the planetary quarantine program - nasa...of the planetary quarantine program (nasa sp-344), will be...

•NASASP-4902

origins and achievements

The PlanetaryQuarantine

Program

1956-1973

H1/91Unclas05752

ATATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19750006598 2020-06-25T23:01:08+00:00Z

THE

Planetary Quarantine

PROGRAM 1956-1973

NASA SP-4902

The Planetary

Quarantine

Program

origins and achievements

1956-1973

CHARLES R. PHILLIPS

Scientific and Technical Information Office 1974NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,Washington, D.C. 20402, Price 85 cents Stock Number 3300-00578

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-600 134

Foreword

THIS IS ONE OF TWO REPORTS.dealing with the events which led up to theestablishment of a Planetary Quarantine Program in the United States,the development of this program, and its status as of the summer of1973. The reports partially fulfill the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration's (NASA's) requirement that the program be recordedfully so that research and development need not be repeated in thefuture. Both were prepared for the NASA Planetary Quarantine Officeby the Science Communication Division of the George WashingtonUniversity Medical Center, under Contract NSR 09-010-027. The otherreport, written by Morton Werber and entitled Objectives and Modelsof the Planetary Quarantine Program (NASA SP-344), will bepublished in the NASA general technical series.

Now that the Apollo Lunar Exploration Program has come to a halt,at least temporarily, and the exploration of the planets is proceeding onan established, although not accelerated, basis, it is time to take stock ofwhere we stand today.

One of the most exciting possible discoveries in space explorationwould be the detection of extraterrestrial life. The PlanetaryQuarantine Program, both national and international, is an outgrowthof great scientific concern that the search for such life might becompromised by terrestrial microbial contamination during earlyspace exploration projects before effective life detection systems couldbe added to the space program.

The very term "planetary quarantine" shows how the program hasexpanded. The first discussions and efforts used the term"sterilization." Then sterilization, an absolute term, was graduallyreplaced by "probability of contamination." The consideration that incases where microorganisms could not be killed they could possibly beconfined led to the concept of "quarantine." When trajectory control

came into use, flybys could be kept at sufficient distance from celestialbodies to avoid transfer of contaminants, while getting close enough togain significant scientific information.

This report outlines United States effort in planetary quarantine,beginning with the expressions of alarm by biologists, then discussinghow a program was put together and implemented, and finallyindicating the academic, governmental, institutional, and industrialagencies and people involved. It ends with a brief summary of theaccomplishments and present status of the Planetary QuarantineProgram and will, we trust, serve as a partial explanation of how theplanetary quarantine effort evolved and reached its present position.

LAWRENCE B. HALLNASA-Planetary Quarantine

- - - Officer- - - - - - -National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Contents

Introduction 1

Scientific Concern Over Possible Contamination 3

Early Beginnings of the Space Program 7

NASA and Its Planetary Quarantine Responsibilities 9

NASA Advisory Croups 15

American Institute of Biological Sciences 16

NASA Life Sciences Committee 19

Planetary Quarantine Research 21

Implementation and Policy Directives 25

Program Accomplishments 35

Lunar Missions 35

Planetary Missions 37

References 41

Appendix Planetary Quarantine Contractual Research .... 45

vii

Introduction

THE PRESENT-DAY SPACE PROGRAM can be considered an outgrowthof the development of military rocketry during World War II and thedecade that followed. It is true that nonmilitary rocket research hadtaken place earlier. Space exploration would probably have comeabout eventually, even without this development, but the readyavailability of the necessary hardware and engineering technologygreatly accelerated the first ventures into space. The logic behind aspace program, however, was much more than a desire for a spectacularengineering feat or a matter of political rivalry between major powers,although these may have been significant factors. Earth-boundastronomy had its limitations, and many important scientific questionscould be answered only by actual exploration of space. Not the least ofthese questions concerned biology. Was life restricted only to theplanet Earth?

Man had always thought not. The ancients had populated the sky, ashad later science fiction writers, exemplified by H.G. Wells in his Warof the Worlds. Modern-day biologists speculated on other worlds beingpopulated too, but they thought mainly in terms of microorganisms orsimple life forms which would be the first to evolve and would bepresent whether higher forms evolved or not. They were concerned lestin the rush to enter space their science would suffer. After all, had notthe War of the Worlds been won by the bacteria of Earth? Could thisconflict not be duplicated, say on Mars, by carelessness in early spaceventures before man ever had a chance to look for extraterrestrial lifethere? Man could do little that would change the geology of the planets,but their biology, if any existed, could be radically changed even withina decade or so. Planetary quarantine arose from these considerations.

Scientific ConcernOver Possible

Contamination

THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY, both national and international, wasalerted by early space efforts and soon began expressing its concernover possible lunar and planetary contamination. The InternationalAstronautical Federation took up this matter at its seventh Congress inRome, in September 1956, a year before the Sputnik program. In theUnited States the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), acting as the focalpoint for organized scientific opinion within this country, served as thecontact with other national and international scientific bodies. NASfirst considered the harmful effects of contamination in 1957, and itspresident at the time, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, recommended aSatellite-Life Sciences Symposium which was held May 14-17, 1958, inWashington. On June 4, 1958, Dr. Bronk established within NAS theSpace Science Board (SSB), with Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner as its firstchairman. Moving into the international arena, on February 8, 1958,NAS had formally transmitted their council's recommendationsconcerning contamination to the International Congress of ScientificUnions (ICSU). As a result of this action, ICSU formed an ad hoccommittee on Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration(CETEX), which held its first meeting on May 12-13,1958, at The Hague(Science, vol;'128, 1958). Dr. Marcel Florkin was the president of thisbody, and Dr. Donald J. Hughes from the U.S. was a member,representing the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics. Allof these events had taken place before the establishment of the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

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Almost coincidental with the establishment of NASA, the ICSU at itsmeeting in Washington, October 2^, 1958, formed COSPAR, aninternational Committee on Space Research. Dr. W. Albert Noyes, Jr.,served as the U.S. National Representative at its first meeting, held inLondon, England, November 14-15, 1958. COSPAR has met annuallyever since, with Dr. Richard W. Porter replacing Dr. Noyes as U.S. .National Representative for the second meeting. Dr. Porter served in >this capacity until the 1971 meeting at Seattle, Washington. Since then .Dr. Herbert Friedman has headed the U.S. delegation at COSPAR. Theplenary sessions of COSPAR and their locations appear in Table I.

Table I Plenary meetings of COSPAR.

1958 London, England1959 The Hague, The Netherlands1960 Nice, France ~ . . . - . . - . . _ _ . ..1961 Florence, Italy1962 Washington, D.C.1963 Warsaw, Poland1964 Florence, Italy1965 Mar del Plata, Argentina1966 Vienna, Austria1967 London, England1968 Tokyo, Japan1969 Prague, Czechoslovakia1970 Leningrad, U.S.S.R.1971 Seattle, Washington1972 Madrid, Spain1973 Constance, West Germany

COSPAR covered all aspects of space research, including biology,after they took over the functions of the ad hoc CETEX following thatgroup's second meeting on March 9-10, 1959, at The Hague. Dr.Wallace 0. Fenn and Dr. Donald J. Hughes represented the U.S. at thesecond and last CETEX meeting. Within the United States CETEX hadits counterparts in EASTEX and later WESTEX, informal groupsmeeting from late 1958 through 1959, under the auspices of theNAS/SSB, with Dr. Bruno B. Rossi of the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT) and Dr. Joshua Lederberg of Stanford Universityserving as respective chairmen.

Dr. Lederberg was also requested by the SSB to set up an ad hocmeeting to make recommendations concerning spacecraft sterilization.This committee met at Stanford on July 6-8, 1959. Besides Dr.Lederberg, who served as Chairman, members included R.C. Bauman,Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA; Richard W. Davies, JetPropulsion Laboratory (JPL); Dr. G. Wesley Dunlap, General Electric

4 The Planetary Quarantine Program

Company; and Dr. Charles R. Phillips, U.S. Army BiologicalLaboratories (BioLabs). George A. Derbyshire from SSB served assecretary.

The biology with which the SSB, and later COSPAR, concernedthemselves covered all aspects as it related to the space program. Thisembraced space medicine, as well as life sciences, exobiology, space-craft sterilization, and planetary quarantine. This report is concernedonly with the latter two disciplines, but it is hard to isolate them fromthe other biological disciplines in the early part of the space program.For instance, the request for the sterilization of spacecraft was anoutgrowth of exobiological concern. If alien life forms were to befound and examined, they must be kept separated, at least in thebeginning, from the ubiquitous microorganisms of Earth. Later as thespace biology program expanded, the various biological disciplinesbecame better defined and were considered separately.

The Space Science Board of NAS and COSPAR were not the onlyscientific groups to express an early concern over possible biologicalcontamination as the space program expanded. As early as December1958, the United Nations formed a Committee on the Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space (UNCOPUOS). The American Astronautical Societyconsidered similar topics at several of its meetings. A paper on thesterilization of space vehicles was presented at the 10th InternationalAstronautics Congress in London, August 31-September 5, 1959 (Davisand Comuntzis, 1960). The American Association for the Advancementof Science sponsored a symposium on Extraterrestrial Biology andBiochemistry at its Denver meeting in December 1959. This wasorganized and chaired by Dr. Charles R. Phillips.

The SSB of the National Academy of Sciences, together with itsrepresentation at COSPAR, served and continues to serve as the mainoutside scientific source of recommendations to NASA on planetaryquarantine. Among the SSB members, most of whom hadnonbiological backgrounds, those most concerned with planetaryquarantine have been Dr. Allan H. Brown, Dr. Wolf V. Vishniac, andDr. Colin S. Pittendrigh. They, together with Dr. Carl E. Sagan andDr. Lawrence B. Hall, have been active on COSPAR Working Group 5,Space Biology, which was set up at the Warsaw meeting in 1963. Theproceedings of the COSPAR meetings appear annually in SpaceResearch (North-Holland, Amsterdam) beginning with Volume I,1960, covering the Nice meeting. Papers dealing with the life sciencescomprise a substantive section in the second volume of Space Researchfor the Florence meeting of 1961. Beginning in 1962, the papers on thelife sciences have been published separately each year in a companionvolume Life Sciences and Space Research.

Scientific Concern Over Possible Contamination 5

One specific COSPAR-sponsored Symposium was held in London,England, just prior to COSPAR's 1967 plenary session there. Theseproceedings were published separately as COSPAR Technique ManualNo. 4, Sterilization Techniques for Instruments and Materiels asApplied to Space Research, (Sneath, ed., 1968).

Other advisory bodies which have been set up by NASA itself, such asthe American Institute of Biological Sciences (AIBS) consultants andthe Life Sciences Committee of NASA, will be discussed later.

The Planetary Quarantine Program

Early Beginnings ofthe Space Program

NASA WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED on October 1, 1958. Anaeronautical research agency, the National Advisory Committee forAeronautics (NACA) was reorganized and became the nucleus of thenew organization. At that time the space program had already begun.Sputnik I had been launched by the U.S.S.R. on October 4,1957, a yearearlier. This was followed by Sputnik II, launched November 3, 1957.The U.S. Navy attempted to launch Vanguard satellites on December 6,1957, and February 5, 1958. They succeeded on March 17, 1958.Meanwhile, on January 31,1958, the U.S. Army had launchedEACjo/orer/ whose instruments discovered the Van Allen belt. The U.S. Air Forceattempted its first lunar probe with Thor-Able I on August 17,1958, butfailed. The Department of Defense Advanced Research ProgramsAgency (ARPA) had taken over the Explorer program with thesuccessful launch of Explorer 4 on July 26, 1958. After theestablishment of NASA, these military projects passed into civiliancontrol.

NASA and Its PlanetaryQuarantine

Responsibilities

THE AUTHORITY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION of the national andinternational recommendations concerning the prevention ofcontamination, and later concerning planetary quarantine, resides inthe National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, subjectalways to the final authority of the Congress, which established thatagency and which appropriates the funds to carry out approvedprograms, and to the Federal Executive office, which approves thebudgets NASA presents to the Congress.

In 1958, Dr. T, Keith Glennan, then President of Case Institute,Cleveland, Ohio, was named by President Eisenhower to be the firstadministrator of NASA. The other top officials were mainly drawnfrom the predecessor organization, NACA. For example, Dr. Hugh L.Dryden became Deputy Administrator, and Dr. Abe Silversteinbecame Director of Space Flight Programs.

NACA had been an engineering and physical sciences organizationcarrying out its own investigations in a complex of research centers:Ames in California, Langley in Virginia, and Lewis in Ohio. Thesecenters had few capabilities in the biological sciences. To remedy this,Dr. Glennan in April 1959 brought into NASA as a special medical andbiological advisor, Dr. Clark T. Randt, Professor of Neurology fromWestern Reserve University. Dr. Randt acted in this staff capacity for ayear until he became the first director of NASA's Office of LifeSciences.

The first major problem facing NASA was' to take over certain

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FEKIEDI

military space programs from the Department of Defense and tocoordinate them with the expanded NACA functions. In December1958, Dr. Dryden delineated the functions of the various organizationsreporting to NASA headquarters. The existing three NACA centerswere to remain in-house research and development centers. GoddardSpace Flight Center, to be constructed in Maryland, was givenresponsibility for Earth orbit missions. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory(JPL), whose contract with the Army Ballistic Missile Agency was tobe assumed by NASA on January 1, 1959, was to handle all deep spacemissions. The first such program at JPL, Ranger, was still in theplanning stage. Another NASA inheritance was the work being done bythe Space Technology Laboratory (STL), a subsidiary of the thenRamo-Woldridge Corporation, under contract to the Air ForceBallistic_Missile Division and later with the Department of Defense's(DOD's) Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). STL was alreadyengaged in the early Pioneer series of lunar shots and the Atlas-Ableshots which were to follow. Only Pioneer 4 (March 1959) was to escapethe Earth's gravitational field. It missed the Moon by 37,000 miles. Evenbefore NASA came into the picture, some effort had been made by themilitary, in. response to the advice of the scientific community, todecontaminate, if not to sterilize, these space probes.

On September 14, 1959, Dr. Hugh Odishaw, Secretary of the SpaceScience Board, wrote to Dr. Glennan and to Dr. Roy Johnson of ARPAtransmitting the recommendations of Dr. Lederberg's ad hocCommittee on Sterilization, saying that the recommendations hadSSB's approval and requesting that they be followed. Dr. Glennananswered this request on October 13, 1959, pledging that NASA wouldattempt to .carry out the recommendations. Also during October, Dr.Abe Silverstein sent JPL, Goddard Space Flight Center, and STL(through the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division) letters stating thefollowing:

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has beenconsidering the problem of sterilization of payloads that mightimpact a celestial body. Consideration was given to scientificquestions, engineering problems, NASA's responsibility towardsprotecting scientific investigations into space, and the reputationand integrity of the United States. As a result of the deliberations, ithas been established as a NASA policy that payloads which mightimpact a celestial body must be sterilized before launching.

The letters went on to list particular payloads of concern, gave severalreferences, and suggested that the group at the U.S. Army BioLabs, FortDetrick, Maryland, under Dr. Charles R. Phillips, had experience in


problems associated with sterilization and should be contacted. Shortlyafter, on November 12, 1959, Dr. Glennan transferred funds to theArmy under a governmental interagency agreement to support theircooperation. Dr. Silverstein's letters could be considered the firstofficial NASA policy directives on spacecraft sterilization.

Dr. Gerhard F. Schilling, one of the German rocket scientists whocame to the United States following World War II, had taken over asNASA Project Manager for the Atlas-Able Pioneer series of shots. Hebecame one of the first NASA officials charged with responsibility forspace vehicle sterilization.

The various committees and scientific advisory panels set up by andreporting directly to NASA— as opposed to the outside scientific bodiesdiscussed earlier—will be listed in a later section of this report. Two ofthese committees were primarily concerned with the establishment ofbiological competence and facilities within the NASA organization.The first was the NASA Special Life Sciences Committee, better knownas the Lovelace Committee after its chairman, Dr. W. RandolphLovelace, II. This was formally established on October 1, 1958, thesame date as NASA itself. It had its foundations in an earlier SpecialCommittee on Space Technology established by NACA in November1957, a month after the first Sputnik launch. This NACA committeehad been headed by Dr. H. Guyford Stever of MIT. It had sevenworking groups, one of which was on Human Factors and Training,headed by Dr. Lovelace. The new NASA Special Life SciencesCommittee stemmed from earlier recommendations that NASA should"develop a capability as quickly as possible [in Life Sciences] startingwith contract coverage concurrent with in-house support" and that aspecial Life Sciences Committee should be established to considerimmediate problems. NASA promptly implemented theserecommendations. This new committee consisted of Dr. Lovelace,Chairman; Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger, U.S. Air Force (USAF); and Dr.Wright Langham, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), from the earlierStever group. Additional members were Lt. Comdr. John M. Ebersole,Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, National Medical Center; Lt. Col. RobertH. Holmes, Medical Corps, U.S. Army; Dr. Robert B. Livingston, U.S.Public Health Service-National Institute of Health (USPHS-NIH); andDr. Orr. E. Reynolds, DOD; with Capt. G. Dale Smith, USAF, servingas secretary. The committee tried unsuccessfully to interest variousinstitutions and government agencies in entering into an agreementwith NASA to manage a major life science program for them. Thecommittee was dissolved on March 31, 1960, after the establishment ofan Office of Life Sciences within NASA.

This Office of Life Sciences was formed after NASA, in August 1959,

NASA and Its Planetary Quarantine Responsibilities . 11

set up another biological group, the ad hoc Biosciehce AdvisoryCommittee, better known as the Kety Committee after Dr. Seymour S.Kety, its Chairman. Other members were Drs. Wallace 0. Fenn, DavidR. Coddard, Donald G. Marquis, Robert S. Morison, and Cornelius A.Tobias. Advisors included Stephen Dole, Dr. Joshua Lederberg, Dr.Melvin Calvin, and Dr. W. Randolph Lovelace, II. Dr. Randt served asexecutive secretary. The Kety Committee had met on October 15-16,1959, and on January 25,1960, and had recommended that an Office ofLife Sciences be established as a major division of NASA.

Dr. Clennan accepted the recommendation and established, theoffice on March 1, 1960, naming Dr. Randt as Director. This office wasresponsible for all biological and medical programs within NASA. Themandate included aerospace medicine, biological satelliteexperiments, exobiology, and the acco'mpanying spacecraftsterilization program. Col. Charles H. Roadman, who was onassignment from the Air Force'and had previous experience withaerospace medicine, was brought into the organization in June 1960.Other chief members of the staff were Drs. Freeman H. Quimby,George J. Jacobs, Richard S. Young, G. Dale Smith, Siegfried J.Gerathewohl, and Jack Posner. The latter served in an administrativeposition and, as such, was the first to oversee the sterilization projectsunderway at JPL and the U.S. Army BioLabs.

On April 1,1961, Dr. Randt resigned as Director of the Office of LifeSciences. Colonel Roadman replaced him, first as Acting Director thenas Director, until November 1, 1961, when, under a majorreorganization, the four major offices of NASA headquarters,including the Office of Life Sciences were abolished. Four new majoroffices were established: (1) Manned Space Flight, Dr. D.B. Holmes,Director; (2) Advanced Research and Technology, Dr. Ira H. Abbott,Director; (3) Space Sciences, Dr. Homer E. Newell, Director; and (4)Applications, Director to be appointed.

The medical and biological programs within NASA, formerly allresiding within the Office of Life Sciences, were split between three ofthese new offices. Aerospace medicine, headed by Brig.-Gen. CharlesH. Roadman, went into the Office of Manned Space Flight. Biologicaltechnology was placed in the Office of Advanced Research andTechnology, while biosatellite experimentation, exobiology, andsterilization of spacecraft went to the Office of Space Sciences (OSS).Dr. Orr E. Reynolds was appointed the first Director of BiosciencesPrograms in OSS on February 11, 1962. Dr. Reynolds first had Dr.Quimby handle sterilization as a part of the exobiology program. OnAugust 1,1963, Capt. Lawrence B. Hall, a senior commissioned officerof the U.S. Public Health Service, was detailed, on request from the


NASA Administrator to the Surgeon General, to duty with NASA. Histask was to develop the sterilization program. He became the first

> NASA Planetary Quarantine (PQ) Officer, assuming responsibility fordirection and operation of the program. He retired from the PublicHealth Service on September 30,1965, but has remained with NASA in

• the same position, as a civilian.•'' The headquarters staff at the PQ office remained small, concernedwith the direction of research and operations, particularly in its overallprogramming and funding aspects. Dr. Carl W. Bruch was brought in atthe beginning of the PQ Program and stayed until September 24, 1966.James Miles, a NASA engineer, was assigned engineeringresponsibilities in the PQ Program from 1963 to 1965, when hetransferred to other duties. Capt. Jack H. Fooks, also detailed to NASAby the Public Health Service, served as Sterility Control Officer forplanetary quarantine from November 1, 1965, to December 31, 1967.Concurrently, Capt. Arthur H. Neill, a USPHS officer detailed to dutywith NASA January 1, 1967, served as Deputy Planetary QuarantineOfficer. He retired on May 31,1971. Lt. Comdr. Donald G. Fox, also onloan as a USPHS commissioned officer, served as a Sterility ControlOfficer from October 1968 to August 30, 1971. During portions of1971-1973, JPL maintained a series of detailees in NASA headquartersto the support of the technical aspects of the PQ Program. Mrs. SuzanneGallagher, on-loan as a USPHS civilian, has served as AdministrativeOfficer from June 21, 1964, to the present.

The PQ Program operated from 1963 to 1971 under the BiosciencePrograms, NASA Office of Space Science and Applications. WhenBioscience Programs was eliminated in 1971, the PQ Program wastransferred to Planetary Programs, Office of Life Sciences, foradministrative purposes. To avoid any possibility of conflict betweenthe regulatory responsibility of the PQ Program and the operationalresponsibility of the Planetary Programs, the NASA Director of LifeSciences was given an overall coordination role, and a direct line ofcommunication was authorized, for use if needed, from the PlanetaryQuarantine Officer to the Associate Administrator, Office of SpaceScience.

The planetary quarantine staff at NASA headquarters has remainedsmall because of staffing limitations in effect at the time oforganization. Its administrative functions have of necessity beenaugmented under three contractual arrangements. Since 1965, theBiological Sciences Communication Project of George WashingtonUniversity has handled documentation of both research supported bythe PQ office and outside scientific literature. The American Instituteof Biological Sciences, since 1964, has performed various functions

NASA and Its Planetary Quarantine Responsibilities 13

including the handling of details for outside conferences and meetings.Exotech Systems, Inc., under a series of contracts beginning in 1965,has provided a number of services in systems analysis, researchintegration, and operations research. These latter two contractualservices will be discussed in more detail later.


NASA AdvisoryGroups

THE FIRST TWO ADVISORY GROUPS which NASA established in the lifesciences, the so-called Lovelace and Kety Committees, have beenmentioned. They were concerned with organizational andadministrative aspects rather than with technical or programproblems. After the Office of Life Sciences was established in NASAHeadquarters (largely as a result of the recommendations of the KetyCommittee), its Director, Dr. Randt, established three advisorycommittees. One on Flight Medicine and Biology was chaired by Dr.Lovelace. A second on Space Medical and Behavioral Sciences waschaired by Dr. Robert S. Morison of the Rockefeller Foundation.Spacecraft sterilization and planetary quarantine, as well asexobiology, were handled by a third group, the NASA AdvisoryCommittee on Space Biology. Dr. Melvin Calvin of the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, was Chairman. Other members were Dr. PhilipH. Abelson, Carnegie Institution; Dr. Sidney W. Fox, Florida StateUniversity; Dr. Norman H. Horowitz (Vice-Chairman), CaliforniaInstitute of Technology; Dr. Henry Linschitz, Brandeis University;Dr. C.S. Pittendrigh, Princeton University; Dr. Carl E. Sagan,then at the University of California, Berkeley; and Dr. Ernest C.Pollard, Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Richard S. Young, NASAheadquarters, served as secretary.

Within NASA headquarters there was also established a BiosciencesSubcommittee of the Space Sciences Steering Committee with Drs.Freeman Quimby, Chairman; Richard Young, Secretary; and GeorgeJacobs, Siegfried Gerathewohl, G. Dale Smith, and Jack Posner,members. During 1960 and 1961, the groups held several meetings withinvited visitors and consultants.

15

NASA also organized two ad hoc conferences on spacecraftsterilization, in which NASA officials met with invited scientists fromother government agencies and outside institutions. The first of thesewas held at NASA headquarters in January 1961. It was chaired by Dr.Randt, and its proceedings were edited by Jack Posner and publishedas NASA Technical Note D-771. The second such meeting was held inJuly 1962 after the reorganization which abolished the Office of LifeSciences. This conference was chaired by Dr. Reynolds and GeorgeHobby of JPL. Its proceedings were edited by Dr. Quimby andpublished as NASA Technical Note D-1357. Some 20 to 25 attendeeswere present at these two conferences.

The SSB also arranged special ad hoc meetings at which spacecraftsterilization, or the need for it, was a subject for consideration. Biologywas one subject considered by the SSB summer study at Ames, Iowa.This will be discussed later. Three other SSB-sponsored meetingsapplicable to planetary quarantine, all held in Washington and chairedby Dr. Allan H. Brown, were "Conference on Hazard of PlanetaryContamination due to Microbial Contamination of Interior ofSpacecraft Components," July 28, 1964; "Conference on PotentialHazards of Back-Contamination from Planets," July 29-30, 1964; and"Ad hoc Panel on Study of Biological Quarantine of Venus," January1967.

A recommendation from the second of these meetings, that both thesamples returned from the Moon and the astronauts themselves bequarantined on their return until found free of possibleextraterrestrial microorganisms, led directly to the decision by NASAto construct the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at Houston before the firstApollo mission landed on the Moon. This quarantine policy isdiscussed later in more detail.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Formal advisory services were reestablished in 1965 for the PQ officethrough a contract with the AIBS. From then on, AIBS organized andmanaged technical seminars on planetary research and developed atechnically qualified group to formulate and recommend the advicesupplied by AIBS to the Planetary Quarantine Officer.

This advisory group has been known progressively as the AIBSSpacecraft Sterilization Advisory Committee (1965-1967), the AIBSPlanetary Quarantine Advisory Committee (1968-1970), the AIBSPlanetary Quarantine Advisory Panel (1970-1972), and, currently, theAlBS Planetary Quarantine Panel (1973).

The Chairman through all these changes of nomenclature has been


Professor Richard G. Bond of the University of Minnesota.Membership has changed from year to year, and not all currentmembers have participated in each meeting. A list of members appearsin Table II.

Table II AIBS planetary quarantine advisory panel, 1965—1973.

MembersProfessor Richard G. Bond, ChairmanUniversity of Minnesota1965-Dr. Robert AngelottiFood and Drug Administration1969-Dr. John R. Bagby, Jr.Colorado State University1972-Dr. John H. BrewerHardin-Simmons University1965-Mr. William B. BriggsMcDonnell-Douglas Astronautics

Company1972-Dr. Allan H. BrownUniversity of Pennsylvania1972-Dr. Byron W. Brown, Jr.Stanford University Medical Center1969-1970Mr. Mark A. ChatignyUniversity of California, Berkeley1966-Dr. Frank B. Engley, Jr.University of Missouri1967-Dr. Franklin A. GraybillColorado State University1972-

Professor Thomas W. KethleyGeorgia Institute of Technology1965-1966

Dr. James C. KonenConsultant, Ashland Chemical1972-

Dr. Gilbert V. LevinBiospherics Incorporated1967-1973

Dr. Morton W. MillerUniversity of Rochester1972-Dr. Irving J. PflugUniversity of Minnesota1965-1972Dr. Richard W. PorterGeneral Electric Company1970-Dr. Orr E. ReynoldsAmerican Physiological Society1971-Dr. Gerald SilvermanMassachusetts Institute of Technology1967-Mr. H.D. SivinskiSandia Corporation1972-Dr. H. Earle SwimUniversity of Kentucky1972-Dr. John A. UlrichUniversity of New Mexico1965-Dr. Wolf V. VishniacUniversity of Rochester1972-1973Dr. William G. WalterMontana State University1965-1966Mr. Robert P. WolfsonSystems Consultant1972-

Advisory ScientistDr. Irving J. PflugUniversity of Minnesota1972-

CoordinatorMs. Mary-Frances ThompsonAmerican Institute of Biological Sciences1965-

NASA Advisory Groups 17

The purposes of the Panel are to

1. Review the broad aspects of the PQ program2. Review research data of PQ interest upon which NASA policy

decisions are based3. Prepare recommendations for technical changes in PQ pol-

icy or confirm policies4. Evaluate research proposals

In 1965, the same year the first panel was organized, AIBS set up forthe Planetary Quarantine Program a National Conference onSpacecraft Sterilization Technology on the California Institute ofTechnology campus in Pasadena. This was attended by about 300persons. Some 36 formal papers were presented over a period of threedays,^ind they, together with discussions,_were .published byJNASA asSP-108 in 1966.

No large national conferences followed, although there was an inter-national meeting in London in 1967 just before the COSPAR meetingthere. The papers presented, together with discussions, were publishedby COSPAR as Manual No. 4 of their Technique Manual Series underthe title Sterilization Techniques for Instruments and Materials asApplied to Space Research. '•

In 1968 the AIBS Planetary Quarantine Panel started the practice ofholding smaller semiannual NASA Spacecraft Sterilization TechnologySeminars. The purpose of the seminars was to permit the PQ Officer tomonitor contracts, to inform the PQ Officer and the AIBS PQ Panel ofprogress made in the supporting research and technology program, andto foster an interchange of ideas and recent developments in spacecraftsterilization. For these seminars research contractors preparedabstracts rather than formal papers, since much of what was reportedwas work in progress. The panel and NASA officials selected from theseabstracts the work they wanted presented in great detail; thus, thetechnology seminars consisted of informal oral presentations by cer-tain contractors and discussions which were not formally published.Other contractors and prospective contractors were invited to attendthe seminars if they wanted to keep up with work related to their own.

Following is a list of these Spacecraft Technology Seminars and theirlocations:

June 1968 Cape Kennedy, FloridaFebruary 1969 Cape Kennedy, FloridaSeptember 1969 Las Vegas, NevadaApril 1970 Atlanta, GeorgiaDecember 1970 Williamsburg, Virginia •June 1971 Seattle, Washington


January 1972 Cape Kennedy, FloridaJuly 1972 San Francisco, CaliforniaJanuary 1973 New Orleans, LouisianaJuly 1973 Denver, Colorado

NASA LIFE SCIENCES COMMITTEE

Recently, the NASA Life Sciences Committee, operating under theNASA Space Program Advisory Council, has undertaken to review andadvise on the adequacy of the planetary quarantine measures employedby planetary missions.

NASA Advisory Groups 19

PlanetaryQuarantineResearch

A RESEARCH PROGRAM IN THE LIFE SCIENCES had to be established afterNASA's formation, since NACA had essentially no experience orin-house capability in the biological field which could be carried overinto the new organization. The NACA research organization had beenbuilt almost entirely around its research centers. Under NASA, theresearch development program became contractor oriented.

The first of the research contractors was JPL. This continuing projectis by far the largest research effort which NASA has supported in thisfield. Although technically a contractor, JPL has, in effect, operated asa major NASA research center.

When NASA took contractual control of JPL on January 1, 1959,JPL too had little experience in biology or the life sciences. Among thefirst to become involved in sterilization problems at JPL was RichardW. Davies, who had been in contact with Dr. Lederberg and was amember of his ad hoc committee on spacecraft sterilization which metin the summer of 1959. Also involved soon after JPL became a NASAprime contractor was Marcus G. Comuntzis, an engineer concernedwith the Ranger program. They gave a joint paper on spacecraftsterilization in London in the summer of 1959. In it they recommendedvarious goals, including one that the probability of landing a viableorganism on Mars or Venus should be less than one in a million.

This was followed up in JPL by an engineering study conducted byLeonard D. Jaffe (Jaffe, 1963, 1964). He took into consideration thecurrent state-of-the-art, both in sterilization and in trajectory control,

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and concluded that these probabilities should be lessenedconsiderably for Venus and that those for Mars should be reduced toabout a 10~4 probability. The further development of these goals interms of probabilities is covered in Werber's companion reportmentioned in the Foreword to this volume.

JPL also started early to build up an in-house biological researchcapability. In March 1959, JPL arranged for George L. Hobby, then,associated with Dr. Dean Burke at the National Institutes of Health, tocome into their organization as a staff biologist. He reported for duty inAugust 1959 and began to build up a small internal biologicalorganization. Frank A. Morelli was an early member of this group. ,

Since then, a large number of JPL staff members have beenassociated with sterilization and planetary quarantine activities eitheron a full-time or part-time basis. The research effort grew particularlyafter the establishment of the PQ office within NASA headquarters,which offered a central source of program planning and funding. Muchof the research is difficult to sort out from other JPL activitiesassociated with funded programs not directly related to planetaryquarantine. For example, there, was a large effort from the start todetermine which spacecraft components were unaffected by varioustypes of sterilization treatments and to develop new sterilizablecomponents when the available ones were damaged by heat or othertechniques. Trajectory computations also had a bearing on planetaryquarantine. Many JPL research efforts were directly funded by NASA'sPQ office and were related directly to that program.

The Planetary Quarantine Program at JPL is now supervised by Dr.Charles W. Craven. He was Project Officer for early Voyager projectwork, supported by various contractors including General Electric,with Robert Wolfson as principal investigator. This led to a cleardefinition of overall planetary quarantine parameters, which in turnled to more than a score of early laboratory investigations to betterdefine problems of die-off and recontamination—die-off due toultraviolet radiation and recontamination due to exhaust gases andspalling.

George F. Ervin had an early assignment as Capsule SystemsSterilization Engineer for Voyager, and he provided the PlanetaryQuarantine Program with a fresh look at procedures and methodology.He exercised considerable engineering acumen in the development ofsterilization specifications and the NASA planetary quarantinehandbook, NHB 8020.12. This documentation has been and continuesto be a key element in Viking development activities.

Victor J. Magistrale carried out early coordination work on alaboratorywide basis to develop the sterilizable parts for various


spacecraft, including electronic components, scientific instruments,batteries, and materials. At that time sterilization requirementsincluded exposure to both dry heat and ethylene oxide. In this effort heworked closely with James R. Miles, the Sterilization Program Managerat NASA headquarters.

Alexander S. Irons worked in the area of sterilization methodologywith both dry heat and ethylene oxide. He defined exposure times,conditions of exposure, i.e., amount of moisture, and carried outstudies to better define clean rooms and to develop means ofquantization. This included work in the Experimental AssemblySterilization Laboratory (EASL). He later projected his work into thecivil systems area, developing a readily sterilizable pressure breathingmachine for use in hospitals. This is considered a direct transfer ofNASA technology to the civil sector.

Dr. Joseph J. McDade conducted early studies to define clean-roomwork areas. These studies included definition of expectedmicrobiological fallout and accumulation of biological load onspacecraft surfaces. In addition, he did pioneering work to quantitizemicrobiological population. Later work in cleaning spacecraft surfaceshas proven of value in the cleanup of all the various Marinerspacecraft.

Dr. Joseph A. Stern and Dr. Richard H. Green selected and directeda team of workers to provide the Viking project discipline, as well asother planetary quarantine achievements. They refined earlyclean-room studies and advanced the quantization of microbiologicalpopulations.

Gunther Redmann worked with the prototype SterilizationDevelopment Laboratory (SADL) and with simulated lander capsuleequipment to collect data showing the level of bioload to be expectedthrough normal assembly and test of Viking hardware. These dataproved that extensive sterile life protection and handling of flighthardware were unnecessary. In addition, his work showed the merit ofthe class 100 type of clean tent which was later adapted for use with thetwo Mariner 71 spacecraft.

Dr. Daniel M. Taylor refined spacecraft cleaning methodology andcontinued the operation of bioassay laboratories required to supportthe Viking lander through launch. His studies of radiation effect onmicroorganisms, combined with effects of the space environment andexposure to dry heat, have proven of great value in defining planetaryquarantine requirements for planned missions to Jupiter and Saturn.

Alan R. Hoffman worked in systems analysis, mathematicalmodeling, and development of planetary quarantine computerprograms in support of the overall Viking Planetary Quarantine

'•-. :\

Planetary Quarantine Research 23

Program. He has also projected his sytems analysis methodology intostudies for missions to the outer planets to provide planners with aselection of strategies for encounters with the planets and theirsatellites.

Aside from the effort at JPL, there were many other contractorsworking on planetary quarantine research. Some were earlyparticipants in the NASA sterilization effort. A larger number came inafter the establishment of the Planetary Quarantine office at NASAheadquarters. These contractors, the scope of their research effort,principal investigators, and duration of study are listed in theAppendix. The reader is referred to the BSCP bibliography for areview of published results.


Implementation andPolicy Directives

DR. ABE SILVERSTEIN'S LETTERS written in October 1959 were partiallyquoted earlier, together with the comment that they constituted thefirst formal NASA policy directive on spacecraft sterilization. They allcontained the statement that "payloads which might impact a celestialbody must be sterilized before launching." This was an unequivocablestatement, with no qualification, and sterilization is an absolute term.

While this directive could not have been completely unexpected,since those involved with imminent launchings were aware of therecommendations the biologists had been making, its immediateapplication posed innumerable difficulties. TO begin with, theseactivities were in the hands of physical scientists and engineers who hadlittle previous experience with biology, much less with sterilizationtechniques, and no knowledge of what the application of thesetreatments would do to the spacecraft they were designing. Sterilizationat that time was usually thought of in hospital terms, involving smallitems such as those used in surgery. The technique predominantly usedwas autoclaving—wet steam at pressures of about 25 psi overatmospheric—and was usually conducted in small pressure chambers.This was hardly applicable to spacecraft.

The Lederberg ad hoc committee on spacecraft sterilization hadstated that one research group, the U.S. Army BioLabs, had experiencedating back to World War II in sterilizing objects as large as army trucksand as delicate as laboratory balances. They recommended that thisexperience be utilized. Dr. Silverstein's letters repeated thisrecommendation, and, shortly afterward, NASA and the U.S. Armysigned an interagency agreement formalizing this cooperation. BioLabs

25

had developed gaseous sterilization techniques, particularly aroundthe use of volatile and noncorrosive ethylene oxide, which could beused in simple plastic containers at ambient temperatures andpressures. The SSB and Dr. Silverstein's directives recommended thatthis technique be explored.

A complicating factor which eliminated sole reliance on a simpleterminal gaseous sterilization of an assembled spacecraft soon evolved.This gaseous treatment would take care of microorganisms only onexposed surfaces. Lederberg had expressed concern thatmicroorganisms might be protected between the threads of screws, forexample, or in plastics or potting materials used to protect electroniccomponents. The lunar launches then in the planning stage involvedhard landings, which could cause such buried contamination tobecome exposed. Until this time, only surface sterilization had been aconcern. No surgeon after an operation would crumble the instrumentshe had used and drop them into the open wound before he sewed up theincision he had made. This, however, was essentially what couldhappen on a hard lunar landing. In the absence of any restrainingatmosphere, the exposed contaminated parts could be transported,depending upon their initial velocity and trajectory, to distances farbeyond the landing site.

The Army BioLabs group looked into this matter of buriedcontamination. After exploratory experiments, they found that hardymicroorganisms could indeed survive certain polymerization processesof plastics, and, moreover, that many electronic compo-nents—capacitors, resistors, transformers—as received from the man-ufacturer contained viable microorganisms inside them which grewwhen the components were cracked or crushed open, even after beingsurface sterilized with ethylene oxide.

This information was reported at the annual convention of theSociety of American Bacteriologists in Philadelphia in May 1960 andsubsequently published in Science (Phillips and Hoffman, 1960).

There were only two known sterilization techniques at that timewhich could be used for such buried contamination—heat andpenetrating radiation. Radiation had considerably less effect onmicroorganisms than on higher forms of life. Very high dosages wererequired, in the order of three to five megarads, rather than dosages inthe hundreds or low thousands which were lethal to higher life forms.Many spacecraft components simply could not withstand thistreatment. Heat too had its drawbacks. Sterilization dosages were wellworked out for autoclaving, requiring only 15 to 20 minutes attemperatures around 125°C. But steam could no more penetrate to theburied microorganisms than could the sterilizing gases. Heat in that


case had to be dry heat, even if applied in an autoclave.Microorganisms in the dry state, as opposed to those freely exposed towet steam, were much more resistant. At temperatures in the range of160°C to 170°C, four or more hours were required for sterilization.Moreover, because of these long exposure times and high temperaturesthe process had been little used and, hence, there were few dataavailable. No data were available on dry heat sterilization rates atlower, and presumably less damaging, temperatures. The ArmyBioLabs in a few exploratory experiments determined that at 125°Cexposure times extending to 24 hours would probably be required.

Meanwhile JPL was finding in planning for the Ranger program thatit was not possible to live up to the absolute terms of the Silversteindirective.

The whole Ranger program was beset with difficulties, of whichattempts at sterilization were only a part, but a particularly annoyingpart. This whole experience has been carefully documented in ProjectRanger. A Chronology (Hall, 1971). This publication listschronologically all the pertinent documents dealing with the Rangerhistory, together with a short summary of their contents. The followingparagraphs summarize rather briefly the part that sterilization playedin this attempt at lunar exploration.

On March 8,1960, JPL established spacecraft sterilization guidelinesfor the Ranger project, and in April a Spacecraft Sterilization Paneldecided that they would only generate techniques with Rangers I and//, which were to be Earth orbiters. Then they would utilize thesetechniques with Rangers HI, IV, and V, which were planned to take TVpictures prior to hard lunar impacts. Later in April 1960, JPL releaseddetailed in-house procedures which included first a dry heat treatmentand then a terminal gaseous sterilization at the launch site.

Further studies with spacecraft components were taking placeduring the delays that occurred in the Ranger program, and JPL wasfinding it impossible to sterilize all Ranger components internally.Such terms as "sterilization to the extent feasible" began to creep intocorrespondence. Then on December 23, 1960, after considerablestaffing, NASA issued a memorandum to Program Directors at NASAheadquarters and Directors of field stations on the subject:"Decontamination and sterilization procedures for lunar andplanetary space vehicles." The memo was signed by Hugh L. Dryden,NASA Deputy Administrator, for T. Keith Glennan, Administrator.The directive restated that "effective decontamination andsterilization procedures for lunar and planetary space vehicles areessential." It called for extensive studies to be initiated to achieve thisgoal. Sterilization plans for each mission would be prepared for the


NASA Associate Administrator and no mission would be flown until hehad approved the planned procedures. Waivers could be granted ifcertain essential components could not be sterilized internally as wellas externally..

The requested studies, particularly on dry heat sterilization,were initialed at JPL. In addition, NASA headquarters supported anextensive basic research program on dry heat with other contractors,beginning with the Wilmot Castle Company contract in March 1961..This effort has continued under various investigators to the present.

At this point it is advisable to list the various U.S. lunar and planetaryflight missions, together with their launch dates, or projected launchdates in the cast of certain planned planetary missions (see Table III).To keep the chronology straight, it should be noted that the first objectto impact the Moon-was the U.S.S.R-Luna 2 launched in September1959. Soviet officials stated that Luna 2 had been given a sterilizationtreatment prior to launch, but details of the methods used were nevermade available.

Ranger /, not launched until August 1961, went into a lower Earthorbit than planned. As a result of the failure of its Agena booster,Ranger II failed in its November 1961 launch attempt and did not gointo orbit. Ranger III, the first attempted lunar lander, missed theMoon by about 23,000 miles, and the TV pictures are unusable. Notuntil April 1962, with Ranger IV, was the U.S. able to repeat the Sovietaccomplishment of landing an object on the Moon. This flight was byno means a complete success. No TV pictures were returned. The spacevehicle went out of control and crashed on the far side of the Moon.

Table III U.S. space launches of planetary quarantine interest.

Lunar missionsAug 58 Thor-Able Pioneer FailedOct 58Nov 58Dec 58Mar 59Nov 59Sep 60Dec 60Aug 61Nov 61Jan 62Apr 62Oct 62Jan 64Jul 64Feb 65

Pioneer 1Pioneer 2Pioneer 3Pioneer 4Atlas-Able 4Atlas-Able 5AAtlas-Able 5BRanger 1Ranger 2Ranger 3Ranger 4Ranger 5Ranger 6Ranger 7Ranger 8

FailedFailedFailedFlyby, missed MoonFailedFailedFailedFailed, nonlunarFailed, nonlunar.Flyby, missed MoonImpact, no TVFlyby, missed MoonImpact, no TVImpact, TVImpact, TV


Table III (Continued).

Mar 65May 66Sep 66Apr 67Jul 67Sep 67Nov 67Jan 68Aug 66Nov 66Feb 67May 67Aug 67Dec 68Mar 69May 69Jul 69Nov 69Apr 70Jan 71Jul 71Apr 72Dec 72Aug 71Apr 72Jul 66Jul 67Jun 73

Ranger 9Surveyor 1Surveyor 2Surveyor 3Surveyor 4Surveyor 5Surveyor 6Surveyor 7Lunar Orbiter 1Lunar Orbiter 2Lunar Orbiter 3Lunar Orbiter 4Lunar Orbiter 5Apollo 8Apollo 9Apollo 10Apollo 11Apollo 12Apollo 13Apollo 14Apollo 15Apollo 16Apollo 17P&F SatelliteP&F SatelliteExplorer 33Explorer 35Explorer 49

Impact, TVSoft landing, TVImpact, no TVSoft landing, TVImpact, no TVSoft landing, TVSoft landing, TVSoft landing, TVOrbit, then impactOrbit, .then impactOrbit, then impactOrbit, then impactOrbit, then impactManned circumlunarManned orbitManned orbitManned landingManned landingAborted landing; manned circumlunarManned landingManned landingManned landingManned landingOrbit, launched from Apollo 15 ,Orbit, launched from Apollo 16; impact

• Flyby, missed lunar orbitSelenocentric (lunar) orbitSelenocentric (lunar) orbit

Mara missionsNov 64Nov 64Feb 69Mar 69May 71May 711975

VenusJul 62Aug 62Jun 67

Mariner 3Mariner 4Mariner 6Mariner 7Mariner 8Mariner 9Viking

missionsMariner 1Mariner 2Mariner 5

FailedFlyby, TVFlyby, TVFlyby, TVFailedMars probe in orbit, TVLander and orbiter (proposed)

FailedFlybyFlyby

Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973 missionNov 73 Mariner 10 Flyby

Outer planets missionsMar 72 Pioneer 10Apr 73 Pioneer 11Aug 77 Mariner

Jupiter flybyJupiter, Saturn flybyJupiter, Saturn flyby (proposed)


Ranger V, launched in October 1962, had a power loss, missed theMoon, and again sent back no pictures. Rangers HI, IV, and V had allreceived dry heat treatments and a terminal sterilization treatment withgas.

The series of Ranger failures aroused a storm of protest, both withinthe government and in the press. In spite of the fact that some failureswere definitely due to other causes, there were claims that thesterilization treatments, particularly dry heat, were at least partiallyresponsible. This could not actually be proven, but the suspicioncaused a heavy flow of memoranda and letters both within NASA andJPL and between them. Waivers grew instead of decreased in numbers.What was more, the climate was changing. The scientific communityhad never presented a unified front demanding sterilization for lunar,as opposed to planetary, missions". Those claiming it w'as unnecessarywere becoming more vocal. In July 1962 at the NAS Iowa SummerStudy, the Working Group on Biology, with Dr. Allan H. Brown asChairman and Dr. C.S. Pittendrigh as Vice Chairman, concluded that"contamination of the Moon does not constitute as serious a problem asis the case of the planets. Nevertheless, lunar contamination should bekept at a feasible minimum." They added, "Planning for MannedLandings on the Moon and planets must be based on the assumptionthat sterility precautions will still be required during the phase ofmanned exploration."

Moreover, priorities were changing. The manned space program waswell along. President Kennedy had stated to Congress in May 1961 thatthe U.S. would land a man on the Moon "within this decade." Andwherever man went, his flora of microorganisms would accompanyhim. The hope now was that contamination could be kept to such aminimum that it would not interfere with tests for the presence ofbiological matter on returned lunar samples.

As early as November 1962, JPL was told to stop dry heat treatmentson components for the future Ranger vehicles. There was a last ditcheffort to keep the requirement for a terminal gaseous surfacesterilization treatment of the assembled vehicle, but that too wasdropped in later correspondence.

This change of policy was not made official until September 9, 1963,when NASA issued its Management Manual NMI^^l-1, "NASAUnmanned Spacecraft Decontamination Policy." The managementinstruction stated under policy for the Moon that

1 The NASA policy is based on acceptance of the scientificopinion that lunar surface conditions would mitigate againstreproduction of known terrestrial microorganisms and that, ifsubsurface penetration of viable organisms were to be caused


by spacecraft impact, proliferation would remain highlylocalized.

2 It is the NASA policy to protect the Moon from widespread orexcessive contamination until sufficient information has beenobtained concerning the Moon, to ensure that scientific studieswill not be jeopardized.

The management instruction further stated under "RequiredProcedures" that clean-room assembly policies be adopted, sporicidalagents be used when "appropriate" to reduce surface contamination,and final assembly be wrapped and handled in such a way as to preventaccumulation of contamination during its shipment to the launch site.This was the policy followed on the subsequent Ranger spacecraft, aswell as on the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter spacecraft.

Ranger VI again failed to return TV pictures, but the last threeRangers, VII, VIII, and IX, were complete successes, and the live TVpictures returned, up until the vehicles crashed on the Moon's surface,were viewed by millions throughout the world. The despair over theU.S. space program turned overnight into complete pride ofaccomplishment.

Ranger was followed by the seven Surveyor launches, five ofwhich-—including the first—successfully showed closeup details of thelunar surface. Also, the Lunar Orbiter program's five missionseffectively mapped the Moon and furnished the basis for choosinglanding sites for the Apollo astronauts. The late President Kennedy'sgoal was accomplished on schedule when Apollo 11 astronautsArmstrong and Aldrin set foot on the moon on July 20, 1969.

The abandoned lunar sterilization policies were replaced byquarantine policies. On. August 24, 1967, NASA entered into anInteragency Agreement, "Protection of the Earth's Biosphere fromLunar Sources of Contamination," with the Departments ofAgriculture; Interior; and Health, Education, and Welfare. All of theseagencies had regulatory responsibilities concerning prevention ofintroduction of alien plant, animal, or human parasites or disease intothe United States. The National Academy of Sciences was also a party tothis interagency agreement. Under this agreement, the MannedSpacecraft Center in Houston issued Management Instruction 8030.1,dated January 9,1967, and entitled "Assignment of Responsibility forthe Prevention of Contamination of the Biosphere by ExtraterrestrialLife." This was followed by the implementary "Quarantine Schemesfor Manned Lunar Missions," prepared by the Interagency Committeeon Back-Contamination which had representatives of all parties to theinteragency agreement.

NPD 8020.13, April 4, 1969; NPD 8020.14, July 16, 1969; NMD/A


8020.15, July 16, 1969; and NMD/M 8020.16, July 23, 1969, allimplemented the interagency agreement dealing withback-contamination, extraterrestrial exposure, and authority to dealwith any cases that might occur. These quarantine provisions weretwo-fold in purpose. One was the prevention of back-contamination.However unlikely one considered the existence of live microorganismson the Moon to be, they could not be completely ruled out beforehand,and the covert introduction of alien life forms to the Earth's biospherecould be catastrophic. A second reason was protection of the preciouslunar samples from any possible terrestrial contamination until theycould be carefully examined for the presence of any trace biologicalcomponent, viable or nonviable. The Lunar Receiving Laboratory wastherefore built at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, and theMobile Quarantine Facility was constructed to transport bothastronauts and samples there from the naval recovery carrier. Duringthe short helicopter trip from the splashdown site to the carrier,the samples were in sealed containers and the astronauts wore aspecially designed Biological Isolation Garment. The public, as well asthe scientists, detected several possible gaps in the quarantineprocedure, and protests, particularly from the medical profession,were numerous, but these were blunted by the fact that all the gaps hadbeen foreseen and were authorized by regulatory authorities outside ofNASA.

On September 6, 1967, NASA issued NPD 8020.8, "Outbound LunarBiological Contamination Control: Policy and Responsibility." Itnoted that, while the object of the early phases of lunar exploration hadbeen "complete sterility," each probe that impacted the Moon hadcarried a number of microorganisms. It quoted the recommendationsof the SSB to minimize contamination and to develop a sterile drillingsystem so that subsurface lunar samples could be collected andreturned aseptically during the Apollo missions. This directive wasupdated by NPD 8020.8A on May 2, 1969, just before the Apollo 11manned landing.

NASA NMI^i-4-1, which lifted lunar sterilization requirements,kept them for planetary missions, however. It stated, "It is the policy ofthe NASA to prevent the biological contamination of the planets untilsufficient information has been obtained concerning the planets toensure that biological studies will not be jeopardized and that nohazard to earth exists."

Not listed in Table IV were two planned 1966 Mars flights whichwere cancelled, primarily for budgetary reasons, and never becameattempted launchings. Both, however, were of considerable planetaryquarantine interest during the planning stages. A planned Voyager


launch was to land an Automated Biological Laboratory on the surfaceof Mars. A sterilization plan was written for this launch before theproject was cancelled. The second cancelled launch, Mariner-Mars1966, was to have been a flyby, although at one time in the planningstages a small landing capsule was considered.

NASA NMI^^-1 was replaced on September 6, 1967, by NASAPolicy Directive 8020.7, "Outbound Spacecraft: Basic Policy Relatingto Lunar and Planetary Contamination Control." This documentrestated that no planetary mission would transport terrestrial life to theplanets "within probabilities established by issuances implementingthis policy." For the first time, the unworkable absolute ban wasdropped. It also specified that "microbial life landed on the Moon . . .shall be identified, quantified and, insofar as possible, located" so thatit could be identified as terrestrial if found in returned samples. Theimplementation of this latter directive appeared in NHB 5340.1 A,"JNASA Standard Procedures for the Microbiological Examination ofSpace Hardware," October 1968.

Basic quarantine policy for planetary missions appeared in NPD8020.10 also dated September 6, 1967, and updated by NPD 8020.10A,"Outbound Planetary Biological and Organic Contamination ControlPolicy and Responsibility," August 1,1972. Both documents containedthe following provision:

Biological Contamination. The basic probability of one in onethousand (1 x 10"3) that a planet of biological interest will becontaminated shall be used as the guiding criterion during theperiod of biological exploration of Mars, Venus, Mercury,Jupiter, other planets and their satellites that are deemedimportant for the exploration of life, life precursors or remnantsthereof.

NASA directive NHB 8020.12, "Planetary Quarantine Provisions forUnmanned Planetary Missions," April 1969, directed that quarantine•plans for planetary missions be submitted to the Planetary QuarantineOfficer for approval, and again spoke not in absolute terms, but inprobabilities of contamination, in line with the internationalagreements.


ProgramAccomplishments

As DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION, NASA lunar policy waschanged from one of sterilization, or attempted sterilization, of thespace vehicles involved to one of an attempt to minimize and localizecontamination. The policy on planetary missions remainedunchanged, save for the fact that it was slated in probabilityterminology rather than in absolute terms. Sterilization may be anabsolute term, but there is always some probability as to whether thisabsolute condition is achieved in any particular case. Because of thisdifference in policy the accomplishments of the lunar program and theplanetary program will be discussed separately.

LUNAR MISSIONS

The effectiveness of the lunar program can best be summed up in asimple statement. No microorganisms were recovered from the lunarsamples returned during the Apollo program. This was true of both invitro and in vivo tests (Holland and Simmons, 1973) at the LunarReceiving Laboratory. This was a result both of the efforts to limitcontamination in the earlier unmanned launches and of the effort totake the samples under aseptic conditions in the Apollo mannedlandings, in spite of the fact that the lunar surface was indeedcontaminated. An estimate of the amount of contamination which theMoon received was made (Dillon, et al., 1973), as was required underNASA Policy Directive 8020.7. The Sandia Laboratory investigatorswho conducted this analysis took into consideration the spacecraftbioburden at launch, the bioburden change in cislunar space, the

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distribution of organisms on the lunar surface, and the changes in theterrestrial density on the lunar surface subsequent to its originaldispersal. They estimated that the number of viable microorganismsper square meter of lunar surface at the times the Apollo samples weretaken was between 1 x 10~4 and 1 x 10"5.

Another interesting study (Flory and Simoneit, 1972) was concernedwith the maximum amount of terrestrial organic chemicalcontamination which might be expected to be found on the returnedApollo samples. It should be noted that while it was consideredunlikely that live microorganisms would be found on the Moon, theorganic geochemists expected to find organic chemicals there, as theyhad found them in meteorite samples which had landed on the Earth.In these latter cases, the question of whether the organic compoundsfound had come from terrestrial contamination upon impact andretrieval had always been raised. It was hoped that the origin of organiccompounds recovered from the lunar samples would be free of suchdoubt. The study reported only on Apollo 11 and Apollo 12 samples, butconcluded,

It can be stated that a contamination control plan was developedand implemented which eventually resulted in providinginvestigators with lunar samples containing less than 0.1 ppm totalterrestrial organic contamination. It should be noted that this is aslow or lower than the experimental blanks obtained in organicgeochemistry research laboratories.

There was one flurry of excitement on returned lunar samples whichshould be discussed. Apollo 12 landed near the site where Surveyor 3had achieved a soft landing and had left instruments on the lunarsurface. The astronauts brought back several of these instruments forexamination of what had happened to them after 31 months ofexposure to the lunar environment. One of those returned was a sectionof the electrical cabling of the Surveyor's TV camera. This cabling wasknown to have a high level of internal contamination associated with itswiring bundles. Moreover, the surface wrappings of this cable had beendeliberately contaminated with several thousand Bacillus subtilisspores. No organisms were recovered from the wrapping or the internalsection of the cable (Knittel, et al., 1972). However, one of thereturned instruments was the camera itself; though not sterile at launchit had not been deliberately contaminated as had the cable wrappings.This too was examined microbiologically, and one microorganism wasrecovered from a part of the polyurethane foam insulation in thecamera interior (Mitchell and Ellis, 1972). After much investigation, inwhich several microorganisms were recovered from the backup camera


which had remained on Earth, the organism recovered from thecamera which had remained on the Moon was identified as alphahemolytic Streptococcus mitis. The investigators concluded that it wasof terrestrial origin and had survived the lunar exposure and returntrip, but other scientists challenge that conclusion. The questionremains unresolved.

'" PLANETARY MISSIONS

The NASA planetary quarantine provisions for missions to the planetsare much more rigorously controlled than were the lunar missions,which were considerably relaxed after the issuance of NASAManagement Manual 4-4-1 in September 1963. They follow thedirective of NPD 8020.10, September 1967, that allocated a basicprobability of 1 x 10"3 that a planet of biological interest would becontaminated and the requirements of NHB 8020.12 that quarantineplans for unmanned planetary missions be submitted to the PlanetaryQuarantine Officer for approval. The NASA PQ Officer suballocates thebasic probability of 1 x 10"3 to each unmanned planetary mission basedupon the type of mission and the total number of flights estimated to beconducted during the period of biological interest.

On the basis of these plans, an initial estimate is made of how much ofthis suballocated probability is needed by that particular mission.Following the flight, a revised calculation is made and a value given tothe probability that the planet was contaminated by that particularmission and, thus, how much of the allocation'had been used. Theevolvement of the basic formula for these calculations is discussed inWerber's companion volume. The formula currently used is

PC = %nu(0):. P(vt) • P(uv) • P(a) : P(sa) • P(r) • P(g).

where.

PC Probability of contaminationmi(O) Initial microbial burden (at launch, after

decontamination)P(vt) Probability of surviving space vacuum-temperatureP(uv) Probability of surviving uv space radiationP(a) Probability of arriving at planetP(sa) Probability of surviving atmospheric entryP,(.r) Probability of releaseP(g) Probability of growth


A simplified model which combines the survival factors into theprobability of the release of an organism in a viable state is

P. = m • P(r) • P(g)

It is evident that some of these values such asm andP(r), can be derivedfrom laboratory data. P(r) is the probability of release ofmicroorganisms from the spacecraft hardware and is determined onthe basis of experimental data for similar hardware and simulatedplanetary environmental conditions. The value for the microbialburden, m , is derived by taking into consideration sampling of theassembled spacecraft for viable organisms and determining fromlaboratory experiments how much this number was reduced by theknown effectiveness of "'the subsequent sterilization" "ordecontamination treatment to which the spacecraft was exposed. Thevalue assigned to the probability of growth after release on a particularplanet, P(g), has to be, of necessity, much more of a value judgment.In either case the PQ Officer officially assigns numbers to these values,depending upon recommendations made to him by his variousconsultants, particularly AIBS. These assigned values, of course, aresubject to revision as new information becomes available. The latestcompilation of these approved parameters appears in a looseleafnotebook entitled "Planetary Quarantine Parameter SpecificationBook." It was especially prepared for the information of theinternational community and was made available at the COSPARmeeting in Constance, West Germany, May 1973. Each volume isserially numbered, issued to a specific individual, and kept up to dateby periodic revisions and supplements.

Two of the services performed by Exotech Systems, Inc., for the PQoffice are maintaining a data bank for the information acquired by thatoffice and keeping the Planetary Quarantine Status Board up to date bysummarizing all the information on the probabilities of contaminationby those missions already flown and the projected allocations of PC tothose missions in the planning stages.

This status board is a rather complicated compilation and will besummarized here, rather than reproduced in full. There have been sixMariner Missions to Mars (Table III). For the first two of these, theinitial allocations of PC were 4.5 x 10;5. The initial allocations for thenext two were reduced to 3 x 10"5. These were all flybys, and thepost-flight calculation indicated no probability of contamination.The same was true of Mariner 8, a planned orbiter which failed.Mariner 9, now in orbit around Mars, was given an initial allocation of7.1 x 10'5; the post-launch estimate of PC was 1.6 x 10'5, and this value


stands as the probability that Mars has been contaminated to date byU.S. missions (Fox, Hall, and Bacon, 1972). A revised estimate of theallocation for each of the two Viking lander missions planned for 1975is 1 x 10-".

The story is similar for Venus. Three flyby missions were attempted;two were successful. Estimates are that no contamination was made bythe U.S. in these missions. A planned Mariner (MVM) flyby later in1973 has been given an initial allocation of PC of 7 x 10"5 for both Venusand Mercury.

Two Pioneer spacecraft intended to fly by Jupiter have beenlaunched. Should the first provide acceptable scientific data, thesecond may be placed on a trajectory to Saturn after swinging byJupiter. Their initial allocation of a PC is 6.4 x 10"5.

The Viking mission to be launched in 1975 and designed to orbit aridland on Mars in 1976 has been given ah initial allocation of 7.2 x 10~5,with a supplement of 2.8 x 10~5 recovered from the previous successfulmissions to Mars. Currently the Viking project has chosen to assignallocations of 3.2 x 10'5 to the orbiter and 2 x 10'5 to the lander, with 2.8x10"5 allowed for ejecta, and the 2 x 10"5 held in reserve for assignment incase of unforeseen need.

In summation, the biological aspects of the U.S. space program can,in spite of all its initial difficulties, be considered a success. The spacemissions have been accomplished without compromise of the planetaryquarantine restraints.


References

ANONYMOUS, "Development of International Efforts to AvoidContamination of Extraterrestrial Bodies." Science, Vol.128 (1958), pp. 887-889.

BRADLEY, F.D. and M.R. NADEL, Bibliography of ScientificPublications and Presentations Relating to PlanetaryQuarantine 1966-1971. Washington, D.C., GeorgeWashington University GWU-BSCP 73-10P (1973), p. 216.

COMMITTEE ON SPACE RESEARCH (COSPAR), "SterilizationTechniques for Instruments and Materials as Applied toSpace Research." Technical Manual Series, Manual No. 4,ed. P.H.A. Sneath. Paris: Muray-Print (1968), p. 287.

DAVIES, R.W. and M.G. COMUNT&IS, "The Sterilization of SpaceVehicles To Prevent Extraterrestrial BiologicalContamination." Proceedings Tenth InternationalAstronautical Congress, London, 1959. Vienna:Springer-Verlag (1960), pp. 495-504.

DILLON, R.T., W.R. GAVIN, A.L. ROARK and C.A. THAUTH, JR.,"Estimating the Number of Terrestrial Organisms on theMoon." Space Life'Sciences, 4(1) (1973), pp. 180-199.

FLORY, D.A. and B.R. SlMONElT, "Terrestrial Contamination in ApolloLunar Samples." Space Life Sciences, 3(4) (1972), pp.457^68.

FOX, D.G., L.B. HALL, and E.J. BACON, "Development of PlanetaryQuarantine in the United States. Life Sciences and Space.Research, X, ed. W. Vishniac. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag

J1972), pp. 1-9.HALL, RlE., Project Ranger. A Chronology. Jet Propulsion

Laboratory, JPL/HR^2 (1971).

'£?'•

41

JftAOB BLANK NOT FILMED!

HOLLAND, J.M. and R.C. SIMMONS, "The Mammalian Responseto Lunar Particulates." Space Life Sciences, 4(1) (1973), pp.97-109.

JAFFE, L.D., Sterilization of Unmanned Planetary and Lunar SpaceVehicles—an Engineering Examination. Jet PropulsionLaboratory, Technical Report 32-325 rev., (1963), p. 23."Problems in Sterilization of Unmanned Space Vehicles."Life Sciences and Space Research. II, eds. M. Florkin andA. Dollfus, Amsterdam, Holland (1964), pp. 406^32.

KNITTEL, M.D., M.S. FAVERO and R.H. GREEN, "Microbe SurvivalAnalyses. Part B. Microbiological Sampling of ReturnedSurveyor 3 Electrical Cabling." Analysis of Surveyor 3Material and Photographs Returned by Apollo 12.Washington, B.C., NASA (1972), pp. 248-251.

MITCHELL, F.J. and W.L. ELLIS, "Microbe Survival Analyses. Part A.Surveyor 3: Bacterium Isolated from Lunar-RetrievedTelevision Camera." Analysis of Surveyor 3 Material andPhotographs Returned by Apollo 12. Washington, D.C.,NASA (1972), pp. 239-248.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, ManagementInstruction. Assignment of Responsibility for thePrevention of Contamination of the Biosphere byExtraterrestrial Life. Manned Spacecraft Center,Management Instruction, 8030.1 (1967).

:— Back Contamination and Quarantine 'ContainmentRequirements for Manned Lunar Missions. Washington,B.C. NASA Policy Birective 8020.13 (1969).Extraterrestrial Exposure. Washington, B.C., NASA PolicyBirective 8020.14(1969).NASA Standard Procedures for the MicrobiologicalExamination of Space Hardware. Washington, B.C., NHB5340.1A (1968).NASA Unmanned Spacecraft Decontamination Policy,4^-1, Washington, B.C., No. 671 (1963).Outbound Lunar Biological and Organic ContaminationControl: Policy and Responsibility. Washington, B.C.,

7 NASA Policy Birective 8020.8A (1969).Outbound Lunar Biological Contamination Control:Policy and Responsibility. Washington, B.C., NASA PolicyBirective 8020.8 (1967).Outbound Planetary Biological and OrganicContamination Control: Policy and Responsibility.Washington, B.C., NASA Policy Birective 8020.10A (1972).


Outbound Planetary Biological Contamination Control:Policy and Responsibility. Washington, D.C., NASA PolicyDirective 8020.10 (1967).Outbound Spacecraft, Basic Policy Relating to Lunar andPlanetary Quarantine Control. Washington, B.C., NASAPolicy Directive 8020.7 (1967).Planetary Quarantine Provisions for Unmanned PlanetaryMissions. Washington, D.C., NHB 8020.12 (1969).Planetary Quarantine Specification Sheets, Washington,D.C. Prepared by Exotech Systems, Inc. (1973).Power and Authority—To E xercise Authority With Respectto Extraterrestrial Exposure. Washington, D.C., NASAManagement Delegation/A 8020.15 (1969).Power and Authority—To E xercise Authority With Respectto Extraterrestrial Exposure. Washington, D.C., NASAManagement Delegation/M 8020.16 (1969).ed. F.H. Quimby, Proceedings of Conference onSpacecraft Sterilization. Washington, D.C., NASATechnical Note D-1357 (1962).ed. J. Posner, Proceedings of Meeting on Problems andTechniques Associated with the Decontamination andSterilization of Spacecraft. Washington, D.C., NASATechnical Note D-771 (1960).Quarantine Schemes for Manned Lunar Missions.Washington, D.C., Interagency Committee on BackContamination (1969).Spacecraft Sterilization Technology. Washington, D.C.,NASA SP-108 (1966).

PHILLIPS, C.R. and R.K. HOFFMAN, "Sterilization of InterplanetaryVehicles." Science, 132 (1960), pp. 991-995.

References 43

AppendixPlanetary QuarantineContractual Research

In this Appendix the discussion is limited to the scope of thecontracts, the dates that they were in effect, and the principalinvestigators involved. Individual abstracts of these contracts appearbelow in chronological order. No effort is made to describe andevaluate the results obtained from these contracts. The GeorgeWashington University Biological Sciences Communication Project(BSCP) has recently published a comprehensive Bibliography ofScientific Publications and Presentations Relating to PlanetaryQuarantine, 1966-1971 (GWU-BSCP 73-10P; 1973). This bibliographylists contract reports, as well as publications in the open literature, byboth contractors and outside researchers. It includes some 1300references and is well indexed. Anyone wanting to look further intoresearch accomplishments is referred to this document. Copies of thedocumentated research reports and published research articles can beobtained from BSCP.

Institution Starting date

Atomic Energy Commission,Sandia Laboratories 1966

Avco Corporation 1965

Becton, Dickinson & Co.,Research Center 1968

Dudley Observatory,New York State Department of Health 1965

Dynamic Science Corporation 1961

CEDING

45

NOTfTCMES

Florida State University,Department of Statistics 1966

Grumman Aircraft EngineeringCorporation 1961

Hardin-Simmons University 1972

Illinois Institute of TechnologyResearch Institute 1961

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 1959

Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology 1962

Naval Biomedical Research Laboratory 1972

North Dakota State University,Department of Polymers and Coatings 1968

Northrop Corporation,-.. -Northrop Space Laboratories . _ . .... _. _1965 _

St. John's University,Department of Biology 1964

Stanford Research Institute 1972

Syracuse University,Biological Research Laboratories 1964

University of Minnesota,Department of Environmental Health 1964

U.S. Army Biological Laboratories 1959

U.S. Public Health Service,Center for Disease Control—Atlanta 1964

U.S. Public Health Service,Center for Disease Control—Phoenix 1964

U.S. Food and Drug Administration,Cincinnati 1965

Wilmot Castle Company 1961

Institution U.S. Army Biological Laboratories, Ft. Detrick,Frederick, Maryland 21701

Principal investigators Charles R. Phillips, Robert K. Hoffman,Herbert M. Decker, Dorothy M. Portner, David R. Spiner

Starting Date: 1959Termination Date: 1972

Scope: Initially this interagency agreement was to make available toNASA experience with sterilization techniques for various types oflaboratory and military hardware, particularly through the use ofethylene oxide. Later studies included the determination of buriedcontamination in plastics and electronic components used inspacecraft and between mated surfaces; dry heat sterilization forburied contamination; other types of chemical sterilization,


particularly with formaldehyde and peracetic acid; sterilization offluids, either gaseous or liquid, by filtration; the effect of ultra-highvacuum on microorganisms; the long-time buildup of contaminationon surfaces exposed to either laboratory or clean-room atmospheres,with the finding of the so-called plateau phenomenon wherecontamination leveled off after long exposure; and other short-rangeexperiments.

For the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, help was given inplanning for the Lunar Receiving Laboratory and in testing the MobileQuarantine Facility and the astronauts' Biological Isolation Garment.

Under subcontract, the American Sterilization Company developedan ethylene oxide exposure chamber in which the resistance ofspacecraft components to this sterilizing technique could bedetermined.

Institution Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute, 10West 35th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60616

Principal investigators Richard Ehrlich, Ervin J. Hawrylewicz,Charles A. Hagen


Scope: The research program involved studies of the survival ofterrestrial aerobic and anerobic microorganisms in simulatedextraterrestrial environments. Of prime importance was the viabilityof vegetative microorganisms and the rate of germination of bacterialspores after various lengths of exposure to simulated .Martianenvironment. The environmental parameters of interest were thecomposition of gaseous atmosphere, pressure, composition of soil,presence of available water, and diurnal temperature fluctuations. Theexperimental program was designed to provide information requiredto estimate the probability of contamination of Mars and other planets.

Institution Wilmot Castle Company, Rochester, New York 14602Principal investigators Carl W. Bruch, Martin G. Koesterer, Mary K.Bruch, Norman Davis, Robert R. Ernst


Scope: This work consisted of a survey of dry heat resistance ofvarious sj)ore-forming microorganisms, including a laboratory study of

;8S|kAppendix " 47

reaction rates at various temperatures and how this was affected byvarious protective agents such as dirt or soil.

Institution Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Bethpage,L.I., New York

Principal investigators Robert J. Del Vecchio, Raymond Davis,K.M. Forman


Scope: The program involved a study of the influence of a closed,artificial environment on the growth and viability of certain terrestrial

^bacteria,_ including the development of sampling devices andtechniques to determine the microbial contamination ofaerospace-controlled environments and a review of information on theenvironments of Mercury, Venus, and Mars.

Institution Dynamic Science Corporation, 1445 Huntington Drive,South Pasadena, California 91030

Principal investigators John B. Opfell, Curtis E. Miller, Allan L.Louderback, Earl G. McNall, William T. Duffy

Starting Date: 1961Termination Date: 1965 «

Scope: The work incorporated evaluation of various liquid sterilantsused in spacecraft sterilization, preparation of a sterilizationhandbook, and study of the recovery of microorganisms inoculatedinto solid propellants.

Institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department ofNutrition and Food Science, Cambridge, Mass. 02319

Principal investigators Gerald J. Silverman, Norman S. Davies, CecilG. Dunn


Scope: Two main investigations were undertaken. The first was incollaboration with National Research Corporation (as a subcontractor)and measured the effect of simulated extraterrestrial environments(mainly the effects of ultra-high vacuum, temperature, ultraviolet


light, gamma radiation, and similar features) on microbial survival.The second program concerned dry heat resistance of microbial

spores as influenced by internal and external moisture. The effects ofeither were dramatic; water, even at temperatures over 100°C, could behighly protective or, if present at too great a level, destructive.

Institution Syracuse University, Biological Research Laboratories,Syracuse, N.Y. 13210

Principal investigators Ralph A. Slepecky, Jere Northrop, JohnGillis


Scope: This was primarily a theoretical study of the greatly enhancedresistance of bacterial spores over that of vegetative cells.

The research program was concerned with the relationship of metalcontent to resistance, dormancy, and germination of bacterial sporesand sporulation of bacterial spore formers: the metal composition ofintact spores; the relative binding of metals to the spore; the kinetics ofmetal release on germination; the kinetics of metal incorporation ascorrelated with sporulation stages; and various relationships betweenmetals and resistance of spores.

Institution St. John's University, Department of Biology, Jamaica,N.Y. 11432

Principal investigators Michael A. Pisano, Raymond M.G. Boucher,George T. Tortora, I. Edward Alcamo


Scope: Studies were conducted on the effect of acoustic vibrations inconnection with gaseous sterilizing agents to see if the rate ofsterilization could be increased. Preliminary studies were done withethylene oxide, and the synergistic effect of high-intensity airbornesound waves with propylene oxide were studied more intensively.

Institution University of Minnesota, Division of EnvironmentalHealth, Minneapolis, Minn. 55455

Principal investigators Richard G. Bond, George S. Michaelsen,Irving J. Pflug, V.W. Greene, Donald Vesley, Jacob E. Bearman

Appendix 49

Starting Date: 1964Termination Date: Continuing

-Scope: Under a series of grants and contracts, the University ofMinnesota has undertaken a training research program for the NASAPlanetary Quarantine Office and has established a Space ScienceCenter on their Minneapolis campus. Not only has training taken placeat the Center, but a teaching group has given short courses at variouslocations across the U.S.

The research program at the Space Science Center has been onenvironmental sterilization. Particular attention has been given to dryheat sterilization, and to developing destruction rate data on matedsurfaces and with encapsulated microorganisms as well as those onopen surfaces. The role-of moisture in dry .heat sterilization has beenstudied and theories developed on the mechanisms involved.

Institution U.S. Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control,Phoenix Laboratories, Phoenix, Arizona 85014

Principal investigators Martin S. Favero, John R. Puleo, Norman J.Petersen, Walter W. Bond, Gerald J. Tritz, Gordon S. Oxborrow,Norman D. Fields, James H. Marshall


Scope: Under an interagency agreement, work was undertaken onmethods for quantitatively recovering microorganisms and bacterialspores from surfaces and solids; establishing microbiological profilesof a variety of environmentally controlled areas ranging fromconventional industrial clean rooms to laminar-flow clean rooms; anddeveloping the technology of air sampling and surface sampling inthese environments. This element of work culminated in theestablishment of a field laboratory at the Kennedy Space Center inFlorida where 25 to 30 (to date) automated and manned spacecraft weresampled in an attempt to establish microbiological profiles. Samplingor culturing procedures that were developed at the PhoenixLaboratories were refined and field-evaluated at the Cape KennedyLaboratory.

Other main research interests concerned recovery of heat- andethylene-oxide-injured bacterial spores; recovery techniques foranaerobic spores; use of ultrasonic energy as an adjuvant for surfacerecovery techniques; and development and evaluation of the vacuumprobe for surface sampling. Another main line of research concernedthe dry heat inactivation of bacterial spores.


This group introduced the concept of utilizing naturally occurringspores associated with spacecraft as the major indices of heat resistancerather than subcultured spores of Bacillus subtilis var. niger.Laboratory evaluations and onsite inspections were conductedthroughout the course of the agreement.

Institution Food and Drug Administration, Cincinnati ResearchLaboratories, Cincinnati, Ohio 45226

Principal investigators Jeptha E. Campbell, Ralston B. Read, Jr.,Robert Angelotti, James T. Peeler


Scope: Through a series of interagency agreements, the principalinvestigators, under the auspices of the Robert A. Taft SanitaryEngineering Center, the National Center for Urban and IndustrialHealth, the Environmental Protection Agency, and, currently, theFood and Drug Administration, have conducted research andspecifically assigned investigations on problems of dry heatsterilization. The major topics addressed by this group includedestablishing D and z values for the selected test organisms Bacillussubtilis var. niger, demonstrating the effect of the immediateenvironment on the thermal stability of spores, and establishing D andz values for the organisms residing within components (buriedcontamination) and within mated surfaces.

More recently, special attention has been given to the relation-ships between time, temperature, and humidity on the thermal in-activation of spores and to the development of experimental systems fortesting and evaluating thermal sterilization cycles under a variety ofhumidity and temperature conditions. This system is suitable for meas-uring survival in the probability ranges of 10"2 organisms per test unit.

Institution AVCO Corporation, Lowell, Massachusetts 01815

Principal investigators D.H. Trussel, Edward A. Botan


Scope: Under a series of contracts with different NASA researchcenters, calculations were made of total microbial burden onspacecraft, and a Terminal Sterilization Chamber (TSC) and a ModelAssembly Sterilizer for Testing (MAST) were designed and constructed.

Appendix 51

Institution Dudley Observatory Division of Laboratories & Research,New York, State Department of Health, Albany, N.Y. 12200

Principal investigators John Hotchin, Peter Lorenz, CurtisHemenway


Scope: Studies on the survival of microorganisms in space werecarried out in rocket, balloon-borne, and satellite exposure ex-periments.

Institution Northrop Corporation, Northrop Space Laboratories,3901 West Broadway, Hawthorne, California 90250

Principal investigators W.H. Cooper, R.J. Calof, A.L. Debolt, J.R.Hamer


Scope: A study was made of critical sterilization problems on a Marsentry probe. In particular, the ability of various spacecraftcomponents or parts to withstand dry heat treatments and ethyleneoxide exposure were investigated.

Institution Florida State University, Department of Statistics,Tallahassee, Florida 32306

Principal investigators Richard G. Cornell, Myles Hollander, JohnJ. Beauchamp, S. Eric Steg


Scope: Probability models were developed for the description ofdecontamination strategies for the exploration of Mars and for thedecontamination of individual spacecraft. Statistical consultation wasprovided on a number of problems encountered by other investigatorsinvolved in the Planetary Quarantine Program.

Institution Atomic Energy Commission, Sandia Laboratories,Albuquerque, New Mexico 87115

Principal investigators H.D. Sivinski, Charles A. Trauth, Jr., WillisJ. Whitfield



Scope: For lunar programs, Sandia Laboratories has developedthe computerized information system used for estimating the ter-restrial bioburden of the Moon as a function of lunar coordinatesand time. From this, scientists are able to provide estimates of thelikelihood that returned lunar samples are contaminated withterrestrial organisms.

For planetary programs, research activities were concentrated inapproximately eight areas: (1) assessment of the importance oflaminar-flow clean-room technology on planetary quarantine success;(2) development of better understanding of the dry heat sterilization ofhomogenous and heterogeneous microbial populations; (3)development of better understanding of the sterilizing effects ofradiation in space; (4) development of better sterilants (notably,thermoradiation and odorless formaldehyde solutions and gels); (5)development of models for bioburden estimation and prediction andstatistical standards for spacecraft sampling; (6) development of highlyaccurate bioburden sampling devices; (7) study of means of translatingprogram objectives into realizable spacecraft requirements in thepresence of much uncertainty about the specific long term nature ofthe program; and (8) general scientific consulting.

Institution North Dakota State University, Department of Polymersand Coatings, Fargo, North Dakota 58102

Principal investigators A.E. Rheineck, Loren W. Hill, S. PeterPappas


Scope: Studies have been done on whether spores remain viable inpolymeric resins that are crosslinked by chemical curing agents.Inherent toxicity of resins and curing agents is determined, and thetoxic effects resulting from high temperatures produced by exothermiccuring reactions are investigated.

Solvents are used to assist in the degradation of crosslinked polymersso as to obtain higher recoveries than are possible through themechanical degradation of dry polymers. Solvent selection is madeusing the solubility parameter approach. Systems studies include suchthings as cured epoxy resins and silicone potting compounds. Otherpolymeric materials used in spacecraft components will also beinvestigated.

Appendix 53

Institution Becton, Dickinson and Company, Becton, DickinsonResearch Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709

Principal investigators G. Briggs Phillips, William S. Miller, J.J.Tulis, V.A. Pace, Jr.


Scope: Methods for the sterilization of potting compounds and matedsurfaces were investigated. The mixture of formaldehyde orformaldehyde complexes was studied in particular.

For the Langley Research Center, a magnetically connected plasticvacuum probe surface sampler was developed, fabricated, and tested.

Institution U.S. Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control,1600 Clifton Road, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30333

Principal investigators Peter Skaily, George W. Gorman, Donald C.Mackel, O.K. Riemensnider, H.V. McEachern, Anita Highsmith,Nancy L. Shearin


Scope: Investigations conducted at the Center for Disease Controladdressed three areas: (1) dissemination of microorganisms fromhumans, (2) germicidal activity of ethylene oxide gas, and (3)destruction of bacterial contamination on surfaces exposed tolow-level heat.

In the dissemination studies, the quantitative and qualitativecharacteristics of microorganisms shed by different individuals weredetermined. Various skin treatments and clothing barriers wereinvestigated to determine whether shedding rates could be reduced.

Studies were conducted to determine the destruction rate ofbacterial spores and naturally occurring extramural microorganismsexposed to ethylene oxide gas. The rate of die-away was determined formicroorganisms in various chemical and physical states, as was thesurvival rate following exposure to different concentrations of ethyleneoxide gas.

Bacterial survival on intramural surfaces under conditions ofcontrolled heating and relative humidity was studied, and the die-awayrate of bacterial spores to low-level heating was determined.

Institution Office of Naval Research, Naval Biornedical ResearchLaboratory, Oakland, California 94625

54 The Planetary Quarantine Program-

. Principal investigators Robert L. Dimmick, Mark A. Chatigny, N. A.Vedrds'


Scope: The laboratory is conducting studies on the possibility ofmicrobial metabolism, growth, and propagation while in aerosols. The

, work is directed toward evaluation ofP(g) for microorganisms enteringthe atmosphere of Jupiter where there are predicted zones withenvironments suitable for growth of terrestrial microorganisms. Thework is being done in collaboration with Biospherics, Inc., ofRockville, Maryland, utilizing Biospherics' technology forultrasensitive detection for microbial metabolism by evaluation ofradio-labelled CO2 provided in the growth substrate. Other test systemsuse special microbial mutants to demonstrate the presence of productsof cell division even though actual physical division may not haveoccurred.

Institution Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California94025

Principal investigators D. Warner North, J. Michael Harrison,Consultant: Joshua Lederberg


Scope: Stanford Research Institute has undertaken a review of thebasic probabilistic models of contamination currently being used inthe PQ Program. A primary question is whether models now in useaccount adequately for the informational dependencies that existamong events important to the contamination process. Effort is alsobeing devoted to the construction of a more detailed model ofmicrobial proliferation on the planet Mars.

Institution Hardin-Simmons University, Department of Biology,Abilene, Texas 79601

Principal investigators Terry L. Foster, Luther Winans, Jr.


Scope: This investigation consists of a comprehensive populationstudy of psychrophilic microorganisms isolated from the soils near the

Appendix 55

manufacture and assembly areas of the Viking spacecraft. It includesenumeration, isolation, characterization, and temperature studies onmicroorganisms capable of growth at low temperatures. Selectedisolates are then subjected to some of the environmental conditionssuggested for Mars to determine if they are capable of growing underthese conditions.

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