1

Johannes Huinink, Institute for Sociology and Demography, University of Rostock

The Macro-Micro-Link in Demography – Explanations of Demographic Change

Presentation at the EuroConference „The Second Demographic Transition in Europe”,23-28 June 2001 in Bad Herrenalb, Germany

1. Introduction

The concept of the second demographic transition is well on the way to gain the prominenceof its precursor – the model of the first demographic transition – in regard to describedemographic change in developed countries during the last 35 years and the near future(Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 1987, 1997). As its precursor this approach is a genuinemacro-level approach – that is why I also see weaknesses in regard to the explanation offertility trends.

In his discussion of theories of social change Raymond Boudon from my point of viewconvincingly argued that macro-level theories fail by principle (Boudon 1986). By and largethey underestimate the variety and heterogeneity in demographic change in the past and willdo so for the future. Counter examples to their models are easy to find. Coale and others werevery successful in showing this studying the first demographic transition in the Princetonfertility project (Coale et al 1986). Others show in their analyses of European fertility in thelast decades that rough trends can be assured but it is hard to see a concise European patternof family development (Dorbritz 2000, Kuijsten 1996).

Not to say that there is no irreversible societal change underlying the demographic change.Not to say that we experience a decline of fertility by mean in developed countries under thelevel of reproduction. Not to say that the age at family formation is increasing by mean. Notto say that is seems unlikely that in developed countries we can expect a return to fertility onthe reproduction level. However, we saw a rise of fertility in previous low fertility countriesduring certain time periods. We see very low fertility in countries like Italy, Spain that do notmeet essential characteristic features of a country at the outset of the second demographictransition. In some countries looking at average levels of fertility makes no sense because ofpolarization phenomena.

In the latest conceptual reconstruction of the idea of the second demographic transition vande Kaa or Lesthaeghe and Willems proposed a three-phase model (Lesthaeghe/ Willems1999: 227; van de Kaa 1997). In the first phase one can regard a general decline in fertilityover all ages – just a further restriction of the number of children in the families incontinuation of the first demographic transition (Cliquet 1991). The second, the intermediatephase is characterized by an ongoing delay of the entry into parenthood during the life course– due to gains in female education and employment. In the cross-sectional perspective this

2

leads to considerably low fertility rates. In the third phase the delay of family formationcomes to an end and one can expect an incomplete recuperation of fertility in the life courseand therefore considerably lower cohort fertility. Looking at the CFR, the completed fertilityrate for different cohorts born between 1955 and 1965 in different European countriesLesthaeghe and Willems indeed can show a decline, even though a quite small one in mostcountries.Where will it end? What is the rationale regarding the current change? Lesthaeghe andWillems only assume that in Europe, in contrast to the US fertility, will remain well belowthe replacement level. The driving forces of the development are „female education, femalelabor force participation, ideational changes, and patterns of union formation and especiallyunion instability” (Lesthaeghe/ Willems 1999: 226). This, however, is not theoreticallyelaborated.

Recently Ron Lesthaeghe discussed explanations of the trends of the second demographictransition by integrating some well known theories in the field of family formation – theapproaches of Becker and Easterlin and what he calls the theory of ideational shifts(Lesthaeghe 1998). As far as fertility is concerned “... compatible with Becker’s thesis is thatfertility during the 1970s and much of the 1980s was strongly inversely related to femaleemployment. This continues to be so in many countries. Evidently, opportunity cost weightheavily in the cost-benefit calculus. But this evidence is equally compatible with Easterlin’sposition in which female employment has become essential to compensate for the weakerearning position of men and to safeguard the material standards of living. With furtherincreasing consumption aspirations, dual earners are far better able to satisfy their materialneeds. In this fashion the competition between consumption and children continues. But thelink between fertility and female employment is equally compatible with that the thirdtheory, that of ideational shift” (Lesthaeghe 1998: 7).

Lesthaeghe argues to bring these theories together in a “multi-causal theory with strongcontextual variations”. This means that explaining fertility decline – and other trends of thesecond demographic transition – by a big deal can be brought about by linking them alltogether. However, there is room for each theory special explanation of the (same) proposedtrends in different social contexts. “When combined, they argue in favor of a stabilization ofthe features of the second demographic transition, and against a cyclical return to the patternsof family formation and dissolution that the West experienced until the 1960s” (Leasthaghe1998: 10). “Working” together they serve for an proposed, irreversible trend of familychange. Each theory takes its special part in that or one effects proposed by one are assumedto trigger effects proposed by the other.

Here I will step in and discuss some aspects of current and future fertility trends on the basisof a multilevel approach of explanation the second demographic transition theory is ratherquite about. I will proceed in four steps.

3

In the first step, very briefly a multi-level approach as proposed by Boudon, Coleman,Lindenberg, and particularly for demography by de Bruijn, and others is presented. Thisserves for a theoretic basis to start with when explaining individual decision and behavior inregard to fertility.In the second step, I will discuss a (pre) assumption concerning individual preferencesregarding fertility. I assume that there is an ongoing, but „modern” motivation to havechildren, which probably is not changing to that degree as the observed results do. Overmore, it can be argued that the pretentiousness and the felt responsibility towards childrenand parenthood increased. This leads to a change of the scope of the focus from asking „Whyhaving no children anymore?” to „Why and under which conditions having one or morechildren?”.In my third and fourth step I try to show some differentiated views on the fertility changeconnecting two macro-level aspects with micro-level behavior orientations. In the third step Iwill refer to a macro level condition of fertility behavior, which today from my point of viewis the most crucial one: the question of compatibility of family and non-family activities. Inthe fourth step I address the relevance of the anticipated material conditions of young peoplefacing family formation. The requirements to be fulfilled before people feel ready forparenthood and the engagement in a long term and costly commitment of raising a childincrease and the same is true for the felt pretentiousness and responsibilities as a parent.The hypothesis of Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa that the step from the first to thesecond demographic transition meant a shift from altruism to individualism as the drivingforce of fertility change can be questioned as well as Lesthaeghe´s particular approach of themulti-causal theory thou.

In my conclusions I will consider some consequences for methodological innovations neededto get a sound basis of empirical research.

2. Theoretical concept of a dynamic multi-level-schema

Fertility has to be seen as a change in the living arrangement, or more general, in thebiographical status of individuals as a consequence of fertility related action. This kind ofaction by actor A is related to action in other life domains Y. It is also strongly related to thebehavior of another actor B. These actions again are embedded in a differentiated structure ofconditions of different kinds (restrictions and opportunities). There many concepts proposedyou all know (Coleman 1990, Esser 1993, de Bruijn 2000). Please regard figure 1 for this.

Figure 1: A multi-level model of social change

4

Actor A and B act pursuing preferred goals – at the end serving for subjective optimal livingconditions in different life domains: Final goals might be physical and psychic well-being,social approval, personal security etc. (Lindenberg 1989; Nauck 2000)People act in a way that from their subjective perspective is most instrumental for these goalstaking into account the conditions of relatively scarce resources to spend and calculating theprobability of the materialization of the expected consequences. Regarding the consequencesof their action, they take into account not only the immediate consequences for their lifecourse, but also more and more the medium and long-term future effects. This is veryimportant.

There are many concepts proposing different dimensions of a general incentive/ disincentivestructure regarding fertility (Nauck/ Kohlmann 1999). Mainly the following dimensions areemphasized, which can be considered regarding the choice of living arrangements in general.As far as the incentives are concerned:

� „psychic and emotional benefits”

� „socio-normative benefits”

� „economic benefits“

� „assurance benefits“

As far as the disincentives are concerned:

� „investment (direct) cost“

� „opportunity cost”

� „cost of social control“

� „negative externalities from the action of the partner and/or children”.

� „separation cost“

The specific incentive / disincentive structure of a particular actor is molded by threedimensions of conditions of action.

First, there are the objective structural conditions of action („external” opportunity struc-

ture): cultural, social, political, economic and ecological conditions that favor or disfavor acertain kind of action (opportunities and restrictions) in the sense that it has different effectson incentives resp. disincentive from the point of view of the actor.Second, we have to regard the resources the individuals have access to or control: economiccapital, human/cultural capital, psychic capital, biological/genetic capital and achievedbiographical status.Third, there are the individual psycho-social dispositions that could be seen as an „inner”opportunity structure with elements that are differently stable in time: expectations,orientations, and emotions. Beliefs, convictions, values, subjective needs establish apreference structure of individual goals saying what is important and what is unimportant fora person from the subjective perspective.

5

On the background of my schema now three aspects are discussed, which are most importantfor explaining today’s stability and change in fertility trends.

3 Motivation to parenthood

The second demographic transition approach is correct, traditional social and cultural factorsdetermining fertility lose relevance. We also have to deal with a fundamental change ingender roles. People have got efficient technical means to plan and conduct family formationand development beyond traditional patterns of behavior. However, does this inevitably leadto a steady decline of cohort fertility – which means no or only small recuperation inLesthaeghe’s model not to talk about a possible reversal of the age at family formation?

The family can be conceptualized as an action system of purposeful actors A, B, and so on. Itis characterized by a joint production of goods, for example raising children and givingemotional satisfaction. Following Coleman’s model, the family is an action system of aparticular kind. The elements of families are persons and not positions like in modernpurposeful corporate actors building the purposeful social structure (Coleman 1990). Duringthe process of modernization many kinds of activities moved from the family to thepusposeful social structure (production, education, care and nurturing etc.). Also the amountof time actors spend together in the family shrank. The male and to an increasing extent thefemale adults engage more and more in the purposeful social structure. Coleman argues thatthe motivation to uphold family relations decreases and family specific social capitaldisappears (Coleman 1990: 590ff). Children are no more private goods, but public ones.

Coleman’s description of the consequences of modernization on the family is correct andquite instructive. However his conclusion with regard to the family are not convincing. Werealize a specialization of inner family relations as a source of particular psychic andemotional satisfaction. The kind of social capital the family provided changed during theprocess of modernization. It is not serving for skill and material oriented support anymorebut psychological and identity sustaining support.The relationship between parents and children now can be expected to be more and morecharacterized by „dialogical”, i.e. non-strategical communication and personal exchange.Getting children means creating a social relation or social capital of a particular kind withadvantages for the parents, which cannot be purchased. There is no substitution for this in themarket. Schoen and his co-authors discuss parenthood in this respect also using the conceptof social capital (Schoen et al. 1997). Using data of the NSFH they investigated fertilityintentions. They conclude:

„Most significantly, we found strong support for the hypothesis that persons for whomrelationships created by children are important considerations in childbearing decisions aremore likely to intend to have a (another) child. The ‘social capital’ effect is strong across

6

parity, union status, gender, and race. The theoretical and empirical evidence presented hereprovides strong justification in social resource value of children as a prime motivator ofchildbearing in low-fertility countries” (Schoen et al. 1997: 349).

Economic factors (employment career and economic costs) play a less prominent role. Theyfind this, even though the operationalization of the „social capital”- or „social resource”-hypothesis is far from ideal, because it combines instrumental and non-instrumental aspects.

Following the VOC-theory, one can propose non-material benefits, such as, emotionalsatisfaction, stimulation and fun, the ”expansion of ones’ self” and social identity. It isargued that a mere list of potential benefits of parenthood, as in the VOC theory, is ofdubious value (Friedman/ Hechter/ Kanazawa 1994: 380). As long as no theoretical reason isprovided for the relevance of those benefits, this criticism is correct. That is why I tried toderive the need for the specific benefit of dialogical relations from a short reflection on atheory of the self in modern societies (Huinink 1995). I do not argue that it is the only onewhich meets the requirements of dialogical interaction, however it is a privileged onebecause there are good reasons to suppose additional psychological benefits of parenting.

Now one can argue that particularly in advanced modern societies people need this kind ofsocial settings with closed network structure characterized by trustful and „authentic” socialrelations. There is a motivation for setting up those relations (Huinink 1995, Schoen et al.1997). Coleman does not stress this – as it is not the case in the second demographictransition theory. It proposes that the incentive to have children should become weakerduring this development (Coleman 1990: 585), arguing with the shift from altruism toindividualism.

Studies of the desire for children show remarkably stable patterns over time and betweendifferent age groups. Empirical evidences come from Bongaarts and others. Bongaarts arguesthat the gap between the desired family size and period fertility is caused by the ongoingdelay of family formation and an effect of demographic translation (Bongaarts 1998). This isa demographic reason but by no means substantial. Results from the FFS show that theexpected number of children in nearly all European countries is well above 2 and that it is notvery different between different educational groups. See for this also figures 2 and 3. Thedata are taken from standard tables of country report of the FFS (comp. Bongaarts 1999).

Figure 2: Average number of children ultimately wanted in different European countries(Age Group 35-39).

In higher age groups the expected number is somewhat more realistic and decreasing,probably counteracting a positive cohort effect. In figure 3, a younger age group is chosen.The latter makes some difference, but in most countries these differences are not too large.Also the ranking of the countries changed quite a bit.

7

Figure 3: Average number of children ultimately wanted in different European countries(Age Group 20-24).

How weak these indicators ever might be – we need much more research on the intentionissues – they show a fairly high level of fertility intentions and with only a small percentageof women expecting to stay childless over time. As we know, the realized number of childrenwill be well below the expected ones for the cohorts presented here. Contrary to the realizedfigures expected family size presumably does not differ very much between different groupsin the populations.

To summarize: There is a particular „modern” or even „postmodern” motivation for childrenand parenthood. Therefore the very low birthrate in many Western societies might be anexpression of an unintended adaptation to the structural recklessness of societal conditionswith respect to the family (Kaufmann 1994: 169) – by delaying and often as a consequenceof this by giving up further fertility.

4 Explaining fertility from a multi-level perspective

In many European countries becoming parents today biographically is not an unconditionaltask anymore. It has to fit into other dimensions of the life course to a sufficient level in thelong-term perspective. I argued elsewhere that particularly three „problems” have to besolved before young people feel ready for a family: gaining certainty about the personalbiographical future, gaining certainty about the long-term economic affordability of a familytasks and the question of compatibility of family with non-family activities.Then fertility is a matter of autonomous decision-making in the life course perspective andcompeting with other life goals. Increasing autonomy in planning and conducting life meansthat structural factors gain relevance as well as individual characteristics. Only studying theindividual level logic of family formation in advanced modern societies helps to identify the(subjectively) relevant macro dimensions of societal conditions of fertility behavior.

Let us look at two of these problems. We consider two macro-micro links explaining fertilitybehavior and showing remarkable deviations from a macro-level based trend hypothesis ofthe kind the second demographic transition theory proposes. They can be connected to two ofthe three theories Lesthaeghe uses to support his approach: Becker’s theory of the effects ofimproved prospects of women in the labor market and Easterlin’s theory of the effects ofrelative income deprivation on fertility behavior (Becker 1991, Easterlin 1980). Both aremulti-level theories because they connect macro conditions with individual decision-making.Both are quite different and I will argue that Lesthaeghe´s concept to combine them with thetheory of ideational shifts for the theoretical basis for the second demographic transition(multi-causal theory with strong contextual variations) can be questioned, because importantaspects are not considered enough.

8

4.1 The compatibility question and polarization in family formation

Referring to Becker’s conclusions and the assumed ideational change, Ron Lesthaeghewrites: „ This joint occurrence constitutes a major interaction term with considerablepredictive power: as long as we have equal education standards for both sexes and as long asthe highly educated also form a cultural elite in tandem with being an economic one, chancesare that fertility will remain below replacement level and that the other outcomes of thesecond demographic transition will continue” (Lesthaeghe 1998: 9). I will discuss that in mythird step.

It is true that many people, well educated in particular, are reluctant to become parentsbecause of their improving prospects in the labor market. However one important aspect isnot taken into account in this context. If it is true that we have still high motivations forchildren, these people might have problems to solve the problem of the combination of work,engagement in other market activities and parenting. This is particularly true if we assumethat the outcomes of different life domains are not completely substitutable against eachother. I argued that this is the case for the experiences with children. Therefore we shouldexpect a high motivation to combine family and non-family activities.

Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) instead argue, ”that the impetus for parenthood isgreatest among those whose alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty are limited orblocked” (Friedman/Hechter/ Kanazawa, 1994: 383). Missing prospects for a stable workcareer, for example, should strengthen the readiness for parenthood. Good prospects shouldhave negative effects on the propensity to parenthood. The same is even proposed in regardto the relation between prospects for marriage and parenthood. The core assumption of thistheory is that marriage, parenthood, and a stable work career are alternative means ofreducing uncertainty in the long run. Therefore, if following one of these perspectives issufficient to satisfy the need for reduction of uncertainty, the incentive to intend any of theothers should be small.

The authors do not consider that combining two tracks, say marriage and parenthood, mightbe rational from the uncertainty point of view. And they do not take into account that thebenefits of one dimension cannot be substituted completely by another. The mentioned lifeplans should not be real alternatives. People want to have both, a family and a gainful workexperience, because it might be rational to try to reduce uncertainty concerning the future lifecourse by gaining stable economic prospects of both partners and therefore being confidentin regard to the affordability of a subsequent parenthood. The motivation to invest into thequality of the children is high. This means, labor force participation of both partners issupportive for a family – if the compatibility problem is solved.Then there is no relation of substitution but of complementarity!

9

This is also overlooked in Becker’s theory or in the theory of second demographic transition.Obviously the ideational change proposed by the second demographic transition theory mustnot be downpushing fertility in times of changing gender roles, if it is accompanied by adecreasing structural familialism, i.e. increasing material support of families and particularlya support of solving compatibility problems by the state or the market (comp. Rindfuss/Brewster 1996; Brewster/ Rindfuss 2000).

Meanwhile, the surprising result is well known that on the macro-level the correlationbetween female labor force participation and fertility changed from negative to positivevalues shown by Brewster and Rindfuss (1996: 278).

Figure 4: Female labor force participation and the TFR 1996 for different countries

A closer look at figure 4 shows that we roughly can distinguish several clusters of countries.There is one with the Scandinavian countries and the Anglo-American liberal democracies.Another cluster consists of the Southern European countries. One can see, that the overallpositive relation is mainly due to the relative position of the first and the second group ofcountries. If we concentrate only on the „Other European Countries” (excluding UK, Francewith a rather low LFLP because of reasons which are not relevant here – men also show aquite low figure here – and East Germany because of it special historical situation) we see anegative relationship between TFR and FLFP. In this group, we still have effects ofcompatibility questions and traditionality.

Let me go into a little more detail on this. Let us have a look at a group of women with highhuman capital and a high motivation to engage in market work: women with an academicdegree. What we find, when we estimate the distribution of these women by parity using FFSdata of a sample of countries, is surprising: in some countries, this distribution is bimodalwith a peak at parity zero and one at parity two (comp. figure 5), in other countries this is notthe case (figure 6)1.

Figure 5: Women with an academic degree by parity and country. Here: Countries with a„polarized” pattern

In figure 5 we see the Netherlands, Switzerland, West Germany, and the US. In the first threecountries the childcare opportunities particularly for very young children were bad and stillare so. In the US this also holds for the provision of public day care, available privatechildcare is not without problems thou (Rindfuss/ Brewster 1996). In figure 6, the results for

10

East Germany, Finland, France, and Sweden can be interpreted as an effect of goodopportunities to combine family and work.Poland was a country with a traditional regime of family formation as it is the case in Italywith its well known paradox effects on family formation.

Figure 6: Women with an academic degree by parity and country. Here: Countries with a„non-polarized” pattern

How to explain this? I cannot go into the details here. My model is based on the notion ofdifferent relations between three kinds of losses or costs people are faced with when thinkingabout their life plans. The first two are different kinds of opportunity costs. First, there arethe costs of childlessness. It is hard to estimate these costs precisely, but after our assumptionand its empirical support they should be still fairly high in all these countries we study. Cashbenefits of the state also play a certain role, too. Second, we assume costs of distraction fromnon-family activities – particularly from market work. Estimating these is not an easy task,but in our group of highly educated women these also should be quite high in the countrieswe look at. Third, one can introduce costs of combining family and non-family activities.Here we have considerable differences between the countries as easily can be shown.

The countries with the bimodal pattern of the distribution by parity mainly can becharacterized by a triple high cost situation the people are faced with. Particularly womenwith an academic degree can be assumed to be torn between the desire for parenthood withinvesting in „high quality” children on the one and high incentives to be continuouslyemployed on the other hand. High costs of solving the compatibility problem push them toone or the other alternative, whatever the individual reason might be. People then try tooptimize the output of their choice. Those who stay childless then concentrate on a career andeven stay unmarried by a particular high proportion. Those who decided in favor of a familytry to optimize the benefits from parenting. However, there is also a growing proportion ofhighly educated couples who can afford the compatibility costs and realize both even in thesecountries.The nontraditional countries showing a unimodel pattern of the distribution by parity servefor low compatibility costs and can combine both family and work or non-family activities toa sufficient extent.

What did we learn from this example? Micro-macro links pay and there might be differentexplanations needed for international differences and similarities in fertility. So seconddemographic transition theory should care about these questions because these results opposehypotheses of linear relations between individualism and fertility and a general acceptance ofBecker’s theory, which only seems to be plausible in a low compatibility regime. 1 The calculations for these figures were done in the context of cooperative work with the MPI of Demographic

11

4.2 The affordability question and roller coaster fertility

Also Easterlin’s approach is used by Ron Lesthaeghe to reason in favor of fertility decline asa consequence of the increase of female labor force participation – starting from theassumption that work opportunities for men are shrinking and consumption aspirations arerising. Relative deprivation is the consequence at least in particuar parts of the population(Lesthaeghe 1998: 9). What could be supportive for the new relevance of Easterlin from mypoint of view, I will show in my forth step.

Indeed, of increasing importance for fertility decisions is the question of affordability and thecertainty about the future life course. This is not only true because the costs of childrenincrease, but also because the aspiration regarding the quality of children increases – againparticularly in an individualistic setting. Why?

Coleman had proposed that the incentive to invest in children to make them productivedecreased. Coleman’s hypothesis is not true concerning the specific psychic benefits parentsreceive from children. We can argue that psychic and emotional satisfaction from raisingchildren and the social interaction with them are both positively correlated with the parentsinvestments in the quality of children. Therefore, if the rise of altruism has been important inthe first transition it is hard to argue that this is not the case today – the contrary might betrue.

Investment into the children optimizes the basis of „dialogical” and personally satisfyinginteraction. Or take the aspect of the expansion of the parent’s self, proposed as a value ofchildren by the VOC-theory (Hoffman/ Hoffman 1973). According to Coleman, this can beobtained by identification with the other or by acting to benefit the other. The second aspect”is most evident in a parent’s identification with a child” (Coleman 1990: 518). The firstaspect means that the parent’s identification with the success the children achieve plays arole. To be able to identify with a successful child, parents have an interest in contributing tooptimal chances of their children to be successful in the society. Finally, it makes sense toinvest in one’s children as far as the aspect of children as a source of social approval andsocial status is concerned.

These are reasons for the increasing relevance of a norm on parenting. Kaufmann calls it thenorm ”responsible parenthood” (Kaufmann 1994: 42). The parental aspiration towards the”quality” of the child rose considerably in the last 40 years.

Resaerch in Rostock. The distribution for the Netherlands I got from Aat Liefbroer. Many Thanks for that.

12

Anticipating this, an increasing number of potential parents want to be sufficiently sure thatthey can afford fulfilling their parental aspirations in a long term perspective – withoutloosing to many opportunities to satisfy needs and desires in other life domains. Youngpeople pay regard to the demanding requirements of parenting. And they consider theprobability that the expected benefits from parenthood in fact can be realized. They decide onwhen and whether to enter parenthood to optimize its expected psychological benefits. Theymight plan only to postpone the birth of a child avoiding the long-term commitment unlessthey are rather sure about their future life perspectives and waiting until they think they canafford to take the responsibility raising a child. This is the problem of affordability.

I said that low compatibility conditions in a country support the Becker approach ofexplaining heterogeneity in fertility. We experience an „anti-cyclical” change or a steadydecline of period fertility caused by an ongoing postponement of family formation and thepolarization phenomena I presented (Andersson 1999). As we already saw, compatibility isan important part of solution to the problem of affordability.In regard to high compatibility regimes, we gain better explanations by a modified version ofEasterlin’s relative deprivation theory. We expect a pro-cyclical change of fertility (Anderson1999). And this might lead to what the Hoems called roller-coaster fertility (Hoem/ Hoem1996). Under good conditions of combining work and family, fertility mainly depends on thebiographical and economic prospects of the members of a society, and these prospects canchange. Fertility now should rely on the economic prospects of both partners.

Good examples for this are the cases of Sweden in the nineties, to a certain extent also EastGermany resp. other Eastern European countries. In Sweden the compatibility costs arerelatively low, even though they have been increasing. However, Sweden experienced aconsiderable detoriation of the economic situation during the nineties and a drop in periodfertility. In different studies it is shown quite convincingly that indeed this could be an effectof pro-cyclical fertility behavior in timing and quantum of fertility (Andersson 1999, Hoem1998, Santow/ Bracher 1998). Andersson very nicely shows the strong positive correlationbetween women’s income and what he called a „mood in society” with fertility. And BrittaHoem concludes from her analyses: “Our conclusion above of the individual women’sincome and activity situation and the employment trend in her home municipality allowed usto ‘explain’ most of the period effect except the rise in first births during the late 1980s and aresidual decline after the mid-1990s. It is possible that these remaining period effects arerelated to changes in the generosity of Swedish family benefits, for they occur in years wheresuch benefits were changed” (Hoem 1998: 10). Andersson (1999) expects a new uprise inperiod fertility in Sweden. Our theoretical considerations support this. However, we have towait whether it really happens.

5 Conclusions

13

Two very important factors of fertility in European countries were addressed: compatibilityand affordability of the long-term commitment of having children. The theory of the seconddemographic transition, however, is rather quiet about this. The reason is that it only ratherroughly addresses the individual decision processes underlying fertility intentions and itsrealization. Therefore, for example, the theories of Easterlin and Becker have to be regardedas multi-level approaches that offer relevant bridge hypotheses linking the conditions andexternal opportunities with individual decision-making in a particular way. Becker andEasterlin fit to different compatibility regimes. While Becker has more explanatory power ina regime of low compatibility between family and work, Easterlin is able to explain theroller-coaster fertility. The fact that economically enforced female labor participation leads toa decline in fertility because of compatibility problems by no means is the whole and not thedecisive story Easterlin tells.

This differentiated view on fertility trends can only be gained by a multi-level perspective.However, we are lacking adequate empirical research on that. This is by part due to the factthat the old instruments and questions asked to the people in surveys are not sufficientanymore. Therefore we have to ask how such a conceptual approach methodologicallyshould look like? We need for example more and better information on

� fertility intentions. A theoretical tool and guidance for this could be the Aijzen-model.We need to ask other questions regarding the desire for children than before and we needtime-dependent information an that. We do not have to explain why young women andmen do not want to have any children or only one child. The question is why, obviously,women will not realize their fertility intentions. What is the logic behind this? Whatmakes them waiting or giving up?

� considered biographical requirements, which have to be fulfilled before one feels readyto start a family, and perceived expectations connected with parenthood to understandmore about how costs and benefits of parenthood are considered. We need this not onlyin the short term but also in the long term perspective which increasingly plays a role.

What we need, are long-term panel studies on the transition to adulthood to study fertility asa part of the interdependent processes and changing orientations and perspectives in youngmen’s and women’s lives.

14

Literature

Andersson, G. 1999. The Impact of Labor-Force Participation on Childbearing Behavior:Pro-Cyclical Fertility in Sweden During the 1980s and 1990s. Manuscript. Rostock.

Becker, G. S. 1991. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge.

Bongaarts, J. 1998. Fertility and Reproductive Preferences in Post-Transitional Societies.Population Council. Policy Research Division Working Papers No. 114.

Bongaarts, J. 1999. Fertility Decline in the Developed World. Where will It End? In:American Economic Review 89: 256-260.

Boudon, R. 1986. Theories of Social Change. Oxford.

Brewster, K.L.; Rindfuss, R.R. 2000. Fertility and Women’s Employment in IndustrializedNations. In: Annual Review of Sociology 26: 271-296.

Cliquet, R.L. 1991. The Second Demographic Transition: Fact or Fiction. Council of Europe(ed), Population Studies, No. 23. Strasburg.

Coale, A.J.; Watkins, S.C. (eds). 1986. The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Princeton.

Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge.

De Bruijn, B. J. 1999. Foundations of Demographic Theory. Choice, Process, Context.Dissertation. Groningen.

Dorbritz, J. 2000. Europäische Fertilitätsmuster. In:Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft25: 235-268.

Easterlin, R. 1980. Birth and Fortune. New York.

Esser, H. 1993. Soziologie. Allgemeine Grundlagen. Frankfurt/M.

Freedman, D., M. Hechter und S. Kanazawa. 1994. A Theory of the Value of Children,Demography, 31, 375-401

Hoem, B. 1998. Entry into Motherhood in Sweden: The Influence of Economic Factors onthe Rise and Fall in Fertility, 1986-1997. Manuscript.

Hoem, B.; Hoem, J. 1996. Sweden’s Family Policies and Roller- Coaster Fertility. In: Journalof Population Problems 52: 1-22.

Hoffman, L.; Hoffman, M. 1973. The Value of Children to Parents, in: Facett, J.T. (eds.),Psychological Perspectives on Population. New York: 19-77

Huinink, J. 1995. Warum noch Familie? Frankfurt/M.

Kaufmann, F.-X. 1994. Die Zukunft der Familie im vereinten Deutschland. Gesellschaftlicheund politische Bedingungen, München.

15

Kuijsten, A. 1996. Changing Family Patterns in Europe: A Case of Divergence? In:European Journal of Population 12: 115-143.

Lesthaeghe, R. 1995. The Second Demographic Transition: An Interpretation. In: Mason, K.O.; Jensen, A.-M. (eds), Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Oxford: 17-62

Lesthaeghe, R. 1998. On Theory Development: Applications to the Study of FamilyFormation. In: Population and Development Review 24: 1-14.

Lesthaeghe, R; Willems, P. 1999. Is Low Fertility a Temporary Phenomenon on theEuropean Union? In: Population and Development Review 25: 211-228.

Nauck, B.; Kohlmann, A. 1999. Values of Children. Ein Forschungsprogramm zur Erklärungvon generativem Verhalten und intergenerativen Beziehungen. In: Busch, F.W.; Nauck, B.;Nave-Herz, R. (eds.), Aktuelle Forschungsfelder der Familienwissenschaft. Würzburg: 53-73.

Rindfuss, R.R.; Brewster K.L. 1996. Childrearing and Fertility. In: Population andDevelopment Review 22, Issue Supplement: Fertility in the United States: New Patterns,New Theories: 258-289.

Santow, G.; Bracher, M. 1999. Deferment of the First Birth and Fluctuating Fertility inSweden. Stockholm Research Reports in Demography, No.141

Schoen, R. et al. 1997. Why Do Americans Want Children ? In: Population and DevelopmentReview 23: 333-358.

Van de Kaa, D. J. 1987. Europe´s Second Demographic Transition. In: Population Bulletin42 (1). Washington.

Figure 1: A multi-level model of social change

Time axis (age, historical time, sojourn times)

Individual Resourceseconomic capitalhuman capital/ cultural capitalsocial capitalpsychic capitalbiological/ genetic capital

Individual Resources

Macro-/Mesostructural Conditions: cultural, social, economic, political („external“ opportunity structure)

Psycho-Social Dispositions(„inner“ opportunity structure)value orientationsemotionspreferences

Psycho-Social Dispositions

Physical andPsychic Wellbeing

Actor B

Acting in lifedomain Y

Status change in lifedomain Y

Fertility Change of the livingarrangementActor A

(Incentives andDisincentives)

New Biogra-phical Status

Figure 2

Average number of children ultimately wantedAge group 35-39 (cohorts in parenthesis)

Source: Family and Fertility SurveyW

est-

Ger

man

y (1

952/

53-5

7)

Can

ada

(195

0-54

)

Eas

t-G

erm

any

(195

2/53

-57)

Au

stri

a (1

956-

61)

Sw

itze

rlan

d (

1955

-59)

Net

her

lan

ds

(195

3-58

)

Ital

y (1

956-

60)

Lat

via

(195

5-60

)

Po

rtu

gal

(19

57-6

2)

Fin

lan

d (

1950

-54)

Bel

giu

m (

1951

-56)

Rep

. Cze

ch (

1958

-62)

Lit

hu

ania

(19

55-6

0)

Po

lan

d (

1952

-56)

***

No

rway

(19

50)

Gre

ece

(196

0-64

)

Slo

ven

ia (

1956

-60)

***

Sw

eden

(19

54)

Est

on

ia (

1954

-58)

Fra

nce

(19

54-5

8)

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

*** Sweden, Norway: age 38

Figure 3

Average number of children ultimately wantedAge group 20-24 (cohorts in parenthesis)

Source: Family and Fertility Survey

Po

lan

d 1

967-

71)

Eas

t-G

erm

any

(196

7/68

-72)

Wes

t-G

erm

any

(196

7/68

-72)

Rep

. Cze

ch (

1973

-77)

Bel

giu

m (

1966

-70)

Au

stri

a (1

971-

76)

Lat

via

(197

0-75

)

Ital

y (1

971-

75)

Po

rtu

gal

(19

72-7

7)

Lit

hu

ania

(19

70-7

5)

Fra

nce

(19

69-7

3)

Sw

itze

rlan

d (

1970

-74)

Net

her

lan

ds

1968

-73)

Slo

ven

ia (

1971

-75)

Gre

ece

(197

5-79

)

** S

wed

en (

1969

)

Can

ada

(196

5-69

)

Est

on

ia (

1969

-73)

** N

orw

ay (

1965

)

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

*** Norway, Sweden: age 23

Figure 4

Female labour force participation and the TFR in 1996for different countries

N

DEast

USA

DK

SCH

UK

IS

A

AUS

CDN

D West

SF

J

NL

F

B

LIRL

GRE

I E

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

40 50 60 70 80 90 100

TF

R

FLFP

Southern Europe

Scandinavien Countries

Non-European Countries

Other European Countries

Figure 5

Women with an Academic Degree by Parity and Countryhere: Countries with a "Polarized" Pattern

(Counts in Parentheses)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Netherlands, Age 35-42, FFS 1993

(593)

Switzerland, Age 35-42, FFS 1994/95

(101)

West Germany, Age 35-39, FFS ’92

(73)

USA, Age 35-42, FFS 1995

(688)

No Child One Child Two Children Three Children and more

Figure 6

Women with an Academic Degree by Parity and Countryhere: Countries with a "Non-Polarized" Pattern

(Counts in Parentheses)

0,0

10,0

20,0

30,0

40,0

50,0

60,0

East Germany, Age 35-39,

FFS ’92(174)

Finland, Age 35-42,

FFS 1989/90(109)

France, Age 35-42, FFS 1994

(132)

Italy, Age35-39,

FFS 1995/96(101)

Italy, Age 40-45,

FFS 1995/96(88)

Poland, 35-42,

FFS 1991(120)

Sweden, Age 35-39,

FFS 1992/93 (272)

Sweden, Age 40-43,

FFS 1992/93 (255)

No Child One Child Two Children Three Children and more