the role of food aid in drought and recovery: oxfam's north turkana (kenya) drought relief...

REPORTS AND COMMENTS

The Role of Food Aid in Drought and Recovery: Oxfam’s North Turkana (Kenya) Drought Relief Programme, 1992 - 94

JENNIFER BUSH

Regional droughts carry the seeds of catastrophe: the immediate risk is famine; the long-term risk is destitution. Preventing both situations is an appropriate, if not essential, goal for relief agencies. In the past, responses to hunger in Turkma District (north-west Kenya) have taken the form of traditional feeding programmes. A better understanding of the boornlbust cycles in pastoralis t systems has, however, produced new relief strategies. A central tenet of these strategies is the acceptance that relief aid should assume two roles: humanitarian - to overcome food deficits - and economic - to overcome ’income’ deficits. Arguments in favour of a broader role for food aid are tested with a case study of a drought relief programme in north Turkana between 1992-1994. Field studies confirmed that when food aid is integrated as an asset into household resources, it can strengthen economic recovery. Ultimately, the extent to which relief operations are able to protect both people’s lives and their livelihoods is the key to more sustainable development in drought-prone areas.

Since Independence, Kenya has held a prominent position in the history of Afri- can development. For a relatively long period, its progress has been shaped by political and economic stability and it is often regarded, therefore, as a nation rich in resources and high in potential. What is often overlooked is the surprising fact that approximately 88 per cent of Kenya is arid and semi-arid land (ASAL).

Unlike the high growth farming areas, Kenya’s ASAL regions have been marginal in the country’s development plans. Until recently, poor communication infrastructure ensured that these regions

- which cover most of northern, eastern and southern Kenya - remained remote from the central hub around Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu. To a large extent, this remoteness was the key to the survival of traditional economic systems. The pre- dominant system in most areas is nomadic pastoralism. In the far north, near the borders with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan, subsistence herding is practised in one of the driest and harshest regions of Kenya. To survive with their herds, pastoralist communities rely on the most crucial weapon at hand: mobility.

The steady erosion of pastoralists’

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nomadic ways has been a chief factor behind increased food insecurity and poverty. Instability in neighbouring countries, increased cattle raiding and the encroachment of farmers into dry season grazing areas have all contributed to decreased mobility and to the undermining of subsistence herding. As poverty became more obvious, concern grew to halt the pattern of impoverishment. Early efforts concentrated on developing economic alter- natives to pastoralism. These efforts were notably unsuccessful and, at their worst, highly disruptive. Later strategies empha- sised the need to strengthen traditional pastoral systems (Bush, 1991).

Despite good intentions, progress has been slow. Development efforts conti- nually stumbled up against drought. With each drought, vital resources were lost and pastoralists seemed increasingly vulnerable to destitution. Historically, droughts played a vital role in maintaining a balance between animal and human populations and available resources. This was, however, at great human cost. Without relief food, deaths were high. Another cost was out-migration. Most of those displaced from pastoralism migrated to nearby agricultural towns. In recent years, migration to trading towns within the district has also become common. In both cases, displaced pastoralists swell the ranks of the urban poor. This strategy, while it may have allowed for survival, was environ- mentally destructive. The spread of settle- ments reduced vegetation cover, leading to localised degradation. One outcome is that pastoralists now keep fewer milch animals in the main camps (Ornas, 1991). Out-migration, as a coping strategy, was also economically limiting. Even in. Kenya’s high-potential areas, economic growth has been insufficient to absorb ‘unskilled’ pastoralist labour. Increasing violence in shanty towns has dramatically focused attention on the need to stem the flow of migration of destitutes. One

central strategy emerges to stem this tide: the strengthening of pastoralism and of indigenous strategies for coping with drought through diversification.

In arid areas, cycles of rural poverty and out-migration can be mitigated by actively managing the effects of droughts in ways that reduce widespread destitution. The strategy of active drought management is based on one assumption: that although pastoralism is not as robust as in the past, it remains the only system that makes economic and environmental sense in very arid areas. A drought management approach recognises that once a pastoralist is destitute, food insecurity becomes a chronic - rather than tempor- ary - problem because economic opportu- nities outside pastoralism in ASAL districts are extremely poor.

For the most part, this challenge has been interpreted as a need to protect local economies during severe droughts. Inter- vening early before a crisis unfolds is central to the theme of drought management. In a prolonged regional drought, famine relief would supplement early drought interven- tions. Could relief programmes also play a role in drought management by butressing the economic system?

The debate about the impact and potential role of food aid during drought emergencies has been complicated by the out- comes of different relief programmes. There are arguments that call for less emphasis on food aid (de Wad, 1987; Jackson et al., 1982); arguments in favour of an expanded food. aid role (Walker, 1989; Baxter, 1993; and arguments that, if not anti-food aid, outline the potential risk of extensive food aid use (Maxwell, 1986). All of these case studies provide lessons to be learned but the extent to which they have general application is still to be determined. Only through constant evaluation of ongoing work will appropriate strategies for over- coming the economic challenges of drought gradually become clearer.

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The Role of Food Aid in Drought and Recovery 249

Although evidence to support an expanded role for food aid is not yet conclusive, emergency efforts during Kenya’s latest drought provide material for further assessment of the impact of food aid. In this article I first look at cycles of drought and drought response amongst Turkana pastoralists, establishing that the main impacts of drought are both nutritional and economic. I then turn to research findings and describe the ways in which food aid was used, and the extent of such use, by the sample population. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for future drought relief efforts in pastoralist communities.

COPING WITH DROUGHT

Turkana is the largest district in Kenya, covering 72,000 km2. As one of twenty-two districts classified as ‘arid and semi-arid land, Turkana falls in the driest and least productive end of the ASAL spectrum. Average annual rainfall in the district is estimated to be about 300-400 mm on the plains (but 150 mm on average in the arid central region). This statistic hides a basic feature of the district; both over time and space, rainfall is extremely variable and unevenly distributed. As an adaptation to low and variable rairJal1, Turkana pastoralists practise diversified production, opportunistically growing sorghum in natural catchment sites and fishing in Lake Turkana. Livestock, however, remain central both to their economy and to their culture. Moreover, despite declining mobility, Turkana pastoralists are still a nomadic people, herding mixed flocks of camels, cattle, sheep and goats.

The first impacts of drought are environmental and economic. With the failure of rain, livestock productivity declines, slowly at first and then more rapidly. As livestock deaths mount and as purchasing power collapses, households break up, old people and children grow sickly and

serious hunger sets in. Famine comes at the end of the cycle: when people cannot produce their own food and when they no longer have anything of value to sell in exchange for food, famine results.

After centuries of adapting to the vagaries of a hostile, arid environment, the Turkana have developed effective strategies for coping with periods of low, or no, rainfall (TDCPU, 1992). The first group of strategiescan be classified as ‘herd management’ (O’Leary, 1985). This group includes various ways of obtaining maxi- mum use of scarce resources, such as by dividing herds into small flexible camps. Another consideration in herd management is reducing stress on the herds. Certain ’stress management’ strategies have unfortunate social implications. To lessen stress on dwindling assets, household ‘dependents’ are encouraged to leave and to secure their food elsewhere.

A second group of strategies can be classified as ’food and income diversification’ (O’Leary, 1985). As milk and sorghum supplies become scarce, the Turkana increasingly rely on commercial food (maize and beans) and, to a lesser extent, on wild fruits. Higher consumption of food that is not produced locally leads to a reliance on the market and, in turn, on agricultural production in distant farming regions. Cash must be generated through sales of livestock, skins and hides, jewellery andlor household goods. When surplus assets have been sold, pastoralists will turn to non-conventional income sources. Typical work for pastoralists during severe droughts is charcoal burn- ing, handicraft sales, mining for precious stones, casual labour, and beer brewing. ‘Begging’ from relatives and friends to secure food or cash is also intensified during the period of drought stress.

A common element in all of these strategies is economic survival. Surviving drought is a test of one’s ability to keep one’s family alive. Just as importantly, it is

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a test of one’s ability to keep alive one’s means of survival (in this case, livestock). In the early stages of drought, when the possibility of starvation is still remote, economic survival is the most pressing concern. Pastoralists may even, under conditions of stress, endure serious hunger in order to sustain the household herd (de Waal, 1989). Thus, herd management, especially during droughts, is an intricate balance between food management and economic management. Pastora- lists must assess daily how much to draw down from their herds - their productive assets - in order to acquire sufficient food. As a drought deepens, this balance is harder to achieve. Ultimately, in a prolonged drought, pastoralists may deplete most of their assets in order to stay alive, thus making recovery after the drought a very difficult task.

If they are able filly to employ their range of coping strategies, of which mobility is central, pastoralists are resilient to drought (Ellis et al., 1985). Turkana herders, for example, can survive a failed rainy season or two without external assistance. Nonetheless, not all pastoralists are resilient. Their degree of vulnerability depends on several factors: access to dry season ranges; peace with neighbouring pastoralist communities; the ratio of female to male stock; and the availability of, and access to, commercial cereals (Swift, 1988). Herd sizes also determine vulnerability. The greater the buffer stock of animals, the greater the likelihood that households can weather a drought on their own. The real achilles heel of pastoralism is the slow pace of recovery after a devastating drought. Just as the slide into destitution is a slow spiral downwards (with total collapse occurring very rapidly at the end), so recovery is a long, uncertain journey back up. It takes several seasons for herds to rebuild to a point of reasonable food security. Until this threshold is reached, milk will be scarce, and the sale of stock to obtain maize, while necessary, will

depress growth, slowing down recovery. The above paragraphs have established

three main points. Firstly, famine is a condition of both food shortage and economic collapse (a loss of food ’entitlement’). Secondly, in coping with drought, pastoralists maintain a careful balance between food management and herd management. Their concern is two-fold: to obtain sufficient food for the family; and to maintain a core of breeding stock to ensure recovery when the rains return. And thirdly, pastoralists are, ironically, both resistant to drought stress as well as vulnerable to destitution. Their vulnerability stems partly from their forced reliance on market forces during drought, and from the long period it takes for a herd to be rebuilt.

DROUGHT RELIEF IN TURKANA DISTRICT, 1992- 1994

In Turkana, drought conditions emerged in 1990 but culminated in 1992. By the middle of 2992, severe and generalised economic disruption was evident. The crisis was long lasting, and conditions did not start to improve until 1994. Drought was further . complicated by hostility between neighbouring tribes which led to restricted access to crucial dry season grazing areas. These factors resulted in widespread deterioration of the livestock economy. Eventually, malnutrition rates amongst children soared to high levels. In the north, drought-related deaths amongst elderly Turkana were reported. All this was evidence of severe stress within the local population.

In response to rapidly deteriorating conditions, and to avert an imminent famine in the district, Oxfam and World Vision began distributing relief food in October 1992. The relief effort covered the whole district with Oxfam acting as the lead agency in the far north. This region covered four divisions: Kakuma, Loki- choggio, Lokitaung, and Kibish. Given the



severity of conditions, a system of broad- focused targeting was adopted. In October 1992, at the beginning of the operation, 224,000 people received food. Sixteen months later in mid-1994, Oxfam was still providing food to 155,000 people.

At the start of the operation, Oxfam identified three objectives: ’to relieve immediate hunger and suffering; to prevent any further deterioration in the nutritional situation; and in the longer term, to provide a means of economic support to the pastoral sector’ (Birch, 1994). Economic objectives were therefore explicitly included as one function of food aid. The main economic measure was more sustained aid to Turkana pastoralists to protect surviving livestock; these would form the nucleus of stock for recovery after the drought. It was assumed that pastoralists would use the food in an economically rational way. It was expected, for example, that with basic food needs met, pastoralists would opportunistically reduce offtake from their herds. Food was also expected to supply small cash needs (e.g. to purchase tobacco, sugar and medicines). Households who carefully managed their food aid supply could realise a small surplus which could then be sold as income support. Food aid was also expected to strengthen drought coping strategies, such as traditional gift networks. In sum, Oxfam argued that mea- sures to prevent total economic collapse and thus to promote faster drought recovery, should be a vital part of emergency relief programmes.

If pastoralists were to use food for economic support, a generous -ration would have to be provided for a sustained period of time and, in the initial stages of the relief programme, when stress was widespread and vulnerability to destitution high, targeting would have to be broad-based. This was not a popular decision, as resource constraints were reportedly great, but it was argued that

broad-focused targeting was absolutely necessary. As the drought reached its peak and resource sharing intensified, there was so much pressure exerted on wealthier households to support more impoverished families that the general (and much depleted) resource base was threatening to collapse. Despite the sighcant contro- versy, all pastoralists in Oxfam’s programme area, regardless of whether they still owned stock, received a relief ration.

FINDINGS: THE ECONOMIC USES OF FOOD AID

To what extent did food aid contribute toward maintaining the economic independence of Turkana pastoralists? This question can be broken down into three components: to what extent did food aid contribute to (a) the rebuilding of herds (through either natural regeneration or direct livestock purchase); (b) income support; and (c) strengthening social bonds through the practice of sharing?

Rebuilding herds

Throughout the period of emergency relief distribution, the main impact of food aid was in preventing hunger (see Figure 1, which shows a gradual decline in children’s malnutrition rates). The percentage of the relief ration consumed directly by the household varied slightly depending on the ration level (the lower the ration, the more of it was consumed directly). Overall, households used at least 80 per cent of the ration for direct consumption (Figure 2). The very fact that food aid filled food gaps, however, contributed to the strengthening of herd growth. Food aid cannot itself prevent animal deaths from occurring, but it can prevent stock depletion at the point where it is controllable: by minimising livestock sales and by reducing livestock slaughter. As ongoing monitoring showed, the availability of a free staple food led to a sustained


252 Jennifer Bush

20 -

10 -

0

-----..._________

I I

1990191 1992 1993 1994

Girls - --+-- Boys

FIGURE 1 Percentage of children undernourished (below 13.5 mid-upper arm circumference)

Source: TDCPUlDMP

I

Kakuma

Lokichoggio v LokitnglKibsh

20 40 60 80 100 0 Percentage = Consumption Given to Relatives

Market Uses

FIGURE 2 Uses of food aid as a percentage of monthly ration by Division, 1994

Source: TDCPUlDMP

downward trend in livestock sales and were low (Figure 5). Herd growth dropped slaughter (Figures 3 and 4). This had several again in 1994 when livestock disease positive effects. First, offtake from the herds epidemics swept through northern Tur- was very low. This led to herd growth even kana, killing many animals. Yet, growth, during the drought, when growth rates although low, was still positive. Second, as



1990191 1.9 I

I

1992 1.7

1993

1994 0.5

I I I I

0 1 2 ,3 4 5

Sheep

Cattle

Goats

Donkeys

Camels

FIGURE 3 Monthly average livestock sales per household herd during yearly phases

Source: TDCPUlDMP

1990/91

1992

1993

1994

I 4

Camels

FIGURE 4 Monthly average slaughter per household herd during yearly phases

Source: TDCPUiDMP

so few livestock were on the market, livestock prices rose substantially, strengthening pastoralists' purchasing power (Figure 6) . A third, although less sigruficant, impact

on herd recovery, was decreased bleeding rates (Figure 7). Lower bleeding rates meant that the livestock were put under less stress, heightening their chances of survival.


254 Jennifer Bush

5 -

0

I I I I

199Ol91 1992 1993 1994

Sheep Goats Camels

0 Cattie Donkeys

FIGURE 5 Monthly average growth rates per household herd during yearly phases

Source: TDCPU/DMP

I I

Shillings

The positive role of food aid in pre- to purchase livestock. Those who did, purchased only a few and restocking at such rates would have been a very slow process. Natural regeneration is not only a faster way to rebuild herds but is a more realistic aim for general famine relief programmes.

serving core breeding stock and for allow- ing herds to multiply immediately after the drought should not be underestimated. Moreover, evidence from the study showed that very few households used relief food


The Rule u j Food Aid in Drought and Recovery 253 -

2

1.5-

1 -

o l I I

199Ol91 1992

Goats

1993 1994

FIGURE 7 Monthly frequency of livestock bleeding by household herd

Source: TDCPUiDMP

Of the sainple households, only an estimated 10 per cent used relief food to purchase livestock. Two factors accounted for this unexpected finding. First, low restocking rates reflected people’s difficulty in accumulating enough surplus food to fund livestock purchases. Restocking is costly. To accumulate maize in surplus, households had to resist day to day sharing with relatives and even reduce their own intake - conditions that were very difficult to achieve. A second factor, was, ironically, the impact of broad-focused targeting itself. As most people were receiving maize, there was no rural demand for the commodity, yet households had few other resources to barter in exchange for livestock. At the same time, the severity of the drought meant that most people lost significant numbers of stock. Once relief food arrived, all herders concentrated on rebuilding their herds. The restocking that did take placed mainly represented cross-border trading, for example with Merille pastoralists from Ethiopia. It was reported, however, that this barter arrangement ended shortly after a relief operation started up in Ethiopia. The evi-

dence on restuchng suggests one important conclusion; the main contribution food aid can make to cushioning the devastating economic effects of drought is by protecting core breeding stock.

Income support

Patterns of income expenditure before the start up of food distribution showed one dominant trend: households’ main purchase was food. Indeed, buying food was their primary reason for engaging in market activities. It was expected, therefore, that households would reduce their market involvement as soon as their food needs were met through the famine relief programme. This assumption proved cor- rect but trends were not as pronounced as expected. One reason for continued market involvement was that during droughts, pastoralists prefer to strategi- cally diversify food and income sources.

It was also assumed that, as cash needs are to some degree ongoing, food aid would be used for income support. Two features of the relief operation made


256 Jennifer Bush

this seem very likely. Firstly, since relief food amved with regularity, households were less likely to store up food in reserve and were more likely to sell off any surplus. Secondly, cereal rations were adequate yet the ration basket was low in other essential commodities ( e g oil and beans). To purchase the missing items, cash could be generated through the sale of surplus relief maize. To some extent, then, relief food did fill income gaps. Yet, the use of food aid in this way was not extensive amongst the sample households - roughly 35 per cent reported using food aid to earn an income. Moreover, the average amount of relief food used was - at 13 per cent - a relatively small part of the monthly ration. When relief food was sold, it was usually sold indirectly: that is, women used the maize to brew beer for commercial sale.

Market involvement declined, therefore, once food aid was provided. With basic food needs covered by relief food, sample households had less need for cash. At the same time, food aid was used, like other resources (trees, fruits, gum arabic, jewellery, handicrafts), to supplement incomes, especially while livestock hold- ings were low. The extent of relief maize sales depended on three factors:

The relief commodity had to be a desirable one. An undesirable commodity, (such as yellow maize) will sup- press sales, especially direct sales. Where good markets existed for other types of commodities (such as fire- wood and charcoal) and where the prices of those commodities were fair, people continued to be involved in those trades. Although more buoyant markets encourage commercial uses of food aid, the amount of food aid each household uses is likely to be low as people have a range of commodities to trade in. The extent of sales also depended on household reserves of relief food and,

in turn, on the size of the household. Household size was important because the distribution system was based on fairly generous individual rations.

Although the overall impact of food aid on the incomes of the sample population was relatively low, it was not clear that this was because households had no need to earn an income from the maize. Households reported an ongoing need for cash to pay for school fees, tea, and other commercial items. In a slightly different context there might have been greater market use of relief food. Households did not recklessly dispose of relief food on the local market but if people had a small amount in surplus, and if a cash need arose that another activity could not fulfil, then the household would sell off a relatively small portion of their ration.

Strengthening social bonds

Amongst pastoralists, the sharing of resources is an ongoing, normal event (Oba, 1994). One of the risks of drought is that when household herds are depleted, people drop out of this network of sharing and, once displaced, their re-insertion into the pastoralist sector is extremely difficult. Conversely, recovery is more likely if people maintain their close ties - through the giving of gifts - so that they can reactivate their claims on livestock when rangeland conditions improve (Oba, 1994).

One of the most extensive uses of relief food was as an asset to be redistri- buted along traditional social networks. Of the sample households, approximately 70 per cent reported giving food to relatives or friends. (This figure was 50 per cent during the first period of the programme when food aid rations were largely inade- quate). While the practise of sharing was widespread, households typically gave away only small amounts of food - on average 9 per cent of the monthly (household) ration. In general, this was less than


The Role of Food Aid in Drought and Recove y 257

the amount of food put to market uses per month. Despite this, judging by the exten- siveness of the practice, sharing food with relatives emerged as the clear priority.

The role that food aid plays in maintaining the social fabric of pastoralist society is one of the greatest benefits of a well-organised, and well supplied relief programme. Households identified two reasons for sharing food: humanitarianism (e.g., if a hungry person came by asking for assistance) and the strengthening of social bonds. The nature of food redistribution varied according to the amount of food available and the person requesting food. The most common form of sharing was inviting a visitor to take part in the family’s cooked meal. Close relatives were more likely to receive a portion of the maize ration; the closer the tie, the more the person would receive. Amounts given ranged from 1 - 2 kg for distant relatives to 10 kg of ‘dry rations’ for very close kin.

Extensive redistribution of food suggests that many households were not registered in the relief programme. Presumably, where some people are receiving free food and others are not, the demand on this food by the ‘unentitled’ will be high (Buchanan- Smith, 1993). In the sample population, on average one person per household was not registered in the relief programme. Mor- eover in some areas, entire households missed being registered. Nonetheless, given the programme’s target population - pastoral nomads - the incidence of non- registration was not unusually high (double registration, on the other hand, was a problem initially). This leads to the conclusion that the extensive sharing of food amongst households reflected the normal practise of chasing old claims and giving gifts to consolidate social bonds.

CONCLUSION

A short term humanitarian goal and a long-term economic goal informed the

1992-94 Oxfam relief programme in northern Turkana. The economic strategy was to design a programme which would maintain the economic independence of local pastoralists. This goal mirrored traditional asset management strategies which strive to maintain a balance between fulfilling food needs and protecting, or building up, economic wealth. The implications of broad-focused targeting is that the timing and targeting of aid is not determined by a narrow definition of vulnerable groups, which traditionally include children under five, pregnant and nursing mothers and the very poor. Instead, targeting is guided by the broader socio-economic need to keep the economy viable. All those who were at risk of depleting their core productive assets because of drought were considered vulnerable. This definition of vulnerability does not exclude those with livestock remaining; it excludes only those with a regular commercial or salaried income. Allocating famine relief to households with livestock is justified on the grounds that if those with remaining assets are forced to deplete them, local economic and social collapse will follow. Food aid, therefore, is given to all households as a support to the general (and depleted) economic resource base.

The implications for famine relief operations (namely higher rations for longer periods of time) may not be popular in today’s climate of resource constraints. Nonetheless, many relief agencies have come to view drought emergencies not strictly in logistical terms - getting food to people - nor in simple humanitarian terms - preventing starvation - but also in economic terms, as a matter of preventing destitution. To this end, there is now more readiness to address recurrent emergency problems in integrated and innovative ways. This shift in thinking comes from the realisation that third world populations are, after decades of development, still extremely vulnerable to hunger


258 Jennifer Bush

and poverty, This situation provides an incentive to look at relief programmes in ways that address the ’vulnerability issue’: can relief operations help buttress local economies daring periods of stress so that they do not totally collapse?

Research in Turkana shows, firstly, that food aid can make a contribution to cushioning the devastating economic effects of drought, mainly by protecting core breeding stock. Food aid discourages livestock offtake and it is this effect that promotes herd growth. This interaction is especially important during the early recovery phase when conditions are more favourable for growth. Second, relief food was also used by beneficiaries for income support. This in turn led to stronger herd growth as relief food replaced livestock as the means to generate a small cash income. A third significant impact was the reinforcement of traditional social struc- tures. In pastoralist economies, social networks are cemented through the practise of giving gifts and pursuing claims. Oba writes of neighbouring Marsabit Dis- trict that ’perhaps its unobtrusiveness and the silent way in which it operates have led to its benefits being disregarded. [Yet] reciprocal sharing . . . has become a vital but threatened survival mechanism’ (1994, pp. 19-22). The survey found that these practices continued during the drought; relief food, however, replaced livestock as the key asset of exchange. Thus, by providing the means to keep alive vital ‘networks of sharing’, relief operations contributed to the ongoing functioning of households as viable socio-economic units.

Resource constraints are nonetheless a reality that must be faced by relief agencies. One consideration in limiting aid is to tailor types of aid to the specific emergency. Broad-focused targeting, for example, is appropriate only in prolonged droughts. Localised drought disasters should be answered with targeted feeding programmes and short-term health inter-

ventions. Similarly, the breadth of inter- ventions proposed on the basis of the case study (higher rations to more people for longer periods of time) should not neces- sarily be applied to agricultural societies. The principle of ’lives and livelihoods’ is applicable here as it should be in any subsistence economy hit by a disaster, but the special dynamics of loss and recovery in agricultural sectors leads to different targeting and timing approaches. Farming people are less resistant to drought; one season of failed rain can throw subsistence households into a condition of serious hunger. Yet, with the return of the rain, recovery from hunger lasts the length of the cropping season, usually a matter of months. By contrast,

just as one bad year of rainfall does not cause destitution amongst pastoralists, one good year will not cause a great increase in prosperity. Pastoralists pay a price for their ability to sustain one or two years of poor crop production. They do not recover as quickly as the agrarian sector from a lean period (Walker 1987, p, 51).

Pastoralists, due to their unusual resistance and vulnerability, require heightened attention during prolonged droughts. Rations to more people for longer (but limited) periods of time may not be granted easily but it is a small price to pay when the outcome is the preservation of a people’s long-term independence.

Note I was a member of a consultancy team which undertook research in Turkana in 1994. The article is based on this research and builds from a document submitted to Oxfam-Kenya on the economic impacts of Oxfam’s drought relief programme. I lived in Turkana District between 1989 and 1994 working on projects funded by the World Food Programme and the Royal Netherlands Embassy. I gratefully acknow- ledge the contribution of Fredrick Wekesa Lukhanyo and Erastus Ngala who carried out the primary research for the study and who


The Role of Food Aid in Drought and Recm~ey 259

provided key analytical insights. The Turkana Drought Contingency and Planning Unit (TDCPU) carried out the research on livestock sale, slaughter, growth, prices and bleeding rates. Mr. Boogaard is thanked for program- ming the data analysis. Oxfam Nairobi staff kindly checked the document for inaccuracies; Stephen Anderson was an excellent proof reader and gave many helpful comments.

Since 1988, the TDCPU has operated an Early Warning System in Turkana District, carrying out monthly monitoring of a range of socio-economic variables (mainly livestock production). The system is decentralised at district level. Monitors are based in rural villages and collect information each month from approximately 1,000 households (or 8,500 people) using formal questionnaires. Over time, this has yielded consistent time series data. For the 1990-94 case study of Oxfam’s relief operation, additional research was carried out. Discussions were held using various Participa- tory Rural Appraisal techniques with 20 men and women in 17 villages (340 people in total) about food sources and food aid uses. A formal questionnaire was implemented in a further, randomly selected 17 villages. The questionnaire reached 421 households. The study period was divided into four phases. There were two pre-food aid phases: April 1990- June 1991 (Phase 1) and July 1991-September 1992 (Phase 2). Phase 1 and Phase 2 correspond to early and peak stages of the drought. There were two food aid phases: October 1992-May 1993 (Phase 3) and June 1993- June 1994 (Phase 4). These phases were characterised by low food rations and high food rations respectively. For purposes of clarity and simplicity, the phases are referred to in the figures as: 1990/91; 1992; 1993; and 1994. The study was completed in October 1994.

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TDCPU, (1992) Turkana District Drought Manual. Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit, Lodwar, Kenya.

Walker, P. (1987) Food for Recovery: Food Moni- toring and Targeting in Red Sea Province, Sudan - 1985’7. Oxfam, Oxford.

Address for correspondence: Jennifer Bush, c/o SCF (UK), P.O. Box 7165, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.


the role of food aid in drought and recovery: oxfam's north turkana (kenya) drought relief...

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