Rhys Davids & Estlin Carpenter, [1903] 1947) 41; AN IV (Ed. Hardy,[1899] 1958) 186, 213; Vin I (Ed. Oldenberg, 1879) 16, 18, 19, 181, 225–226; II (Ed.Oldenberg, 1880) 156.

[3] The importance of this concept of dependent origination for the Buddhist doctrine is, e.g. tobe read in MN I 191. In Chang ahan jing (Dīrghāgama), Eds. Junjiro, Watanabe, and Ono(1924–1935), Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, T.vol.1, no.1, p. 467a18 and Pinimu jing(Vinayamātr:kā), T.vol. 24, no.1463, p. 820b13 ff., dependent origination is seen as synon-ymous with the doctrine.

[4] For the Buddha’s recognition of the chain of 12 members, see Waldschmidt (1960, p. 114).See also Frauwallner (1953, p. 197).

[5] Ed. Oldenberg (1880, pp. 13–14); translation Horner (1962, pp. 20–21). This passage is alsomentioned in Mishasebu hexi wufen lü (Mahīśāsakavinaya), T.vol. 22, no.1421, p. 105a15–24; Sifen lü (Dharmaguptakavinaya), T.vol. 22, no.1428, p. 789a12-b1; SN III 67 f.

[6] See Nakamura (1980, pp. 165–166), who claims that, at the earliest stage, Buddhists wereprimarily concerned with setting forth their own experience, not with formulating a theore-tical construct.

[7] See, for example, Prajñāvarman’s Tibetan translation of the Udānavargavivaran: a, where thetwo series are explained with respect to the same stanza. See Bernhard (1968–1969, pp. 57–60). See also Wayman (1970–1971, p. 186).

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[8] See Bernhard (1968–1969, pp. 54–55) who refers to the Catus:paris:atsūtra par 6.1 ff. in thisrespect.

[9] See Schmithausen (1992, p. 124), who remarks the following: ‘In Buddhist canonical (andpost-canonical) texts, the ās(r)avas are often specified as three, namely, [desire for] sensualpleasure (kāmās(r)ava), [desire for] existence (bhavās(r)ava), and ignorance (avijjāsava/avidyāsrava), to which later on a fourth one, viz. (false) views (dit: t:h’āsava/dr: s:t:yāsrava), isadded. This means that the ās(r)avas are understood as evil mental attitudes or states, i.e. inlater terminology, as kleśas, and often the terms āsrava and kleśa are even taken to be quasi-synonyms’.

[10] Suttanipāta (Eds. Anderson & Smith, 1913) 1033, 1048, 1065. On the position of theSuttanipāta in early Buddhist literature: see Lamotte (1958, pp. 172–173).

[11] The Sarvāstivādin Zhong shi fen apitan lun ([Abhidharma]prakaran: apāda[śāstra], T.vol. 26,no.1541, p. 674b8–22, a text that most likely was written in the beginning of the 300 yearsafter the Buddha, for example, explains the four conditions in their relation to the four nobletruths. The list of six causes first appears in the Sarvāstivādin As:t:agrantha/Jñānaprasthāna, atext that was most likely written at the end of the 300 years after the Buddha: See Apitan bajiandu lun (Abhidharmās:t:askandhaśāstra), T.vol.26, no.1543, p. 773a13–21, pp. 774b22–775a9; Apidamo fazhi lun ([Abhidharma]jñānaprasthāna[śāstra]), T.vol.26, no.1544, pp.920c5–921a10. Stcherbatsky (1958, vol. 2, p. 138) remarks that ‘There is no hard and fastline of demarcation […] between what a cause and what a condition is. The list of six causesseems to be a later doctrine which came to graft itself upon the original system of four“conditions”’. See also Conze (1962, pp. 153–156), Kawamura (1972, pp. 187–193). For thedating of these texts: see Dessein (2012).

[12] For the identity of the Vaibhās:ika Sarvāstivādins and of the Sautrāntikas: see Willemen,Dessein, and Cox (1998, pp. 106–110), Dhammajoti (2009, pp. 55–59).

[13] This division into three time periods first appears in the Jñānaprasthāna, T.vol. 26, nr.1544,p. 921b16 ff.

[14] See Apitan xin lun (*Abhidharmahr:daya), T.vol.28, nr.1550, pp. 826c21–827a11; Apitan xinlun jing (*Abhidharmahr:dayasūtra), T.vol.28, nr.1551, p. 860b26–c20; Za apitan xin lun(*Sam: yuktābhidharmahr:daya), T.vol.28, no.1552, p. 935b15–c25; Apitan gan lu wei lun(Abhidharmāmr: tarasaśāstra), T.vol.28, nr.1553, pp. 970c26–971a2, p. 971a2–9; Apidamodapiposha lun (*[Abhidharma]vibhās:ā[śāstra]), T.vol.27, nr.1545, pp. 116b28–122b10;Apidamo jushe lun (Abhidharmakośaśāstra), T.vol.29, nr.1558, pp. 48a21–49b17.

[15] Notice that, as mentioned, MN I (Ed. Trenckner, [1888] 1964) 54 has a variant of theformula of dependent origination that starts with ‘impurities’ (āsrava). Cf. Visuddhimagga,Ed. Rhys Davids (1975, p. 525).

[16] For a detailed study of this interpretation of the 12-membered formula in terms of (1) thethree time periods, (2) defilement, action, and actual entity, and (3) cause and fruition: seeWayman (1970–1971, pp. 187–191) and Ed. Dessein (1999). See also de La Vallée Poussin(1913, pp. 35–38).

[17] In fact, Wayman (1974, p. 229) states that ascribing the first two members to the past periodof time was given in by the Abhidharma literature. He claims that ‘the first two members,nescience (avidyā) and motivations (sam: skāra) would perforce constitute an intermediatestate, after No. 12, old age and death (jarāmaran: a), unless the first two members couldsomehow be understood to not follow upon death’; and that a solution was ‘to say that thosetwo belong to the previous cycle’.

[18] For an overview of Śrāvakayāna schools that accepted and that did not accept the existence ofan intermediate state, see Bareau (1955, p. 283).

[19] Cfr. de La Vallée Poussin (1934–1935, p. 148) who calls this ‘une sorte d’âme’.[20] See Wayman (1970–1971, p. 189), Wayman (1974, p. 231) and Wayman (1980, p. 287).

Wayman (1970–1971, p. 189) gives parallels in the Tibetan tradition, and Wayman (1974, p.

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231) gives parallels in the Sām: khya tradition. Wayman (1970–1971, p. 198) calls the firstthree members a ‘pregenetic realm’.

[21] It is because of their elevated state that they can choose their future parents, continent, etc.,as this was the case with the historical Buddha.

[22] Another possible interpretation is seeing these two members as belonging to the previouscycle, along with members 11 and 12. See Wayman (1974, pp. 229–230) and Wayman (1980,p. 291).

[23] Also the Theravādin bhavan:gavin

:n:ana, the Vibhajyavādin bhavān

:gavijñāna and the

Mahāsām: ghika mūlavijñāna are similar concepts. See Wayman (1974, p. 228) and Bareau(1955, pp. 240, 177, 72 resp.). All these schools do not accept an intermediate state.

[24] de La Vallée Poussin (1934–1935, p. 167) continues that, probably, the concept of the‘storehouse consciousness’ originally had nothing to do with the Yogācāra ideas and waslater brought into the Yogācāra philosophy.

[25] Also Nāgārjuna, the second century Mahāyāna philosopher, in hisPratītyasamutpādahr:dayakārikā, opposed the idea of an intermediate state, and reconciledthe pratītyasamutpāda formula with the doctrine of selflessness (śūnyatā). For reflections onNāgārjuna’s authorship of the Pratītyasamutpādahr:dayakārikā, see Lindtner (1990, p. 170).

[26] Dacheng yizhang, T.vol. 44, nr.1851, p. 486b19–24. See also Tanaka (1990, p. 36).

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