THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KINGOF FRANCE, 1665-1700

BY

PAXJL WALDEN BAMFOBD

The Order of Malta^ was one of the major maritime powersof the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-turies, and one of the few powers with which French kingshad no wars. French relations with the Order were generallyamicable. Kings of France, and notably Louis XIV, not onlyallowed their subjects to join the Order, but actively en-coin-aged them to do so by granting privileges and diplomaticposts, and by giving commissions in their armed forces toFrenchmen who were Knights. In consequence, the roster ofthe members of the Order included many of the first familiesin public life in France, among them such distinguishedfamilies as the De la Salle, Forbin, Tourville, Noaiiles, andRochechouart. The appeal the Order had, and the powerfulconnections possessed by some Knights included in its fight-ing class was evident in the reign of Louis XIV when severalmembers of two great rival families of the period, the Colbertand the Louvois, became Chevaliers de Make. Noble familiessometimes reserved places in the Order for younger sons onthe very day of birth, thus maximizing the seniority of theirinfant^aspirant to the Knighthood of Saint John.

The fighting Knights of Malta were crusaders; their Orderpreserved and cherished and epitomized the tradition ofcrusading zeal. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenthcenturies the Knights were still the most active and tenaciousof Islam's Mediterranean enemies. They thought of them-

The Order of the Knights of St. John {Hospitallers) of Jerusalem,transferred success si veiy to Cyprus (1291) and to Rhodes (1308), wasfinally forced to evacuate Ehodes tinder the terms of a capitulation to theTurks in 1522, and eight years later received Malta as a fief from CharlesV, being known thereafter as the Order of Malta or la Reliffion de Matte.The Abbe Rene Aubert de Vertot^s Histoire des chevaliers kospitaliers deS. Jean, de Jerusalem (Paris» 1772) in seven volumes is celebrated (Ch^niel,Zeller, Godechot) for errors, but has utility; recent histories of the modemOrder at Malta include R. Cohen, KnighU of M^ilttt, 15SS^1798 (London,1920); Jacques Godechot, Histoire de Matte ("Que sais-je") (Paris, 1952);Q,-i, Engel, L'Ordre de Malte en Mediterranee, 1530-1798 (Monaco, 1957),

[429]

430 FRENCH HISTORICAL STTTOIES

selves as "the 61ite of Christianity."^ The historian of theKnights, the Abb6 Vertot, referred to them as a "fighting forcecomposed of the most noble blood of the Christian world." ^They vowed "to defend the [Roman Catholic] Church inperpetuity, [and] never to draw the sword against a Chris-tian nation." * For them the objects of campaigns at sea werethe protection of the trade of Christians and the eliminationof Infidels by capture or conversion, using as their principalmedium the sword. One of the Knights, exhorting his brothersto duty, underscored their fighting purposes in observing thatit was the duty of every Knight' to defend the Faith againstInfidels, [and] to destroy pirates and Mohammedans." ^ TheKnights of the Order of St. John conducted relentless religi-olus war with Infidels during the two and three-quarterscenturies they were established at their mid-MediterraneanMalta base.*

Yet many Knights held administrative or diplomatic postsin princely or royal governments, or served as administratorsin overseas colonies, such as Nouvelle France. Many servedin the armed forces of European Catholic powers. The armedforces of the Kings of France included many Knights ofMalta, and Knights were specially numerous in Louis XIV'sCorps des Galeres. In 1674, for example, about two-thirds ofLouis' galleys were under the command of Knights of Malta.'Throughout the last third of the seventeenth century theyalways constituted a comfortable majority of the captains;nearly all of the captains who rose to the rank of squadroncommander after 1680 were Knights. The eflFective com-mander-in-chief of the galley Corps for two decades after

'Archives de la Marine, series D' volume 18, folio 163, hereaiter citedas D' 18 Marine fol 163.

'Vertot (edition of 1761), V, 300-301.' Godechot, p. 37. cf. Vertot, VI, "Status de L'ordre de Saint Jean de

Jerusalem," titre I, "De la Regie: Costume," pp. 14-15; III, "Donation derisle de Malte" (1530), 432-23, 425; and the "Acte du Serment Fait auViceroi de Sicile par les Ambassadeurs de Malthe," 429-30.

" Chevalier Luc de Boyer d'Argens, Reflexions politiques sur VStat etles Devoirs des Chevaliers de Malte (La Haye, 1739), p. 115. On the vowsand obligations of Knights: Vertot, refs cited above; Godechot, pp. 36-7,41; Engel, pp. 79-86.

' The Order appears to have made no treaty -with the Ini^del after thecapitulation at Rhodes in 1522. Recueil d'Actes intemaiionaux de I'EmpireOttoman Paris, 1897), pp. 28, 401.

' B' 8 Marine fols 1-2.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA .^ND THE KING 431

1679, the Lieutenant General des Galeres ir des Armeesnavdes du Roi, Jacques de Noailles, was a Knight and com-mander in the Order, and he later served as its ambassadorat the court of France. The title Vice^amiral du Levant, re-vived in 1689, was conferred on another distinguished Knightof Malta, the Comte de Tourville, commander of the com-bined fieets and later Marechal de France. Notwithstandingvariations in the proportion of Knights in different ranks atdifferent times, they dominated Louis XIV's Galley Corps.^

The question as to why Louis XIV commissioned so manyKnights of Malta in his newly organized and expanding Gal-ley Gorps after 1665 seems, on the surface at least, readilyanswerable, Louis XIV wanted a navy in a hurry. He neededofficers for his fighting fleet, and he preferred to be served bynoblemen. Knights of Malta were noblemen—men enteringits fighting ranks were expected to furnish proofs of nobleancestry unless special dispensation was obtained-and mostof them acquired sea-going experience on the galleys or ves-sels of the Order, Some Knights not only had experience, butalso had distinguished records as fighting men. Moreover, itwas traditional for Kings of France to use Knights of Maltaas ofBcers in their Mediterranean navy; Louis' royal pre-decessors frequently appointed them to serve in various gov-ernmental capacities. The Order had much to commend it asa school for officers; indeed, it was used with such frequencyby the Catholic maritime powers, and especially by France asa recruiting ground for naval officers that the Order of Maltacame to be considered a veritable ecole de guerre navale.Louis was thoroughly convinced that Knights of Malta should

^ F o r lists of French galley officers, usually in the order of seniority:Vepot des Cartes et Plans hereinafter cited Dep.C.P.) 49(272) *'Extraitbur les 25 Ga eres Commandees par M. le Baylly de Noailles (1694), siene^^^iVSoi^ Si6?ioiA^g?te NationaU (hereinafter cited as "BN'O, Nouv. Icq,Fr 21381, fola 17-21, "Liste greneralle des ofl&ciers" (1692) ; B« 12 Marinefols 32-35 (list for 1680), Officers who were Knigrbts were customarily,though not always designated with the title Chevalier, Confirmation of theconnection with the Order can in many cases be obtained in the Archivesde la Marine, series C (personal dossiers of officers), or in standard pub-lished sources on French biography and nobility or in voluine VII ofVertot, comprising incomplete lists of Knights of Malta arranged hylangue, or branch. Lists for the individual langues are arranged eitheralphabetically or chronologically (by date of admission to the Order) inVertot; the writer is indebted to T. E. Hall and R. C. Adams for preparingan alphabetical erosa-referenced card-file of those Knights listed in Vertot

432 FHENCH HISTTOBICAL STUDIES

not only be employed, but should be given preference overother persons when men were selected to serve as officers ongalleys.® In 1672 the Due de Vivonne was instructed that allthe men proposed henceforth as oflScer candidates should beexperienced men, "should have served on the galleys of Malta,and should be members of the Order. . . .His Majesty desiresto have aboard his galleys the greatest possible number ofKnights of Malta.""

There were doubtless many reasons why Knights, for theirpart, chose to serve on Louis' galleys even in preference toserving on the galleys of their Order. Many Knights withpious inclinations, seeing infidels among Louis XIV's enemies,must have reasoned that in taking service on his galleys theywould have a double opportunity, the chance to serve bothChurch and King and mus combine the two traditions ofservice that French nobility customarily found most accept-able. Other men, having less exalted motives, no doubt judgedthe chances of advancement to be good on Louis' galleys.They were good, especially in the decade of the sixties andearly seventies, when expansion of the navy was creating newand immediate needs for experienced officers. On the galleysof the Order itself, noble status being no distinction, senioritycounted for almost everything. But in Louis' Galley Corps,on the other hand, in the early days of expansion. Knights ofMalta had preference in promotions. Furthermore, as anyman who bothered to inquire could be informed, the pay ofofficers in Louis' galleys was better than the pay of officersserving under sail. There was also some attraction in the factthat Marseille, the largest commercial port in all of France,was the base for Louis' galley Corps after 1665, oiBFeringmany attractions which the isolation of the Order's base onMalta could not afford. Some Knights may have been at-tracted by the regularity of Louis' service under oars; unlikemost of his sailing ships, Louis' galleys customarily cam-paigned every year and their officers were rarely unemployed,as officers in the sailing navy sometimes were for years on

• On the expressed preferences of Louis XIV and Colbert for Knights ofMalta as galley ofiScers: BN, Nouv. Acq. Pr., 21307; B' 4 Marine fol 66;B' 12 Marine fola 26, 42.; Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Lettres, instructions etm^mcn.re8, ed. Pierre ClSment (8 TOIS in 10, Paris, 1861-82), III, pt 1, 143.

»B ' 4 Marine fol 66.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND TEBE Kir^c 433

end, on partial pay if they were lucky. In short, some menwere attracted to the galleys, as Ernest Lavisse believed, bygood pay and long vacations every year, and the fact tiiatgalleys never made ''those wretched voyages of two or threeyears in distant seas."" With varied motives, certainly, nobleKnights of Malta chose service in the galleys of the King ofFrance in preference even to service in the fighting forces oftheir Order

To the extent that Louis did send expeditions against NorthAfrican principalities or into the eastern Mediterranean, hisinterests and objectives seemed to coincide with those of theOrder. Louis sometimes fought the Infidel as did the Orderof Malta itself sometimes ran down privateers in collabora-tion with vessels of the Order, or dispatched his own expedi-tions against the Moslem city-states of North Africa. ButLouis seldom concerned himself with the "Infidel" privateersbased in the eastern Mediterranean with which the Orderwas very much more preoccupied. When Louis did dispatchone of his rare expeditions to Levantine waters, he used someflag other than his own, usually, to dissimulate his purposes.Gonsidered overall, Louis' campaigns against Moslems lackedboth the constancy and zeal of those conducted by the Order.

Louis had many non-rehgious purposes in view, the pur-suit of which interfered, and was sometimes antithetical tothe interests of crusading Roman Gatholic Ghristianity. Infact, Louis was officially an ally of the Ottoman Turk, whosecollaboration he found useful in humbling or diverting cen-tral European Habsburgs. The Gatholic Habsburgs, andnotably His Most Gatholic Majesty the King of Spain werenumbered among Louis* many enemies. The campaign in-structions issued to the commanders of his galleys usuallyspecified, in both peace and war, especially during the lasttwo decades of the seventeenth century, that every effortmust be made to find and engage (or in peacetime, humble)the Spanish galleys. Such instructions were based on Louis'belief in the strategic vulnerability of Spain's holdings on theEuropean continent. The scattered possessions of Spain in

^ Ernest Lavisae, "Sur les Galferes du Roi,*' Revue de Paria, TV, part 6,16 norverabre 1897, 227. Cf B- 13 Marine fol 220.

434 FRENCH HISTOEICAL STUDIES

the southern Netherlands, central Europe, Italy, Sicily andSardinia demanded communication links across the westernMediterranean. Spanish galleys maintained that link, cam-paigning to and fro between Spain and Italy with regularity.In addition to the usual functions of coast defense, and thesuppression of piracy and privateering, Spanish galleys car-ried troops for Spanish armies and shuttled back and forthcarrying envoys and funds; they were vital to the courierservice of Spain's European Empire. "Spain has always re-garded her galleys as a bond between her scattered Medi-terranean possessions," said Louis. A defeat for Spanishgalleys, he said, will render Spain "incapable of opposing myenterprises." ^ Knights of Malta accepting service on LouisXIV's galleys thus found themselves campaigning as oftenagainst the Catholic King of Spain as against the Infidel.

There were other difficulties for Knights serving on thegalleys of the King of France. Many Knights who were Span-ish or Italian-born took service in the naval forces of theKing of Spain. Hence when French and Spanish fleets ofgalleys campaigned against each other, or fought one an-other. Knights of Malta were pitted against each other,brother against brother. Such engagements were bound tohave effects that were the opposite of those the Knights hadvowed to seek. They aided, rather than confined or injuredInfidels, as Knights had sworn to do. Fighting among them-selves they only strengthened the one enemy they had obli-gated themselves by vows to fight implacably.

Problems of still another sort faced conscientious Knights.One notable example was afforded by Louis' punishment ofGenoa for showing friendship and for giving aid to the navalforces of the King of Spain. What thoughts, one wonders,did the Knights in Louis' service entertain when they foundthemselves bombarding Catholic Genoa in 1684 to punishthat Republic for aiding Spain, and commanded on thatoccasion by that intractable old Huguenot Admiral Abra-

" Quote from Dep.CP., S(&4), Instruetiona, signe Louis, dtd 1 aout 169S.Of Armand du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, Testament politviue, ed LouisAndre (Paris, 1947), pp. 405-15, a. significant exposition of Spain s strate-Of Armand du PlessAndre (Paris, 1947)

i i t i DC

du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, Testament politviue, ed LouisAnde ( P s , 1947), pp. 405-15, a. significant exposition of Spain s strate-gic situation; Dep.CP., 3(84), Recueil des Ordres, InstruetionB, Louis XIVto NoaiSles, dated 16 dec 1679, 10 juin 1680 and letter dtd 1 aout 1694.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KING 435

ham Duquesne. Louis XIV no doubt desired that loyalty tohim take precedence over any other loyalties among theofficers in his fleet, and the presence with the fleet off Genoaof no less a personage than the Marquis de Seignelay, hisMinister of Marine, must have seemed a sufficient guaran-tee of that/ '

The existence of conflicting loyalties and troubled con-sciences among the Knights of Malta was made apparent ina little volume published in the eighteenth century by theGhevalier d'Argens, He pointed out to his brother Knights,in no uncertain terms, that if they had any intention of doingtheir duty as Knights, they should stay at Malta and serveunder the banner of the Order itself; they should not takeservice, he said, in the armies and navies of European princes.When you go "to fight against the French, the Germans andEnglish/' he said, you do not fulfill your duties as a Knight.You vowed

to war against the Infidels, not to spill the blood of Christians orto butcher your own brothers . , . If you consider earefully howmany unjust wars are fought by Christian princes, how many menthey send off to their deaths, sometimes simply to satisfy theirpersonal hatred or ambition, you cannot but cherish tbe service ofa state [the Order of Malta] that makes war only to defend theFaith, and instead of taking part in the criminal disputes ofChristians, sees with regret the passion associated so inappropri-ately with glorious names and love of la

In addition to their obligations to their Order and theirfaith, the Knights of Malta had certain special obligationsto the Kings of Spain. They became vassals of the SpanishGrown in 1530 when Malta, Gozo, and certain other terri-tories, were accepted from Charles V by the Grand Masterof the Order, Villiers de Flsle Adam in his own name andin that of all the knights. The contract was accepted as be-ing binding on the Grand Master and the Order and all theKnights in perpetuity.^^ Malta was received by the Order

"B* 12 Marine fols 151-53, 268; Charles de la Roncidre, Histoire de laMarine frangaise (Paris^ 1899-1934), VI, 2-4.

"D'Argens, pp. 116-117. Cf. Godechot, pp. 37-41.^"Donation de lisle de Malthe", dtd 24 mars 1630, printed in Vertot,

III, 422-29,

436 FBENCH HiSTOBicAi STUDIES

"as a noble fief, Ubre et franc." The Order was only obli-gated to give, on All Saints' Day each year to the King ofSpain or to his Viceroy in the IHngdom of the Two Sicilies(that then belonged to the Crown of Spain), one falcon inrecognition of their vassalage. The obligation of militaryservice was specifically renounced by Charles, but his con-tract was insistent on the vassalage. Malta was not intendedas a gift. By the contract terms each Grand Master in suc-cession at his investiture acknowledged vassalage to Spain.At the succession of each new King of Spain, the Order re-newed its feudal contract and its vassalage. At all thesetimes and in all these ways each Grand Master and eachKnight acknowledged vassalage, and thereby incurred thevassal's obligation not to attack or harm his lord, re-enforcedin their case by religious vows forbidding them ever to attacka Christian prince.^"

Charles' Donation described the fief of Malta as a placewhere the Knights could "carry on the functions of theirReligion in repose for the general advantage," and fromwhich "to employ their forces and their arms against theperfidious enemies of the Holy Faith." " That was the objectthat Charles had in view in granting this important fief. Hisgrant erected an important mid-Mediterranean obstacle tome free movement of the maritime forces of the infidel; itconferred a site for the establishment of a bastion and a basefrom which maritime offensives against the Infidels couldbe launched."

Of course such feudal contracts as this were broken count-less times by feudatories in medieval times. Yet when fiefswere accepted and religious vows were taken in the six-teenth century by a tradition-bound religious Order of noble-men such as the militia of St. John, having as the very objectof their existence the maintenance of Christian ideals andthe defence of their Holy Faith in accordance with the high-

" Donation, Vertot, III, 422 seq."Donation. Vertot, III, 422-423." Donation, Vertot, III, 424. Charles V desired to obtain direct mibtary

aid for the defense of Tripoli in compensation for his grant, and also anengagement under which the Order would "join its galleys to the imperialfleet for all operations in the Mediterranean," hut "many Knights" halkedhecanse "tiiat condition was in contradiction -with the statutes of the Orderthat forbade combat with any Christian state." Godechot, p. 41.

THE KNIOEHS OF MALTA AND THE KING 437

est crusading ideals of medieval Christianity, one could ex-pect such obligations to be taken seriously, to have thebinding character that religious vows were supposed tohave. Clearly, as long as the Knights held Malta as theirbase of operations and their home, fealty as well as religiousvows forbade them giving hurt to Spain by war or anyother means.

Once signed and solemnly approved by the Papacy, thiscontract and its obligations had significant implications forthe relations of the Order with the Kings of France, Barrierswere erected that forbade the Knights from serving in thearmed forces of French Kings when French forces were used,as they normally and very often were used before the eigh-teenth century, to injure me interests or weaken the strengthof the Kings of Spain. Yet scores and hundreds of French-bom knights did serve in the galleys and other forces ofKings of France, including those of Louis XIV. One is ledlogically to ask: Is it possible that all those Knights wereguilty of the offence of breaking sworn vows and promises?

Evidence that seems to bear on the answer to this questionis implicit in the conduct and outcome of campaigns carriedon by French galleys against the Kings of Spain in the seven-teenth century, and especially in those of the last few decadesof that century, A survey of the campaigns of French andSpanish galleys shows that battles were surprisingly infre-quent. Between 1665 and the end of the century, Louis XIVdeveloped the largest fleet of galleys in Europe; he had onhand at once, in flie early 169O's, no less than fifty galleys,and between fifteen and forty of his galleys were ordinarilyemployed in campaigns each year during the three decades1670-1700. But never, in all those thirty years of campaigningdid Louis XIV's galleys fight the galleys of the King of Spain,SlQce Louis* galley squadrons were often commanded byKnights of Malta, and large numbers of Knights were alwaysfound among the senior officers of the Corps, one is led toask whether or not this failure to fight meant that Louis'commanders purposely avoided combat with the Spanishenemy? On the face of it, that does seem possible; yet con-sider the evidence.

438 FKENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES

The notable failure of the French to fight the Spanishgalleys is made more remarkable inasmuch as the Spanishwere often out of port in the western Mediterranean, andalmost all the French campaigns with galleys in that Seawere conducted within the confines of mat same restrictedarea, the Mediterranean west of Italy. That section of theinland sea was fringed by Spanish ports and territories, orby ports that harbored Spanish galleys willingly. Spanishgalleys or those in the pay of Spain were based on both itseastern and its western snores. Of course part of the blamefor the infrequency of fights might be placed on Spain andSpanish galley officers. Spanish commanders must have car-ried orders to run and not to fight, since their usual and mostimportant function was that of carrying precious cargo andcommunications; furthermore, the number of galleys in eachof Spain's squadrons, divided as they usually were betweenseveral different bases, must frequently have been numer-ically inferior to the squadrons with which the French cam-paigned. Numerical inferiority might have been an addedreason for the Spaniard to eschew a fight. It ought also to besaid, in explanation of the rarity of fights, that it was difficultif not impossible, from the standpoint of logistics, for Frenchgalleys to remain on station very long as "pickets" off an un-friendly shore, such as the western coasts of the Kingdom ofthe Two Sicilies, or in the waters off Sardinia, the BalearicIslands, or off Spain itself. On the other hand it was easy forthe French to cruise off north Italian coasts, as in Genoesewaters, where Spanish galleys were seen frequently. Nat-urally, the commanders of French galleys had orders tolengthen as much as possible their stay in the waters wheretheir enemy might appear, since the importance of findingthe Spanish galleys was clearly understood in France. Shipsunder sail could, and often did accompany French galleysquadrons on campaigns, to carry victuals and thus extendtheir radius of operation. In some years two separate fleetsof French galleys campaigned concurrently on the coasts ofSpain and Italy with instructions to find and fight the Span-ish galleys. But year after year, French galleys failed toachieve the objective of interrupting Spanish communica-

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KING 439

tions, the most important single service they could be calledon to perform.

There were occasions, as in 1696, when French galleys didencounter Spanish galleys at sea in time of war, but theFrench commander failed to attack even though the Span-iard stood in close, in apparent willingness to engage.^*French commanders concerned excused themselves by as-serting that the Spanish could not be attacked because theywere slightly (one or two galleys) more numerous than theFrench. Louis XIV showed remarkable restraint in dealingwith such officers. In some navies even admirals have facedthe firing squad for less; surprisingly, Louis XIV did littlemore than remonstrate and criticize. In some cases Louis_^didnot even relieve the officers concerned of their commands!In expressing "indignation," as well he might, he merelypointed to "the bad maxims that seem to be established inthe Corps des Galeres, making decisions dependent on hav-ing one galley more or less" than the enemy; ** such maximswere "unjustified/' said Louis. His Minister of Marine intonedthat "His Majesty does not require the impossible/' On ordersfrom the King the Minister sent an "information copy" of thefollowing Instruction to young Louis de Rochechouart, Duede Mortemart:

it contributes to the glory and leputation o£ His [Majesty^s] armsif his commanders profit from occasions when they can attack theenemy with some chance of success. . , His Majesty does not meanto suggest that 15 of his galleys must attack 22 of the enemy; but15 galleys cannot justifiably avoid combat against 18, or 30 against35, and so on, in proportion. This clarification of His Majesty'sintentions that I am giving you will serve in the future, if youplease [as an order] if such occasions should [again] ^

In fairness to Louis' officers, it might also be observedthat over the years they sometimes did receive instructionsof a sort that could have dampened the spark of fighting

^BN, Mss.Fr, 9177, "Relations de la Eeconfcre des Galeres du Roy avecCelles d'Espagne sur les Costes de Catalogne (Sept 1696). Twenty-fiveFrench galleys encountered twenty-six Spanish on that occasion- Cf. MS,FT.6172 (Portulan), tome I.

*E ' 17 Marine fol 263." BM7 Marine "Instruction que Le Itoy veut estre mise en mains du Sr,

Due de Mortemart, General des Galeres/' dtd 25 juillet 1685, and fol 263.

FRENCH HISTOBICAL STUDIES

enterprise. At times (as in 1679) they were told to avoidcombat with the enemy unless he was in force "nearly equal"(c peu pr^s egal) to themselves.^^ In 1692, for example, thecommander of the King's galleys received such cautionarycounsels, being ordered to undertake a particular enterpriseonly if he could do so "without too much risk" (sans un tropgrand danger); that same commander was also warned notto allow himself to be surprised by the enemy, or obliged tofight an unequal fight.'* After having issued such instructionsthe King might be considered to have obligated himself totolerate some timidity or lack of enterprise, at least in theconduct of that particular commander; perhaps he encour-aged caution with excessive frequency. Perhaps Louis' owninstructions to his officers had been such as to require thathis commanders be informed, as one was told in 1696, thatthe enemy galleys were known to be "equal in number toyours." *

Yet Louis' own instructions can hardly be held responsiblefor the many occasions when French galley commandersshowed lack of enterprise. As early as the spring of 1677galley officers incurred the displeasure of both the King andhis Minister of Marine for their seeming lack of competenceand vigor, in the face of both the weather and the enemy.Louis was persuaded, said his Minister of Marine, "that theestablished {ancienne) conduct of galley officers is a bit toocircumspect, and that they have excessive fears about ex-posing me galleys [to bad weather]. You must get out of thishabit of behavior," said the minister. You must "overcome byyour application and vigilance the bad impression that gal-ley officers have given of themselves up to now." ' Ten yearslater the minister was still writing to squadron commandersin the following terms:

You can assure M. le Chevalier de Breteiiil that knowing as I dothe extraordinary precautions with which he is accustomed tonavigate, I am sJways doubtful that he really tries to get to the

"Dep. C.P., 3(84), Louis XIV to Noailles, 16 decembre 1679." Dep. C.P., 3(84), Louis XIV to Noailles, 14 avril 1692.•Dep. C.P., 3(84), Louis XIV to NoaiUes, 1 aout 1696.• B« 9 Marine fol 92; cf. fols 69, 87.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND IHE KING 441

coast of Languedoc [JBrst stage of tbe route to Spain]; to servethe King well, one must sometimes be less prudent. ®

Probably the rarity of combats between French and Spanishgalleys can partly be explained by lack of ''enterprise'' and"excessive caution*' on the part of Louis* officers.

But such behavior did not derive from any lack of compe-tence or courage on the part of oflBcers; the record itselftends to prove that Louis* Knights of Malta were well en-dowed in those respects. Admittedly their record against thegalleys of the King of Spain was poor, but against otherenemies, including some that were considered more dan-gerous than Spanish galleys, the record of some of Louis'galley commanders was excellent. On the Atlantic seaboard,for example, where galleys were reputed to be least effective,the record of Louis' galley commanders against non-Spanishenemies was remarkable, A small squadron of six Frenchgalleys operating out of Ostend, commanded by M. leChevalier de la Pailletrie (a Knight of Malta), attacked andcaptured a Dutch warship of 56 guns within view of elevenother Dutch men*of-war in 1702. In those same northeast-em seaboard waters, the Chevalier de Langeron, also aKnight of Malta, who likewise had only six galleys in hiscommand, attacked and boarded and captured a 36-gmiEnglish frigate in 1707.^'

These galley actions were notable by any standard. Theywere a striking conti-ast to the record of performance, ornon-performance by the Knights against the galleys of theKing of Spain, or other Spanish enemies. Whatever theexcellence of the record against non-Spanish enemies, therecord against Spanish galleys was poor. Writing sometimein the early eighteenth century the Chevalier Barras de laPenne, himself a Knight of Malta and toward the end of hiscareer, commander of the Corps des Galores in France, re-marked that there had been only one combat between French

"B* 19 Marine fol 176-•'D^ 18 Marine fol 156; B' 142 Marine ^^Memoirt" (1749); Ronci^re, VI,

410-12.Itonciere, VI, 456-58; Memoires d*un protegtant: Jean Marteilhe de

t ed. by Gaston Toumier (Cevennea, 1942), pp. 94*104 passiuu

442 FRENCH HISTOBICAL STUDIES

and foreign galleys (including Spanish) in the previoussixty years, and "barely two In one hundred years."l ^^

By 1700 Louis XIV had more than ample reason to com-plain of the "bad maxims" established among the command-ers of his galleys, at least when they campaigned against theKing of Spain. The mildness of Louis' reaction to the prac-tice of "bad maxims" might indicate that he was not per-turbed by the ineffectiveness of the Spanish campaigns ofhis galley officers. But that was not the case. Louis was verymuch dissatisfied with the service they rendered him. Hewanted action, or so it would appear from the terms inwhich he expressed himself to the Due de Vivonne in 1674:

I desire that you do everything possible to find and fight thevessels and galleys of Spain, and that you run risks to bring on anaction of iclat; I would much prefer to lose some of my vessels ina vigorous action [bonne occasion] than to keep them all and donothing at alL **

When commanders could not win him glory, he wantedthem to earn stature and prestige; "de la reputation' was aterm used in instructions to Louis' officers, as well as at theCourt.

A clear indication of such sentiments was apparent inLouis' insistence that his flag be saluted, and be given "prece-dence" to demonstrate his superiority.''* Then, as now, thesalute itself was the usual method of recognition exchangedwhen fighting ships under diflFerent Hags encountered oneanother at sea; it was usually rendered by the discharge of

" ly- 18 Marine fol 167. The two engagements to which the Chevalier dela Penne apparently refers are the galley battle fought off Genoa in 1638,and the raising of ttie Franco-Catalan seige of Taragonne in 1641 in whichboth galleys and sailing vessels were used by both sides.

"• B' 6 Marine fol 106 (1674)." That remained the constant tenor of Louis' Spanish policy -until near

the end of the last decade of the seventeenth century. But on the eve ofthe death of the Spanish King Charles II, Louis instructed his commandersto relax their efforts to obtain marks of deference and subordination fromSpanish commanders; Louis aimed to dispose the dying Charles to bequeathto the French claimant. B' 19 Marine "Meraoire sur I'empioy des gal-eres . , ." (1698), referring to the precarious heaith of the Spanish monarchand Louis' desire that his commanders be "full of circumspection" in deal-ings touching Spain. Fol 83. After Charles' death and the accession of theFrench claimant to the throne of Spain (1700-1701), long-standing enemiesbecame allies, and French and Spanish galieys became collaborators againstcommon enemies.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KING 443

cannon, the number of coups on each side being equal orunequal, depending on the measure of honor and respect, orsubmission deemed suitable, in view of the status and pres-tige of the two princes or govermnents concerned. Flagswere also lowered in salutes, and a distinction was madebetween salutes to sovereigns, to princes, and to the stillless respectable republics. Since Louis sought evidence ofsubmission, the salute became a delicate question of prece-dence and prestige. His flag, according to his instructions,was not to be lowered to any other sovereign's flag, for hemaintained that no other sovereign was his equal His flagshould be acknowledged and hence saluted first, with asalute appropriate to his superiority; then, and only ^en ,was his commander to reply with a salute of some lessersort, appropriate to the inferior status and dignity of theforeigner.

Other sovereigns did not take kindly to Louis' pretensionsto superiority and precedence. With Spain and some of theother Mediterranean powers, the question of salutes andprecedence produced serious difficulties and even naval en-gagements* The King of Spain and his commanders werecertainly unwilling to submit to Louis XIV's claims. Toenforce them Louis ordered the commanders of his galleys,and other naval vessels, to use force if necessary. Thus in thewinter of 1679 (a "peacetime" year) the Chevalier deNoailles, commanding Louis'' galleys in the Mediterraneanreceived the following instructions to guide his behavior inevent he encountered the Spanish galleys on campaign, asLouis very much hoped he would:

My intention is that you call for the salute no matter how numer-ous they are, but with this difference in case they refuse: if theyare approximately equal in number to [the galleys] of your com-mand, I desire that you force them to salute; if, on the otherhand, you find them so much superior that you cannot attack,you can ask for a salute, but without attempting to force theminto an unequal engagement that would imperil the fleet I haveconfided to

Dep. C.R, 3(84), Imtruetion, signe LoTiis, 16 dec. 1679.

444 FKENCH HJSTOHICAL STUDIES

The Spanish galleys were not located by Noailles that year,but such instructions were perennial in the last two decadesof the century; Louis was implacable. He demanded thesubmission of the Spaniard; he complained with annoyanceof "the ill-foimded pretension of the King of Spain, whoclaims the equality of My Crown and His." ^ It was said in1687 that the Spanish galleys, up to that date, had not ren-dered to Louis' galleys the desired salute,** though there hadbeen instances when Louis' sailing vessels attacked the ves-sels of Spain and continued to cannonade them until theystruck their flag, an act interpreted as the sought-for indica-tion of inferiority.®^

In Louis XIV's Corps des Galeres Knights of Malta wereplaced in circumstances that obliged them to decide whichof several conflicting loyalties to hold most high, which tosubordinate. Each Knight had religious obligations to hisOrder and the Roman CathoUc Church. He had both feudaland religious obligations that forbade him to do damage orinjury to his lord. His Most Catholic Majesty, the King ofSpain. But as galley officers in the service of the King ofFrance, French-bom knights owed loyalty and duty to theirKing. The difficulty of discharging these varied and some-times conflicting obligations could discourage knights ofMalta from the vigorous and full discharge of duty as navalofficers in the service of the King of France, at least whencampaigns against the King of Spain were involved.

Many Frenchmen living in the seventeenth century mighthave approved, and a good many in the twentieth centurywould likewise applaud the decision of men who held high-est among several loyalties, their allegiance to their Order,Church, and Pope, and who made subordinate their loyaltyto their King and France. But in either age some mightquestion the advisability or utility of commissioning asFrench naval officers, men who had an obligation or compul-sion to be loyal to a foreign power at the expense of theinterests of die King of France. Some might even consider

» Dep C P , 3(84), Instructions, dtd 10 juin, 12 oct. 1680; similar senti-ments expressed in B* 19 Marine fol 167 (1687).

" B" 19 Marine fol 166-167." Ronciere, VI, 11-12.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KING 445

that French noblemen compromised their honor and integ-rity when they accepted commissions in the armed forcesof the Kings of France after taking holy vows and makingpromises on oath that could prevent them giving to theirPope and Church or to their King and France a fuS measureof their loyalty.

But perhaps the Knights should not be criticized undulyfor their failure to follow, to the letter, their self-imposedorthodoxy. Doubtless every Knight had ideals or aims ofvaried sorts, and also many loyalties. Every knight, in hispersonal life, doubtless faced problems of loyalty that in-volved some degree of compromise. For them, as for mostmen, life was necessarily a series of compromises. Saintswere rare, perhaps non-existent in the crusading Order ofSaint John; only a few knights could have held perfection,or its earthly approximation, as the object of their mortallives.

Knights deeply motivated by religiosity, by the highestaims of their Order and their Church, were well-advisedperhaps to accept such counsels as those of the Chevalierd'Argens, and remain at Malta serving la religion with allpossible fidelity. In tbat environment the strict execution ofpersonal responsibilities was apt to be least onerous, andleast compromised. On the other hand those who left thatisland and accepted service in the forces of European princes,thereby willingly diminished the external sanctions to con-formity for the sake of serving personal purposes in otherways elsewhere.

Though personal aims and loyalties were apt to be asvaried with the knights as they were with other men, knightsdid have certain qualities in common as a group. They weremoulded by circumstances of birth, religion, privileged socialstatus, and respect for family and tradition which encour-aged personal and professional conduct of characteristickinds. The knights, being recruited for the most part fromnobility, were often younger sons disinherited by primogeni-ture. The family interests that put them out and sent themto the Church also encouraged them to follow careers asKnights. Apart from service on the galleys of the Order, onevocation that was attractive to the knights, offering and

446 FRENCH HISTOHICAL STUDIES

encouraging individuality, and easily amenable to the hal-lowed traditions of knighthood and nobility was that ofmaritime condottiere.

Mercenary condottiere, many of them Knights of Malta,were the "seadogs" of the Mediterranean between the four-teenth and the seventeenth centuries. The Order offeredmercenaries a base of operations and letters of marque, andthe authority to use the flag of Malta in commercial venturesor privateering operations or in combinations of the two. ®Enterprising knights preferring independent ventures ontheir own account, when based at Malta, gave their Ordera commission of ten percent ad valorem on their prizes.''^Mercenaries having the requisite resources and some repu-tation or distinction as fighting men, might buy galleys oftheir own and gather slaves and freeman crews, and setthemselves in business at Malta or elsewhere as "fightingmen for hire." The Marquis de Centurion based at Genoa,and the Due de Turcy in the employ of Spain (and laterFrance) were examples of such "entrepreneurs," the mari-time counterparts of the condottiere of early modem armies. ®Kings of realms bordering the Mediterranean employedmercenaries of this sort to help protect tlieir coasts and tokeep down "pirates," usually meaning Moslems, in the daysbefore royal navies were established. Princes believed itcheaper to hire mercenaries than to buy, build, equip, or-ganize, and maintain fighting forces of their own. Even theKings of France and Spain depended on such mercenaries.

To remedy the lack of protection around French coasts,Cardinal Richelieu was counselled by a distinguished Knightof Malta, the veteran Chevalier Isaac de Razilly, to maintaina numerous fleet of galleys. The Cardinal received thosecounsels favorably.'* But neither RicheKeu nor other royal

"Jean Mathiex, "Sur la Marine marchande barbaresque au XVIII"si^Ie," Annales, XIII (1968), No. 1, 88 note; Engel, 214. Commonly, com-mercial ventures, privateering and theft were easily confounded.

" Godechot, pp. B6-7 and pasBim." See, for example, Fritz Eedlich, De Praeda Militari. Looting and

Booty, lSOO-lSlS (Wiesbaden, 1956).* Cardinal Richelieu dispatched his own private galley, the Cardinale,

commanded by a Knight of Malta (the Chevalier des Roches) to Malta forinformation concerning the construction and maintenance of galleys. PaulMasson, "Les galeres de France, 1481-1781," Ann. de la Fac. de lettresd'Avc, XX, 1937-8, 104.

THE KNIGHTS OF MAI.TA AND THE KING 447

ministers provided all the protection desired by port authori*ties in France. In the absence of royal forces, cities and tov^nswere sometimes moved by desperation to hire mercenaryKnights of Malta to fight for them. Thus in the troubledyears between 1611 and 1616 the merchants of Marseillearmed galleys on their own account. They employed Jacquesde Vincheguerre, a Knight of Malta, to campaign for them.His squadron and its operations cost the merchants no lessthan 450,000 livres, but the losses sustained by the corsairsin consequence were doubtless gratifying to the merchants/^

Knights of Malta and other mercenaries compiled impres-sive records in the service of France and French interestsduring the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century, buttheir renown as courageous fighting men was matched,bytheir notoriety in matters of discipline. They proved them-selves, time and again, ill-disciplined and independent, andoften unreliable in the execution of the orders they received."Belonging to great families, having powerful protectorsat Court, these officers thought they could do as they pleased,and Richelieu himself sometimes showed them strange par-tiality."^^ Independent and self-interested behavior came tobe expected when such officers, among them Knights ofMalta, owned and managed galleys for a fee. Some mightexplain the mercenary conduct of such captains by suggest-ing that they thereby demonstrated good business sense andeconomic enterprise in addition to the courage and spiritthey showed in their role as "fighters for hire"; economy ofexpenditure had a place even in the uneconomic business ofwar. A good eye for economy in the management of victuals,manpower and materiel might be welcome to Colbert, andeven to the Crand Monarch himself, as long as the economiesinvolved did not affect such matters as magnificence andgloire.

But economy could be overdone. Parsimonious practicesby sea-going officers could have intolerable effects. By the166O's private ownership and independent maintenance ofm.ateriel by mercenaries had compromised or ruined the

"Gaston Kambert, Histoire du commerce de Marseille (Paris, 1954), IV,pt 1 (Louis Bergasse), 84.

"C. Chabaud-Arnault, Histoire des flattes mihtaires (Paris, 1SS9), 11.

448 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES

effectiveness of numerous naval enterprises. Commenting onthis problem, and in particular about the excesses in economypracticed by commanding officers under the system of pri-vate ownership, one memoirist observed:

When galleys were owned privately, they always seemed to bedefective in some respect, either because of negligence or avariceon the captain's part. . . officers proved reluctant to expose theirgalleys to the perils of war and [to the sea] . . . galleys often quitthe fleet lor lack of victuals or for other reasons, because the cap-tains [had] over-economized. • . Many merchants were ruined forlack of payment from the galley captains, even though the cap-tains had received their payment from the King. . , and lastly, itwas found that. . , forgats [condemned to serve on galleys andsupplied as oarsmen to the captains by the king] escaped moreoften, either through connivance of the captains or for otherreasons [ unexplained] .*2

Such criticisms did not apply to every single officer who helda contract or command, perhaps, but they did apply toenough of them, over the years, to convince Louis XIV andhis ministers that the system should be changed.

The need for reform was underscored at mid-century bythe sedition of the Fronde and was posed no less poignantlyby the headstrong conduct of a certain chevalier de Malte,Jean Baptiste de Valbelle. As an officer Valbelle demon-strated valor, courage and initiative on many occasions,earning the nickname "Tiger" from admirers, but the "Tiger"could be rash to the point of utter irresponsibility. In 1660,instead of cooperating in the vast and secret operation forthe relief of Crete that the King himself had organized, Val-belle ignored the King's intention and also his personal obli-gations as a knight of Malta, since the campaign was directedagainst the Turk; indeed, Valbelle disobeyed direct ordersfrom his immediate commander and fellow knight, the loyalCommandeur de Paul, and braving the latter s cannonfire,disappeared over the horizon under a press of sail, resolvedto go privateering on his own account. For this colossal pieceof impudence the Chevalier de Valbelle and his subordinatefellow officers were condemned in absentia to the penalty of

" B* 77 Marine fols 287-88.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KING 449

death; but they never suffered such severity, and were infact restored to royal favor afterward.*^ But perhaps it is sig-nificant that Valbelle's defiance of authority was followed,two years later, by a major reorganization of the navy aimedat introducing better discipline and greater loyalty amongthe officers.

A new regime of royal ownership was decreed for thesailing navy in 1662,** and for the galleys also when theywere set apart as a separate Corps in 1665. From that timeforward, the King owned most of the vessels in his fleet, paidthe salaries of officers and crews, and furnished victuals;understandably, the regulations and orders of the King wereexpected to govern the management and operation of thenew royal Corps, The Marquis de Centurion, a veteran tHer-cenary officer, who remained for a time as part of the fleet,represented an exception in this new regime of royal owner-ship since he managed in the 1660*s to wrangle one of theold-fashioned condottiere contracts for himself, agreeing tosupply and to command a handful of galleys that the King'sminister may have viewed as a useful cost control for meas-uring economy in galley management; the Marquis' contract,in any case, was cancelled by his "retirement" in the earlyseventies. Mter 1665, ordinarily, the captains of royal galleyswere assigned to their commands as the King saw fit; allofficers under this new regime were expected to show "blindobedience, on all occasions, to persons having the honor ofcommanding His Majesty's forces." *^

The apparent expectation of authorities that "blind obe-dience" should ensue from change of ownership was far frombeing realized in actual fact. The "new" regime was in moreways old than new. The innovation hardly went beyond theexpenditure of royal funds to buy and build the vessels ofthe fleet. The main outlines, and most significant details ofgalley management were left substantially unchanged. Since

« Charles de la Ronciere, ValbeUe 'Le Tigre* (Paris, 1935), pp. 73-5, 80and passim. Valbelle waa not seriously »elf-interested in the economicsense; as he once remarked to the King: *'I venture to say to Your Majes-tv that I have never served for money. I have always obtained from theenemies of Your Majesty all the money I need. . . . in your service honorshave been my only object," pp, 149-50.

** A" 12 Marine p. 65.«B' B Marine fols 201-202.

450 FHENCH HISTOHICAL STXJDIES

a rapid expansion of the fleet was the most important objectheld in view, the King had little choice but to keep theofficers he had, and he continued to prefer noblemen, andknights of Malta in particular as officers, insisting that expe-rienced officers must be recruited for the expanding fleet. Byboth necessity and preference, the men retained and usedwere imbued with knowledge and habits acquired under thesystem that was being "replaced." For them, discipline wasdifficult, especially for those officers who were accustomedto owning galleys of their own, or habituated to the methodsof mercenary officers. In short, the traditions, methods andhabits of mercenary condottiere were in many particularsretained and integrated into Louis' "new" Corps des Cktleres.

The methods of the mercenaries produced disciplinarvproblems in Louis' Corps that persisted well into the decadeof the eighties, and in some instances, beyond the end of thecentury. In 1677 it was reported that captains of royal gal-leys, before departing from Marseille on campaign, or whenin foreign ports, fitted out merchantmen with sailors andforgats taken from the galleys under their command, "thusweakening their rowing force and allowing many forgats toescape." In 1677 a royal ordonnance forbade this practice"on pain of confiscation of the vessel armed." " The practiceof freighting merchant vessels for private profit was, ofcourse, a left-over from the days when captains owned andnavigated galleys of their own. The novelty of the situationconsisted merely in the opportunity to man and victual mer-chantmen at the King's expense, a remunerative innovationfor the captains. Officers apparently believed such practicesto be legitimate perquisites. Their persistence was evidencethat some officers had not yet adjusted to the notion of serv-ing their King disinterestedly.

Other mercenary habits of behavior on the part of officerswere equally persistent, and in many particulars traditional,but they constituted, nonetheless, insubordinate and refrac-tory behavior on the part of the noblemen and Knights com-posing Louis' officer corps. Captains of galleys, for example,employed as personal valets condemnees selected from the

*• B* 9 Marine fol 49.

THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE KING 451

rowing force. This practice was made profitable for the cap-tains by the fact that the condemnees were clothed and fedby the King; hence the captains using them as valets couldpocket the funds allocated by the King to provide rationsand remuneration for the eight valets allotted for the officersof each galley by the regulations of the King. Junior officerscomplained continually that the captains failed to share theallowances (i.e., the funds) with them, as they expected themto do since some of the valets were destined by the regula-tions for the use of junior officers. ' Of course several valetswere customary for noblemen and for officers in that age (asthey have been in other periods) under both private androyal schemes of ownership; but in French galleys the temp-tation to have the king pay twice for valets apparently pr6vedirresistible. No less tantalizing and irresistible for Louis'captains, apparently, were certain other opportunities foreconomic gain. Thus in selecting and appointing non-com-missioned officers on their commands, captains took certain"small and secret remunerations" from funds provided bythe King as salary for such men. ^ Captains not only recruited,but also paid many of the sailors, soldiers, guards and con-script oarsmen (mariniers de rame) on their commands, andby padding their enlistment rolls with double-duty and ficti-tious personnel, captains enriched themselves considerably,even though in doing so they depleted the fighting capabili-ties and morale of their commands. ® These manipulationsof authority by galley officers were systematic, and long-tinued, and hence more serious in their effects than suchisolated instances of mercenary irresponsibility as that in-volving the Sieurs de Montaulieu and de Saint Paul, whostole cannon from the royal galley on which they served andsold them secretly to the Prior of the Abbey of Saint Victorin Marseille. **

~*^Archives du Bouchea du Rhosne, Fonds Coriolis, XIV E 824, Ordan-nancey dtd 17 nov. 1688; B* 87 Marine fol 448.

« B" 87 Marine fols 424-425. ^ ^ ^^ . ,^^^* Archives de la Marine. Toulon, lL 119, Ordonnance d.t6. 16 fev 1682,

ordre du roi, dtd S Jan. 1685; Arch B. du R,, Fonds CorioUs ,XIV, E S24,Ord, dtd 8 Jan. 1686, "Convention", dtd 12 juin 1688, ord dtd 9 mai 1689,and Coriolis XIV, E 827. or±, dtd 2 Jan. 1717 art. 46; B* 98 Marine fol 414;B" 19 Marine fol 229. Cf. Ronciere, VttlhelU, 44-5.

"B" 10 Marine fol 87. When discovered by authorities, the sale was

452 FRENCH HisroHiCAL STDPIES

Clearly, there is no easy explanation for the behavior ofLouis' officers, nor is there any simple explanation that canfully accoimt for the failures of French galley commandersagainst the forces of the King of Spain. No matter how thor-ough the research, the possible influence of many imponder-ables must be allowed in the analysis of their campaigns.Such matters as weather conditions, defective materiel, hu-man error and even accident—always important factors atsea—had influence on every campaign, and must have con-tributed to the failures of French campaigns. Yet it is remark-able that the interplay of factors did produce French failurequite consistently, that chance and circumstance, if that iswhat it was, should so frequently have favored the King ofSpain while thwarting the achievement of the objects of theKing of France.

Since the courage of French galley officers cannot bedoubted, other factors must be relevant. Instances of indis-cipline or disobedience on the part of officers were common-place in the Corps des Galeres. Lack of discipline was evidentin the habits of self-interested economic enterprise that per-sisted among them, partly as traditions of condottiere days,partly as venal innovations aimed at taking advantage of mesystem of royal ownership and maintenance. Galley officersthereby sapped the efficiency, the morale and the fightingstrength of the royal galley corps. The knowledge that theirpaper strength was not their actual strength could clearlyundermine the confidence and fighting spirit of commandingofficers, and is a plausible, if only a partial explanation forthe prudence and "lack of enterprise" that Louis and hisministers criticized in galley officers.

Religious vows and other obligations may have had simi-lar effects as depressants on the "fighting spirit" of officersin some campaigns. One cannot assume that all Knights ofMalta in French service ignored or were insensitive to theirobligations to the Order or Saint John and His Most CatholicMajesty, their lord, of Spain. The discouragements to "fight-ing enterprise" that came from other causes could have been

allowed to stand; apparently the Prior kept the gxais (for hells?); theofficers were condemned to suffer deductions from their appointments luttUthey had paid for them.

THE KNIGHTS OF MAI.TA AND THE XING 453

re-enforced by officers responding to the sanctions of theirobligations.

For noblemen and Knights of Malta of the seventeenthcentury, it was dfficult and perhaps impossible to keep bothpersonal honor and holy vows, to be loyal to both King andOrder in a Corps that included many mercenary brother-officers, and required service to a King of France, like LouisXIV, who was the enemy of Catholic Christian Spain and,frequently, the active collaborator and ally of Infidels. NoKnight who was a "strict constructionist" in interpreting hispersonal obligations could long remain in the service of theKing of France. Some did resign. No Knight could serve twosuch masters with fidelity. Yet scores of Knights did servemost of their professional lives in the French Corpi desGaleres, and by their numbers and prestige. Knights of Maltacame to control and dominate that Corps,

Knights of Malta brought courage and experience toLouis' service, and conferred upon his Corps the prestigeand reputation that derived from having Christian knight-hood and nobility in positions of command- The King relishedbeing served by them, and where they were concerned hewas generous and complaisant, tolerant of foibles, indulgentof unenterprising conduct that came close to disobedience,and was even willing to forgive some insubordination. Butsome officers brought with them, or developed in his Corpsto excess, those independent and venal inclinations, those"bad maxims" that Louis lamented in his galleys, and thathis officers maintained even in the face of exorcizing effortsby Colbert and Seignelay, Officers brought upon themselvesand justified the reproaches of the minister, who empha-sized that officers on the royal galleys "should not have otherpurposes in their conduct than those that honor, integrityand zeal for the service could inspire." " Though the Kingof France did not expect his captains to be saints, neitherdid he want them to be self-seeking mercenaries, or insubor-dinate partisans of another prince or power.

University of Minnesota

25 Marine fol 295-