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DemocratizationPublication details including instructions for authorsand subscription informationhttpwwwtandfonlinecomloifdem20

The political economy ofexternal exploitation Acomparative investigation ofChinas foreign relationsJulia Bader aa Department of Political Science University ofAmsterdam Amsterdam The NetherlandsPublished online 24 Jun 2013

To cite this article Julia Bader Democratization (2013) The political economyof external exploitation A comparative investigation of Chinas foreign relationsDemocratization DOI 101080135103472013795550

To link to this article httpdxdoiorg101080135103472013795550

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The political economy of external exploitation A comparativeinvestigation of Chinarsquos foreign relations

Julia Baderlowast

Department of Political Science University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands

(Received 19 November 2012 final version received 4 April 2013)

On the basis of the selectorate theory this article examines the link betweendistributional policies autocratic cooperation and its potential for autocraticstability It compares to what extent Cambodia Myanmar and Mongoliacomplied with Chinarsquos key external interests in the period 1990ndash2010Against this background the article examines the cooperation betweenwinning coalitions in these countries and China and thereby links a politicaleconomy argument to the discussion on regime type and regime stability inautocracy research The article finds that autocratic exploitation is beneficialto authoritarian powers such as China but that hybrid regimes rather thanclosed autocracies are most vulnerable to such exploitation

Keywords political economy selectorate theory external exploitationregime type external factors autocracy China

Introduction

Since the third wave of democratization ebbed away in the 2000s a growing inter-est has emerged in why autocracies endure Though usually predominantly focusedon domestic factors researchers have started to link external factors to the processof democratization or the lack thereof For example it has been argued that ties toWestern democracies have enhanced democratization while strategic or economicinterests by Western external actors have been identified as a barrier to democrati-zation even after the end of the Cold War1 However abandoning this preoccupa-tion with Western influence a number of experts have claimed that emergingauthoritarian states such as Russia China Venezuela or Iran also underminedemocracy or even promote autocracy in the world2

This debate on ldquoautocracy promotionrdquo is still at an early stage Earlyapproaches to the topic simply categorized the different channels through whichautocratic powers may exert influence on regimes elsewhere3 Recently this per-spective has been blended with a diffusion argument according to which autocratsldquodiffusion proofrdquo their regimes against democratization in order to prevent theerosion of their own power4 Popular upheaval elsewhere may find followers athome and each falling dictatorship then increases the pressure for those remaining

2013 Taylor amp Francis

lowastEmail JuliaBaderuvanl

Democratization 2013httpdxdoiorg101080135103472013795550

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in power to also democratize The most comprehensive approach to synthesize thedifferent components into one conceptualization has been made by Ambrosio5 Inhis conceptualization for ldquoautocratic diffusionrdquo to take place it needs both dom-estic demand for viable survival strategies and external supply that is best practiceexamples Additionally ldquoappropriatenessrdquo that is the degree to which authoritar-ian norms enjoy international legitimacy facilitates autocratic diffusion6

Being valuable for its comprehensiveness there are two weaknesses to thisconceptualization of ldquoautocratic diffusionrdquo First there is no agreement on themechanism behind learning and adaptation as is already indicated by thevarious terminologies used such as ldquoleversrdquo ldquolinkagesrdquo or ldquocontribution con-ditionsrdquo7 Second capturing the external dimension of authoritarianism as aprocess of diffusion tends to overlook another important component to autocraticpatronage Autocratic patronage takes place not only for reasons of diffusion andlegitimacy but also for reasons of political economy

This article suggests an actor-centred political economy framework thatemphasizes the economic nature of autocratic interaction The starting point isthe consideration that the political economy in autocracies provides incentivesfor autocratic cooperation beyond diffusion or domino effects The fact that redis-tribution of private goods in autocratic systems is possible in a highly discretionarymanner makes these systems prone to exploitation from outside and hence pro-vides incentives for external powers to cultivate autocracies abroad8 This articleapplies this framework to China as an autocratic power and looks at exploitationin three case studies

By approaching the topic from a political economy perspective this articlecontributes to the current scientific debate in several ways First the article exam-ines whether and under what conditions the exploitation argument holds Secondusing this actor-centred framework the article illuminates how autocratic inter-action works and examines the mechanism of autocratic cooperation that even-tually may lead to autocratic learning Finally the approach allows for analysingand comparing different types of autocracies and can therefore also contribute toresearch on authoritarianism which has recently emphasized the traits of differenttypes of authoritarian regimes9

My findings suggest that autocratic exploitation is beneficial to China and thusstrong incentives for China to sustain non-democracies exist It also finds thathybrid autocracies might be more useful to this end than closed autocraciesFinally the liberal foreign policy approach applied in this study offers a new per-spective on the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relations and suggests that analystsshould pay more attention to the strategic benefits that come from cooperationbetween autocratic elites

The remaining article is structured as follows The next section presents theselectorate theory as the analytical framework for my further investigationThen the empirical examination begins by presenting three countries ndash CambodiaMyanmar and Mongolia ndash through the lens of the selectorate theory as three caseswith differing winning coalitions and differing compliance with Chinese interests

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This is followed by a discussion of the patterns of interaction between actors inthese countries and China for each of the case studies The conclusion providesa reflection on the results and discusses their implications for democratizationand future research in the field of Chinarsquos foreign policy

Analytical framework

The analytical framework of this article builds on existing work that emphasizes acorrelation between the political order and the distributional policies of a govern-ment10 More specifically the selectorate theory views political systems from theperspective of three societal subgroups the winning coalition and the nominaland true selectorates11 The nominal selectorate refers to the subset of peoplethat have a formal role in choosing the leadership while the true selectorate arethose who are essential for the selection of leadership The winning coalition asubset of the selectorate consists of those whose support is necessary for aleader to remain in power In sum democracies tend to have large selectoratesand relatively large winning coalitions Autocracies in contrast often havesmall selectorates and small winning coalitions while the democratic elementsin hybrid regimes translate into large nominal selectorates with limited true selec-torates and limited winning coalitions

In selectorate theory political actors are considered to trade privileges againstpolitical support from the winning coalition As a consequence the size of thewinning coalition has an impact on the distributional decisions of decision-makers Leaders in small winning coalitions are encouraged to buy the supportof their coalition members with targeted goods When the winning coalition islarge by contrast it is more effective to create support by providing untargetedpublic goods Therefore large coalition systems tend to produce more publicgoods while small coalition systems are prone to redistribute private goodsincluding patronage cronyism and corruption12

As to external relations selectorate theory reasons that it is easier to extractpolicy concessions from a leader depending on a small winning coalition asthere is discretionary leeway in distributing resources13 This susceptibility toexploitation in turn delivers a formidable incentive for leaders in powerfulautocracies to cultivate autocratic governments abroad14 External powers profitfrom stripping authoritarian countries of their resources Especially externalautocratic powers benefit from weaker autocracies as these serve to legitimizenon-democratic rule and offer opportunities for exploitation

As distribution is essential for political survival external actors can influencethe stability of an existing regime by engaging in the latterrsquos re-distributional pol-icies Interaction at the international level creates benefits which those involved canpass on to their domestic winning coalition Competitors excluded frominternational interaction are deprived of such a possibility By interacting onlyselectively with some groups external actors can influence the power relationsbetween groups competing over power15

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The following sections investigate the nexus between externalexploitation the engagement of winning coalitions and its potential impact onregime stability

Selectorates winning coalitions and compliance

In this section I present a comparison of compliance with Chinese interests in threeAsian countries Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia In sum this section revealsthat compliance is linked to the size of winning coalitions I start by briefly elabor-ating on the selection of these countries before introducing their winningcoalitions I will then present a set of Chinese interests which serve to measurecompliance and then contrast the actual compliance of the three countries witheach other

The investigation of whether the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) has beenable to successfully realize its interests in these countries is based on newspaperarticles and secondary literature in addition to semi-structured interviews16 Itcovers the post-Cold War period until the end of 201017 and is limited to Asiato improve comparability between cases in terms of their exposure to China Inaddition to the size of winning coalitions the cases were chosen according totheir low income levels as classified by the World Bank Also Chinese economicinterests in these countries should be comparable because according to the CentralIntelligence Agencyrsquos online World Factbook they are all rich in terms of naturalresources and raw materials such as timber rubber precious stones cashmereand mineral deposits18 Most of these deposits have only been discovered duringthe 2000s and will become available in the near future

While this case selection seeks to limit the potential for alternative expla-nations some differences that might affect compliance cannot be eliminated Forexample there is variation in the level of integration into the international commu-nity exposure to other major powers and the degree of domestic state authorityAlso some cultural historical and ideological aspects such as the existence ofChinese minorities alignment during the Cold War and ideological orientationsdiffer in the three cases I will pay specific attention to these factors in the followingcase studies

Since I am interested in whether compliance with external interests depends onthe size of the winning coalition three countries of varying coalition size are com-pared Communist regimes have been prevalent in all three countries until the late1980s but in the last two decades they have developed different political systemstranslating into winning coalitions of varying sizes

Cambodiarsquos semi-democratic political system translates into a large nominalselectorate consisting of the electorate However in the last two decades the pol-itical survival of the government was usually based on the support of the militaryand business elites rather than on election results These groups in effect controlthe political and economic landscape and form the true selectorate as well as thewinning coalition

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Throughout the period under investigation Myanmarrsquos highly autocraticregime had an extremely small winning coalition no nominal and a small realselectorate Since the constitution was suspended in 1962 a military junta hadbeen ruling the country The real selectorate and the winning coalition were iden-tical in that the leadership was selected from the ranks of the military and wasdependent on the support of rival factions within the military19 With the electionsin 2010 the nominal selectorate grew to include all eligible voters However as ofthe end of 2010 the real selectorate and the winning coalition still remained smalldue to constitutional law which secured the militaryrsquos dominance in parliamentMost importantly the central government has never been able to bring the wholecountry under its control despite numerous ceasefire agreements between thecentral government and opposing ethnic rebel groups during the 1990s In factseveral local power centres exist next to the central government each of themhaving its own winning coalition

With Mongoliarsquos new democratic constitution of 1992 it has become the mostopen system of the three with the largest winning coalition and a large selectorateAll Mongolians are entitled to elect the government and hence to be part of thenominal selectorate Including those voters whose support is essential to win theelection the size of the Mongolian winning coalition is also relatively largeAlthough observers noticed a trend towards oligarchization in Mongolian politicsfrom 2000 onwards the country experienced two peaceful changes of governmentin line with election results Thus voters still constitute the true selectorate20

The first step of my investigation is to examine whether China finds it indeedeasier to exploit that is to extract concessions from systems with small winningcoalitions In order to do so I compare the compliance of the three presentedcountries with a selection of Chinarsquos external interests (1) the access to naturalresources given to Chinese companies and (2) geo-political interests that may becontext specific but with a particular attention to a countryrsquos relation to theUnited States (US)21 To clarify this analysis is not interested in the determinantsof Chinarsquos foreign policy goals but in finding out whether compliance with theseinterests is different in small or large coalition regimes and how such compliance isachieved

I measure exploitation by means of three degrees of compliance ldquorefusalrdquoldquoreluctancerdquo and ldquoeagernessrdquo The reluctant position usually corresponds to aminimum common denominator response designed to save face for both sideseagerness clearly exceeds Chinese expectations while refusal deviates from thestandard by frustrating Chinese interests In the remainder of this section Ibriefly discuss the compliance of the three cases with Chinese interests

Of all three cases Cambodia is most compliant with Chinarsquos interests Chinesestate-backed investments have made deep inroads into Cambodia with heavyinvestments in infrastructure mining agri-business and the energy sector indicat-ing that Chinese investors have been highly welcomed China has also been par-ticularly successful in acquiring economic concessions to exploit naturalresources in Cambodia Notwithstanding the fact that some Chinese stakeholders

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lacked any experience in this sector Chinese companies obtained concessions forat least three out of six oil exploration blocks indicating that they may be chosenfor reasons other than economic ones22

For a long time Chinarsquos strategic interest in Cambodia was the containment ofVietnamese expansionism With Chinarsquos increasing resource dependencehowever Cambodia gained importance due to its strategic location offeringaccess to the Indian Ocean through which 80 of Chinese oil imports areshipped With the construction of a special economic zone involving the upgrad-ing of Sihanoukvillersquos deepwater port Chinarsquos attempts to improve access to Cam-bodian ports were highly successful Even though the project was commercial innature due to its dual-use character observers speculated that it would feature asone of Chinarsquos ldquostring of pearlsrdquo a chain of deepwater ports in Southeast Asiancountries to which the Chinese acquired access23

Effectively Myanmar has responded by being eagerly compliant to most ofChinarsquos interests Ranking among Myanmarrsquos largest investors China has beenhighly successful in securing access to natural resources and energy and it has beenmuch more successful than India with which it competes over natural gas sales

Similarly China successfully realized its strategic interests in Myanmar whichfocus on excluding the US while at the same time increasing its own influencevis-a-vis other regional players chiefly India in order to secure strategic accessto the Indian Ocean24 During the last decade China was heavily involved in theextension of Myanmarrsquos infrastructure Chinese companies constructed majortransportation networks throughout the country and developed several portswhere they assisted in the construction of radar communication and refuellingfacilities25 In 2009 construction began on an oil and gas pipeline throughMyanmar mitigating Chinarsquos dependence on energy imports via major shippinglanes controlled by the US

Chinarsquos success in realizing its interests in Mongolia is mixed at best andMongolian governments have shown a tendency towards the refusal end of thespectrum In the economic sphere China has been only partially successful Onthe one hand Chinese investors encountered much resistance when they wantedto be included in the development of a few huge resource deposits for which con-cessions were allocated recently On the other hand however many smaller sitesare in fact exploited directly or indirectly by Chinese investors by means ofmore or less legally valid concessions26

Geo-strategically Mongoliarsquos foreign policy under all different governmentswas guided by the desire to connect more closely with Western powers in orderto balance China and Russia Since 1992 the dominant foreign policy concept isMongoliarsquos ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy It implies neutrality with respect to disputesbetween its neighbours and an active cooperation with third countries This policybecame most effective in the aftermath of 911 when the Mongolian governmentdeveloped closer ties to the US

Table 1 summarizes the location of the three countries with reference to each ofthe Chinese objectives Critical for its position along this spectrum is a countryrsquos

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performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

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agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

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Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

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started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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14 1

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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ded

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2013

in power to also democratize The most comprehensive approach to synthesize thedifferent components into one conceptualization has been made by Ambrosio5 Inhis conceptualization for ldquoautocratic diffusionrdquo to take place it needs both dom-estic demand for viable survival strategies and external supply that is best practiceexamples Additionally ldquoappropriatenessrdquo that is the degree to which authoritar-ian norms enjoy international legitimacy facilitates autocratic diffusion6

Being valuable for its comprehensiveness there are two weaknesses to thisconceptualization of ldquoautocratic diffusionrdquo First there is no agreement on themechanism behind learning and adaptation as is already indicated by thevarious terminologies used such as ldquoleversrdquo ldquolinkagesrdquo or ldquocontribution con-ditionsrdquo7 Second capturing the external dimension of authoritarianism as aprocess of diffusion tends to overlook another important component to autocraticpatronage Autocratic patronage takes place not only for reasons of diffusion andlegitimacy but also for reasons of political economy

This article suggests an actor-centred political economy framework thatemphasizes the economic nature of autocratic interaction The starting point isthe consideration that the political economy in autocracies provides incentivesfor autocratic cooperation beyond diffusion or domino effects The fact that redis-tribution of private goods in autocratic systems is possible in a highly discretionarymanner makes these systems prone to exploitation from outside and hence pro-vides incentives for external powers to cultivate autocracies abroad8 This articleapplies this framework to China as an autocratic power and looks at exploitationin three case studies

By approaching the topic from a political economy perspective this articlecontributes to the current scientific debate in several ways First the article exam-ines whether and under what conditions the exploitation argument holds Secondusing this actor-centred framework the article illuminates how autocratic inter-action works and examines the mechanism of autocratic cooperation that even-tually may lead to autocratic learning Finally the approach allows for analysingand comparing different types of autocracies and can therefore also contribute toresearch on authoritarianism which has recently emphasized the traits of differenttypes of authoritarian regimes9

My findings suggest that autocratic exploitation is beneficial to China and thusstrong incentives for China to sustain non-democracies exist It also finds thathybrid autocracies might be more useful to this end than closed autocraciesFinally the liberal foreign policy approach applied in this study offers a new per-spective on the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relations and suggests that analystsshould pay more attention to the strategic benefits that come from cooperationbetween autocratic elites

The remaining article is structured as follows The next section presents theselectorate theory as the analytical framework for my further investigationThen the empirical examination begins by presenting three countries ndash CambodiaMyanmar and Mongolia ndash through the lens of the selectorate theory as three caseswith differing winning coalitions and differing compliance with Chinese interests

2 J Bader

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2013

This is followed by a discussion of the patterns of interaction between actors inthese countries and China for each of the case studies The conclusion providesa reflection on the results and discusses their implications for democratizationand future research in the field of Chinarsquos foreign policy

Analytical framework

The analytical framework of this article builds on existing work that emphasizes acorrelation between the political order and the distributional policies of a govern-ment10 More specifically the selectorate theory views political systems from theperspective of three societal subgroups the winning coalition and the nominaland true selectorates11 The nominal selectorate refers to the subset of peoplethat have a formal role in choosing the leadership while the true selectorate arethose who are essential for the selection of leadership The winning coalition asubset of the selectorate consists of those whose support is necessary for aleader to remain in power In sum democracies tend to have large selectoratesand relatively large winning coalitions Autocracies in contrast often havesmall selectorates and small winning coalitions while the democratic elementsin hybrid regimes translate into large nominal selectorates with limited true selec-torates and limited winning coalitions

In selectorate theory political actors are considered to trade privileges againstpolitical support from the winning coalition As a consequence the size of thewinning coalition has an impact on the distributional decisions of decision-makers Leaders in small winning coalitions are encouraged to buy the supportof their coalition members with targeted goods When the winning coalition islarge by contrast it is more effective to create support by providing untargetedpublic goods Therefore large coalition systems tend to produce more publicgoods while small coalition systems are prone to redistribute private goodsincluding patronage cronyism and corruption12

As to external relations selectorate theory reasons that it is easier to extractpolicy concessions from a leader depending on a small winning coalition asthere is discretionary leeway in distributing resources13 This susceptibility toexploitation in turn delivers a formidable incentive for leaders in powerfulautocracies to cultivate autocratic governments abroad14 External powers profitfrom stripping authoritarian countries of their resources Especially externalautocratic powers benefit from weaker autocracies as these serve to legitimizenon-democratic rule and offer opportunities for exploitation

As distribution is essential for political survival external actors can influencethe stability of an existing regime by engaging in the latterrsquos re-distributional pol-icies Interaction at the international level creates benefits which those involved canpass on to their domestic winning coalition Competitors excluded frominternational interaction are deprived of such a possibility By interacting onlyselectively with some groups external actors can influence the power relationsbetween groups competing over power15

Democratization 3

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The following sections investigate the nexus between externalexploitation the engagement of winning coalitions and its potential impact onregime stability

Selectorates winning coalitions and compliance

In this section I present a comparison of compliance with Chinese interests in threeAsian countries Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia In sum this section revealsthat compliance is linked to the size of winning coalitions I start by briefly elabor-ating on the selection of these countries before introducing their winningcoalitions I will then present a set of Chinese interests which serve to measurecompliance and then contrast the actual compliance of the three countries witheach other

The investigation of whether the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) has beenable to successfully realize its interests in these countries is based on newspaperarticles and secondary literature in addition to semi-structured interviews16 Itcovers the post-Cold War period until the end of 201017 and is limited to Asiato improve comparability between cases in terms of their exposure to China Inaddition to the size of winning coalitions the cases were chosen according totheir low income levels as classified by the World Bank Also Chinese economicinterests in these countries should be comparable because according to the CentralIntelligence Agencyrsquos online World Factbook they are all rich in terms of naturalresources and raw materials such as timber rubber precious stones cashmereand mineral deposits18 Most of these deposits have only been discovered duringthe 2000s and will become available in the near future

While this case selection seeks to limit the potential for alternative expla-nations some differences that might affect compliance cannot be eliminated Forexample there is variation in the level of integration into the international commu-nity exposure to other major powers and the degree of domestic state authorityAlso some cultural historical and ideological aspects such as the existence ofChinese minorities alignment during the Cold War and ideological orientationsdiffer in the three cases I will pay specific attention to these factors in the followingcase studies

Since I am interested in whether compliance with external interests depends onthe size of the winning coalition three countries of varying coalition size are com-pared Communist regimes have been prevalent in all three countries until the late1980s but in the last two decades they have developed different political systemstranslating into winning coalitions of varying sizes

Cambodiarsquos semi-democratic political system translates into a large nominalselectorate consisting of the electorate However in the last two decades the pol-itical survival of the government was usually based on the support of the militaryand business elites rather than on election results These groups in effect controlthe political and economic landscape and form the true selectorate as well as thewinning coalition

4 J Bader

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2013

Throughout the period under investigation Myanmarrsquos highly autocraticregime had an extremely small winning coalition no nominal and a small realselectorate Since the constitution was suspended in 1962 a military junta hadbeen ruling the country The real selectorate and the winning coalition were iden-tical in that the leadership was selected from the ranks of the military and wasdependent on the support of rival factions within the military19 With the electionsin 2010 the nominal selectorate grew to include all eligible voters However as ofthe end of 2010 the real selectorate and the winning coalition still remained smalldue to constitutional law which secured the militaryrsquos dominance in parliamentMost importantly the central government has never been able to bring the wholecountry under its control despite numerous ceasefire agreements between thecentral government and opposing ethnic rebel groups during the 1990s In factseveral local power centres exist next to the central government each of themhaving its own winning coalition

With Mongoliarsquos new democratic constitution of 1992 it has become the mostopen system of the three with the largest winning coalition and a large selectorateAll Mongolians are entitled to elect the government and hence to be part of thenominal selectorate Including those voters whose support is essential to win theelection the size of the Mongolian winning coalition is also relatively largeAlthough observers noticed a trend towards oligarchization in Mongolian politicsfrom 2000 onwards the country experienced two peaceful changes of governmentin line with election results Thus voters still constitute the true selectorate20

The first step of my investigation is to examine whether China finds it indeedeasier to exploit that is to extract concessions from systems with small winningcoalitions In order to do so I compare the compliance of the three presentedcountries with a selection of Chinarsquos external interests (1) the access to naturalresources given to Chinese companies and (2) geo-political interests that may becontext specific but with a particular attention to a countryrsquos relation to theUnited States (US)21 To clarify this analysis is not interested in the determinantsof Chinarsquos foreign policy goals but in finding out whether compliance with theseinterests is different in small or large coalition regimes and how such compliance isachieved

I measure exploitation by means of three degrees of compliance ldquorefusalrdquoldquoreluctancerdquo and ldquoeagernessrdquo The reluctant position usually corresponds to aminimum common denominator response designed to save face for both sideseagerness clearly exceeds Chinese expectations while refusal deviates from thestandard by frustrating Chinese interests In the remainder of this section Ibriefly discuss the compliance of the three cases with Chinese interests

Of all three cases Cambodia is most compliant with Chinarsquos interests Chinesestate-backed investments have made deep inroads into Cambodia with heavyinvestments in infrastructure mining agri-business and the energy sector indicat-ing that Chinese investors have been highly welcomed China has also been par-ticularly successful in acquiring economic concessions to exploit naturalresources in Cambodia Notwithstanding the fact that some Chinese stakeholders

Democratization 5

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2013

lacked any experience in this sector Chinese companies obtained concessions forat least three out of six oil exploration blocks indicating that they may be chosenfor reasons other than economic ones22

For a long time Chinarsquos strategic interest in Cambodia was the containment ofVietnamese expansionism With Chinarsquos increasing resource dependencehowever Cambodia gained importance due to its strategic location offeringaccess to the Indian Ocean through which 80 of Chinese oil imports areshipped With the construction of a special economic zone involving the upgrad-ing of Sihanoukvillersquos deepwater port Chinarsquos attempts to improve access to Cam-bodian ports were highly successful Even though the project was commercial innature due to its dual-use character observers speculated that it would feature asone of Chinarsquos ldquostring of pearlsrdquo a chain of deepwater ports in Southeast Asiancountries to which the Chinese acquired access23

Effectively Myanmar has responded by being eagerly compliant to most ofChinarsquos interests Ranking among Myanmarrsquos largest investors China has beenhighly successful in securing access to natural resources and energy and it has beenmuch more successful than India with which it competes over natural gas sales

Similarly China successfully realized its strategic interests in Myanmar whichfocus on excluding the US while at the same time increasing its own influencevis-a-vis other regional players chiefly India in order to secure strategic accessto the Indian Ocean24 During the last decade China was heavily involved in theextension of Myanmarrsquos infrastructure Chinese companies constructed majortransportation networks throughout the country and developed several portswhere they assisted in the construction of radar communication and refuellingfacilities25 In 2009 construction began on an oil and gas pipeline throughMyanmar mitigating Chinarsquos dependence on energy imports via major shippinglanes controlled by the US

Chinarsquos success in realizing its interests in Mongolia is mixed at best andMongolian governments have shown a tendency towards the refusal end of thespectrum In the economic sphere China has been only partially successful Onthe one hand Chinese investors encountered much resistance when they wantedto be included in the development of a few huge resource deposits for which con-cessions were allocated recently On the other hand however many smaller sitesare in fact exploited directly or indirectly by Chinese investors by means ofmore or less legally valid concessions26

Geo-strategically Mongoliarsquos foreign policy under all different governmentswas guided by the desire to connect more closely with Western powers in orderto balance China and Russia Since 1992 the dominant foreign policy concept isMongoliarsquos ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy It implies neutrality with respect to disputesbetween its neighbours and an active cooperation with third countries This policybecame most effective in the aftermath of 911 when the Mongolian governmentdeveloped closer ties to the US

Table 1 summarizes the location of the three countries with reference to each ofthe Chinese objectives Critical for its position along this spectrum is a countryrsquos

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performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

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agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

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Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

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Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

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resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

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unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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This is followed by a discussion of the patterns of interaction between actors inthese countries and China for each of the case studies The conclusion providesa reflection on the results and discusses their implications for democratizationand future research in the field of Chinarsquos foreign policy

Analytical framework

The analytical framework of this article builds on existing work that emphasizes acorrelation between the political order and the distributional policies of a govern-ment10 More specifically the selectorate theory views political systems from theperspective of three societal subgroups the winning coalition and the nominaland true selectorates11 The nominal selectorate refers to the subset of peoplethat have a formal role in choosing the leadership while the true selectorate arethose who are essential for the selection of leadership The winning coalition asubset of the selectorate consists of those whose support is necessary for aleader to remain in power In sum democracies tend to have large selectoratesand relatively large winning coalitions Autocracies in contrast often havesmall selectorates and small winning coalitions while the democratic elementsin hybrid regimes translate into large nominal selectorates with limited true selec-torates and limited winning coalitions

In selectorate theory political actors are considered to trade privileges againstpolitical support from the winning coalition As a consequence the size of thewinning coalition has an impact on the distributional decisions of decision-makers Leaders in small winning coalitions are encouraged to buy the supportof their coalition members with targeted goods When the winning coalition islarge by contrast it is more effective to create support by providing untargetedpublic goods Therefore large coalition systems tend to produce more publicgoods while small coalition systems are prone to redistribute private goodsincluding patronage cronyism and corruption12

As to external relations selectorate theory reasons that it is easier to extractpolicy concessions from a leader depending on a small winning coalition asthere is discretionary leeway in distributing resources13 This susceptibility toexploitation in turn delivers a formidable incentive for leaders in powerfulautocracies to cultivate autocratic governments abroad14 External powers profitfrom stripping authoritarian countries of their resources Especially externalautocratic powers benefit from weaker autocracies as these serve to legitimizenon-democratic rule and offer opportunities for exploitation

As distribution is essential for political survival external actors can influencethe stability of an existing regime by engaging in the latterrsquos re-distributional pol-icies Interaction at the international level creates benefits which those involved canpass on to their domestic winning coalition Competitors excluded frominternational interaction are deprived of such a possibility By interacting onlyselectively with some groups external actors can influence the power relationsbetween groups competing over power15

Democratization 3

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The following sections investigate the nexus between externalexploitation the engagement of winning coalitions and its potential impact onregime stability

Selectorates winning coalitions and compliance

In this section I present a comparison of compliance with Chinese interests in threeAsian countries Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia In sum this section revealsthat compliance is linked to the size of winning coalitions I start by briefly elabor-ating on the selection of these countries before introducing their winningcoalitions I will then present a set of Chinese interests which serve to measurecompliance and then contrast the actual compliance of the three countries witheach other

The investigation of whether the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) has beenable to successfully realize its interests in these countries is based on newspaperarticles and secondary literature in addition to semi-structured interviews16 Itcovers the post-Cold War period until the end of 201017 and is limited to Asiato improve comparability between cases in terms of their exposure to China Inaddition to the size of winning coalitions the cases were chosen according totheir low income levels as classified by the World Bank Also Chinese economicinterests in these countries should be comparable because according to the CentralIntelligence Agencyrsquos online World Factbook they are all rich in terms of naturalresources and raw materials such as timber rubber precious stones cashmereand mineral deposits18 Most of these deposits have only been discovered duringthe 2000s and will become available in the near future

While this case selection seeks to limit the potential for alternative expla-nations some differences that might affect compliance cannot be eliminated Forexample there is variation in the level of integration into the international commu-nity exposure to other major powers and the degree of domestic state authorityAlso some cultural historical and ideological aspects such as the existence ofChinese minorities alignment during the Cold War and ideological orientationsdiffer in the three cases I will pay specific attention to these factors in the followingcase studies

Since I am interested in whether compliance with external interests depends onthe size of the winning coalition three countries of varying coalition size are com-pared Communist regimes have been prevalent in all three countries until the late1980s but in the last two decades they have developed different political systemstranslating into winning coalitions of varying sizes

Cambodiarsquos semi-democratic political system translates into a large nominalselectorate consisting of the electorate However in the last two decades the pol-itical survival of the government was usually based on the support of the militaryand business elites rather than on election results These groups in effect controlthe political and economic landscape and form the true selectorate as well as thewinning coalition

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Throughout the period under investigation Myanmarrsquos highly autocraticregime had an extremely small winning coalition no nominal and a small realselectorate Since the constitution was suspended in 1962 a military junta hadbeen ruling the country The real selectorate and the winning coalition were iden-tical in that the leadership was selected from the ranks of the military and wasdependent on the support of rival factions within the military19 With the electionsin 2010 the nominal selectorate grew to include all eligible voters However as ofthe end of 2010 the real selectorate and the winning coalition still remained smalldue to constitutional law which secured the militaryrsquos dominance in parliamentMost importantly the central government has never been able to bring the wholecountry under its control despite numerous ceasefire agreements between thecentral government and opposing ethnic rebel groups during the 1990s In factseveral local power centres exist next to the central government each of themhaving its own winning coalition

With Mongoliarsquos new democratic constitution of 1992 it has become the mostopen system of the three with the largest winning coalition and a large selectorateAll Mongolians are entitled to elect the government and hence to be part of thenominal selectorate Including those voters whose support is essential to win theelection the size of the Mongolian winning coalition is also relatively largeAlthough observers noticed a trend towards oligarchization in Mongolian politicsfrom 2000 onwards the country experienced two peaceful changes of governmentin line with election results Thus voters still constitute the true selectorate20

The first step of my investigation is to examine whether China finds it indeedeasier to exploit that is to extract concessions from systems with small winningcoalitions In order to do so I compare the compliance of the three presentedcountries with a selection of Chinarsquos external interests (1) the access to naturalresources given to Chinese companies and (2) geo-political interests that may becontext specific but with a particular attention to a countryrsquos relation to theUnited States (US)21 To clarify this analysis is not interested in the determinantsof Chinarsquos foreign policy goals but in finding out whether compliance with theseinterests is different in small or large coalition regimes and how such compliance isachieved

I measure exploitation by means of three degrees of compliance ldquorefusalrdquoldquoreluctancerdquo and ldquoeagernessrdquo The reluctant position usually corresponds to aminimum common denominator response designed to save face for both sideseagerness clearly exceeds Chinese expectations while refusal deviates from thestandard by frustrating Chinese interests In the remainder of this section Ibriefly discuss the compliance of the three cases with Chinese interests

Of all three cases Cambodia is most compliant with Chinarsquos interests Chinesestate-backed investments have made deep inroads into Cambodia with heavyinvestments in infrastructure mining agri-business and the energy sector indicat-ing that Chinese investors have been highly welcomed China has also been par-ticularly successful in acquiring economic concessions to exploit naturalresources in Cambodia Notwithstanding the fact that some Chinese stakeholders

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2013

lacked any experience in this sector Chinese companies obtained concessions forat least three out of six oil exploration blocks indicating that they may be chosenfor reasons other than economic ones22

For a long time Chinarsquos strategic interest in Cambodia was the containment ofVietnamese expansionism With Chinarsquos increasing resource dependencehowever Cambodia gained importance due to its strategic location offeringaccess to the Indian Ocean through which 80 of Chinese oil imports areshipped With the construction of a special economic zone involving the upgrad-ing of Sihanoukvillersquos deepwater port Chinarsquos attempts to improve access to Cam-bodian ports were highly successful Even though the project was commercial innature due to its dual-use character observers speculated that it would feature asone of Chinarsquos ldquostring of pearlsrdquo a chain of deepwater ports in Southeast Asiancountries to which the Chinese acquired access23

Effectively Myanmar has responded by being eagerly compliant to most ofChinarsquos interests Ranking among Myanmarrsquos largest investors China has beenhighly successful in securing access to natural resources and energy and it has beenmuch more successful than India with which it competes over natural gas sales

Similarly China successfully realized its strategic interests in Myanmar whichfocus on excluding the US while at the same time increasing its own influencevis-a-vis other regional players chiefly India in order to secure strategic accessto the Indian Ocean24 During the last decade China was heavily involved in theextension of Myanmarrsquos infrastructure Chinese companies constructed majortransportation networks throughout the country and developed several portswhere they assisted in the construction of radar communication and refuellingfacilities25 In 2009 construction began on an oil and gas pipeline throughMyanmar mitigating Chinarsquos dependence on energy imports via major shippinglanes controlled by the US

Chinarsquos success in realizing its interests in Mongolia is mixed at best andMongolian governments have shown a tendency towards the refusal end of thespectrum In the economic sphere China has been only partially successful Onthe one hand Chinese investors encountered much resistance when they wantedto be included in the development of a few huge resource deposits for which con-cessions were allocated recently On the other hand however many smaller sitesare in fact exploited directly or indirectly by Chinese investors by means ofmore or less legally valid concessions26

Geo-strategically Mongoliarsquos foreign policy under all different governmentswas guided by the desire to connect more closely with Western powers in orderto balance China and Russia Since 1992 the dominant foreign policy concept isMongoliarsquos ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy It implies neutrality with respect to disputesbetween its neighbours and an active cooperation with third countries This policybecame most effective in the aftermath of 911 when the Mongolian governmentdeveloped closer ties to the US

Table 1 summarizes the location of the three countries with reference to each ofthe Chinese objectives Critical for its position along this spectrum is a countryrsquos

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performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

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agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

8 J Bader

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Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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14 1

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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2013

The following sections investigate the nexus between externalexploitation the engagement of winning coalitions and its potential impact onregime stability

Selectorates winning coalitions and compliance

In this section I present a comparison of compliance with Chinese interests in threeAsian countries Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia In sum this section revealsthat compliance is linked to the size of winning coalitions I start by briefly elabor-ating on the selection of these countries before introducing their winningcoalitions I will then present a set of Chinese interests which serve to measurecompliance and then contrast the actual compliance of the three countries witheach other

The investigation of whether the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) has beenable to successfully realize its interests in these countries is based on newspaperarticles and secondary literature in addition to semi-structured interviews16 Itcovers the post-Cold War period until the end of 201017 and is limited to Asiato improve comparability between cases in terms of their exposure to China Inaddition to the size of winning coalitions the cases were chosen according totheir low income levels as classified by the World Bank Also Chinese economicinterests in these countries should be comparable because according to the CentralIntelligence Agencyrsquos online World Factbook they are all rich in terms of naturalresources and raw materials such as timber rubber precious stones cashmereand mineral deposits18 Most of these deposits have only been discovered duringthe 2000s and will become available in the near future

While this case selection seeks to limit the potential for alternative expla-nations some differences that might affect compliance cannot be eliminated Forexample there is variation in the level of integration into the international commu-nity exposure to other major powers and the degree of domestic state authorityAlso some cultural historical and ideological aspects such as the existence ofChinese minorities alignment during the Cold War and ideological orientationsdiffer in the three cases I will pay specific attention to these factors in the followingcase studies

Since I am interested in whether compliance with external interests depends onthe size of the winning coalition three countries of varying coalition size are com-pared Communist regimes have been prevalent in all three countries until the late1980s but in the last two decades they have developed different political systemstranslating into winning coalitions of varying sizes

Cambodiarsquos semi-democratic political system translates into a large nominalselectorate consisting of the electorate However in the last two decades the pol-itical survival of the government was usually based on the support of the militaryand business elites rather than on election results These groups in effect controlthe political and economic landscape and form the true selectorate as well as thewinning coalition

4 J Bader

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Throughout the period under investigation Myanmarrsquos highly autocraticregime had an extremely small winning coalition no nominal and a small realselectorate Since the constitution was suspended in 1962 a military junta hadbeen ruling the country The real selectorate and the winning coalition were iden-tical in that the leadership was selected from the ranks of the military and wasdependent on the support of rival factions within the military19 With the electionsin 2010 the nominal selectorate grew to include all eligible voters However as ofthe end of 2010 the real selectorate and the winning coalition still remained smalldue to constitutional law which secured the militaryrsquos dominance in parliamentMost importantly the central government has never been able to bring the wholecountry under its control despite numerous ceasefire agreements between thecentral government and opposing ethnic rebel groups during the 1990s In factseveral local power centres exist next to the central government each of themhaving its own winning coalition

With Mongoliarsquos new democratic constitution of 1992 it has become the mostopen system of the three with the largest winning coalition and a large selectorateAll Mongolians are entitled to elect the government and hence to be part of thenominal selectorate Including those voters whose support is essential to win theelection the size of the Mongolian winning coalition is also relatively largeAlthough observers noticed a trend towards oligarchization in Mongolian politicsfrom 2000 onwards the country experienced two peaceful changes of governmentin line with election results Thus voters still constitute the true selectorate20

The first step of my investigation is to examine whether China finds it indeedeasier to exploit that is to extract concessions from systems with small winningcoalitions In order to do so I compare the compliance of the three presentedcountries with a selection of Chinarsquos external interests (1) the access to naturalresources given to Chinese companies and (2) geo-political interests that may becontext specific but with a particular attention to a countryrsquos relation to theUnited States (US)21 To clarify this analysis is not interested in the determinantsof Chinarsquos foreign policy goals but in finding out whether compliance with theseinterests is different in small or large coalition regimes and how such compliance isachieved

I measure exploitation by means of three degrees of compliance ldquorefusalrdquoldquoreluctancerdquo and ldquoeagernessrdquo The reluctant position usually corresponds to aminimum common denominator response designed to save face for both sideseagerness clearly exceeds Chinese expectations while refusal deviates from thestandard by frustrating Chinese interests In the remainder of this section Ibriefly discuss the compliance of the three cases with Chinese interests

Of all three cases Cambodia is most compliant with Chinarsquos interests Chinesestate-backed investments have made deep inroads into Cambodia with heavyinvestments in infrastructure mining agri-business and the energy sector indicat-ing that Chinese investors have been highly welcomed China has also been par-ticularly successful in acquiring economic concessions to exploit naturalresources in Cambodia Notwithstanding the fact that some Chinese stakeholders

Democratization 5

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lacked any experience in this sector Chinese companies obtained concessions forat least three out of six oil exploration blocks indicating that they may be chosenfor reasons other than economic ones22

For a long time Chinarsquos strategic interest in Cambodia was the containment ofVietnamese expansionism With Chinarsquos increasing resource dependencehowever Cambodia gained importance due to its strategic location offeringaccess to the Indian Ocean through which 80 of Chinese oil imports areshipped With the construction of a special economic zone involving the upgrad-ing of Sihanoukvillersquos deepwater port Chinarsquos attempts to improve access to Cam-bodian ports were highly successful Even though the project was commercial innature due to its dual-use character observers speculated that it would feature asone of Chinarsquos ldquostring of pearlsrdquo a chain of deepwater ports in Southeast Asiancountries to which the Chinese acquired access23

Effectively Myanmar has responded by being eagerly compliant to most ofChinarsquos interests Ranking among Myanmarrsquos largest investors China has beenhighly successful in securing access to natural resources and energy and it has beenmuch more successful than India with which it competes over natural gas sales

Similarly China successfully realized its strategic interests in Myanmar whichfocus on excluding the US while at the same time increasing its own influencevis-a-vis other regional players chiefly India in order to secure strategic accessto the Indian Ocean24 During the last decade China was heavily involved in theextension of Myanmarrsquos infrastructure Chinese companies constructed majortransportation networks throughout the country and developed several portswhere they assisted in the construction of radar communication and refuellingfacilities25 In 2009 construction began on an oil and gas pipeline throughMyanmar mitigating Chinarsquos dependence on energy imports via major shippinglanes controlled by the US

Chinarsquos success in realizing its interests in Mongolia is mixed at best andMongolian governments have shown a tendency towards the refusal end of thespectrum In the economic sphere China has been only partially successful Onthe one hand Chinese investors encountered much resistance when they wantedto be included in the development of a few huge resource deposits for which con-cessions were allocated recently On the other hand however many smaller sitesare in fact exploited directly or indirectly by Chinese investors by means ofmore or less legally valid concessions26

Geo-strategically Mongoliarsquos foreign policy under all different governmentswas guided by the desire to connect more closely with Western powers in orderto balance China and Russia Since 1992 the dominant foreign policy concept isMongoliarsquos ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy It implies neutrality with respect to disputesbetween its neighbours and an active cooperation with third countries This policybecame most effective in the aftermath of 911 when the Mongolian governmentdeveloped closer ties to the US

Table 1 summarizes the location of the three countries with reference to each ofthe Chinese objectives Critical for its position along this spectrum is a countryrsquos

6 J Bader

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2013

performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

Democratization 7

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2013

agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

8 J Bader

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Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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2013

PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

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Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

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niv

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liote

] at

07

14 1

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ecem

ber

2013

Throughout the period under investigation Myanmarrsquos highly autocraticregime had an extremely small winning coalition no nominal and a small realselectorate Since the constitution was suspended in 1962 a military junta hadbeen ruling the country The real selectorate and the winning coalition were iden-tical in that the leadership was selected from the ranks of the military and wasdependent on the support of rival factions within the military19 With the electionsin 2010 the nominal selectorate grew to include all eligible voters However as ofthe end of 2010 the real selectorate and the winning coalition still remained smalldue to constitutional law which secured the militaryrsquos dominance in parliamentMost importantly the central government has never been able to bring the wholecountry under its control despite numerous ceasefire agreements between thecentral government and opposing ethnic rebel groups during the 1990s In factseveral local power centres exist next to the central government each of themhaving its own winning coalition

With Mongoliarsquos new democratic constitution of 1992 it has become the mostopen system of the three with the largest winning coalition and a large selectorateAll Mongolians are entitled to elect the government and hence to be part of thenominal selectorate Including those voters whose support is essential to win theelection the size of the Mongolian winning coalition is also relatively largeAlthough observers noticed a trend towards oligarchization in Mongolian politicsfrom 2000 onwards the country experienced two peaceful changes of governmentin line with election results Thus voters still constitute the true selectorate20

The first step of my investigation is to examine whether China finds it indeedeasier to exploit that is to extract concessions from systems with small winningcoalitions In order to do so I compare the compliance of the three presentedcountries with a selection of Chinarsquos external interests (1) the access to naturalresources given to Chinese companies and (2) geo-political interests that may becontext specific but with a particular attention to a countryrsquos relation to theUnited States (US)21 To clarify this analysis is not interested in the determinantsof Chinarsquos foreign policy goals but in finding out whether compliance with theseinterests is different in small or large coalition regimes and how such compliance isachieved

I measure exploitation by means of three degrees of compliance ldquorefusalrdquoldquoreluctancerdquo and ldquoeagernessrdquo The reluctant position usually corresponds to aminimum common denominator response designed to save face for both sideseagerness clearly exceeds Chinese expectations while refusal deviates from thestandard by frustrating Chinese interests In the remainder of this section Ibriefly discuss the compliance of the three cases with Chinese interests

Of all three cases Cambodia is most compliant with Chinarsquos interests Chinesestate-backed investments have made deep inroads into Cambodia with heavyinvestments in infrastructure mining agri-business and the energy sector indicat-ing that Chinese investors have been highly welcomed China has also been par-ticularly successful in acquiring economic concessions to exploit naturalresources in Cambodia Notwithstanding the fact that some Chinese stakeholders

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lacked any experience in this sector Chinese companies obtained concessions forat least three out of six oil exploration blocks indicating that they may be chosenfor reasons other than economic ones22

For a long time Chinarsquos strategic interest in Cambodia was the containment ofVietnamese expansionism With Chinarsquos increasing resource dependencehowever Cambodia gained importance due to its strategic location offeringaccess to the Indian Ocean through which 80 of Chinese oil imports areshipped With the construction of a special economic zone involving the upgrad-ing of Sihanoukvillersquos deepwater port Chinarsquos attempts to improve access to Cam-bodian ports were highly successful Even though the project was commercial innature due to its dual-use character observers speculated that it would feature asone of Chinarsquos ldquostring of pearlsrdquo a chain of deepwater ports in Southeast Asiancountries to which the Chinese acquired access23

Effectively Myanmar has responded by being eagerly compliant to most ofChinarsquos interests Ranking among Myanmarrsquos largest investors China has beenhighly successful in securing access to natural resources and energy and it has beenmuch more successful than India with which it competes over natural gas sales

Similarly China successfully realized its strategic interests in Myanmar whichfocus on excluding the US while at the same time increasing its own influencevis-a-vis other regional players chiefly India in order to secure strategic accessto the Indian Ocean24 During the last decade China was heavily involved in theextension of Myanmarrsquos infrastructure Chinese companies constructed majortransportation networks throughout the country and developed several portswhere they assisted in the construction of radar communication and refuellingfacilities25 In 2009 construction began on an oil and gas pipeline throughMyanmar mitigating Chinarsquos dependence on energy imports via major shippinglanes controlled by the US

Chinarsquos success in realizing its interests in Mongolia is mixed at best andMongolian governments have shown a tendency towards the refusal end of thespectrum In the economic sphere China has been only partially successful Onthe one hand Chinese investors encountered much resistance when they wantedto be included in the development of a few huge resource deposits for which con-cessions were allocated recently On the other hand however many smaller sitesare in fact exploited directly or indirectly by Chinese investors by means ofmore or less legally valid concessions26

Geo-strategically Mongoliarsquos foreign policy under all different governmentswas guided by the desire to connect more closely with Western powers in orderto balance China and Russia Since 1992 the dominant foreign policy concept isMongoliarsquos ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy It implies neutrality with respect to disputesbetween its neighbours and an active cooperation with third countries This policybecame most effective in the aftermath of 911 when the Mongolian governmentdeveloped closer ties to the US

Table 1 summarizes the location of the three countries with reference to each ofthe Chinese objectives Critical for its position along this spectrum is a countryrsquos

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performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

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agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

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Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

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Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

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started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

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resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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2013

lacked any experience in this sector Chinese companies obtained concessions forat least three out of six oil exploration blocks indicating that they may be chosenfor reasons other than economic ones22

For a long time Chinarsquos strategic interest in Cambodia was the containment ofVietnamese expansionism With Chinarsquos increasing resource dependencehowever Cambodia gained importance due to its strategic location offeringaccess to the Indian Ocean through which 80 of Chinese oil imports areshipped With the construction of a special economic zone involving the upgrad-ing of Sihanoukvillersquos deepwater port Chinarsquos attempts to improve access to Cam-bodian ports were highly successful Even though the project was commercial innature due to its dual-use character observers speculated that it would feature asone of Chinarsquos ldquostring of pearlsrdquo a chain of deepwater ports in Southeast Asiancountries to which the Chinese acquired access23

Effectively Myanmar has responded by being eagerly compliant to most ofChinarsquos interests Ranking among Myanmarrsquos largest investors China has beenhighly successful in securing access to natural resources and energy and it has beenmuch more successful than India with which it competes over natural gas sales

Similarly China successfully realized its strategic interests in Myanmar whichfocus on excluding the US while at the same time increasing its own influencevis-a-vis other regional players chiefly India in order to secure strategic accessto the Indian Ocean24 During the last decade China was heavily involved in theextension of Myanmarrsquos infrastructure Chinese companies constructed majortransportation networks throughout the country and developed several portswhere they assisted in the construction of radar communication and refuellingfacilities25 In 2009 construction began on an oil and gas pipeline throughMyanmar mitigating Chinarsquos dependence on energy imports via major shippinglanes controlled by the US

Chinarsquos success in realizing its interests in Mongolia is mixed at best andMongolian governments have shown a tendency towards the refusal end of thespectrum In the economic sphere China has been only partially successful Onthe one hand Chinese investors encountered much resistance when they wantedto be included in the development of a few huge resource deposits for which con-cessions were allocated recently On the other hand however many smaller sitesare in fact exploited directly or indirectly by Chinese investors by means ofmore or less legally valid concessions26

Geo-strategically Mongoliarsquos foreign policy under all different governmentswas guided by the desire to connect more closely with Western powers in orderto balance China and Russia Since 1992 the dominant foreign policy concept isMongoliarsquos ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy It implies neutrality with respect to disputesbetween its neighbours and an active cooperation with third countries This policybecame most effective in the aftermath of 911 when the Mongolian governmentdeveloped closer ties to the US

Table 1 summarizes the location of the three countries with reference to each ofthe Chinese objectives Critical for its position along this spectrum is a countryrsquos

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performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

Democratization 7

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agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

8 J Bader

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2013

Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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2013

PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

Dow

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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2013

performance with regard to these interests rather than whether or not this outcomeis desired by its leaders Table 1 reveals that compliance goes together with thesizes of winning coalitions In order to provide a better understanding of howexploitation works exactly the next sections take a closer look at Chinarsquos engage-ment in Cambodia Myanmar and Mongolia

Preaching to the choir in Cambodia

There is little controversy about the degree of Cambodian compliance with Chineseinterests Given the Chinese influence over Cambodia during the Cold War Cambo-diarsquos compliance seems not too surprising at first sight What is puzzling though isthe fact that Cambodiarsquos alignment with China occurred under Prime Minister HunSen a former member of the resistance against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rougeregime who when coming to power was strongly reliant on the backing ofVietnam Back then the Chinese government considered Hun Sen to represent aVietnamese puppet regime and in 1988 he accused China of being the root of allevil in Cambodia27 Against this background the prospects for a Sino-Khmer rap-prochement were not good in the early 1990s This section investigates throughthe lens of the selectorate theory how reconciliation and increased obedience withChinese interests was possible under these anachronistic circumstances

The turning point of the relation between Hun Sen and the Chinese governmentcan be traced back to 1997 when an armed conflict evolved between two compet-ing leaders Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia Considering this a coupdrsquoetat most international actors distanced themselves from Hun Sen with the resultof unexpectedly dire consequences Western donors suspended developmentassistance to the highly aid-dependent country international investors shelved pro-jects or left the country altogether the members of the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations postponed Cambodiarsquos planned accession to the organization andeven Cambodiarsquos delegation to the United Nationrsquos (UN) General Assembly wasrejected28

In contrast to most Western reactions the Chinese government declared theconflict an internal affair in which the Chinese would not interfere thereby accept-ing the reality of power distribution in Cambodia As a symbolic gesture an

Table 1 Compliance by issue area and country

CountrySize of nominal Strue Swinning C

Resource access(treatment of Chinese

investment)Geo-politics (geo-politicalposition vis-a-vis China)

Cambodia Largesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedgingbandwagoning)

Myanmar Nonesmallsmall Eager (preferential) Eager (hedging)Mongolia Largelargelarge Reluctant (equal) Reluctant (balancing

hedging)

Democratization 7

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agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

8 J Bader

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2013

Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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2013

agreement on development aid was signed only weeks after the coup The alle-gation that the royalists had used Taiwanese money to re-arm themselves offeredHun Sen a justification to subsequently close down the Taiwanese representationa move with symbolic value to the Chinese29

This rapprochement was of strategic importance For the Chinese the switch toHun Sen offered an opportunity to regain a foothold in Cambodia after all formerallies became marginalized The Khmer Rouge were outlawed King Sihanouk wasbankrupt and the royal party was at the edge of dissolution30 For Hun Sen itallowed him to sustain and eventually to reassure his power position by either mar-ginalizing or co-opting his challengers into his winning coalition

Since then China has addressed the needs of Hun Sen his true selectorate andhis winning coalition ndash the military and business elites ndash in exchange for politicalconcessions China has emerged as the greatest supporter for the Cambodian RoyalArmed Forces loyal to Hun Sen providing equipment at special prices but alsoschools and hospitals for military personnel Against Chinarsquos no-strings-attachedapproach it seems not always evident that the relationship is one of giving andtaking However the provision of military trucks which was first suspended bythe US and then given by China after Cambodia had deported 20 Uygur refugeesas reported by Associated Press on 23 June 2010 provides a compelling example

In Cambodia a few families inside the winning coalition are in control of theeconomy As members of the winning coalition these families receive economicconcessions and in return fund Hun Senrsquos Cambodian Peoplersquos Party (CPP)Often they receive political positions as a reward for their loyalty This createsfurther business opportunities and ndash given the weak formal institutions ndash powerfulpatronndashclient relationships that are indispensable for doing business31

Most crucially from a selectorate theory perspective Hun Sen allows externalactors to directly reward the members of his winning coalition for facilitatingbusiness interests in Cambodia for example with commissions or stakes injoint-ventures32 With regard to this aspect it is important that Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition also comprises ethnic Chinese business tycoons These powerfulSino-Khmer individuals serve as the entry point for Chinarsquos economic and politicalinterests in Cambodia while at the same time investments from China have cata-lysed the accumulation of their wealth and thus their power33

Historically playing a substantial societal role Cambodiarsquos ethnic Chineseminority has been discriminated against after Cambodiarsquos independence Duringthe 1980s Cambodiarsquos Vietnamese-backed leaders tried to implementideologically motivated class policies which were in fact strongly anti-Chinese34 With the economic reforms and the re-establishment of associationsthe ethnic Chinese elites regained wealth but their emergence as part of thewinning coalition was also boosted by the fact that China was allowed to ldquoactivelyassist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese communityrdquoafter bilateral relations had improved35 Some oversized Sino-Khmer enterprises inagri-business for example were financed through Chinese loans to the Cambodianstate

8 J Bader

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2013

Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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Ethnic and cultural ties to China enhance Chinarsquos soft power and hence thelikelihood that Chinese interests are considered However soft power mattersmost when those who are receptive to Chinese interests also have a say in domesticpolitics as receptivity is then most likely to translate to compliance According toone interviewee employed by a Sino-Khmer member of Hun Senrsquos winningcoalition traditional Sino-Khmer families have close relations to officials inSouth China and Beijing they are usually involved when Chinese delegationsvisit the country and sometimes they also hold lucrative business concessions inChina36 However they do not only facilitate investment deals but also more pol-itical matters According to an article in Asia Times Online on 16 September 2003Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma then president of the Chinese Association of Cambo-dia was reportedly asked through the Chinese embassy ldquoto intervene on severaloccasions with his senior contactsrdquo in the CPP when China did not agree withthe handling of particular issues during the 1990s37 Hence the role of Sino-Khmer minorities goes beyond being mere entry points for Chinese soft powerIn fact they also seem to be key in ensuring the compliance of the regime withChinese interests as opposed to those of other external players

One caveat should be considered here Given the socialist background of theCPP Cambodiarsquos extraordinary compliance with Chinese interests could poten-tially also be driven by ideological similarity However in an interview aChinese expert argued that China did not favour the establishment of socialismin Cambodia at the time when Cambodiarsquos political system was negotiated inthe Paris Peace Agreement Against the background of collapsing communismin the Soviet Union Chinarsquos post-Tiananmen trauma and its successful economicreform trajectory this would ldquohave been irrationalrdquo38 On Cambodiarsquos part HunSen de facto abandoned socialist rhetoric and practice in the late 1980s when hetried to re-invent the party and its financial foundations in anticipation of ebbingSoviet support Hughes suspects that ldquomost of these ideals were abandoned withsome reliefrdquo as ldquosocialism operated as a burden rather than as a source of legitimacyfor the 1980s regimerdquo39 Thus while I cannot rule out the possibility that similarparty structures may have eased the cooperation between the two parties it canbe reasoned that ideology had become less relevant at the time of theirrapprochement

To conclude the rapprochement between the PRC and Hun Sen dates back tothe mid-1990s when the latter faced international isolation At the same time facili-tated by China ethnic Chinese minorities re-emerged as members of Hun Senrsquoswinning coalition As these elites have close ties to China their inclusion in thewinning coalition greatly supports Cambodiarsquos compliance with Chinese interests

Complexity in Myanmar

Myanmarrsquos compliance with Chinese interests appears eager although most obser-vers would agree that Myanmar is ldquoneither a puppet nor pawnrdquo of China40 Thissection investigates the complex relationship between the governments of the

Democratization 9

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

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07

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

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ded

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2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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PRC and Myanmar and finds that the extreme domestic and external insecurity onthe part of Myanmarrsquos central government troubles this relation Myanmarrsquos mili-tary leaders face difficulties in ensuring the loyalty of their winning coalitionWhile China supports Myanmarrsquos leaders at the international level it has contrib-uted to insecurity at the domestic level by closely cooperating with individuals inthe junta and by reaching out to opposition groups

Collaboration between the governments of China and Myanmar dates back tothe late 1980s when it intensified as both governments faced international criticismbecause of human rights violations Internationally isolated in dire need of modernarms ldquoto ensure its continuing grip on political powerrdquo and facing economic col-lapse Myanmarrsquos generals accepted Chinarsquos ldquoimmediate diplomatic protection[ ] arms project aid technical assistance and financerdquo41 It was ldquoa simplematter of survivalrdquo in order to alleviate the immediate crisis and gain time to con-solidate power42

Since the restoration of high-level diplomatic exchange in 1991 visits by mili-tary party and state officials have taken place regularly China became the coun-tryrsquos largest weapons supplier as a result of which the junta was able to expand andimprove its military capability at a time when the West imposed an arms embargoon Myanmar

Economically Chinese assistance supported the generalsrsquo development priori-ties focusing on the construction of state-owned enterprises which remained underthe militaryrsquos control Since Chinese companies gained preferential treatment fromthe Myanmar government for the supply of equipment goods and servicesChinese support to the Myanmar government was also beneficial to the Chineseeconomy43 Also the relationship is often portrayed as one in which Chinese infra-structural investment is traded against oil or gas concessions44 With revenuesending up in international accounts rather than contributing to Myanmarrsquos statebudget the export of the countryrsquos energy resources offers a possibility to fillthe governmentrsquos coffers

In addition to international pressure the generals felt threatened domesticallywhich was reflected in high levels of repression the 2004 purge of General KhinNyunt then number three in Myanmarrsquos leadership circle as well as in the 2005relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw Observers reasoned that Khin Nyuntrsquospurge was motivated by fear of his growing power acquired partly through hispro-Chinese policies45

After Khin Nyuntrsquos removal from power the gap between the PRC and theMyanmar government widened46 The PRC was dissatisfied with the generalsrsquorule their economic mismanagement and their intransigent dealing with the dom-estic opposition which created much international criticism that fell back on ChinaTo improve political stability the PRC favoured reforms within the existing struc-tures that is a cautious extension of the small winning coalition by the co-optationof the varying domestic oppositional players so that the junta would gain a morecivilian face and increase its legitimacy In order to achieve this the Chinesegovernment considered domestic reconciliation necessary47

10 J Bader

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

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started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

Dow

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ded

by [

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liote

] at

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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by [

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] at

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2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

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ded

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] at

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ber

2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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ded

by [

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niv

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liote

] at

07

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ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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ded

by [

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2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

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ded

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2013

Therefore while protecting the junta against international criticism on the onehand China called for improved governance and reconciliation on the other Chinasupported visits of UN missions and encouraged the junta to hold talks with theopposition At the same time Chinese agents tried to convince domestic oppositiongroups to engage with the military They reportedly also asked Aung San Suu Kyiwhether she ldquocould be flexible and whether she might be able to accept a role lessthan head of state in which she could exercise influence but could also be recon-ciled with the armyrdquo48 This approach tried to increase the oppositionrsquos willingnessto be included in the existent winning coalition instead of displacing the currentgovernment

The various local players on both sides of the border add another layer of com-plexity to the picture of Sino-Myanmar relations From a selectorate perspectivethe various rebel groups which control large border territories form competingwinning coalitions Dependent on external resources to maintain resistanceagainst the central government these groups offer the natural and human resourcesunder their authority for external exploitation49 As a result Chinese businesses inlogging and agriculture can circumvent Myanmarrsquos central government and estab-lish ldquospecial cooperation and consensus with the local ethnic groupsrdquo50At thesame time weak state authority implying weak loyalty towards the central govern-ment allows regional army commanders to be involved in these arrangementsChinese businesses have profited from the competition between alternativepower centres and the corruption of regional cadres to such an extent that auth-orities in southern China reportedly welcomed international pressure onMyanmar as a weakened central government allowed them ldquoto engage withlocal actors with fewer constraintsrdquo51

While it is straightforward to view the ethnic rebel groups as alternativewinning coalitions it is not entirely clear to what extent this also holds forChinese local or provincial authorities and their agents such as Yunnanrsquos enter-prises On the one hand one could infer that the central government is unable tocontrol these actors since they threaten Chinarsquos national interest On the otherhand however the Chinese central government also strategically uses these alleg-edly dissociated provincial actors when official involvement is not appropriate forexample to uphold contact with the ceasefire groups52 It is therefore difficult toassess whether the central government is unwilling or unable to align provincialactors In any event both the proliferation of seemingly uncoordinated actors atthe sub-national level pursuing their own organizational goals and the ambiguousposition on the part of the Chinese central government are more general trendsobservable in Chinese foreign relations53

To conclude this section insecurity seems to be an issue in Myanmar Againstthe background of instability within the country with competing groups claimingpower Myanmarrsquos central government is unsure to what extent China also backsother actors Historically Myanmarrsquos leaders distrust China but their internationalisolation drove them into the arms of the Chinese54 During the 2000s the juntarsquosleaders searched for alternative partners such as India and Russia from which they

Democratization 11

Dow

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2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

Dow

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ded

by [

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] at

07

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2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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by [

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kow

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liote

] at

07

14 1

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ber

2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

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2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

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ber

2013

started to buy arms The Indian government competing with China over influenceand access to natural resources shifted its approach towards Myanmar from criti-cism over human rights to lending itself as a counterbalance against China55

However it appears that India simply could not satisfy the generalsrsquo security inter-ests as illustrated in 2007 when even though it was outbid by an Indian compe-titor a Chinese state-owned enterprise was awarded a major gas concession onlythree days after the Chinese UN Security Council veto against a resolution onMyanmar56 An exchange of private goods between narrow distribution coalitionsin which a nationrsquos resource wealth is traded against the private benefits for the eliteas manifested in the external protection of their personal security seems to havetaken place57

A tough nut to crack in Mongolia

In contrast to the previous cases Mongolia has a large winning coalition while itscompliance is rather reluctant even though exploitation still takes place What isdifferent too is that Mongolia and China share a history of common statehoodunder the Yuan and Qing dynasties which raises the question to what extentalternative explanations such as negative historical memories account for Mongo-liarsquos reluctant compliance In the following section I investigate Sino-Mongolianrelations from the perspective of the selectorate theory It becomes evident that thisframework is useful as it shows when and how historical factors translate into pol-itical action

Mongoliarsquos transition to democracy in the early 1990s was strongly motivatedby the desire to develop stronger ties to Western powers in order to safeguard Mon-goliarsquos independence58 None of the Mongolian governments and their winningcoalitions was specifically close to China According to an article in the Ulaanbaa-tar Post on 21 November 2003 in order to improve bilateral relations and ulti-mately to promote its interests the Chinese Communist Partyrsquos InternationalDepartment established ties to all important Mongolian parties during the 2000sBut the relationship is troubled by the fact that large parts of Mongolian societyperceive China as a threat59 Mongolian politicians respond to public fears andtry to exploit Sino-phobia in their election campaigns in order to bind theirwinning coalition that is their voters

Being a landlocked country Mongoliarsquos economy is dominated by its neigh-bours While Russian influence decreased Mongoliarsquos economic reforms facili-tated Chinese investments during the 1990s However in contrast to its relationswith Russia Mongoliarsquos relations with China suffer from a strong suspicion60

In the governmentrsquos considerations of how to develop the enormous miningsites fears of overdependence on the Chinese market were often raised Duringthe 1990s the Mongolian government ldquodeliberatelyrdquo restricted Chinese invest-ments in state industries including the mineral sector61 In 2003 former presidentHu Jintao stated Chinarsquos interest in investing in Mongoliarsquos mining sector andoffered a soft loan to improve infrastructure62 but the Mongolian government

12 J Bader

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by [

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] at

07

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ber

2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

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by [

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te U

niv

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liote

] at

07

14 1

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ber

2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

Dow

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2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

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ded

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2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

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] at

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ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

resisted the quick development of the area63 Given the unpopularity of all Chinesethings in Mongolian society representatives of Chinese interests had to find a morehidden point of entry in order to influence Mongolian decision-makers

In reaction to this the Chinese government has adopted an alternative approachto promote its economic interests in Mongolia Acknowledging the pivotal role ofthe electorate in Mongolian politics the Chinese government tried to improve itsimage It regularly provided humanitarian aid to Mongolia launched an educationinitiative and started to aggressively promote Chinese culture64 In an interviewChinese academics attributed Chinarsquos economic difficulties in Mongolia to ldquocom-munication problemsrdquo especially with regard to history Therefore a Sino-Mongo-lian joint research project to ldquorewriterdquo history was established This project aimedat promoting a new understanding of periods in Sino-Mongolian history much dis-puted among Mongolian historians in order to influence how Mongolians perceiveChina65 In 2010 2000 additional Chinese government scholarships to Mongolianstudents were announced a massive increase given Mongoliarsquos small population ofless than four million people

However another entry point is through corruption and manipulation Duringthe 2000s Mongolian businessmen became increasingly active in politics manyinvested in political parties and sought a seat in parliament In Mongoliarsquos privati-zation Chinese investors allegedly gained stakes through Mongolian bidders and itis suspected that Mongoliarsquos oligarchs have joint business interests with Chineseinvestors which in turn offer possibilities to influence and manipulate theirdecision-making66 In addition officials at the provincial level frequently uselegal loopholes to award mining licences for smaller sites to Chinese investors67

Here the limitations to the power of the Mongolian winning coalition becomesapparent While the broader winning coalition delivers incentives to create publicgoods it can constrain policy-makers only to a limited extent Only with regard tohigh-profile exploitation sites the greater winning coalition created pressure forincreased accountability for example by commitments to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI) that were able to prevent reckless plunder bycorrupt officials When exploitation sites are less in the public eye howeverthere are few controls to prevent Mongolian officials from trading exploitationlicences in the face of widespread corruption

Given Russiarsquos role as a saviour of Mongoliarsquos sovereignty during the ColdWar it is appropriate to consider Mongoliarsquos compliance with Chinese interestsin the context of competing Russian interests In the late 2000s the Russian gov-ernment launched a comeback in order to secure its economic interests in Mongo-lia and therefore Chinarsquos difficulties could possibly also stem from Russiarsquospresence in Mongolia Russia still has influence over Mongolian leaders and some-times extorts policy concessions as became apparent in the rejection of the attemptby the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to modernize the Mongolianrailway Russiarsquos influence alone however cannot convincingly explain Mongo-liarsquos reluctant position towards China because the design of those policies thatunderline reluctance to Chinese interests such as the ldquothird neighbourrdquo policy or

Democratization 13

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

the commitment to the EITI is to constrain both Chinese and Russian influencesThus they were not particularly beneficial for Russia either

To summarize the Mongolian case shows how the greater reluctance of Mon-goliarsquos governments to comply with external interests is driven by the largerwinning coalition which prevents the reckless plunder of Mongoliarsquos naturalresources ndash at least for high profile exploitation sites With regard to China thisconstraining effect is reinforced by an anti-Chinese sentiment among the popu-lation that cannot be ignored

Conclusion

This article uses the selectorate theory as a framework to investigate autocraticcooperation It takes the link between domestic distribution and externalcooperation as the starting point to investigate the nexus between domestic distri-butional coalitions autocratic cooperation and external exploitation and its poten-tial impact on regime stability Based on a comparison of compliance with Chineseinterests the article investigates the nature and effectiveness of autocraticcooperation

My analysis suggests that the selectorate framework is a useful tool to investi-gate the external dimension of authoritarianism and autocracy promotion Itappears that small winning coalitions are more compliant with Chinese interestsindicating that incentives indeed exist for authoritarian powers to cultivate autocra-cies abroad More specifically the framework proves to be useful because it disre-gards explicit or implicit intentions This is particularly relevant in the case ofChina Although China officially adopts a policy of non-interference it de factocourts actors that succeeded in domestic conflicts over power by channelling allinteraction through the incumbent government As a result this policy contributesto the persistence of autocratic regimes

Moreover the framework is also helpful to understand the perspective of thecase study countries Leaders consider how to deal with the interests of externalplayers according to whether they are useful to their own political survivalLeaders weight the costs and gains of compliance and they comply when conces-sions are rewarded but are not very costly domestically

However the examination of the cooperation between the PRC and its neigh-bours also revealed two factors that can increase or inhibit external exploitabilityFirst the effect of winning coalition size may be conditioned on the accessibility ofthe winning coalition to the external player The case of Cambodia suggests that theinclusion of ethnic Chinese minorities in the winning coalition and interdependen-cies created when these elites do business in China increase the receptivity forChinese interests In the case of Cambodia this cultural affinity of the winningcoalition helps to ensure that China is the beneficiary of exploitation

Second insecurity seems to have an impact on exploitability Small winningcoalitions paired with small nominal selectorates that is closed autocracies areinherently unstable68 In terms of exploitability this insecurity may result in

14 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

unpredictability and may obstruct exploitability from outside The relation betweenChina and Myanmar for instance is greatly complicated by the generalsrsquo internaland external insecurity It is thus not surprising that the PRC actually has tried topush for reforms in Myanmar that would co-opt regime opponents into thewinning coalition In contrast to this reassured of the high loyalty of his coalitionHun Sen has been able to instrumentalize external interaction to underwrite hisown power base

These findings point to topics for further research because the exploitability ofhybrid regimes has so far received little attention in the study of democratizationNot only because hybrid regimes are easier to legitimize internationally but alsobecause their domestic political economy enhances external exploitation the exter-nal interest in preserving authoritarian structures may be strongest for hybridauthoritarian regimes rather than closed dictatorships that is regimes with largeas opposed to small nominal selectorates The strategic benefits created bycooperation between elites in autocracies hence need further investigation tobetter understand the dynamics behind the proliferation of hybrid regimes

Another interesting question for further research is whether and to what extentexternal players adapt to the distributive logic stipulated by a given coalition sizeelsewhere when attempting to realize foreign policy interests This question is par-ticularly relevant in the case of China as it opens up a new perspective on the studyof Chinarsquos foreign relations Currently the analysis of Chinarsquos foreign relationsand especially with its neighbours is dominated by the perception that a givenset of foreign policy goals and principles shapes Chinarsquos neighbourhood policyregardless of the type of political regime in the target state69

However my findings and observations seem to indicate that regime type in thepartner country is a more important aspect in Chinarsquos foreign policy than usuallyassumed For instance my case studies suggest that the Chinese governmentreacts to distribution patterns In the case of Mongolia where formation of govern-ment is subject to elections and can change suddenly the Chinese governmentestablished good relationships with all Mongolian parties but also tried to reachout to the electorate70 In Cambodia the Chinese government targeted its inter-actions exclusively to Hun Senrsquos supporters With regard to Myanmar Chinarsquosspeedy reaction to Myanmarrsquos 2011 liberalizations is interesting to note Havingsolely engaged the central government and the rival ethnic rebel groups inMyanmar before the Chinese government immediately announced efforts toreach out to a wider range of non-governmental actors after the Myanmar govern-ment showed more concern with public opinion71

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Aurel Croissant Oliver Hensengerth and two anonymousreviewers for their valuable comments as well as my former colleagues at the GermanDevelopment InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik where this article waswritten

Democratization 15

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

Notes1 Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism Bellin ldquoThe Robustness of Author-

itarianismrdquo 139ndash572 Kagan ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash Jackson

ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash18 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWouldAutocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash100

3 Burnell ldquoNew Autocracy Promotionrdquo 269ndash94 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a NegativeExternal Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Ambrosio Authoritarian Backlash

4 Koesel and Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofingrdquo Vanderhill ldquoLearning to Be Badrdquo5 Ambrosio ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash926 See also Jackson ldquoThe Role of External Factorsrdquo 101ndash187 Tolstrup ldquoStudying a Negative External Actorrdquo 922ndash44 Levitsky and Way ldquoInter-

national Linkage and Democratizationrdquo 20ndash33 Ambrosio ldquoFramework of Authori-tarian Diffusionrdquo 375ndash92 For an overview see Ambrosio

8 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash1009 Geddes ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdownrdquo Hadenius ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo

143ndash5710 Olson ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo 567ndash76 Acemoglu and Robin-

son Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy11 Bueno de Mesquita et al The Logic of Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook12 Ibid Milner and Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Traderdquo 107ndash43 Lake and Baum

ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracyrdquo 587ndash621 Faust ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividendrdquo 1ndash2613 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy Concessionsrdquo 251ndash8414 Bader Gravingholt and Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote Autocracyrdquo 81ndash10015 Smith ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and International Cooperationrdquo 853ndash7716 Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010 During this period more than 80 semi-

structured interviews were conducted with academics political actors administrativestaff and international experts in Beijing Shanghai Ulaanbataar Phnom PenhHanoi Singapore Berlin and Bonn

17 Since June 2011 the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberal-ize the political sphere In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was notaffected by these changing political conditions the investigation ends before thesechanges took place

18 Cock ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boomrdquo 525ndash4619 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma20 Barkmann ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Elitenrdquo21 Deng and Wang China Rising22 Global Witness Country for Sale23 Storey ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo Job and Williams CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook Shaw and Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises ConcernsAbout Intentrdquo

24 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash87 GanesanldquoMyanmar-China Relationsrdquo 95ndash111

25 Clapp Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Selth Burmarsquos China Connection26 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7127 Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash10828 Ros Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire Peou Intervention amp Change in

Cambodia29 Roberts ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodiardquo 520ndash38

Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Marks The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance

16 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

30 Peou Intervention amp Change in Cambodia31 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition32 Cock ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Eliterdquo 241ndash6533 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge34 Gottesman Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge35 Mengin La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo

92ndash10836 Interview Phnom Penh 17 November 200937 See also Lintner Blood Brothers and Marks ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo 92ndash108

As an underworld figure Theng Bunmarsquos birthplace is however not known38 Interview Beijing 18 September 200939 Hughes The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 6040 Storey ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with Chinardquo Storey ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-

Burmese Relationsrdquo 5ndash841 Selth ldquoBurma and the Competition between China and Indiardquo 22242 Ibid43 Ibid 21444 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma45 Clapp Building Democracy in Burma46 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 3247 Chenyang and Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmarrdquo 255ndash8748 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 1049 Kramer From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt This is not orchestrated by the PRCrsquos

central government However Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative invest-ments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation and lax controlsallowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies

50 International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma 4051 Ibid 40 and 2652 Ibid 1053 Lampton ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Processrdquo 1ndash33

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea54 Sun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo 73ndash9655 Zhao China and India Courting Myanmar56 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo 38ndash56 Lund-

holm ldquoPipeline Politicsrdquo57 As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012 the example of falling

dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmarrsquos junta to take up thereform process again

58 Interview Ulaanbataar 6 October 200959 Declaring independence in 1911 Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by

China which agreed to Mongoliarsquos independence only to make Russia enter thewar against Japan in 1945 To safeguard independence Mongolian leaders alignedwith the Soviet Union during the Cold War

60 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from BeijingrsquosViewpointrdquo

61 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations62 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo63 Campi Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations64 Batchimeg ldquoFuture Challengesrdquo Campi ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos

Viewpointrdquo Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10365 Interview Beijing 31 October 2009

Democratization 17

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

66 Rossabi Modern Mongolia Baabar ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo TsenddooldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo

67 Reeves ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo 453ndash7168 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith The Dictatorrsquos Handbook69 Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asiardquo 64ndash99 Yunling and Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional

Strategyrdquo70 Bulag ldquoMongolia in 2009rdquo 97ndash10371 International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway

Notes on contributorJulia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amster-dam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut furEntwicklungspolitik Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimesforeign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politicsand Politische Vierteljahresschrift She is also the author of the book Chinarsquos ForeignRelations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming)

BibliographyAcemoglu Daron and James Robinson Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006Ambrosio Thomas Authoritarian Backlash Russian Resistance to Democratization in the

Former Soviet Union Farnham Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009Ambrosio Thomas ldquoConstructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion Concepts

Dynamics and Future Researchrdquo International Studies Perspectives 11 no 4(2010) 375ndash392

Baabar B ldquoA Country without Much Hoperdquo Accessed March 14 2011 httpeconomicsgogomnnews55237

Bader Julia Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner ldquoWould Autocracies Promote AutocracyA Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in RegionalNeighbourhoodsrdquo Contemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 81ndash100

Barkmann Udo ldquoZur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten ndash Am Beispiel der Mandatstragerder MRVP in der groszligen Staatsversammlung (1992ndash2005)rdquo [On the Development ofPolitical Parties ndash the Example of the MPRPs Members of Parliament (1992-2005)]In Die Rolle der politischen Parteien im Transformationsprozess der Mongolei [TheRole of Political Parties in Mongolias Transformation Process] edited by UdoBarkmann 293ndash296 Ulaanbaatar Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2006

Batchimeg Migeddorj ldquoFuture Challenges for the PRC and Mongoliardquo China Brief 5no 10 (2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Batchimegamptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30358amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=93295bb330e8e9cafd4df25f9a9fbffa

Bellin Eva ldquoThe Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle Eastrdquo Comparative Politics36 no 2 (2004) 139ndash157

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith ldquoForeign Aid and Policy ConcessionsrdquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 51 no 2 (2007) 251ndash284

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and Alastair Smith The Dictators Handbook Why BadBehavior is Almost Always Good Politics New York Public Affairs 2011

Bueno de Mesquita Bruce Alastair Smith Randolph M Siverson and James D MorrowThe Logic of Political Survival Cambridge London MIT Press 2003

18 J Bader

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

5 D

ecem

ber

2013

Bulag Uradyn ldquoMongolia in 2009 From Landlocked to Land-Linked CosmopolitanrdquoAsian Survey 50 no 1 (2010) 97ndash103

Burnell Peter ed ldquoIs there a New Autocracy Promotionrdquo In Promoting DemocracyAbroad Policy and Performance 269ndash294 London Transaction Publishers 2010

Campi Alicia Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations Challenges for the NewCentury Regional Security Issues and Mongolia 21 Ulaanbaatar Institute forStrategic Studies 2004

Campi Alicia ldquoSino-Mongolian Relations from Beijingrsquos Viewpointrdquo China Brief 5 no 10(2005) httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3eamptx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Alicia20Campiamptx_ttnews[pointer]=1amptx_ttnews[tt_news]=30359amptx_ttnews[backPid]=7ampcHash=3dec51750526961708e830e295f1e49b

Chenyang Li and Lye Liang Fook ldquoChinarsquos Policies Towards Myanmar ASuccessful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issuerdquo China An InternationalJournal 7 no 2 (2009) 255ndash287

Clapp Priscilla Building Democracy in Burma Working Paper 02 Washington DCUnited States Institute of Peace 2007

Clapp Priscilla Burmarsquos Long Road to Democracy Special Report 193 Washington DCUnited States Institute of Peace 2007

Cock Andrew ldquoAnticipating an Oil Boom The Resource Curse Thesis in the Play ofCambodian Politicsrdquo Pacific Affairs 83 no 3 (2010) 525ndash546

Cock Andrew ldquoExternal Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-UNTAC Cambodiardquo Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 41 no 2 (2010) 241ndash265

Deng Yong and Fei-Ling Wang eds China Rising Lanham Rowman and LittelfieldPublishers 2005

Faust Jorg ldquoDemocracyrsquos Dividend Political Order and Economic Productivityrdquo WorldPolitical Science Review 3 no 2 (2007) 1ndash26

Ganesan Narayanan ldquoMyanmar-China Relations Interlocking Interests but IndependentOutputrdquo Japanese Journal of Political Science 12 no 1 (2011) 95ndash111

Geddes Barbara ldquoAuthoritarian Breakdown Empirical Test of a Game TheoreticArgumentrdquo Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation Atlanta September 2ndash5 1999

Global Witness Country for Sale How Cambodiarsquos Elite Has Captured the CountryrsquosExtractive Industries Washington DC Global Witness 2009

Gottesman Evan Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge New Haven Yale University Press2003

Hadenius A ldquoPathways from Authoritarianismrdquo Journal of Democracy 18 no 1 (2007)143ndash157

Hughes Caroline The Political Economy of Cambodiarsquos Transition 1991-2001 LondonRoutledge 2003

International Crisis Group Chinarsquos Myanmar Dilemma Asia Report No177 BrusselsInternational Crisis Group 2009

International Crisis Group Myanmar Major Reform Underway Asia Briefing No127Brussels International Crisis Group 2011

International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea I Report No 223 BrusselsInternational Crisis Group 2012

Jackson Nicole ldquoThe Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-liberal Democratic Formsof Political Rule A Case Study of Russiarsquos Influence on Central Asian RegimesrdquoContemporary Politics 16 no 1 (2010) 101ndash118

Job Brian and Erin Williams eds Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia PacificRegional Security Outlook 2009-2010 Singapore Council for Security Cooperationin the Asia Pacific 2009

Democratization 19

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] at

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2013

Kagan Robert ldquoThe End of the End of Historyrdquo The New Republic April 23 2008Kleine-Ahlbrandt Stephanie and Andrew Small ldquoChinarsquos New Dictatorship Diplomacyrdquo

Foreign Affairs 87 no 1 (2008) 38ndash56Koesel Karrie and Valerie Bunce ldquoDiffusion-Proofing Russian and Chinese Responses to

Popular Uprisings Against Authoritarian Rulersrdquo Paper presented at the GIGA work-shop ldquoStemming the Wave International Learning and Cooperation of AuthoritarianRegimesrdquo Hamburg November 8ndash9 2012

Kramer Tom From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt The Future of Opium Bans in theKokang and Wa Regions Drug Policy Briefing No 29 Amsterdam TransnationalInstitute 2009

Lake David and Matthew Baum ldquoThe Invisible Hand of Democracy Political Control andthe Provision of Public Servicesrdquo Comparative Political Studies 34 no 6 (2001)587ndash621

Lampton David ed ldquoChinarsquos Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process Is itChanging and Does it Matterrdquo In The Making of Chinese Foreign and SecurityPolicy in the Era of Reform 1ndash33 Stanford Stanford University Press 2001

Levitsky Steven and Lucan Way ldquoInternational Linkage and Democratizationrdquo Journal ofDemocracy 16 no 3 (2005) 20ndash33

Levitsky Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism Hybrid Regimes After theCold War Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2010

Lintner B Blood Brothers The Criminal Underworld of Asia New York PalgraveMacmillan 2002

Lundholm Gideon ldquoPipeline Politics India and Myanmarrdquo World Security NetworkAccessed December 16 2012 httpwwwworldsecuritynetworkcomIndia-AsiaLundholm-GideonPipeline-Politics-India-and-Myanmar

Marks Paul ldquoChinarsquos Cambodia Strategyrdquo Parameters 30 no 3 (2000) 92ndash108Marks Paul The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance Springfield Foreign Area Officer

Association 2000Mengin Francoise La Presence Chinoise au Cambodge Contribution a une Economie

Politique Violente Rentiere et Inegalitaire [The Chinese Presence in CambodiaConribution to a Violent and Unequal Political Economy] Les Etudes du CERI 133Paris Sciences Po 2007

Milner Helen and Keiki Kubota ldquoWhy the Move to Free Trade Democracy and TradePolicy in the Developing Countriesrdquo International Organization 59 no 1 (2005)107ndash143

Olson Mancur ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo American Political ScienceReview 87 no 3 (1993) 567ndash576

Peou Sorpong Intervention amp Change in Cambodia Towards Democracy New YorkSt Martinrsquos Press 2000

Reeves Jeffrey ldquoMongoliarsquos Environmental Securityrdquo Asian Survey 51 no 3 (2011)453ndash471

Roberts David ldquoDemocratization Elite Transition and Violence in Cambodia 1991ndash1999rdquo Critical Asian Studies 34 no 4 (2002) 520ndash538

Ros Chantrabot Cambodge la Repetition de lrsquoHistoire [Cambodia the Repetition ofHistory] Paris Editions You-Feng 2000

Rossabi Morris Modern Mongolia ndash from Khans to Commissars to Capitalists BerkelyUniversity of California Press 2005

Selth Andrew ldquoBurma and the Strategic Competition between China and Indiardquo Journal ofStrategic Studies 19 no 2 (1996) 213ndash230

Selth Andrew Burmarsquos China Connection and the Indian Ocean Region Vol 377 WorkingPaper Canberra The Australian National University Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre 2003

20 J Bader

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07

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2013

Shambaugh David ldquoChina Engages Asia Reshaping the Regional Orderrdquo InternationalSecurity 93 no 3 (2004) 64ndash99

Shaw William and Pin Sisovann ldquoChinarsquos Patronage Raises Concerns About IntentrdquoAccessed January 1 2009 wwwcamnetcomkhcambodiadailyselected_featuresed-13-7-05htm

Smith Alastair ldquoPolitical Groups Leader Change and the Pattern of InternationalCooperationrdquo Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 no 6 (2009) 853ndash877

Storey Ian ldquoChinarsquos Tightening Relationship with Cambodiardquo China Brief 6 no 9 (2006)httpwwwjamestownorgsingleno_cache=1amptx_ttnews[tt_news]=3947

Storey Ian ldquoBurmarsquos Relation with China Neither Puppet nor Pawnrdquo China Brief 7 no 3(2007) httpwwwjamestownorgprogramschinabriefsingletx_ttnews[tt_news]=4029amptx_ttnews[backPid]=197ampno_cache=1

Storey Ian ldquoEmerging Fault Lines in Sino-Burmese Relations The Kokang IncidentrdquoChina Brief 9 no 18 (2009) 5ndash8

Sun Yun ldquoChinarsquos Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmarrdquo Journal of Current SoutheastAsian Affairs 31 no 1 (2012) 73ndash96

Tolstrup Jakob ldquoStudying a Negative External Actor Russiarsquos Management of Stabilityand Instability in the lsquoNear Abroadrsquordquo Democratization 16 no 2 (2009) 922ndash944

Tsenddoo B ldquoFrom Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongoliardquo Daily NewsMay 13 2010

Vanderhill Rachel ldquoLearning to Be Bad How Autocratic Leaders Adopt Strategies fromAbroad to Maintain Powerrdquo Presented at the 2012 annual meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association New Orleans August 30ndashSeptember 2 2012

Yunling Zhang and Tang Shiping ldquoChinarsquos Regional Strategyrdquo In Power Shift China andAsiarsquos New Dynamics edited by David Shambaugh 48ndash68 Berkeley University ofCalifornia Press 2005

Zhao Hong China and India Courting Myanmar for Good Relations East Asian InstituteBackground Brief No 360 Singapore East Asian Institute 2007

Democratization 21

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

07

14 1

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ecem

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2013