the iraq war learning from the past, adapting to the present, and planning for the future pub754

8/7/2019 The Iraq War Learning From the Past, Adapting to the Present, And Planning for the Future Pub754

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THE IRAQ WAR:LEARNING FROM THE PAST,ADAPTING TO THE PRESENT,

AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

Thomas R. Mockaitis

February 2007

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FOREWORD

The Iraq War has been the subject of heatedpolitical debate and intense academic scrutiny. Muchargument has focused on the decision to invade andthe size of the force tasked with the campaign. Whilethese factors have contributed to the challenge ofcounterinsurgency operations, so has the Americanapproach to unconventional war.

Taking full account of the factors beyond the controlof the U.S. military and avoiding glib comparisonswith Vietnam, this monograph examines how theAmerican approach has affected operations. Theauthor, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, draws on the experienceof other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, toidentify broad lessons that might inform the conduct

of this and future campaigns. He also documents theprocess by which soldiers and Marines in Iraq haveadapted to the challenging situation and incorporatedboth historic and contemporary lessons into the newcounterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual3-24.

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased topublish this monograph under SSIs External ResearchAssociates Program.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS R. MOCKAITIS is Professor of History atDePaul University. As an adjunct faculty memberof the Center for Civil Military Relations, he has co-taught several terrorism/counterterrorism coursesand worked with a team of specialists to help theRomanian Army rewrite its civil-military cooperationdoctrine. He has lectured at the U.S. Marine CorpsCommand and Staff College and the Canadian ForcesStaff College, and presented papers at the PearsonPeacekeeping Center (Canada), the Royal MilitaryAcademy Sandhurst (UK), and at conferences co-sponsored with the Military Science Department ofthe Austrian Ministry of Defense. A frequent mediacommentator on terrorism and security matters, Dr.

Mockaitis has appeared on Public Television, NationalPublic Radio, and various Chicago radio and TVstations. He appears regularly as a terrorism expertfor WGN TV News (Channel 9). He co-edited GrandStrategy and the War on Terrorism (London: Frank Cass,2003) with Paul Rich; and The Future of Peace Operations:Old Challenges for a New Century (London: Frank Cass,2004), co-edited with Erwin Schmidl. He is the authorof British Counterinsurgency: 1919-1960 (London:Macmillan, 1990), British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester: University of ManchesterPress, 1995), and Peacekeeping and Intrastate Confict:the Sword or the Olive Branch? (Westport, CT: Praeger,1999). Dr. Mockaitis earned a BA in European Historyfrom Allegheny College in Meadville, PA, and his MA

and Ph.D. in Modern British and Irish History from theUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison.


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SUMMARY

Iraq confronts the U.S. military with one of themost complex internal security operations in history.It must occupy, pacify, secure, and rebuild a countryof 26 million people with fewer than 150,000 troopsorganized and trained as a conventional force inpredominantly heavy armored divisions. Theyoccupy a land divided into two broad ethnic and threereligious groups crisscrossed by hundreds of regional,local, and family loyalties. For the past 3 years, Iraqhas been wracked by a Sunni insurgency augmentedby foreign mujahedeen terrorists and complicated bygeneral lawlessness. Growing intercommunal violencebetween Sunni and Shiite militias has taken the countryto the brink of civil war.

Developing an effective strategy to counter sucha complex insurgency would be challenging for anyconventional force. However, the historical experienceof the U.S. military compounds the challenge. Thatexperience has engendered a deep dislike for all formsof unconventional war. This aversion naturally reectsAmerican attitudes. Popular democracies have greatdifculty sustaining support for protracted, open-ended conicts like counterinsurgency. The VietnamWar strengthened this tendency and led the Pentagonto relegate counterinsurgency to Special Forces. Thesefactors help explain both the difculty the armedforces have had in conducting operations in Iraq andthe growing impatience of the American people withthe war.

Faced with a conict they did not expect to ghtand denied the resources, training, and requisitetroop strength to ght it, however, the U.S. military


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understandably has resented criticism of its efforts inIraq. American troops have made the best of a difcult

situation. They have adapted their methods to anevolving war, learned from their own mistakes, andeven learned from the study of history. However, thecounterinsurgency campaign in Iraq can benet fromfurther study of current operations and past campaigns.Such study may provide valuable lessons to inform theconduct of this and future campaigns.


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THE IRAQ WAR:LEARNING FROM THE PAST,

ADAPTING TO THE PRESENT,AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Military in Iraq faces the most complexinternal security operation in its history. As the leadnation in a coalition whose other members, save theBritish, have contributed very small contingents, theymust occupy, pacify, secure, and rebuild a country of 26million people with fewer than 150,000 troops organizedand trained as a conventional force in predominantlyheavy armored divisions. They occupy a fracturedstate divided into two broad ethnic and three religious

groups crisscrossed by hundreds of regional, local, andfamily loyalties. Historically, Iraqs diverse populationhas been held together rst by colonial occupiers andthen by a repressive dictatorship, both of which used aminority to dominate the country. The inux of foreignmujahedeen to ght the indels further complicatesthe situation. Diverse insurgent and terrorist groupsunited by a desire to expel the coalition move throughan urban landscape ideal for their operations and hideamong a sullen population embittered by the failureof the occupiers to rebuild the country fast enough. Inshort, it is the insurgency from hell.

Crafting a strategy to counter such a threat wouldbe challenging under any circumstances. The historicalexperience of the U.S. military and American culture

make responding to it even more difcult. TheVietnam War soured the American military on thewhole idea of counterinsurgency. Many considered


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the war in Southeast Asia a wasteful episode foughtunder difcult circumstances with insufcient political

support and far too much interference from on high.The conict diverted valuable resources from themilitarys proper task of defending Western Europeand South Korea. In any case, the U.S. Army, with itspreponderance of heavy divisions and commitment tomaneuver warfare, seemed ill-suited to unconventionalwar. The Nixon Doctrine put counterinsurgency underthe umbrella of Low-intensity Conict, which itrelegated to Special Forces, who would advise andassist threatened governments as part of foreign aidfor internal defense.1

This aversion to irregular warfare naturallyreected American attitudes. Popular democracieshave great difculty sustaining support for protracted,open-ended conicts like counterinsurgency. Indeed,

they have difculty sustaining any long, costlymilitary effort unless the public perceives that the vitalinterests, perhaps even the survival of the nation, areat stake. Few low-intensity conicts in support of alliedstates t that bill, so the armed forces understandablyseek to avoid them. The Vietnam War and popularreaction against it severely damaged army moralefor perhaps as much as a decade.2 The Americanpublics low tolerance for protracted, unconventionalconict and the long shadow of Vietnam clearly canbe seen in the initial response to the insurgency inIraq. Strong support for the war declined soon after aswift victory and assurances of a speedy withdrawalgave way to a desultory struggle promising to lastyears. Comparisons with Vietnam began to appear

in the popular media and academic journals, andrebuttals soon followed. One such exchange occurredin Foreign Policy between Andrew Krepinevich, a


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leading authority on the Vietnam War; and StephenBiddle, Senior Fellow in Defense Policy at the Council

on Foreign Relations. Krepinevich argued vehementlythat the United States was repeating the mistakes ithad made Vietnam and could expect the same outcomeunless the Department of Defense (DoD) changed itsapproach to the war.3 Biddle argued just as passionatelythat the conicts differed so fundamentally in naturethat little from Vietnam could be applied to Iraq.4 IfAmerican ofcers bristled at references to SoutheastAsia, they also objected to comparisons between theircounterinsurgency methods and those of other Westernarmies, most notably the British.

Faced with a conict they did not expect to ghtand denied the resources, training, and requisite troopstrength to ght it, the U.S. military understandably hasresented criticism of its efforts in Iraq. Since armed forces

in a democratic society must ght the wars that theyare given, not those that they would choose, Americantroops have made the best of a difcult situation. Theyhave adapted their methods to an evolving war, learnedfrom their own mistakes, and even beneted from studyof historic conicts. The conduct of counterinsurgencyin Iraq can, however, continue to benet from furtherstudy of current operations assessed in the light of pastwars. Such assessment must begin with understandingthe Iraq insurgency in all its complexity, proceed toan examination of the U.S. approach to countering it,and conclude with recommendations that may informthe conduct of the current campaign and guide futureoperations. A critique of the U.S. approach also mustdistinguish clearly between policy failures and military

mistakes. Recommendations based upon historyshould distill broad principles from a range of conictsand avoid trying to derive a template for victory fromany single campaign or national approach.


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DEFINING TERMS

A public fed a steady diet of suicide bombings andgeneral mayhem on the evening news may wonderat any ambiguity about the denition of insurgency.However, misunderstanding the nature of suchconicts has contributed considerably to mishandlingthem. For the rst 3 months of the occupation, the U.S.Government dismissed signs of a growing insurgencyas mere terrorism and/or sporadic violence by Baathistmalcontents. Failure to recognize the true nature ofthe threat seriously hampered efforts to counter itand underscores the need to dene clearly the type ofenemy one faces.

Insurgency.

Current DoD Doctrine denes insurgency as Anorganized movement aimed at the overthrow of aconstituted government through use of subversionand armed conict.5 This denition covers virtuallyany form of political violence, fails to delineate thetype of armed conict employed, and omits theimportant fact that in addition to subversion andarmed conict, insurgents also use terror as a weapon.Insurgency develops when a signicant segment ofthe population feels alienated from a government thatneither represents it nor meets its needs. Insurgentsuse propaganda to persuade these disaffected peoplethat replacing the current regime will improve theirlives. When this subversion succeeds in eroding popularsupport for (or at least tolerance of) those in power,

insurgents can begin to useguerrilla warfare against thegovernment and its institutions. Insurgent guerrillasare the military wing of the political movement. They


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Insurgencies have taken many forms and in somecases followed prescribed theories of revolution. Mao

Tse-Tungs primer on guerrilla warfare is the mostfamous. Based on the Communist takeover of China,Mao saw revolution progressing through distinctphases from subversion through mobile war. TheChinese Communists based their insurgency rmlyon the countrys vast rural population, leading Mao todescribe insurgents as sh swimming in a sea of peasantsupport that eventually would drown the cities.10 Maostheory became the blueprint for Communist-led, anti-colonial wars of national liberation. For example,Ho Chi Minh applied Maos approach successfully indriving the French from Indochina.

In the post-colonial world few insurgencies havegained enough strength to defeat an establishedgovernment. This realization has led many to

pursue a somewhat different strategy. Under certaincircumstances insurgents can provoke the securityforces into committing atrocities on such a scale that aforeign state or an alliance of powers will intervene onthe insurgents behalf. This strategy worked brilliantlyin Kosovo, where the Kosovo Liberation Army baitedSerbian military and paramilitary forces into yetanother round of ethnic cleansing. Horried by similaratrocities they had witnessed in Croatia and Bosniaduring the previous decade, the Western alliancehad had enough. Led by the United States, the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) went to warwith Serbia and forced its withdrawal from Kosovo.Final status talks indicate that the province probablywill be given its independence. The Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA) thus had succeeded even though it couldnever have hoped to defeat the Serbian army.

Even when insurgents fail to take over a country,they can improve the conditions of their people.


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Although the Basque insurgent organization,Fatherland and Liberty (ETA in the Basque language),

did not gain independence for its province, it didextract valuable concessions from the Spanishgovernment, including a greater degree of localautonomy, ofcial use of the Basque language in theprovince and consideration of Basque culture andinstitutions. The Fabrundo Mart National LiberationFront failed to topple the Salvadoran government, butit opened up the democratic process in El Salvador,forced scrutiny and, as a result, improvement of thegovernments human rights record, and ultimatelybecame a legitimate political party. The ProvisionalIrish Republican Army (IRA) failed to unify NorthernIreland with the Republic of Ireland but succeeded inimproving the living conditions for Catholics and inguaranteeing them a share in political power.

Counterinsurgency.

As the prex counter suggests, counterinsurgencyincludes all measures taken to defeat insurgency.However, as the late Sir Robert Thompson aptly noted,a state that merely reacts to an insurgent threat facesdefeat. To be successful counterinsurgency must bebased upon a comprehensive, pro-active strategy. Sinceinsurgency usually derives from bad governance, athreatened state must rst get its own house in order.Economic privation in the midst of grossly inequitabledistribution of wealth has been a major source ofdiscontent feeding revolution. Once it addresseseconomic and social issues, the government can then

turn to political grievances.While addressing the causes of unrest that fuel the

insurgency, the state also must take military and police


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action against the insurgents. The manner in which itconducts offensive operations can make or break the

counterinsurgency campaign. Since insurgents hidewithin a sympathetic or at least acquiescent population,the temptation to retaliate against entire communitiescan be hard to resist. However, indiscriminate useof force invariably will make a bad situation worse.Civilians punished for aiding insurgents whom theyhave no real power to resist may be turned fromreluctant participants into enthusiastic supporters.Every errant bomb or misdirected shell creates moreinsurgent supporters.

Focusing the right amount of force precisely on theinsurgents requires accurate intelligence. As BritishGeneral and counterinsurgency expert Sir FrankKitson observed, defeating insurgents consists verylargely in nding them.11 Accurate information on the

insurgents organization, membership, and intentionsallows the security forces to operate in a focused anddiscriminating manner. Such information usuallycomes not from coerced confessions or even spies,but from disaffected members of the insurgency or itserstwhile supporters. The hearts-and-minds campaignlinks indirectly to offensive operations by encouragingcooperation. Persuaded that the government isaddressing their needs and convinced that it willprotect them, ordinary citizens may come forward withinformation that allows the security forces to developan accurate picture of the insurgents organization,membership, and intentions. Disillusioned insurgentsmay even be enticed to defect, especially if they receiveamnesty and perhaps modest monetary rewards.

If counterinsurgency is difcult for a threatened state,it is even more complicated for a foreign governmentsupporting that state, a role the United States often has


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played. Providing foreign aid for internal defense,the doctrinal category that includes counterinsurgency,

historically has put American advisors and, in somecases, troops in the unenviable position of supportingsome very oppressive regimes.12 They have had totrain, equip, and otherwise assist militaries whosebehavior contributed to the insurgency in the rstplace. Threatened regimes often have been able to resistU.S. demands for reforms that would have erodedtheir privileged positions because they understoodthat U.S strategic interests outweighed the Americancommitment to human rights. No matter how effectivethey may be, counterinsurgency methods will notredeem bad governance. U.S. personnel can improvethe quality of the indigenous security forces, but theycannot convey legitimacy upon a regime that doesnot enjoy the support of its own people. If anything,

they will be seen as accomplices to the illegitimategovernment and become targets themselves. Thecase of El Salvador illustrates this point. U.S. advisorsviewed with alarm the human rights record of theSalvadoran military, but could do little to improve itbecause the Salvadoran government knew perfectlywell that the Reagan administration placed a higherpriority on combating Communism than it did onpromoting human rights or social justice.13

The ambiguity of assisting a threatened state withinternal defense plagues U.S. operations in Iraq aswell. Indeed, the American presence is even moreproblematic than it was in El Salvador. Not only doesthe United States support a government strugglingto gain legitimacy, but also in the eyes of many Iraqis

and the larger Arab world, it actually installed thatregime as an American client. Desire to expel theoccupiers unites many insurgents who have littleelse in common.


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HISTORIC PATTERNS AND OUTCOMES

Insurgency has been one of the most persistenttypes of conict since the end of World War II.The period 1945 to 1960 experienced a particularlyintense concentration of such wars coinciding withthe process of decolonization. Insurgencies broke outperiodically in the post-colonial era as well, and a hostof unconventional operations following the end of theCold War challenged conventional armies in wayssimilar to the classic counterinsurgency campaigns.Insurgency and counterinsurgency have been studiedso thoroughly that past conicts need not be reviewedhere except in the most general terms. Insurgents wonmost of the anti-colonial wars owing to a combinationof European weaknesses and international oppositionto imperialism. During the post-colonial era, victory

most often went to the side that could attract externalsupport (e.g., the Salvadoran government in the 1980sand the KLA in the late 1990s).

The approach of one nation, however, deserves closerattention because it has yielded better results. Beforeexamining the British approach to counterinsurgencyin greater detail, however, it is worth reiterating thatthis approach does not offer a panacea for handlinginternal conict. The British suffered serious defeatsin Ireland (1919-21) and Palestine (1944-47) and madeserious mistakes in all their wars. The United Stateswill not, therefore, win in Iraq by asking GI Joeto become more like Johnny Brit. The accidents ofhistory did, however, give the British army a wealth ofcounterinsurgency experience that, carefully analyzed,

can increase understanding of the Iraq war and perhapssuggest some adjustments to conducting it.


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THE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIESOF BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY

Although the British have enjoyed considerablesuccess in countering insurgencies from Malaya toNorthern Ireland, their approach has become quitecontroversial in recent years. American ofcers havebeen barraged with ungenerous, over-simplied, andoften glib comparisons between their supposedlyineffectual methods in Vietnam and the allegedlysuperior British approach employed in Malaya. Similarcomparisons between the British armys handling ofBasra and the U.S. militarys alleged mishandling ofthe far more challenging Sunni triangle have madeAmerican ofcers understandably resistant to what theysee as more British tripe. Several misunderstandingsmust be addressed before considering what, if any,

methods from British counterinsurgency campaignscan be applied to Iraq.

To begin with, the British Approach is not uniquelyBritish. Virtually every nation that has managed anempire, formal or otherwise, has had experience withinsurgency and at least some success in combatingit. French General Maxim Weygands pacicationof Morocco and the U.S. Marine Corps campaign inNicaragua during their interwar period offer two casesin point. The Marines in particular developed extensivecounterinsurgency experience in Latin America beforeWorld War II, much of it preserved in the U.S. MarineCorps Small Wars Manual.14 This excellent work denesan approach similar to that found in Britains Noteson Imperial Policing from the same period.15 Armed

forces, however, are shaped by the preponderance oftheir historical experiences. For the French and theAmericans, that experience has been conventional.


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The British Army for much of its history has been moreof an imperial police force tasked with maintaining

order and later combating insurgency within a globalempire.

Furthermore, despite their considerable success,the British have not discovered a silver bullet fordefeating insurgents. Their record, though impressive,contains some stunning defeats. From 1919-21, theIRA conducted a highly successful campaign againsta much larger British force that grossly mishandledthe insurgency. They alienated the general publicwith heavy-handed tactics, had poor intelligence,and committed atrocities. The treaty under which theBritish withdrew from what became the Irish Free Statefavored London, but as one historian of the conictobserved, it could not be denied that great powerhad been deed.16 The British also withdrew from

the Mandate of Palestine following an unsuccessfulcampaign against Zionist insurgents prior to thecreation of Israel (1948). In this case, the defeat owedless to awed counterinsurgency methods than it didto an untenable political situation. Numerous mistakesdid, however, dog the British campaign against theGreek Nationalist Organization of Cypriot Fighters(EOKA from its Greek initials, 1954-59), although itultimately succeeded in suppressing the revolt. Finally,British forces withdrew from Aden in 1967, following adesultory and largely unsuccessful counterinsurgencycampaign in South Arabia.

It also must be noted that Britains most successfulcounterinsurgency campaign in Malaya (1945-60)occurred under highly favorable circumstances that

probably will never be repeated. In Malaya andelsewhere, British forces enjoyed an extraordinarydegree of control over local populations and could


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promulgate quite draconian Emergency Regulationswith little domestic or international scrutiny. Critics

of the British approach further note that its victoriesserved as little more than holding actions to delayinevitable imperial withdrawal and perhaps hand overto pro-British successor governments.

These qualications notwithstanding, fewconventional militaries have had as much experienceof insurgency or enjoyed as much success in counteringit as the British Army. For most of the 19th and 20thcenturies, the British engaged in a continuous seriesof border skirmishes, internal security operations,and full-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. Theyconducted these operations in a variety of settingsthroughout an empire covering a quarter of theearths land surface and encompassing 25 percentof its population. Out of this diverse and extensive

experience, the British fashioned a exible approachbased on three broad principles: minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and decentralization of commandand control.17 British success has continued beyond thecolonial era. One of its most spectacular successes camein Oman (1970-75), where British contract and loanofcers in cooperation with Special Air Service (SAS)teams assisted the Sultan of Omans Armed Forcesin defeating a Communist-led insurgency in DhofarProvince. Following a rather slow start characterized byserious mistakes, the British Army has performed wellduring the 30-year conict in Northern Ireland. Thearmy also adapted its counterinsurgency experienceto the task of Wider Peacekeeping, as the new UnitedNations (UN) humanitarian interventions of the 1990s

came to be called.18 The British contingent in NATOsKosovo Force has performed better than most of itscounterparts in the difcult task of internal securityand rebuilding.19


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The efcacy of British counterinsurgency alsohas been demonstrated in Iraq. During their initial

occupation of Basra, British forces relied on excellenturban warfare tactics learned in Belfast and Londonderryand called on re support only when they could doso with minimal risk of civilian casualties. When indoubt, the Brits walked softly. For example, theyinltrated two-man sniper teams into the city. Theseunits targeted highly visible Baath Party members,killing few people but having a profound psychologicaleffect on the enemy.20 As one analyst with extensiveexperience of the British Army has noted:

Thirty years of engagement with the Irish RepublicanArmy, in the grimy streets of Northern Irelands cities,has taught the British, down to the level of the youngestsoldier, the essential skills of personal survival in theenvironment of urban warfare and of dominance over

those who wage it.21

Once they occupied the city, United Kingdom (UK)forces took immediate steps to win the trust of localpeople. They removed their helmets and ak jackets tomingle with the crowd and later as the city remainedquiet withdrew their armored cars as a gesture of goodfaith.22 The British later engaged the Mahdi Army insome tough battles, but they always adjusted forceprotection and tactics as the situation dictated. Theirapproach contrasts markedly with the initial Americantactic of reconnaissance by re, in which troopsdrove through hostile areas hoping to draw out theinsurgents. If we get one round of incoming re, aU.S. soldier observed, We will put down 3,000 before

we even dismount from our vehicles.23Building trust has been easier because of the

more pragmatic approach the Brits have taken to


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reconstruction. Based once again on experiencegarnered in maintaining an empire, the British

determined that establishing and maintaining law andorder should be their rst priority. They then restoredelectricity and reopened schools and hospitals. TheBritish also showed a willingness to work with whoeverwould cooperate with them, regardless of past politicalafliation. This pragmatism contrasted markedly withthe Americans ideological approach characterizedby a zero-tolerance policy for former Baathists and acommitment to building democracy above all else.24

The British do, however, occupy a smaller and farless challenging sector of Iraq than do the Americans.They also have experienced serious failures includingallegations of abuse of Iraqi civilians by British troops.These reservations, however, do not diminish the valueof what can be learned from the British approach.

Based on broad principles applied in a exible manner,British counterinsurgency has proven quite adaptable.A clear distinction, however, must be made betweenmethods and principles. No single blueprint could beapplied to Malaya, Oman, Northern Ireland, Kosovo,and Iraq. Copying specic tactics from one campaignand applying them slavishly to another almost certainlywill result in failure. South Vietnamese efforts to createnew villages based on the Malayan model led to theineffective Strategic Hamlet program. Even Britishvictories included colonial methods best not repeated.Unfortunately, critics latch on to past mistakes orobjectionable tactics from a single campaign to dismissthe British approach entirely.25 Tactics, however, changewith time and circumstances while the principles from

which they derive endure.


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The British Approach.

British counterinsurgency developed out of aunique legal framework and more than a centurysexperience handling civil unrest. At the core of theBritish approach lay the common law principle of aid tothe civil power. English common law requires anyoneto aid the civil authorities when called upon to do soand makes no distinction between soldier and civilian.During a state of war, British forces do not operate inaid to the civil power and are subject to the MutinyAct (the equivalent of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) and international agreements such as theGeneva Convention. Internal conicts, however, occurunder conditions in which civil authority still operates.This legal framework had profound implications forthe conduct of internal security operations ranging

from riot to full scale rebellion.To begin with, aid to the civil power put the

civilian authority rmly in control of handlingunrest. A magistrate typically would request troopsto quell a disturbance and provide general guidancefor their employment. He would not exercise tacticalcontrol of the troops, but the military would be heldaccountable for its action under ordinary civil law.Quelling temporary disturbances such as riots provedto be relatively straitforward. Full-blown insurgenciespresented a more complex challenge requiring thecivil authorities to be in close partnership with themilitary and police. This partnership resulted in acomprehensive approach that addressed the causes ofunrest while countering its violent manifestations.

Aid to the Civil Power also placed signicantrestrictions on the military. Like police and thosecalled upon to assist them, soldiers were bound by the


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Common Law principle of Minimum Force. Accordingto this principle, soldiers could use just enough force

to achieve the immediate effect of stopping violentunrest in a particular location. Following the infamousmassacre at Amritsar, India, in 1919, General ReginaldDyer faced disciplinary action not because he openedre on an illegal meeting, but because he continuedring after the crowd had begun to disperse. As longas the offenders were British subjects, soldiers had toexercise restraint when facing unrest ranging from riotto insurgency. There is, however, one principle thatmust be observed in all action taken by the troops,one eld manual instructed, No more force shall beapplied than the situation demands.26 A legal principle,of course, could not prevent excesses from occurring,but it did have the desirable effect of subordinating useof military force to a broader political strategy aimed at

addressing the causes of unrest and winning the heartsand minds of disaffected people.

Winning hearts and minds has become a muchmaligned, often misunderstood concept that conjuresup images of soldiers building playgrounds for smilingchildren, diverting personnel and resources from theirproper task of ghting wars. A hearts-and-mindscampaign, however, consists of soberly assessing whatmotivates people to rebel and devising a strategy toaddress the underlying causes of unrest. In most cases,discontent stems from bread-and-butter issues. Lack ofjobs, decent housing, electricity, running water, healthcare, and education can motivate people to accept oreven actively support insurgents. Once their basicneeds have been met, however, people may desire

political freedoms, the absence of which also can fuelan insurgency.

Realization that rebellion demands a politicalsolution, combined with the legal limits placed on


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the amount of force the military could use, led theBritish to develop a comprehensive approach to

counterinsurgency. Soldiers and police (collectivelydubbed security forces) provided a shield behindwhich political, social, and economic reform took place.Improving living conditions and a growing convictionthat the government would win encouraged ordinarypeople to provide intelligence on insurgent activity.This intelligence in turn allowed the security forcesto take the offensive. Successful operations, combinedwith generous amnesties and even monetary rewards,enticed insurgents to surrender, producing moreintelligence leading to further success.

Combining the various elements of the Britishapproach into a coherent and effective counterinsurgencycampaign required a mechanism of coordination.During the Malayan Emergency, the British developed

a committee system at district, state, and federal level.At the local level, these committees consisted of theDistrict Commissioner (a civil administrator), the Chiefof Police, and the commander of troops in the area(usually a lieutenant colonel commanding a battalion).The High Commissioner and Director of MilitaryOperations (a joint appointment), Sir Gerald Templer,insisted that committees meet at least once a day, ifonly for a whiskey and soda.27 The system workedwell in Malaya and could be adapted to a variety ofsituations right up to and including Northern Irelandand Iraq.

The British facilitated cooperation with the policeand civil authorities through extended military postings.Dubbed framework deployment, this approach kept

units in a specic local for extended periods ratherthan moving them around. Soldiers, like policeman ona beat, got to know an area intimately. They met the


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locals, learned who belonged in their neighborhoodand who did not, and developed good relations with

community leaders. This prolonged contact sometimesyielded valuable intelligence on the insurgents.

The British approach to counterinsurgency did notoffer a panacea. The British made serious mistakes evenin successful campaigns and experienced signicantfailures. Some insurgencies cannot be defeated evenwith the best of methods, as the British learned inPalestine (1945-47) and South Arabia (1963-67).28Nonetheless, the British have a better track record incounterinsurgency than any other nation. They haveadapted what they learned in half a century of colonialconicts to the post-colonial tasks of peace operationsin Bosnia and Kosovo. Their approach properlyunderstood and appropriately adapted can providelessons applicable to Iraq, Afghanistan, and future

conicts.

IRAQ IN CONTEXT

The most intransigent of colonial insurgencies,of course, pales by comparison with Iraq. It still,however, is worth considering the degree to whichthe lessons of past campaigns can inform the conductof the current one. Without engaging in a nowpointless argument over whether or not the invasionwas justied, understanding the context in which itoccurred is essential to assessing the U.S. responseto the subsequent insurgency. Such an assessment inturn may lead to recommendations for rening thatresponse and for improving the American approach to

counterinsurgency in general.Only in the broadest sense can contemporary Iraq

even be considered a modern nation-state. Carved out


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of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, theBritish Mandate (under the League of Nations) of Iraq

incorporated diverse ethnic groups within boundariesdrawn by the European powers at Versailles. TheBritish had strategic interests to protect and promises tokeep. While they had no desire to trap a large Kurdishminority within their Mandate, they very much wantedcontrol of the oil rich regions of Mosul and Kirkuk in theheart of Kurdistan. They also owed a considerable debtto Faisal, the Sharif of Mecca, who had supported theArab Revolt led by T. E. Lawrence during the war. TheMcMahon-Hussein letters of 1915 had promised thatthe Sharifs son, Abdullah, would receive one emiratebased in Jerusalem and his son, Faisal, would receiveanother in Damascus. Unfortunately for all concerned,the British also had pledged to the Zionist movementsupport for a national homeland for the Jewish

People in Palestine and promised the French controlof Syria and Lebanon.29 Because of these irreconcilablepromises, Abdullah had to settle for the newly createdEmirate of Transjordan with its capital in Amman (helater became king of Jordan). His brother, Faisal, ruledbriey in Damascus before being turned out by theFrench and, quite naturally, turned to the British forcompensation.

Faisal seemed the answer to British problems inIraq. Following a bloody revolt in 1920-21, the colonialpower sought to rule indirectly. As a leader of theArab Revolt, a member of the Prophets family, and aBritish ally, the Saudi prince seemed the ideal choice togovern Iraq.30 He was, however, also a Sunni Muslimand inclined to appoint Sunnis to important posts, to

the chagrin of the Shiite majority.31 Working with aminority group who would depend completely upontheir colonial masters was, however, a time-honored


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clerics. If this dizzying array of ethnic and religiousafliations were not complicated enough, the spider

web of family, clan, and regional loyalties beneathit further complicates the human landscape of Iraq.A complex and variegated social network of tribes,lineages, and khamsahs (vengeance groups) underliesthe broad religious and ethnic divisions within thecountry. Class distinctions, the inevitable cronyismof a one party, dictatorial regime and the hardshipscreated by an international embargo, invasion, and theensuing destruction of Iraqi infrastructure exacerbatethese historic rifts.

In addition to being complex, Iraqi demographicshave proven to be quite dynamic. The last year has seena decided shift to broad ethnic/religious afliations.From the outset of the occupation, the Kurds havepushed hardest for regional autonomy and would

probably favor partition. Sectarian violence seems tohave weakened, if not destroyed, many kinship tiesthat crossed the Sunni-Shiite divide. Should the Iraqiconict escalate from insurgency to civil war andpartition become a more attractive option to all parties,the country would face a situation not unlike that ofIndia and Pakistan in 1947. Many mixed areas andenclaves would make partition difcult and bloody.

The physical geography of the country has beenno less challenging to those trying to govern Iraq thanits human landscape. The country occupies 437,000square kilometers at the crossroads of Middle Eastpolitics and conict. The arid or semi-arid nature of80 percent of this land constricts the population to adense band of settlement along the banks of the Tigris

and Euphrates rivers, a concentration which explainsthe overwhelmingly urban nature of the insurgency.Iraqs 3,650 kilometers of border abut two of Americas


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most intransigent foes in the region, Syria and Iran,through sparsely populated, difcult-to-control

regions. Members of the same Bedouin tribes straddlethe Syrian border adjacent to troublesome Anbarprovince. The Shiite south shares an equally porousfrontier with neighboring Iran, and Iraqi Kurdistanborders Kurdish regions in Syria, Turkey, and Iran.Supplies for coalition forces must come to Baghdadvia air or over thousands of kilometers of roads northfrom the port of Um Qasr in friendly Kuwait.33

Unfolding Conict.

The development and course of the insurgencystemmed in large measure from the manner in which theU.S.-led coalition planned and conducted the invasionof Iraq and subsequently occupied the country. For the

purpose of analysis, the conict to date can be dividedinto four phases: preinvasion planning, the invasionitself, the rst year of occupation (April 2003-April2004), the period from April 2004 to February 2006(the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara), andthe period from that bombing to the present. Duringthese phases, the insurgency took root and evolvedaccording to its own internal dynamic and in responseto U.S. actions.

Planning and Invasion.

While the decision to invade Iraq will be the subjectof considerable debate for years to come, the mannerin which the invasion occurred undeniably shaped

the insurgency that followed. Failure to persuade theUN, NATO, and many of its allies to join the coalitiondeprived the U.S.-led operation of legitimacy and,


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more importantly, troops. During the rst Gulf Wara truly international coalition mustered half a million

men and women for the more limited task of liberatingKuwait. Now the United States planned to invadeand occupy Iraq with a force of 130,000 American and25,000 British troops.34 Many U.S. ofcers questionedSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds claim that thesmaller force could, in fact, do the job. Then Chief ofStaff of the Army General Eric Shinseki told Congressthat many more troops would be necessary, not todefeat the Iraqi army but to stabilize Iraq followingthe mission. Asked to be more specic, the Generalresponded, I would say that whats been mobilized tothis point, something on the order of several hundredthousand soldiers.35 The White House disputed thisassessment, Shinseki retired soon after testifying, andthe mission went ahead as planned. Rumsfeld and the

Commander of Central Command, General TommyFranks, planned and conducted the invasion based ontwo assumptions: that the Iraqi military would put uplittle resistance and that the U.S. military would nottake the lead role in the post-hostilities Phase IV of theoperation.36 The rst assumption proved correct, thesecond wildly optimistic.

These assumptions shaped planning for thepost-invasion period. The possibility of a protractedinsurgency received scant attention, as did thecatastrophic impact of general lawlessness.37 Lack ofplanning for an insurgency combined with the shortageof troops had immediate repercussions and long-termconsequences, allowing the insurgency to take rootand helping to keep it going ever since. The collapse

of Saddams regime produced not the expected rushof enthusiastic Iraqis willing to accept responsibilityfor self-government but an enormous power vacuum.


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American forces faced pillaging, looting, settling ofvendettas, and other forms of lawlessness that they

were ill-equipped, untrained, and ultimately unableto prevent. The release of thousands of criminals bySaddam on the eve of the invasion contributed tothe chaos. Numerous accounts document how thisstate of lawlessness turned a potentially supportivepopulation into a resentful and potentially hostileone. The assessment of journalist Richard Engel, whoentered Baghdad before the invasion and remained inplace through its immediate aftermath, captured theprevailing situation:

There can be no doubt that most Iraqis in Baghdad weregenuinely delighted that the Americans ousted SaddamHussein . . . Its profoundly disappointing, how quicklythe Iraqis joy and appreciation turned to frustration andin some cases hatred of the Americans. I heard the rst

anti-American rumblings in Baghdad only 1 day afterthe statue [of Saddam] came down. The main problemwas the shameful looting that broke out as Baghdadcollapsed, and the Americans utter inability to stop it.Many Iraqis have subsequently accused the U.S. forces ofbeing unwilling to stop the looters, even of encouragingthem, although this isnt true.38

The fact that U.S. forces did manage to protect theOil Ministry no doubt encouraged the belief that theycould have maintained law and order had they wishedto do so, and that Washington cared more about Iraqioil than about Iraqi people.

April 2003-April 2004.

Nature of the Insurgency. Not only did the UnitedStates fail to prepare for an insurgency, it took severalmonths to even recognize that an insurgency actually


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was occurring, and even longer to admit it to theAmerican public. While soldiers on the ground had a

more realistic understanding of what was developing,the administration dismissed the escalating violenceas the work of regime diehards who soon would bedefeated. By the summer of 2003, it became difcultto deny that something far more serious was afoot.Even then, Washington persisted in describing attackson coalition forces and cooperative Iraqis as mereterrorism.39 The delay in acknowledging the threatallowed the insurgency to take root, making it far moredifcult to eradicate.

Even when U.S. forces became aware of thedanger, they had great difculty putting together acoherent picture of the insurgent order of battle. Thisfailure stemmed in part from poor intelligence butalso from the complexity of the insurgency and its

continuing evolution. One observer has aptly dubbedIraq a compound insurgency in recognition ofthe multiple organizations and movements unitedaround the common goal of expelling the Americans.40The enemy is a hydra with numerous heads and nosingle center of gravity. To further complicate matters,the insurgents have changed their tactics over time,constantly adapting, usually staying one step ahead ofthe coalition, and frequently provoking them to behavein a fashion that broadens and deepens support for theinsurgency.

During the rst year following the U.S.-led invasion,the insurgency remained largely within the Sunni Arabcommunity supported by foreign terrorists, althoughserious ghting between the coalition and the radical

Shiite cleric, Muktada al Sadr, also occurred. The Sunniinsurgents (initially at least) represented a variety ofgroups and interests. In a report written for the United


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States Institute of Peace, Professor Amatzia Baram ofthe Haifa University, Israel, divided the insurgents

into three broad groups: the secularists, the tribes,and the Islamists.41 The secularists consist primarily offormer Baathist regime members and their supporters.Contrary to popular belief, these disaffected peoplehad little love of Saddam Hussein, but do resent theloss of lucrative jobs and worry about their place ina Shiite dominated Iraq. Some 30,000 of them havebeen removed from positions and/or forbidden fromentering public service. Family members and associateswho beneted from these sinecures magnied the sizeof the disgruntled population several times over. Tomake matters worse, many of the former Baathistshad been dismissed from the army and so possessedmilitary training and even weapons.42

Although the word tribe has become politically

incorrect, in Iraq it aptly describes networks of peopleinterrelated through kinship and patronage-clientrelationships. Some tribes resent not only loss ofgovernment jobs but also the lucrative smuggling tradethe United States interrupted in its efforts to secureIraqs borders against terrorist inltrators.43 Tribalnorms make an offense against one family member anattack upon all, particularly if the aggrieved party isa tribal leader. The repercussions of slights, real andimagined, have an enormous ripple effect throughtime and space.

Islamism is a broad reform movement committedto returning Islam to its roots. Its most radical proponentscall for the removal of the secular, apostate, regimesthat govern many Muslim countries. Islamists also

would rid their world of immorality as most clearlymanifested in a popular Western culture that seems tocondone promiscuity, drugs, and alcohol. They would


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return the Muslim world to their vision of the uma orcommunity of the 7th century, the time of the Prophet

Mohammed and his immediate successors. AlthoughIslamism is not inherently violent, its more extremepractitioners do advocate violence against indels andapostates, non-Muslims and Muslims not followingthe teachings of the Quran. Foreigners occupyingMuslim lands and Muslims who support them havebeen primary targets of Islamist terror.

Baram divided Iraqi Islamists into moderates andradicals. Moderates found in Iraqs Mosques one ofthe few havens from Husseins regime. Renewed faithin Islam provided what pan-Arabism and the BaathParty could not, a sense of purpose and direction ina threatening world. While moderates fought theAmerican-led occupation, they had little interest inconducting a global jihad. Although they feared Shiite

domination, they did not oppose the Shiite sect of Islamper se. Radical Islamists, on the other hand, considerShiites as idol worshipers and perpetrated the brutalmurder of Shiite pilgrims journeying to the Holy City ofKarbala in March 2003. Radicals of various theologicalpersuasions cooperate with other insurgents to drivethe Americans from Iraq but remain committed toglobaljihad. While moderates may be enticed to giveup the struggle so long as their religious sensibilitiesare respected and their other needs met, radicals refuseto compromise.44

Native Iraqi insurgents received support, training,weapons, and funding from mujahedeen. These holywarriors ocked to Iraq to ght the American invadersjust as their predecessors had ocked to Afghanistan in

the 1980s to expel the Soviets. Thanks to the small sizeof the coalition force (relative to terrain and population)and the countrys long, porous borders, these foreign


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ghters have little difculty getting into Iraq. Theirleader, the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a

thorn in Washingtons side from the outbreak of theinsurgency until his death in June 2006. Whether or notIraq was a haven for international terrorists before thewar, it has certainly become one since.

Finding mujahedeen to ght and die for the Iraqicause has proven very easy. Until the July 2006 Israeliincursion, southern Lebanon in particular was a fertileground for recruitment. Hezbollah recruited youngzealots, provided them with false passports at the costof $1,000 each, and sent them to Damascus from whichthey inltrate into Iraq. The recruits received $800 amonth, three times the salary of an Iraqi policeman.45These recruits provided many of the suicide bombersthe insurgents used with deadly effect. Thesemujahedeen would consider Christian occupation of any

Muslim country illegitimate, but the manner in whichthe United States entered Iraq (without a UN mandate)made their cause more legitimate among many peoplein the region who might not otherwise have supportedthem.

Cooperation between radical Shiite Hezbollah andradical Sunni insurgents in Iraq, groups with seeminglyantithetical worldviews, illustrate the depth of angertowards the United States in the Muslim world.Such cooperation, once deemed impossible, has beenoccurring for quite some time. Considerable evidencesuggests that Lebanese Hezbollah cooperated with al-Qaida to conduct the 1995 attack on the Khobar Towersin Saudi Arabia. The Shiite group also cooperates withSunni Hamas in the struggle against Israel.46

Trying to determine the exact number of insurgentsin any conict is usually an exercise in futility. Thenumber more often than not reects the optimal number


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of ghters for a given environment at a moment intime rather than real strength of the movement. Far

more important than the number of active combatantsis the degree of support they enjoy among the generalpopulation. The Provisional IRA tied down 12 Britishinfantry battalions and a large police force for over 30years with fewer than 500 insurgents at any one time.While they could never hope to defeat the securityforces, they could persist indenitely.47 As long asthey enjoyed the support of a sizeable proportion ofthe Catholic population and the tacit acceptance of therest, they would have an inexhaustible source of newrecruits. The solution to the conict lies not in killinginsurgents but in eroding their base of support.

Estimates on insurgent strength have varied widelyand been constantly revised upward. Initial estimatesput their number at 5,000; more recent assessments

suggest as many as 20,000.48

The range can be explainedby two factors. First, the number of insurgents probablyhas increased over time. Insurgencies, like res, oftenstart small but spread rapidly. The longer they burn,the harder it is to put them out. Second, in the absenceof good intelligence, estimates of insurgent strengthoften represent little more than educated guesses.

The diversity of insurgent groups makes general-izing about their intentions difcult. Sunni moderatesfocused on bread and butter issues and someguarantee that their rights as a minority communitywould be preserved. Former Baath Party membersinitially wanted a return to power, but most cameto realize the impossibility of that goal and seek toensure the best political deal possible for themselves

and their followers. Islamists wanted a state governedby Sharia, an outcome opposed by secular Sunnis andKurds. Foreign mujahedeen ghting al-Qaidas jihad


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against the West seemed content to kill Americansand keep Iraq unstable. Because at the outset the

U.S.-led coalition had no coherent counterinsurgencystrategy to separate moderates from extremists, allinsurgents united around the simple goal of expellingthe invaders.

The insurgency, of course, has not remained static.Considerable evidence suggests that the distinctionsBaram makes between various types of Sunni insurgentshave become less important than the broader conictbetween Sunni and Shiite Iraqis. Since 2006, violencehas been increasingly sectarian. Foreign mujahedeencommitted to global jihad appear to be giving way tolocal insurgents struggling to control Iraq. These localcombatants may even have provided intelligence thatlet to the killing of al-Zarqawi, whom many consideredto be liability in the new conict.

Insurgent Strategy and Tactics. The various insurgentgroups have a clear goal and a simple, effectivestrategy for achieving it. Whatever their differences,they all want the United States and its allies to leaveIraq. They know full well that they can never defeatcoalition forces. They do not, however, need to doso to succeed. They need only undercut the politicalwill to continue to the struggle. In a democraticsociety, support for a costly protracted war can onlybe maintained if a majority of people believe that thenations vital interests, perhaps even its survival, are atstake. As fewer and fewer Americans see any point incontinuing the occupation of Iraq, political pressure forwithdrawal will increase. The insurgents thus can winif they can force a withdrawal before the Iraqi security

forces become strong enough to maintain order. Toaccomplish this goal, the insurgents need only persistin their struggle. The decisive battle may take place,


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not in the streets of Baghdad, but in the living rooms ofAmerica.

The insurgents have employed tactics eminentlysuited to achieving their political objective and adaptedthem as the insurgency has progressed. Initially theyrelied heavily on sniping, ambushes, and the use ofimprovised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs consistof conventional explosives detonated along convoyor patrol routes. The insurgents targeted Americansoldiers, particularly the more vulnerable Reserve andNational Guard units. Their attacks had two objectives:to produce casualties and so erode domestic support forthe war, and to provoke U.S. forces into overreactingto attacks. The insurgents deliberately operate withinpopulated areas, knowing full well that the Americanswill be blamed for the inevitable collateral damagecaused by attacking them. Although U.S. forces have

exercised considerable restraint in trying circumstances,the temptation of conventionally trained soldierswith little experience of irregular warfare to rely onoverwhelming, sometimes indiscriminate repoweroften proves irresistible. Commenting on the practiceof shooting anyone who gets to close to his troops, onelieutenant observed, Its kind of a shame, because itmeans weve killed a lot of innocent people.49

During the summer of 2003, the insurgentsadjusted their tactics and their targeting. While theycontinued to go after U.S. military personnel, they alsoattacked foreign contractors, journalists, internationalorganizations, and Iraqis who collaborated with theoccupiers. They also made increasing use of suicidebombers. One devastating attack on the UN mission

building in Baghdad in August killed the Chief ofMission and several of his staff, causing the UN topull out of Iraq, just as the insurgents hoped it would.


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Another car bomb destroyed the embassy of Jordan, aclose American ally in the region. The insurgents also

captured and beheaded American contract workers. Asnew recruits to Iraqs edgling police force and armycome on line, they too suffer devastating attacks. Iraqiemployees of Western companies and their familiesrisked death unless they resigned their positions.

In conducting these attacks, the insurgents werepursuing a very effective strategy, but one thatcarried with it certain risks. They hoped to make Iraqungovernable, delay rebuilding of critical infrastructure,and prevent the emergence of democratic government.They calculated quite reasonably that most Iraqiswould blame the United States for the abysmal livingconditions into which they had sunk. However, inpursuing this strategy, they were the ones denyingtheir own people better times. If the violence shifted

from Iraqi on American to Iraqi on Iraqi, they might stilllose the war. Initially, the gamble paid off. Americansremained the bad guys in no small measure becauseof how they handled the insurgency during its rstphase.

Initial U.S. Response. The U.S. military response tothe insurgency in Iraq has been profoundly shapedby preinvasion policy decisions, its own historicalexperience, and American culture. Despite some verypromising initiatives and a genuine effort to make thebest of an extremely difcult situation, these factorslimited the effectiveness of the counterinsurgencycampaign during its rst year.

More than any other factor, the shortage of troopsin Iraq has hampered the U.S. response. The decision

to disband the Iraqi army and police and to ban formerBaath Party members above a certain rank fromserving in the new Iraqi security forces and police,


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among former Baathists with whom they had beenworking, actual friends turned into potential enemies

by the decision. A tacit admission that the dismissalof former Baath Party members indeed had been toosweeping came in April 2004 when the administrationannounced that it indeed would employ some of thevery people Bremer had let go. While the debate overthe disbandment order will continue for years to come,the preponderance of indirect evidence supports thecontention of the soldiers that Iraqi forces could havebeen recalled and used to help maintain law and orderduring the early stages of the insurgency.

Along with removal of other civil servants fromthe Saddam era, the dissolution order laid off almost500,000 Iraqis. To the soldiers who had heeded thecall of U.S. commanders not to resist the invasion,this action seemed especially unjust.54 At least some

of these disillusioned veterans took their skills (and insome cases, even their weapons) into the ranks of theinsurgents or the various militias. Bremers decisioncontradicted the wisdom gained in rebuilding Japanand Germany after World War II. Although the alliesremoved prominent Nazis, they left the police forcelargely intact and even used former Wehrmacht ofcersto rebuild the Bundeswehr in the 1950s. The UnitedStates took a similar approach in occupied Japan.Ordinary Germans and Japanese did not, of course,perceive their security forces as representatives of ahostile ethnic minority actively oppressing them, aswas the case in Iraq. Even so, had the Sunni-dominatedpolice and military been restricted to the Sunni triangle,their presence might have helped reduce the general

lawlessness that wracked the country. Disbanding theentire Iraqi state security apparatus in one fell swoopdeprived the coalition of badly needed troops and policewho spoke the language and knew the local people at a


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critical juncture of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Thisexpertise could not be replaced easily or quickly.

Numbers matter in counterinsurgency evenmore than they do in a conventional war, in whichtechnology can offset a troop decit. A harsh arithmeticseems to correlate with success or failure in internalsecurity operations. In Malaya and Northern Ireland,the British deployed approximately 20 members of thesecurity force per 1,000 inhabitants of the threatenedcountry. The same ratio applied to NATO deploymentsin Kosovo and Bosnia. In Somalia, which ended infailure, the coalition deployed only 4.6 troops per 1,000.In Iraq the ratio has been approximately 7 per 1,000.55Maintaining this 20 per 1,000 ratio in Iraq would haverequired the sustained deployment of over 500,000troops, which critics have maintained could not havebeen done and might not have produced victory

anyway.56

Accepting the validity of this argument,however, further underscores the error in not securingthe support of more allies before the invasion and of notreconstituting at least some security forces afterwards.The paucity of boots on the ground forced the Armyand Marines to take a re brigade approach to theinsurgency during its rst phase. Lacking the numbersto pacify and occupy all trouble spots, they movedtroops around to quell disturbances. This approachdisplaces rather than defeats the insurgents, whosimply move from the threatened area to a safer one.Al-Zarqawi and most of his followers slipped the noosein Fallujah only to pop up elsewhere. The inevitablecollateral damage and civilian casualties caused bysuch operations increase rather than diminish support

for the insurgency.The troop shortage, combined with an historic

overemphasis on force protection, had an additionaladverse effect. American soldiers lived in fortied


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insensitivity. In one incident, a U.S. convoy driving upthe wrong side of an Iraqi main street, horns blaring,

encountered an Iraqi taxi driver. A soldier pointed anassault rie at the terried man and ordered him toback out of the street.59 As one correspondent aptlydescribed the situation:

We have broken down their doors, run them off theroads, swiveled our guns at them, shouted profanities atthen, and disrespected their women--all this hundreds

or thousands of times every day. We have dishonoredthem publicly, and within a society that places publichonor above life itself. These are the roots of the ghtwe are in.60

Arab journalists corroborate the observations ofWesterners: When the average Iraqi sees Americansoldiers violating basic Iraqi values and norms of

behavior on a daily basis, it creates a lot of resentment.61

The numerous private rms who provide security forcontractors sometimes behave with even less restraintand answer to no one except the companies that hirethem.62

The accidental killing of innocent civilians should beunderstood not as malicious acts but as the inevitablebehavior of over-extended and frustrated conventional

war soldiers who lack the training, language skills, orcultural understanding to conduct counterinsurgencyoperations in Iraq. The same, unfortunately, cannot besaid for the atrocities committed at Abhu Grab Prison.Neither the certain knowledge that very few Americansengaged in such behavior nor the punishment metedout to those who did could offset the adverse publicity

caused by photographs of smiling GIs abusingprisoners.Use of excessive force and cultural insensitivity

alone do not explain support for the insurgency. They


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certainly are not its primary cause. Like most disaffectedpeople, those who support the insurgents do so for

a variety of reasons. While some Iraqis back specicinsurgent groups for ideological reasons, frustrationand bitterness over the general climate of insecurityand their poor quality of life motivate many others.Sunnis in particular have experienced a signicantchange of fortune. While some relative decline in thestandard of living inevitably would have followed theremoval of Saddam and his henchman from power, atleast some hardship has stemmed from U.S. occupationpolicies. Initial failure to mount an effective hearts-and-minds campaign has alienated people unnecessarily.Although this failure was primarily political, theremark of one senior ofcer suggests that the militarybears at least some responsibility for this short-coming:[I] dont think we will put much energy into trying

the old saying, win the hearts and minds. I dont lookat it as one of the metrics of success.63

Unemployment skyrocketed after the invasion,reaching 67 percent, due in large measure to deliberateU.S. policy.64In addition to the nearly 500,000 people laidoff because of their connection to the previous regime,Bremer let go another 150,000 as an austerity measure.65Unfortunately, reconstruction efforts have not comeclose to absorbing the unemployed. Lucrative contractsalmost exclusively have gone to Americans, while Iraqirms have received little of the reconstruction capitalowing into their country.66 While American rmsdo hire local workers, Iraqis who work for them faceintimidation and threats against themselves and theirfamilies from the insurgents. Those who fail to head

insurgent warnings not to work with the Americansare murdered. The U.S. policy on issuing contractscreated further problems because it precluded Russian


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contractors familiar with Iraqs Soviet era energy gridfrom participating in the reconstruction effort.67

The reconstruction effort suffered not only frommistakes that might have been prevented but also fromexpectations that it unwittingly created. Keenly awareof Americas impressive technology, vast resources, andawesome military power, Iraqis could not understandor accept the slow pace of reconstruction. Surely, theyreasoned, the occupation forces could restore electricity,water, and services if they so desired. Clearly they musthave some ulterior motive for not doing so.68

In addition to the absence of a coherent hearts-and-minds strategy, the U.S. counterinsurgencycampaign also suffered from the perennial problem ofmicromanagement. While American forces can be quiteexible in conventional operations, the uncertaintiesof unconventional conict combined with political

aversion to casualties encourages an American culturaltendency for those in the upper ranks to provideprecise instructions to their subordinates.69 Sinceinsurgent guerrillas and terrorists operate in smallunits as part of a at organization, those who opposethem must operate in correspondingly small units tobe effective. These units, usually led by a lieutenantor senior noncommissioned ofcer (NCO), must befree to take the initiative based on sound judgmentand according to a broad strategy without constantlyasking for instructions up the chain of command.

The tendency to adopt rigid, hierarchical systems isa deep-rooted American issue by no means unique tothe military. However, the U.S. militarys commitmentto a re-power maneuver-warfare conventional

army coupled with its historical experience probablyexaggerated this tendency, at least during the rstphase of the insurgency. The sheer complexity of


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a modern high-tech battleeld upon which over ahundred killing systems can be brought to bear requires

signicant coordination and considerable control fromabove. An advancing column of armor out of place byeven a small distance risks friendly-re casualties.70Useful as it may be in large-scale conventional battles,however, such tight control of operational units doesnot work well in counterinsurgency.

April 2004-February 2006.

Perhaps as early as the fall of 2003 and certainlyby the spring of 2004, the United States had cometo recognize the nature of the insurgency and todevelop aplan for dealing with it. The United Statesalso advanced its political objectives for the country.An agreement among the members of Iraqs interim

Governing Council on how to administer the countryled the Bush administration to turn sovereignty of Iraqover to them on June 28, 2004. In October the Iraqisapproved a new Constitution for the country, and inDecember they elected members of Parliament.

Political progress did not necessarily improve thesecurity situation, but it did change the pattern ofviolence. U.S. forces continued to be targeted and evenengaged in full-scale conventional operations againstal-Sadrs Mahdi Army in August and to recaptureFallujah in November. The core U.S. strategy focusedon rebuilding Iraqi security forces and graduallydeploying them, rst in support of, and ultimately toreplace, coalition troops. Sensing the danger posed bythis approach, the insurgents concentrated their efforts

on disrupting the emerging political and securityinstitutions. They focused more and more on killingIraqis who volunteered to serve in the police or thearmy.


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While the new Iraqi units were being trained,U.S. forces retained primary responsibility for

internal security. In carrying out this mission, theydeveloped or relearned effective counterinsurgencytactics and corrected many mistakes made duringthe rst year of occupation. Given the opportunity,training, and support, American soldiers have proventhemselves as effective as those of any other nationat counterinsurgency and better than most. Smallunit operations and framework, deployment, andassigning units to Iraqi villages for long periods haveproven effective. Troops had to be reassigned fromconventional duties, and although those forming heavyarmored units had the most difculty adjusting, theytoo learned effective tactics.

A U.S. company deployed to the village of Salaam toprotect Baghdad airport illustrates the new approach.

I know this village like the back of my hand, theCompany Commander observed. He chats with localsabout prices in the local market and watches for signsof ination. He secured a water pump for the village,dines with locals, and exchanges kisses with the sonof the local Sheik. He also attests to how easily hisefforts can be undermined by heavy handed tactics.When a C130 dropped ares to counter heat-seekingrockets and inadvertently set re to crops, the Captaincomplained, Hes burning my elds. I do not knowwhy they do that. He compensated villagers fortheir monetary loss, but they no doubt harbor lastingresentment as well.71

Elsewhere in Iraq, American units have receivedsmaller, more lightly armored vehicles better suited

to the urban environment. Experts also have calledfor a revival of the Combined Action Platoons (CAPs)used with considerable success in Vietnam. The CAPs


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program stationed a squad of 12 marines in a village totrain and support local militia to defend their homes.

By living among the villagers for an extended period oftime, the Marines won their trust. Hastily conscriptedlevies who receive limited training and serve alongsideof, but separate, from U.S. forces do not perform as wellas those in which Americans become a regular part ofthe unit, acting as a kind of leaven. While some efforthas been made to deploy U.S. soldiers to mentor theirIraqi counterparts, too few have been deployed on thisimportant duty. Only 4,000 American troops have beenassigned to military transition teams to work alongsideIraqi units, and most of these operate at battalion levelor higher instead of with company, platoon, or squadlevel where most counterinsurgency operations takeplace. 72

This tactic closely approximates what the British

have done for over a century. In Oman, for example, theBritish SAS units enjoyed considerable success raising,training, and leading local defense forces knownas Firqats. These units defended their local villages,gathered intelligence on the insurgents, and evenengaged in offensive operations. The key to successlay in demonstrating a long-term commitment to livewith the local people until the war could be brought toa successful conclusion.73

February 2006-Present.

The insurgency may have entered a third phasebeginning in late 2005 when intercommunal violencebetween Shiites and Sunnis increased signicantly.

On November 18, suicide bombers attacked two Shiitemosques in the Kurdish town of Khanaqin, killingsome 70 people. The situation escalated dramatically


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with the February 23 bomb attack on the GoldenMosque in Samarra, one of Shiite Islams holiest sites.

Over a thousand people died in the wave of sectariankillings that followed. Since that attack, tit-for-tatmurders have been an almost daily occurrence. Someof the murders clearly have been the work of Sunniand Shiite militias. In other cases, Iraqi police ofcersappear to have been involved. Implication of Iraqisecurity force members in sectarian violence brings tothe fore a question looming in the background sincethe training of Iraqi units began: with whom does theloyalty of these new soldiers and police ultimately lie,the central government or their own faction leaders?

The U.S. approach to combating the insurgencycontinued to evolve, with troops applying improvedtactics developed over the previous 2 years. In relativelycalm areas, the Americans pulled back and handed over

control to Iraqi units as these came on line. In the mostcontested areas, U.S. forces continue to bear the bruntof the internal security duties and to take casualties.Small unit tactics, constant patrolling, vigilance, andgood re discipline have become the norm, replacingless effective methods employed during the rst year.Battalion and company commanders have made aconcerted effort to learn from past counterinsurgencycampaigns as well as from their own contemporaryexperience. Password-secured websites such as ArmyKnowledge on Line and Companycommand.mil provideforums for information-sharing. Ofcers who haveserved in Iraq share what they have learned withthose about to deploy. They circulate briengs andrecommended reading lists, which include works by

Vietnam-era scholars such as British Counterinsurgencyguru Sir Robert Thompson. Those who have servedin Iraq stress the importance of understanding Islam,


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more serious problems. As units prepare for their thirdrotation to Iraq, other strains are beginning to show.

In August 2006, the Army recalled 300 members of the172nd Striker Brigade home to Alaska from a yearstour of duty in Iraq and sent them back for another 4months to deal with escalating violence in Baghdad.The soldiers had gotten to spend between 3 and 5 weekswith their families.75 In 2005, more than one-third ofWest Point Graduates from the class of 2000 left thearmy after fullling their mandatory 5-year term, thesecond year in a row to see such declining retentionrates.76 And the divorce rate among army personneldoubled between 2001 and 2004.77 Even the Marineshave had to resort to mandatory recalls of inactivereservists because of an anticipated shortfall of 2,500volunteers for Afghanistan and Iraq.78

In the midst of these difculties, however, U.S.

forces experienced one of their most dramatic successes.On June 7, 2006, they conducted a precision air strikeagainst a safe house Northeast of Baghdad, killing AbuMusab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. A seriesof raids on other locations accompanied this action,netting a wealth of intelligence on the insurgents. TheJordanian terrorist leader had been the most ruthlessopponent of the United States and moderate Iraqis.Although the details of the operation that killed al-Zarqawi remain classied, a great deal can be surmisedfrom ofcial reports and public statements. Clearly,the United States got very precise intelligence on theal-Qaida leader and his whereabouts, probably withthe help of the Jordanians and quite possibly fromother insurgents. This intelligence coup may have

been the product of the new American approach tocountering the Iraqi insurgency, or it may reect thenew phase into which the insurgency has entered.


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Persuaded that their future lay with the government,ordinary Iraqis willingly may have provided the vital

information on al-Zarqawis whereabouts. On theother hand, indigenous insurgents may have decidedthat the foreign terrorist leader, whose indiscriminatekilling alienated everyone, had become a liability inthe internal sectarian power struggle and turned himin. These insurgents would be far more interested ingaining control of Iraq than in supporting the worldIslamist revolution to which al-Zarqawi belonged.

An Effective Strategy?

In November 2005, the White House publisheda National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, its rst effort toarticulate a comprehensive approach to counteringthe 2 1/2-year-old insurgency. The long delay in

drafting such a statement testies to an inability orunwillingness to recognize the nature of the conictduring its initial phase. Although the documentrepresents a signicant improvement over the initialapproach to the insurgency, it still contains seriousweaknesses that need to be addressed.

The Strategy clearly articulates a comprehensive,long-haul approach to counterinsurgency based onthree broad tracks. The political track calls for isolatingextremists from the general population who can bepersuaded to support the new Iraq; engaging peopleoutside the political process through ever-expandingavenues of peaceful participation; and buildingstable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions.The security track calls for clearing areas held by the

insurgents; holding these areas so that the insurgentscannot return; and building Iraqi Security Forces andthe capacity of local institutions to deliver services,


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the British approach, though most notably omits anyreference to minimum force. The major problem lies

not with methods but with means. The stated objectiveto clear and hold territory can be little more than aplatitude without the requisite number of troops tocarry it out. U.S. forces understand what needs to bedone but still lack the resources to do it.

Prospects and Outcomes.

Predicting the outcome of an ongoing conictis always tricky, but never more so than in acounterinsurgency campaign. The United States clearlyhas an effective strategy to defeat the insurgents andprobably can produce the resources to implementit if the political will to stay the course in Iraq canbe maintained. Actual operations and the trajectory

of the conict offer much encouragement. Outsidethe Sunni triangle and Anbar Province, the securitysituation has been improving, and much rebuildingof critical infrastructure has taken place. The politicalsituation also has gotten better with the countrys rstd

the iraq war learning from the past, adapting to the present, and planning for the future pub754

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