the israeli arsenal deployed against gaza during … · learned from its 2006 lebanon war: whereas...

THE ISRAELI ARSENAL DEPLOYED AGAINST GAZA

DURING OPERATION CAST LEAD

The gross disparity between the military resources available to Israel and the Pales-

tinian factions during Operation Cast Lead (OCL) could make a comparison between

their two “arsenals” seem absurd. Yet this and the following document devoted to

Palestinian weaponry not only highlight the imbalance but help the reader better

appreciate the dynamics at play in the broader conflict.

The compendium that follows does not pretend to be a complete list of Israeli

armaments, but rather intends to provide as full an idea as possible regarding

weapons known or suspected to have been deployed during OCL. Because a mere

listing of weapons used by Israel is not particularly instructive, efforts have been

made to describe the features of the weapons and equipment and how they were

used. Particular attention has been paid to how the various branches of Israel’s mil-

itary operated together in what was for the Israel Defense Forces a truly innovative

battle plan uniting air, ground, and naval components. To this end, readers are

given a broad picture of the different stages of the operation.

Israel’s argument that the technical advancement and precision of its weaponry

allows it to be more careful and humane in the execution of war is a valid one.

But this begs the question of why such a high percentage of Palestinian casualties

and other losses of OCL were civilian (see the casualties charts in this section for

details). What does this mean about Israel’s conduct of the war? From the launch

of operations, concerns were raised regarding Israel’s conduct in terms of legality,

proportionality, and the use of Gaza as a testing ground for new weapons. This

document does not intend to render a verdict on these issues, although factual

detail relevant to these questions is provided where possible.

This document was compiled by IPS Senior Research Associate Michele K. Esposito.

Overview of OCLIsrael opened Operation Cast Lead (OCL) at midday on 27 December 2008 with a

3-minute, 40-second “shock and awe” campaign involving 64 warplanes hitting morethan 50 Hamas-related security targets across the Gaza Strip. Thereafter, the first phaseof the operation (27 December 2008–3 January 2009) comprised ongoing air andnaval bombardment of Hamas-controlled security posts, smuggling tunnels, and sym-bols of Hamas rule (e.g., Palestinian Authority [PA] ministries, jails, and presidentialcompounds). According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), more than 100 tons ofexplosives were dropped in the first 9 hours of combat alone. During this initial phase,the IDF worked through a list of targets that had been at least 6 months in the drafting.

The second phase began around 8:00 P.M. local time on 3 January when, after theIDF had done all it could to strike preselected targets from the air, ground forces beganto cross into Gaza to secure control of areas from which Palestinian rockets were beingfired into Israel and to conduct more precise targeting of Hamas-affiliated tunnels andinstallations, rocket-launching teams, and other targets. This ground advance, which

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 (Spring 2009), pp. 175–191 ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614.C© 2009 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissionto photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’sRights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2009.XXXVIII.3.175.

176 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

focused on controlling open areas and encircling towns and refugee camps, but stoppedshort of making deep incursions into densely populated areas, brought tanks, artillery,and other armored vehicles into play. The infantry’s first move was to cut an east–west swath roughly from the Qarni and Nahal Oz crossings to the former Netzarimsettlement on the coast. From 3 January through 18 January, when Israel announceda unilateral cease-fire, ground forces operated mostly north of this line. Meanwhile,air and naval bombardments continued across the Strip, in coordination with groundoperations.

During the last week of the offensive (from 12 January), Israel mostly hit targets ithad damaged previously and struck Palestinian rocket-launching units as they emerged,while the Israeli government debated whether to open a third phase of the operationto deal Hamas a “knockout blow.” The politicians were ultimately swayed againstopening a third phase by military and intelligence assessments indicating that shiftingthe goal to destroying Hamas would require weeks of deep ground incursions intoGaza’s urban areas and refugee camps that would result in heavy casualties on bothsides, inevitably erode the very strong domestic support for the war, and result instronger international criticism.

During phases 1 and 2 of OCL, Israel relied heavily on unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs or drones) to provide critical surveillance and remote strike capability. WhileUAVs primarily provided support to other IDF units, they were frequently also theprimary tools for executing strikes.

This aspect of integration and cooperation among the various branches of the IDFwas key to OCL. According to Defense Technology International, OCL marked the firsttime that infantry commanders on the ground were allowed to direct UAVs, helicopters,and warplanes independently, without having to run operational orders through airforce command. Each brigade commander at the front was assigned a dedicated UAVsquadron and an air-support controller team to provide them with real-time surveillancedata from UAVs and other assets. Commanders on the ground could then immediatelycall in air strikes from attack helicopters waiting on standby or from drones and war-planes already over the combat zone. At least a dozen UAVs were kept in the air overGaza at all times in order to detect Palestinian movements and to direct aircraft, tanks,and artillery (including naval artillery) to the targets. Action time was so quick that Is-raeli intelligence sources reported that F-16 aircraft could identify and fire air-to-groundmissiles within 30 seconds of surveillance data being sent.

Logistically, infantry units typically entered Gaza preceded by UAVs at a distance of500 yards. The UAVs were used to clear the area ahead (firing antitank and antipersonnelweapons as needed) and to guide troops by relaying advice regarding safe routes ofentry and advancement. If infantry units were ordered to take or reach a target, theywould first call in artillery or air power and then move in behind tanks and armoredbulldozers, riding in armored personnel carriers (APCs) to avoid to the extent possibleoperating in the open.

In terms of troop strength, OCL’s ground offensive involved three paratroop/infantrybrigades and one armored brigade, artillery support, and special engineering and intelli-gence units. This is the equivalent of one reinforced division, or, in Israel’s case, slightlymore than 10,000 troops. By comparison, Israel deployed 5 divisions in the West Bank

MILITARY DIMENSIONS 177

(operating in an area nearly 16 times Gaza’s size) during Operation Defensive Shieldin 2002 and 4 divisions during the 2006 Lebanon war (operating in an area more thantwice Gaza’s size). Four brigade commanders, all colonels, fought on the front lineswith their troops throughout OCL’s two-week ground offensive: Herzi Levy of the para-troopers brigade; Avi Peled of the Golani Brigade; Ilan Malka of the Givati Brigade; andYigal Slovick of the 401st Armored Brigade. This highlights one major lesson the IDFlearned from its 2006 Lebanon war: Whereas striking the enemy from a distance andoperating remotely are always preferred to close combat, there is no replacement forhaving eyes and leadership on the ground during battle.

Israel’s Basic ArmamentsKeeping in mind the integrated nature of Israel’s logistical operations during OCL,

one can better appreciate how Israel deployed various armaments. It becomes clearerwhy particular weapons were used, given their technical abilities—even if there aresuspicions or indications that they were not used for the specific purposes for whichthey were designed. Basic descriptions of weapons specifications give a sense of thesheer weight of the force Israel brought to bear against the Palestinian factions.

Planes and Helicopters

For OCL, Israel relied on its fleet of approximately 300 U.S.-supplied F-16 warplanesto lead its air assault. Considered the IDF’s “bomber workhorse,” the F-16 can be armedwith various air-to-ground missiles, rockets, and bombs. As a multifunctional tacticalaircraft, it can also be outfitted with navigation and targeting equipment to providesupport for other units, including infantry and artillery. These features, combined withits small and light construction, ability to travel at supersonic speeds, and enhancedmaneuverability, made it well suited to Israel’s OCL campaign, which relied on closecooperation between ground and air combat teams and quick response to intelligencedata to strike Palestinian targets.

Israel’s F-16s were responsible for the heavy bombing of smuggling tunnels alongRafah’s border and most (if not all) of the massive strikes targeting structures acrossGaza. The F-16s’ “general purpose” munitions are the M-82 and M-84 high-explosive“dumb bombs,” both of which can be upgraded with precision guidance systems(U.S.-made Paveway II and JDAM kits, respectively). The smaller M-82 carries a 500-lb.warhead, whereas the M-84 carries a 2,000-lb. warhead. The M-84 can form a crater50 feet wide and 36 feet deep, and it can penetrate up to 15 inches of metal or11 feet of concrete, depending on the height from which it is dropped; it has alethal fragmentation radius of 400 yards. Over the years, Israel has received at least1,500 M-82s and 13,500 M-84s from the U.S., along with 4,000 Paveway II and 10,000JDAM precision guidance upgrade kits.

In addition, Israel has produced a laser-guided variant of the M-83 “dumb bomb”called the PB500A1, which Israel military sources confirmed was used to hit tunnelson the Rafah border during OCL. The PB500A1 is a 1,000-lb. hard-target penetrationbomb capable of blasting through 6.5 feet of reinforced concrete. Experts say that thePB500A1’s sophisticated design gives it a blast impact equal to a bomb twice its size.


F-16s also would have delivered the GBU-39s that sources have confirmed Israel firedduring the conflict. If Israel did indeed use GBU-28s for targeting tunnels, they wouldhave been delivered by Israel’s F-15Is (there are no specific reports that F-15Is wereused during OCL). (For specifications on both these bombs, neither of which couldin any way be classified as standard munitions, see “Special Weapons and WeaponSystems” below.)

In addition to warplanes, Israel also used U.S.-made AH-64 Apache attack helicoptersand AH-1F Cobra helicopter gunships. (Israel had grounded its Cobra fleet 6 monthsbefore OCL, when a crash killed 2 pilots, but rushed it back into service for OCL.)Israel’s Apaches come standard equipped with a 1,200-round M230 30 mm cannonand for OCL were loaded with AGM-114 Hellfire guided missiles and possibly Hydra70 rockets. (Standard Hydra 70s are unguided rockets, but they can be upgraded withguidance kits and can carry white phosphorous munitions. Israel’s Elbit and U.S. rocketmaker ATK launched joint development of a guidance upgrade kit suitable for the Hydrain July 2008 and successfully tested one in October 2008.) Cobras carry multiple rocketlaunchers and TOW 2 missile systems (8 per helicopter). (TOWs are guided heavyantitank, antibunker, and antifortification missiles. Israel makes 2 domestic copies ofthe TOW 2, the Mapatz and the Orlev.)

Israeli air force sources told Ha’Aretz (2/9/09) that standing orders during OCL wereto use only laser-guided weapons to minimize collateral damage and that over 1,000Hellfire and Orlev missiles were fired by Israeli helicopters during OCL. (It is not clearif upgraded Hydra 70s were fired.) Separately, the IDF has acknowledged carrying outabout 1,500 air strikes during OCL. This would mean that roughly 500 air strikes wouldhave been heavy bombings conducted by F-16s or F-15Is.

Naval Vessels

Few details have been reported regarding which naval vessels took part in OCL orwhat weapons they fired. The navy played primarily a support role during the operation.Its large intelligence component was certainly put to use, as was its artillery capabilityto shell targets inland. In addition, its fleet of Super Dvora-class fast patrol boats werevideotaped directing cannon and machine gun fire along the coast.

Artillery

Israel’s artillery corps, one of the most technologically advanced in the world, linksinto the IDF’s sophisticated radar and navigation networks to maximize accuracy. Themain equipment used by the corps are the Soltam M-71 towed howitzer, the M109 self-propelled howitzer, the Sholef 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, and the M270 MLRSmultiple rocket launcher.

Israel has received 100,000s of artillery rounds from the U.S.; these constitute thecorps’ standard munitions. The overwhelming majority are M433 40 mm high-explosive,dual-purpose (HEDP) cartridges and M889A1 81 mm high explosive cartridges, but U.S.provisions have also included M107 155 mm high explosive artillery rounds, M14183 mm bunker defeat munitions, and M930 120 mm illuminating cartridges. The HEDP,M889A1, and M107 have armor-piercing capability effective against vehicles or build-ings, but all are specifically designed or (in the case of the HEDP) modified to be


UNOSAT Satellite-Based Map of Gaza Damage, 19 February 2009

This map presents a satellite-based damage assessment of the Gaza Strip following Operation Cast Lead. UNOSAT

notes that it is highly probably that the damages identified in this map underestimate the actual building and

infrastructure damages on the ground, particularly in dense urban areas. (Source: unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/)


antipersonnel fragmentation devices as well. The M107 is designed to spray some2,000 pieces of shrapnel. The M141 is designed to breach walls. The M930 providesbattlefield illumination but apparently does not contain white phosphorous. All of thesewere used during OCL.

In addition to buying general purpose munitions from the U.S., Israel has also jointlydeveloped and produced with U.S. manufacturers its own artillery ammunition, includ-ing the M971 120 mm dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) usedduring OCL. Intended as an anti-armor and antipersonnel weapon, this artillery shell isessentially a cluster bomb that separates into 24 submunitions, each containing morethan 1,200 fragments, that explode above the target to create a wide and dense area ofcoverage within a 350-foot radius.

While most artillery munitions are unguided, Israel and U.S. manufacturer Raytheonjointly developed a GPS-guided mortar in the wake of the 2006 Lebanon war, whichwent into production in Israel in 2008. The mortars are equipped with satellite navi-gation and boast a +/−3 m range of error. These munitions were battle tested for thefirst time during OCL. Israel acknowledged using them in a 6 January strike that killed43 Palestinians outside an UNRWA school in Jabaliya being used as a shelter. (Sepa-rately, and perhaps contradictorily, the IDF admitted using white phosphorous shellsin that same attack; see “White Phosphorous” below.)

Defense News estimates that the IDF fired 7,000 artillery rounds of the types de-scribed above during OCL. Notably, while Israel used many antipersonnel fragmenta-tion weapons, there is no indication that it used the M483A1 DPICM artillery-deliveredcluster munition for which it received international condemnation for using during the2006 Lebanon war. Nonetheless, unexploded ordnance (UXO) was an issue followingOCL. Two children were killed by UXO near Jabaliya refugee camp (r.c.) on 20 January,and the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a warning to Gazans regardingUXO the next day.

Tanks and Armored Vehicles

During OCL, tanks and armored vehicles physically led ground incursions, carriedout strikes on identified targets (structures or personnel), and generally protected Israelitroops by allowing them to operate to the extent possible from armored enclosed spacesand at a distance. A standard infantry division would operate around 300 tanks and 100sof APCs, though all these might not be sent into battle at once.

Merkava TanksThe IDF deployed Merkava II, III, and IV main battle tanks in Gaza during OCL.

The versions vary slightly in design, size, and armaments but generally are armed with105 mm or 120 mm laser-guided antitank missiles, multiple 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm heavymachine guns, 60 mm mortars, and smoke grenades. The main tank guns are capable offiring high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds and sabot rounds (which disperse armor-piercing flechettes; see “Special Weapons and Weapon Systems” below). Newer andupgraded models have advanced firing control systems that allow gunners to keepa lock on moving targets while on the move and are capable of receiving real-timeencrypted intelligence data from the IDF’s drones.


Israeli tanks typically are armed with a variety of grenades, missiles, and heavymachine guns, and they primarily fire guided TOW (see “Planes and Helicopters” above)and Spike missiles (see “Special Weapons and Weapon Systems” below). The soldiersaccompanying the tanks are equipped with antitank rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)such as the RPG-7, the M72 LAW, and B300 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose AssaultWeapon, which can target vehicles or buildings. Israel’s battle tanks are heavily armoredand generally impervious to anything less than an antitank guided missile, of which thePalestinian factions are thought to hold very few (see “Palestinian Weapons Deployedagainst Israel” in this special documents section).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) military analysts say Israel’s precision-guided tankshells are so accurate that they can be fired into a window from a distance of a mile (1.5km). Given the numerous reports during OCL of tank shells being fired directly intoPalestinian homes, Amnesty International and HRW suspect that IDF soldiers routinelytargeted any home or building where signs of movement were detected by their tank’svision system. Such a blanket open fire policy could be illegal under international law.

Armored Personnel CarriersInfantry troops are primarily transported in armored personnel carriers (APCs),

which come standard equipped with machine guns operated remotely from inside thevehicle and are often fitted with RPGs, smoke grenades, mortars, rockets, or antitankmissiles. The IDF’s principal APC is the M113, or Nagmash, purchased from the U.S. andupgraded by Israel. Modifications typically include adding armor and weapons, thoughthe Nagmash can be fitted with mine plows or rollers to clear improvised explosivedevices (IEDs), bulldozer blades for demolition, radar to aid artillery, or communicationsequipment for command and control in the field. The IDF has also modified someoutdated tanks and vehicles designed to move heavy engineering equipment for useas APCs (e.g., Israel’s Achzarit and Puma APCs), since they have heavier armor. APCcrews range from 3–13 persons.

Caterpillar Armored D9 BulldozersThe IDF reportedly deployed some 100 armored CAT D9 bulldozers during OCL. This

variety (the D9L, D9N, and D9R) has been specifically modified by the U.S. manufacturerand Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) to meet Israel’s needs. Modifications typicallyinvolve adding armor and bulletproofing windows to protect operators against IEDs,RPGs, and heavy machine gun and sniper fire, though crew-operated machine guns,smoke projectors, and grenade launchers have been added to some units. Otherwise,models generally vary in size, horsepower, and pull capacity. In addition to buildingbarriers and fortifications, the IDF has used the D9 for demolition; opening routes toother armored fighting vehicles and infantry, including within urban areas; and clearinglandmines, IEDs, booby traps, and other explosives. The IDF claims to have used theD9s during OCL primarily to ensure that paths were cleared of IEDs and to demolishtunnels. The IDF also confirmed that it used an unmanned, remote-controlled versionof the D9 (called Black Thunder) to clear roads of IEDs during OCL; at least 1 of thesewas heavily damaged.


Lioness Armored BulldozersIn January 2008, the IDF unveiled a tiny armored bulldozer specifically designed to

maneuver in narrow alleyways during urban combat operations. The driver sits in a360-degree firing post used for “staving off attacks and destroying targets.” The Lionessserves the same purpose as the D9 but in close quarters, particularly to clear routesof obstacles for advancing infantry. Since Israel did not progress to stage 3 of OCL,which would have involved deep incursions into Palestinian built-up areas, it is unclearwhether Lionesses were among the 100 armored bulldozers used during OCL.

Unmanned Systems and Jamming

Throughout OCL, the IDF relied on a wide range of sophisticated intelligence-gathering, targeting, and jamming tools to execute its operations quickly, precisely,and with an element of surprise. Many of these devices were designed to serve a dualpurpose: (1) surveillance and targeting and (2) conducting the actual missile strikes.Taken together, the various devices created a surveillance and early warning umbrellaable to monitor and target the entire Strip from every possible angle.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or Drones)Israel has pioneered drone development globally, so it is no surprise that unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs) were integral to its intelligence and remote operating capabilityduring OCL, providing an agile, mobile aerial component that even helicopters couldnot offer.

For pure intelligence purposes (what is known as ISTAR: intelligence, surveillance,target acquisition, and reconnaissance), Israel relied on 3 types of unarmed UAVs:the Hermes 450, the Heron, and (to a lesser extent) the Searcher 2. Though theirspecifications differ slightly, all are considered MALE (medium-altitude, long-endurance)UAVs, capable of missions of at least 20–40 hours at heights of 9,500–35,000 feet. Alloffer unparalleled surveillance capability, with day and night imaging (infrared andvisible light), a mix of top-level intelligence systems (including COMINT for detectingcommunications between people and ELINT for detecting electronic communicationsbetween machines), precise GPS navigation or radar systems for targeting, sophisticatedcommunications systems for transferring images and data in real time wherever needed,and quiet operation to avoid detection.

For attacks as well as for ISTAR purposes, Israel deployed the MQ-1 Predator UAVsystem, manufactured in the U.S. by the former chief designer for the Israeli Air Force,Abraham Karem. The system consists of four MALE UAVs, a ground control station,and a satellite communication suite operated by a total of 55 people. In addition tosophisticated ISTAR equipment, the UAVs can be loaded with 2 AGM-114 Hellfireguided missiles. The UAVs have infrared cameras with digitally enhanced zoom thatcan identify the heat signature of a human body from an altitude of 10,000 feet.

In addition to armed Predator UAVs, Israel during OCL is believed to have deployeda modified Hermes 450s equipped with 2 Hellfire missiles and 2 domestically mademissiles (not identified). Israel has also developed a new assault version of the Heron(called the Heron TP or Eitan), Israel’s largest UAV, which can carry more than a ton of


weapons. Thought to have been developed for a strike on Iran and tested in war gamesover the Aegean in July 2008, the Eitan is believed to have seen its first combat useduring OCL, possibly firing Spike missiles (see “Special Weapons and Weapon Systems”below).

Human rights groups, including Amnesty International and HRW, have noted thatdespite the clear imaging and precise targeting abilities of the UAVs, missiles firedfrom drones seem to have been responsible for a high number of Palestinian civiliandeaths during OCL. Human rights groups also confirmed a significant number of cases inwhich drones fired an unidentified missile that dispersed “tiny [2–4 mm], sharp-edgedcubes of purpose-made shrapnel” similar to a flechette round (see “Special Weaponsand Weapon Systems” below).

Also of note: At least 1 surveillance blimp remained tethered over the Erez crossingon Gaza’s northern border during OCL. Carrying ISTAR equipment similar to the UAVsand relaying data back to monitoring stations inside Israel, the blimp was apparentlyused primarily for surveillance support and local border monitoring.

Sentry Tech Remote-Operated Weapons StationsIsrael’s existing Sentry Tech monitoring and early warning system along the Gaza

border was also put to combat use during OCL, allowing IDF camera operatorsat bases safely inside Israel to monitor and engage targets near the border usingremote-controlled weapon stations. Each Sentry Tech unit comprises a stationary,prepositioned, fortified pillbox (itself called a Mini-Samson weapons station) shield-ing a machine gun (0.5-cal or 7.62 mm) or other weapons (e.g., long-range antitankguided missiles for distant-strike capability), motion sensors, and an optics system thatare connected by fiber-optic link to a remote monitoring station. Sensors send a warn-ing to operators at the base, who are then able to observe, track, and attack the target.Sentry Tech pillboxes have been placed several hundred yards apart along the entirelength of the Gaza border. The IDF reported on 8 January that female soldiers stationedinside Israel had for the first time used a machine gun controlled via the Sentry Techsystem to kill a Palestinian inside the Gaza border. Mobile versions of Sentry Tech havebeen built to travel with infantry units to protect forward positions on the battlefieldduring combat, but these were not deployed during OCL.

Mini Robots and “Football Cameras”The IDF used Israeli-made Viper miniature robots for the first time during OCL.

These small, lightweight, portable robots were designed for use in urban warfare tonegotiate obstacles typical in such conditions, such as climbing stairs and surmountingrubble. Vipers are remotely operated by a single soldier wearing a special harnessand helmet-mounted display. They can be fitted with various devices including dayand night zoom cameras and mapping systems for reconnaissance, explosive detectingsensors, electronic jammers to disable IEDs, grippers for moving objects, and weapons(including a 9 mm mini-Uzi with scope and pointer, or a grenade launcher).


An uncorroborated report by al-Watan (2/19) cited IDF sources as confirming thatIsraeli infantry used “football photo cameras” during OCL ground operations. Thesewere described as cameras placed in units as small as a tennis ball that troops coulddrop by hand or roll inside a building and then remotely operate. The cameras transfer360-degree live footage with a 15-second delay to troops located close by.

Electronic JammingThe IDF employed an array of electronic jamming equipment during most of OCL. At

the opening of the conflict, the IDF kept telephone and radio broadcast communicationsto Gaza open so that Israel itself could use the services to contact Palestinians. (Israelsent 10,000s of automated phone calls and text messages and regularly interruptedradio broadcasts during OCL to warn Gazans to evacuate areas, to stay indoors, or toavoid cooperation generally with militant groups.) However, the IDF later (probablyat the start of the ground incursion) began jamming Palestinian communications: TheNew York Times (1/16) among other sources reported that the IDF had “lowered a kindof electronic curtain to prevent remote-controlled bombs, disabling even remote carlocks well into Israel.” The primary aims of jamming likely were (1) to block cell phonesor other transmission signals used to set off IEDs and (2) to block Palestinians’ ability torelay information regarding IDF troop movements. An added benefit for Israel was thatPalestinian civilians could not use phone lines, cell phones, or e-mail to recount whatwas happening to the outside world via interviews, blog reports, e-mailed photos, andso on, as Palestinians had done extensively during previous large-scale IDF operationsduring the al-Aqsa intifada. Indeed, unusually little of this type of grass-roots reportingemerged from Gaza during OCL.

Personal and Company Weapons

Mention should be made of the standard weapons carried by IDF infantry soldiers.The personal weapon of most IDF soldiers is the U.S.-made M-16 assault, though Israelalso makes its own Tavor-21 assault rifle. (Of note: The U.S. has sold Israel morethan $31 million worth of small arms and light weapons since 2004.) Every soldierin operational service is also equipped with various hand grenades. The companyand platoon weapons are diverse and include light and heavy machine guns, semi-automatic sniper rifles, and RPGs. These are precision weapons, many of which havebeen upgraded to improve rapid-fire accuracy. While Israel’s strength during OCL wasfighting at a distance, and commanders made an effort to avoid close-combat fighting,the IDF did report numerous heavy exchanges with Palestinian gunmen, meaning theseweapons were certainly put to use.

Special Weapons and Weapon SystemsIn addition to the basic “general purpose” weapons used during OCL, as outlined

above, the IDF also used a number of irregular weapons and weapons systems. Most aresimply specialty tools designed for specific narrow purposes, while others constitute


larger and more lethal versions of general purpose munitions. Most criticisms andconcerns raised regarding Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war (legality and proportionalityin particular) are centered on Israel’s use (or suspected use) of these armaments.

GBU-28s

Some sources suspect, thought it has not been proved, that Israel used U.S.-madeGBU-28 bunker buster bombs to strike tunnels on the Rafah border and perhaps tohit buildings elsewhere during the operation. The U.S. sold Israel 100 of these 2.5-tonlaser-guided munitions in 2005 and another 50 in 2007. Packed with 630 lbs of highexplosives, a GBU-28 is capable of penetrating over 100 feet of earth or 20 feet of solidconcrete.

GBU-39s

OCL marked Israel’s first use of GBU-39s, U.S.-made GPS-guided munitions said tobe among the most accurate in the world. Israel received a rush shipment of 1,000 ofthem from the U.S. in late November or early December 2008. They were used fromthe opening “shock and awe” campaign through the end of operations, primarily totarget tunnels but probably also to target structures such as security and governmentcompounds. Superior design means the 250-lb. bomb has the same penetration capa-bilities (at least 3 feet of steel-reinforced concrete) as a normal bomb four times its size,although it has only 50 lbs. of explosives. Its small size and light weight increase thenumber of bombs a warplane can carry and consequently the number of targets thatcan be struck in a single sortie.

GBU-39s can be packed with 2 types of explosives: (1) steel encased AFX-757high explosives or (2) a lightweight composite-encased focused blast explosive suchas Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME). The DIME version is specifically intended toreduce collateral damage when using the weapon for pinpoint strikes in urban areas.At least some of the GBU-39s Israel used on Gaza are believed to have been DIMEmunitions (see more below).

Spike Multi-Purpose Anti-Armor Missile

Jointly developed by Israel’s Rafael corporation and the U.S. Navy in 2005–2006 andmanufactured by Rafael, Spike is a medium- to extended-long-range “fire and forget”missile specially designed to make very high-speed turns, enabling it to chase a target onthe move. Though designed as an antitank missile, it can also be used against buildingsand unarmored vehicles. The missile trajectory can be arced to hit the target fromabove or set laterally to hit it straight on. It can be fired by infantry (similar to an RPG),warplane, or naval vessel. A miniature version can be hefted by UAVs. Aviation Week

confirmed that the Israeli navy fired Spikes during OCL, and many sources suggest theywere also fired by helicopters and ground forces during the operation, primarily to targetstructures. Some analysts suspect that during OCL, UAVs fired mini Spikes augmentedwith fragmentation sleeves that dispersed mini-cube shrapnel on detonation to increasecasualties (see “Mini-Cube Shrapnel Missile” below).


Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel Tank Rounds (APAM)

A primary reason Israel Military Industries (IMI) developed the anti-personnel/anti-materiel (APAM) laser-guided tank round was to increase the tank corps’ ability tosupport the infantry by clearing pathways and creating passageways for soldiers in urbancombat, particularly by blasting openings in walls of up to 20-inch double-reinforcedconcrete. When used in open areas, APAM essentially serves as an antipersonnel clusterbomb: 6 submunitions explode in succession above the target, “producing a very wideand long lethal-fragmentation kill zone” roughly 55 yards by 20 yards, according to IMI,“leaving enemy infantry forces with no place to hide even if they are behind groundslopes, in trenches, and other concealed areas.” APAM has been in Israel’s arsenal since2003, and HRW believes it was used during OCL, but use has not been confirmed.

Man-Portable Anti-Tank, Anti-Door Short-Range Anti-Armor Weapon (MATADOR)

The man-portable antitank, anti-door (MATADOR) is an RPG-sized, portable, dis-posable anti-armor weapon jointly developed by Israel and Singapore that was firstused in combat during OCL. It was developed to destroy APCs and light tanks butwas used during OCL particularly to breach walls in structures, allowing IDF troops topass through and/or attack targets inside. According to the Singapore Defense Ministry,MATADOR is especially designed to offer “a nonconventional entry point for the soldierwhen fighting in built-up areas” and essentially acts as antipersonnel weapon againstanyone behind a wall. It is so accurate that Israel’s Rafael corporation promotes its“mouse-holing capability” for targeting enemy combatants inside bunkers or buildings.The IDF also used a smaller modified version in OCL called the MATADOR-Wall Breach(MATADOR-WB) specifically designed to blast man-sized holes in standard urban walls.

CARPET (Using Fuel Air Explosives)

Made and developed by Israel’s Rafael corporation, CARPET is an antitank minefieldclearing and IED neutralization system consisting of a launcher assembly holding 20rockets equipped with fuel air explosive (FAE) warheads. The system can be fitted tobattle tanks or APCs. The launcher is placed near the edge of a mine field and elevated.Rockets are then fired forward, expelling the FAE, which forms a highly explosive cloudthat is ignited, creating pressure waves that detonate antitank mines or IEDs on or in theground below. The explosion clears a path up to 100 yards in less than 1 min., with theboundaries of the cleared path being marked by the rocket’s fins. Palestinian securityforces in Gaza recovered rocket fins that, according to Ha’Aretz, were consistent withCARPET. The fins were displayed to the press in Gaza City, but the location where theywere found was not confirmed.

White Phosphorous

Fired by infantry, artillery, or helicopter to explode either in the air or on impact,white phosphorous (WP) is commonly used for signaling, screening, and incendiarypurposes to eliminate the enemy’s resources or to obscure his vision. It is typicallyused against vehicles, fuel depots, and ammunition storage areas; to frustrate enemy


An Israeli soldier sits next to pallets of artillery shells outside the northern Gaza Strip, 5 January 2001. The

light-colored shells are M825A1 white phosphorous projectiles, which the Israel Defense Forces denied using

until confronted with photographic evidence. (Gil Cohen Magen/Reuters)

observers; and to block targeting equipment. WP causes rapid, deep, painful chemicalburn injuries similar to napalm and simultaneously causes delayed wound healing.Spraying WP fires with water increases the fire’s intensity. The munitions are legalunder international law when used for their intended purposes, but their use in denselypopulated urban/civilian areas may legally constitute a war crime.

Israel’s use of WP during OCL was highly controversial, and it was only after theoperation ended that Israel acknowledged having used it. (On 1/21/09, Ha’Aretz re-ported that the IDF the previous day had admitted having used white phosphorous inthe 1/6/09 strike on the UNRWA school in Jabaliya; an IDF statement, dated 1/20/09,acknowledging the firing of some 200 WP artillery shells on “Hamas fighters and rocketlaunching crews in northern Gaza” was reported in the 2/18/09 issue of Counterpunch.)Until that time, Israel had repeatedly denied using WP, even though live footage andstill photographs taken during the operation clearly showed WP in use as early as5 January. Palestinian doctors reported (e.g., Times 1/8) seeing numerous casualtieswith “third-level burns that we can’t seem to control,” which would be consistent withWP. On 13 January, the New York Times cited evidence (including manufacturer’s shellcasings for the U.S.-made 155 mm M825A1 WP artillery munition) of WP use in BaytLahiya, Gaza City, and Khan Yunis. In March 2009, HRW documented WP use at 7 sitesin northern Gaza (3 in Bayt Lahiya, 3 in Siyafa, 1 in al-Atatra), 5 in Gaza City (includinga 15 January strike that destroyed UNRWA’s main food storage depot), and 7 in Khuzanear Khan Yunis.


Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME)

Created by the U.S. Air Force specifically for use in crowded urban areas, denseinert metal explosives (DIME) creates an explosion that is extremely powerful but oflimited (5–10 meter) range to reduce collateral damage, but it is also believed to behighly cancerous to those injured. DIME munitions are packed with a fine mix of 25%TNT and 75% tungsten alloy (tungsten with small amounts of nickel and either cobaltor iron) that forms a dust cloud that ignites upon impact, similar to an FAE device.Victims in the immediate range are hit by a micro-shrapnel made up of the canceroustungsten. DIME is not illegal under international law, but its use is discouraged becauseof its cancer-causing effects.

During OCL, Gazans reported seeing bombs that produced a reddish mushroomcloud of dust, and doctors reported treating injuries, such as bloodless amputations,that are consistent with DIME. Experts in DIME technology who have viewed photosof Gazans’ injuries suspect that Israel did use DIME during OCL, but this has notbeen proved conclusively. Israel is also suspected of having used DIME in Lebanon in2006.

Depleted Uranium (DU)

DU’s density makes it an effective coating for bullets and missiles to give them armor-piercing capability. DU is often suspected as a component in missiles and bombs thathave superior penetrating ability. Its use is highly controversial, however, because it haspotentially devastating long-term health effects. DU is not illegal under international lawbut is discouraged because of the potential health hazards to civilians through inhalinguranium dust and shrapnel embedded in the ground leeching uranium into soil andgroundwater.

Israel has long been suspected of using DU munitions and has been accused of doingso again during OCL, with doctors in Gaza reporting removing shrapnel with tracesof DU from casualties. Bolstering suspicions, experts highly suspect that U.S. TOWmissiles and GBU-28 bombs used in Iraq contained DU, and the U.S. has sold both typesof munitions to Israel. On 21 January 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agencyagreed to conduct a formal investigation of Israel’s DU use, based on an appeal by Arabambassadors.

Flechette Rounds

While most artillery shells in Israel’s arsenal are designed to disperse shrapnelwhen they explode to “increase lethality” (giving them a “dual use” as antiperson-nel weapons), flechette rounds (also known as sabot rounds) are primarily intendedas antipersonnel devices. Each shell is packed with 5,000–8,000 razor-sharp, nail-likemetal darts, each about 4 cm long. Shells explode in the air, scattering the darts in acone-shaped pattern 300 yards long and 90 yards wide.

Flechettes are intended for use against massed infantry attacks or squads of troops inthe open. They are not banned under international law, but their use in built-up civilianareas could be ruled illegal.


In 2003, the Israeli High Court rejected a petition to ban use of flechettes altogether,ruling that the military guidelines restricting their use were adequate. Amnesty Inter-national has documented Israel’s use of flechettes during OCL but described its use as“limited.” Reported incidents include Rafah on 3 January, near Bayt Hanun on 5 January,and in Nussayrat r.c. on 13 January.

Mini-Cube Shrapnel Missile

Amnesty International reported Israeli use of a mystery weapon fired by dronesthat dispersed “tiny [2–4 mm], sharp-edged cubes of purpose-made shrapnel” similarto a flechette round. Some sources believe that this describes the Viper Strike anti-armor weapon that disperses tungsten microcubes, though these were not previouslybelieved to be in Israel’s arsenal. Other experts speculate that the cubes could be partof a “fragmentation sleeve” fitted to a Hellfire or Spike missile to increase its lethality;Spikes and Hellfires are light enough to be mounted on a UAV. At least 2 children werekilled and 2 severely injured by mini-cubes, which Amnesty International called “a moresophisticated version of the ball-bearings or nails and bolts which armed groups oftenpack into crude rockets and suicide bombs.”

Fake Missiles

The IDF acknowledged (4/22/09) using fake missiles designed not to explode inorder to frighten Gaza’s civilian population during OCL. Calling the tactic “a knockon the roof,” the IDF described firing fake missiles onto the roofs of buildings to scareresidents into evacuating the area, portraying this as a method “to ensure that Palestiniancivilians could avoid harm.”

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of GATR,” 6 October 2008; ATK press release, “Elbit Systems and ATK to Develop Laser Guided

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