the housing challenge in south africa

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1996 33: 1629Urban StudRobina Goodlad

The Housing Challenge in South Africa

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Urban Studies, Vol. 33, No. 9, 1629± 1645, 1996

The Housing Challenge in South Africa

Robina Goodlad

[Paper ® rst received, June 1995; in ® nal form, May 1996]

Summary. This paper considers the housing conditions inherited by the new government in

South Africa and the challenge they presen t. It draws on primary and secondary sources, and on

interview s with some of the key actors involved in housing policy. It exam ines contemporary

housing conditions, and the colon ial and aparth eid legacy which largely created them. It goes on

to consider the implication s of the struggle under aparth eid for improvem ents in living conditions,

and to review developments in housing policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. The policies emerging

from the ® rst year of the new govern ment are described, and the implementation of policy in the

® rst two years is review ed. Issues that arise are discussed, and the conditions required for the

state, market and civil society to play their part in achieving the objectives of housing policy are

considered .

Introduction

The appointment of Joe Slovo, a key African

National Congress (ANC) negotia tor in the

Convention for a Democratic South Africa

(CODESA, 1990±93), as Minister for Hous-

ing following the ® rst free elections in April

1994, con® rmed that the ANC perceived

housing as a key issue. The role of housing

policy in apartheid meant that:

What housing there was, was about con-

trol. It was about excluding people from

urban areas. It was about regimentation. It

was about the administration of depri-

vation. (Slovo addressing the Housing

Summit, Botshabelo, 27 October 1994)

The ANCs manifesto, The Reconstruction

and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC,

1994) said that 1m houses should be built

within 5 years of the election. Yet one year

later, at the end of the ® rst year of the new

Government, only 878 subsidised units had

been built (Forbes, 1995, p. 68), and six

months later a further 10 600 homes had

been delivered (Financial Times, 21 Novem-

ber 1995, p. 3).

This paper considers the reasons why

progress has apparently been so slow by

examining the nature of the housing chal-

lenge faced by the government of South

Africa. This requires consideration of a num-

ber of historical, political, social and econ-

omic factors: ® rst, the legacy of apartheid

and earlier segregationist polic ies; secondly,

the nature of housing conditions inherited by

the new government; thirdly, the housing

Robina Goodlad is in the Centre for Housing Research and Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, 25 Bute Gardens, Glasgow G128RT, Scotland, UK. Fax: 0141 330 4983; e-mail: [email protected]. The author is indebted to the people andorganisations who assisted in the research leading to this paper. The Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, Urban Studiesand the University of Glasgow assisted with ® nancial and other support. Two anonymous referees provided invaluable comments.Many people at all three levels of government, in NGOs, in community groups and in universities in South Africa provided insightsinto urban conditions and the policy process or assisted in other ways. Ivan Turok encouraged the author throughout, and Mary Turokprovided some valuable data and much else.

0042-0980/96/091629-17 $6.00 Ó 1996 The Editors of Urban Studies

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ROBINA GOODLAD1630

policies developed in the moves towards

democracy and reform in the early 1990s

then in the ® rst year of the new government;

fourthly, the implementation of policy and

the institutional and other obstacles impeding

the housing programme; ® fthly, the implica-

tions of social, economic and politica l factors

which make housing a key issue for the

government.

The paper considers these factors in turn to

reach conclusions about the condition s that

are required if the roles of the state, market

and civil society in the new South Africa are

to be adapted to achieve the objectives of

housing policy. It draws on primary and sec-

ondary sources, and on interviews with some

of the key actors involved in the develop-

ment of policy at three levels of government,

in NGOs and community groups, and in the

ANC.

Segregation and Housing

Aparthe id alone cannot be held responsible

for the housing conditions in South Africa in

1994, but equally no account of housing

policy and condition s can be credible if it

does not take into account the recent history

of South Africa, and the colonia l legacy of

the African continent (Davenport, 1991;

Lemon, 1987; Worden, 1994; Robinson ,

1996).

By the end of the second decade of the

20th century, a spatial segregation of racial

groups to mirror the class segregation of

occupational groups was well advanced, es-

pecially in urban areas. White people ª were

already 55 per cent urbanisedº (Lemon,

1991, p. 3). The extent to which this segre-

gation had racist, capitalist or other roots is

disputed (Robinson , 1996), but a variety of

devices, from compounds for mine-workers

to racial exclusion clauses in property deeds

and even removals following plague, were

used to secure segregation, and ` security’ for

whites and to perpetuate their economic

dominance.

The ® rst indication of a more systematic

approach to segregation came in the 1923

Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which embodied

the sentiments of the Transvaal Local

Government Commission of 1922 that ª the

native should only be allowed to enter the

urban areas, which are essentially the White

man’ s creation, when he is willing to enter

and minister to the needs of the White man,

and should depart therefrom when he ceases

so to ministerº (quoted in Lemon, 1991, p.

4). A further Act of 1937 allowed central

government to enforce the 1923 Act provi-

sions in particular local authorities, and ex-

tended early in¯ ux controls. By the time of

the Nationalists’ election victory in 1948, the

pre-aparthe id city was ª highly but not com-

pletely segregatedº (Lemon, 1991, p. 8).

The infamous Group Areas Acts of 1950

and 1966 set about designating every square

inch of land for occupation by one of four

` racial’ groups (` African’ , ` Indian’ ,

` coloured ’ , and ` white ’ ). In an unusua l dis-

play of irony and euphemism combined, the

task was entrusted to a ` Community Devel-

opment Board’ for most of the apartheid

years. Within cities, ` coloured ’ and ` Indian’

people were most affected, whereas 99.7 per

cent of whites already lived in what became

white group areas (Lemon, 1991, p. 10).

Africans were effectively excluded from

white areas, with the exception of domestic

workers. Those with permission to do so

resided in the distant townships, increasingly

in grossly overcrowded conditions. Most

whites were comfortably housed at low den-

sities, and increasingly in fortress-like condi-

tions of security. Indians were concentrated

in much poorer housing , some built for

owner-occupation by the state, in small

` group areas’ , sometimes after resisting re-

moval from inner-city locations (Davies,

1991, p. 82). ` Coloureds’ ,concentrated in the

Cape area, were removed to the Cape Flats

townships, far from the city centre, where

overcrowding and shack developments in-

evitably resulted.

Africans in ` white ’ rural areas were forced

into 10 ` homelands’ , based on allegedly tra-

ditional African rural allegiances. ª During

the 1960s the popula tion of the Bantustans

rose by 70 per cent, while those of African

townships actually fellº (Worden, 1994, p.




THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1631

111). The ` homelands’ were intended to pro-

vide politica l rights to Africans, while deny-

ing them the full economic and social rights

of participation in the South African econ-

omy. But instead some became a base for

very long distance commuting into cities

such as Pretoria and Durban, and those at

greater distance from cities became poverty-

stricken and underdeveloped.

The measures were implemented in differ-

ent parts of South Africa with varying de-

grees of commitment and ef® ciency, but

overall with signi® cant effectiveness. The

1985 census in Cape Town, for example,

showed that 9 per cent of ` coloureds’ still

lived outside areas designated for ` coloured’

occupation (Cook, 1991, p. 32). By the end

of 1987, 1300 group areas had been pro-

claimed and some highly public ised re-

movals such as those in Sophiatown

(Johannesburg), Cato Manor (Durban) and

District Six (Cape Town) had taken place.

The effects of the growing contradictions

arising from aparthe id were to increase the

extent of informal development, as migration

to the cities continued, and to add

signi® cantly to the shortfall in accommo-

dation in the townships which governments

since have been unable or unwilling to rec-

tify. The substantial house-building pro-

grammes for Africans of the 1950s in the

peripheral townships had slowed, then halted

in the 1960s as aparthe id entered its ` se-

cond’ , more draconian, phase, follow ing the

Sharpeville shootings and the growing iso-

lation of South Africa in the international

community. In the 1960s, controls on urban

migration and growth intensi ® ed (Turok,

1994, p. 246), despite some opposit ion from

employers in need of labour. In 1968

Africans were forbidden from holding free-

hold property in townships: they had to be-

come tenants of municipalities. The

allocation of permits to work and reside was

coordina ted with the allocation of township

houses. Informal settlements expanded

within the homelands and on the edges of

cities, where they were demolished routinely

almost until the end of the apartheid era.

Some migrant male workers were con® ned to

hostels in the townships, in a disastrous as-

pect of policy which has left a legacy of

bitterness, and con¯ ict, as well as some of

the worst living conditions directly attribu-

table to aparthe id.

It is easy to establish that Africans,

` coloureds’ and Indians were systematically

discriminated against in the allocation of

state ® nances for housing purposes in the

aparthe id years, but the exact incidence of

subsidies and tax advantages to whites is

little documented. Most whites were able to

use their economic power to provide for their

own housing needs, but the state assisted

them, where necessary, sometimes with the

use of the tax system. Also common for

whitesÐ now for middle-class workers, who

are mainly whitesÐ is assistance with hous-

ing costs from employers (including the state

as a substantial employer of whites).

Housing and the Struggle against Apart-

heid

Residential segregation and inequalities in

living conditions were an important strand in

the growing resistance to the effects of apa-

rtheid from the late 1970s. The revolt by

schoolchildren in Soweto in 1976 was more

publicised but no more signi® cant than the

increasingly common breaches of restrictions

on place of residence, usually carried out as

a means to achieving access to jobs, or the

hope of jobs, and urban services. These

struggles were clearly linked to the apartheid

system. Examples include the resistance to

enforced removals in neighbourhoods such

as Cato Manor (Durban) from the 1950s to

the 1970s (Davenport, 1991); and the inva-

sions of land within the boundaries of towns

and cities. An unusual example is Hillbrow ,

on the northern edge of the Johannesburg

CBD, an area of high-density, multi-storey

¯ ats designated for white occupation, but

increasingly occupied by other racial groups

from the late 1970s (Morris, 1994).

The exact signi® cance of housing strug-

gles in the defeat of apartheid is contested.

In one type of account: ª what ought to be

clear from this presentation is not so much




ROBINA GOODLAD1632

the historical development of social move-

ments, but rather their importance for eman-

cipatory actionº (Soni, 1992, p. 50). In

another, the struggles ª defy any simple cate-

gorisation ¼ struggles within informal set-

tlements and, increasingly, formal townships

as well, often involve no direct confrontation

with the stateº (Mabin, 1992, p. 23). The

improvement of material condition s, rather

than apartheid per se, may have been the

primary motive in protest. But the close rela-

tionship between the regime and the material

condition s it produced makes this a conten-

tious conclusion.

Less controve rsial is the view that apar-

theid itself compounded housing inequalities

in ways which led to additional con¯ icts,

sometimes between disadvantaged groups,

rather than between them and the regime.

This is seen in con¯ icts such as those be-

tween residents in formal housing and those

occupying shacks nearby, over access to

township water; between householders and

their tenants or sub-tenants, over space; and,

most well-known, between hostel-dwellers

and others, in political con¯ icts, exacerbated

by government action (Mabin, 1992).

In the African townships, attempts to es-

tablish elected black local authorities

(BLAs), in an effort to placate the population

after the uprisings of 1976 and 1984, were

unsuccessful. These BLAs never achieved

legitimacy in the eyes of their electorateÐ for

example, in Soweto the electoral turnout was

6 per cent in 1978 (Lemon, 1991, p. 23). The

BLAs were seen as implicated in in¯ ux con-

trol and in perpetuating the inequities of

property rights and access to resources of the

apartheid system. One of the most important

forms of resistance to the BLAs was the rent

boycott, which was left a legacy of non-pay-

ment with serious implications for the future.

Some developments in the late 1980s, and

especially follow ing F. W. de Klerk’ s epoch-

ending speech on 2 February 1990, can be

seen as replacing struggle and protest with

participation. A limited but signi® cant con-

sensus about the direction of national hous-

ing policy was apparent, largely through the

work of the National Housing Forum , a vol-

untary umbrella organisation involving many

interest-groups. Within local and provincial

government as well there was some adjust-

ment, and anticipation of a new regime. For

example, in Johannesburg, the City Council

started to engage in dialogue with black or-

ganisations, and initiated the Central Johan-

nesburg Partnership with business and

community representatives to seek consensus

on housing and employment projects. In Dur-

ban, the Cato Manor Development Associ-

ation was set up in 1993 as a non-pro ® t

company by a combination of private-, pub-

lic- and voluntary-sector bodies ª as a symbol

of urban reconstructionº and as ª a clear de-

parture from the aparthe id planning of the

pastº (Robinson and Smit, 1994, p. 2). These

developments were atypical, but character-

ised the approach which politicians and ur-

ban professionals increasingly espoused in

the early 1990s, using the language of ` pro-

cess’ rather than ` blue-print planning’ .

The 10 years of struggle from 1984 had

also created a strong volunta ryÐ civicÐ

movement which did not see the universal

franchise as the only requirement of a

democracy. Many activists argued that the

consequences of not engaging with the peo-

ple intended to bene® t from development

were violence or abandonment. For example,

one experimental hostel upgrading project in

Khayelitsha (Cape Town’ s largest peripheral

township) ended in despair when some of the

new terraced houses were set on ® re by

people aggrieved by the allocation policies

(Umzamo, 1994).

In the early 1990s little was apparent of a

changed politica l situation in black residen-

tial areas. Rent boycotts continued, due to

poverty, or in sceptical impatience about the

prospects for improvements. Community

groups struggled to secure the support, land

and resources they required to improve their

living condition s in a system still structured

on racist principles. Almost until the last

hour, it was not clear that elections would

take place, and until they did, no-one would

have been justi® ed in assuming the result, or

the effect. This was illustra ted in the estab-

lishment, from 1987, of 43 multi-racial





Regiona l Services Councils (RSCs) intended

to ª redirect some resources from the econ-

omic base of the white areas for selective

investment in the townshipsº , and in some

metropolitan areas to provide some services

directly. However, the extent of redistribu-

tion was limited and the RSCs never

achieved a legitimacy in the eyes of non-

whites (Turok, 1994, p. 256).

This account has shown that creating a

democratic society was inextricably bound

up with the struggle for better material condi-

tions. Urbanisation and housing conditions

provided a focus for protest and participation

which have important implications for the

future, and contribut ed to the high expecta-

tions held of the new government in 1994.

The nature of these conditions is now con-

sidered, before the policies pursued immedi-

ately before and after the 1994 election are

examined.

Housing Conditions in South Africa

The housing challenge posed by the end of

apartheid is enormous, but dif® cult to quan-

tify precisely, in the absence of adequate data

about population, household composition ,

migration patterns and income. Estimates of

population predicted 42.6m in 1995, two-

thirds of whom would live in towns and

cities, leaving a rural population of 15m. The

white, Indian and ` coloured’ popula tions are

more urbanised than the African (NHF,

1994). In 1994 there were about 2.6m formal

housing units. An estimated 1.7m house-

holdsÐ around 7m peopleÐ were living in

shacks on unserviced sites, and over 2m peo-

ple were in 620 000 shacks on serviced sites.

A further 100 000 serviced sites were not

occupiedÐ they were in the wrong place,

provided the wrong facilities, or were unaf-

fordable. About a quarter of the population

did not have access to piped water. Almost

half (46 per cent) did not have electricity,

and a similar propor tion had no access to

proper sanitation . Homelessness (de ® ned as

roo¯ essness) was estimated at a minimum of

1.5m households. An astonishing 2.1m peo-

ple lived in hostels, often with a family to a

bed, and sometimes with additiona l friends

or family squatting outside (NHF, 1994).

Wilson and Ramphele (1989, p. 128) report a

1984 survey of 8 hostels at Nyanga East,

Cape Town, in which there was 1 toile t for

every 22 men. Since then condition s have

worsened as the dismantling of apartheid

enabled wives and children to join husbands

and fathers in the hostels. The levels of

overcrowding in the townships were also

excessive, with of® cial assumptions of occu-

pancy levels of 7 people per house belied by

surveys which have found 17, 20 or even up

to 30 occupants of the 4-room houses

(Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, pp. 125±126).

One outcome is a plethora of shacks built in

gardens or on any other site that can be taken

over.

The division between rich and poor is

structured largely on ` racial’ lines. At the

beginning of the 1990s, whites, with almost

13 per cent of the population (5.1m) received

54 per cent of personal income; Africans,

with almost 76 per cent of the population

(39.4m ), received 33 per cent of income;

` coloureds’ with 8.6 per cent of the popu-

lation (3.4m), received 9 per cent of the

income; and ` Indians’ , with 2.5 per cent of

the population (1.0m) received 4 per cent of

income (population data, 1992; income data,

1990; Smith, 1995, p. 49). The worst condi-

tions are consistently experienced in the rural

areas, although the edges of the cities contain

numerically the largest concentrations of

shacks, poor or no sanitation, inadequate wa-

ter supplies, and sparse urban facilities of all

types. Women have suffered particularly

from a combination of patriarchal traditions

and aparthe id-inspired laws. Given the spar-

sity of health services and the high levels of

poverty, the disadvantages of poor health and

disability also compound housing inadequa-

cies for substantial numbers of people .

African urbanisation was occurring at a

fast rate from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s

as a result of migration, but since then the

growth in the African populat ion has been

more a consequence of natural growth than

in migration from rural areas (Dewar, 1992,

p. 243). Migration from countries to the




ROBINA GOODLAD1634

north of South Africa has excited much com-

ment, but the scale is unknow n. Whatever the

source, the growing African population has

been ` housing ’ itself largely in shanty towns

round all South Africa’ s towns and cities.

Economic and demographic indicators are

not propitious, although again there are data

dif® culties in clarifying the position. The

average growth rate in the economy was 1.03

per cent between 1986 and 1991 (NHF,

1994), but reached 2.5 per cent in 1994, and

3 per cent in 1995. Only 2 per cent of GNP

was spent on housing in 1993/94 in contrast

with 5±17 per cent in comparable developing

countries. Estimates of unemploym ent vary

from around 33 per cent to over 50 per cent

of economically active people . Rogerson es-

timates 53.5 per cent of the potential work-

force were without formal employment in

1991, either unemployed or working in the

informal or subsistence economies (Roger-

son, 1995, p. 170). The Housing Ministry

1994 projections of income for 1995 sug-

gested that almost 4 out of 10 (39.7 per cent)

households had an income of less than R800

per month (approximately £138), and 86.1

per cent had less than R3500 (approximately

£600) (South Africa, 1994c ). In¯ ation is

high, and so are interest rates. In 1994, an

estimated 130 000±150 000 houses were

needed each year to provide for new house-

holds, but in 1993 only 50 000 houses were

builtÐ and most would have been inaccess-

ible to the majority of the population (NHF,

1994; South Africa, 1994c ); in addition,

many more are needed to catch up with the

` backlog’ created by the apartheid years.

Housing Policy 1980± 94

The 1980s were characterised by reforms

within the aparthe id framework which made

minimal concessions to the political aspira-

tions of ` Indian’ , ` coloured ’ and African

groups, but acknowledged the inevitability of

black urbanisation. This acceptance was be-

ginning to be apparent in 1975 and 1978

when reforms had allowed blacks the right to

leasehold ownership of housing on 30- then

99-year leases. Legislation in 1983 providing

for the sale of township housing to residents

at large discounts (Parnell, 1992, p. 59) was

taken up on a signi® cant scaleÐ by 1989, 34

per cent of African tenants had purchased,

the lowest proportion of the four ` race’

groupsÐ but for remaining tenants, the rent

increases of the mid 1980s provided a trigger

for the unrest of 1984±86 which resulted in a

state of emergency. ª Rent boycotts soon be-

came a key form of resistance to the stateº

(Lemon, 1991, p. 24).

In 1983 the government con® rmed its

view that it was not the role of the state to

provide housing directly (South Africa,

1983). Yet the ª rate of government building

of housing remains constant and the amount

of state money allocated to shelter has in-

creased ¼ º (Parnell, 1992, p. 51). This is

partly explained by the increase in house-

building for Indians and ` coloureds’ for

whom tangible rewards were being offered

for supportÐ never forthcoming on any

scaleÐ in the establishment of the tricameral

parliamentary system in 1984. Much of this

housing was constructed for owner-occu-

pation (Parnell, 1992, pp. 55±56), and from

the mid 1980s the state provided minimal

services on sites on the edges of the cities

where people could erect their own shacks,

or more conventional houses (Mabin, 1991,

p. 22). This approach characterised a govern-

ment reconciled to the idea of African urban-

isation but unwilling to devote a large budge t

to housing Africans. The illegitimacy of the

regime and the unsuitability of some of the

sites made this an unsuccessful approach to

mass provision.

In contrast, ª housing ® nance ¼ continues

to favour whites over blacks, and the rich

over the poor ¼ º (Parnell, 1992, p. 51),

particularly as a result of using income cri-

teria for assistance. These subsidies were

phased out from the early 1990s, but by the

end of the 1980s were reaching a signi® cant

group of middle-class Africans despite the

limitations (Parnell, 1992, p. 61). In the

townships, an emerging black middle class

was able to buy, improve or build higher-

quality housing , including some built with

state subsidy as a result of government at-





tempts to win ` hearts and minds’ amongst

Africans.

From 1990 developments in housing pol-

icy were based on the hope, or assumption,

of a constitutional settlement granting equal-

ity of political rights to all, and were also a

result of a ª widely recognisedº perception

that South Africa had ª no coherent and legit-

imate housing policyº (Lupton and Murphy,

1995, p. 162). A number of new programmes

were intended to assert the commitment of

the government to reform and development.

In 1986 the South African Housing Trust had

been established as a non-pro ® t provide r of

serviced land and loans on a small scale

(9500 homes in 1992) (Lupton and Murphy,

1995, p. 155). In 1990 a government grant of

R3bn established the Independent Develop-

ment Trust (IDT) which adopted housing as

one of its priorities, and a programme of

capital subsidies was established at the rate

of R7500 per unit and targeted on low-in-

come families. The scheme was administered

on a project basis, with public, voluntary and

private-sector organisations eligible to make

proposals either for new site-and-service

schemes, or for upgrading informal settle-

ments.

The National Housing Forum (NHF), con-

vened in August 1992 by the Independent

Development Trust and the Development

Bank of Southern Africa, included in its

membership the South African National

Civic Organisation (SANCO), the main pol-

itical parties including the ANC, and repre-

sentatives of trade unions, the construction

industry, ® nancial institutions and develop-

ment agencies. The Forum had an uneasy

relationship with the old government, which

initia lly took part then withdrew. Eventually

in 1993 the Forum was asked to nominate six

people to serve on the government’ s new

National Housing Board, created to replace

boards for each of the three legislatures, and

to consider ® nancial and institutional reforms

to housing policy. The recommendations in-

cluded an expansion in state expenditure,

targeted on the poorest, and non-discrimina-

tory in its effects and administration. Legis-

lation in late 1993 and in 1994 began to put

in place the administrative structures re-

quired for the housing subsidy regime being

created. The Housing Arrangements Act

1993 created the National Housing Board

and four regional boards. A few weeks be-

fore the general election in April 1994, the

details of a subsidy scheme were agreed:

R5000±12 500 per unit, dependent on house-

hold income of no more than R3500, apply-

ing criteria widely discussed and agreed in

the National Housing Forum . These included

models which attempted to improve upon the

late 1980s site-and-service schemes on new

sites.

The new schemes broadly allowed two

approaches: formal housing for low-income

residents who could support, with the help of

the capital subsidy and any savings, the re-

sulting loan repayments; and projects to ® nd

approaches to the upgrading of shacks, in

situ. The latter approach, termed ` incremen-

tal’ , was controversial, perceived by some of

its supporters as the inevitable pragmatic re-

sponse to the inadequate resources set

against the scale of need, and by other propo-

nents as the only viable option to prevent the

commodi® cation of housing , and to secure

affordability and sustainability for the

poorest. To its opponents, it was not what the

liberation struggle had been for:

We shall not be party to any scheme or

plan whose eventual outcome ¼ is to

create serviced informal settlements in the

name of housing . People deserve to live in

proper low-cost houses. (Tokyo Sexwale,

Premier of Gauteng Province, addressing

the PW V provinc ial legislature at its ® rst

meeting in 1994; quoted in Tomlinson,

1995, p. 7)

As the elections for nationa l and provincial

assemblies took place in April 1994, a poss-

ible direction in housing policy was apparent,

but still lacking were many of the condition s

required to develop and implement it. Some

participants saw the Forum as having

achieved a national policy, providing others,

such as provinc ial housing ministers, for ex-

ample, learned more about housing so that

they could fall into line behind it. Others saw




ROBINA GOODLAD1636

the NHF as having left unresolved some key

issues, a view which is more consistent with

analyses of policy processes in which ` pol-

icy’ becomes clear only at the point of ` im-

plementation ’ (Ham and Hill, 1993).

Housing Policy 1994± 95

The origins of the housing policy which

emerged are to be found in the work of the

NHF, and in the Reconstruction and Devel-

opment Programme (ANC, 1994) which was

adopted as a White Paper by the multi-party

Government of National Unity (South

Africa, 1994d). Some individuals, for exam-

ple, the new Director General of Housing

(head of the civil service in the Ministry of

Housing) , provide a link from the NHF to the

new Government. ª Slovo was bringing the

ANC’ s chief negotiator at the NHF over to

the department with the plan, in a sense, in

his back pocketº (Tomlinson, 1995, p. 5).

Housing features strongly in the RDP,

which emphasises the importance of com-

munity and private-sector involvement and

other forms of politica l participation for the

future. With some quali® cations, it provides

an essentially social democratic manifesto

for economic, social and political develop-

ment: ª Without meeting basic needs, no pol-

itical democracy can survive in South

Africaº (para. 2.2.1); and:

We are convinced that neither a comman-

dist central planning system nor an unfet-

tered free market system can provide

adequate solutions to the problems con-

fronting us. Reconstruction and develop-

ment will be achieved through the leading

and enabling role of the state, a thriving

private sector, and active involvement by

all sectors of civil society which in combi-

nation will lead to sustainable growth.

(ANC, 1994, para 4.2.1)

The approach taken to housing was different

from the corporate state models of the UK,

and other western European models, where at

times of crisis and reconstruction the state

has created mass social rented housing . The

aim was to create an environment in which

the state facilitated delivery rather than en-

gaged directly in provision, and in which

market and community involvement was

maximised. This approach borrows from a

number of sources, including the experience

of other developing countries in Latin Amer-

ica and India , where informal housing has

been a contentious policy issue.

The discredited site-and-service schemes

of the apartheid years, poverty and the lack

of state income maintenance provision make

the provision of housing problematic. The

public rented housing experience of South

Africa and several European countries led

the RDP away from a large state programme

of construction, although paradoxically a

mass housing programme was called for,

achieving 1m ` low-cost houses’ over 5 years

(para 2.5.2). Government subsidy ª to reach a

goal of not less than 5 per cent of the budge t

by the end of the ® ve-year RDPº was

promised (para 2.5.5). The means of delivery

was seen as a combination of self-help, pub-

lic subsidy, choice in the market, and small-

scale communal provision. ª Delivery

systems will depend on community partici-

pationº as well as market provision (para

2.5.20). The policy framework required in-

cluded subsidies, private ® nance and pro-

vision of land and a variety of tenure options .

As will be seen, this gives some insight into

the nature of the compromises the RDP rep-

resents, rather than provides a prescription

for action. The government’ s actions fell

broadly into ® ve elements during the ® rst

twelve months: legislation, commitment

from key actors, institut ional reform, a sub-

sidy system, and development support and

advice.

Legislation

Land was a priority and the Development

Facilitation Act 1995 was intended to pro-

vide the legal framework for all three levels

of government to assist in gaining access to

development land. The Act provided for the

establishment of tribunals in each province to

resolve disputes, broadly in favour of devel-

opment. This might involve , for example,





overturning the provisions of town planning

schemes. The Act was intended, inter alia, to

ensure freehold land for projects such as

those involved in upgrading shacks on the

edges of towns and cities.

Commitment from Key Actors

Commitment from key actors was sought to

the terms of a draft white paper. This process

was assisted by the work of the National

Housing Forum in the few months after the

election as it ® nally came down in favour of

the ` incremental approach’ to the use of sub-

sidy, as Slovo was doing (Tomlinson, 1995,

p. 13). Early in October a Record of Under-

standing between the Department of Housing

and the Association of Mortgage Lenders

(1994) was signed, providing for a resump-

tion of lending to lower-income borrowers

by ® nancial institutions which for many

years had refused to lend because of fear of

political violence and payment boycotts, or

because of racial prejudice. The aim was to

achieve 50 000 loans in the ® rst year to

households who quali® ed for government

subsidy so that lower-income earners should

be able to purchase a house with a combi-

nation of subsidy and loan. The government

undertook to campaign for a resumption of

payment for goods and services, and to pro-

vide temporary (three years) mortgage in-

demnity where there was a breakdown of law

in a speci® c area (Department of Housing

and Association of Mortgage Lenders, 1994,

p. 6). The banks undertook to supply the

Ministry with data on their lending practices

under the agreement (for publication only in

aggregate form) and to publish their own

guidelines for the extension of credit. A

Code of Conduc t, including provision of an

ombudsman, was also agreed.

Exactly six months after the elections, Joe

Slovo launched a draft housing White Paper

(South Africa, 1994a) at a conference in

Botshabelo attended by over 600 delegates

from ® nancial and construction ® rms, volun-

tary organisations, development agencies,

trade unions, provinc ial and local govern-

ments and political parties (South Africa,

1994b). The un® nished nature of the paper

can be seen positively as part of an open

system of government intended to ensure that

key agencies can contribute to the ® nal docu-

ment, or it can be seen as a symbol of the

failure to reach agreement to a detailed pack-

age. The Accord signed at Botshabelo was

strong on rhetoric, but said little in detail

apart from adopting the targets of the RDP. It

contained, however, some commitments by

individual signatories, such as ` civil society’

represented mainly by SANCO and the

South African Homeless People’ s Federation

who ª ¼ commit ourselves to an intensive

campaign to change the hostilit ies between

® nancial institut ions, local government and

the communities and bring to an end the

tradition of non-payment for services, rent

and bond boycotts, including the tradition of

non-delivery of servicesº .

Institutional Reform

Another key requirement was in relation to

the institutions of government, where at all

three levelsÐ national, provincial and localÐ

public servants as well as elected representa-

tives were adjusting to the new regime. At

provincial level, in a process intended to take

up to ® ve years to complete, nine new

provinces were being created from the four

` white’ provinces of Natal, Transvaal, Or-

ange Free State and Cape, the four ` indepen-

dent’ homelands, and the six ` self-governing

territories’ . In July the four regional housing

boards created in 1993 were replaced by

nine, based on the new provinces. These

boards were made up of one-third regulators,

one-third consumer representatives, and one-

third producer representatives. Their role in-

cludes approving applications for subsidy for

schemes presented by developers, as the old

boards had done, so giving them a key role in

the implementation of the RDP.

Elections for new local authorities were

delayed until November 1995, and until May

1996 in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-

Natal. This meant some delays in establish-

ing the policy frameworks and procedures

which would allow all three levels of govern-




ROBINA GOODLAD1638

Table 1. Subsidy per househo ld, SouthAfrica 1995

Joint spouse income Subsidy

R0±R800 R15 000R801±R1500 R12 500R1501±R2500 R9500R2501±R3500 R5000

Source: South Africa (1994c, p. 44).

ment to contribute to reconstruction. How-

ever, transitional councils, made up of repre-

sentatives of the old, discredited authorities

and of politica l parties and community repre-

sentatives, took over at the end of 1994 in

most areas. The new authorities were non-

racial and metropolitan-based, some with lo-

cal assemblies at a lower level. The new

councils ’ role in housing policy was mainly

seen as facilitating rather than directly pro-

viding housing . A crucial potential role was

in servicing land and putting together part-

nerships to achieve development or improve-

ment. The idea of ` parastatal’ landlords

Ð roughly equivalent to the European idea of

municipal housing companiesÐ was con-

sidered feasible by some policy advisers at

provincial and local level.

Subsidy

The subsidy arrangements described in the

White Paper represented a victory for those

who favoured incremental up-grading of in-

formal settlements, and wider distribution of

subsidy in small quantities, over those who

wanted to see a programme of subsidised

formal house construction. Capital subsidies

of R15 000 for the poorest, based on the

existing scheme of R12 500 per household,

were seen as a ` cornerstone’ (p. 30) in the

government’ s approach, and ` width’ over

` depth’ was favoured as a way of balancing

need and resources. Subsidy was dependent

on household income, with households earn-

ing less than R3500 per month (approxi-

mately £600) qualifying, as shown in Table

1.

The White Paper (South Africa, 1994c) set

down the nature of the dilemma seen by the

government in creating a subsidy:

The required annual delivery rate (of

c.350,000), (the) relatively high ` pro-

portion of poor households and budgetary

constraints do not allow suf® cient subsidy

money per household to enable the con-

struction, at State expense, of a minimum

standard complete house for each house-

hold not able to afford such a house. Only

a limited State subsidy contribution to-

wards the cost of a house is possible.

(South Africa, 1994c, p. 20)

At an annual rate of housing 150 000 house-

holds, it was estimated to take 10 years to

eliminate the ` backlog’ Ð and then only if an

additional 200 000 new households were

housed each year. Mobilising credit was seen

as essential for some households, and

speci® c ® nancial proposals included collabo-

rating with the banks to ensure a growth in

lending to assist individuals to fund their

own housing. But for many others, the key

was seen to be savings. Around half the

households in need of housing were thought

to be unlikely to gain access to credit, so

collective savings mechanisms would be sup-

ported. Subsidy was to be applied to securing

tenure (usually freehold), providing access to

basic services, and creating a basic structure.

The subsidy had to be designed to allow the

poorest to use it to assist them to build a

reasonable structure for themselves, or with

the help of others in their community. The

Housing Ministry was anxious to create a

greater market in housing production, but

was also impressed by evidence such as that

of the Homeless People’ s Federation





(SAHPF) that the cost of a house could be as

little as 21±33 per cent of the cost of a

contractor-built house , with the help of self-

help labour and a loan provided from a sav-

ings and loan scheme (SAHPF, 1995, p. 8).

In the longer term, a National Housing Fi-

nance Corporation was envisaged ª to facili-

tate ongoing mobilisation of appropriate

credit to the lower end of the housing mar-

ketº (SAHPF, 1995, p. 29).

A wide range of tenure and delivery op-

tions was allowed for (although some of the

institutional mechanisms required were not

in place), including assisting:

Ð individuals into owner-occupation , either

individually or through approved projects;

Ð collective ownership schemes;

Ð rental subsidies aimed at organisations

providing rental housing ª to the lower end

of the marketº (SAHPF, 1995, p. 30);

Ð the improvement of site-and-service

schemes implemented under previous sub-

sidy regimes.

Development Support and Advice

Finally, support and advice were seen as

essential to facilitate the process of housing

development. Drawing on international ex-

perience, the 1994 White Paper expressed the

government’ s belief in the ª resilience, ingen-

uity and abilityº of households to look after

their own housing needs, ª with appropriate

institutional support and ® nancial assistance

from governmentº (SAHPF, 1995, p. 28).

The development of the local and national

government institut ional framework was an

important part of this, but here it is relevant

to note also the establishment of a network of

ten ` housing support centres’ to assist indi-

viduals and communities in planning devel-

opment, mobilising resources, acquiring

materials, and providing advice on legal,

technical and ® nancial aspects (conference

presentation, Director General 10 May 1995,

London).

Also seen as signi® cant in the White Paper

(p. 41) was the work of support and develop-

ment agencies (NGOs) such as the People ’ s

Dialogue and the Urban Founda tion. Peo-

ple’ s Dialogue assisted the South African

Homeless People’ s Federation and empha-

sised the crucial role of community-con-

trolled savings and loans societies, and the

Urban Foundation, funded by philanthropic

industr ialists and overseas aid, assisted com-

munity groups to prepare and implement up-

grading schemes and had experimented with

different models for upgrading. Staff usually

required a combination of technical skillsÐ

planning, building , ® nance, architecture, for

exampleÐ and community development ex-

pertise. They were widely seen as having a

continuing role in assisting community in-

volvement and self-help, although they and

others saw a need to ensure greater account-

ability to funders and community.

Progress 1994± 96

By the end of the ® rst year (1994/95), more

than 150 000 subsidies had been approved,

but these approvals had not been converted

into homes (Tomlinson, 1995, p. 18). The

government demonstrated its commitment to

increase the level of resources applied to

housing by increasing the budget provision

from R1.4bn in 1994/95 to R1.8bn in 1995/

96 (from 1.3 to 2.3 per cent). But by then, the

level of budget provision became less

signi® cant than the state’ s capacity to spend

the money available. Only R42m of the

1994/95 allocation was spent during that

year, and at the end of 1995/96, R2.227bn

was available for 1996/97 as a result of

further underspending. However, spending

committed in 1995/96 was at the level of 30

per cent of available funds (including monies

brought forward). The number of units to be

upgraded or built in projects approved by the

end of 1995/96 was almost one-third of a

million (321 594), with an additiona l 23 077

approvals for structures on sites serviced

with state assistance in the past (personal

communication, Department of Housing) .

These approva ls were not yet completions,

but they showed the potential capacity of the

programme, and criticisms that ª the systemº




ROBINA GOODLAD1640

had ª crashedº (Ruiters and Bond, 1996, p.

28) seem premature. The lack of progress led

the Parliament’ s Housing Committee to call

for the Housing Department to embark ª on

building rental housing on a large scaleº

(Portfolio Committee on Housing and Select

Committee on Housing and Public Works,

1996, p. 6).

Many conditions had to be met in order to

improve housing condition s in the ways set

down in the RDP. These included an active

house-building construction industry; skilled

workers and plentiful building materials; a

® nance system and institutions able and will-

ing to operate a market in housing in all parts

of South Africa; subsidy and other levers to

assist the achievement of social objectives;

ef® cient, legitimate and effective administra-

tion at provincial and local government lev-

els; political stability; community-based

organisations and the creation of support

structures and skilled professionals to assist

them to become housing developers; a

® nancial system which enabled those with no

conventional access to credit to secure the

funds necessary to become their own housing

developers; and the development of models

for social rented housing . Few of these were

inherited from the old regime, and the length

of this list alone indicates how ambitious was

the aim of putting a policy and institutional

framework in place in the twelve months

after April 1994.

When considered against these criteria,

much more was achieved than some critics

acknowledge. The strategy was neither sim-

ply market-driven, providing housing for

those who could operate in a subsidised mar-

ket, nor was it only a people-driven, decom-

modi® ed, participatory strategy dependent on

the organisation of community groups in in-

formal settlements. Time spent by national

and provinc ial ministers and of® cials in se-

curing agreements from the lending institu-

tions and in stimulating the interest of

developers to bring forward proposals was

therefore not available for creating the right

condition s for the poorest to gain better hous-

ing, and vice versa. Criticism that neither

type of development was achieved to the

extent intended by the government is valid,

though misplaced given the nature of hous-

ing development processes; but suggestions

that the policy was intended to be only

ª (private) developer-driven, bank-centred,

(and) fully-commodi® edº (Ruiters and Bond,

1996, p. 28) after the Accord of October

1994, misrepresents what the RDP made

clear, that the ANC sought to stimulate mar-

ket- and people-driven forms of production.

In the ® rst twelve months more had been

achieved in creating the framework for stim-

ulating the market than in developing the

model of community-based development,

though formidable obstacles remained, and

private-sector institutions failed to operate on

the government’ s termsÐ for example,

charging higher rates of interest in the town-

ships, and continuing to ` redline ’ more than

25 per cent of them (Ruiters and Bond, 1996,

pp. 28±29).

Delivering the Policy

The target of 1m homes by the end of 5 years

is one that ministers at provincial and na-

tional level may yet regret inheriting since it

will inevitably be an important criterionÐ for

some the only criterionÐ against which they

will be judged. However, although the target

is unlikely to be met, the rate of acceleration

in the development process could mean that

at the end of 5 years the rate of development

is consistent with over 300 000 units per

annum. Those who saw the ® rst year as

producing ª a signi® cant number of mile-

stonesº (Tomlinson., 1995, p. 18) also

identi® ed obstacles and tensions concerned

with development bottlenecks, such as those

arising from administrative weaknesses and

lack of development land, and differences of

view about appropriate strategies, such as

continuing disagreements between provincial

ministers of housing and national levels of

government, as provinc ial ministers sought

to meet their election promises to provide

4-roomed houses. Key factors in overcoming

obstacles to development include the creation

of an institutional framework to assist hous-

ing production, the implementation of an





effective subsidy scheme, and the accessibil-

ity of credit for the poorest. These and other

factors are now discussed.

Affordability

Achieving affordability lies at the crux of the

government’ s dilemma in choosing a subsidy

system which maximises production and sus-

tainability for the poorest. The wider the

subsidy, the more people it reaches, but the

shallower it is, carrying the danger of the

poorest not being able to build a decent

structure. The deeper the subsidy, the fewer

it reaches, but it allows the construction of a

complete house , possibly at the cost of con-

tinuing high maintenance payments. On its

own, R12 500 or R15 000 will buy in the

market, perhaps, a serviced site with a toilet

block and stand pipe, and ` a pile of bricks’ .

Some argue this is too little, while others

argue that the cost of self-building can be as

little as one-quarter or one-third of the cost

of a similar house built by contractors, but

that ª the necessary instruments and institu-

tional arrangementsº for this sort of self

building ª are highly underdevelopedº

(SAHPF, 1995, p. 7).

This issue is being resolved in the short

term by the limited upgrading of some infor-

mal settlements and the construction of some

houses for households who can ® nance the

rest of the cost of a house through savings or

loans. Another possibility is raising the size

of the individual subsidyÐ with some argu-

ing for a minimum of R17 500Ð especially if

housing achieves greater priority in the na-

tional budge t, but this would still not secure

complete formal housing provided in the

market without private ® nance. However, it

should secure reasonable standards for those

able to build for themselves. An expansion in

the budget cannot be assumed, as other min-

isters discover the necessities of protecting

their budgets, but progress towards the RDP

target of 5 per cent is an essential require-

ment.

Creating the right conditions for the

poorest to gain better housing remains the

greatest challenge and an appropriate

® nancial model is one of the most important

requirements. A major feature of ª people-

centredº self-build housing production is that

relatively small amounts of capital may be

required to get started, but conventiona l

loans are unavailable (Gilbert, 1994, pp. 96±

101). The availability of government subsidy

on completion of a top structure, as the South

African policy provides, is not, therefore, a

suf® cient or viable inducement. The Home-

less People ’ s Federation’ s proposa l for a re-

volving loan fund is intended to overcome

this obstacle, and has been welcomed by the

ministry (SAHPF, 1995). But it will take

time to test and then amend or extend this

model. The proposed National Housing Fi-

nance Corporation must address this issue, or

fail in its primary purpose.

The Institutions of Government

The lack of preparedness of government in-

stitutions has already been described. It is

inevitable that new structures such as those at

local and provincial level take time to be-

come established and effective in administer-

ing land assembly, service provision and the

other constituent parts of the housing devel-

opment process, such as the implementation

of a subsidy system, held up, for example, by

a need for a new computer system at one

stage (Tomlinson, 1995, p. 16). There is also

a continuing danger that local disputes and

con¯ icts over land and occupancy rights di-

vert the energies of politic ians and their staff

from the planning and development process.

In the ® rst year, provinc ial ministers were

drawn in to assist in resolving many local

disputes, but, in time, local government

might be expected to take primary responsi-

bility for this type of mediationÐ though

here too there is a risk of distraction from

longer-term tasks. There is less of this type

of distraction at the national level, where the

central Ministry of Housing is not so in-

volved in implementing policy. It was feared

that the death of Joe Slovo in January 1995

would damage the progress being made, but

the rapid appointm ent of a replacement,




ROBINA GOODLAD1642

Sankie Mthembi-Nkondo, and her broad ad-

herence to the same policy framework, has

shown that the government continues to seek

consensus to pursue both market and decom-

modi® ed forms of housing provision.

Land

Land will continue to be a contentious issue

affecting house production in some areas.

Experience in many other ` developing’ and

` developed’ countries suggests that land

con¯ icts will not be easily resolved. The

location of housing development has import-

ant implications for the urban environment

and for planning, and one test of the new

regime will be the extent to which it is

possible to house African people in more

convenient locations, closer to transport, jobs

and urban facilities. Early private develop-

ments under the policy were mainly located

on the edges of cities and towns, as land in

more convenient locations was less afford-

able. Such locations may lead to racial ten-

sion, although it must be remembered that

racial tension was an endemic feature of

apartheid South Africa. If the extent of resi-

dential segregation becomes increasingly a

function of the class position of Africans,

this will be a quali ® ed gain for social inte-

gration.

Participation and Participants

The process by which housing is produced

was seen by the RDP as just as important as

the quantity produced. The model adopted

may appear to be similar to that of the World

Bank, which recommends that governments

play ª an enabling roleº and ª move away

from producing, ® nancing and maintaining

housing, and toward improving housing mar-

ket ef® ciency and the housing conditions of

the poorº (World Bank, 1992, p. 7). But the

RDP does not eschew the provision of state

subsidy, and the housing strategy based on it

is intended to foster welfare through collec-

tive organisation and self-help in ways un-

familiar to most market economies.

The participation of the main actorsÐ

community activists, professionals, politi-

cians and government of® cialsÐ in the new

conditions is likely to be problematic at

times. The politic isation of community ac-

tivists in the ® nal apartheid years created

expectations of participation and negotiation

which the new government institutions will

have to meet, or risk the consequences

which, at worst, extend to violent protest.

Activists may need to learn new forms of

dialogue appropriate to the new situation.

But so too will the former activists who ® nd

themselves in the seats of power, and their

civil servants and professional advisers, for

many of whom a concern with process and

community involvement brings entirely new

challenges. Most of the relevant professional

groups are overwhelmingly white and un-

familiar with the language and forms of com-

munity participation. There is a scarcity of

trained workers to manage the housing de-

velopment process, let alone the management

of existing housing and any new rented hous-

ing built. It will take time for local and

provincial governments to build up the

necessary expertise in social and physical

development work, even with a role restric-

ted to enabling rather than providing.

The aim of assisting a people-centred pro-

duction process will not be achieved by the

same methods as apply to the private market.

One proposed remedy, ª rebuilding mass or-

ganisationsº in the townships and informal

settlements (Ruiters and Bond, 1996, p. 30),

may be necessary, but is also insuf® cient.

Suppor t mechanisms are required to facilitate

the formation of groups, the development of

project proposals, and all the other require-

ments of the housing produc tion process. But

some NGOs report a scarcity of applicants

with the right combination of ` hard’ , techni-

cal, skills, and ` soft’ , community develop-

ment skills. The development of additional

new courses stressing housing as a social

process is also required.

The vibrancy of community organisation

in South Africa is in marked contrast with

other African countries (Hoek-Smit, 1994),

and with the former communist countries in

Eastern Europe. Community groups in town-





ships and informal settlements, including

church groups, credit unions, women’ s

groups, tenants’ associations and civic asso-

ciations (the ` civics’ ) are seen as crucial in

providing the ` community’ participation el-

ement in the RDP. The civic associations

federated in the South African National Civic

Organisation (SANCO) since 1992, and

other federations, such as the South African

Homeless People’ s Federation, provide a so-

cial infrastructure for participation and devel-

opment at local and national levels. Within

the government’ s model of development, dis-

missed by some as ` corporatist’ , they need to

® nd a modus operandi which protects their

independence while enabling their partici-

pation.

The necessary conditions for meaningful

community participation are more apparent

amongst community groups than in some of

the institutions of government. Condition s

are better than for many countries undergo-

ing radical transformation, but they are not

ideal. It will take time to develop new roles

and practices, and to see the product of nego-

tiation, on the ground . Public of® cials have a

lot to learn, and some have to overcome a

legacy of distrust. Community activists may

be willing to wait for the development pro-

cess to take its course, but the less active

may not appreciate the nature and cause of

delay, and may be susceptible to apathy and

alienation. The new local authori ties have a

particularly important role to play, but are 18

months or 2 years behind nationa l and prov-

incial governments in starting.

Models of Delivery

A gap in the non-governmental institutional

framework is the absence of models for the

delivery of rented housing . Many South

Africans have a rural as well as an urban tie,

and prefer to rent in at least one of their

homes. Yet recent programmes have empha-

sised freehold. The new models for social

rented housing are still being developed, so a

large volum e cannot be produced immedi-

ately. There is, for example, little popula r

understanding of the concept of collective

ownership or social rented housing on the

housing association or non-pro ® t company

model. Some professionals see the idea as

too utopian, while others are actively explor-

ing it and are adapting models from overseas

to the South African situation.

Political Tensions

Continuing public debate about the adequacy

and effect of policy can be seen as helpful to

the policy process. However, there is a dan-

ger that it may instead be seen as a mark of

the uncertainties which surround policy, sap-

ping market or community con® dence. Ten-

sions within the ANC were most apparent in

the relationships between provincial housing

ministers and national government. To some

extent this re¯ ected a difference about where

the emphasis in delivery should be placed,

with some provinces seeing better prospects

of rapid delivery from the private sector than

from community groups seeking to go

through a long development process. But

others believed the circumstances favoured

more direct forms of state delivery, with

government in the driving seat, forcing the

pace, and ensuring that housing and other

forms of delivery were integrated. A continu-

ing strand in the ANC’ s debates was about

the adequacy of a policy that could not pro-

vide a complete house within the subsidy. On

one side were those who argued nothing less

than a complete house was good enough to

rectify the injustices of the past, and to retain

credibility in the townships and informal set-

tlements. On the other side were those who

referred to the scale of the budget, and to the

case for incremental development as the only

form which took account of the need to avoid

large rental, maintenance or loan payments

for the poorest people.

More problematic is a resolution of the

continuing rent and bond boycotts, and the

con¯ icting accounts of the reasons and reme-

dies for it. On one side are those who point

out that residents cannot afford to pay, that

injustices still exist in the inadequate equalis-

ation of service levels and charges between

black and white areas, and that payment is




ROBINA GOODLAD1644

unjusti ® ed until service delivery has shown

signi® cant improvement. On the other side,

the government’ s Masakhane (building to-

gether now) campaign is intended to change

the non-payment culture of the townships

and encourage community-based organisa-

tions to achieve improved services. Failure

could prove deeply damaging to the prospects

of the housing policy reaching the most needy

target groups.

Conclusions

The two overwhelmingly important features

of the housing policy environment in contem-

porary South Africa are the circumstances

and results of the election of April 1994, and

the scale of need apparent in comparing the

typical housing condition s of different racial

groups. For the future, the crucial factor will

be the extent to which the new government

institutions can deliver the improvements in

living conditions promised in the RDP, es-

pecially to the poorest Africans, or persuade

the electorateÐ and in particular the African

people whose votes brough t the ANC to

powerÐ that there are good reasons why

progress is slow.

The housing strategy, informed by the his-

tory of South Africa, combines elements of

welfare and market models, and although

some international in¯ uences are apparent it

has no close similarity to any other nation

state’ s strategy. The attempt to combine in-

ducements for private, public and community

sectors to engage in housing development

provides both a challenge and an opportunity.

The opportunity exists to provide a model

which would be of interest world-wide for its

capacity to combine market and state mecha-

nisms to create welfare, without creating the

problems of a residualised social housing

sector which characterise so many ` devel-

oped’ countries. After two years, the quali® ed

achievement in creating a framework in

what were very unfavourable conditions

was apparent and the housing programme

showed more potential to pick up speed than

suggested by the simple recitation of statistics

of houses built or upgraded. The rate of

approval of projects had not been matched

by the rate of delivery, and so conclusions

cannot be drawn about who is being served

by the new housing developments, or about

whether the development bottlenecks can be

eliminated. But the models of delivery were

geared better to the needs of those able to

help themselves with the assistance of a loan,

than to the needs of the poorest, who had no

access to credit. The potential of the policy

should be apparent by the end of ® ve years of

implementation, even if the programme has

not reached full productive capacity.

The success of the housing strategy will

depend on many institutions and linkages,

and such pluralism provides scope for some

breaks in the chain of actions required have

disastrous effects. They would affect speci® c

localities, forms of provision, or institutions,

but the effect of a ¯ aw in one house design,

in a new institutional structure for rented

housing , or in one bank’ s lending practices,

for example, would be limited. More serious

potential problems can be imagined, es-

pecially arising from the effects of poverty ,

non-payment and any failure to develop a

® nancial and development model to meet the

needs of the poorest and to provide sustain-

able forms of housing .

There is optim ism that enough can be

achieved in housing policy to maintain politi-

cal stability. If disillusionment grows, the

electoral consequences are likely to be apathy

and low turn-outsÐ not least because there is

no alternative that commands the loyalty and

support of the millions of South Africans who

see the ANC as their liberators. But the civil

consequences would include the resump-

tionÐ or continuationÐ of the struggles

around material conditions which have char-

acterised urban life in South Africa in the

1980s and 1990s. Tragically, these struggles

have often included con¯ ict and violence

within and between groups of disadvantaged

Africans living in the worst conditions. En-

gaging community groups and other stake-

holders on a large scale in the political and

housing development process may be the

only style of politics which can reconcile

suf® cient of the interests to enable a new





political order to be created and reproduced,

as well as achieving the material objectives

of housing policyÐ albeit more slowly than

the RDP’ s optim istic targets for the ® rst few

years of the new South Africa.

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