the military in traditional african societies

The Military in Traditional African SocietiesAuthor(s): S. C. UkpabiSource: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1974), pp. 200-217Published by: Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/GermanyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40173622 .

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The Military in Traditional African Societies

S.C. UKPABI

Although military establishments in Africa showed as many variations in their development and organization as the traditional societies which fashioned them, yet the former served the latter in similar ways. The military served as a means of maintaining or establishing a social order. Ex- ternally it was used against other societies in order to maintain the balance of power or to create a new centre of political power1. As the society's foremost instrument of violence, the military served ont only the government but also as the embodiment of a society's will2. Consequently, a society, no matter how rudimentary, possessed a military organization whose fortunes had a direct bearing on the former's well-being or its disintegration.

Types of military organizations

One can distinguish between three main types of military organizations in traditional African societies. In segmentary societies3, a citizen-army, or "levee en masse" was raised as the need arose. This meant that every able-bodied man was liable for military service during periods of emergency at the end of which the army was disbanded and the individuals took up once more their civilian occupation. In well-established kingdoms, such as Dahomey4 and Ashanti, there existed a core of professional sol- diers5 whose number was supplemented by the calling up of able-bodied citizens to serve whenever necessary. A new level was readied in the nineteenth century in the total reliance on professional armies by such nation- builders as King Shaka6 in South Africa or Al-Hajj Umar ibn Tal7, the Tukulor.

There is a noticeable evolutionary trend in the development of military organizations in traditional African societies8. Initially, wandering groups

1 Fortes, M. and E. E. Evans-Prit- chard: African Political Systems. O. U. P. 1958, p. xiv.

2 van Doorn, J.: Armed Forces and Society. Mouton 1968, p. 42.

3 Such as among the Igbo of Nigeria, the Tallensi of Ghana or the Kavirondo of Kenya.

4 Forde, D. and P. M. Kaberry (Ed): West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth century. O. U. P. 1969, pp. 86-89.

5 In Buganda, in the eighteenth century, a royal bodyguard was instituted

and built up by the Kabakas. Oliver, R. and G. Matthew: History of East Africa. Vol. I Oxford 1968, p. 190.

6 Omer-Cooper, J. D.: The Zulu Afte- math. Longmans 1966, chapter 2.

7 Saint-Martin, Y.: L'Artillerie d'El Hadj Omar et d'Ahmadu. - In: Bulletin de 1'I.F.A.N. Se*rie B. Vol. XXVII 1965.

8 For this development among the Lwoo of East Africa, please see Ogot, B. A. and J. A. Kieran (Ed): Zamani. Long- mans 1968, pp. 145-147.

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of people ensured their own safety against other groups by uniting for offence and defence, and by remaining constantly on their guard against the incursions of hostile groups. At this stage the military factor exerted a preponderant effect on the lives of the people. Since the able-bodied men spent most of their time in martial activities or in anticipation of such activities, the economic and social activities were organized to suit this form of existence9. At a later stage these wandering groups might settle in a given location and consequently be confronted with a different kind of situation which in turn would lead to a change in their military organization. Increase in population and incorporation of related groups would lead to a division of labour in the society and to more peaceful pursuits which would be broken only long enough to enable the "levee en masse"10 to be called up to deal with problems requiring a military solu- tion. Later still, and possibly through conquest, a kingdom or empire would be established in which a "levee en masse" might not even be considered adequate to deal with all the military commitments which such a political entity would be called upon to undertake. The result could be the existence of a professional army and even the rise of an officer class in the form of war-chiefs.

Arising from this argument is the proposition that a great deal of in- teraction existed between traditional societies and the type of military organization which they possessed. Segmentary societies in which each adult male was expected to help in the defence of the society tended to be egalitarian11. There was usually no warrior class which had the monopoly of arms and which could as a result acquire special privileges. Nor did any group have the right to command others. Since such segmentary societies were based on kinship or cultural links, each individual in the society was all the more willing to render military service since it was quite clear that the individual's survival in the face of external aggression, was conterminous with the survival of the society. Moreover, since the individual was called upon to defend his society he also had much say in any deliberations which might result in his being called up for military service12. It often happened that chiefs, elders, or priests of cults were entrusted with the task of assembling and leading the men to war. This, however, did not usually confer special privileges on them since this was only one of the tasks which they performed for the society as the occasion demanded. They might receive a greater share of the booty but they never set themselves up as a special military caste13.

In segmentary societies, continuous military training or military service

9 Thus the loss of their cattle in the seventeenth century led many khoi (Bush- men) in South Africa into a predatory existence which exacerbated Khoi-Dutch relations. Marks, S.: Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eigh- teenth Centuries. - In: Journal of African History (= J.A.H.), Vol. XIII, No. I 1972, pp. 55-80.

10 Andrzejevski, S.: Military Organi-

sation and Society. London 1954, p. 39. 11 van Doorn, op. cit., p. 46. 12 Among the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria

it was customary for the warrier age-grades to be consulted in such matters and their agreement usually facilitated such military ventures.

13 Ajayi, J. F. A. and R. Smith: Yo- ruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century. Ibadan 1971, p. 10.

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could not be reconciled with such economic activities as farming and trade which were the normal occupation of the members of the society14. Nei- ther could such a society engage in protracted wars. This was why military engagements were not allowed to last more than a few days and casualties were reduced to the barest minimum. Such societies warring against one another generally sought, not to decimate the other group with whom trading, marriage and cultural ties were maintained under normal circumstances, but to achieve military equilibrium which would enable them to coexist in a given area.

The military organization of segmentary societies was more conducive for defence than for offence15. This was partly the result of the logistic difficulties which might arise if the society undertook campaigns of long duration, a long distance away from base, in addition to the fact that a greater determination and ready willingness were exhibited by the men in the defence of their homes than in offensive warfare. Arising out of this preoccupation with defence was the fact that villages and towns were sited where they could be defended easily, such as on hill tops, difficult country, or in thickly-wooded plains. It did happen that segmentary societies at some stage organized themselves for offence and created large principalities which altered the original military organization, promoted military professionalism, and led to the centralization of political power.

Kingdoms and empires evolved elaborate and often complex military organizations. Their military needs were quite great. The royal court had to be defended adequately and the safety of the rulers assured. This necessitated the existence of a group of professional warriors who were charged with this responsibility and whose qualification for office included unquestioned loyalty to the government in power. This military unit at the capital formed part of the standing army of the state. Large military units were often quartered in frontier regions for defense against in- vasion while other units were deployed in other parts of the kingdom for internal security. A system was created to coordinate all military activities in the state. In the kingdom of Mani-Congo for instance, this was achieved by the creation of a ministry of war under the control of a min- ister16. Elsewhere military activities, as in the case of Ashanti, were reg- ulated by the king17. In times of emergency, selective conscription was resorted to, in order to supplement the efforts of the standing army. Each chief in the outlying district was required to lead a certain number of his men to pre-arranged rendezvous where all the contingents were collected to form the national army for a particular war18. The chiefs were required to command their men in the field and a judicious system was worked out whereby those citizens used in a particular campaign were replaced in other campaigns by other citizens.

14 Andrzejewski, op. cit., p. 34. 15 For the effects of offensive or de-

fensive preoccupation in a given society please see Andrzejewski, op. cit., Chap- ter III.

16 Ukpabi, S. C: Military Involvement in African Politics. Conch 1972, p. 3.

17 Kimble, D.: A Political History of Ghana. Oxford 1963, pp. 265-267.

18 This was particularly the case with the Dahomean Military System. See Hers- kovits, M. J.: Dahomey Vol. II North- western 1967, chapter XXV.

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But in the final analysis the kingdom depended on a certain group of levies for its security. This group would generally include those from the heartland of the kingdom. Thus, the Ashanti levies from the confederate states19 around Kumasi became the most important and loyal group, while in Dahomey, the inhabitants of the Dahomey plateau and the des- cendants of the conquering Adja formed the most important units of the Dahomean levies. This arrangement conferred on these groups certain privileges which distinguished them from the inhabitants of the other parts of the kingdom. To them went certain positions of command in the army in addition to a greater proportion of the war spoils.

Since kingdoms and empires in Africa south of the Sahara were created largely through military conquest20, their military establishments were organized more for offence than for defence and this affected all aspects of life in the society21 at the same time as creating the opportunity for military specialization and the development of military professionalism. The consolidation and expansion of the empire led to increased military activities which in turn made it necessary to maintain a large body of men under arms for a long period22. For instance the Dahomean standing army was estimated at 12 000 in 184523. Most of the members of this standing army came from the levies raised for particular campaigns but later re- tained in military service after the expedition. In this way a large number of the civilian population was removed from its occupation and used in a special role. The standing army itself meant that the ruler had an armed instrument with which to subordinate and intimidate the unarmed population - a situation which not only created social stratification but also enhanced the position of the king against the local chiefs whose concur- rence was required, in the past, before war was declared or a campaign undertaken24.

A standing army was an economic drain on the resources of the state since such an army had to be paid in cash or in kind. It also had to be armed at state expense and the provision of horses for the cavalry and guns for the infantry required a large capital25. At the same time an idle standing army constituted a danger to its employers. In order to utilise the soldiers for providing the means for their pay and to engage their attention in war, the rulers found it necessary to send them to war constantly. Stand- ing armies consequently gave rise to continued warfare which yielded booty and slaves, part of which was used to pay the troops26. Among

19 Tordoff, W.: Ashanti Under the

Prempehs. Oxford 1965, pp. 1-15. 20 The article of Armstrong, R. G.:

The Development of kingdoms in Negro Africa. - In: Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria (= J.H.S.N.), vol. 2 No. I, 1960, pp. 27-39, will be found useful in the study of the emergence of

kingdoms in Africa, South of the Sahara. 21 Thus a society which engaged con-

stantly in war could develop social inequa- lities. Andrzejevski, op. cit., p. 28.

22 Omer-Cooper, op. cit., chapter 2. 23 Forde and Kaberry, op. cit., p. 86. 24 At this applied to Ashanti please

see Forde and Kaberry, op. cit., p. 213. 25 In Bornu, the government used cap-

tured weapons to arm its own troops. Fisher, A. G. B. and H. J. Fisher: Sla- very in Muslim Society in Africa. New York. 1971, p. 162.

26 Ibid., p. 162.

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the Yoruba of Oyo, the rule that the Kakanfo must go to war frequently27, at least once every three years, was supposed, among other things, to be a way of keeping the Yoruba general and his army busy.

A standing army could be sent on a long campaign in a distant area without bringing the state's political and economic organization to a halt28. The troops of Benin or Yoruba29 in the 19th century trying to subdue a rebellious district or to conquer a new territory were accompanied by relations or wives who looked after the men in the military camps.

, Every soldier was expected to fend for himself in food and other neces- saries and sometimes even to provide himself with weapons. In long campaigns, the women and the non-combatants grew crops near the camps, assisted in the repair of the thatched huts and carried out trade designed to supply some of the needs of the troops30. It did happen, that sometimes these troops never returned to the metropolis but set themselves up in their new abode31 and organized a system of government and social institution similar to what they were used to in their former towns.

Elaborate military establishments encouraged the growth of such associated industries as blacksmithing and the manufacture of shields. For instance, blacksmiths manufactured iron swords, cutlasses, and arrows and it is relevant to note that in some kingdoms (such as among the Yoruba) Ogun, the god of iron, was also the god of war32.

Of particular significance was the role played by hunters in war. In some states they were used as scouts33 and were formed, whenever necessary, into a paramilitary organization which was charged with watching over the security of the town or village. Hunting provided suitable training for war since it inculcated the spirit of adventure, daring, courage, patience and persistence in stalking wild and dangerous animals. It also happened that the same weapons used for hunting animals were also used for war and the proficiency in handling them in hunting resulted in proficiency in weaponry in combat.

Effects of the military on traditional societies

One of the major effects of the military on traditional societies, particularly among such groups as the Masai and the Zulus, which could be des- cribed as "states in arms" was the military orientation of cultural values. Songs and dances extolled military valour and the dominant values of life became those of the warrior. Among the Zulu a man was called the

27 Ajayi, J. F. A.: Professional War- riors in the Nineteenth Century Yoruba Politics. - In: Tarikh, Vol. I, no. I, pp. 72-81.

28 In important campaigns each Daho- mean soldier was accompanied by a boy who did his apprenticeship under the soldier and was taught the art of war during combat. Snelgrave, W.: A New Account of some Parts of Guinea and the Slave Trade. London 1734, pp. 77-79.

29 Ajayi and Smith, op. cit., p. 22. 30 Ibid. 31 Ukpabi, op. cit., p. 2. 32 Ajayi, op. cit., p. 73. 33 Nzewunwa, C: Ogu Mkpuru Oka

(The Corn-seed War) 1888-1890. Unpu- blihsed dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment for the B. A. (Hons) History, Univ. of Nigeria, Nsukka. 1972, Chapter 2.

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"war-shield of the king" and a man's main ambition became to win hon- our in the battlefield or to fulfil himself in the service of the king34.

Military organizations in kingdoms and empires provided the opportunity for specialization in the use of certain arms which in turn made it possible for such states to extend their ascendancy over contiguous peoples. Some African armies comprised a cavalry arm, foot soldiers (who fought with swords and lances) Archers, and infantry armed with guns. Profi- ciency in fighting on horseback or in the use of the gun required special and prolonged training35. The mastery of these instruments of war conferred on the troops a great advantage over soldiers who fought with swords and spears. For instance, Oyo ascendancy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was achieved through the use of cavalry36 which also limited the southward expansion of the empire since cavalry could not operate in the dense forests of the south. Similarly, the ascendancy of Ashanti37 and Dahomey in the 19th century was attributable to the importation of a large number of guns which gave their armies immense advantage over their neighbours. The survival of Moshesh and the Basuto kingdom in the troubled period following the Mfecane was the result of the people becoming a nation of mounted gunmen38.

Thus, it was quite common to find the army of a state divided into wings or units depending on the weapons with which such units were armed. This division gave rise to "esprit de corps" among the troops serv- ing in the same unit and made it necessary for the commander of such a unit no longer to be the chief of an outlying district but a soldier who had distinguished himself in the use of the weapon in question in many battles39. In time a class of professional commanders emerged whose loyalty or otherwise had a far-reaching effect on the fortunes of the state40. Military specialization and technique, therefore produced two contrary effects on the state. On the one hand, a good and loyal standing army spe- cialising in the use of certain weapons strengthened the centripetal forces in the state and used its superior skills to subdue distant regions. On the other hand, unless such an army was permeated with patriotism, a stage

34 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 31.

35 New weapons also led to innova- tions in tactics. For instance, the increas-

ing use of firearm in Central Sudan brought about the rearrangement of forces in battle formation. Smalldone, J. P.: Fireams in Central Sudan: A. Re- valuation. - In: J.A.H., Vol. XIII no. 4

(1972), p. 595. 36 For the role of the horse in the

formation of states in central Sudan see Fisher, H. J.: The Horse in the Central Sudan. - In: J.A.H., Vol. XIII no. 3 (1972), pp. 369-388.

37 Ward, W. E. F.: A History of Gha- na. London. 1966, p. 138, p. 142.

38 Atmore, A. and P. Sandors: Sothe

Arms and ammunition in the Nineteenth century. - In: J.A.H., Vol. XII no. 4 (1971), pp. 535-544.

39 In discussing this issue as it affected the Yoruba, Bolanle Awe declared that in the older (Yoruba) states "military leadership based on achievement tended to take precedence over traditional leadership". Awe, B.: Militarism and economic development in Nineteenth Century Yoruba Warfare. - In: J.A.H., Vol. XIV no. I (1973), p. 66.

40 The loss of the support of his fa- ther's military commanders contributed to the inability of Ahmadu (Son of al-Hajj Umar b. Tal) to hold the empire together. Crowder, M. (Ed): West African Resistan- ce. London 1971, p. 61.

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would be reached when the troops would consider their interests as over- riding those of the state and would proceed either to establish their own rule or to withdraw their allegiance to the rulsers thereby bringing about the disintegration of the state41.

The role of woman, slaves and mercenaries in traditional armies

In indigenous societies women were used widely not only to provide support for the soldiers in war but also in a combatant role. The part played by women in looking after an army engaged in a distant war has been noted. Their role in a beseiged town or village was very pronounced. They attended to the wounded, looked after the food and the children and hid these in places where they would not fall into the hands of the enemy. They brought food and replacements for the armaments to the de- fenders on the city wall or in the perimeter of the town or village. In ex- tremities they armed themselves and fought side by side with their menfolk. At other times they were used in the offensive. For instance, Clapperton reported that part of Bello's army which attacked Gobir in 1826 was made up of women slaves. He cited a particularly brave old woman who rode astride a horse and was found where the battle was thickest42. At a later date, the sultan of Bagirmi was reported to possess a large number of female slaves who accompanied him into battle and whose duty included taunting "cowards to an assumption of courage"43. Shaka, in reorganizing his military establishment, organized the young women into regiments similar to those of the men. The women assisted in the agricultural work needed to feed the male regiments quartered in a particular military town. They also took part in ceremonial dances. When- ever a male regiment was released from military service, a female regiment was also dissolved and given as brides to the men44.

The use of women as soldiers reached its highest level in the Dahomean army. In 1845, the kingdom had 5 000 women as part of its standing army. In the second half of the nineteenth century there were two distinct types of army in Dahomey. On the one hand, there was a standing army of male and female warriors, and on the other hand, a reserve army of all able-bodied men and women capable of bearing arms. A century earlier, the rulers of Dahomey used to enlist some of their wives as soldiers during periods of extreme emergency. Under King Gezo who usurp- ed the throne in 1818 the use of women as soldiers was institutionalised45. Gezo felt himself so insecure, at first, and doubted the loyalty of the male soldiers, that he created from among the palace women a military unit which served as his bodyguard and which defended him in any civil con- flict. Recruited from captive slaves of non-Dahomean origin, these Ama- zons gave their loyalty to the king who owned and maintained them.

41 Andrzejewski, op. cit., p. 83. 42 Clapperton, H.: Journal of a Se-

cond Expedition into the Interior of Afri- ca. London 1829, p. 188.

43 Macleod, O.: Chiefs and Cities of Central Africa. London 1912, p. 227.

44 Ajayi, op. cit., Tarikh, p. 74-76. 45 Forde and Kabberry, op. cit. pp.

87-90.

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By the time Gezo died in 1858 the women corps had become such a vital arm of the state's defence system that enlistment was extended to all women capable of bearing arms.

In times of war the reserve female units guarded the palace and the capital. In battle, they wore uniforms similar to the men's, fought in the front ranks and showed as much courage and tenacity as their male counterpart. In their youth, these women-soldiers were celibate and were forbidden to marry until they reached middle age. Even then, they still needed the king's consent to marry. In peace time they maintained themselves by making pots and carving calabashes which were their exclusive mono- poly46.

By sharing with their menfolk in the perils inherent in warfare and by rising as the occasion demanded in defence of their state, the women were accorded great respect in their societies. Some of them, as the rulers of their people, showed great valour in leading their armies to battle. Their military service gave them much influence in the ordering of the political and social life of their societies47. For instance, in Dahomean court, sen- ior women had the same ranks and status as state ministers. There was a female counterpart of the prime minister and another counterpart of the "Meu", the second most powerful minister in the state48. In addition, the upkeep of the court and the royal tombs was mainly in their hands while many of them acted as the king's advisers and enjoyed his absolute con- fidence49.

The use of slaves (usually regarded as belonging to the lowest class in indigenous society) as soldiers was practised widely in Africa south of the Sahara although much more is known about their activities as soldiers in those parts of Africa which came under some form of Muslim influence than in the non-Muslim parts. This could be accounted for partly by the extensive documentation of slave activities in the Muslim areas visited by Muslim scholars and European travellers. In segmentary societies the ow- ner of slaves usually expected the latter to come to his aid whenever his person was in danger and it was not uncommon to find slaves joining in the defence of the village or town of their master50.

In the eastern Sudan, the Funj employed a large slave army whose activities helped in the expansion of the Funj empire51. In Nineteenth Cen- tury Bornu, al-Kanemi used many slave-soldiers in his expeditions. It was even reported that his commander-in-chief was of thfc slave class52. Al- kanemi did not have a centralised armed force but relied on the contingents (often of slaves) which his dignitaries were prepared to equip and to contribute for the national cause. In such instances, the commanders of

46 Ibid. 47 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 35. 48 Herskovits, op. cit., chapter XXV. 49 Nevbury, C. W. (Ed): Sir Richard

Burton: A Mission to Gelele king of Da- hole. London 1966, pp. 32-33.

50 Among the Yoruba of Ibadan it was quite common for the household slaves

trained for war to accompany their masters to war. Johnson, S.: The History of the Yoruba. London 1969, pp. 131-137.

51 Fisher and Fisher, op. cit., p. 154. 52 Denham and H. Clapperton: Nar-

rative of Travels and Discoveries in Nor- thern and Central Africa . . . London 1826, pp. 162-163.

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the contingents were generally of the slave class53. Consequently, the structure of the military forces of Bornu made it necessary for slaves to be in constant demand. From the Sokoto caliphate, the rebellion of Hadeija against Sokoto in the middle of the nineteenth century yielded the story of a slave warrior who fought so bravely in the ranks of the army of Hadeija that the blood of his foes cemented his hand to his spear54. To the west, the initial forces which al-Hajj Umar used against Bambara in 1850 included many slaves some of whom were later given important military commands55.

Certain African rulers used slave soldiers as the means of creating a centralised administration aimed at enhancing the authority of the mon- archs against the competition of their subordinate chiefs. For instance, threatened by the revolt of one of his chief officials in 1500, the Sultan of Kano survived this through the support of the slave warriors one of whom he appointed to a position of eminence in the state56. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the rulers of Zaria appointed slave generals to command their armies partly in order to forestall the rebellion of certain dignitaries in the state and partly because these were the only people whom they could trust to defend the state against invaders57. Sim- ilarly, Kabaka Kalema of Buganda, in the late nineteenth century, when he found himself losing popular support, relied for his safety on the Arabs and their bands of slaves58.

The use of slaves for the defence of the state and as a prop for individual rulers had its own dangers since some slaves or their commanders tended to over-reach themselves or to bring about the collapse of the government through their excesses. In Kayer (Senegal) the excesses of the slave-soldiers, at the end of the seventeenth century, caused the inhabitants to carry out a successful revolt against the ruler59.

Similarly, the collapse of the Funj dynasty in the eighteenth century has been attributed partly to the over-reliance of the rulers on slave-sol- diers60. At the end of the thirteenth century, the situation had deteriorat- ed to such an extent that the throne of Mali was seized by Sakura, a freed slave61.

With the rise of a professional army and the over-dependence of certain rulers on slave-soldiers, there was the danger that the commanders of such standing armies could turn against their masters or could interfere in political matters. Faced with this situation, the clever rulers kept their throne by encouraging rivalry among the slaves, by playing the dignitaries against the slaves and by summarily executing slave commanders as the need arose62.

53 Barth, H.: Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa. London 1857, Vol. I, p. 599.

54 Fisher and Fisher, op. cit., p. 159. 55 Delafosse, M.: Haut-Senegal-Niger.

Vol. II. Paris 1912, p. 306. 56 Fisher and Fisher, op. cit., p. 164. 57 Smith, M. G.: The Hausa system of

Social Status. - - In: Africa, 1959, p. 242.

58 Gray, J. M.: The Year of the Three Kings of Buganda. - In: Uganda Journal, 1950, pp. 37-38.

59 Fisher and Fisher, op. cit., p. 165. 60 Trimingham, J. S.: The Influence

of Islam on Africa. London 1968, p. 25. 61 Fisher and Fisher, op. cit., p. 167. 62 Ibid.

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There was little doubt that the use of slaves as warriors made it possible for some of these slaves to attain the highest posts in the land, to rise in social status and to use their acquired positions of authority to lord it over the free-born.

It is necessary to mention the role of merceneries in African warfare. These warriors who sold their services for money or booty were hired for several reasons one of which was to utilise their special skills in weaponry. In the nineteenth century, part of the bodyguard of the Asantehene in Kumasi comprised Hausas who had seen military service under the British or French and consequently possessed proficiency in handling snider ri- fles68. Al-Hajj Umar made special efforts to enlist skilled African soldiers from French Senegal to man the artillery pieces captured from the French and to drill his troops64. As his fame grew, Umar attracted into his army adventurers from far and wide, in search of booty, who were very proud to serve under such a renowned general.

Other mercenaries were hired simply to augment the forces of one party in an armed struggle or to do the fighting for a group unable or too weak to challenge a much stronger opponent. For instance, in March 1845, the king of Porto Novo hired Iso warriors to attack Badagry, and a day- long naval engagement began between the two groups until darkness fell65. In the seventeenth century, an English traveller, Thomas Phillips, reported that the Akan at Cape Coast hired the warriors of Asebu in their war against the king of Efutu - a combination which overwhelmed the people of Efutu and caused them to abandon their capital66.

Among the Temne of Sierra Leone, the use of mercenaries was widespread. Temne military organization centred on the war chiefs some of whom possessed enough influence and wealth to raise a band of warriors67. But the chiefs, instead of leading their bands to battle, usually hired out- standing warriors of proven ability and from any ethnic group to lead them against whomsoever the chief might wish. Even the warrior bands comprised men from several ethnic groups who were willing to sell their services for wages. In order to raise such a band "the war chief would give his leading warriors a large amount of goods which was then taken to other chiefs in other areas, from whom the warriors would ask permission to recruit more warriors as well as pass through their countries with their recruits. Through these means warriors were collected from a variety of chiefdoms and peoples, and some would come from more distant places because the fame of the war-leader had attracted them. They were rewarded for their services with rights of plunder and portion of the value of any slaves they might capture . . ."68

Many of the famous generals in West Africa began their career by of-

63 Ellis, A. B.: The land of Fetish. London 1883, p. 215.

64 Crovder, M. (Ed): West African Resistance. London 1971, p. 57.

65 CAz/085 b. (C.M.S. Papers. Lon- don) Townsend, Journal entry for 17 March, 1845.

66 Wolfson, F.: Pageant of Ghana. London 1962, p. 77.

67 Crovder, op. cit., p. 245. 68 Ibid.

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fering their military services to those that needed them. Bai Bureh who was to offer much military resistance to the British forces in the Hut Tax war of 1898, in Sierra Leone, began his military career by creating a warrior band which, by 1865, was hired by the paramount chief of Rowoola, to aid a subordinate chief. Later Bureh was to give his services to the British in 1892 as a result of which he was able to observe the fighting techniques of the West India Regiments in Sierra Leone69. Similarly, Samori Toure's fame as a skilled soldier began during his services as a mercenary in the pay of Sori Birama, the king of Bissandugu70.

Mercenaries observed certain codes of conduct. They offered to serve under renowned generals who had something to offer them in the form of the acquisition of military techniques and the opportunity for wealth through success in battle. Among the commanders themselves there was the understanding that they must believe in the cause they fought for, before they offered their service to one party in a war, neither was it common for them to switch their allegiance from one party to another. In Igboland (Eastern Nigeria), the famous Abam and Ohafia warriors who undertook military engagements in various parts of the territory in the Nineteenth century, did not simply offer their services to anyone who wanted to hire them. Since they were the allies of the people of Arochukwu who possessed the oracle "Ibin Ukpabi" and who used their military allies to enforce the verdict of the oracle, the Aro became the agents through whom these warriors could be made available to any Igbo town which needed them. In this way, the Aro used them to safeguard their trading and political interests in parts of Igboland. Among the people of Abam and Ohafia, military achievements were idealised and commemorated in songs and dances. The baptism of fire in the battlefield and any tangible evidence of having vanquished an enemy in hand-to-hand combat became the true test of manhood.

Above all, mercenaries as a group tended to develop trans-ethnic loyalties and valued comradeship in arms more than kinship ties.

Military and political matters

The danger that military commanders of whatever social status would interfere in political matters was something an African ruler had to guard against and in many states there were provisions aimed at minimising this interference in order to prevent a civil war or the collapse of the established government. In Mossi, the Tapsoba (the commander of the infantry) had enormous military influence but he was forbidden to have his head-

quarters in the state capital71. Instead he resided in one of the four mil-

itary camps located away from the capital. After three years in office he was ritually put to death. It was also significant that the main forces of the state were not quartered near the state capital but were located near the frontiers of the kingdom72.

69 Crowder, op. cit., pp. 246 - 247. 70 Tarikh, Vol. I. no. 4, p. 30.

71 Forde and Kaberry, op. cit., p. 171. 72 Ibid.

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In discussing this problem as it affected the Oyo empire, Ajayi argued that the Kakanfo (Commander-in-chief) was so influential that he became the rival of the king of Oyo73 and ,,in this way raised the problem of how to prevent clashes between the civil and military administrations. It was a problem inherent in the emergence of the Eso (military chiefs

probably instituted in the seventeenth century) as a semi-professional class of warriors, with an "esprit de corps" and ideas and values of its own, but it usually took the form of how to keep their leader, the Kakan- fo, away from the politics of the capital and the whole Oyo Empire. "There were several devices intended to insulate the Kakanfo from politics. The title was conferred on the greatest soldier and tactician of the day, but care was usually taken not to select members of the royal lineage or anyone likely to combine political influence at Oyo with his military power and prestige. He was not allowed to reside in the capital. He was supposed to go to war frequently, at least once every third year, to conquer or be brought home a corpse within three months. To give him some scope for exercising power, he was made ruler of an outlying district, usually in an area of the empire most threatened by external foes. But his rule was expected to be eccentric and irresponsible, his subjects tolerating it only in the knowledge that it would be for a short while and that if the Kakanfo lived long enough he would at least bring them lustre with his fame or booty from his conquests."74 Military rulers, like Shaka, solved the problem of the over-mighty commanders by becoming their own commanders-in-chief. Shaka appointed and dismissed his commanders at will, or sent them constantly on campaigns which kept them away from the capital75.

In spite of these safeguards, several commanders were still able, by their action, to shatter the established political system. Gezo, who was a very skillful warrior, used his genius to wrest the throne of Dahomey in 1818. Having done this, he proceeded to reorganize the army and the government to ensure that he himself was not overthrown76. His activities and his long rule of forty years contributed to the development of royal ab- solutism in Dahomey in the ninteenth century. Similarly, the revolt of Afonja, who succeeded for a while in making Ilorin independent of Oyo77, not only contributed to the collapse of Oyo but proved that the safeguards worked out for insulating the Kakanfo from politics could be illusory.

Nowhere in Africa south of the Sahara in the 19th century did the military have such far-reaching effect on traditional societies as in Southern Africa where constant warfare among the Bantu78 and the military inno- vations arising therefrom brought about revolutionary changes whose effects were felt from Zululand to Tanganyika, in the north. These wars necessitated the emergence of standing and professional armies and changes organizations. Conflicts in themselves have been known to increase the in tactics which in turn brought about changes in Bantu social and political

73 Ajayi, op. cit., Tarikh, pp. 71 - 81. 74 Ibid. 75 Omer-Cooper, op. cit., Chapter 2. 76 Forde and Kaberry, op. cit., p. 73.

77 Ajayi, op. cit., Tarikh, pp. 72 - 81. 78 Macmillan, W. M.: Bantu, Boer

and Briton. Oxford 1963, pp. 31-37.

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pace of social change79. In Zululand they stimulated the adaptation of existing institutions along militarist lines. For instance, the age-grade system became the basis for the establishment of the age-grade regiments which Shaka used as the means of assimilating rapidly the conquered peoples through the enlistment of their able-bodied men and women into the appropriate units80. Initiation ceremonies, which involved circumci- sion and a period of ritual seclusion, had no place in the new scheme of things. Social habits and customs were encouraged or eliminated depending on how far they promoted or hindered the military interests of the rulers.

Politically, these military developments gave rise to large and centralised kingdoms comprising different ethnic groups, which replaced the small and clan-based political units of old. These new kingdoms tended to con- centrate a great deal of political power in the hands of the ruler and sub- verted the traditional role of subordinate chiefs. A new crop of leaders emerged whose main qualification for political office lay in their military prowess. Men, like king Shaka of Zululand, Moshesh the founder of the Basuto nation, Zwangendaba, the general who led the Zulu migrants into Tanganyika, and Faku, the chief of Pondoland who defended his people against foreign invaders, rank among the greatest figures in African history in the nineteenth century81.

From Zululand and its neighbourhood, defeated groups migrated northwards into Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanganyika taking with them their new cultural and political conceptions into these new areas. Sometimes they modified these concepts to suit the circumstances in which they found themselves but generally their intrusion became the occasion for far-reaching social and political changes among their unwilling hosts. On the other hand, some groups like the Basuto, who were indirectly affected by events in Zululand reacted to this, by clustering together in large supra-tribal communities. Subsequently they evolved new military and political systems which made it possible for them to survive in the new situation in which they found themselves82.

These wars in Southern Africa led to social fragmentation over a wide area. There was a change in the pattern of population distribution. Some groups which survived the conflagration tended to expand and to absorb weaker groups. Others, like the kololo, abandoned their homeland and migrated northwards to establish an empire in Barotseland. The pattern of economic activities also changed. Some sedentary groups, like the Tlok- wa, who had been driven from their homes and had, in the process, lost their means of livelihood, became predatory and brought woe to the weaker groups whom they encountered in their wandering. In addition, crafts associated with war (such as blacksmithing and shieldmaking) were encouraged and the women regiments, under Shaka, were given the task of producing the food needed by the army.

79 Ajayi and Smith, op. cit., p. 9. 80 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op.

cit., p. 26.

81 Omer-Cooper, op. cit., p. 6. 82 Ibid., p. 5.

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Since most of the kingdoms and empires established in Africa south of the Sahara were largely the result of one group, or several groups, establishing their suzerainty over others through conquest, these "conquest states" showed a high degree of social stratification and military organization which seemed to leave military power in the hands of the conquering group83. The situation in the interlacustrine region in East Africa, from Bunyoro to Rwanda, between the 17th and the 19th centuries, illustrates this clearly. In this region, an ethnically distinct aristocracy, known as Hima in the North and Tutsi in the south84 established their authority over the original Bantu inhabitants. In Ankole, for instance, as soon as the Bahima, who were cattle men, had conquered the Bairu, they had to work out a political and military system best suited to safeguard their own ascendancy. They also had to defend their cattle and their Bairu subjects from external attack. This in turn led them to conquer other less strongly organized cattle people whose subjugation became a necessary feature of state defence. The conquered Bairu, who had no affinity with the Bahima, possessed inferior social and legal status and were obliged to pay tribute to their overlord85. The Bahima constituted themselves into the nucleus of the Ankole kingdom and all government functions were in their hands. In maintaining the differential relationships which existed in the kingdom the Bahima relied on military power. At the head of the military organization was the Mugabe (king). He ordered his chiefs to form warrior bands for the protection of the borders or the defence of the kingdom as the case might be. While every Mugima was liable for military service, the Bairu were excluded from this service. Thus the latter lacked any military discipline and training which would have helped them to alter their inferior status through military action86.

There is the view that the ability of the Hima and the Tutsi to dom- inate the Bantu agriculturists was partly the result of their superiority as fighting men - a superiority acquired through protecting their herds from "animal and human enemies. Constant raiding and counter-raiding develop- ed a military discipline which could be expanded and put to political uses. The organization of the Bahima kraal was a larger collective enterprise than the Bairu homestead. The unilateral . . . lineage offered wider political and military cooperation than the relatively smaller Bairu . . . extended family. Thus even without a further development of the political organization, the Bahima had the advantage in fighting experience and cooperation"87.

As the ruling group, and in the rendering of military service, the Ba- hima and their king were bound by reciprocal obligations. The former swore an oath of allegiance by which they bound themselves to follow the king in war. They also undertook to pay tribute periodically in the form of cattle. In return, the king guaranteed his client protection against cattle-raiders and other enemies, maintained peace between his subjects

83 Andrzejewski, op. cit., pp. 31-33. 84 Oliver, op. cit., p. 86. 85 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op.

cit., pp. 128-132.

86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.

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and assisted them materially during periods of disaster. Thus military service was based on a system of allegiance reinforced by mutual interest in an economy based on cattle88.

In the raising of large armies, several indigenous rulers relied on a system of vassalage based either on land or on state offices. "The fief system was above all a component of the military and administrative system. Pieces of land and offices were distributed to the ruler's military subor- dinates as rewards."89 They were granted for life under the condition that their possessors performed special vassal duties (mostly military duties) for his feudal lord. "The distribution of fiefs in the form of offices, acres of land or cattle therefore meant a degree of military and administrative organization which must guarantee the regular supply of revenue and military contingents to be placed at the disposal of the ruler in the event of a campaign."90

In traditional African societies, the warrior was accorded much respect. He was looked up to for protection and counsel in periods of emergency. Success in warfare enabled him to attain higher status and prestige in the military hierarchy of the state and also served as a means of gaining wealth. Among the people of Kavirondo, clan heads were best remember- ed for their deeds of valour91. Consequently, given certain conditions, the warriors as a group were quite capable of urging very strongly their views on their people or government. Worried by European incursions into the Ndebele kingdom, Lobengula's regiments (the impis) urged the king to grant them permission to destroy the Boers before the latter grew so strong as to make their elimination impossible. "Day after day the different impis came pouring in to the king demanding the white man's blood in the country, and for leave to attack the army which was coming up to eat them. Meetings of the excited warriors were held, and it became a question whether Lobengula would be able to restrain them or not. At one stormy meeting held in Bulawayo the old men, who sided with the king, stood up and said the young soldiers must fight them first before attacking the few whites, who were the king's visitors. The king's position was now an unenviable one, the whole nation rising against him, and it required his utmost tact and judgement to deal with them without losing his dignity or showing want of courage . . ."92 Eventually, and when it was already late, Lobengula consented to fight. However, the en- suing war with the Europeans led to the destruction of the Ndebele nation.

So much has been written about the destructive effects of warfare in indigenous societies that one is apt to overlook the complex codes and the sense of chivalry which often minimised loss of life. Even large armies bent on outright conquest and the annexation of territory did not always achieve the surprise necessary to annihilate the enemy in his most unguard- ed moments. War appeared often to be used as a lever in diplomacy and

88 Ibid. 89 Buttner, T.: The economic and So-

cial character of Pre-Colonial States in Tropical Africa. - In: J.H.S.N., Vol. 5, no. 2 (1970), pp. 286-287.

90 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 128-132.

91 Ibid., p. 235. 92 Quoted in Tarikh, Vol. 2, no. 2,

1968, p. 64.

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in maintaining the balance of power in a given geographical locality. This partly explains why the combatants adopted, in the main, the tactics of ambushes, skirmishes and feints93 rather than pitched battles which might lead to the utter annihilation of one party. Consequently, by the end of a day's battle casualties in dead and wounded might be very low94. The party that had sustained a good deal of casualties might break off hostili- ties or might take steps to sue for peace. It was therefore not surprising, for instance, that the endemic state of warfare in Southern Nigeria in the nineteenth century did not result in the vast depopulation of the area95.

By and large, marriage relationship and the complex pattern of inter- locking interests made contiguous towns and villages keep bloodshed to the barest minimum. Among the Igbo96 of Eastern Nigeria, for instance, wars between certain towns did not necessarily bring to a halt peaceful contacts (such as in trade) between their people, and often the women from one belligerent town married in another town initiated moves to bring about peace97. Although the popular tactics adopted by parts of Nsukka Division of Igboland was to surround a village to be attacked, by night, yet a sense of chivalry caused the warriors to defer attack until the enemy had been given sufficient warning to enable them to prepare themselves for battle. After taking their position "the attacking force an- nounced its arrival by discharging a few shots and then waited until the enemy collected and came out of the town" (which usually happened at daybreak). "Prisoners captured were sold as slaves, but women were not touched as the capture of women would lead to a cessation of intermar- riage between the two towns."98 In some societies, wars were not allowed to interfere with attendance in markets and with other economic activities. For instance, among the Kavirondo, periods of truce were observed during the planting season99.

Neither were many societies able to sustain a battle for more than a day or two. Moreover the indigenous weapons of warfare (swords, matchets, spears, bows and arrows and dane guns) did not cause enormous casualties to the enemy when compared with the weapons of mass destruction introduced by the colonial powers.

The military, therefore, was an essential aspect of the organization of

93 Ajayi and Smith, op. cit., p. 30. 94 F.O. 84/1134 Enclosure no. 17 of

20 Juni 1861. Governor Hill at Sierra Leone to Lord John Russell.

95 I do not wish to minimise the loss of life sustained in indigenous warfare. I merely wish to draw attention to the fact that the picture of widespread holocaust often painted in history books on Africa may have been overdrawn.

96 For further reading on Igbo Social and Political Systems please see (a) Nzimiro, I.: Studies in Igbo Political Systems. Lon- don 1972. (b) Nzimiro, I. and A. E. Afig- bo: The Warrant Chiefs Ibadan. 1972, pp. 1-35.

97 "In time of war it was the old women's business to bring peace. It was said that as soon as they heard where the fighting was going on they used to make for the spot, and come between the combatants and stop them fighting." EP 9262 A Intelligence Report on Ete Clan, Nsukka Division 1931, p. 12.

98 Meek, C. K.: An Ethnographic Re- port on the Peoples of the Nsukka Divi- sion. Onitsha Province, p. 26.

99 Fortes and Evan-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 230.

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African traditional societies100. It shared with politics the realm of the society's greatest endeavour, and as such, required the harnessing of all the human and material resources in order to maximise its output. As a social system101, it was used as a method of producing and fostering group loyalties which enabled the citizen soldiers to function under extreme pressure. Apart from a few despotisms, the military was always under civilian control, and there were constitutional safeguards aimed at insulating professional military men from politics102. As in other parts of the world, the military tended to be conservative but at the same time, such men of genius as Shaka were prepared to try something new, and in do- ing so set off a chain reaction whose effects were felt over a wide area and for a long time103. Moreover, since the military was the creation of the society which gave it birth it was bound to be affected by societal changes. Thus at each stage of the society's development a military system was established which was considered adequate for its needs104. In- digenous warfare, which required detailed planning, logistic support and intricate manoeuvres, could only have been carried out by those who knew the art of war105. Eventually the indigenous military system collapsed only in the face of superior weaponry and novel tactics introduced by Euro- pean conquerors. Faced with a situation not of their own choosing those African communities (or leaders) which adapted their "modus pugnandi" to the exigencies of the times achieved spectacular successes106 while others who maintained a conservative approach were toppled easily107.

Resume

Dans les societes africaines traditionnelles, Varmee touchait a tous les domaines de la vie et servait de moyen pour soutenir ou etablir un ordre social. Orientee vers Vexterieurt elle contribuait an maintien de Pequilibre des forces ou bien a Vinstauration de nouveaux

100 However, see Johnson, J. J. (Ed): The Role of the Military in underdevelop- ed countries. Princeton, 1962, p. 31, where it was argued that ,,The military would ap- pear to be outside the circle of traditional- ly".

101 Janovitz, M.: The New Military. New York 1967, p. 2.

102 For a detailed study of the place of the professional soldier in modern societies see Janowitz, M.: The Professional Soldier. New York 1971.

103 " The memories and traditions of this period (the Mfecane) serve to maintain the sense of identity of peoples who were vitally affected by it, influencing attitudes within the group in many complex ways." Omer-Cooper, op. cit., p. 7.

104 Even the colonial powers, in order to defeat the peoples of the forest regions, had to copy the methods of warfare ot the latter. Ukpabi, S. C: British Colonial Wars

- Image and Reality. - In: Civilizations, Vol. XX, 1970, no. 3, pp. 398-399.

105 Ukpabi, S. C: West Africa and Europe in Military Confrontation. - In: J.H.S.N., Vol. VI, no. I, Dec. 1971, pp. 104-105.

106 This was particularly the case with Ashanti during the Anglo-Ashanti war of 1900. Ukpabi, S. C: The West African Frontier Force: An Instrument of Imperial Policy 1897-1914 (Unpublished thesis submitted for the degree of M. A. University of Birmingham 1964), pp. 237-238.

107 A new angle to the overthrow of the Sokoto Caliphate by Lugard's forces was supplied by Professor Crowder who declared that "the collapse of the Sokoto caliphate is attributable not to the alleged but unproved loss of Sokoto's authority over the emirates, but to obsolete military strategies". Reviewed by Idovu, H. O., J.H.S.N., Vol. V, no. 1 (1969), p. 174.

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centres de pouvoir. En outre, elle faisait fonction, dans le systeme social, de domaine propre a creer et conserver la hyalite au groupe. Les differents types de societes africaines - des groupements laches et limites dans Vespace, jusqu'aux puissants royaumes - conduisaient egalement a des formes differentes de la vie militaire.

La vie militaire et la vie politique marquaient dans la meme mesure la societe. Les capacites militaires etaient fort considerees, et le guerrier, qui souvent aussi pouvait etre de sexe feminin, ou meme sortir du rang des esclaves, occupait une place d'honneur dans la societe. Uarmee disposait en consequence d'une grande influence dans la distribution des activites economiques et meme dans la fixation des structures du pouvoir a Vinte- rieur de la societe. A part quelques exceptions, Varmee restait cependant toujours sous controle civil, et des mechanismes constitutionnels isolaient le guerrier des hommes poli- tiques.

Comme dans d'autres parties du monde, Varmee etait conservatrice par un cote, mais dans quelques cas particuliers aussi capable de declencher de nouveaux developpements qui ont parfois entraine des reactions en chaine de longue duree (Shaka). Finalement, Varmee etait sans cesse soumise a certaines transformations depuis sa creation par la societe et parallelement a celle-ci. En outre, ne pouvaient mener une guerre que les per- sonnes qui se montraient capables de planifier en prevoyant, dyassurer Vapprovisionne- ment, et d'utiliser au mieux les subordonnes. Ueffondrement des armees traditionnelles africaines au moment du choc avec les conquerants europeens ne contredit pas cela pour autant. Ces conflits ont justement montre que les societes ou chefs africains qui savaient adapter leurs techniques de combat aux exigences nouvelles etaient en mesure d'atteindre des resultats spectaculaires, alors que les armees accrochees a la tradition etaient facile- ment bousculees.

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the military in traditional african societies

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