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DOI: 10.1080/0042098966538
1996 33: 1629Urban StudRobina Goodlad
The Housing Challenge in South Africa
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Urban Studies, Vol. 33, No. 9, 1629± 1645, 1996
The Housing Challenge in South Africa
Robina Goodlad
[Paper ® rst received, June 1995; in ® nal form, May 1996]
Summary. This paper considers the housing conditions inherited by the new government in
South Africa and the challenge they presen t. It draws on primary and secondary sources, and on
interview s with some of the key actors involved in housing policy. It exam ines contemporary
housing conditions, and the colon ial and aparth eid legacy which largely created them. It goes on
to consider the implication s of the struggle under aparth eid for improvem ents in living conditions,
and to review developments in housing policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. The policies emerging
from the ® rst year of the new govern ment are described, and the implementation of policy in the
® rst two years is review ed. Issues that arise are discussed, and the conditions required for the
state, market and civil society to play their part in achieving the objectives of housing policy are
considered .
Introduction
The appointment of Joe Slovo, a key African
National Congress (ANC) negotia tor in the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA, 1990±93), as Minister for Hous-
ing following the ® rst free elections in April
1994, con® rmed that the ANC perceived
housing as a key issue. The role of housing
policy in apartheid meant that:
What housing there was, was about con-
trol. It was about excluding people from
urban areas. It was about regimentation. It
was about the administration of depri-
vation. (Slovo addressing the Housing
Summit, Botshabelo, 27 October 1994)
The ANCs manifesto, The Reconstruction
and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC,
1994) said that 1m houses should be built
within 5 years of the election. Yet one year
later, at the end of the ® rst year of the new
Government, only 878 subsidised units had
been built (Forbes, 1995, p. 68), and six
months later a further 10 600 homes had
been delivered (Financial Times, 21 Novem-
ber 1995, p. 3).
This paper considers the reasons why
progress has apparently been so slow by
examining the nature of the housing chal-
lenge faced by the government of South
Africa. This requires consideration of a num-
ber of historical, political, social and econ-
omic factors: ® rst, the legacy of apartheid
and earlier segregationist polic ies; secondly,
the nature of housing conditions inherited by
the new government; thirdly, the housing
Robina Goodlad is in the Centre for Housing Research and Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, 25 Bute Gardens, Glasgow G128RT, Scotland, UK. Fax: 0141 330 4983; e-mail: [email protected]. The author is indebted to the people andorganisations who assisted in the research leading to this paper. The Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, Urban Studiesand the University of Glasgow assisted with ® nancial and other support. Two anonymous referees provided invaluable comments.Many people at all three levels of government, in NGOs, in community groups and in universities in South Africa provided insightsinto urban conditions and the policy process or assisted in other ways. Ivan Turok encouraged the author throughout, and Mary Turokprovided some valuable data and much else.
0042-0980/96/091629-17 $6.00 Ó 1996 The Editors of Urban Studies
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ROBINA GOODLAD1630
policies developed in the moves towards
democracy and reform in the early 1990s
then in the ® rst year of the new government;
fourthly, the implementation of policy and
the institutional and other obstacles impeding
the housing programme; ® fthly, the implica-
tions of social, economic and politica l factors
which make housing a key issue for the
government.
The paper considers these factors in turn to
reach conclusions about the condition s that
are required if the roles of the state, market
and civil society in the new South Africa are
to be adapted to achieve the objectives of
housing policy. It draws on primary and sec-
ondary sources, and on interviews with some
of the key actors involved in the develop-
ment of policy at three levels of government,
in NGOs and community groups, and in the
ANC.
Segregation and Housing
Aparthe id alone cannot be held responsible
for the housing conditions in South Africa in
1994, but equally no account of housing
policy and condition s can be credible if it
does not take into account the recent history
of South Africa, and the colonia l legacy of
the African continent (Davenport, 1991;
Lemon, 1987; Worden, 1994; Robinson ,
1996).
By the end of the second decade of the
20th century, a spatial segregation of racial
groups to mirror the class segregation of
occupational groups was well advanced, es-
pecially in urban areas. White people ª were
already 55 per cent urbanisedº (Lemon,
1991, p. 3). The extent to which this segre-
gation had racist, capitalist or other roots is
disputed (Robinson , 1996), but a variety of
devices, from compounds for mine-workers
to racial exclusion clauses in property deeds
and even removals following plague, were
used to secure segregation, and ` security’ for
whites and to perpetuate their economic
dominance.
The ® rst indication of a more systematic
approach to segregation came in the 1923
Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which embodied
the sentiments of the Transvaal Local
Government Commission of 1922 that ª the
native should only be allowed to enter the
urban areas, which are essentially the White
man’ s creation, when he is willing to enter
and minister to the needs of the White man,
and should depart therefrom when he ceases
so to ministerº (quoted in Lemon, 1991, p.
4). A further Act of 1937 allowed central
government to enforce the 1923 Act provi-
sions in particular local authorities, and ex-
tended early in¯ ux controls. By the time of
the Nationalists’ election victory in 1948, the
pre-aparthe id city was ª highly but not com-
pletely segregatedº (Lemon, 1991, p. 8).
The infamous Group Areas Acts of 1950
and 1966 set about designating every square
inch of land for occupation by one of four
` racial’ groups (` African’ , ` Indian’ ,
` coloured ’ , and ` white ’ ). In an unusua l dis-
play of irony and euphemism combined, the
task was entrusted to a ` Community Devel-
opment Board’ for most of the apartheid
years. Within cities, ` coloured ’ and ` Indian’
people were most affected, whereas 99.7 per
cent of whites already lived in what became
white group areas (Lemon, 1991, p. 10).
Africans were effectively excluded from
white areas, with the exception of domestic
workers. Those with permission to do so
resided in the distant townships, increasingly
in grossly overcrowded conditions. Most
whites were comfortably housed at low den-
sities, and increasingly in fortress-like condi-
tions of security. Indians were concentrated
in much poorer housing , some built for
owner-occupation by the state, in small
` group areas’ , sometimes after resisting re-
moval from inner-city locations (Davies,
1991, p. 82). ` Coloureds’ ,concentrated in the
Cape area, were removed to the Cape Flats
townships, far from the city centre, where
overcrowding and shack developments in-
evitably resulted.
Africans in ` white ’ rural areas were forced
into 10 ` homelands’ , based on allegedly tra-
ditional African rural allegiances. ª During
the 1960s the popula tion of the Bantustans
rose by 70 per cent, while those of African
townships actually fellº (Worden, 1994, p.
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1631
111). The ` homelands’ were intended to pro-
vide politica l rights to Africans, while deny-
ing them the full economic and social rights
of participation in the South African econ-
omy. But instead some became a base for
very long distance commuting into cities
such as Pretoria and Durban, and those at
greater distance from cities became poverty-
stricken and underdeveloped.
The measures were implemented in differ-
ent parts of South Africa with varying de-
grees of commitment and ef® ciency, but
overall with signi® cant effectiveness. The
1985 census in Cape Town, for example,
showed that 9 per cent of ` coloureds’ still
lived outside areas designated for ` coloured’
occupation (Cook, 1991, p. 32). By the end
of 1987, 1300 group areas had been pro-
claimed and some highly public ised re-
movals such as those in Sophiatown
(Johannesburg), Cato Manor (Durban) and
District Six (Cape Town) had taken place.
The effects of the growing contradictions
arising from aparthe id were to increase the
extent of informal development, as migration
to the cities continued, and to add
signi® cantly to the shortfall in accommo-
dation in the townships which governments
since have been unable or unwilling to rec-
tify. The substantial house-building pro-
grammes for Africans of the 1950s in the
peripheral townships had slowed, then halted
in the 1960s as aparthe id entered its ` se-
cond’ , more draconian, phase, follow ing the
Sharpeville shootings and the growing iso-
lation of South Africa in the international
community. In the 1960s, controls on urban
migration and growth intensi ® ed (Turok,
1994, p. 246), despite some opposit ion from
employers in need of labour. In 1968
Africans were forbidden from holding free-
hold property in townships: they had to be-
come tenants of municipalities. The
allocation of permits to work and reside was
coordina ted with the allocation of township
houses. Informal settlements expanded
within the homelands and on the edges of
cities, where they were demolished routinely
almost until the end of the apartheid era.
Some migrant male workers were con® ned to
hostels in the townships, in a disastrous as-
pect of policy which has left a legacy of
bitterness, and con¯ ict, as well as some of
the worst living conditions directly attribu-
table to aparthe id.
It is easy to establish that Africans,
` coloureds’ and Indians were systematically
discriminated against in the allocation of
state ® nances for housing purposes in the
aparthe id years, but the exact incidence of
subsidies and tax advantages to whites is
little documented. Most whites were able to
use their economic power to provide for their
own housing needs, but the state assisted
them, where necessary, sometimes with the
use of the tax system. Also common for
whitesÐ now for middle-class workers, who
are mainly whitesÐ is assistance with hous-
ing costs from employers (including the state
as a substantial employer of whites).
Housing and the Struggle against Apart-
heid
Residential segregation and inequalities in
living conditions were an important strand in
the growing resistance to the effects of apa-
rtheid from the late 1970s. The revolt by
schoolchildren in Soweto in 1976 was more
publicised but no more signi® cant than the
increasingly common breaches of restrictions
on place of residence, usually carried out as
a means to achieving access to jobs, or the
hope of jobs, and urban services. These
struggles were clearly linked to the apartheid
system. Examples include the resistance to
enforced removals in neighbourhoods such
as Cato Manor (Durban) from the 1950s to
the 1970s (Davenport, 1991); and the inva-
sions of land within the boundaries of towns
and cities. An unusual example is Hillbrow ,
on the northern edge of the Johannesburg
CBD, an area of high-density, multi-storey
¯ ats designated for white occupation, but
increasingly occupied by other racial groups
from the late 1970s (Morris, 1994).
The exact signi® cance of housing strug-
gles in the defeat of apartheid is contested.
In one type of account: ª what ought to be
clear from this presentation is not so much
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ROBINA GOODLAD1632
the historical development of social move-
ments, but rather their importance for eman-
cipatory actionº (Soni, 1992, p. 50). In
another, the struggles ª defy any simple cate-
gorisation ¼ struggles within informal set-
tlements and, increasingly, formal townships
as well, often involve no direct confrontation
with the stateº (Mabin, 1992, p. 23). The
improvement of material condition s, rather
than apartheid per se, may have been the
primary motive in protest. But the close rela-
tionship between the regime and the material
condition s it produced makes this a conten-
tious conclusion.
Less controve rsial is the view that apar-
theid itself compounded housing inequalities
in ways which led to additional con¯ icts,
sometimes between disadvantaged groups,
rather than between them and the regime.
This is seen in con¯ icts such as those be-
tween residents in formal housing and those
occupying shacks nearby, over access to
township water; between householders and
their tenants or sub-tenants, over space; and,
most well-known, between hostel-dwellers
and others, in political con¯ icts, exacerbated
by government action (Mabin, 1992).
In the African townships, attempts to es-
tablish elected black local authorities
(BLAs), in an effort to placate the population
after the uprisings of 1976 and 1984, were
unsuccessful. These BLAs never achieved
legitimacy in the eyes of their electorateÐ for
example, in Soweto the electoral turnout was
6 per cent in 1978 (Lemon, 1991, p. 23). The
BLAs were seen as implicated in in¯ ux con-
trol and in perpetuating the inequities of
property rights and access to resources of the
apartheid system. One of the most important
forms of resistance to the BLAs was the rent
boycott, which was left a legacy of non-pay-
ment with serious implications for the future.
Some developments in the late 1980s, and
especially follow ing F. W. de Klerk’ s epoch-
ending speech on 2 February 1990, can be
seen as replacing struggle and protest with
participation. A limited but signi® cant con-
sensus about the direction of national hous-
ing policy was apparent, largely through the
work of the National Housing Forum , a vol-
untary umbrella organisation involving many
interest-groups. Within local and provincial
government as well there was some adjust-
ment, and anticipation of a new regime. For
example, in Johannesburg, the City Council
started to engage in dialogue with black or-
ganisations, and initiated the Central Johan-
nesburg Partnership with business and
community representatives to seek consensus
on housing and employment projects. In Dur-
ban, the Cato Manor Development Associ-
ation was set up in 1993 as a non-pro ® t
company by a combination of private-, pub-
lic- and voluntary-sector bodies ª as a symbol
of urban reconstructionº and as ª a clear de-
parture from the aparthe id planning of the
pastº (Robinson and Smit, 1994, p. 2). These
developments were atypical, but character-
ised the approach which politicians and ur-
ban professionals increasingly espoused in
the early 1990s, using the language of ` pro-
cess’ rather than ` blue-print planning’ .
The 10 years of struggle from 1984 had
also created a strong volunta ryÐ civicÐ
movement which did not see the universal
franchise as the only requirement of a
democracy. Many activists argued that the
consequences of not engaging with the peo-
ple intended to bene® t from development
were violence or abandonment. For example,
one experimental hostel upgrading project in
Khayelitsha (Cape Town’ s largest peripheral
township) ended in despair when some of the
new terraced houses were set on ® re by
people aggrieved by the allocation policies
(Umzamo, 1994).
In the early 1990s little was apparent of a
changed politica l situation in black residen-
tial areas. Rent boycotts continued, due to
poverty, or in sceptical impatience about the
prospects for improvements. Community
groups struggled to secure the support, land
and resources they required to improve their
living condition s in a system still structured
on racist principles. Almost until the last
hour, it was not clear that elections would
take place, and until they did, no-one would
have been justi® ed in assuming the result, or
the effect. This was illustra ted in the estab-
lishment, from 1987, of 43 multi-racial
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1633
Regiona l Services Councils (RSCs) intended
to ª redirect some resources from the econ-
omic base of the white areas for selective
investment in the townshipsº , and in some
metropolitan areas to provide some services
directly. However, the extent of redistribu-
tion was limited and the RSCs never
achieved a legitimacy in the eyes of non-
whites (Turok, 1994, p. 256).
This account has shown that creating a
democratic society was inextricably bound
up with the struggle for better material condi-
tions. Urbanisation and housing conditions
provided a focus for protest and participation
which have important implications for the
future, and contribut ed to the high expecta-
tions held of the new government in 1994.
The nature of these conditions is now con-
sidered, before the policies pursued immedi-
ately before and after the 1994 election are
examined.
Housing Conditions in South Africa
The housing challenge posed by the end of
apartheid is enormous, but dif® cult to quan-
tify precisely, in the absence of adequate data
about population, household composition ,
migration patterns and income. Estimates of
population predicted 42.6m in 1995, two-
thirds of whom would live in towns and
cities, leaving a rural population of 15m. The
white, Indian and ` coloured’ popula tions are
more urbanised than the African (NHF,
1994). In 1994 there were about 2.6m formal
housing units. An estimated 1.7m house-
holdsÐ around 7m peopleÐ were living in
shacks on unserviced sites, and over 2m peo-
ple were in 620 000 shacks on serviced sites.
A further 100 000 serviced sites were not
occupiedÐ they were in the wrong place,
provided the wrong facilities, or were unaf-
fordable. About a quarter of the population
did not have access to piped water. Almost
half (46 per cent) did not have electricity,
and a similar propor tion had no access to
proper sanitation . Homelessness (de ® ned as
roo¯ essness) was estimated at a minimum of
1.5m households. An astonishing 2.1m peo-
ple lived in hostels, often with a family to a
bed, and sometimes with additiona l friends
or family squatting outside (NHF, 1994).
Wilson and Ramphele (1989, p. 128) report a
1984 survey of 8 hostels at Nyanga East,
Cape Town, in which there was 1 toile t for
every 22 men. Since then condition s have
worsened as the dismantling of apartheid
enabled wives and children to join husbands
and fathers in the hostels. The levels of
overcrowding in the townships were also
excessive, with of® cial assumptions of occu-
pancy levels of 7 people per house belied by
surveys which have found 17, 20 or even up
to 30 occupants of the 4-room houses
(Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, pp. 125±126).
One outcome is a plethora of shacks built in
gardens or on any other site that can be taken
over.
The division between rich and poor is
structured largely on ` racial’ lines. At the
beginning of the 1990s, whites, with almost
13 per cent of the population (5.1m) received
54 per cent of personal income; Africans,
with almost 76 per cent of the population
(39.4m ), received 33 per cent of income;
` coloureds’ with 8.6 per cent of the popu-
lation (3.4m), received 9 per cent of the
income; and ` Indians’ , with 2.5 per cent of
the population (1.0m) received 4 per cent of
income (population data, 1992; income data,
1990; Smith, 1995, p. 49). The worst condi-
tions are consistently experienced in the rural
areas, although the edges of the cities contain
numerically the largest concentrations of
shacks, poor or no sanitation, inadequate wa-
ter supplies, and sparse urban facilities of all
types. Women have suffered particularly
from a combination of patriarchal traditions
and aparthe id-inspired laws. Given the spar-
sity of health services and the high levels of
poverty, the disadvantages of poor health and
disability also compound housing inadequa-
cies for substantial numbers of people .
African urbanisation was occurring at a
fast rate from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s
as a result of migration, but since then the
growth in the African populat ion has been
more a consequence of natural growth than
in migration from rural areas (Dewar, 1992,
p. 243). Migration from countries to the
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ROBINA GOODLAD1634
north of South Africa has excited much com-
ment, but the scale is unknow n. Whatever the
source, the growing African population has
been ` housing ’ itself largely in shanty towns
round all South Africa’ s towns and cities.
Economic and demographic indicators are
not propitious, although again there are data
dif® culties in clarifying the position. The
average growth rate in the economy was 1.03
per cent between 1986 and 1991 (NHF,
1994), but reached 2.5 per cent in 1994, and
3 per cent in 1995. Only 2 per cent of GNP
was spent on housing in 1993/94 in contrast
with 5±17 per cent in comparable developing
countries. Estimates of unemploym ent vary
from around 33 per cent to over 50 per cent
of economically active people . Rogerson es-
timates 53.5 per cent of the potential work-
force were without formal employment in
1991, either unemployed or working in the
informal or subsistence economies (Roger-
son, 1995, p. 170). The Housing Ministry
1994 projections of income for 1995 sug-
gested that almost 4 out of 10 (39.7 per cent)
households had an income of less than R800
per month (approximately £138), and 86.1
per cent had less than R3500 (approximately
£600) (South Africa, 1994c ). In¯ ation is
high, and so are interest rates. In 1994, an
estimated 130 000±150 000 houses were
needed each year to provide for new house-
holds, but in 1993 only 50 000 houses were
builtÐ and most would have been inaccess-
ible to the majority of the population (NHF,
1994; South Africa, 1994c ); in addition,
many more are needed to catch up with the
` backlog’ created by the apartheid years.
Housing Policy 1980± 94
The 1980s were characterised by reforms
within the aparthe id framework which made
minimal concessions to the political aspira-
tions of ` Indian’ , ` coloured ’ and African
groups, but acknowledged the inevitability of
black urbanisation. This acceptance was be-
ginning to be apparent in 1975 and 1978
when reforms had allowed blacks the right to
leasehold ownership of housing on 30- then
99-year leases. Legislation in 1983 providing
for the sale of township housing to residents
at large discounts (Parnell, 1992, p. 59) was
taken up on a signi® cant scaleÐ by 1989, 34
per cent of African tenants had purchased,
the lowest proportion of the four ` race’
groupsÐ but for remaining tenants, the rent
increases of the mid 1980s provided a trigger
for the unrest of 1984±86 which resulted in a
state of emergency. ª Rent boycotts soon be-
came a key form of resistance to the stateº
(Lemon, 1991, p. 24).
In 1983 the government con® rmed its
view that it was not the role of the state to
provide housing directly (South Africa,
1983). Yet the ª rate of government building
of housing remains constant and the amount
of state money allocated to shelter has in-
creased ¼ º (Parnell, 1992, p. 51). This is
partly explained by the increase in house-
building for Indians and ` coloureds’ for
whom tangible rewards were being offered
for supportÐ never forthcoming on any
scaleÐ in the establishment of the tricameral
parliamentary system in 1984. Much of this
housing was constructed for owner-occu-
pation (Parnell, 1992, pp. 55±56), and from
the mid 1980s the state provided minimal
services on sites on the edges of the cities
where people could erect their own shacks,
or more conventional houses (Mabin, 1991,
p. 22). This approach characterised a govern-
ment reconciled to the idea of African urban-
isation but unwilling to devote a large budge t
to housing Africans. The illegitimacy of the
regime and the unsuitability of some of the
sites made this an unsuccessful approach to
mass provision.
In contrast, ª housing ® nance ¼ continues
to favour whites over blacks, and the rich
over the poor ¼ º (Parnell, 1992, p. 51),
particularly as a result of using income cri-
teria for assistance. These subsidies were
phased out from the early 1990s, but by the
end of the 1980s were reaching a signi® cant
group of middle-class Africans despite the
limitations (Parnell, 1992, p. 61). In the
townships, an emerging black middle class
was able to buy, improve or build higher-
quality housing , including some built with
state subsidy as a result of government at-
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1635
tempts to win ` hearts and minds’ amongst
Africans.
From 1990 developments in housing pol-
icy were based on the hope, or assumption,
of a constitutional settlement granting equal-
ity of political rights to all, and were also a
result of a ª widely recognisedº perception
that South Africa had ª no coherent and legit-
imate housing policyº (Lupton and Murphy,
1995, p. 162). A number of new programmes
were intended to assert the commitment of
the government to reform and development.
In 1986 the South African Housing Trust had
been established as a non-pro ® t provide r of
serviced land and loans on a small scale
(9500 homes in 1992) (Lupton and Murphy,
1995, p. 155). In 1990 a government grant of
R3bn established the Independent Develop-
ment Trust (IDT) which adopted housing as
one of its priorities, and a programme of
capital subsidies was established at the rate
of R7500 per unit and targeted on low-in-
come families. The scheme was administered
on a project basis, with public, voluntary and
private-sector organisations eligible to make
proposals either for new site-and-service
schemes, or for upgrading informal settle-
ments.
The National Housing Forum (NHF), con-
vened in August 1992 by the Independent
Development Trust and the Development
Bank of Southern Africa, included in its
membership the South African National
Civic Organisation (SANCO), the main pol-
itical parties including the ANC, and repre-
sentatives of trade unions, the construction
industry, ® nancial institutions and develop-
ment agencies. The Forum had an uneasy
relationship with the old government, which
initia lly took part then withdrew. Eventually
in 1993 the Forum was asked to nominate six
people to serve on the government’ s new
National Housing Board, created to replace
boards for each of the three legislatures, and
to consider ® nancial and institutional reforms
to housing policy. The recommendations in-
cluded an expansion in state expenditure,
targeted on the poorest, and non-discrimina-
tory in its effects and administration. Legis-
lation in late 1993 and in 1994 began to put
in place the administrative structures re-
quired for the housing subsidy regime being
created. The Housing Arrangements Act
1993 created the National Housing Board
and four regional boards. A few weeks be-
fore the general election in April 1994, the
details of a subsidy scheme were agreed:
R5000±12 500 per unit, dependent on house-
hold income of no more than R3500, apply-
ing criteria widely discussed and agreed in
the National Housing Forum . These included
models which attempted to improve upon the
late 1980s site-and-service schemes on new
sites.
The new schemes broadly allowed two
approaches: formal housing for low-income
residents who could support, with the help of
the capital subsidy and any savings, the re-
sulting loan repayments; and projects to ® nd
approaches to the upgrading of shacks, in
situ. The latter approach, termed ` incremen-
tal’ , was controversial, perceived by some of
its supporters as the inevitable pragmatic re-
sponse to the inadequate resources set
against the scale of need, and by other propo-
nents as the only viable option to prevent the
commodi® cation of housing , and to secure
affordability and sustainability for the
poorest. To its opponents, it was not what the
liberation struggle had been for:
We shall not be party to any scheme or
plan whose eventual outcome ¼ is to
create serviced informal settlements in the
name of housing . People deserve to live in
proper low-cost houses. (Tokyo Sexwale,
Premier of Gauteng Province, addressing
the PW V provinc ial legislature at its ® rst
meeting in 1994; quoted in Tomlinson,
1995, p. 7)
As the elections for nationa l and provincial
assemblies took place in April 1994, a poss-
ible direction in housing policy was apparent,
but still lacking were many of the condition s
required to develop and implement it. Some
participants saw the Forum as having
achieved a national policy, providing others,
such as provinc ial housing ministers, for ex-
ample, learned more about housing so that
they could fall into line behind it. Others saw
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ROBINA GOODLAD1636
the NHF as having left unresolved some key
issues, a view which is more consistent with
analyses of policy processes in which ` pol-
icy’ becomes clear only at the point of ` im-
plementation ’ (Ham and Hill, 1993).
Housing Policy 1994± 95
The origins of the housing policy which
emerged are to be found in the work of the
NHF, and in the Reconstruction and Devel-
opment Programme (ANC, 1994) which was
adopted as a White Paper by the multi-party
Government of National Unity (South
Africa, 1994d). Some individuals, for exam-
ple, the new Director General of Housing
(head of the civil service in the Ministry of
Housing) , provide a link from the NHF to the
new Government. ª Slovo was bringing the
ANC’ s chief negotiator at the NHF over to
the department with the plan, in a sense, in
his back pocketº (Tomlinson, 1995, p. 5).
Housing features strongly in the RDP,
which emphasises the importance of com-
munity and private-sector involvement and
other forms of politica l participation for the
future. With some quali® cations, it provides
an essentially social democratic manifesto
for economic, social and political develop-
ment: ª Without meeting basic needs, no pol-
itical democracy can survive in South
Africaº (para. 2.2.1); and:
We are convinced that neither a comman-
dist central planning system nor an unfet-
tered free market system can provide
adequate solutions to the problems con-
fronting us. Reconstruction and develop-
ment will be achieved through the leading
and enabling role of the state, a thriving
private sector, and active involvement by
all sectors of civil society which in combi-
nation will lead to sustainable growth.
(ANC, 1994, para 4.2.1)
The approach taken to housing was different
from the corporate state models of the UK,
and other western European models, where at
times of crisis and reconstruction the state
has created mass social rented housing . The
aim was to create an environment in which
the state facilitated delivery rather than en-
gaged directly in provision, and in which
market and community involvement was
maximised. This approach borrows from a
number of sources, including the experience
of other developing countries in Latin Amer-
ica and India , where informal housing has
been a contentious policy issue.
The discredited site-and-service schemes
of the apartheid years, poverty and the lack
of state income maintenance provision make
the provision of housing problematic. The
public rented housing experience of South
Africa and several European countries led
the RDP away from a large state programme
of construction, although paradoxically a
mass housing programme was called for,
achieving 1m ` low-cost houses’ over 5 years
(para 2.5.2). Government subsidy ª to reach a
goal of not less than 5 per cent of the budge t
by the end of the ® ve-year RDPº was
promised (para 2.5.5). The means of delivery
was seen as a combination of self-help, pub-
lic subsidy, choice in the market, and small-
scale communal provision. ª Delivery
systems will depend on community partici-
pationº as well as market provision (para
2.5.20). The policy framework required in-
cluded subsidies, private ® nance and pro-
vision of land and a variety of tenure options .
As will be seen, this gives some insight into
the nature of the compromises the RDP rep-
resents, rather than provides a prescription
for action. The government’ s actions fell
broadly into ® ve elements during the ® rst
twelve months: legislation, commitment
from key actors, institut ional reform, a sub-
sidy system, and development support and
advice.
Legislation
Land was a priority and the Development
Facilitation Act 1995 was intended to pro-
vide the legal framework for all three levels
of government to assist in gaining access to
development land. The Act provided for the
establishment of tribunals in each province to
resolve disputes, broadly in favour of devel-
opment. This might involve , for example,
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1637
overturning the provisions of town planning
schemes. The Act was intended, inter alia, to
ensure freehold land for projects such as
those involved in upgrading shacks on the
edges of towns and cities.
Commitment from Key Actors
Commitment from key actors was sought to
the terms of a draft white paper. This process
was assisted by the work of the National
Housing Forum in the few months after the
election as it ® nally came down in favour of
the ` incremental approach’ to the use of sub-
sidy, as Slovo was doing (Tomlinson, 1995,
p. 13). Early in October a Record of Under-
standing between the Department of Housing
and the Association of Mortgage Lenders
(1994) was signed, providing for a resump-
tion of lending to lower-income borrowers
by ® nancial institutions which for many
years had refused to lend because of fear of
political violence and payment boycotts, or
because of racial prejudice. The aim was to
achieve 50 000 loans in the ® rst year to
households who quali® ed for government
subsidy so that lower-income earners should
be able to purchase a house with a combi-
nation of subsidy and loan. The government
undertook to campaign for a resumption of
payment for goods and services, and to pro-
vide temporary (three years) mortgage in-
demnity where there was a breakdown of law
in a speci® c area (Department of Housing
and Association of Mortgage Lenders, 1994,
p. 6). The banks undertook to supply the
Ministry with data on their lending practices
under the agreement (for publication only in
aggregate form) and to publish their own
guidelines for the extension of credit. A
Code of Conduc t, including provision of an
ombudsman, was also agreed.
Exactly six months after the elections, Joe
Slovo launched a draft housing White Paper
(South Africa, 1994a) at a conference in
Botshabelo attended by over 600 delegates
from ® nancial and construction ® rms, volun-
tary organisations, development agencies,
trade unions, provinc ial and local govern-
ments and political parties (South Africa,
1994b). The un® nished nature of the paper
can be seen positively as part of an open
system of government intended to ensure that
key agencies can contribute to the ® nal docu-
ment, or it can be seen as a symbol of the
failure to reach agreement to a detailed pack-
age. The Accord signed at Botshabelo was
strong on rhetoric, but said little in detail
apart from adopting the targets of the RDP. It
contained, however, some commitments by
individual signatories, such as ` civil society’
represented mainly by SANCO and the
South African Homeless People’ s Federation
who ª ¼ commit ourselves to an intensive
campaign to change the hostilit ies between
® nancial institut ions, local government and
the communities and bring to an end the
tradition of non-payment for services, rent
and bond boycotts, including the tradition of
non-delivery of servicesº .
Institutional Reform
Another key requirement was in relation to
the institutions of government, where at all
three levelsÐ national, provincial and localÐ
public servants as well as elected representa-
tives were adjusting to the new regime. At
provincial level, in a process intended to take
up to ® ve years to complete, nine new
provinces were being created from the four
` white’ provinces of Natal, Transvaal, Or-
ange Free State and Cape, the four ` indepen-
dent’ homelands, and the six ` self-governing
territories’ . In July the four regional housing
boards created in 1993 were replaced by
nine, based on the new provinces. These
boards were made up of one-third regulators,
one-third consumer representatives, and one-
third producer representatives. Their role in-
cludes approving applications for subsidy for
schemes presented by developers, as the old
boards had done, so giving them a key role in
the implementation of the RDP.
Elections for new local authorities were
delayed until November 1995, and until May
1996 in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-
Natal. This meant some delays in establish-
ing the policy frameworks and procedures
which would allow all three levels of govern-
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ROBINA GOODLAD1638
Table 1. Subsidy per househo ld, SouthAfrica 1995
Joint spouse income Subsidy
R0±R800 R15 000R801±R1500 R12 500R1501±R2500 R9500R2501±R3500 R5000
Source: South Africa (1994c, p. 44).
ment to contribute to reconstruction. How-
ever, transitional councils, made up of repre-
sentatives of the old, discredited authorities
and of politica l parties and community repre-
sentatives, took over at the end of 1994 in
most areas. The new authorities were non-
racial and metropolitan-based, some with lo-
cal assemblies at a lower level. The new
councils ’ role in housing policy was mainly
seen as facilitating rather than directly pro-
viding housing . A crucial potential role was
in servicing land and putting together part-
nerships to achieve development or improve-
ment. The idea of ` parastatal’ landlords
Ð roughly equivalent to the European idea of
municipal housing companiesÐ was con-
sidered feasible by some policy advisers at
provincial and local level.
Subsidy
The subsidy arrangements described in the
White Paper represented a victory for those
who favoured incremental up-grading of in-
formal settlements, and wider distribution of
subsidy in small quantities, over those who
wanted to see a programme of subsidised
formal house construction. Capital subsidies
of R15 000 for the poorest, based on the
existing scheme of R12 500 per household,
were seen as a ` cornerstone’ (p. 30) in the
government’ s approach, and ` width’ over
` depth’ was favoured as a way of balancing
need and resources. Subsidy was dependent
on household income, with households earn-
ing less than R3500 per month (approxi-
mately £600) qualifying, as shown in Table
1.
The White Paper (South Africa, 1994c) set
down the nature of the dilemma seen by the
government in creating a subsidy:
The required annual delivery rate (of
c.350,000), (the) relatively high ` pro-
portion of poor households and budgetary
constraints do not allow suf® cient subsidy
money per household to enable the con-
struction, at State expense, of a minimum
standard complete house for each house-
hold not able to afford such a house. Only
a limited State subsidy contribution to-
wards the cost of a house is possible.
(South Africa, 1994c, p. 20)
At an annual rate of housing 150 000 house-
holds, it was estimated to take 10 years to
eliminate the ` backlog’ Ð and then only if an
additional 200 000 new households were
housed each year. Mobilising credit was seen
as essential for some households, and
speci® c ® nancial proposals included collabo-
rating with the banks to ensure a growth in
lending to assist individuals to fund their
own housing. But for many others, the key
was seen to be savings. Around half the
households in need of housing were thought
to be unlikely to gain access to credit, so
collective savings mechanisms would be sup-
ported. Subsidy was to be applied to securing
tenure (usually freehold), providing access to
basic services, and creating a basic structure.
The subsidy had to be designed to allow the
poorest to use it to assist them to build a
reasonable structure for themselves, or with
the help of others in their community. The
Housing Ministry was anxious to create a
greater market in housing production, but
was also impressed by evidence such as that
of the Homeless People’ s Federation
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1639
(SAHPF) that the cost of a house could be as
little as 21±33 per cent of the cost of a
contractor-built house , with the help of self-
help labour and a loan provided from a sav-
ings and loan scheme (SAHPF, 1995, p. 8).
In the longer term, a National Housing Fi-
nance Corporation was envisaged ª to facili-
tate ongoing mobilisation of appropriate
credit to the lower end of the housing mar-
ketº (SAHPF, 1995, p. 29).
A wide range of tenure and delivery op-
tions was allowed for (although some of the
institutional mechanisms required were not
in place), including assisting:
Ð individuals into owner-occupation , either
individually or through approved projects;
Ð collective ownership schemes;
Ð rental subsidies aimed at organisations
providing rental housing ª to the lower end
of the marketº (SAHPF, 1995, p. 30);
Ð the improvement of site-and-service
schemes implemented under previous sub-
sidy regimes.
Development Support and Advice
Finally, support and advice were seen as
essential to facilitate the process of housing
development. Drawing on international ex-
perience, the 1994 White Paper expressed the
government’ s belief in the ª resilience, ingen-
uity and abilityº of households to look after
their own housing needs, ª with appropriate
institutional support and ® nancial assistance
from governmentº (SAHPF, 1995, p. 28).
The development of the local and national
government institut ional framework was an
important part of this, but here it is relevant
to note also the establishment of a network of
ten ` housing support centres’ to assist indi-
viduals and communities in planning devel-
opment, mobilising resources, acquiring
materials, and providing advice on legal,
technical and ® nancial aspects (conference
presentation, Director General 10 May 1995,
London).
Also seen as signi® cant in the White Paper
(p. 41) was the work of support and develop-
ment agencies (NGOs) such as the People ’ s
Dialogue and the Urban Founda tion. Peo-
ple’ s Dialogue assisted the South African
Homeless People’ s Federation and empha-
sised the crucial role of community-con-
trolled savings and loans societies, and the
Urban Foundation, funded by philanthropic
industr ialists and overseas aid, assisted com-
munity groups to prepare and implement up-
grading schemes and had experimented with
different models for upgrading. Staff usually
required a combination of technical skillsÐ
planning, building , ® nance, architecture, for
exampleÐ and community development ex-
pertise. They were widely seen as having a
continuing role in assisting community in-
volvement and self-help, although they and
others saw a need to ensure greater account-
ability to funders and community.
Progress 1994± 96
By the end of the ® rst year (1994/95), more
than 150 000 subsidies had been approved,
but these approvals had not been converted
into homes (Tomlinson, 1995, p. 18). The
government demonstrated its commitment to
increase the level of resources applied to
housing by increasing the budget provision
from R1.4bn in 1994/95 to R1.8bn in 1995/
96 (from 1.3 to 2.3 per cent). But by then, the
level of budget provision became less
signi® cant than the state’ s capacity to spend
the money available. Only R42m of the
1994/95 allocation was spent during that
year, and at the end of 1995/96, R2.227bn
was available for 1996/97 as a result of
further underspending. However, spending
committed in 1995/96 was at the level of 30
per cent of available funds (including monies
brought forward). The number of units to be
upgraded or built in projects approved by the
end of 1995/96 was almost one-third of a
million (321 594), with an additiona l 23 077
approvals for structures on sites serviced
with state assistance in the past (personal
communication, Department of Housing) .
These approva ls were not yet completions,
but they showed the potential capacity of the
programme, and criticisms that ª the systemº
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ROBINA GOODLAD1640
had ª crashedº (Ruiters and Bond, 1996, p.
28) seem premature. The lack of progress led
the Parliament’ s Housing Committee to call
for the Housing Department to embark ª on
building rental housing on a large scaleº
(Portfolio Committee on Housing and Select
Committee on Housing and Public Works,
1996, p. 6).
Many conditions had to be met in order to
improve housing condition s in the ways set
down in the RDP. These included an active
house-building construction industry; skilled
workers and plentiful building materials; a
® nance system and institutions able and will-
ing to operate a market in housing in all parts
of South Africa; subsidy and other levers to
assist the achievement of social objectives;
ef® cient, legitimate and effective administra-
tion at provincial and local government lev-
els; political stability; community-based
organisations and the creation of support
structures and skilled professionals to assist
them to become housing developers; a
® nancial system which enabled those with no
conventional access to credit to secure the
funds necessary to become their own housing
developers; and the development of models
for social rented housing . Few of these were
inherited from the old regime, and the length
of this list alone indicates how ambitious was
the aim of putting a policy and institutional
framework in place in the twelve months
after April 1994.
When considered against these criteria,
much more was achieved than some critics
acknowledge. The strategy was neither sim-
ply market-driven, providing housing for
those who could operate in a subsidised mar-
ket, nor was it only a people-driven, decom-
modi® ed, participatory strategy dependent on
the organisation of community groups in in-
formal settlements. Time spent by national
and provinc ial ministers and of® cials in se-
curing agreements from the lending institu-
tions and in stimulating the interest of
developers to bring forward proposals was
therefore not available for creating the right
condition s for the poorest to gain better hous-
ing, and vice versa. Criticism that neither
type of development was achieved to the
extent intended by the government is valid,
though misplaced given the nature of hous-
ing development processes; but suggestions
that the policy was intended to be only
ª (private) developer-driven, bank-centred,
(and) fully-commodi® edº (Ruiters and Bond,
1996, p. 28) after the Accord of October
1994, misrepresents what the RDP made
clear, that the ANC sought to stimulate mar-
ket- and people-driven forms of production.
In the ® rst twelve months more had been
achieved in creating the framework for stim-
ulating the market than in developing the
model of community-based development,
though formidable obstacles remained, and
private-sector institutions failed to operate on
the government’ s termsÐ for example,
charging higher rates of interest in the town-
ships, and continuing to ` redline ’ more than
25 per cent of them (Ruiters and Bond, 1996,
pp. 28±29).
Delivering the Policy
The target of 1m homes by the end of 5 years
is one that ministers at provincial and na-
tional level may yet regret inheriting since it
will inevitably be an important criterionÐ for
some the only criterionÐ against which they
will be judged. However, although the target
is unlikely to be met, the rate of acceleration
in the development process could mean that
at the end of 5 years the rate of development
is consistent with over 300 000 units per
annum. Those who saw the ® rst year as
producing ª a signi® cant number of mile-
stonesº (Tomlinson., 1995, p. 18) also
identi® ed obstacles and tensions concerned
with development bottlenecks, such as those
arising from administrative weaknesses and
lack of development land, and differences of
view about appropriate strategies, such as
continuing disagreements between provincial
ministers of housing and national levels of
government, as provinc ial ministers sought
to meet their election promises to provide
4-roomed houses. Key factors in overcoming
obstacles to development include the creation
of an institutional framework to assist hous-
ing production, the implementation of an
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1641
effective subsidy scheme, and the accessibil-
ity of credit for the poorest. These and other
factors are now discussed.
Affordability
Achieving affordability lies at the crux of the
government’ s dilemma in choosing a subsidy
system which maximises production and sus-
tainability for the poorest. The wider the
subsidy, the more people it reaches, but the
shallower it is, carrying the danger of the
poorest not being able to build a decent
structure. The deeper the subsidy, the fewer
it reaches, but it allows the construction of a
complete house , possibly at the cost of con-
tinuing high maintenance payments. On its
own, R12 500 or R15 000 will buy in the
market, perhaps, a serviced site with a toilet
block and stand pipe, and ` a pile of bricks’ .
Some argue this is too little, while others
argue that the cost of self-building can be as
little as one-quarter or one-third of the cost
of a similar house built by contractors, but
that ª the necessary instruments and institu-
tional arrangementsº for this sort of self
building ª are highly underdevelopedº
(SAHPF, 1995, p. 7).
This issue is being resolved in the short
term by the limited upgrading of some infor-
mal settlements and the construction of some
houses for households who can ® nance the
rest of the cost of a house through savings or
loans. Another possibility is raising the size
of the individual subsidyÐ with some argu-
ing for a minimum of R17 500Ð especially if
housing achieves greater priority in the na-
tional budge t, but this would still not secure
complete formal housing provided in the
market without private ® nance. However, it
should secure reasonable standards for those
able to build for themselves. An expansion in
the budget cannot be assumed, as other min-
isters discover the necessities of protecting
their budgets, but progress towards the RDP
target of 5 per cent is an essential require-
ment.
Creating the right conditions for the
poorest to gain better housing remains the
greatest challenge and an appropriate
® nancial model is one of the most important
requirements. A major feature of ª people-
centredº self-build housing production is that
relatively small amounts of capital may be
required to get started, but conventiona l
loans are unavailable (Gilbert, 1994, pp. 96±
101). The availability of government subsidy
on completion of a top structure, as the South
African policy provides, is not, therefore, a
suf® cient or viable inducement. The Home-
less People ’ s Federation’ s proposa l for a re-
volving loan fund is intended to overcome
this obstacle, and has been welcomed by the
ministry (SAHPF, 1995). But it will take
time to test and then amend or extend this
model. The proposed National Housing Fi-
nance Corporation must address this issue, or
fail in its primary purpose.
The Institutions of Government
The lack of preparedness of government in-
stitutions has already been described. It is
inevitable that new structures such as those at
local and provincial level take time to be-
come established and effective in administer-
ing land assembly, service provision and the
other constituent parts of the housing devel-
opment process, such as the implementation
of a subsidy system, held up, for example, by
a need for a new computer system at one
stage (Tomlinson, 1995, p. 16). There is also
a continuing danger that local disputes and
con¯ icts over land and occupancy rights di-
vert the energies of politic ians and their staff
from the planning and development process.
In the ® rst year, provinc ial ministers were
drawn in to assist in resolving many local
disputes, but, in time, local government
might be expected to take primary responsi-
bility for this type of mediationÐ though
here too there is a risk of distraction from
longer-term tasks. There is less of this type
of distraction at the national level, where the
central Ministry of Housing is not so in-
volved in implementing policy. It was feared
that the death of Joe Slovo in January 1995
would damage the progress being made, but
the rapid appointm ent of a replacement,
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ROBINA GOODLAD1642
Sankie Mthembi-Nkondo, and her broad ad-
herence to the same policy framework, has
shown that the government continues to seek
consensus to pursue both market and decom-
modi® ed forms of housing provision.
Land
Land will continue to be a contentious issue
affecting house production in some areas.
Experience in many other ` developing’ and
` developed’ countries suggests that land
con¯ icts will not be easily resolved. The
location of housing development has import-
ant implications for the urban environment
and for planning, and one test of the new
regime will be the extent to which it is
possible to house African people in more
convenient locations, closer to transport, jobs
and urban facilities. Early private develop-
ments under the policy were mainly located
on the edges of cities and towns, as land in
more convenient locations was less afford-
able. Such locations may lead to racial ten-
sion, although it must be remembered that
racial tension was an endemic feature of
apartheid South Africa. If the extent of resi-
dential segregation becomes increasingly a
function of the class position of Africans,
this will be a quali ® ed gain for social inte-
gration.
Participation and Participants
The process by which housing is produced
was seen by the RDP as just as important as
the quantity produced. The model adopted
may appear to be similar to that of the World
Bank, which recommends that governments
play ª an enabling roleº and ª move away
from producing, ® nancing and maintaining
housing, and toward improving housing mar-
ket ef® ciency and the housing conditions of
the poorº (World Bank, 1992, p. 7). But the
RDP does not eschew the provision of state
subsidy, and the housing strategy based on it
is intended to foster welfare through collec-
tive organisation and self-help in ways un-
familiar to most market economies.
The participation of the main actorsÐ
community activists, professionals, politi-
cians and government of® cialsÐ in the new
conditions is likely to be problematic at
times. The politic isation of community ac-
tivists in the ® nal apartheid years created
expectations of participation and negotiation
which the new government institutions will
have to meet, or risk the consequences
which, at worst, extend to violent protest.
Activists may need to learn new forms of
dialogue appropriate to the new situation.
But so too will the former activists who ® nd
themselves in the seats of power, and their
civil servants and professional advisers, for
many of whom a concern with process and
community involvement brings entirely new
challenges. Most of the relevant professional
groups are overwhelmingly white and un-
familiar with the language and forms of com-
munity participation. There is a scarcity of
trained workers to manage the housing de-
velopment process, let alone the management
of existing housing and any new rented hous-
ing built. It will take time for local and
provincial governments to build up the
necessary expertise in social and physical
development work, even with a role restric-
ted to enabling rather than providing.
The aim of assisting a people-centred pro-
duction process will not be achieved by the
same methods as apply to the private market.
One proposed remedy, ª rebuilding mass or-
ganisationsº in the townships and informal
settlements (Ruiters and Bond, 1996, p. 30),
may be necessary, but is also insuf® cient.
Suppor t mechanisms are required to facilitate
the formation of groups, the development of
project proposals, and all the other require-
ments of the housing produc tion process. But
some NGOs report a scarcity of applicants
with the right combination of ` hard’ , techni-
cal, skills, and ` soft’ , community develop-
ment skills. The development of additional
new courses stressing housing as a social
process is also required.
The vibrancy of community organisation
in South Africa is in marked contrast with
other African countries (Hoek-Smit, 1994),
and with the former communist countries in
Eastern Europe. Community groups in town-
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1643
ships and informal settlements, including
church groups, credit unions, women’ s
groups, tenants’ associations and civic asso-
ciations (the ` civics’ ) are seen as crucial in
providing the ` community’ participation el-
ement in the RDP. The civic associations
federated in the South African National Civic
Organisation (SANCO) since 1992, and
other federations, such as the South African
Homeless People’ s Federation, provide a so-
cial infrastructure for participation and devel-
opment at local and national levels. Within
the government’ s model of development, dis-
missed by some as ` corporatist’ , they need to
® nd a modus operandi which protects their
independence while enabling their partici-
pation.
The necessary conditions for meaningful
community participation are more apparent
amongst community groups than in some of
the institutions of government. Condition s
are better than for many countries undergo-
ing radical transformation, but they are not
ideal. It will take time to develop new roles
and practices, and to see the product of nego-
tiation, on the ground . Public of® cials have a
lot to learn, and some have to overcome a
legacy of distrust. Community activists may
be willing to wait for the development pro-
cess to take its course, but the less active
may not appreciate the nature and cause of
delay, and may be susceptible to apathy and
alienation. The new local authori ties have a
particularly important role to play, but are 18
months or 2 years behind nationa l and prov-
incial governments in starting.
Models of Delivery
A gap in the non-governmental institutional
framework is the absence of models for the
delivery of rented housing . Many South
Africans have a rural as well as an urban tie,
and prefer to rent in at least one of their
homes. Yet recent programmes have empha-
sised freehold. The new models for social
rented housing are still being developed, so a
large volum e cannot be produced immedi-
ately. There is, for example, little popula r
understanding of the concept of collective
ownership or social rented housing on the
housing association or non-pro ® t company
model. Some professionals see the idea as
too utopian, while others are actively explor-
ing it and are adapting models from overseas
to the South African situation.
Political Tensions
Continuing public debate about the adequacy
and effect of policy can be seen as helpful to
the policy process. However, there is a dan-
ger that it may instead be seen as a mark of
the uncertainties which surround policy, sap-
ping market or community con® dence. Ten-
sions within the ANC were most apparent in
the relationships between provincial housing
ministers and national government. To some
extent this re¯ ected a difference about where
the emphasis in delivery should be placed,
with some provinces seeing better prospects
of rapid delivery from the private sector than
from community groups seeking to go
through a long development process. But
others believed the circumstances favoured
more direct forms of state delivery, with
government in the driving seat, forcing the
pace, and ensuring that housing and other
forms of delivery were integrated. A continu-
ing strand in the ANC’ s debates was about
the adequacy of a policy that could not pro-
vide a complete house within the subsidy. On
one side were those who argued nothing less
than a complete house was good enough to
rectify the injustices of the past, and to retain
credibility in the townships and informal set-
tlements. On the other side were those who
referred to the scale of the budget, and to the
case for incremental development as the only
form which took account of the need to avoid
large rental, maintenance or loan payments
for the poorest people.
More problematic is a resolution of the
continuing rent and bond boycotts, and the
con¯ icting accounts of the reasons and reme-
dies for it. On one side are those who point
out that residents cannot afford to pay, that
injustices still exist in the inadequate equalis-
ation of service levels and charges between
black and white areas, and that payment is
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ROBINA GOODLAD1644
unjusti ® ed until service delivery has shown
signi® cant improvement. On the other side,
the government’ s Masakhane (building to-
gether now) campaign is intended to change
the non-payment culture of the townships
and encourage community-based organisa-
tions to achieve improved services. Failure
could prove deeply damaging to the prospects
of the housing policy reaching the most needy
target groups.
Conclusions
The two overwhelmingly important features
of the housing policy environment in contem-
porary South Africa are the circumstances
and results of the election of April 1994, and
the scale of need apparent in comparing the
typical housing condition s of different racial
groups. For the future, the crucial factor will
be the extent to which the new government
institutions can deliver the improvements in
living conditions promised in the RDP, es-
pecially to the poorest Africans, or persuade
the electorateÐ and in particular the African
people whose votes brough t the ANC to
powerÐ that there are good reasons why
progress is slow.
The housing strategy, informed by the his-
tory of South Africa, combines elements of
welfare and market models, and although
some international in¯ uences are apparent it
has no close similarity to any other nation
state’ s strategy. The attempt to combine in-
ducements for private, public and community
sectors to engage in housing development
provides both a challenge and an opportunity.
The opportunity exists to provide a model
which would be of interest world-wide for its
capacity to combine market and state mecha-
nisms to create welfare, without creating the
problems of a residualised social housing
sector which characterise so many ` devel-
oped’ countries. After two years, the quali® ed
achievement in creating a framework in
what were very unfavourable conditions
was apparent and the housing programme
showed more potential to pick up speed than
suggested by the simple recitation of statistics
of houses built or upgraded. The rate of
approval of projects had not been matched
by the rate of delivery, and so conclusions
cannot be drawn about who is being served
by the new housing developments, or about
whether the development bottlenecks can be
eliminated. But the models of delivery were
geared better to the needs of those able to
help themselves with the assistance of a loan,
than to the needs of the poorest, who had no
access to credit. The potential of the policy
should be apparent by the end of ® ve years of
implementation, even if the programme has
not reached full productive capacity.
The success of the housing strategy will
depend on many institutions and linkages,
and such pluralism provides scope for some
breaks in the chain of actions required have
disastrous effects. They would affect speci® c
localities, forms of provision, or institutions,
but the effect of a ¯ aw in one house design,
in a new institutional structure for rented
housing , or in one bank’ s lending practices,
for example, would be limited. More serious
potential problems can be imagined, es-
pecially arising from the effects of poverty ,
non-payment and any failure to develop a
® nancial and development model to meet the
needs of the poorest and to provide sustain-
able forms of housing .
There is optim ism that enough can be
achieved in housing policy to maintain politi-
cal stability. If disillusionment grows, the
electoral consequences are likely to be apathy
and low turn-outsÐ not least because there is
no alternative that commands the loyalty and
support of the millions of South Africans who
see the ANC as their liberators. But the civil
consequences would include the resump-
tionÐ or continuationÐ of the struggles
around material conditions which have char-
acterised urban life in South Africa in the
1980s and 1990s. Tragically, these struggles
have often included con¯ ict and violence
within and between groups of disadvantaged
Africans living in the worst conditions. En-
gaging community groups and other stake-
holders on a large scale in the political and
housing development process may be the
only style of politics which can reconcile
suf® cient of the interests to enable a new
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THE HOUSING CHALLENG E IN SOUTH AFRICA 1645
political order to be created and reproduced,
as well as achieving the material objectives
of housing policyÐ albeit more slowly than
the RDP’ s optim istic targets for the ® rst few
years of the new South Africa.
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