the impact of mediation on negotiators’ zones of agreement

8/13/2019 THE IMPACT OF MEDIATION ON NEGOTIATORS ZONES OF AGREEMENT

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MEDIATING RIPENESS:THE IMPACT OF MEDIATION ONNEGOTIATORSZONES OF AGREEMENT

VICTOR ASSALUniversity of Maryland

KATHLEEN YOUNG

University of Maryland

AMY PATE


JONATHAN WILKENFELDUniversity of Maryland

DAVID QUINN


KYLE BEARDSLEY*

University of California, San Diego

Department of Government and Politics


3140 Tydings Hall

College Park MD 20742

[email protected]

301/405-4381

Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science

Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 2002.

Research for this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant IIS0208608.

*Mr. Beardsley received additional support from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University

of California.


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International crises are threatening events that demand the attention not just of the parties most

directly involved but of actors throughout the international system. Often, parties not directly

involved will intervene in a crisis to try to guard against the further escalation, and resultantinstability, that tend to characterize such episodes. But questions remain as to when and how

such interventions are most likely to be successful in defusing or managing a crisis. In thisstudy, we continue our examination of one such mechanismmediation by a third partyto

help determine the factors that facilitate successful crisis management. Specifically, we focus onthe issue of the ripeness for resolution in crisis negotiations. Many researchers in the fieldconsider ripeness to be a prerequisite for successful mediation (for discussions of ripeness and

mediation see Pruitt 1981; Haass 1990; Rubin 1991; Bercovitch 1997; Salla 1997; Zartman andTouval 1997; Greig 2001; Hancock 2001; Zartman 2001). A more complete understanding of

crisis mediation is dependent on an understanding of the impact of mediation in general, as wellas the varying effects of different styles of mediation on levels of ripeness within a negotiation.

In our previous research, both empirical and experimental, we have examined the effect

of mediation on the nature of crisis outcomes and on the duration of crises. This researchindicates that one style of mediation does have a significant effect on these factors. Manipulative

mediation increases both the likelihood of a peaceful outcome and the pace of reaching such anoutcome (Wilkenfeld et al. 2001).This has prompted us to explore the mechanisms that explainthe success of manipulative mediation in crises. Toward this goal of determining the relationship

between mediation, mediation style, ripeness, and crisis outcomes, we bring together conceptsfrom the all-too-often disconnected realms of negotiation and mediation theory in order to

explore one central question: Is the relationship between mediation, especially manipulativemediation, and crisis outcome a result of the ability of mediators to expand the zone ofagreement in a negotiation?

One of the key challenges in exploring ripeness is determining an effectiveoperationalization of a concept that has been criticized as being tautological (Kleiboer 1994).

This is one reason why most of the studies that try to explore the impact of ripeness are casestudies (for example, see Mandell and Tomlin 1991). While the hurting stalemate component ofripeness has been systematically explored (see, for example, Bercovich and Langley 1993;

MooradianandDruckman 1999), we intend to explore another key element of ripeness--therecognition of a mutually acceptable way out of the conflict that results from a change in the

parties perception of the conflict (Kleiboer 1994; Coleman 1997). In operationalizing andmeasuring this change in perceptions we have focused our efforts on the concept of zone ofagreement (ZOA) that is prominently used in the negotiation literature (see Hopmann 2001 for a

brief overview). We contend that the greater the size of the ZOA in a negotiation, the more likelyit is that the negotiators will be able to recognize the existence of outcomes that are both

achievable and acceptable to both sides. In order to expand our understanding of the way outcomponent of ripeness and avoid the post hoc tautological danger that Kleiboer (1994) warns of,we have chosen to explore the relationship between mediation, ripeness, and crisis outcome

using a series of experiments conducted in a simulated crisis negotiation environment. Theseexperiments allow us to track the breadth of the ZOA and its changes during a negotiation. Our

research design also provides us with direct feedback about negotiators perceptions of mediationand with a range of data on the nature of the outcomes of crisis negotiations.


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We turn first to a brief examination of key studies focusing on the effect of mediation oninternational conflict and crises, as well as a review of work on the relationship between ripeness

and mediation. We begin with a discussion of three central concepts: crisis, mediation, andripeness.

CrisisIt is important to be clear about what we mean by international and foreign policy crises. In thisstudy, we employ the definitions developed by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project.An international crisis is identified when it meets two criteria: (1) A change has occurred in the

type, and/or an increase in the intensity, of disruptive (hostile verbal or physical) interactionsbetween two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities. These changes,

in turn, (2) destabilize their relationship and challenge the structure of an international system.When an international crisis is triggered at the system level, at least one state is experiencing aforeign policy crisis. A state is considered a crisis actor if three conditions are present: decision

makers perceive a threat to basic national values; leaders believe that they must make a decisionwithin a finite period of time; and leaders consider the chances of involvement in military

hostilities to be heightened (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).

Mediation

Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) define mediation as a process of conflict managementwhere disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group,

state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting tophysical force or invoking the authority of the law (1991: 8). Bercovitch and Langley (1993)note that this behavioral definition is most useful because of its emphasis on the key components

of mediationthe disputants, the third party, and the specific conflict resolution context.Despite the extensive scholarly literature on mediation and other forms of third-party

participation in disputes in general and in international conflict specifically,1there remains muchto be discovered about these phenomena. Sacks, Reichert, and Proffitt (1999) remark, eventhough third-party intervention in dispute resolution has become a popular option for solving

differences, we know little about what exactly third parties do or should do (1999: 341). Evenless is known about the topic of mediation in international crises. Analysts have generated a

substantial number of case studies examining mediator involvement in individual crises (seeespecially Ott 1972; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999; Mooradian and Druckman 1999;Greenberg, Barton, and McGuiness 2000; Gerner and Schrodt 2001). While these analyses have

generated a breadth of findings about specific situations, they have not provided as muchprogress toward general theories of crisis mediation. The dearth of systematic research on the

topic of crisis mediation is especially problematic given Dixons observation that mediationefforts occur between two and three times more often during crisis and hostility phases (ofconflicts) than during periods of lower intensity (1996: 678). Despite the likelihood that

mediation will take place during international crises, both the mediation literature and the crisisliterature have failed to offer systematic analyses of crisis mediation.

RipenessSimilarly, there is a lack of systematic research regarding how the ripeness of a crisis might be

affected by mediation efforts. Indeed, while ripeness is often cited as a necessary element in

1See Bercovitch (1997) for a review of the work in this field.


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successful mediation processes (see especially Zartman 1989, 2001), there is no consensus onwhat ripeness actually means. Definitions range from the appropriate time to mediate, to the

situation brought about by structural changes that alter the perceptions of the disputants, to apsychological change in the way that the parties view the conflict. (For a review of this literature

see Wall and Lynn 1993 or Wall, Stark, and Standifer 2001.)

While some researchers focus solely on the subjective decision of the parties to changetheir perceptions and approaches to the conflict relationship (Kleiboer 1994; Coleman 1997),

ripeness is most often defined as both the byproduct of structural changes and changes in thedisputants perceptions of the conflict and/or negotiation process the combination of a hurting

stalemate between parties and the perception of each party to see a way out of this hurtingstalemate (Kleiboer 1996; Zartman 2001). A hurting stalemate emerges when the partiesperceptions of their cost/benefit calculi change from a prisoners' dilemma (PDG) into a chicken

dilemma game (Zartman 2001: 8-9).2Zartman further explains that when such a stalemateemerges, parties may seek an alternative policy or way out (2001: 8). Ripeness requires not

just a hurting stalemate, then, but also the existence of an acceptable solution the so-calledway out.

We focus our research on the dynamics surrounding the existence and evolution of this

perceived way out. We borrow a page from the negotiation literature and operationalize thiscomponent of ripeness by looking at the zone of agreement created by the red lines of the two

sides (see Raiffa 1982). The existence of a zone of agreement (ZOA) indicates the possibility ofparties discovering an acceptable agreement, and a larger zone indicates more possibilities forsuch agreement (Hopmann 2001): the more acceptable possibilities for agreement available, the

greater the number of ways out, and the higher the degree of ripeness. Thus, an unripe crisisshould have no zone of agreement, while the creation of a zone of agreement through a

reassessment of redlines provides for ripeness. This study will focus on the absence or presenceand nature of such a way out in crisis negotiations, whether mediation leads parties to a wayout, and the relationship between the perception of an acceptable agreement and the outcome of a

crisis.

Ripeness as a Function of TimingSeveral analysts have noted that ripeness may be the key to successful mediation (Haass 1990;Rubin 1991; Wall and Lynn 1993; Kleiboer 1996; Hancock 2001; Greig 2001; Wall, Stark, and

Standifer 2001), but few have explored this dynamic in a systematic manner. Most of those whohave analyzed the general relationship between mediation and ripeness have reduced the nature

of the relationship to an issue of appropriate timing. Debate exists over whether it is better formediators to intervene early, late, or at some time in the middle of the conflict process.

Bercovitch (1986, 1997) argues that mediation is most effective when done halfway through the

life cycle of the conflict, when parties own efforts have failed. Of course, trying to figure out thehalfway point of a conflict while the conflict persists is no small task. Others argue that

mediation is less effective early in disputes when parties havent experienced high costs or late indisputes when the conflict has escalated too much (Regan and Stam 2000; Wall, Stark, and

2Kleiboer elaborates, a conflict is ripe for resolution when (1) a mutually hurting stalemate exists, marked by a

recent or impending catastrophe(2) the efforts of both parties to impose unilateral solutions are blocked and

bilateral solutions become conceivable, leading antagonists to believe that there is a workable alternative to combat;and (3) power relations have changed in such a way that a party that previously had the upper hand in the conflict

starts slipping and the underdog starts rising (1996: 363).


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Standifer 2001). Northedge and Donelan (1971), Ott (1972), and Pruitt (1981) comment thatmediation is most effective when a conflict has gone through a few phases and should not be

initiated before each side has shown willingness to moderate its intransigence and revise itsexpectations. Princen (1992) has the most complex view of timing: an "optimization problem

between, on the one hand, entering early, in which case the high likelihood of acceptance and

low likelihood of uncontrollable escalation are countered by the low level of process influence;and, on the other, entering late, in which case the high likelihood of escalation is countered by

the high expected process influence (1992: 54).We do not operationalize ripeness as an issue of timing. Rather, our focus is on the

emergence and expansion of a way out created by changing perceptions of a conflict situation.Our use of the ZOA concept to operationalize ripeness is not without precedent, but heretoforethere has been little systematic study of the relationship between mediation and zones of

agreement, or zones of agreement and outcome. The existence of a mediator alone interjectsflexibility into the bargaining situation (Young 1967) and thus can affect bargaining zones and

ripeness. Touval and Zartman argue that a mediator must invent solutions where they don't exist,promote these solutions if they have already been identified, or "make them possible if the two'halves' of the negotiating front (as then perceived) do not yet overlap to permit a jointly

agreeable outcome (1985: 260-61). Likewise, Stevens (1963) argues that a mediator shouldcreate a domain in which agreement is possiblewhat he refers to as a contact zoneif one

doesnt exist and assist the parties to weigh and rank existing alternative agreements within thatdomain.

Several researchers (Touval and Zartman 1985; Haass 1990; Rubin 1991; Salla 1997)

also believe that mediation should be able to create or enhance ripeness. Most of these scholarsrefer specifically to the mediators ability to affect stalemates. Rubin (1991) suggests that

ripeness can be created by using sanctions and rewards or by manipulating stalemates so theystart to hurt. Mediators can also create the perception that stalemates exist (Zartman andTouval 1996). Because a mediators intervention at a time of hurting stalemate can influence

the decision toward de-escalation, concession, and compromise (1985: 16), Touval and Zartmancontend that a mediator must produce the hurting stalemate that leads the parties to see that a

mediated solution is a way out.

The Effect of Time Pressure on Evolving Ripeness

The effect that mediation efforts will have on ripeness generally and on zones of agreement morespecifically is likely influenced by how long a negotiation endures and whether negotiators are

feeling time-induced pressure a situation that is characteristic of crises. Though somedisagreement exists on the effects of time pressure on negotiations,3it is generally concluded thattime pressure produces lower demands,4more concessions and less competitiveness during

negotiations (Pruitt and Johnson 1970; Yukl 1974; Yukl et al. 1976; Carnevale et al. 1979; Pruitt

3Some scholars have argued that time pressure can enhance demands and competitiveness, depending on the context

of the conflict and negotiations (see Pruitt 1981; Smith, Pruitt, and Carnevale 1982; Carnevale and Lawler 1986).

For instance, Carnevale and Lawler found that when actors took part in multiple-issue, integrative bargaining tasks

in an experimental setting, more competitiveness, firmer demands, and poorer outcomes resulted when actors

negotiated in a non-cooperative manner and were subject to time pressure in the form of deadlines. Time pressure

had a negligible effect when actors negotiated cooperatively.4Using automated computer simulations to conduct bilateral negotiations, De Dreu (1995) concluded that a relative

power balance between parties induces a stronger decline in demand than a power imbalance. For a discussion of the

effects of power parity and disparity on mediated crises, see Young et al. (2002).


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1981; Smith, Pruitt, and Carnevale 1982; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Druckman 1993, 1994a;Ma and Manove 1993; Balakrishnan and Eliashberg 1995), and more agreements as the result of

negotiations. 5The findings regarding concession making are particularly important for the studyat hand since fostering ripeness by ensuring a zone of agreement often requires mediators to

encourage negotiators to concede on their initial and subsequent minimal acceptable outcomes

(their reservation prices or red lines) and hardline bargaining stances.Many studies found increased concession making and decreased competitiveness

specifically when time pressure is operationalized as deadlines (as opposed to penalties spent fortime bargaining).6It has also been discovered that the largest concessionary moves were made

just before individual trials or time as a whole expired the endgame phases of negotiations(Yukl et al. 1976; Smith, Pruitt, and Carnevale 1982; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Druckman1993, 1994; Ma and Manove 1993). In the study at hand, we operationalize time pressure as both

deadlines (negotiators have twelve, ten-minute time periods to reach an agreement or the statusquo conditions of the conflict prior to the negotiation prevail) and penalties for continued

negotiation (negotiator payoffs decrease with the expiration of each successive time period).Much of the literature on mediation and time pressure pertains to how time pressure

affects the activity of mediators. The general conclusion is that time pressure - by itself or in

combination with other intervening variables such as mediator ability and impartiality,interpersonal trust, etc. - augments a mediator's perception of decreased common ground

between negotiators (and does not reduce the mediator's concern for the disputants' aspirations),which leads the mediator to play a more active, substantive, and pressing role in the negotiation(Brookmire and Sistrunk 1980; Carnevale and Conlon 1988; Kressel and Pruitt 1989; Cooper

and Carnevale 1990; Conlon, Carnevale, and Murnighan 1994; Ross and Wieland 1996). Underconditions of time pressure, then, mediators would be most likely to affect zones of agreement.

Classification of Mediation StylesMany analyses of mediation and ripeness do not acknowledge that mediation is actually an

umbrella term for several different styles of third-party intervention. Recognition of the range ofbehaviors that qualify as mediation begs the question, what approach to or style of mediation

should best serve the purpose of creating ripeness or willingness?The literature on mediation has converged on three basic styles that mediators can adopt

in their efforts to resolve a conflict (Touval and Zartman 1985; Princen 1992; Bercovitch and

Houston 1996)that of the facilitator, the formulator, and the manipulator. Some offeralternative classification schemes, somewhat more detailed than that of Touval and Zartman (see

Skjelsbaek 1986; Mitchell 1993;Hopmann 1996; Keashly and Fisher 1996). We agree withBercovitch (1997), however, that the facilitator-formulator-manipulator schema sufficientlydistinguishes general mediator behavior.

5For reviews of the extensive literature on time pressure and negotiation, including the relationship between time

pressure and the likelihood of reaching agreements, see Pruitt (1981); Carnevale , O'Connor, and McCusker (1993);

Stulmacher et al. (1998); and Mosterd and Rutte (2000).6For those who operationalize or discuss time pressure as induced deadlines, see Yukl et al. 1976; Smith, Pruitt, and

Carnevale 1982; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Zart man 1989; Druckman 1993, 1994a; Ma and Manove 1993;

Schwarzer 1998; and Mosterd and Rutte 2000. For those who also operationalize or discuss time pressure as the

costs of continued negotiation, including penalties spent for time bargaining, see Druckman 1994a and Mosterd andRutte 2000). Druckman (1994) found that agreements were reached more quickly when time pressure is

operationalized as penalties spent for time bargaining, as opposed to deadlines.


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The mediator as communicator or facilitator serves as a channel of communicationamong disputing parties (Burton 1984; Touval and Zartman 1985; Hopmann 1996). This type of

mediation is also referred to as third-party consultation (Fisher 1972; Kelman 1992; Keashly andFisher 1996), good offices, or process facilitation (Hopmann 1996).7The mediator as facilitator

can organize the logistics of the negotiation process, collect information, set the agenda

regarding which issues will be discussed and in what order, and/or deliver messages betweenparties if face-to-face communication isnt possible or isnt desired. The mediator as facilitator

makes no substantive contribution to the negotiation process but, rather, is restrained to ensuringcontinued, and hopefully constructive, discussion and dialogue among disputants.

The second role defined by Touval and Zartman is the mediator as formulator. Unlikefacilitation, formulation involves a substantive contribution to the negotiationsincludinginventing and proposing new solutions to the disputantsto assist the disputants when the

parties reach an impasse in the negotiation process (Touval and Zartman 1985; Hopmann 1996;Zartman and Touval 1996). However, the mediator as formulator is not empowered to pressure

the crisis actors to endorse or advocate any particular outcomea capability associated withmanipulation, as described below. 8

Manipulative mediators also provide a substantive contribution to negotiations. In

addition to formulating potential solutions, this mediator uses its position and its leverageresources of power, influence, and persuasionto manipulate the parties into agreement

(Touval and Zartman 1985: 12). The mediator augments the appeal of its solutions by adding andsubtracting benefits to/from the proposed solution (Zartman and Touval 1996). Hopmann (1996)indicates that only a powerful mediator can play this role and notes that mediators can influence

the direction of negotiations not only through carrot-and-stick measures but also by manipulatingthe international environment.

Mediation Styles and RipenessWhile there is general agreement among scholars as to the categories of mediation style, there is

disagreement as to which style of mediation is most likely to be successful in a conflict or in acrisis. (See Wilkenfeld et al. 2001 for a discussion of this debate.) Debate also exists as to how

different mediation styles might interact with the ripeness of a given situation. Most researcherswho advocate creating ripeness or taking advantage of pre-existing ripeness to achieve asettlement point to the use of manipulation. Formulation and manipulation may also be

particularly helpful once two negotiating parties are in a stalemate because it becomes more andmore difficult for each side to see the validity of the others suggested solutions, and concession

is often misconstrued as capitulation. The entrance of a third party with suggestive power canbreak the stalemate by causing parties to consider, and perhaps even accept, new possibleresolutions of the dispute that arent necessarily part of their former cognitive structure

(Schelling 1960).Most scholars argue that if there is no objective indicator to which to refer, creating

ripeness may involve a much more active engagement of the mediator, moving that role fromcommunication and formulation to manipulation (Zartman and Touval 1996). The manipulator

7Not all observers classify facilitation as mediation, given the constrained authority associated with this type of

intervention (see Skjelsback 1986; Dixon 1996). We agree with Bercovitch and Langley (1993), though, that while

this strategy involves limited powers, it does qualify as mediation.8To date, we do not include an analysis of formulation. In future research, we will examine whether its effects are

similar to facilitation, to manipulation, or whether its effects are unique.


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may use carrots and sticks to "cause the minimum point of acceptable agreementto change inways that favor reaching agreement...to create overlapping bargaining space and the possibility

of agreement" (Hopmann 1996: 241). As a manipulator, the mediator either increases the size ofthe stakes, attracting the parties to share in a pot that otherwise would have been too small, or

limits the actions of the parties in conflict, providing objective elements for the stalemate

(Zartman 2001). During a hurting stalemate, even a small dose of mediator resources can induceparties to change their policies (Edmead 1977), and manipulative mediators are the most likely to

possess any degree of sufficient resources. Coercion and promises can create a willingness toconcede that was not there previously. Powerful mediators may be able to manipulate the

interests of the parties to make them overlap, as opposed to a mediator that can bring noresources to bear on the conflict. Interestingly, for situations in which hostilities are high (acondition often present in crisis situations), Hiltrop (1985, 1989) argues that use of pressure

tactics by mediators is positively associated with settlement when the parties bottom linepositions are far apart in other words, when the zone of agreement is small or non-existent.

The exact nature of the relationship between mediation, ripeness, and the outcomes of mediatednegotiations is still in debate. Mediators are advised to not only take advantage of ripe situations

by assisting the parties to find acceptable outcomes within their overlapping bargaining zones,but also to create ripe situations when they dont exist. Towards this goal of affecting ripeness, it

is generally concluded that a more substantive and intrusive intervention by the mediator isnecessary, causing the mediator to play the roles of formulation and/or manipulation. In addition,increasing time pressure pushes the mediator to assume a more intrusive role, and d isputants are

also more likely to make concessions under such pressure, further increasing the likelihood ofagreement.

However, little has been concluded about the precise nature of the relationship betweenripeness and successfully mediated outcomes because, as noted earlier, the discussion of ripenesshas often been tautological (Kleiboer 1994). If ripeness is necessary for successful outcomes,

then what are the mechanisms by which ripeness secures these outcomes? Mediators are advisedto employ specific tactics, but little is noted about how ripeness works to produce outcomes

within the context of a mediated dispute. Greater clarity about the relationship between onecomponent of ripenessnegotiators zones of agreementand the outcome of a negotiationwould be beneficial here: Is it the case that more ways out are essential for successful

mediation? Or is it the case that the existence of one way out is sufficient? By measuring thiscomponent of ripeness, we hope to be able to more accurately describe the effect that ripeness

and mediation have on each other, as well as the effect that both have on securing settlements.

Hypotheses

This paper examines the general relationship between mediation and crisis outcomes, while

accounting for two key factors in the process: mediator style and ripeness for resolution. That is,does crisis mediation lead to more agreementsversus warsbecause of the effect thatmediation has on the ripeness of a crisis? More specifically, is the relationship between

mediation, especially manipulative mediation, and positive crisis outcomes a result of the abilityof mediators to expand the zone of agreement in a negotiation?

Based on existing theories of mediation effect and situational ripeness, we propose twosets of hypotheses in response to the research questions above.


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Mediation, Mediation Style, and Zones of Agreement

Hypothesis 1a: The zone of agreement (ZOA) between crisis negotiators is more likely to

expand in crises that involve mediation by a third party than it is in unmediated crises. This

relationship is strengthened the longer the negotiation persists.

Hypothesis 1b: The zone of agreement (ZOA) between the crisis actors is more likely toexpand in crises that involve manipulative mediation than it is in those crises that involve

facilitative mediation. This relationship is strengthened the longer the negotiation persists.

Zones of Agreement and Crisis Outcome

Hypothesis 2a: Crises are more likely to end successfully more agreements, greater

individual and joint utility, greater satisfaction with outcomes - when the size of the zone ofagreement (ZOA) between actors in a crisis negotiation is large.

Hypothesis 2b: Crises are more likely to end successfully more agreements, greaterindividual and joint utility, greater satisfaction with outcomes - when the size of the zone of

agreement (ZOA) expands throughout the course of a crisis negotiation.

Research Design

Experimental SettingThe experiments reported on in this study utilize a scenario loosely based on the Ecuador/PeruBorder Dispute of 1981.9 This crisis involved an historical instance of successful mediation after

military clashes along the borders of these two states triggered an international crisis.10One hundred eighty-six students enrolled in international relations courses at the

University of Maryland during 2001 and 2002 participated in simulations of a one-on-one crisisnegotiation between Ecuador and Peru. Half of the students negotiated on behalf of Peru whilethe others represented Ecuador.

Some issues pertaining to external validity are raised by the use of college students assubjects (Mintz and Geva 1993; Mintz et al. 1997; Kanazawa 1999; Green and Gerber 2002).

Many point out that it is problematic for political scientists to draw inferences about the activitiesof different kinds of decision makers from a population of undergraduates (Beer 1993), and otherfields recognize the shortcomings of this type of research, as well. Sears (1986) has found that

9

The protracted conflict between Ecuador and Peru lasted from 1935 until 1998 and included five internationalcrises. For a more complete discussion of these crises, see Simmons (1999) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000). Thenegotiation scenario, developed by Kathleen Young, David Quinn, and Chris Frain, is available at

http://www.icons.umd.edu/gvpt450/e-pscen.htm.10

Historically, states involved in crises over competing territorial claims have a higher propensity to terminate

through agreements. Sixty-one percent of ICBs border-related crises ended in agreement, while only 33% of crises

based on other issues, such as threats to influence or of grave damage, terminated in agreement (2=17.28,p< .000).

Regardless of mediation effects, we would expect that simulations of a border crisis would have a high tendency toend in agreement. We hypothesize, however, that the introduction of mediation into this simulated border crisis will

further increase the likelihood of agreements being reached.


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the reliance on students in psychology research does produce a bias in understanding of humanbehaviors, yet the vast majority of top-level social psychology research still relies on student-

based experiments (Stevens and Ash 2001). Kanazawa (1999) asserts that student-as-subjectresearch is not problematic so long as the generalizations that researchers draw from such

experiments are about theories, not the empirical findings. We adopt a more cautious attitude

and agree with Druckman, who argues that simulations are a useful tool for arbitrating betweencompeting hypotheses (1994b: 447). We contend that in the context of a careful experimental

design (Stern and Druckman 2000: 49), the experimental approach we adopt here is appropriate.Negotiators for Peru and Ecuador communicated with one another through a specially

developed computer-based communication system, somewhat analogous to a private chat room.Each student received identical background material on the nature of this crisis, as well as arelevant history of relations between the states. The mutually exclusive outcomes possible in

these crisis negotiations were acceptance of the status quo, an agreement to a cease fire, anagreement on a cease fire and a land division, acceptance of binding arbitration, and the

launching of a military operation by one or the other state. The simulation is divided into twelve10-minute time periods. Negotiations which lasted the entire time period without negotiatorsreaching an agreement or without one of them launching war resulted in a status quo outcome.

Each negotiator in the 93 simulations had access to a computer-based decision supportsystem (DSS) that displayed the utility-point values associated with each of the possible

outcomes of the negotiation. 11 The DSS is intended to assist each negotiator in working towardthe best possible outcome for his/her country. (For more on the role of DSSs, in general, seeWilkenfeld et al. 1995; Kersten and Noronha 1999.) The DSS allows negotiators to see how the

utilities of these possible outcomes change as the context of the negotiation changes. During thenegotiations, either Ecuador or Peru can close its borders to people and goods from the other, and

each state can decide whether to mobilize troops in the disputed territory. In addition, Peru hasthe option of granting to Ecuador much desired access to the Amazon River. Changes in any ofthese conditions will affect the expected utility of each possible outcome, and these changes are

noted in the DSS. Additionally, the passage of time from one negotiation period to another alsoaffects the expected utility of the outcomes.

The MediatorsOne-third of the simulated negotiations were unmediated. The remaining two-thirds involved a

mediatorone-half with a facilitator, one-half with a manipulator. The mediator in thissituation worked on behalf of the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, and Chilethe four countries that

serve as guarantor states of the border designation between Ecuador and Peru. Graduate andundergraduate political science research assistants at the University of Maryland served as themediators in these simulations. Each mediator underwent extensive training in one specific style

of mediation (either facilitative or manipulative), with checks to ensure reliability withinmediation style prior toand duringthe actual experiments.

Negotiators in this simulation did not explicitly request mediation. The leaders ofEcuador and Peru had previously agreed (in the 1942 Rio Protocol) that, should anydisagreement arise between the two states regarding the border designation, the Organization of

American States (OAS) could call upon the guarantor states to mediate between the disputants.The OAS took this action in 1981, and participants involved in mediated simulations were

informed that the same had happened in the experimental setting.

11The DSS for this simulation is available at www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/can/appendix_3.htm.


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Each mediator was tasked with preventing an escalation of this crisis by attempting tosecure an agreement between the two states. The range of actions and tools available to each

type of mediator differed distinctly, consistent with the descriptions of these styles of mediationexplored above. Facilitators encouraged the negotiators to work toward compromise and to think

about the needs of the opposing state but could not recommend any specific outcomes or options

to either negotiator. Manipulative mediators, on the other hand, subjected negotiators to a muchmore aggressive and active intervention. Manipulators proposed and advocated those options

and solutions that they thought most likely to lead to a rapid but peaceful termination of thecrisis. In addition, manipulative mediators had carrots and sticks at their disposalincluding

the ability to impose trade sanctions, cut off foreign aid, and/or allow arms salesto entice thenegotiators to agree to a proposed outcome. The DSS revealed to the negotiators (but not to themediators) the effect of actions taken by the manipulative mediator in terms of each states utility

points, so that the extent of the mediators leverage was clear to the negotiators.Mediators communicated with negotiators using the same communication software as the

representatives of Peru and Ecuador and could direct comments or questions to either or bothnegotiators. Because all communication was done via computer, we were able to monitor thestatements of all of the mediators to determine whether each remained true to the role assigned

the mediator. While mediators were provided with ample background material on the crisis, theydid not have access to a DSS and did not know the precise utility values associated with any

particular agreement. Their efforts at resolving the crisis were primarily informed by whatnegotiators were willing to share with individual mediatorsa condition consistent with thesituation often faced by mediators in real-world negotiations.

The Elusive Nature of Ripeness

Operationalizing ripeness is a key challenge to researchers. As noted previously, ripeness isgenerally conceived as comprising two components, namely, a mutually hurting stalemate andthe perception on the part of the actors of a way out. Previous work has focused primarily on

the presence or absence of a mutually hurting stalemate and has operationalized this component,for example, in terms of conflict cycles and levels of violence. Bercovich and Langley (1993)

focused their empirical ripeness research on the objective criteria of battle deaths, but this doesnot allow us to examine the perceptual change that most researchers feel is key to the impact ofripeness. Focusing on perceptions is also problematic because different leaders of the same party

may possess radically different views of if or when a hurting stalemate exists. A quickexamination of the internal arguments of the Israelis and the Palestinians or the IRA and the

Unionists can serve as an illustration of this point.This studys experimental design focuses on the second component of ripeness, the

presence or absence of a way out. Using an experimental approach, we take a page from

negotiation theory and focus on zones of agreement or bargaining space as the operationalizationof this component. A zone of agreement (ZOA) is comprised of the space between one sides

minimal acceptable outcome --their red line, according to Fisher and Ury (1983)--and anothersides red line. In principle, any agreement in this space should be acceptable to both sides(Hopmann 2001: 450-451). Morgan (1994) points out that while the red lines of each side create

a ZOA, the parties may still reject an agreement within this zone because said agreement doesnot rise to the most beneficial outcome in their eyes. They may decide that the risk of war or

rejection of an agreement in this zone is worthwhile because victory may get them a better


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outcome or rejection may lead to a better offer. Thus, the existence of a ZOA does not ensureagreement, but its absence should pose a significant obstacle to agreement.

We suggest that both the presence of a zone of agreement and its size will affect theoutcome of the negotiation, and that mediation will affect both of these aspects. The larger the

ZOA, the more options for settlement will exist. The lower the parties set their redlines, the

higher degree of flexibility they are expressing.

12

This approach fits actual cases of internationalcrisis mediation. For example, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger used mediation

to change the cost/benefit views of Israel and Egypt in the process of helping them find a newzone of agreement between the parties by redefining key issues (Mandell and Tomlin 1991: 52).

Zones of Agreement in an Experimental SettingFor each negotiation, survey instruments were used to determine the presence and size of ZOAs,

as well as any changes in ZOA size. After training but before the experiments began, eachnegotiator was asked to examine the DSS from his/her countrys perspective in order to assess

the desirability of different conditions and outcomes and to determine his/her bargaining zone interms of utility points. Negotiators then recorded (but did not share with either their adversary orthe mediator) the amount of utility points they hoped to earn for their country (their green line)

and their red linethe lowest amount they would be willing to accept. In order to determinewhether a ZOA existed in each simulation, we examined the range of acceptable outcomes for

each of the two players in a simulation and determined whether the negotiators expectationsoverlapped at some point. That is, we determined the breadth of the ZOA between thenegotiators, defined as the percentage of all possible outcomes that provided both Peru and

Ecuador with utility points equal to or greater than the red line of each. (Raiffa 1982). 13 Thegreater the percentage of outcomes acceptable to both Peru and Ec uador, the larger the ZOA

was. We also surveyed subjects on their red and green lines at the end of each negotiation periodin order to identify changes in the size of the ZOA throughout the course of the negotiation.

Results

We used the data from the simulations to analyze 1) the effects of mediation on the dynamics ofzones of agreement and 2) the effects of variations in zones of agreement on negotiationoutcomes.14

12We believe this bargaining-based approach to ripeness is justified when observing international crises because, as

Hopmann has pointed out, the bargaining approach has tended to dominate in international negotiations,

especially in those involving issues in which the security and well-being of the state is at stake and bad agreementsmay undermine essential state interests (2001: 455).13

For unmediated negotiations and those with a facilitative mediator, a total of 416 possible outcomes existed. For

negotiations with a manipulative mediator, a total of 13,312 possible outcomes existed. The manipulative

simulations have a far greater number of possible payoff outcomes due to the mediators carrots and sticks.14

It should be noted that some of the survey data were incomplete, so the available sample sizes vary among the

empirical analyses, depending on the variables used and whether the models are monadic or dyadic, as reported in

the appropriate tables. We have no reason to suspect that the cases with missing data are systematically related tothe variables at hand.


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Mediation and zones of agreementTo address the first question of whether mediation affects the size of the ZOA as a negotiation

progresses, we used three models. In all three models, the percent change in the size of the ZOA,ZOACHANGE, was used as the dependent variable. We formulated this variable by subtracting

the initial size of the ZOA from the end size and then dividing by the initial ZOA size. The

variable was left in decimal units. The variable is operationalized in this way to scale for theinitial level of ZOA. Presumably, if a small ZOA changes by the same amount as a much larger

ZOA, the significance of the former change is greater.The independent variables vary depending on the model, but they generally have two

components. The first component, DURATION, measures in minutes how long the negotiationslasted from beginning to termination. The inclusion of the duration variable enables us toanalyze the influence of different types of mediation on the pace at which zones of agreement

change, as well as the effect of time on the negotiations in general. The second independentvariable consists of dummy variables that indicate the types of mediation present. UNMED

indicates if there was no mediation, FACIL indicates that there was facilitative mediation, andMANIP indicates if there was manipulative mediation.

The results of the three models that analyze the relationship between mediation and ZOA

change are presented in Table 1. Model 1 is actually four separate bivariate linear regressionmodels. The models are adjusted so that the regression lines pass through the origin, thereby

fixing the constant term for comparison between the different bivariate models. From Model 1,it is evident that the duration of the negotiation has a positive relationship approachingsignificance (p=0.092) with ZOACHANGE; for each additional minute that the negotiation lasts,

the size of the ZOA increases by about four percent with respect to the initial size of the ZOA.The presence of a manipulative mediator also has a significant (p=0.035) and positive effect on

the change in the ZOA on average, manipulated crises experience a greater expansion of theZOA, by almost 500 percent, compared to unmediated or facilitated crises. The absence of amediator and the presence of a facilitative mediator have no significant relationship with the

changes in ZOA size.Model 2 is a multivariate linear regression with duration and the dummy variables for the

type of mediation as the independent variables. The cases that did not involve mediationcomprise the reference category in this model. From Table 1, it is evident that manipulation hasa significant (p=0.025) and positive effect on the ZOA size change with respect to the cases that

were not mediated; the effect of facilitation is not significant. More noteworthy is the size of thecoefficient on the MANIP dummy variable the ZOA change is 746 percent greater with respect

to the initial ZOA on average when a manipulative mediator is present than when there is nomediator. Note that DURATION is also significantly (p=0.012) related to ZOA CHANGE,although its impact is relatively small.


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Table 1: Factors affecting ZOA CHANGE

Model 1 (bivariate) Model 2 Model 3

Coefficient p

value

Coefficient p value Coefficient p value

DURATION 4.0E-02 0.092 0.24 0.012 8.8E-03 0.484

(3.0E-02) (.11) (0.21)

UNMED -0.34 0.446 ----- ----- ----- -----

(2.51) ----- -----

FACIL -0.12 0.482 0.17 0.481 0.44 0.487

(2.63) (3.51) (13.33)

MANIP 4.98 0.035 7.46 0.025 -26.95 0.025

(2.69) (3.71) (13.47)

DURATION*UNMED NA NA NA NA ----- -----

-----

DURATION*FACIL NA NA NA NA -3.7E-03 0.494

(0.25)DURATION*MANIP NA NA NA NA 0.76 0.004

(0.27)

constant NA NA -12.85 0.017 -0.83 0.471

(5.91) (11.05)

Standard error values are in parentheses

p values are for a one-tail test

N=62

The third, most complete model involves the same independent variables in Model 2, aswell as the interaction variables between the mediation dummy variables and the durationvariable. In this specification, displayed in Table 1, the constant and the coefficient value on the

DURATION variable indicate the intercept and slope of the regression line when there is nomediation; the coefficient values on the dummy variables exhibit the change in the intercept

when these dummy variables are equal to 1; and the coefficient values on the interactionvariables indicate the change in the regression slope when the respective dummy variables are 1.From the interaction variable between manipulation and duration, it is evident that duration and

manipulative mediation significantly (p=0.004) work together to expand the ZOA. We are ableto conclude that 1) in negotiations that last longer, manipulative mediation will have a greater

effect on ZOA expansion and 2) the rate at which the ZOA expands will be much greater whenthere is a manipulative mediator present. Duration has little effect on the change in ZOA whenthere is no mediator, but when there is a manipulative mediator present, the size of the ZOA

increases by over 75% (with respect to the initial ZOA size) per additional minute of the

negotiation.15

The value on the MANIP dummy variable is negative, which means thatnegotiations that end almost immediately tend to have less expansion of the ZOA when amanipulative negotiator is present. However, since we do not have data on a sample ofnegotiations that end almost immediately (no cases finished earlier than 17 minutes), we cannot

say for certain whether such cases actually exhibit less ZOA expansion with manipulative

15A scatter plot analysis reveals that there is one outlier point, as the ZOA for one negotiation increased

dramatically. If we discard this outlier, a significant and positive relationship would remain between manipulation

and the rate at which the ZOA expands.


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mediation than with facilitative or no mediation. 16 Finally, it should be noted that we reject thenull hypothesis that there is a similar significant interaction effect involving no mediation or

facilitative mediation only manipulation is effective at increasing ZOA expansion over time.17

Zones of agreement and crisis outcome

The second main question addressed in the analyses is whether the size of the zone of agreementaffects the crisis outcome. Four separate dependent variables were used: whether the outcome

ended in agreement (AGREEMENT), the payoff for each negotiator measured in expected utilitypoints (UTILITY), the satisfaction level self-reported in a post-simulation survey (SATIS), and

the dyadic expected utility payoff (DYAD UTIL).18 These dependent variables were used inbivariate regressions with two different independent variables, thereby resulting in eight differentmodels to address the question at hand. The models with AGREEMENT as the dependent

variable were used in a logit analysis. OLS methods were used for models involving the otherthree dependent variables.19

The independent variables include ZOA CHANGE (as defined above) and the size of theZOA at the end of the negotiation (END ZOA). These variables were used to identify anyrelationship between the nature of the ZOA and outcomes. Specifically, ZOA CHANGE

captures how the different outcomes might move with the expansion of the ZOA, which isespecially relevant given the analyses in Table 1. END ZOA is employed to see if there is a

direct relationship between larger but not necessarily expanding ZOAs and outcomes.Table 2a presents the results of the models with ZOA CHANGE as the independent

variable, while Table 2b provides the results of the models with END ZOA. The only

relationships approaching significance (p


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Table 2a: The effect of ZOA CHANGE on four outcome measures(bivariate analyses)

Coefficient p value N

AGREEMENT -6.1E-02 0.241 62(8.7E-02)

constant 1.50 0.000

(0.33)

UTILITY -1.38 0.140 124

(1.27)

constant 527.74 0.000

(15.21)

SATIS 8.3E-03 0.123 123

(7.0E-03)

constant 2.21 0.000

(8.6E-02)

DYAD UTIL -2.6E-03 0.078 62(2.0E-03)

constant 1.02 0.000

(2.2E-02)


p values are for a one-tail testThe first and last models are dyadic, the others are monadic; the first two models involve a logit analysis,while the latter two are OLS regressions.

Table 2b: The effect of END ZOA on four outcome measures(bivariate analyses)

Coefficient p value NAGREEMENT -1.02 0.249 76

(1.51)

constant 1.60 0.000

(0.42)

UTILITY -55.77 0.226 152

(73.84)

constant 535.09 0.000

(18.98)

SATIS -0.16 0.355 151

(0.43)

constant 2.30 0.000

(.11)DYAD UTIL -0.15 0.075 76

(0.10)

constant 1.04 0.000

(2.6E-02)


p values are for a one-tail testThe first and last models are dyadic, the others are monadic; the first two models involve a logitanalysis, while the latter two are OLS regressions.


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Since manipulative mediation increases the rate at which the ZOA expands, and ZOA

expansion tends to lead to smaller dyadic payoffs, we expected manipulative mediation to alsohave a negative relationship with dyadic utility. However, the results paradoxically indicate that

this relationship is significantly (p


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crisis negotiation. In doing so, we are explicitly addressing mediation in crisis management, andour findings should be evaluated in this somewhat restricted environment, since they do not

address the larger area of conflict resolution in general.The analysis began with two key areas of research pertaining to negotiations in

international crises: the impact of mediation on the creation and/or expansion of zones of

agreement among the parties, and the impact of the existence of zones of agreement on theoutcomes of crises. At one level, the results of these analyses are reasonably straightforward:

Mediation is positively related to the expansion of zones of agreement during the course of thenegotiation. However, we have found scant evidence for the existence of a relationship between

zones of agreement and positive crisis outcomes, defined either in terms of individual or jointutility points, achievement of agreements, or satisfaction of the parties involved.

We have employed a variety of aggregation and statistical techniques to explore these

relationships further, and these analyses have provided us with a more nuanced view of the wayin which these complex relationship work. First, we have clearly found that only the more

manipulative style of mediation has a strong impact on zones of agreement. Neither unmediatedcrises, nor crises with the less intrusive facilitative mediation style, showed any relationship withzone of agreement dynamics. Further, there is an important interactive effect between

manipulation and duration. The longer the negotiation lasts, the greater the impact ofmanipulative mediation on zones of agreement. And, the rate at which the zone of agreement

expands will be much greater when there is a manipulative mediator present. Thus, whileduration on its own is only weakly related to the expansion of zones of agreement, its interactiveeffect with manipulative mediation is quite powerful.

Extent of zone of agreement change over the course of the negotiation, and the size of thezone of agreement at the end of the negotiation were both unrelated to all but a single outcome

variable, dyadic utility. And, in that case, the relationship was negative in direction. This makesintuitive sense dyads with large or expanding zones of agreement are likely to achievemutually beneficial agreements through mediation that will result in lower utility payoffs for

each of the parties as part of the compromise achieved. Nevertheless, and despite the largeliterature on the beneficial effects of zones of agreement, this factor does not appear to impact

the achievement of agreements, individual utility, or satisfaction with the negotiation.This latter finding led us to reintroduce manipulative mediation into our analysis, and to

explore the joint effect of that style of mediation and zone of agreement change on dyadic utility.

While manipulative mediation was positively related to zone of agreement change, and zone ofagreement change was in turn negatively related to dyadic utility, manipulative mediation and

dyadic utility are strongly and positively related. While we do not as yet have an adequateexplanation for these seemingly contradictory findings duration clearly plays a key role here -it does appear to be the case that the impact of manipulative mediation is an extremely salient

and positive factor in the crisis negotiation process. This then adds additional weight to ourearlier findings (Wilkenfeld et al. 2001) regarding the importance of manipulative mediation

style on crisis negotiation, as compared with both non-mediated crises and those exhibiting onlyfacilitative mediation.

In light of these findings, it is interesting to speculate whether the impact of manipulative

mediation is not in its capacity to widen the zone of agreement per se, but rather to pressure eachside to reach agreements with less reference to the actual issues under negotiation, making zones

of agreement less important under these circumstances. In the difficult mediation missionundertaken by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the aftermath of the 1973 war in the


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Middle East, manipulative mediationwith its characteristic use of leverage as well as offers ofboth rewards and threatsultimately made the difference in the conclusion of agreements

between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria. While a manipulative mediation style may notbe appropriate in many international crises, when it does occur, it is likely to lead to positive

outcomes for the parties involved.Finally, it is worth putting the results of this study in the context of the larger researchenterprise of which they are a part. Our efforts are directed toward the development of a theory

of crisis negotiation, in which the relationship between mediation and outcome is set in thecontext of three main process attributes: style of mediation, power discrepancy among

adversaries, and zones of agreement. We expect these three components of the mediatednegotiation process to come together in an important statement of how mediation can be usedeffectively to enhance the prospects of successful crisis negotiations. The work we have

presented here moves us further toward this ultimate objective, but also demonstrates thecomplexity of the relationships among these factors.


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