the mughal case

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The Passing of Empire: The Mughal CaseAuthor(s): M. Athar AliReviewed work(s):Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1975), pp. 385-396Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311728 .

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Modern sianStudies, , 3 (1975), pp. 385-396. Printed n GreatBritain.

ThePassingf Empire: heMughulCase- M. ATHAR ALI

AligarhMuslimUniversityTHERE avebeennumerous ttempts o explain hefallof the MughalEmpire;and I trulyfeel greathesitationn addingmyselfto the longlist of its exponents.To historiansike Irvineand Sarkar)he declinecouldbeexplainedn termsof a personaldeteriorationn thequalityofthe kingsandtheirnobles.The:haremnfluencegrew- andwomen,forsome strangeunscientificreason,are alwayssupposedto be a badinfluence.The kingsand noblesbecamemoreluxuryloving, thoughno-onehasyet establishedhat the blughalsduringthe sixteenthandseventeenth enturiesenjoyedany less luxuriousmodeof living thantheireighteenth-centuryuccessors.l arkar,n hismonumentalHzstoryof Aurangzib,lso elaboratedupon the traditionallyecognized actor,namely, Hindu-Muslimdifferences:Aurangzib'sreligiouspolicy isthought o haveprovoked HinduReaction hatundidtheunitythathad beenso laboriouslybuiltup by his predecessors.2Recently, herehasbeenanattemptat a more undamentalxamina-tion. SatishChandra oughtto findthe criticalfactor n the Mughals'failure o maintain hemansabnd agirsystem,whoseefficientworkingwasessentialor thesurvivalofthe Empireasacentralizedpolity.3IrfanHabib,on theotherhand,hassought o explain hefallof the MughalEmpireas an effect of the workingof this very system.The jagir-transfersed to intensifiedexploitation;and such exploitation ed torebellionby zamindarsthesuperior ight-holders) nd the peasantry.4Withall thesefactors s sometimes ompounded et another-the riseof 'nationalities', ubvertingand shattering he unifiedempire.Thethesis,developedby Sovietscholars ike Reisnerand maintainedby aschoolof popularIndianMarxistwriters,has receivedstrangecorro-borationrom youngandyoungish'American cholarswhohavefound

1 WilliamIrvine,LaterMughals,d. Sarkar,2 vols., and J. N. Sarkar,Fall of theMughalEmpire, VOlS? passim.2 J. N. Sarkar,Historyf Aurangzib,II (Calcutta, 9 I 6), 283-364.3 Satish Chandra,Partiesand Politicsat the MughalCourt, 707-I7#0 (Aligarh,

\ . . . 5 . .I 959), pp x 111-xlvll.4 Irfan Habib, *4grarianystem f MughalIndia, I556-I707 (Bombay, I963),

pp. 3I7-5I.

385


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386 M. ATHAR ALInew regionalpower-groupsn the states hat aroseduring he eighteenthcentury.SIt is easy to be lost in the welterof these 'factors'. t is also perhapspossible o reconcilecontradictions y propounding cause-sequence-cause ormula nd by simplydisowning he search or the singleultimatecause.Such a synthesiss yet to be attempted;but I do not profess nyambition o make the attempthere. I should ike simplyto relate theentiretext to what I conceive o be the propercontext.In following he scholarlydiscussion verthe break-up f the MughalEmpire,I have been struckby the fact that the discussion houldhavebeen conducted n such insular erms.The firstpart of the eighteenthcenturydid not only see the collapseof Mughal Empire:The SafavidEmpirealso collapsed; he Uzbek Khanate brokeup into fragments;and the Ottoman Empire began its career of slow, but inexorabledecline. Are all these phenomenamere coincidences? t seems to mestrainingone's senseof the plausible o assert hat the same fate over-came all the large empiresof the Indic and Islamicworld at preciselythe same time, but owing to quite diSerent(and rathermiscellaneous)factorsoperating n the case of each of them. Even if the search houldultimatelyprove futile, one must see whether t is possible o discoversome commonfactor that caused more or less stable empiresto dis-integrate nd created onditionsn whichnewpolitical tructures, hichlook large enough on the map, like Nadir Shah'sempire,the Afghan(Durrani) empire or the Maratha Confederacy, merged and thenalmost mmediatelybroke nto splintered ragments.There is one remarkable oint too, which may serve as the guide-post in our search.The break-up f the empiresdistinctlyprecedes heimpactfrom the armedattackof the westerncolonialpowers,notablyBritainand Russia.But t precedes he impactwithsucha short ntervalthat the questionmustarisewhether he riseof the Westwasnot in someways, not yet properlyunderstood, ubverting he polity and societyofthe Easteven beforeEuropeactuallyconfronted he eastern tateswithits superiormilitarypower.It is a regrettable ap in our study of the economichistoryof theMiddleEast and India, that no generalanalysishas been attemptedofthe changes n the patternof tradeand markets f thesecountries, s aresult of the new commercebetween Europe and Asia. There is atendencyto belittle the significance f the great commercialdevelop-mentsof the sixteenthand seventeenth enturies or eastern conomies,

5 Cf. M. N. Pearson n IndianEconomic nd Social HistoryReview[I.E.S.H.R.], IX,I I4 and note.


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3g7HE PASSING -OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASEowingto thesmallvolumeof goodsthatenterednternational, r-ong-distance, radeat thattime.Buttherealquestions notof volume,butvalueXn termsofvalue,long-distancerademusthaveaccoun--ted-forsizeableportionof the grossproduct n all the economieswith whichwe are concerned.The majorevent betweenI500 and I700 was certainly he riseofEuropeas the centreof worldcommerce,with its dominanceovertheNew Worldand the High Seas,and its totalmonopolyof the CapeofGoodHope. Recentestimates uggestan increasen the populationofEuropefromabout 50 millions n I450 to I20 millions n I700,6anoutstanding chievement articularlywhenwe bear n mindthedemo-graphicdebacleof the ThirtyYearsWarin Germanyand the slowdeclineof populationn Spain.No similarestima-tesxistforAsia.Butit wouldseemthatIndianpopulation emainedargelystabl-e-etweenI600 and I800. Moreland's stimateof I00 millionfor I600 has beenproperlyquestioned,and the Sture of I50 millionprobably s nearerthe truth.7The Censusof I868 72 discloseda populationof lessthan250 million.India thussaw an increaseof barely66 per cent in 270years,whereasEuropehad enhanced ts populationby some I40 percentin a periodof 250 years.This contrastn populationgrowthsug-geststhat a real shift in the economicbalancebetweenEuropeandAsiahad alreadyoccurredby the endof the seventeenth entury.This shift found its true repercussionn international rade. Thediscovery f the Capeof GoodHopewascertainlyan important vent)and in givinga direct,unhampered outeto India, it had importantmilitary consequences n the eighteenth century. But the majoreconomic hangewasnotrepresentednlybythenewroute(indeed,-tis likelythattheolder,RedSearouteremained simportant channelas the Cape until after I700)t It was, above all, representedby theemergence f Europeastheprincipalmarketortheluxuriesandcraft--manufacturesf the world.Economichistorianshaveso farremainedimmersedmainlyin Europe'sproblemof payments,a preoccupationinheritedromthe ulercantilist ontroversiesf the period.The othercompl-ementaryspects,viz., the increase n demand or the productsofthe worldand the effiect f thison othermarketsof theseproducts,ap?ear itherto haveescapednoticeor to havenotreceived he atten-tiondue to them.

In other words,we have to considernot only the exportof large6 The estimatefor I4501S that of J. Russell(Fontana conomicistory f Europe,VO1.I,P. 36) andfor I70Q thatof AndreArmengaudibid.,Vol. 3, p. 27).7 MissShireenMoosavi, .E.S.H.R.,X, I94.


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388 M. ATHAR ALIquantitiesof gold and silver (especially he latter) from Europe o theEast,but also the fact that a largepartof the luxurymanufacturesndhigh-valueproducts f the Eastwerediverted rom heirother,hitherto'traditional'markets,and carried o Europe.Unfortunately) wing tothe lack of fuller investigations, nd partly to the limitations n oursources, t is difficult o set thisshift n quantitative erms.But whereverwe look in Asia near the end of the seventeenth entury, he Europeandemandwas exercisingts pull, strongor feeble, director indirect.The fact that Iran no longer remained he principalmarket or awholerangeof Indiancommodities indigo,pepper,chintz),and Indiaand Iran, together,no longer for a numberof Chineseexports (silk,porcelain),speaksvolumesfor the relative economicdecline of thesecountries.This decline,was, however,not only relative; t couldnot butbe absoluteas well. One-thirdof the Bengalsilk was alreadyexported,through the Dutch and the English, before I 667, and one-thirdthroughPersianand Armenianmerchants muchof whichpresumablyfor overland ransport o Mediterranean ortsand thence to Europe);only a third remained or Indian markets.8 he EuropeanCompaniesobtaineda practicalmonopolyof the pepperof the Western oast,andthey became the principal buyers of India's finest chintz, that ofMasulipatam. t is not very ikelythat production xpanded ufficientlyto meet the Europeandemandwithoutreducing he shareof the othermarkets. ndeed, f the production id expand o someextent, n condi-tions of stationary echnology,costs and prices must have gone up,relatively o the generalprice-level.My suggestion s that these developments auseda seriousdisturb-ance in the economiesof the Easterncountries,and intensified hefinancial difficultiesof the ruling classes. The Great Silk Road nolonger carriedthe great caravans;and this must have distinctly m-poverishedCentralAsia (the Uzbek Khanate).But in India and Iran,too, the costsof luxuryarticlesrose - and, afterall, for members f theruling class it was these luxuries hat life was all about. The incomepreviously btainedno longer ufficed.Herewas a factor or an attemptat greater agrarian exploitation;and when that failed, or provedcounter-productive,or reckless actionalactivities or individualgain,leading to interminable ivil wars. Such conditionswould, of course,spell the end of the great empires.

While, obviously,what I have suggested s repletewith speculation,and requires much detailed investigationfor its substantiation,Ishould ike to consider nother mportanthistorical actor hat emerges8 Tavernier,Travelsn India, 640-67 (tr. Ball, ed. Crooke,London,I925), IIn 2.


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THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 389from a consideration f the Europe-Asia elationship.The Europeanimportsof easterngoodswere paid for mainly in gold and silver; andthese, especially he latter, came from Latin America n hithertoun-precedented uantities.13ut he Europeandemand or these commodi-ties was generated,not so much by the possession f the specie,as by adistinctqualitativeand quantitativedevelopment f craft production,leading to the enrichment f the entireeconomyand a notableexpan-sion of its urbansector.At the beginningof the seventeentll entury,towns ike Lahoreor Agradwarfed he European itiesof the period.ByI 700, European owns ike Londonand Parishad populations overhalfa million) exceedingthose of all Indian cities, except perhapsAgra.According o Deane and Cole'sestimate, 3 per cent of the people ofEnglandand Waleswere living in townsof s,ooo and above, n I 70I .9This percentagehad not been reached n India even by I9OI.This spurt in Europeanurban growth was the first productof thenew science and technology hat was generating mall advances n anumberof sectors, he cumulative Sect of which was phenomenal.Acompletelydifferentpicture was presentedby Asia, especiallyIndia.One need not be a followerof Marx's heoryof the unchangeablenessftraditional ndiansociety o acceptthe fact that therewas no consciousspiritof technologicalnnovation andscientific nquiry)hereand n theIslamic East to match the spirit already motivatinga large part ofEuropean ociety n the seventeenth entury.This does not mean thatno mechanicalnnovationwas propagated r spread n the Eastduringthe sixteenthand seventeenth enturies. t has been shown that such'generalization' id takeplace.10But what we are concernedwith is itspace and scope. The pace was certainlyslow, and the scope severelylimited.This is manifested, boveall, by the utterabsence n the litera-tureof India of any descriptions f even the most mportantproducts fEurope'snew technology, .g. the clock, the telescope, he flint-lock.Whether he source ay in somestructuralaultof Indianand Islamicsociety, which perpetuated he divorcebetween ntellect and manuallabour,or whether t lay in somepeculiar nhibitionagainst cience nIslamic (and Hindu) ideology t is difficult o decide. The intellectualaridity s manifest; ts causesare obscure.The aridity is relevantto us becauseof its economicand politicalconsequences. f technologicalgrowth resulted n urbanization, his

9 Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, BritishEconomic rowth,688-s959 (Cambridge,I962), p 710Irfan EIabib, BechnologyndEconomyf Mughal ndia,Devaraj Chanana MemorialLecturesn 97 I (cyclo-styled)


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M. ATHAR ALI39o-meatlthatthe-expansionftownscouldprovidea safety-valve t timesof agrariancrises.Sincea similarprocessdid not occurin India andothercountries ftheEast, hissafety-valvewasmissingn India.Ashasbeenpointedout}the Indianurbanpopulationwasparasitical,based-uponhe expropriationf agrarian urplus.llA corollary f thisis thatif the expiropriationf that surpluswas affected,the scopeof urbanenlployment lsodeclined.Thismeans hat,solongascraftproductiondid -notobtain-an ndependentbase,as it did increasinglyn Europefrom the si-xteenthenturyonwards,therewas no possibilityof theabsorptio-nf the shockof an agrarianupheaval.In that sense, theM-ughal tnpire,nspiteofitssplendidprofessionalrmy,waspeculiarlyvulnerable o the ill-armedbut million-headedamindar

nd peasantreb.els.l2Talkingaboutthe a^my,anotherpoint suggests tself.If therewasanythingthat was aSected most speedilyby technologicalchangesthroughout-the orld t wasthearmy.Artillery-makingasthe 'heavyindukstry'f the time.In Europe t attracted he ingenuityof scientistsand mathematiciansromthe sixteenthcenturyonwards.But as onemovedeastward rornEuropethe pace of its development n eachcountrywouldhave appeared o be slowerand slower.India saw no-consciousttemptotodesignnewartilleryweapons:makingof musketsand guns remaineda merecraft,with lro touch of science;and ac-cordinglyby I700 these were almost completely out-dated. ThelSlughals ontinued o relyuponsword-wieldingavalrywhenits dayswerelong over. It is, perhaps, his that led to theirmajordebacleatKarnal n I739, whe-n hey had to face NadirShah,who had be-tterartillery,mitated romthe Europeans ndthe Ottomans.l3To me, then,thefailureof the WIughal mpirewouldseemto deriveessentiallyro-m culturalailure,sharedwith the entire

Islamicworld.It wasthisfailure hattiltedtheeconomicbalance n favourof Europe,well beforeEuropean rmiesreducedIndiaandotherpartsof Asiatocolonialpossessions,rotectoratesnd spheresof influence.It was thisculturalfailureagain that deprivedthe empiresof the capacity tograpplewith theiragrari-anrises.Thesetwin economicconsequenceswerethemselveshecausesof thepoliticalandmilitarydebacles;butaswehave ustseen? venmilitaryweaknesseslowed rom heintellectualstagn-ationhatseems o havegripped he easternworld.

IrfanHabib,Enquiry, .S. III (3), 55.12 On the composition f the Marathaarmy,see SatishChandra, .E.S.H.R.,X,

2 I 7 andnote. Cf. IrfanHabib,Agrarianystemf Mughalndia,pp. 346-5 .13 Cf. Irvine,LaterMughals,I, 352 -(Sarkar'sddendum).


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THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 39IOf course, he wordstagnations relative.It is quitepossible hat ifwe werenot in the compellingnecessityo haveto be lookingoverourshouldersat what was being thoughtand written in Europe at the

sametime, we mighthaveregarded he IslamicEast andIndiaduringsixteenthandseventeenthenturies sfairlyproductiven thematterofliterature ndrational ciences.But whilewe mayadmire hepoetryofHafiz, the rationalism f Abul Fazl, the religiouseclecticismof DaraShukoh, he astronomical bservations f RajaJai Singh)the fact re-mainsthat of modernsciencethere is hardly a trace.This is so veryclear in the gij-i Muhammadhahi I732), the celebratedworkof JaiSingh.Here the entiretheoretical ext is practicallyborrowed erbatimfromthe 4g-i Ulughwthani,omposednearly300yearsearlier.-Onlythetablesare-changed. ai Singh is interested n Europeanastronomicalobservations, nd he refers o them in his preface.ButNewtonmightnot have lived,so far as he is concerned.Thus the entire ramework freasoning nd thought,and,indeed, the limitsand scopeof reflection,remained he same as had been definedby the greatArabicwritersbefore hetwelfth entury. Ehetirringswere hereandwere mportant;but, unluckily, hey broughtout only ripples,where a flood)a break-through,wasneeded n orderto put men'sminds nto newmoulds.

IIThe politiesthat emergedupon the collapse of the MughalEmpirewereofdemonstrablywo kinds.In oneclasswerethe'successiontatesflikeHyderabad,BengalandAwadh,whichwerereally ragments f theEmpire, hat had to stand upontheirovfn feet as the centralgovern-mentdecayedandbecamepowerless o assistor assert.Theyinheritedmoreor less theentireNIughalmachinery f administrationn a work-ing order.In the secondcategorywerethe MarathaConfederacy,heJats and the Sikhs, and the Afghans.Their origins as politieswereindependentof the MughalEmpire,thoughthey mightoccasionallycome to termswith it, or, indeed, in the case of the first two, evenacknowledgehe nominalsupremacyof the MughalEmperor.Theywere clearly the productsof the crisisthat we have touchedupon.While they might use certainMughaladministrativenstitutions ortheirown purposes,heir modeof governmentwas by and largeanti-theticalto that of the Empire,and could not be reconciledwitll it.Mughalprofessionalavalrycould indeedsurvivewithinthe MarathaConfederacy, ut only as Pindaris, hat is, as realhistoricalDraculas,


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392 M. ATHAR ALIwhodrankup thebloodof theirnewmasters.The entirecontradictionissummedupin theprotest xpressed yAzadBilgramin I 76 thattheMarathaleaders,in spite of their conquests,were not behavingasrulers,but as zamindars.14MysoreunderHaidarAli andTippuSultanstoodoutsidethesetwocategories,and was in someways the mostremarkable.On the onehand, it represented consciousattemptat implantingMughalad-ministrativenstitutionsn anareathathadonlybeennominallya partoftheMughalEmpire.Thiswasmostclearly obeseen n theorganiza-tionofland-revenuedministration,swellasthearmy(notablyunderHaidarAli). On theotherhand, t wasthefirststate n Indiato makeabeginningowardsmodernization,irstandforemostn therealmof thearmyand armsmanufacture, ut also even in commerce,wheretheEnglishEastIndiaCompany'spracticesweresoughtto be imitated.lsThis preliminary lassification f eighteenth-centuryolitiesis im-portantnecause omewriters end to speakas if, irrespective f theselargediSerences n their essentialnatures,we could still find somecommonbasis orthem.The theory hatthesepolitieswerereflectionsofthe emergenceof 'regionalelites',or gave opportunitieso certaingroups,previously njoyingonly limitedprominence, o becomeco-sharersn power,are eitherstatementsof the obvious n sociologicalterms,or are based upon ratheruntenableassumptionsabout theMughalEmpire.Thusif the MughalErnpire roke ntocertain ragments,with eachfragmentn autonomous r independenttate,its rulingclassmust,ofcourse,psoactobe regionalized.No longercouldan officer erving nAwadhesentto theDeccan.Butthis s aneffect,nota cause;andit isenforcedegionalization,f anything.The caseof Bengalthat is oftencitedl6s ratherpeculiar.Here the nazims, r Governors,irstcarriedoutwhat n anearlierperiodwouldhaveappeared sanactofextremecentralization. urshidQuli Khanobtained mperial anction ortheconversionf agirs ntoSkalisa,andthussecured hewithdrawal f allMughalagirdarsr commandersromBengal.Then,becausehe com-bined is ofiice of Aazimwith that of Diwan,or provincialrevenueminister,e henceforthmanaged heShalisa;andhe andhissuccessorsremittednormousamounts o the MughalEmperor.l7By I740 thispracticeeased.ThustheBengalAawabs ecamemasters f the entire

4 AzadBilgrami,Shizanv-iAmira,Kanpur 87 ) ) p. 47.5 Mohibbul IasanKhan,Historyf 7CipuultanCalcuttan95I) pp. 3+e+7.6 Phil CalkinsnjrournalfAsianStudies, XIX, 799 .7 Cf.Z. Malikin I.E.S.H.R. IY) o69-70


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THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 393revenues f Bengalwithouthavingto share hemwith thejagirdars,.e.without herebeinganytrueremnant f MughalnobilitycontinuingnBengal,except for the Xazims hemselves.For managing he lCkalisanthe nawabsecruitedrevenue-farmersnd officials rom amongstthelocal zamindarsnd merchant-bankers.his phenomenon asgiven riseto muchmisunderstandingboutthe emergence f new elites.No suchemergences discerniblen Hyderabador in Awadh, wherethe jagirsystemcontinued o be in vogue.Informationabout merchants' ole in administrations rather tooreadilyseizedupon as evidenceof their increasedpoliticalparticipa-tion. In factnheirrolein the MughalEmpirewas equally mportant.l8Quite obviously,the Gujaratmerchantsn the seventeenthcenturyexercised nfluenceat the Mughal court that even the nagarsethsfBengal n the eighteenth enturymight haveenvied.TheMarathaConfederacyns I havesaidn annotbe groupedwith theSuccession tatesforany politicalanalysis.That it was a failureas anattempt at Empire is admitted by all serious historians.Whilesucceeding o brilliantlyn the field,at leastuntil I76I, tlle Marathasfailed to evolve even those minimumconventions-or fictionsnf youlike -thatare essentialor buildingan empire.The sloganof Hindu-pad-padshahiied an abortivedeath, possiblybecause he Peshwaswere nottoo keen to give undue weight to their titularsovereign, he rajaofSatara.In their attempt o makethemselvesndependent f their ownnominalmasters, he Peshwas eemedalwaysprepared o accept thenominal overeigntyf the MughalEmperor, olong as theactualgainsweretheirs.But ust asthey had reduced heirrajao a titular tatus, hePeshwas, oo, were subsequentlyo be reducedto a titularstatus byNana Phadries Fardnawis).Thusthere wasa simplefailure o estab-lish evena stablerepository f sovereignpower.The seconddifficulty aced in the workingof the Marathapolityaroseout of the factthat plunderremainedan essential lement or itscontinuedunctioning. t too oftenseemed hatchauth ndsardeshmukAi,and in lieu thereof,a generaldevastationof the countryinvolved,rather than its direct conquest,constitutedthe acme of Marathaambitions.Thus, whenfull-fledgedMarathaadministration as estab-lished anywhere and,if MuhammadAli, authorof Mzrat-iAhmadi,sto be believed,it could on occasionbe excellent),the country hadalreadybeen so ravaged hat the Marathas ouldonly replenish heirresources y extending he rangeof plunder.I do not wish to enter nto similardetails orthe Abdalior Durrani

8 Cf. Pearsonn I.E.S.H.R.,IX, I I8 ffW.


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394 M. THAR ALIEmpiref Afghanistan)whichduringthe latterhalfof the eighteenthcenturyame to include the whole of presentPakistan,as well asIkashmir.ut in some essentialfeatures,especiallythe dependenceuponlunder, t cxhibited imilaraspects.Onemightthensaythatoncethelimits orplundering ctivitieswerereached,itherbecauseof geography,or of opponents, he tide wasboundo turn;andcivilwarn.e. reallyplunderof theinternalpartsofthesetates,wasthereupon oundto breakout.Thiscanbe a plausibleexplanationf the break-up f boththe MarathaandAfghansystems.ButhereI should iketo drawattention o another actor hatmighthaventroduce-dn elementof exceptional conomic trainprecisely ta ime when these states were otherwisevulnerableto centrifugaltendencies.n I757 theBritish onquest fBengalbeganwiththebattleof ?lassey,and within seven years they were completemastersofEasternndia.Thisconquestwasnot simplya merepoliticalevent.Itchangedhe entirecomplexionof India'scommerce.The revenuesofBengalndBiharbecame hesourceoftheEnglishEast ndiaCompany,andwith these enormousresources, he Englishchangedthe entiredirectionf the exportsof Bengaland Bihar)as well as Coromandel.The xports oonpassed he5-millionmark.l9Thiscompletediversionof ommercemusthaveresultedn theupsetting f thewholepatternofIndian ommerce.Thecommercial eclineofGujarat ndAgra)whichimportedilkand cottonstuffs romBengal,wasinevitable.Similarlyatheoverland radethroughAfghanistanwas boundto suffer.As theEnglishadvancedfurther nland at the beginningof the nineteenthcentury,he declinewouldbecomestillmoremarked.Howadverselydid thiseconomicprocessaffectthe politicalstrengthof the MarathaConfederacy nd the AfghanEmpire) t is obviouslydifficulto saywithanydegreeof conSdence.Oneis struckby the factthat the suddencollapseof the AfghanEmpire, n I809, shouldhavefollowed osoonafter heEnglishadvanceup to Delhiin I803. Elphin-stonewholeda missiono thecourtoftheAfghan ulerShahShujaandwhowasa witnessof the dissolution f his authority) imselfobservedthedeclineof thetradeandthe abandonmentf commercebyAfghantribesmenn favourof agriculture.20he -declinen commerces thusestablislled:Whatis still to be proven s its link with the Britishcon-

19The BrItIshmportsromsEast ndiafamounted os,78s,ooo in I 797-8 (Deane& Gole,BritishEconomicrowth,. 87). These mportsncluded mports romGhina;but the Chinatradewasitselffinancedby exports romBengal.zoMountstuartElphinstone,AnAccountf theKingdomfCaubulLondon, 839), In383, 387-S, etc.


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THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 395quest on the one hand, and its role as a factor in the decline ofthe Afghanempire.My plea is that both the processes ccurin suchsequence hat,at leasttentatively, he litlk oughtto be accepted.Per-haps,closerscrutinyof the evidencewould some day put us on surerground.Finally,a questionabout these 'transition egimes'.Why is it thatwhen faced directlywith Britishpower)they attemptedno, or verylittle,modernizationThe caseof MysoreunderHaidarAli andTippuremainedunique. Marathasardars, ike the Sindhias,would go nofurther than having some regimentstrained and commandedbyEuropean fficers.What s singulars that at the ideologicalevelthe Englishnfluenceshould have made so little dent. It is true that informationaboutwesternsciencesbegins to appear in some Persianworks; but oninspection heyare all foundto havebeen writtenat the directionandwishesof an Englishofficialor clergyman. n the main, the Persianliteraturecontinued n its well-establishedroc)ves.ndeed,the eigh-teenthcenturysaw its maximumprogressn India.Checking hroughtheworks isted n the late C. A. Storey'smonumentalPersian iterature-a Bio-bibliographicalurvey, lol. I, I foundthat whereas herewereonlysix Hinduwriterswho wroteonebookeachin Persian,during heseventeenth entury, here wereduringthe eighteenth enturyno lessthanthirty-two finduwriterswho wroteas many as forty-ninebooks.Thisis a tribute o thestrength f thecultural raditionbequeathed ythe MughalEmpire.But it alsopartlyexplains,I think,why the newculture,coming romEurope,held so little attraction,and was,there-fore,almostwholly gnoredby the educated n India.

IIIThe authorof Siyar-alMutakAirin,imselfa protegeof the English,presentedn his workan idealizedpictureof theMughaladministrationwhichhe setbeforehismasters s a model.Hewas writing n I 78T Thedebatethat subsequently ccurredbetweenGrant, Shoreand Corn-wallis,reproducedn the celebratedFifthReport,howshow to the newrulers,too, the rightsand institutions stablishedunderthe MughalEmpirewereof abiding nterest.Theirclaimto land-revenue,n par-ticular,derived romMughalprecedent nd practice. t has beenurgedthat even the PermanentSettlementwas not totally exotic and wasrooted n the practiceof the Mughalgovernrnentn Bengalduring he


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396 M. ATHAR ALIseventeenth entury.2lMunro'sRyotwariSystemwas even moreclearlya development f the Mughal ystemof zabtassessmenthat lle found nvogue in areasseizedfromMysore.Mrs Asiya Siddiqihas commentedon how the British administrators f the Ceded and ConqueredProvinces reatlyreliedupon Indian and-revenue xpertise, vhich,asreflected n a work ike Diwan-pasand,as simply a survivalof Mughalland-revenuepractices.22n so far as the Mughalshad establishedauniformsysternof administration ll over the country, and a singleofficial anguage Persian), lle Englishwere helpedthereby n creatingan administrativemachinery hat was not too varied in character orendercentralized ontroldifficult,and yet was in some harmony vithexistingconditions.23While saying all this, I should ike to referto a parallel.When theSpaniardscapturedthe Inca emperorof Peru and stepped into hisshoes, hey usedthe highlycentralized tructure f the Incasto quicklyestablishand extendtheir rule. But it can hardlybe said that the IncaEmpiresurvived n any form through he Spanishcolonization.Simi-larly, the entirebasisof British ule in India was so different romthatof the MughalEmpire, hat one can hardlyspeakof the former s in anysensea continuation f the latter.The conception f the revenues f thecountry,as grossprofitsof the EnglishEast India Company,was thebasic principle on which English dominion was founded; and theDrainof Wealth o England, hroughpublicas well as privatechannclswas the ultimateobject o be realized.Thus the survivals f the MughalEmpirewere subverted o a new use, and not employed o resurrectanything esemblinghe old Empire.Thatempirehad ts own nequities,louttllese, to le fair to it, were of a diSerentform and content alto-gether.

21 Irfan Habib, AgrarianSystem f Me>ff/lalndia, I 7s-922 A. Siddiqi, AgrarianCAhangen a JVortXlndianState (Oxford, I973), p. 178-g.23 See the pexceptive lemalks of Eric .Stokes n Plzstand Pre.sent, o. 5S, pp. I44-5,

I46-7.

the mughal case

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