the house of lords: reform cm 7027 - gov.uk · the house of lords act 1999 13 the royal commission...

The House of Lords: Reform

The House of Lords: Reform

Presented to Parliament by the Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Sealby Command of Her Majesty

February 2007

Cm 7027 LONDON: THE STATIONERY OFFICE £13.50

© Crown Copyright 2007The text in this document (excluding the Royal Arms and departmental logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium providing that it is reproducedaccurately and not used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the document specified. Any enquiries relating to the copyright in this document should be addressed to The Licensing Division,HMSO, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich, NR3 1BQ.Fax: 01603 723000 or e-mail: [email protected] information presented in this publication is also available on the TSO website:www.official-documents.gov.uk

Contents

Foreword 5

1. Executive Summary 6

2. Introduction 8

3. Background 10The Parliament Act 1911 10The Salisbury-Addison Convention 10The Parliament Act 1949 11The Life Peerages Act 1958 11Leave of Absence 1958 12The Peerage Act 1963 121968 Proposals 121970s and 1980s 131997 and Onwards 13

The House of Lords Act 1999 13The Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords 14House of Lords Appointments Commission 14

2001 and Onwards 15The House of Lords – Completing the Reform, White Paper – November 2001 15Free Vote 2003 16Consultation Paper 2003 18

4. Current Steps Towards Reform of the House of Lords 19The Joint Committee on Conventions 19The Government Response to the Joint Committee on Conventions 20Free Vote on Composition of the House of Lords 21

5. International Comparisons 22The Role of the Second Chamber 22Bicameral and Unicameral Parliaments 22Powers and Composition 23The United Kingdom – a Bicameral Parliament 24

6. A Reformed Chamber: Principles of Composition 25Primacy of the House of Commons 25Complementarity of the House of Lords 26A More Legitimate House of Lords 26No Overall Majority for Any Party 26Non Party-Political Element 27A More Representative House of Lords 28Continuity of Membership 28

3

7. A Reformed Chamber: Elected, Appointed, or Hybrid? 30All-Appointed 30All-Elected 30Hybrid 31Electing Members – Indirect or Direct Election? 33

Indirect Election 33Direct Election 33Direct Election – Electoral Method 33

First Past the Post 34Regional Lists 35Single Transferable Vote 35

Constituencies 36Timing of Elections 37By-election 38Government Proposals: Elections 39

8. A Reformed Chamber: a Statutory Appointments Commission 40Pre 2000 40Current Appointments Commission 40Performance of the Current Appointments Commission 40Proposed Statutory Appointments Commission 41Legal Status 41Membership of the Statutory Appointments Commission 41Role of the Statutory Appointments Commission 41Non Party-Political Members 42Political Party Members 42Prime Minister's Appointments 43

9. A Reformed Chamber: Membership 44Size of the Chamber 44Minimum Age Limit 45Payment and Resourcing of Members 45Ministers in the Lords 46Law Lords and Retired Justices of the Supreme Court 46Lords Spiritual 47Resignation 47Leave of Absence 47Restriction on Former Members of the Lords Standing as MPs 48Breaking the Link with the Peerage 48Franchise 48Disqualification 48Name of Reformed Chamber 49

10. A Reformed Chamber: Transition 50Removing the Hereditary Peers 52Costs 54

11. Next Steps 55

12. Conclusion 56

13. Annex A – Membership of the Cross-Party Working Group on Lords Reform 57

14. Annex B – Arrangements for the Free Vote Using an Alternative Vote Ballot 58

4

Foreword

by The Rt Hon Jack Straw MP,Leader of the House of Commonsand Lord Privy Seal

Reform of the House of Lords has provokedintense debate and policy initiatives for over100 years. The Lords is not a static institution.Like other key British institutions, it has changedand evolved through its history, and will continueto do so. This has never been more evidentthan in the last century, which saw majorchanges to the Lords – from the ParliamentActs to life peers and the introduction of thefirst women members of the House.

In 1999, the Government enacted a significant,and overdue, reform by removing the right ofthe majority of the hereditary peers to sit andvote. As a result of this reform, a more assertiveand effective House of Lords has emerged.The reform has improved the scrutiny ofGovernment and in so doing, has improvedBritish democracy overall.

However, reform of the House of Lords remainsunfinished business. There are still 92 hereditarypeers sitting in the Lords. But ending thisanomaly, in the Government’s view, does notgo far enough to ensure that Britain’s secondchamber is fit to meet the demands andexpectations of this century. The legitimacyand authority of the second chamber continueto be called into question.

Significantly, the 2005 manifestos of the threemain parties commit them to further reform ofthe Lords.

If changes of the magnitude involved are totake place, broad agreement on some of thekey issues and agreement that the changesshould be introduced over a long period oftime is, to say the least, highly desirable. Thealternative is likely to be deadlock. Time andtime again – in 1909, 1949, 1968 and 2003– fundamental reform of the House of Lordshas failed because, for some, the best becamethe enemy of the good. Deadlock would beeasy to achieve; the prize of progress meansmoving forward gradually and by consensus.

To reach next stage of reform, our 2005 Generalelection manifesto committed us to holding afree vote in Parliament on the composition of areformed House of Lords.

This reflects the fact that, despite parties’official positions on reform, there are stronglyheld and conflicting views on the future of theLords. These will no doubt be reflected in theway in which the free votes are cast – includingby Ministers. The paper therefore offers noprediction on the outcome of the votes: thefuture composition of the House is a matterfor Parliament to decide.

However, to assist debate, and help progress,it is both practical and useful to offer anindication of a model around which consensuson the issue might be achieved. My own viewis that a House where 50% of members areelected and 50% appointed is that point. Thisis also the model that the White Paper uses toillustrate how a hybrid House might work. Thefinal outcome might well be different from this.Free votes are exactly that – free. But eventhen, the tangible proposals in this paper ontransitional arrangements, on electoral systemsand on a range of other matters should havefocussed debate and, hopefully, enabledParliament to come to a clear view – somethingwhich was absent when a free vote on thisissue was held in 2003.

I believe that the approach outlined in thisWhite Paper represents the best opportunityto make progress. It is, in my view, a uniqueopportunity to move forward with reform tomake the House of Lords a more effective,legitimate and representative chamber, fullyplaying its part in a 21st century democracy.

The House of Lords: Reform | Foreword

5

1. Executive Summary

1.1 The White Paper aims to set the stage forthe free votes on the composition of a futureHouse of Lords, promised in the Government’s2005 manifesto. The paper has therefore beendrafted to reflect the arguments for and againston the various questions associated withreform of the House of Lords in a balanced way.It takes account of the invaluable discussionsin the Cross-Party Working Group on LordsReform, which has been meeting over thelast year.

1.2 The Government believes the principle ofHouse of Commons’ primacy in our Parliamentaryarrangements must remain in any reform ofthe Lords. The Lords should be neither a rivalnor a replica of the Commons, but nor shouldit simply provide a rubber stamp for theGovernment’s proposals. It should be acomplement to the Commons, having a differentkind of membership and providing a distinctvoice in scrutinising and revising legislation.

1.3 To help ensure this, the Government’sview is that no party in the Lords should havea majority of either the party-political membersof the House or the House as a whole. At least20% of the House should be non party-politicalappointments, which would help maintain awide range of experience in the Lords. It isentirely possible, if the Lords is to be partlyor fully elected, that independent candidateswould also be elected to the House, increasingthe proportion of non party-political members.

1.4 In the Government’s view, it is difficult,in a modern democracy, to justify a secondchamber where there is no elected elementand in which the public has no direct inputinto who sits in it. The White Paper thereforeproposes that a reformed House should bea hybrid House. This is the judgement of allrecent enquiries into the future of the House ofLords, including the Royal Commission (2000),the report of the Public Administration SelectCommittee (2002) and the ‘Breaking theDeadlock’ group in 2005. Opinions as to thebalance between the elected and appointedmembers have, however, varied.

1.5 To facilitate the forthcoming debate, theWhite Paper sets out an illustration of how ahybrid House might work. This model assumesthat 50% of the House is elected through apartially open list system. The appointmentssystem and the electoral system set out for

this model are applicable to the other modelsproposed in the free vote.

1.6 The Government suggests that the totalsize of the reformed House should be 540members. Elections would be held at the sametime as elections to the European Parliament,and would use the same constituencies – butthe electoral system proposed however wouldbe different – it is proposed to use a partiallyopen list system.

1.7 When changes to composition have beddeddown, it would, of course, be up to Parliamentto decide whether to alter the proportion ofelected members, if that was thought desirable(to give this effect, further legislation wouldbe required).

1.8 Maintaining the relatively non-partisanstyle of the current chamber, and ensuring thatmembers of a reformed House demonstrateindependent thinking and long-term focus isimportant. The Government therefore believesthat members of a reformed House shouldserve long terms which are not renewable. If aproportion of members are to be elected, thenthis should be staggered, with a third of theelected element being introduced at eachelection. Members of the Lords who finishserving in the House would be prevented fromstanding for a seat in the House of Commonsfor a number of years after they leave.

1.9 The Government believes that the work ofthe Lords will be enhanced if it is comprisedof the widest range of views possible. To thatend, the membership of a reformed Houseshould reflect as far as possible the diversity ofpeople and viewpoints in the United Kingdom.The Government is also of the view that therepresentation of the Church of England in theHouse of Lords should continue.

1.10 It will be much easier to secure thenecessary diversity of the Lords if therecontinues to be an appointed element to theHouse. The model envisaged by the WhitePaper would mean that as well as the 20%non party-political members, a further 30%of the reformed House would be appointedparty-political members.

1.11 Appointments to the reformed House wouldbe made by a new Statutory AppointmentsCommission, which would be independent andreport directly to Parliament. There would beno Prime Ministerial appointments.

The House of Lords: Reform | 1. Executive Summary

6

1.12 The link between the peerage and aseat in Parliament would be broken altogether.There would be further changes to the term ofmembership for the House of Lords. Members(including current members) would be able toresign their seat in the Lords. All would be ableto vote in General Elections. Disqualificationprovisions in the Lords for those convicted of anoffence would be brought into line with thosein the Commons. The minimum age limit for theLords would be the same as for the Commons.

1.13 Again, as the earlier reports haverecognised, there will have to be a long transitionperiod for existing members. None of thecurrent life peers will be forced to leave theHouse. The Government will look at whether afinancial package can be provided for memberswho wish to retire.

1.14 The Government will consider whethernew remuneration arrangements should beput in place for a reformed House, linked toattendance in the House. If so, the Governmentwill invite the Review Body on Senior Salaries(SSRB) to report and make recommendationson the future level of remuneration of membersof the House of Lords once the final shape ofthe House has been decided.

1.15 As part of the reform process, the right ofhereditary peers to sit and vote in the House ofLords on the basis of their ancestry will finallybe brought to an end.

The House of Lords: Reform | 1. Executive Summary

7

2. Introduction

2.1 The Government’s 2005 General Electionmanifesto committed to a free vote in Parliamenton the composition of a reformed House of Lords.This paper is intended to inform that vote.

2.2 This paper examines the history of theHouse of Lords and its reform (includingattempts at reform) over the last hundred years.It sets out the Government’s major proposalsfor change and the form the Governmentsuggests the free vote should take.

2.3 The paper should be read in the contextof the other steps that the Government hastaken since 2005 towards completing reformof the House of Lords. A Joint Committeeon Conventions was established in May 2006to examine the conventions governing therelationship between the two Houses. It reportedin November 2006. Significantly, this cross-partyreport was unanimously approved by eachHouse without division.

2.4 The cross-party nature of the JointCommittee’s report is important, and it will beadvantageous if cross-party working can bemaintained throughout the process of reform.As high a degree of consensus as possible isnecessary to ensure the success of such majorconstitutional reform.

2.5 Therefore, alongside the Joint Committee’sinvestigations, the Leader of the House ofCommons has chaired a cross-party groupto discuss proposals for reform. The groupconsisted of Lord Falconer of Thoroton,representatives of the other two main parties,the Convenor of the Cross Bench Peers, anda representative of the Lords Spiritual. A fulllist of the group’s membership can be foundat Annex A.

2.6 The group has met eight times sinceJune 2006, and has worked with a high level ofco-operation. A significant degree of consensushas been found on several important aspectsalthough – unsurprisingly given the long historyof Lords reform – there has not been unanimousagreement on all the issues. Where agreementcould not be reached, this paper is intended toreflect the different arguments for and againstparticular options on reform in a balanced way.

2.7 All members of the cross-party group wereagreed on the fundamental principle of theprimacy of the Commons, and that the Houseof Lords should be a complement to theCommons, and not a rival to it.

2.8 There was agreement that a reformedHouse should consist of at least 20% nonparty-political members, and that it wasessential that no political party should beable to hold a majority of the whole Houseor the party-political members of it. Therewas agreement that effort should be made toensure that the membership of the reformedHouse reflects the gender and racial diversityof the United Kingdom, and that the rangeof religious opinion in the country should alsobe reflected in the membership of the Lords.All agreed that the special arrangements formembership of the House by a limited numberof hereditary peers should come to an end.

2.9 The group identified that essential tothe success of any reform would be a longtransition period, with new members phasedin over a period of time. The group agreed thatmembers of a reformed House should serve fora long, single term of office, with no prospectof re-election or re-appointment.

2.10 There was also agreement on many of theissues discussed in this paper in the sectiontitled ‘Membership of the Lords’, issues suchas breaking the link between the peerage anda seat in Parliament, disqualification provisions,allowing members of the Lords to vote, andrestrictions on former Lords standing as MPs.

2.11 Although all three political parties agreedthat a reformed House should be a hybridHouse, agreement was not reached on thefuture proportion of elected and appointedmembers. It is the Government’s intention thatthe free vote should provide a clear answer tothis question.

2.12 All parties agreed that the elected elementof the House should be elected through a formof direct election, but there was no furtheragreement on the form of direct election,or timing, to be used.

The House of Lords: Reform | 2. Introduction

8

2.13 The debate on these issues will continueas the process moves forward, and it is likelythat some issues will not be resolved untildebate takes place in Parliament on any Billnecessary to complete reform of the Lords.However, the progress that has been made is,in the Government’s view, encouraging, anddemonstrates that there is now a seriousopportunity to move forward with this vitalstage of reform of the House of Lords.

The House of Lords: Reform | 2. Introduction

9

3. Background

3.1 The origins of Parliament, includingthe House of Lords, can be found in theWitenagemot, where Saxon kings summonedreligious leaders and other counsellors toadvise on the administration of the Kingdom.

3.2 By the 14th century a bicameral Parliamenthad evolved. Its two Houses were distinct. Thereligious leaders (Lords Spiritual), magnates(Lords Temporal), officials, counsellors andjudges sat in the first House. Borough andshire representatives sat in the second.

3.3 The term ‘peer’ emerged by the 15thcentury to refer to the Lords Temporal, whohad by this time formed five ranks – Baron,Viscount, Earl, Marquess and Duke.

3.4 By the 18th century, the House of Commonswas already responsible for determining theGovernment’s resources and, as the industrialrevolution began, the authority of the Commonswas enhanced as land lost its dominant positionas a source of wealth. The widening differencesbetween the agendas of the political parties,the development of party machines and theextension of the electoral franchise reinforcedthe growing dominance of the Commons, asdid the Reform Acts of the 19th century.

3.5 For many years the House of Lordsconsisted primarily of peers from one party andmembers of the Lords still held many of thekey offices of state. These factors contributedto a number of significant clashes betweenthe two chambers, which in turn advancedthe case for reform of the House of Lordsand saw reform included on the mainstreampolitical agenda.

The Parliament Act 1911

3.6 The crisis over the Lords’ rejection of the1909 budget led to the Parliament Act 19111,which was passed only under the threat of thecreation of a large number of Liberal peers.The Act ensured that a Money Bill couldreceive Royal Assent without the approval ofthe House of Lords, if not passed by the Lordswithout amendment within one month. The Actalso provided that any other Public Bill (exceptone extending the life of a Parliament) wouldreceive Royal Assent without the consent ofthe House of Lords, if it had been passed bythe Commons in three successive sessions,as long as two years had elapsed betweenits second reading in the first session and itsfinal passage in the Commons. The Act alsoshortened the maximum length of a Parliamentfrom seven to five years.

The Salisbury-Addison Convention

3.7 The General Election of 1945 produceda Labour Government with a majority of 156in the House of Commons. In the House ofLords, however, only a small number of peerstook the Labour whip. Indeed, there were only16 Labour peers out of a total of 831 votingpeers. This imbalance posed a considerablestrain on the relationship between the twoHouses. During the Government of 1945-1951,the then Viscount Cranborne, Leader of theOpposition in the House of Lords (and fifthMarquess of Salisbury from 1947) and ViscountAddison2, the Labour Leader of the House ofLords, came to an agreement on the passage ofmajor pieces of Government legislation throughthe House of Lords. Viscount Cranbornedescribed his perspective on the agreementin the House of Lords debate on the King’sSpeech of 1945, in which the Government’slegislative agenda was being considered:

The House of Lords: Reform | 3. Background

10

1 The Parliament Act, 1911 (1&2) George V, Ch.132 The Salisbury Doctrine,House of Lords Library Note LLN 2006/006

“Whatever our personal views, we shouldfrankly recognise that these proposals wereput before the country at the recent GeneralElection and that the people of this country, withfull knowledge of these proposals, returned theLabour Party to power. The Government may,therefore, I think, fairly claim that they have amandate to introduce these proposals. I believethat it would be constitutionally wrong, whenthe country has so recently expressed its view,for this House to oppose proposals which havebeen definitely put before the electorate.3”

3.8 Since that time, the doctrine known asthe “Salisbury-Addison Convention” has cometo imply that the House of Lords should notreject at second or third reading an intentionto legislate mentioned in the Government’selection manifesto.

3.9 The recent report of the Joint Committeeon Conventions4 considered that the mainprinciples of the Salisbury-Addison conventionremain in place, although it concluded that theconvention has changed over time, and thatit should be renamed. The Government hasaccepted the Joint Committee’s conclusionand its recommendation.

The Parliament Act 1949

3.10 Despite the Salisbury-Addison Convention,the 1945 Labour Government became concernedthat the three session delay in the 1911 Actwould mean that its proposals for nationalisingthe iron and steel industry would not get throughbefore the next General Election was due.In 1947, the Labour Government introducedthe second Parliament Bill, which amendedthe 1911 Act by decreasing the number ofsessions in which the Commons must passa Bill from three to two. It also reduced theperiod between the first second reading andfinal passage in the Commons to one year.

3.11 Following the second reading debates onthe Bill in the Lords in January-February 1948,talks between the Government and oppositionparty leaders took place on reform of theHouse of Lords. Tentative agreement was, thatthe House of Lords “should be complementaryto and not a rival to”5 the Commons, that womenshould be admitted, that no one political partyshould have a permanent majority and thatheredity should not, in itself, determineappointment to the Lords.

3.12 The talks broke down over the question ofthe Lords’ power to delay legislation. The Billitself was eventually passed into law in 19496

but only by use of the Parliament Act 1911.

3.13 In 1951, the Conservative Party electionmanifesto made a commitment to reconveneall-party discussions on reform of the House ofLords. Viscount Simon introduced a Life PeersBill in 1953 and the Conservative Governmentattempted to convene talks with the Liberaland Labour Party leaders. However, ClementAttlee, the then Leader of the Opposition,declined the invitation and the talks did nottake place. The Bill fell.

The Life Peerages Act 1958

3.14 In 1958, the Conservative Governmentpassed the Life Peerages Act7. This allowed,for the first time, holders of life peeragesother than those appointed as Law Lords to sitin the House of Lords. It also allowed womenawarded life peerages to sit in the House.Previously, although the House of Lords hadaccepted that the Crown had the right tocreate life peerages, it had insisted that theHouse had the right to determine who couldsit as a member. It had refused to accept thatmembership extended to holders of peerageswith no right of succession. One of the originalintentions behind the legislation was to improvethe party-political balance in the House,because it was felt that Labour Party supportersmight be more likely to accept a life peeragethan a hereditary one. The Labour Partyopposed the reform because they felt that itwould create a barrier to more radical reformof the Lords.


11

3 House of Lords Hansard, 16 August 1945, Vol. 137, Col. 474 Conventions of the UK Parliament, Report of Session 2005-06, Vol. 1, House of Lords Paper 265-I, House of Commons

Paper 1212-I, November 20065 Parliament Bill 1947: Agreed Statement on the Conclusion of the Conference of Party Leaders, Cm. 7380 May 1948, page 36 Parliament Act, 1949: 12, 13 & 14 George VI, Ch. 1037 The Life Peerages Act, 1958: 6 & 7 Elizabeth II. Ch. 21

3.15 The introduction of life peeragestransformed the House of Lords. In the 1950s,it was a moribund institution, with only a tinyproportion of its nominal membership attendingregularly except when the ‘backwoodsmen’(the name given to peers who seldom attendedthe House) were called in. For example,in 1959-60, there were 859 members of theHouse of Lords (excluding the Lords of Appealin Ordinary and the Church of England Bishops)and the average daily attendance was 136 (15%).By 1981-2, membership (excluding the Lordsof Appeal in Ordinary and the Church ofEngland Bishops) had increased to 1134 andthe average daily attendance to 284 (24%).

3.16 For the first few years, there were equalnumbers of life and hereditary peers created.However, since 1965, there have only beenthree non-Royal hereditary creations8, andit rapidly became accepted that in only themost exceptional circumstances would newhereditary peerages be awarded. Since 1958,a total of 1108 life peerages have been created,of whom 189 were women. There are currently615 life peer members of the House of Lords,of whom 139 are women.

Leave of Absence, 1958

3.17 ‘Leave of absence’ rules were created in1958 to quell concern that peers who seldomattended the House were only encouraged todo so in order to sway a particular vote. TheStanding Orders of the House of Lords9 wereamended to require peers to apply for leave ofabsence if they could not attend the House.

The Peerage Act 1963

3.18 Following the recommendations of theJoint Committee on House of Lords Reformof 196210, the Peerage Act 196311 made threesignificant changes to the peerage. It allowedfemale hereditary peers as well as all membersof the Scottish peerage to sit in the House ofLords. Hitherto, Scottish peers had elected 16‘representative peers’ from their number. Most

importantly, it enabled hereditary peeragesto be disclaimed for life. This was primarilya consequence of the Stansgate case of1960-6112 in which Tony Benn was disqualifiedfrom sitting in the House of Commons asmember for Bristol South East, upon hissuccession to the Viscountcy of Stansgate,a hereditary peerage awarded to his father.

3.19 The Act provided for a peerage to berelinquished during a set period of time afterits inheritance and ‘remain dormant’ until thetime of death, at which point the peeragewould pass to the heir as normal (unless heor she also chose to relinquish it). Disclaiminga peerage allowed the individual to stand forelection to the House of Commons and alsoentitled them to vote. On the passing of the Act,Mr Benn relinquished his peerage and wasre-elected at a by-election on 20 August 1963.

1968 Proposals

3.20 In 1966, the Labour Government proposedreform of the House of Lords, and entered intodiscussions with the opposition parties on theform this should take. A substantial measure ofagreement had been reached when the Houseof Lords decided in June 1968 to reject astatutory instrument imposing UN sanctionson Southern Rhodesia13. This breach of theconvention that the Lords should not vote downsecondary legislation led to the breakdown ofthe talks. Despite this, the Government broughtforward a White Paper14 setting out a detailedpackage of reform based on those inter-partydiscussions.

3.21 The White Paper, House of Lords Reform(Cmnd. 3799), proposed a two-tier Houseconsisting of both voting and non-votingmembers. Voting members consisted of‘created peers’, which in 1968 still includedabout 100 hereditary peers of first creation.Proposed conditions for retaining voting rightsincluded a minimum level of attendance and aretirement age. Non-voting peers included allexisting hereditary peers by succession in the


12

8 Viscount Whitelaw, Viscount Tonypandy (Mr Speaker Thomas) and the Earl of Stockton (Harold Macmillan). Life peeragescan be awarded only as baronies, so any higher honour must be hereditary. Viscounts Whitelaw and Tonypandy in facthad no male heirs and so both titles are already extinct.

9 The Standing Orders of the House of Lords: Leave of Absence, 16 June 1958. House of Lords, No. 23, (1)10 Report of the Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform House of Lords Paper 125, House of Commons 262,

Session 1961-6211 Peerage Act, 1963 Elizabeth II. Ch. 4812 Stansgate Case, House of Commons 142, Session 1960-6113 House of Lords Hansard, 18th June 1968, Vol. 293, Col. 59414 House of Lords Reform 1968, Cmnd. 3799

House and ‘created peers’ who could notmeet the conditions for voting rights. Thiswas intended to be a transitional measure,and hereditary peers newly succeeding werenot entitled to any form of membership ofthe House. The paper also proposed that theGovernment of the day should maintain a smallmajority of party-political seats in the House.

3.22 Additional measures would have allowedthe House of Lords to require the Commonsto reconsider subordinate legislation, but notreject it outright. It would have imposed a timelimit of 60 days on Lords’ consideration of aBill, and changed the period of delay from theyear in the Parliament Act 1949, to one of6 months after either the date of disagreementbetween the two Houses, or the 60th day ofconsideration, whichever came first. After thisdelay a Bill could be submitted for Royal Assentby resolution of the House of Commons.

3.23 The House of Lords approved the WhitePaper. Despite difficulties in gaining supportfor the White Paper in the Commons, theGovernment persevered and introduced a Bill.However, backbench opposition on both sidesdelayed the Bill to such an extent that theGovernment decided not to proceed withthe legislation.

1970s and 1980s

3.24 During the 1970s and 1980s all partiesmade proposals for reform, but none werepursued. It was not until the election of theLabour Government in 1997 that reform againbecame a serious proposition.

1997 and Onwards

3.25 The 1997 Labour Party manifesto15 said:

“The House of Lords must be reformed. Asan initial, self-contained reform, not dependenton further reform in the future, the right ofhereditary peers to sit and vote in the Houseof Lords will be ended by statute. This will bethe first stage in a process of reform to makethe House of Lords more democratic andrepresentative. The legislative powers of theHouse of Lords will remain unaltered. The

system of appointment of life peers to theHouse of Lords will be reviewed. Our objectivewill be to ensure that over time party appointeesas life peers more accurately reflect theproportion of votes cast at the previous GeneralElection. We are committed to maintainingan independent cross-bench presence of lifepeers. No one political party should seek amajority in the House of Lords. A committeeof both Houses of Parliament will be appointedto undertake a wide-ranging review of possiblefurther change and then to bring forwardproposals for reform.”

3.26 In 1999, the Government introduced theHouse of Lords Bill16 to remove the hereditarypeers, as the first stage of Lords reform.It also appointed the Royal Commission onthe Reform of the House of Lords, chairedby Lord Wakeham.

The House of Lords Act 19993.27 Before the House of Lords Bill wasintroduced in the Commons, the Governmentand Viscount Cranborne (then Leader ofthe Opposition in the Lords) negotiated anarrangement whereby 92 hereditary peers wouldretain their seats in the House of Lords. TheGovernment undertook that the arrangementsto retain a certain number of hereditary peersin the House would remain in place until thecompletion of the second stage of reform.The Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, said in theHouse that the amendment would providefor retention of some of the hereditary peers,“until the second stage of House of Lordsreform has taken place. The amendmentreflects a compromise negotiated betweenPrivy Councillors on Privy Council terms andbinding in honour on all those who have cometo give it their assent.” He added that “the10 per cent. will go only when stage two hastaken place. So it is a guarantee that it willtake place.”17

3.28 The Government made no comment onwhat constituted stage two; in particular, it didnot commit itself to any element of election.Whichever package of proposals is endorsedby the free vote would constitute a fulfilmentof the pledge to complete the second stage ofthe reform of the House of Lords.


13

15 Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, General Election Manifestos Vol. 216 The House of Lords Bill, Bill 34 of 1998-9917 House of Lords Hansard 30 March 1999 Col. 207

3.29 At committee stage in the House ofLords, the Government agreed an amendment,tabled by Lord Weatherill, the Convenor ofthe Crossbench peers and former CommonsSpeaker, to exempt 92 hereditary peers, to giveeffect to the arrangement. Therefore, under theHouse of Lords Act 199918, 92 hereditary peerswere excepted from the general removal ofthe right to sit and vote in the Lords by virtueof a hereditary peerage. These 92 peers wereidentified in three groups. 75 peers wereelected by the hereditary peers in the existingparty groups in the Lords (including thecrossbenchers as a party group for thesepurposes) in proportion to the share of eachparty within the total sitting membership ofhereditary peers. This meant that there were2 Labour, 3 Liberal Democrat, 42 Conservativeand 28 crossbench peers selected by thismethod. 15 were elected by the whole House(including life peers) to be available to serve asoffice holders (deputy speakers, chairmen ofcommittees). At the time of the reform, therewere 15 hereditary peers holding such offices.The remaining two excepted peers were thehereditary office holders, the Earl Marshal ofEngland and the Lord Great Chamberlain.

3.30 Until the end of the first session of thefollowing Parliament (November 2002), hereditarypeers who died were replaced by the nextcandidate on the relevant election list. SinceNovember 2002, a by-election mechanism hasbeen in place. Candidates can be any qualifyinghereditary peer. The electors are either theremaining hereditary peers in the party groupin which the vacancy occurred (including theelected hereditary office holders) or, for the 15office holders, the whole House. The detailedarrangements for the by-elections are set outin the Standing Orders of the House.

The Royal Commission on the Reform ofthe House of Lords3.31 The Royal Commission on the Reformof the House of Lords, with a distinguishedand balanced membership and chaired byLord Wakeham, was established in 1999 to“consider and make recommendations on therole and function of the second chamber, andto recommend the method or combinationof methods of composition required toconstitute a second chamber fit for that roleand those functions”19.

3.32 The Royal Commission published itsreport in January 200020. It stressed that thereformed House should not challenge theprimacy of the House of Commons. It madea number of recommendations, including thatthe House should have around 550 peersserving a fixed term. It suggested that asignificant minority should be regionalmembers, elected to reflect directly politicalopinion within their region. It proposed thatthe Prime Minister should lose the powerto appoint peers and that an independentappointments commission should beestablished, with a statutory duty to ensurethat at least 30 per cent of new members werewomen and that members of the reformedHouse were broadly representative of Britishsociety. It further recommended that theappointments commission should regularlyadjust the overall balance within the House ofLords of those members affiliated to politicalparties to match closely the distribution ofvotes at the most recent General Election.However, the Royal Commission did not agreeon the method for electing members andsuggested three options for the electedcomponent of the House of Lords:

• Model A 65 peers elected using acomplementary voting system, according tothe General Election results in the regions(approximately 12% of the total House).

• Model B 87 regional members electedby thirds at the time of the EuropeanParliament elections (approximately 16%of the total House).

• Model C 195 regional members directlyelected by thirds at the same time as eachEuropean Parliament election, to serve forthree terms (approximately 35% of the total).

House of Lords Appointments Commission3.33 Following the recommendations of theGovernment ’s 1999 White Paper21, the Houseof Lords Appointments Commission wasestablished on a non statutory basis in May2000 to assist with the transitional phase inreforming the House of Lords. The AppointmentsCommission is an independent non-departmentalpublic body, sponsored by the Cabinet Office.It recommends to Her Majesty The Queenpeople to be appointed on merit to the Houseof Lords as non party-political life peers. The


14

18 House of Lords Act 199919 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 453420 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 453421 Modernising Parliament - Reforming the House of Lords Cm. 4183

Appointments Commission also vets allnominations for membership of the House toensure that standards of propriety are upheld.

2001 and Onwards

The House of Lords – Completing the Reform,White Paper22 – November 20013.34 The 2001 Labour Party manifesto said:

“We are committed to completing House ofLords reform, including removal of the remaininghereditary peers, to make it more representativeand democratic, while maintaining the House ofCommons’ traditional primacy. We have givenour support to the report and conclusions ofthe Wakeham Commission, and we will seekto implement them in the most effective waypossible. Labour supports modernisation ofthe House of Lords procedures to improve itseffectiveness. We will put the independentAppointments Commission on a statutory footing.”

3.35 The Government’s White Paper of 2001,The House of Lords Completing the Reform(Cm. 5291), therefore set out its detailedresponse to the report of the Royal Commission.It strongly endorsed the Royal Commission’svision of the role and importance of the Houseof Lords and accepted the Royal Commission’sbroad framework for the composition ofthe House.

3.36 The White Paper proposed that theremaining 92 hereditary peers should be removedfrom the House and that the link between thepeerage and a seat in Parliament should bebroken. It supported the Royal Commission’srecommendation that an independent StatutoryAppointments Commission should be createdand that Government control over membershipof the House of Lords should cease.

3.37 It proposed that the House of Lordsshould consist of no more than 600 members,a majority of whom should be nominated bythe political parties and one fifth should beindependent of party affiliation. Elections

would take place for 120 seats to representthe nations and the regions (around 20% ofthe whole House) and seats would remain forthe Lords Spiritual and the Law Lords.It further recommended an increase in themembership of women and members ofethnic minority communities in the Lords.

3.38 However, the White Paper failed tocommand widespread support. In terms ofpublic response, 89% of the 906 respondentswho commented on composition wanted aHouse which was 50% or more elected (with45% calling for an all-elected House). TheHouse of Commons Public AdministrationSelect Committee (PASC), in their fifth reportof the 2001-2002 session, entitled “TheSecond Chamber – Continuing the Reform”23,recommended that a consensus could bebuilt around a ‘centre of gravity’ of about60% elected. Debates in Parliament focussedalso on those areas where the Governmentproposed to depart from the recommendationsof the Royal Commission. There was particularconcern about the powers of the AppointmentsCommission over political appointments,where the Government was proposing toreserve the final say over the identity of theseappointments to the parties, rather than theAppointments Commission. 75% of the 260public responses which commented on themethod of appointment also said that allappointments should be made via theAppointments Commission. Generally, therewas concern at the level of political patronageimplied by the proposals for both the electoralsystem (closed lists, and with re-electionallowed) and the appointments process.

3.39 In July 200224, following the reaction tothe White Paper proposals, the Governmentsecured the establishment of a Joint Committeeon House of Lords Reform under theChairmanship of Jack Cunningham MP (nowLord Cunningham of Felling), to consider andreport on options for the composition andpowers of the House.


15

22 House of Lords, Completing the Reform, A Government White Paper, 7 November 2001, Cm. 529123 Public Administration Select Committee, Fifth Report, The Second Chamber: Continuing the Reform, Session 2001-2002,

14 February 2002, HC 494-I24 Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform, House of Lords Reform: First Steps, Session 2002-2003, HL Paper 151, HC 1109

Free Vote 20033.40 The Joint Committee reported25 inDecember 2002, recommending seven optionsfor the composition of a reformed House.These ranged from a fully appointed to a fullyelected House as listed in table 1, 2 and 3below. Both Houses put the options to a freevote in February 2003.

3.41 In addition, an option of abolition wasmoved as an amendment in the Commons.

3.42 Members were asked to vote successivelyon each option. Contrary to the usual practice,even if one option secured a majority, theintention was that voting should continueon the remaining options, as the objectivewas to test the level of support for each. Inpractice, the Commons divided on five options(including abolition), and did not divide on80% appointed; 60% appointed or 50/50,all of which they rejected without a vote.The House of Lords voted on every option.

3.43 As the tables below indicate, no clearconsensus could be found. There was noendorsement of any of the options in theHouse of Commons. The House of Lordsvoted for a wholly appointed House.


16

25 Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform, House of Lords Reform: First Report, Session 2002-03, HL Paper 17, HC 171

Table 1: Options Recommended By The Joint Committee

Option 1 Fully appointed

Option 2 Fully elected

Option 3 80% appointed, 20% elected

Option 4 80% elected, 20% appointed


Option 6 60% elected, 40% appointed



17

Tab

le2:

Voti

ngFi

gur

esFr

om

The

Free

Vote

InT

heH

ous

eO

fC

om

mo

nsA

ndH

ous

eO

fLo

rds

On

The

Co

mp

osi

tio

nO

fT

heH

ous

eO

fLo

rds,

4Fe

bru

ary

2003

Am

end

men

tO

ptio

n1

Op

tion

2O

ptio

n3

Op

tion

4O

ptio

n5

Op

tion

6O

ptio

n7

(Ab

olit

ion)

(100

%(1

00%

(80%

(80%

(60%

(60%

(50:

50)

Ap

po

inte

d)

Ele

cted

)A

pp

oin

ted

)E

lect

ed)

Ap

po

inte

d)

Ele

cted

)

CO

MM

ON

S

For

172

245

272

281

253

Aga

inst

390

323

289

284

316

Maj

ority

for

orag

ains

t-

218

-78

-17

-3

-63

LOR

DS

For

335

106

3993

6091

84

Aga

inst

110

329

375

338

358

317

322

Maj

ority

for

orag

ains

t22

5-

223

-33

6-

245

-29

8-

226

-23

8

Tab

le3:

Bre

akd

ow

nO

fC

om

mo

nsVo

teB

yP

arty

Fro

mT

heFr

eeVo

teO

nT

heC

om

po

siti

on

Of

The

Ho

use

Of

Lord

s,4

Feb

ruar

y20

03

Lab

our

Maj

ori

tyC

ons

erva

tive

Maj

ori

tyLi

bD

emM

ajo

rity

Oth

erM

ajo

rity

Am

end

men

tA

bo

litio

nFo

r15

82

39

Aga

inst

184

2614

614

448

4512

3

Op

tion

110

0%Fo

r17

359

310

Ap

po

inte

dA

gain

st17

96

8728

4744

10

Op

tion

210

0%Fo

r15

759

4134

159

Ele

cted

Aga

inst

197

4079

207

6

Op

tion

480

%Fo

r15

173

4744

10E

lect

edA

gain

st19

544

752

311

1

Op

tion

660

%Fo

r15

250

4236

7E

lect

edA

gain

st19

947

9747

614

7

Consultation Paper – September 20033.44 Following the free vote, the Governmentpublished a Consultation Paper, ConstitutionalReform: Next Steps for the House of Lords26,setting out proposals to press forward withreform and responding to the reports of theJoint Committee on House of Lords Reform.

3.45 The Government proposed again toremove the remaining hereditary peers andcreate a Statutory Appointments Commission.It also recommended that peers should begiven the right to renounce their peerage andthat the rules for disqualification of peersshould be brought into line with those of MPs.

3.46 However, following a consultation exercise,the Government decided that the political andpublic appetite for a limited package of reformwas not sufficient, and in March 2004 theGovernment announced that it would notproceed with legislation in that Parliamentto enact the proposals put forward in theconsultation paper.


18

26 Government’s Consultation Paper, Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for the House of Lords, (CP 14/03)

4. Current Steps TowardsReform of the House ofLords

4.1 In its 2005 General Election manifesto27,the Labour Party committed itself to proceedingwith reform of the Lords:

“In our first term, we ended the absurdity ofa House of Lords dominated by hereditarypeers. Labour believes that a reformed UpperChamber must be effective, legitimate andmore representative without challenging theprimacy of the House of Commons.

Following a review conducted by a committeeof both Houses, we will seek agreement oncodifying the key conventions of the Lords,and developing alternative forms of scrutinythat complement rather than replicate those ofthe Commons; the review should also explorehow the upper chamber might offer a betterroute for public engagement in scrutiny andpolicy-making. We will legislate to placereasonable limits on the time Bills spend inthe second chamber – no longer than 60sitting days for most Bills.

As part of the process of modernisation,we will remove the remaining hereditary peersand allow a free vote on the composition ofthe House.”

4.2 On 5 May 2006 the Prime Ministerasked the Leader of the House of Commons,the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, supported by theDepartment for Constitutional Affairs, to takecharge of the issue.

The Joint Committee on Conventions

4.3 The Joint Committee on Conventionswas established on 22 May 2006, under theChairmanship of Lord Cunningham of Felling(who had also chaired the previous JointCommittee) with the following Terms ofReference:

“accepting the primacy of the House ofCommons, ... to consider the practicalityof codifying the key conventions on therelationship between the two Houses ofParliament which affect the considerationof legislation, in particular:

• the Salisbury-Addison convention thatthe Lords does not vote against measuresincluded in the governing party’s Manifesto;

• conventions on secondary legislation;

• the convention that Government businessin the Lords should be considered inreasonable time;

• conventions governing the exchange ofamendments to legislation between thetwo Houses”

4.4 The Joint Committee published its FirstSpecial Report28 on 25 May and receivedevidence from all three political partiesand others.

4.5 The Joint Committee’s final report29

was published on 3 November 2006. TheGovernment believes that the evidence thecommittee collected, both oral and written,provides a valuable source of informationon the origins, development and meaningof the various conventions which give life tothe relationship between the two Houses ofParliament. The Committee’s work will notonly inform the current debate, it will alsobe an important source for future reference.Both Houses have now debated the JointCommittee’s report, and passed resolutions inidentical terms approving it. The debate in theHouse of Lords was held on 16 January 2007,and the debate in the House of Commons on17 January 2007.

The House of Lords: Reform | 4. Current Steps Towards Reform of the House of Lords

19

27 Labour Party Manifesto 2005, Britain Forward Not Back28 Joint Committee on Conventions, First Special Report, 2005-06, HL Paper 189, HC 115129 Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament, Report of Session 2005-06, Volume I, HL Paper

265-I, II, HC Paper 1212-I, II

The Government Response to theJoint Committee on Conventions

4.6 The full Government response30 to theJoint Committee can be found in Conventionsof the UK Parliament, Cm. 6997. The Governmentagreed with all the recommendations of theJoint Committee, and accepts its view that ifthe House is reformed, the current relationshipbetween the two Houses, and the conventionsgoverning that relationship, will inevitably becalled into question.

4.7 The Government believes that the JointCommittee’s report is a most important pieceof work, and that it will serve as a guide toboth Houses on how the current conventionsbetween the two Houses should operate.Parliament’s approval of the Joint Committee’sreport is significant, setting out as it doesagreement by both Houses on how theconventions currently operate. It is an invaluablebaseline for the debate on the future of theHouse of Lords.

4.8 Much of the focus of the debates in thetwo Houses was on the question of the relativepowers of the two Chambers, and whetherthe conventions could survive a significantchange in composition. There was widespreadacceptance that it would be undesirable forthe powers of a reformed House to underminethe primacy of the House of Commons. Concernwas expressed that changes to the compositionof the second chamber might lead to thishappening, and there was much discussion inboth Houses about the Government’s view thatthe current conventions should be robust enoughto define the powers of a reformed House.

4.9 The Government accepts that changesto the composition of the Lords will call thecurrent conventions into question, and that,having brought forward these proposals forreform there will inevitably be debate abouthow the conventions might evolve.

4.10 The current conventions have helpeddeliver a House of Lords which is effective,and plays an important and valuable role in ourlegislative procedures. The Government believesthat reform of the House is necessary to ensurethat it continues to be effective and to make ita more legitimate chamber. The Government is

not alone in this belief – the two other mainpolitical parties committed to reform of theLords in their 2005 election manifestos.

4.11 The Government’s view is that the currentconventions are the right ones for a reformedHouse to work with, certainly early in its life.There are those who suggest that reform ofthe Lords, and in particular the introductionof an elected element, will lead to the Houseof Lords seeking power over issues such astaxation, and a challenge to the primacy of theCommons. The Government believes that ifthis were to happen it would undermine therole and purpose of the House of Lords, andlead to the loss of much of what is valuableand successful about the current House.Crucially, it would start to erode a vital facet ofthe successful operation of the House of Lords– that it can invite a Government to reconsiderits specific proposals without calling intoquestion its authority to govern.

4.12 Although the primacy of the Commonsis historically derived from its elected mandate,primacy no longer rests solely on this fact.Primacy is made real by the different functionsexercised by the two Houses, and theirdifferent roles. The Government cannot governwithout the support of the Commons, theCommons controls supply, and the Commonshas the final say on legislation – this is how theprimacy of the Commons is now expressed.

4.13 It is for Parliament to decide how it wantsthe House of Lords to operate, and work toensure that this happens. Parliament can decideto maintain the primacy of the Commons, anddecide, at the same time, to have an electedelement in a reformed House of Lords. TheGovernment hopes that a consensus can befound on what the role of the Lords should be,whatever form of composition is decided upon.

4.14 It is significant that all the recent majorreports on possible reform of the House ofLords (the Wakeham Commission, the PublicAdministration Select Committee report of2002, the previous Joint Committee on Houseof Lords Reform, and the 2005 cross-partyreport “Breaking the Deadlock”31) all advocatedchanges to the composition of the Lords, butargued that the role and powers of the House ofLords should remain broadly as they are now.


20

30 Government Response to the Joint Committee On Conventions’ Report of Session 2005-06: Conventions of the UKParliament Cm. 6997

31 Reforming the House of Lords: Breaking the Deadlock, The Constitution Unit, 2005

4.15 Whether the conventions will survivecompositional change is essentially a matterof judgement. That judgement will obviouslybe affected by the stance of the three mainpolitical parties and the views of those whoparticipate in the debates.

4.16 We make clear that we are proceedingon the basis that we would wish to see thecurrent conventions survive into a new House.

4.17 Once the debates on this White Paper andthe free votes have taken place, and in advanceof any legislation on reform of the House ofLords, the Government will look in furtherdetail at the issue of the adequacy of thecurrent conventions to ensure the primacy ofthe Commons in practice, to which all partiesare committed.

Free Vote on Composition of theHouse of Lords

4.18 The Government is committed to holdinga free vote on composition of the House ofLords in both Houses. This should providea clear decision on the way forward. Furtherdetails on the proposed voting arrangementsand options can be found at Annex B.

4.19 To ensure that both Houses are able toproduce a single winning option from the vote,it is proposed that both Houses be invited toconsider voting on seven options using analternative vote procedure.

4.20 It is important to make the distinctionthat the free vote is not an alternative vote ona legislative proposal. It will be an alternativevote designed to give the Government a clearview from Parliament on the form it wantslegislative proposals to take.


21

5. International Comparisons

The Role of a Second Chamber

5.1 The primary function of a secondchamber is the revision and scrutiny ofproposed legislation, in essence, to providea second opinion.

5.2 In order to secure the highest possiblequality of legislation, any constitution mustprovide this second opinion somewhere in itslegislative process. A second chamber is asuitable place to provide it, and it has additionaladvantages in terms of the other functionsit can perform. For example, to examine theeffectiveness of the executive through questionsand committees, to provide a forum for debate,and to be representative of different views andinterests from the primary chamber.

5.3 International examples have somerelevance to discussions of reform in theUnited Kingdom. While it is necessary to bearin mind the unique circumstances of eachcountry, international comparisons can forexample show the different powers thatsecond chambers have compared to firstchambers, and also help demonstrate thatthere is in many cases no link betweenpowers of a chamber and its composition.

5.4 Internationally, the functions of secondchambers can be broadly divided into thosewhich are relevant only to federal states, andthose of more general relevance. In manyfederal states, the role of the second chamberis to provide a voice at the centre for theindividual states or provinces. This is the case,for example, in the United States and Australia,whose systems give a strong voice to the states.It is also the case for example in Austria andCanada, though the voice of the provincesat the centre is weaker. However, even non-federal states can use the second chamberto represent local communities rather thanindividuals; this is the case, for example,with the French Sénat.

Bicameral and Unicameral Parliaments

5.5 There are two main reasons why countriestend to have one kind of Parliament rather thananother. Larger countries tend to require agreater range of views to be expressed withintheir Parliaments, and tend to have bicameralParliaments. As well as typically being smaller,unicameral countries also tend to useproportional voting systems more, ensuringa wider range of views in their legislativeprocedures (but with the associated drawbacksof more proportional electoral systems). Theyalso ensure that the function of a second lookat the first chamber’s proposals is built intotheir procedures.

5.6 The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s32 latestfigures show that of the 189 member countries,75 have bicameral Parliaments. On the whole,the larger countries have bicameral Parliamentsand the smaller countries tend to haveunicameral Parliaments. Of the 50 membercountries with a population in excess of 20million, 33 have bicameral Parliaments. Theseinclude India, the Russian Federation, the USA,Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Colombia,Brazil, South Africa, Germany, France, Italy andSpain, all of whom have populations in excessof 40 million. Conversely, of the 76 countrieswith populations below 5 million, 55 haveunicameral legislatures. Of the bicameral ones,7 are Caribbean islands which have inheritedtheir Parliamentary structures from the UnitedKingdom, and small bicameral nations aretypically those which have been subject toinfluence by either the Westminster or USmodels. Of the countries of Europe, the largestto have a unicameral Parliament are Greece,with 11 million inhabitants, and Portugal, with10.5 million. In population terms the UnitedKingdom is nearly six times the size of thosetwo countries.

5.7 Larger countries tend to have bicameralParliaments because they enable a diverserange of opinions to be voiced in the legislature.This is important in larger countries like theUnited Kingdom, and helps Parliamentsmaintain public confidence that the politicalprocess is representative of different interestsand viewpoints.

The House of Lords: Reform | 5. International Comparisons

22

32 Parliaments Across Frontiers: A Short History of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1975

5.8 With no second chamber to performscrutiny and revision functions, well-designedunicameral Parliaments build in other proceduresand mechanisms to ensure that proper scrutinyis provided somewhere in the legislative process,and often have voting systems which providefor a diversity of views to be represented in thesole chamber. For example, in New Zealand,which abolished its second chamber in 1950,a special select committee stage betweenfirst and second reading of a bill is specificallycharged with detailed scrutiny of legislativeproposals. There does however continue tobe debate in New Zealand about whether toreintroduce a second chamber. Many formerCommunist countries in the 1990s, such asPoland and the Czech Republic, establishedor revived bicameral Parliaments.

Powers and Composition

5.9 Both the powers and composition of asecond chamber should be determined by itsfunction. However, this does not mean thatthere is an automatic and necessary correlationbetween particular forms of composition andparticular powers, as can be seen from anumber of international examples.

5.10 On the face of it, one of the mostpowerful second chambers in the world isthe wholly appointed Canadian Senate. Whenthe Canadian Parliament was established, theSenate’s powers were based upon those of thepre-1911 House of Lords. Even today, Canadahas no equivalent of the Parliament Acts.There are only two restrictions on the Senate’snominal powers: financial legislation must beintroduced in the first chamber; and, althoughthe Senate may amend financial legislation, itcannot increase taxation.

5.11 The indirectly elected Irish Senate, bycomparison, has very few powers. It has 90days to consider ordinary legislation, but thefirst chamber can override any veto within 180days. The Senate can make recommendations(but not amendments) to financial legislationand these must be made within 21 days.

5.12 The same is true of the indirectly electedAustrian Bundesrat. Although Austria is afederal system, and the Bundesrat representsthe interests of the provinces in the federallegislative process, the Bundesrat has fewpowers. According to established practice,

Bills are usually introduced in the first chamber;and then the Bundesrat has 8 weeks toobject. However, except when Bills affect thecompetencies of the provinces or the powersof the Bundesrat, the first chamber canoverride any Bundesrat veto. In Germany, bycontrast, there is a broadly similar method ofelection, but many financial Bills and all Billsincluding details on administration (a stateprerogative) can be finally vetoed by theBundesrat (the German second chamber).Only for the other 40-50% of Bills can theveto be overridden by the first chamber.

5.13 The directly elected Japanese secondchamber, the Sangiin, has only 60 days to reviewlegislation, although Bills can be introduceddirectly into the Sangiin. A two-thirds majorityin the first chamber can override the secondchamber veto. The Sangiin only has 30 daysto consider financial legislation, which mustbe introduced into the first chamber, whichretains supremacy over legislation. The largelydirectly-elected Spanish Senate only has twomonths to consider legislation, which must beintroduced into the first chamber. The Senatemust have an absolute majority to introduceamendments, which can be overridden bythe first chamber. The first chamber can alsooverturn a Senate veto, either immediately withan absolute majority, or after a two months’delay with a simple majority. Similarly, thewholly directly elected Polish Senate has only30 days to consider legislation, which mustbe introduced in the first chamber. The firstchamber can always override the Senate veto.

5.14 In the majority of cases, the secondchamber has fewer powers than the firstchamber, regardless of its composition.The US Senate is not typical. It enjoysequal legislative power with the House ofRepresentatives including over tax and thebudget. In addition, all senior civil service andjudicial nominations, and all treaties, must beapproved by the Senate but not by the Houseof Representatives. One of the few other secondchambers in a Parliamentary democracy withequal powers to the first chamber is the ItalianSenate (which is elected, bar a very smallnumber of ex officio life members).

5.15 These examples demonstrate that manysecond chambers have special rules for dealingwith financial legislation, which generally givegreater authority to the first chamber than isthe case for other kinds of legislation.


23

5.16 In most bicameral Parliaments, only thefirst chamber has the power to call a vote ofconfidence in the Government of the day.This has the effect of enhancing the scrutinyfunction of the second chamber, as they areable to disagree with a Government on particularissues without calling into question their overallauthority to govern.

5.17 The one area where second chamberstypically have equal, or even greater powersto first chambers, is in relation to constitutionalamendments. This applies in a limited wayto the United Kingdom as well. The provisionof the Parliament Acts means that the Lordshas a veto over proposals to extend the lifeof a Parliament.

The United Kingdom – a BicameralParliament

5.18 There is a widely, though not universally,held view that in a country of the UnitedKingdom’s size and complexity, our Parliamentshould be bicameral. The case for a unicameralParliament in the United Kingdom was putduring the House of Commons debates whichpreceded the vote of February 2003, notablyby George Howarth MP33, who moved anamendment adding abolition to the optionson which a vote was taken. The amendmentwas defeated by 390 votes to 172.

5.19 Mr Howarth argued that there wereample examples of western democracieswhich worked perfectly well with unicameralParliaments. His main point, however, was thatif the motive for reform of the House of Lordswas concern about the effectiveness ofParliament generally, this would be muchbetter addressed by looking at reform of theHouse of Commons. He argued that anyreform of the House of Lords would posesignificant problems, of continued doubtfullegitimacy (in an appointed House) or as a rivalto the Commons (in an elected House) or leadto confusion and inconsistency (in a hybridHouse). Others who favoured the optionargued that not having the ‘backstop’ of theLords would itself encourage MPs to take theirfunction of scrutiny more seriously. Otherswere concerned that there was no ‘legitimate’option for reform of the Lords, by which theyusually meant elected, that would not pose a

threat to both the primacy of the Commonsand the special relationship between an MPand his or her constituents.

5.20 An effective House of Commons isplainly essential to an effective Parliament. Butit is not enough to ensure that Parliament fulfilsits proper role in the United Kingdom’s systemof government. Nor does the Governmentargue that the case for reform of the House ofLords is based upon perceived deficiencies inthe performance of the House of Commons.Speakers in the debate in February 2003referred to the example of unicameral countrieslike Sweden and New Zealand. Some referredto the example of the Scottish Parliament,which also works through an extensivenetwork of committees as part of its legislativeprocess. For countries of that size andcharacter, a unicameral system may work verywell. But it remains the case that the demandslaid upon the Parliament of a country the sizeand diversity of the United Kingdom would bea significant burden for a single Parliamentarychamber to carry on its own.

5.21 The variety and rigour of detailed scrutinythat the United Kingdom’s legislative proposalsdeserves is best delivered by the participationof those who are within Parliament but able totake a longer-term view on the issues broughtbefore them. The relative authority and thedifferent role of members of the House arematters to be addressed during the reformprocess, but not reasons for dispensing withthe second chamber altogether.


24

33 House of Commons Hansard, 4 February 2003, Vol. 399, Col. 166

6. A Reformed Chamber:Principles of Composition

6.1 The Government believes that thereare certain principles that should underpina reformed House of Lords, whatever itscomposition:

• Primacy of the House of Commons

• Complementarity of the House of Lords

• A More Legitimate House of Lords

• No Overall Majority for Any Party

• A Non Party-Political Element

• A More Representative House of Lords

• Continuity of Membership

Primacy of the House of Commons

6.2 The House of Commons has long beenestablished as the pre-eminent authority in theUnited Kingdom Parliamentary system. Theparty which secures a majority through aGeneral Election has the right to form aGovernment and, subject to sustaining theconfidence of the Commons, to carry throughthe programme set out in its election manifesto.Ministers are accountable to the House ofCommons through debates and votes. Evenduring formal coalition Governments, theHouse of Commons has continued to performits functions relating to the formation of aGovernment, enacting legislation and holdingMinisters to account.

6.3 The primacy of the Commons rests onthree clear factors. First, election of its membersas the direct representatives of the people hasmeant the House of Commons has always hadgreater democratic legitimacy than the Lords, afactor which has grown in importance with thegradual introduction of universal adult suffrage.

6.4 Second is the Commons’ power to grantor withhold supply (i.e. public expenditure),which has been asserted for over 300 years.This is the root of the Commons’ ability touphold or dismiss the Government. Withoutthe consent of the House of Commons theGovernment cannot function. Governmentexpenditure must be approved by those whohave the power not just to hold the Governmentto account, but to withdraw their support sothat the Government cannot govern. There isno case for giving the House of Lords thesame power to grant or withhold supply,because there must be a single route throughwhich the Government secures its authority togovern. Therefore, the House of Lords shouldhave less power over the Government. Andas discussed elsewhere, it is a strength of ourcurrent constitutional arrangements that theLords can ask the Government to reconsidera proposal without calling into question itsauthority to govern.

6.5 Third, the principle of the primacy of theCommons is enshrined in the Parliament Acts,which limit the power of the Lords to vetolegislative proposals, and contain specificprovisions relating to Bills which deal withnational taxation, public money or loans ortheir management It is a fact that in a disputebetween the two Houses on primary legislation,the Commons has the final say, albeit at thecost of delay. All major British political partiescontinue to support the principles of theParliament Acts.

6.6 It is a common feature of many otherbicameral legislatures for one House to haveprimacy over the other, and there does notseem to be any serious proposal that theprimacy of the Commons in the UnitedKingdom’s system should be challenged.

6.7 A reformed House should therefore notthreaten the principle of primacy. It must notbe a rival to the House of Commons. As theRoyal Commission chaired by Lord Wakehamemphasised, “The House of Commons, as theprincipal political forum, should have the finalsay in respect of all major public policy issues”and “it would be wrong to restore the fullybicameral nature of the pre-1911 Parliament”34.

The House of Lords: Reform | 6. A Reformed Chamber: Principles of Composition

25

34 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, January 2000, paragraph 4.7, pg. 33

Complementarity of the House of Lords

6.8 If a reformed House should not be a rivalto the House of Commons, neither should it bea replica. There is general agreement that theHouse of Lords’ role in revising and scrutinisinglegislation is best met by a chamber that is acomplement to the primary chamber. Althoughthere are examples of second chambers whicheffectively duplicate the functions of theirprimary chamber (e.g. the Italian Senate),much more often second chambers around theworld provide a complementary function. Thatcomplementarity is usually reflected in bothpowers and composition.

6.9 They may, in a federal state, provide fora voice for the constituent states in the centrallegislature (e.g. the US Senate). They may, inunitary states, provide for collective regionalor local representation at the centre (e.g. theFrench Sénat).

6.10 The House of Lords has traditionallyprovided a complementary function to theHouse of Commons through its composition;in the presence of a large contingent of nonparty-political members, and the fact thatits members sit as individuals rather thanrepresenting a constituency, and through itspowers and procedures. The United KingdomParliamentary system is therefore built aroundthe idea of a complementary second chamber.

6.11 The history of the development of ourParliamentary system shows that the UnitedKingdom has moved over time from aduplicatory system to the current complementarysystem. The Government believes thatParliament operates best with such a system.Therefore, a reformed House should continueto be different from the Commons andgenuinely complementary.

A More Legitimate House of Lords

6.12 Although the House of Lords is lesspowerful than the House of Commons, it isa fundamental part of the United KingdomParliament, and has an integral part to playin the creation of the laws that govern ourcountry – it is not powerless. However, theauthority of the Lords has been called intoquestion over the last century. Recent concern

over the allocation of seats in the House ofLords has once again brought this question tothe forefront of debate. Despite a recognitionthat the House is working, its unelected basismeans that, in many people’s eyes, it stilllacks the necessary legitimacy to carry outits current role.

6.13 The issue of legitimacy goes to theheart of the question of reform. In a moderndemocracy in the 21st century it is increasinglydifficult to justify a second chamber wherethere is no elected element. There is a strongcase that the electorate should have a say inwho is able to contribute to making the lawsthat govern it. A reformed House should bemore accountable to the people of the UnitedKingdom than the current House. This greaterdemocratic legitimacy would not just increaseconfidence in the second chamber, butstrengthen Parliament as a whole.

6.14 As ever, the United Kingdom’sconstitutional arrangements must be a carefulbalancing act. The ‘extent’ of the reformedHouse’s legitimacy needs to be balancedagainst the principles of primacy of theCommons and the complementarity of thesecond chamber outlined above. It is onthe combination of these three fundamentalprinciples that discussions about furtherreform of the Lords should be built.

6.15 If this is accepted, the following otherkey principles of composition should helpdeliver that.

No Overall Majority for Any Party

6.16 As shown in table 4 below35, the Houseof Lords currently includes approximately anequal number of Labour and Conservativemembers. The third group by number is thenon party-political members, and the fourth theLiberal Democrats. At 4 January 1999, 66% ofthe Lords taking a party whip were membersof the Conservative Party. Since the 1999reforms, no single party has been able tocommand a majority of the party-politicalmembers of the House of Lords. The largestparty, the Labour Party, holds 42% of theparty-political seats in the Lords. Overall, itmakes up approximately 29% of the House.


26

35 Source: House of Lords Information Office, excludes 14 Peers on Leave of Absence

6.17 This essential principle should remainin a reformed House. No single party shouldnormally be able to command an overall majorityof the political parties in the House of Lords.It may be that exceptional circumstances, suchas a union of two parties, or very high publicsupport over a long period of time for oneparty, could produce a House where a partyhas a majority over the other political parties.However, in the models discussed below,this is highly unlikely, and if at least 20% ofthe House is non party-political, public supportfor a party would have to be extraordinarilyhigh for a long period of time to give a party amajority of the whole House. The principle thatit should not normally be possible for a party tocommand a majority is crucial to maintainingthe House of Lords’ complementary role.

6.18 A balance between the parties wouldenable the House of Lords to continue to berelatively independent from the executive or anyone political party, creating a clear distinctionbetween the two Houses of Parliament. Itwould ensure that, within the House, the flowof work was generally negotiated, not imposed.The balance helps prevent any party, whetherGovernment or opposition, from dominating theHouse of Lords either by blocking legislationor acting as a rubber stamp of the Houseof Commons.

Non Party-Political Element

6.19 As a result of the manner of theirappointment, the powers of the Lords, andabove all their life term, the membership of theLords is able to encompass a very wide rangeof views. A good many serving members ofgreat distinction and expertise take a partywhip, and this should be welcomed. But oneof the distinct strengths of the current Houseof Lords is the presence of non party-politicalmembers. Their presence helps to focusdebates on the merits of the argument inquestion, and away from partisan politics.This distinct feature should be preservedin a reformed House.

6.20 As to the proportion of non party-politicalmembers to form part of the reformed House,the Wakeham Commission suggested thisshould be at least 20%, and the Governmentagrees. This would be a large enoughproportion to ensure, along with the otherproposals in this White Paper, that no singleparty could achieve an overall majority in theHouse, and encourage the political parties toensure they try to attract the support of thefuture non party members in presenting theirposition in debate.

6.21 This is not to suggest that the onlyreason for having the non party-politicalmembers is to block an overall majority. Thenon party-political peers currently play a veryimportant role in the House, both in committeework and debates. This contribution shouldcontinue in a reformed House.


27

Table 4: Analysis Of Composition In The House Of Lords: As At February 2007

Party Life Hereditary: Hereditary: Hereditary:* Bishops Total PercentagePeers Elected Elected Royal Office of Whole

by Party Office Holder HouseHolder

Conservative 157 38 9 0 0 204 28

Labour 207 2 2 0 0 211 29

Liberal Democrat 72 3 2 0 0 77 10

Crossbench 169 29 2 2 0 202 27

Bishops 0 0 0 0 26 26 4

Other 10 2 0 0 0 12 2

TOTAL 615 74 15 2 26 732 100

A More Representative House of Lords

Religious Representation6.22 It is important that faith communities arerepresented in the House of Lords. The Churchof England, as the established Church, enjoysa special status in social and political life inEngland and more widely around the UnitedKingdom. This has long been recognised evenby people who are not themselves Anglicans.Lords Spiritual have sat in the Lords sinceits inception. They are the only category ofmember whose term is limited to the holdingof their office. There have in the past beenarguments about the disestablishment of theChurch of England. There is little steam behindsuch arguments today, and, in any event, anyprofound change in the status of the Churchmust be in the first instance for the Churchitself. It is therefore right for there to continueto be special representation of the Church ofEngland in the reformed Lords.

6.23 Whilst recognising the quality of workLords Spiritual bring to the House, thereremains a strong case for a more flexibleapproach which would allow the Church todetermine, from among the Bishops, thosewho they consider would be able to make thebest contribution, rather than appointment onseniority. Assuming the overall size of the Housereduces, it would be difficult to justify retainingthe current number of 26 Lords Spiritual.

6.24 It is equally important that a reformedHouse of Lords reflects the wider religiousmake-up of the United Kingdom, though theformal nominated representation of particularfaith groups may not be possible. As theWakeham Commission pointed out “It is clearlynot possible to find a way in which all other faithcommunities could be formally representedon any kind of ex-officio basis. None of themhas a suitable representative body.”36.” TheGovernment will look carefully at how theviews of those of faith and those of none canbe represented in a reformed House of Lords.This will of course only be realistically possibleif there is a significant appointed element in areformed House.

Regional Representation6.25 Before the 1999 reforms, as theWakeham Commission indicated, membershipof the House of Lords was heavily biasedtowards the south-east of England and Scotlandin terms of the origin of its members.37 Althoughmore members have joined the House fromoutside these regions since then, the potentialfor this bias remains. A reformed House ofLords should be set up to ensure thatrepresentation of the nations and regions isinbuilt, serving the interests of the whole of theUnited Kingdom, no matter what method ofcomposition is chosen. Whilst members wouldnot represent the interests and views of anindividual constituency or assist with theproblems of individual constituents as MPsdo, their membership would as a whole berepresentative of the views held right acrossthe nations and regions of the United Kingdom.

A Diverse Membership6.26 It is vital that the diversity of interests andpeople are represented in a reformed House ofLords. One of the criticisms of Parliament as awhole, and of the Lords in particular, has beenthat it is not as representative as it could be ofcontemporary British society. Recent reforms –in particular the work of the House of LordsAppointments Commission – have made someprogress in this direction, but work still remainsto be done. The Government will look at how,under any system for choosing members ofthe House of Lords, the method of selectioncan best take account of the diversepopulation of the United Kingdom.

Continuity of Membership

6.27 One of the strengths of the current Houseof Lords is the continuity of its membership.Members serve for a long time, and newmembers make up a small proportion of theHouse. The Lords does not see the majorchanges in composition of the kind that theCommons experiences when there is a changeof Government.


28

36 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, paragraph 15.1537 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, paragraph 13.30

6.28 This is valuable for two reasons. First, thelength of service helps ensure that membersare able to take a long-term view of the issuesbefore them, looking beyond election cyclesand other relative short-term considerations.Second, it ensures that there is a great deal ofexperience of both the legislative process andthe work of the House which can readily bepassed on to new members when theybecome members of the House.

6.29 It seems desirable that a reformed Houseshould try, as far as is possible, to retain thiselement of continuity, even if the terms ofmembership are unlikely to be as long as theyare for current members.

6.30 Furthermore, if the Lords is to be whollyor partly elected, the terms of membershipshould be designed to maintain the currentindependence of the Lords. Long terms ofoffice will help deliver this, as should theprevention of re-election or re-appointment.This will ensure that members are free totake potentially unpopular positions on issueswithout having to consider whether theirstandpoint makes it more or less likely thatthey would be returned to the House eitherby their party or the electorate.


29

7. A Reformed Chamber:Elected, Appointed, or Hybrid?

7.1 The question of how individuals obtaina seat in the House of Lords is the most hotlydebated point in all discussions on Lordsreform. The method of composition decidedon for a reformed House must be able todeliver on the key principles outlined in theprevious chapter. Broadly speaking, there arethree main options, an all-appointed House,an all-elected House, or a hybrid of the two.

All-Appointed

7.2 A House made up of an all-appointedmembership has the advantage of being thesimplest way to ensure that the majority ofthe principles of composition set out aboveare met.

7.3 Appointment would mean that thecomposition of the Lords did not replicate theCommons at all. It would provide the maximumopportunity for those with sufficient experienceof the outside world to gain a seat, and it wouldhelp ensure that the House properly reflectsthe diverse population of the United Kingdom.

7.4 However, an all appointed House fails tomeet a crucial principle in a reformed chamber– that of legitimacy. It does little to meet theexpectation of many that in a modern Parliament,the second chamber should have a degreeof democratic legitimacy. Indeed, previousproposals for a fully or majority appointedHouse of Lords have been strongly criticised onthese grounds, claiming that such compositionwould diminish the credibility and authority ofthe House in Britain’s Parliamentary system.

All-Elected

7.5 Those who support a fully elected Housebelieve that this is the best option because itis the most democratic model for a reformedHouse of Lords. It is often suggested that thelimited, but still significant, power of the Lords toscrutinise, amend, and in some circumstances,delay legislation, should be justified by electoralauthority. A fully elected Lords could alsoensure that members were more obviouslyrepresentative of the nations and regions ofthe United Kingdom.

7.6 However, a fully elected House couldchallenge a number of the other principles ofcomposition set out in this paper. It is likelythat such a House would become moreovertly party political than the current House,which could well be detrimental to both itseffectiveness and to the respect in which it isheld. It is possible that such a House wouldfind it difficult to avoid challenging the primacyof the Commons, undermining the principle ofcomplementarity.

7.7 It would be very difficult in a fully electedHouse to ensure the desired degree ofrepresentation of non party-political members,because the political parties would be verylikely to dominate any election process.Depending on the election system chosen,there is an increased likelihood that a singleparty could come to dominate the House,risking turning it into either a permanent blockor a rubber stamp for the policies of theGovernment of the day.

7.8 Unless strict rules were in place aboutthe individuals who were allowed to stand forelection, it would be very hard to ensure thatthe principles of representation of the racialand gender mix of the United Kingdom, andthe representation of religious opinion, weremet. It would also be impossible, in a fullyelected House, to see how representation ofthe Church of England could continue.

7.9 Additionally, some models of a fully electedHouse could pose a risk to the principle ofcontinuity. The obvious way to ensure that theHouse is genuinely reflective of the politicalviews of the United Kingdom is to elect theentire membership at once. This risks exposingthe House of Lords to the kind of dramaticchanges in membership that can be experiencedby the Commons, and would mean the loss ofvaluable experience, expertise and continuity.Depending on when elections take place, italso risks creating a duplicate of the Commonsboth in terms of political balance, and in thebehaviour of members.

7.10 There are also strong arguments thatmembers should not be able to seek re-electionto help preserve independent judgement and toensure that they are not focussed on seeking asecond or third term. If this is accepted, thencombining this with re-election of the wholeHouse would mean the entire membership ofthe House changing at each election, whichseems highly undesirable.

The House of Lords: Reform | 7. A Reformed Chamber: Elected, Appointed or Hybrid?

30

7.11 If members of a fully elected Houseentered through staggered elections, ratherthan all at once, this would safeguard a degreeof continuity. However, staggered electionsinevitably mean that the balance of the partiesoverall would not be the same as at theprevious election, even if the relative votesfor each party were similar.

7.12 This would undermine the legitimacy ofa fully elected House (and the benefits to beexpected from it), because two-thirds of themembership would not be reflective of currentpolitical opinion in the country. It would,however, go some way to mitigating concernsthat a fully elected Lords would be a challengeto the Commons.

Hybrid

7.13 If a fully appointed House would lackthe legitimacy necessary to make it effective,and a fully elected House might not deliverthe necessary diversity of membership andsufficient presence of non-political members(as well as having other drawbacks), then theobvious alternative would seem to be a hybridof the two.

7.14 All major cross-party proposals broughtforward on Lords reform over the past 10 yearshave been for a hybrid House. Although theymay have disagreed on the ratio of elected toappointed members, the Wakeham Commission,the Public Administration Select Committee(PASC) Report of 2002, and the more recentcross-party proposals, “Reforming the Houseof Lords – Breaking the Deadlock”, all proposeda hybrid House in one form or another.

7.15 The Wakeham Commission proposed amajority appointed House with a significantelement of regional members. The Commissionfelt that a fully elected House would too readilybe a potential source of challenge to the primacyof the Commons, and would not enable thosewith wider experience and expertise to enterthe House easily; a fully appointed Housewould not allow the electorate any choice inthe membership of the Lords and would notallow for adequate regional representation.The Commission offered three options for theelected element, ranging from approximately12% to 35% of the House.

7.16 The report of the Wakeham Commissionstated that each of the three options on anelected element “has the support of differentmembers of the Commission. Model B [87regional members, elected at the same time asEuropean Parliament elections] has the supportof a substantial majority of the Commission.”38

7.17 The PASC report analysed all the mainoptions and concluded that a fully or majorityappointed House would lack legitimacy andtherefore authority, and a fully elected House:

“would leave little or no room for non-alignedpeople who are independent of party. Andthere is a fear that it could jeopardise someof the other principles set out above: that noparty should have an outright majority (whichcannot be precluded, even under proportionalvoting systems); that the House should be morediverse in a whole variety of ways (because thiswould be left to the hazards of party selection);and that the second chamber should includeexpertise and experience from people whosecareers have lain outside politics.”39

7.18 The Committee also argued in favour ofretaining an element of party-political appointments:

“We expect the parties to continue to nominatemembers of two kinds. First, former PrimeMinisters, Cabinet Ministers, party leaders andother senior MPs who want to continue to servein Parliament, but to retire from the House ofCommons. In future such figures would haveno routine expectation of a seat in the secondchamber, but would have to take their chancewithin their party’s quota. However, those whohave served with distinction in Parliament andGovernment can and should be able to make acontribution in the second chamber. We do notsubscribe to the denigration of party politiciansand believe that they may have a valuable roleto play in the reformed second chamber.Second, the parties will continue to nominateexperts similar to those who sit on the crossbenches, but who have a party affiliation. Notall experts are non-political: to take examplesfrom three recent appointments, Lord Winstonprofessor of gynaecology (Labour), Lord Wallaceof Saltaire, professor of international relations(Liberal Democrat), and Lord Norton of Louth,professor of Government (Conservative) are alldistinguished experts in their respective fieldswho take the party whip.”40


31

38 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, pg.12739 Public Administration Select Committee 5th Report Session 2001-2002, paragraph 8440 Public Administration Select Committee 5th Report Session 2001-2002, paragraph 131

7.19 The Committee came down in favour of apredominantly elected House, proposing a splitof 60% to 40%.

7.20 “Breaking the Deadlock” argued, for verysimilar reasons, that the House should bepredominantly elected:

“A mixed chamber allows the strengths ofboth the elected and appointed models tobe combined. It also helps ensure that whilstthe chamber gains legitimacy, it can neverchallenge the primacy of the fully electedHouse of Commons. We believe that thediversity that a mixed chamber can bringshould be celebrated.”41 The report arguedfor a 70% elected chamber.

7.21 In any model for a hybrid House,the appointed element, both non party andparty-political members (should there be any),would be appointed by the AppointmentsCommission (as discussed at Chapter 8).

7.22 One objection to a hybrid House isthat the differences in method of entry to theHouse would cause difficulties. It is arguedby some that two classes of member woulddevelop, with elected members claiming agreater degree of legitimacy, and thereforeauthority, than appointed members. How farthis is a likely risk is questionable. The currentHouse of Lords is, in some senses, a hybridHouse. The House has long contained differentcategories of members – life peers, LordsSpiritual (who leave on retirement as Bishops),and hereditary members. Indeed, this objectionignores one of the strengths of the House ofLords (and one the Government would want tomaintain in a reformed chamber) – the focus ofits membership on the work they are there todo as members of the House, irrespective ofhow they got there.

7.23 If elections and appointment rounds arestaggered, and appointments take account ofthe balance of support for the parties at themost recent General Election, then it would bedifficult for particular individuals to claim thatthey have greater legitimacy than others. Theywould be one part of an institution embodyinga number of different principles, all designedto deliver an effective second chamber ofParliament.

7.24 As to the correct proportion of electedand appointed members, the final decisionrests, of course, with Parliament. However,the model for a reformed House set out herefollows the PASC report’s suggestion that thereshould be a rough balance between electedand appointed members. Rather than the60/40 framework proposed by PASC however,it envisages a 50/50 split. As mentioned in theWakeham Report, systems of direct electionsometimes tend not to provide a gender-balanced representation, or adequaterepresentation for ethnic, religious and otherminorities. That being the case, the White Paperillustrates a model of a hybrid House which,as well as non party-political appointments,allows for some party appointment within aframework which encourages greater diversity,to help ensure that the membership of thepolitical parties within Parliament as a whole ismore diverse than it might be under a systemwhere the only party members of Parliamentwere elected.

7.25 A hybrid House of 50% elected, 50%appointed (20% non party-political and 30%party-political appointments) would allow forlegitimacy through direct election, greaterdiversity within the political parties in Parliament,and a significant element of non party-politicalmembership within the House of Lords.Models composed of a greater proportionof elected members would obviously includefewer party politically nominated members.A House with an 80/20 split, for example,would not contain any party politically appointedmembers at all.

7.26 If Parliament agrees that a hybrid Houseis the way forward, whatever proportion ofelected to appointed members is eventuallydecided on, then there are two questionswhich need to be addressed: how do peopleget elected, and how do people get appointed?


32

41 Reforming the House of Lords: Breaking the Deadlock, The Constitution Unit 2005, pg. 19

Electing Members – Indirect orDirect Election?

Indirect Election7.27 An indirect election system has beensuggested by some, on the grounds thatthis would give legitimacy to the Lords whileretaining some of the valuable aspects of anappointed system. Indirect election could also– it is argued – avoid any claims that the Lordshad a different, and possibly more legitimate,mandate than the Commons, and shouldtherefore have increased powers.

7.28 There is a range of options to deliver theidea within the overall heading of an indirectsystem, from electoral colleges made up ofthe main locally elected politicians and/ordevolved assemblies, to direct representationof vocational and interest groups in the secondchamber, and the so-called secondary mandate.

7.29 These options might offer a greaterdegree of democratic legitimacy than a fullyappointed House, but the complexity of thesystems, and the inevitable arguments aboutwho would comprise the electoral colleges,or which organisations would be representedin the House of Lords are often seen asdisadvantages to the proposals.

7.30 The simplest form of indirect election,which has been particularly suggested inthe context of House of Lords reform, is theso-called secondary mandate proposal, whereseats are allocated to nominated individualson the basis of the proportion of votes castat the General Election. Were it to be followed,it would probably be most appropriate on aregional basis.

7.31 Although very simple to operate, thesecondary mandate proposal has significantdisadvantages. The degree to which both it,and other indirect options, is more legitimatethan a fully appointed House is open toquestion. Some argue that an indirectly electedHouse, where the general electorate casts nospecific vote for its membership and has nosay over the individuals who subsequentlyenter the House, is an all-appointed House byanother name. The secondary mandate system

leaves power almost entirely in the hands ofthe parties and may not meet public concernsabout party control over who enters the House.It also counts votes cast for one purpose anduses them for a different purpose, which isunlikely to be regarded as satisfactory.

7.32 Such a system might also haveconsequences for voter behaviour at GeneralElections – acting as a distraction from themain purpose of electing MPs.

7.33 It can also be argued that the lack ofany clear and transparent link in any indirectsystem between voters and the Lords woulddo little to increase the perceived legitimacyof the Lords.

7.34 The Wakeham Commission discounted42

any form of indirect election from the devolvedinstitutions or United Kingdom MEPs to areformed House. However, one of the threepotential systems it put forward for electing itsproposed regional element was what it calleda ‘complementary system’, which was similarto the secondary mandate. Under this system,the votes cast for the parties’ general electioncandidates would be accumulated at regionallevel and the parties would secure a number ofregional members of each region proportionalto their share of the vote in that region.

Direct Election7.35 Direct election of individuals plainlywould confer more legitimacy than an indirectsystem. Many other second chambers aroundthe world use direct election as the method forselecting the whole or part of their membership,and it allows every voter in the country to havea say in who sits in the House of Lords.

7.36 If direct election is agreed as a principle,the next question is about the method ofelection to be deployed, and what constituenciesshould be used.

Direct Election – Electoral Method7.37 Direct elections to the Lords could eitherbe (a) first past the post, or (b) by one of themore proportional methods of election. Thereare two basic forms of the latter – list systems,or transferable or alternative vote systems.


33

42 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, January 2000, paragraph 30, pg. 7

First Past The Post7.38 This system of voting is strongly linkedto the idea of territorial representation, wherean individual would stand for election andrepresent individual constituencies, rather thansegments of opinion or political parties. Thecandidate who secured the most votes wouldbe elected to Parliament and the chamber (orthe elected element of it) would be comprisedof all the individual representatives from thedifferent constituencies.

7.39 The electorate is familiar with this methodof voting. It would be simple and straightforward,and people would clearly understand how thevoting would work. It also meets the legitimacyprinciple; voters would have a direct say inexactly which individual represented them inthe reformed House of Lords, as they do inrespect of the House of Commons.

7.40 It has also been argued that first pastthe post is better than list systems in allowingindependent candidates to stand and besuccessful. A number of elected independents,as well as the appointed non party-politicalmembers, might further enhance theindependent nature of the chamber.

7.41 The classic argument in support offirst past the post is that it generally deliversmajority Governments with a clear mandate,and that this benefit far outweighs the fact thatthe system is not proportionate. Supporters offirst past the post also argue that no system ofelection is able to translate a proportionality ofvotes into a proportionality of power, and thatfirst past the post does ensure that it istypically the largest minority of votes, not thesmallest minority, which is able to exercisepower, via a majority of seats. Although verystrong, these arguments are only relevant tothe chamber in Parliament which delivers theGovernment of the day. In the United Kingdom,that is the responsibility of the Commons. Asa scrutinising and revising chamber, the Lordsdoes not have any responsibility for deliveringa Government. The argument in favour ofusing first past the post to elect its memberstherefore is considerably weaker than it is inrespect of the Commons.

7.42 Those in favour of first past the postfor the House of Commons cite the clear linkbetween the member and the constituencyas key strength – people would know whichindividual represented their area in a reformedHouse of Lords. And the personal accountability

of that member would be transparent – peoplecould see what ‘their’ member was voting for,and against.

7.43 For elections to the Lords however, thisstrength could easily become a weakness,as it poses a potential threat to the primacyof the House of Commons. Not only wouldthe electoral mandate of the two Houses beidentical, but it would also create the greatestpotential for a rival focus to the constituencyMP. A constituent who was, for example,unhappy with their MP’s stance on an issuecould try and get their member of the Houseof Lords to help them, thus creating a rivalrybetween the MP and member of the Lords.Of course, such rivalry may exist betweenelected representatives covering the same areabut in different democratic bodies (e.g. in thedevolved legislatures, European Parliament,or local government) but rivalry within thesame Parliament could pose a problem ofquite a different order.

7.44 The importance of the current linkbetween constituent and MP in the Commonscannot be overstated. At present, everycitizen of the United Kingdom has a clearlyidentifiable point of contact for their issues andconcerns, and a direct link to the legislature ofthe country. They also know that their MP isexpected to represent their interests whetheror not they happened to vote for the MP.Another person who might try and carve out asimilar role would undermine the link betweenconstituent and MP, and erode the clarity of theconnection between citizen and Parliament,and the distinction in function between thetwo chambers.

7.45 Because of the way in which seats areallocated compared to proportions of votescast, if first past the post were applied to thesecond chamber it makes acute the risk of theLords becoming either a block or a rubber stampfor the policies of the Government of the day.A Government with a significant majority in theCommons could also have a large majority inthe Lords too (even if, say, 20% of the seatswere non political-party appointments). Thiswould undermine the desired complementaryrole of the House of Lords, making it a moreopenly party political House, in competitionwith the Commons. It could also make it muchmore difficult to deliver a situation where nosingle party can under normal circumstancesenjoy a majority in the Lords.


34

7.46 First past the post is criticised in somequarters for not delivering seats in proportionto votes cast. A variant could be to apply thealternative vote (where candidates are rankedin preference and votes are transferred untilone candidate achieves more than half of thevote), which would deliver a more proportionateresult within the individual constituencies. Itcan lead, however, to a less proportionate votenationally, with first and second choice votesbeing split between two parties, squeezing outthe first choice votes for the third.

7.47 Constituency size is a particularlyimportant factor when considering any systemof first past the post. If the same constituenciesare used as for MPs, the risk of a competingrole with the MP is heightened, and the sizeof the House increases beyond that proposed.If larger constituencies are used, then someof the advantages of first past the post (e.g.representativeness, connection with theconstituency) carry less weight.

Regional Lists7.48 In a regional list system voters areasked to choose between lists of candidatesproposed by the political parties, on a regionalbasis. Seats are then allocated to the partiesin accordance with their proportion of thevote. This is the system which Parliamentestablished in 1999 in respect of the EuropeanParliamentary elections. Lists can be run onopen or closed systems.

7.49 The advantage of the list system,whether open or closed, is that it produces aproportionate result, thus ensuring that moreshades of political opinion in an area arerepresented. It also reduces the personalinvolvement of the member in the “constituency”,thus reducing the risk of the representative(s)of a particular area becoming a rival focusto the MP.

7.50 It emphasises that all the elected membersrepresent the whole of the electoral area, and thiswider-range of interests also helps to mitigatethe risk of competition with the role of the MP.

7.51 In a closed list system, such as thatused for elections to the European Parliament,voters simply select from the choice of parties,and the parties’ ranking of the candidates isused to select the candidates who eventuallytake up a seat. Members who leave the Housewould be replaced by the next person on thelist from that region, as is the case for EuropeanParliament elections.

7.52 In a closed list system, the voter has aclear choice over the party for which they votebut no discretion over the identity of thoseelected. This gives a good deal of power to thepolitical parties, allowing them to select andrank their candidates. It has been argued thatthis compromises the accountability and theindependence of the candidates – dissentingvoices are unlikely to be highly ranked withina list.

7.53 Partially open list systems go some wayto overcoming the criticism levelled at closedlists by enabling the voter, if he or she wishes,to vote for an individual on the list, rather thanfor the party. The vote will still count towardsthe party’s total in determining the number ofseats to which it is entitled. Individuals on thelist, however, may collect sufficient votes toentitle them to a seat within their party’s quota,even if their original place on the list was toolow to qualify.

7.54 As with a closed list, a partially opensystem would ensure that the relationshipbetween the elected member and the electoralarea is qualitatively different from that betweenthe MP and his constituency. At the sametime, it would give electors the opportunityto express support for an individual on the list,and therefore help them to connect better withthe electoral process. It is more complicatedto understand than a straightforward closedlist system, and a method of election notpresently used for other elections in theUnited Kingdom.

Single Transferable Vote7.55 In a multi-member constituency, a SingleTransferable Vote (STV) system would rank all(or some) of the candidates in preferentialorder. Seats within each constituency wouldthen be allocated on the basis of a ranking ofthe proportion of votes cast for each candidate,with the least popular candidates dropping outof contention (and their votes transferring tothe voters’ alternative choices) until the seatsare filled.

7.56 The advantage of such a system is thatit produces a proportional result. It also allowsthe voter to nominate an individual, ratherthan a party, and thus it is claimed enhancesaccountability, and can give voters a feelingof ownership of at least one of the selectedmembers. It can also allow voters to spreadtheir votes among the parties and independentcandidates.


35

7.57 This is a complicated system to operate,primarily in terms of counting the votes. It isthe system of choice in some countries, e.g.Ireland, but it has been argued that such acomplex system discourages voters.

7.58 The fact that individuals, rather thanparties, have to campaign for votes may leadto individuals attempting to gain a higher publicprofile which could create a more political House.Individuals elected in this way may viewthemselves as having a more democraticmandate than in other systems, and could evenargue that they have more of a mandate thanMPs in the Commons, thus risking underminingthe relationship between the Houses.

Constituencies7.59 Because the existing Westminsterconstituencies would produce too large aHouse, and would risk competition betweenthe role of the MP and the role of the memberof the House of Lords, the only realistic optionsfor the constituencies for Lords elections areas follows :

(a) Those used for the European Parliament

(b) Cities and counties of the United Kingdom(the ‘top-up’ constituencies recommendedby the 1998 Report of the IndependentCommission on the Voting System43)

(c) Ad hoc groupings of Westminsterconstituencies

(a) European Parliament Constituencies7.60 European Parliament constituencies arecoterminous with the nations and regions ofthe United Kingdom, and use of them wouldtherefore emphasise the regional basis formembership of the House.

7.61 There is a political structure already inplace in these constituencies, and electionofficials are used to operating within them.They are also large enough to deliver aproportional result when electing in staggeredtranches of one-sixth of the whole House,within a total House of the size discussed laterin the paper and on the basis of a 50/50 model(see Chapter 9).

7.62 The size of the European constituencieswould also be large enough to diminish the riskof competition with the local MPs. However,some see their size as a disadvantage, arguingthat they are too large and not easily identifiable,and therefore, the regional link between votersand their elected representative in the Lordswould be almost non-existent. That said, thismay not be of crucial significance in the caseof a reformed House as it is not envisaged thatregional representatives will have the same roleor visibility at a local level as an MP.

7.63 Another potential disadvantage is thatconstituency sizes vary quite widely, with smallgeographical but densely populated areas, likeLondon, electing a higher number of membersthan, for example, a physically larger butsparsely populated region like the north-east.

(b) Cities and Counties of the United Kingdom7.64 The 1998 Report of the IndependentCommission on the Voting System (commonlyknown as the Jenkins Commission) suggestedthat for elections to the House of Commons,80 special constituencies could be createdto elect by alternative vote additional MPsas a top-up to the existing ones. Theseconstituencies were based on the cities andcounties of the United Kingdom, and there havebeen proposals to use these constituencies,or very similar ones, to elect representativesto the House of Lords.

7.65 The advantages are that theseconstituencies are readily identifiable forvoters, they have more meaning and are moreclearly linked to the area in which they livethan the European Parliament regions. Thiswould be particularly important if a first pastthe post electoral system were used, whereone of the main benefits is a clear connectionbetween constituent and representative.

7.66 The disadvantage is that, because of thenumber of constituencies, only a small numberof representatives could be elected at eachstaggered election. Without this, the size of theeventual House becomes too large. For example,on a 50/50 model, electing 3 members perconstituency per election means electing 240members per election, and over a 3 electioncycle this gives a House containing 720


36

43 The Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System Cm. 4090-I, Cm. 4090-II, 1998

elected members, with the possibility ofsome appointed members on top. Electingone or two members per constituency reducesthe proportionality of the result within theconstituency, and nationally, because only oneperson would represent the diverse range ofviews within an area.

7.67 The nature of these constituencies alsomakes it more likely that members will bedrawn into local constituency work, creatingcompetition between members and MPs.

7.68 Another drawback is that there would beno relevant political infrastructure to supportthese constituencies as there would be withthe European constituencies. This wouldincrease the cost of elections to the Lords.

(c) Ad hoc Groupings of WestminsterConstituencies7.69 A variation on the Jenkins Commissionconstituencies would be to devise new ones,of a size better suited to elections to theLords. Careful selection would enable theconstituencies to be the same size and returnthe same number of members, which may beseen to be fairer. Separating the constituenciesfrom those used in other elections will alsoemphasise the importance in their own rightof the elections to the House of Lords.

7.70 That said, these ad hoc groupings mightnot have any inherent identity and argumentsabout which areas should fall in whichconstituency could be complex. Voters wouldalso be less likely to know which constituencythey live in, and consequently, who theirrepresentative in the Lords was. As withthe criticisms levelled at the Europeanconstituencies, this is not necessarily amajor problem given that there is not intendedto be a constituency role.

7.71 Ad hoc groupings share similar problemswith the cities and counties of the UnitedKingdom, in terms of their lack of politicalinfrastructure.

7.72 For the system to allow a proportionalresult with only a proportion of members beingelected at any one time, the constituencieswould need to be quite large. In practice, theycould therefore end up as little different fromthe regions used for European Parliamentelections. It also seems unnecessary todesign new constituencies when appropriateones are already used for elections to theEuropean Parliament.

Timing of Elections7.73 There are several options for whenelections and appointments to a reformedHouse of Lords could be held. All of theoptions discussed here are predicated onthe idea that elections will be staggered,specifically, that a third of the elected elementwill be replaced at an election, and will sit for aterm of three elections. This is to help ensurethat the principle of continuity is not lost ifthere is an elected element in the Lords. Underthe 50% elected, 50% appointed model, thiswill mean that one-sixth of the whole Housewill be chosen at each election.

(a) At the Same Time as a General Election7.74 Holding elections to the House of Lordsat the same time as elections to the House ofCommons would be likely to give the highestturnout, thus enhancing the democraticaccountability of the reformed House.

7.75 It would also emphasise the nature ofthe House of Lords as an important part ofour Parliamentary system. Voters would beelecting their regional representatives to it,as well as electing their local MP and helpingto determine the party of Government.

7.76 Although some would argue that usingtwo different voting systems at the same timemay confuse voters, other combined electionsalready frequently require this.

7.77 The risk that Parliamentary terms underthis timing system would be uneven andslightly uncertain (particularly if two GeneralElections were held quite close together)can be mitigated by having minimum termsof a specific number of years to compensatefor any such circumstances, but thesearrangements would be complex, and notreadily understood. For example, the termof office could be until the dissolution ofthe Parliament in existence on the twelfthanniversary of the election to the reformedLords. This would give terms of between 12and up to just under 17 years, though inpractice the term would be likely to bebetween 12 and 15 years. There would alsoneed to be very detailed rules for determiningwhether elections to the reformed Lordsshould need to be held at all if a secondGeneral Election were held shortly after thefirst (as in 1964-66, and in 1974). It would alsobe inevitable that people would serve terms ofdiffering lengths under this system.


37

7.78 However, elections at the same timeas a General Election do not, unlike the otheroptions, demonstrate that elections to theLords are clearly different from the electionsthat deliver the Government.

(b) Alongside Elections to the EuropeanParliament7.79 The main advantage of elections atthe same time as elections to the EuropeanParliament is that the electoral cycle is fixedat 5 years, so it would be very straightforwardto set the length of a member’s term in areformed House at 15 years.

7.80 It would also be more straightforwardadministratively if the same regions andelectoral cycle were used for both Europeanand House of Lords elections, and it couldenhance the regional aspect of the elections.

7.81 Although turnout for European electionsis historically much lower than that for GeneralElections, the prospect of elections to the Houseof Lords could boost turnout, enhancing thecredibility of both elections.

7.82 It is likely that European elections wouldfall between General Elections, which creates adifficulty in respect of Parliamentary procedure.If elections to a reformed Lords fell withinsessions of Parliament, there is some risk thatvoting on individual pieces of legislation couldbe affected by the replacement of a third of themembership of the Lords part-way throughconsideration of legislation.

7.83 Similar arguments apply in respectof elections tied to those for the devolvedadministrations and to entirely freestandingelections, but these are not insurmountabledifficulties.

(c) Alongside Elections to the DevolvedAssemblies7.84 There are two advantages of holdingelections alongside elections to the devolvedassemblies. First, there is a regular electioncycle of four years, giving a fixed overallterm for members of the Lords. Secondly, thecoincidence of elections would help to bindthe devolved elections more closely into theUnited Kingdom electoral system, and wouldmean that the whole of the United Kingdom,not just parts of it, were all voting on thesame day.

7.85 The disadvantage is that there is atpresent no structure in England that is set upto hold major elections alongside elections tothe devolved assemblies, as there is for theEuropean Parliament elections.

7.86 Another drawback is that the electoratemay be unhappy if elections to the Lords usedifferent voting systems from those to thedevolved assemblies.

By-election7.87 There are different ways of replacingmembers of the Lords following resignation ordeath, but all are faced with the same difficulty.The term of office will be fixed, and entry andexit will only normally takes place at an electionor at an appointment round. Therefore anyentry or exit that takes place away froman election or appointment round causesdifficulties in deciding how long an individual’sterm should be.

7.88 All options for replacement have theirdrawbacks. Some proposals lead to variablesizes of cohorts of Lords entering the Houseat each election or appointment round. Some,such as not replacing members who leave theHouse, would require a very large House inorder to cope with the effect of membershipdeclining over time.

7.89 The simplest option, favoured by theGovernment, is to replace members as andwhen they leave (unless there was less than ayear of their term remaining) with the incomingmembers serving the remainder of the term ofthe person they replaced.

7.90 The drawback of this option is thatsome individuals will serve very short terms, ofperhaps as little as a year, with no prospect ofre-election. Although it might seem at first thatit would be difficult to find suitable candidatesto serve shorter terms, in practice there arelikely to be a good many people with thenecessary abilities who would like to serve inthe Lords, but would prefer not to serve for afull term.

7.91 The question of whether a by-election isnecessary will depend to a large extent on themethod of election chosen. If first past thepost is used, then a by-election will almostcertainly be required. List systems allow theoption of ‘promoting’ the next candidate willingto stand off the list of the party that won theseat. Under STV, it may well be that the next


38

most popular candidate is someone of adifferent party, but since no party will be in themajority in the Lords, this may not be a seriousconsideration.

7.92 Appointed members who leave theHouse could, of course, simply be replacedby another appointment.

Government Proposals: Elections7.93 The Government’s overall judgement isthat the most appropriate system of electionfor a reformed House of Lords is a partiallyopen regional list system – which is the mostconsistent with the principles set out inChapter 6. We will consider further the precisedetails of the list system to be used.

7.94 Under this kind of system, parties willwish to consider how they ensure that theirlists are representative of the diversity of theUnited Kingdom. The Government will consulton and consider whether there is a case formaking diversity a formal requirement for partylists., in respect of gender and/ or ethnicity,and/ or other factors.

7.95 In terms of constituency, the simplestapproach is to use the regions used forelections to the European Parliament.Constituencies which are smaller andencourage a more direct constituency rolecould undermine both the position of MPs,and the role of the member of the House ofLords in a reformed chamber.

7.96 Overall, the advantages of holdingelections to the Lords at the same time aselections to the European Parliament seem tooutweigh the disadvantages. It is proposedtherefore that elections should take place atthe same time as elections to the EuropeanParliament, giving a 15-year term for membersof a reformed House. This approach alsoproduces the simplest procedure for theelectorate, who would vote at the same time,in the same area, for both their Europeanrepresentatives and the Lords. It is likely thatparties would need to reach a minimumthreshold of votes before they could gain entryto the Lords. The Government will consultfurther on this point.

7.97 Both appointed and elected memberswould sit for 15 years, and there would beno prospect of re-election or re-appointment.One-third of the elected members and one-third of the appointed members of a reformedHouse would be replaced at each election.Members who had been elected could notsubsequently be appointed, nor could formerappointees be elected.


39

8. A Reformed Chamber:a Statutory AppointmentsCommission

8.1 There seems to be general agreement thatunder any system with appointed members,party and non party-political appointments wouldbe overseen and made by an independentStatutory Appointments Commission.

Pre 2000

8.2 Prior to the establishment of the currentAppointments Commission in 2000, thearrangements for appointing life peers weresomewhat haphazard. There was no systemof inviting widespread nominations and nosystematic machinery in place to identifyappropriate candidates. The Prime Ministerdecided nominations from his or her ownparty, sometimes creating peerages to enableindividuals to serve as Ministers. The PrimeMinister invited recommendations from otherparty leaders to fill vacancies on their ownbenches. Non party-political appointmentswere in the control of the Prime Minister andthe Political Honours Scrutiny Committeevetted all nominations for life peerages.

Current Appointments Commission

8.3 The House of Lords AppointmentsCommission, an independent, advisory,non-departmental public body, was establishedin May 2000 to assist with the transitionalphase in reforming the House of Lords, torecommend non party-political appointmentsand vet all nominations of individuals to sit inthe House of Lords. In February 2005, its remitwas extended to take on the functions of theHonours Scrutiny Committee to scrutinise forpropriety individuals added to the honours listsby the Prime Minister.

8.4 The Appointments Commission currentlyconsists of six members, including the Chairman.Three members represent the main politicalparties and ensure expert knowledge of theHouse of Lords, and the other members,including the Chairman, are independent ofGovernment and political parties. The currentmembers of the Appointments Commissionhave been invited by the Prime Minister tocontinue to serve, pending further discussionson the House of Lords. The posts are part-time, and the Cabinet Office provides thesecretariat to the Appointments Commission.

8.5 Under the current arrangements, thePrime Minister retains the power to decide theoverall number of new peers created and thebalance between the parties. The appointmentof party-political peers is a matter for thePrime Minister, in consultation with the otherparty leaders. The Appointments Commissionis responsible for vetting the nominationsbut does not assess the suitability of thosenominated by the political parties, whichis a matter for the parties themselves. TheAppointments Commission’s role is to advisethe Prime Minister of any concerns aboutpropriety and it is the Prime Minister who thenpasses on the nominations from other partiesto The Queen.

8.6 The responsibility for recommendingnon party-political appointments lies with theAppointments Commission. The Prime Ministerthen passes on these recommendations toThe Queen and will not intervene, except inthe most exceptional circumstances.

8.7 The Prime Minister has retained the powerto nominate direct to The Queen a limitednumber of distinguished public servants onretirement and has agreed that the number ofappointments under this arrangement will notexceed ten in any one Parliament. The PrimeMinister also makes direct nominations to theQueen in respect of ministerial appointments.

8.8 The Appointments Commission rolein vetting nominations does not extend toministerial appointments, the Law Lords orthe Lords Spiritual.

Performance of the CurrentAppointments Commission

8.9 As of May 2006, the AppointmentsCommission had appointed 36 individuals asnon party-political members to the House ofLords, making up almost a fifth of the totalnumber of non political-party members sittingin the House. Of these appointments, thereare 9 from minority ethnic groups and 2 withdisabilities. The Appointments Commissionhas appointed almost half of the femalemembers sitting on the Cross-Benches.

8.10 Some of the members appointed by theCommission sit on Lords’ committees. Manyhave made important contributions to discussionsin the House on key matters of public interest,reflecting their own experience and expertise.

The House of Lords: Reform | 8. A Reformed House: a Statutory Appointments Commission

40

Proposed Statutory AppointmentsCommission

8.11 The current system of appointmentcannot be retained in a reformed House. Theestablishment of the non-statutory AppointmentsCommission was a temporary measuredesigned to assist with the transitional phasein reforming the House of Lords. Under anysystem with an appointed element in a reformedHouse, an independent United Kingdom bodywould need to oversee future appointments,as the Wakeham Commission recommended.

8.12 The proposals for the AppointmentsCommission set out here are broadly based onthe Wakeham Commission’s proposals, whichenvisaged that the Appointments Commissionwould have the only role in appointments tothe reformed House:

“The Appointments Commission should becharged by the Crown with a general duty toappoint members to the second chamber andempowered to appoint individual members onits own authority.” (Recommendation 80).44

8.13 Whilst the Wakeham Commissionacknowledged that there was no direct parallelfor such a body in the United Kingdom orabroad, it argued that it was by no means anentirely new approach in the British constitution(Wakeham Commission report, paragraph13.8). It identified several bodies in the UnitedKingdom that already had responsibility forsensitive elements of the relationship betweenthe Government and Parliament – for example,the National Audit Office, the ParliamentaryCommissioner for Standards and, more recently,the Electoral Commission. All these independentbodies play an important role in ensuring thesmooth running of the Parliamentary system.

Legal Status

8.14 The role of the current AppointmentsCommission is limited to the appointment ofnon party-political appointments. Its only rolein relation to party political appointments isto check nominations for propriety. Whilst itwould be acceptable for the AppointmentsCommission to remain on a non-statutorybasis if its current role were to continue, itwould not be appropriate if its role were toincrease significantly.

8.15 As it is envisaged that the new StatutoryAppointments Commission would have powerover both non-party and party-politicalappointments, the parameters of those powerswould have to be laid down in statute. The bodyshould be established by primary legislation.The Statutory Appointments Commissionwould be independent of Government andshould be accountable to Parliament, ratherthan Ministers.

Membership of the StatutoryAppointments Commission

8.16 It is envisaged that the StatutoryAppointments Commission would consistof a total of 9 Commissioners to be formallyappointed by The Queen on the address ofboth Houses of Parliament. There would bethree members to represent the main politicalparties and the remaining six would beindependent of Government and the politicalparties. The Commissioners would serve fixedbut renewable terms of office.

Role of the Statutory AppointmentsCommission

8.17 The Statutory Appointments Commissionwould recommend people for appointment intwo different classes:

• Political-party appointments (wherenominations would be invited from theparties) and;

• Non party-political appointments (whereindividuals would be selected by theStatutory Appointments Commission).

8.18 It is envisaged that the principal functionsof the Statutory Appointments Commissionwould be:

• To establish the characteristics as tosuitability which members of the Houseof Lords should possess (and publishthese criteria).

• To ensure that these characteristics deliverhigh calibre appointees who make asignificant contribution to the work ofthe House of Lords.


41

44 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, pg.130

• To select all non party-political membersusing an open and transparent selectionprocedure.

8.19 Under the current arrangements, theAppointments Commission has no responsibilityfor ministerial appointments, the Law Lords,representatives of the Church of England andex-officio members. The Wakeham Commission,however, suggested that the AppointmentsCommission should be the only route into thereformed House although, in practice, theirview was that this would be a formality inregard to the regionally elected members,the Law Lords and the Lords Spiritual.

8.20 The current proposals envisage followingWakeham’s recommendations in this regard,with the exception of the Lords Spiritual andthe elected members of the reformed House,who would enter the House without goingthrough the Statutory Appointments Commission.It appears eccentric that those who have beenelected to seats in the House should haveto go through the Statutory AppointmentsCommission, even as a formality. However, theGovernment believes that where members ofthe legislature are not elected, it is importantthat the constitutional principle that the PrimeMinister should pass names to the Monarchshould be preserved. Therefore it is proposedthat the Prime Minister will receive a list ofnames for appointment from the StatutoryAppointments Commission, and pass this tothe Monarch without alteration.

Non Party-Political Members

8.21 The principle that 20% of the reformedHouse should be non party-political membersis discussed in Chapter 6. It is envisaged thatthe Statutory Appointments Commission wouldselect these non party-political members tobe recommended for appointment, with theexception of the Lords Spiritual. This wouldalso include the retired Justices of the SupremeCourt, although as the Wakeham Commissionsuggested, this will likely be a formality.

8.22 As with all public appointments, theStatutory Appointments Commission would beexpected to consider nominations on the basisof merit and would follow strict criteria.

8.23 There would be a duty on the StatutoryAppointments Commission to encouragenominations from a broad range of applicants

and the Government will look at howappointments to the reformed House couldbetter reflect the diverse makeup of theUnited Kingdom.

8.24 For example, the Government wouldwant to urge the Statutory AppointmentsCommission to set up its procedures andmethods of selection in a way that encouragesthe appointment of a widely representativeHouse of Lords. In looking at diversity, theStatutory Appointments Commission couldbe expected to consider matters such aseconomic and professional background,as well as issues like gender, ethnicity andregional roots. The Government does not atthis stage envisage any statutory provisionsin this respect. Nor does it expect that thoseappointed by the Statutory AppointmentsCommission should feel that they have beenappointed as ‘representatives’ of a particulargroup. Most people are likely to feel that theyhave multiple identities and interests, andappointed members in particular will be sittingas individuals with no mandate to act asrepresentatives. The intention is that the Houseof Lords, taken as a whole and taking all thequalities that each member brings to it, shouldbetter reflect the diverse make up of UnitedKingdom society.

8.25 It will clearly be important to assessthis aspect of the Statutory AppointmentsCommission’s work, and whether the requirementwas being adhered to in an appropriate way,over a reasonably long timescale.

Political Party Members

8.26 Political party appointees would onlyform part of a reformed House in a hybridmodel where the proportion of electedmembers was below 80%. In the event thatthe free vote resulted in support for an 80%elected chamber, there would then be no partypolitical appointees. This is because of theprinciple that 20% of the reformed Housewould have to be non party-political members.The following paragraphs illustrate how thisappointments procedure might work in practice.

8.27 It is envisaged that the StatutoryAppointments Commission would have to takeaccount of the balance of the parties at the lastGeneral Election and appoint party-politicalmembers in line with the proportion of votes cast.


42

8.28 So, for example, a party that polled20% of the vote at the General Election wouldreceive 20% of the party political seats. Basedon the model of a House of 540 members, witha third of the appointed members put in placeat each appointment round, this would meanthey received 11 out of the 54 party politicalappointed seats available in that round.

8.29 This is of course a version of thesecondary mandate proposal discussed above,but it does not make a direct link between thevotes cast and the overall composition of theLords, and therefore does not risk altering voterbehaviour. It is designed to ensure that theparty political appointments reflect the supportof the parties in the country at that time. This,combined with the elected members, helpsensure that while the composition of the Lordswould be different to the Commons, it wouldnevertheless have an element of similaritywith it, and would help reduce the risk ofa reformed Lords acting as a block to thedecisions of the Commons.

8.30 As the Wakeham Commission proposed,the parties would put forward recommendationsfor suitable members to the StatutoryAppointments Commission. In parallel to anydiversity considerations used by the StatutoryAppointments Commission, the political partiescould be required to take account of diversitycriteria in making their nominations. This wouldensure that the Statutory AppointmentsCommission had an adequate pool of nominationsfrom which to create the necessary balance ofnew nominations to the House.

8.31 It is proposed that the StatutoryAppointments Commission would perform amore extensive role in relation to the partymembers than it does now, and assess thesuitability of those put forward by the partiesagainst its published criteria. The StatutoryAppointments Commission would thereforehave the power to refuse to recommend aperson for appointment on more than simplygrounds of propriety.

8.32 The Statutory Appointments Commissioncould ask the political parties for a list ofcandidates, perhaps ranked in preferentialorder, which would include more candidatesthan there were spaces. Should the StatutoryAppointments Commission reject a candidate,it could refer to the next candidate on this list.It would be for the Statutory AppointmentsCommission to make the final selection interms of its published criteria.

Prime Minister’s Appointments

8.33 The Prime Minister is currently able tomake a small number of appointments directlyto the House, both of former public servantsand individuals to serve as Ministers. There isa question as to whether this practice shouldcontinue in a reformed House.

8.34 There is a case for retaining the currentarrangements and allowing the Prime Ministerto make Ministerial appointments and up to10 appointments of former public servantsper Parliament. The Statutory AppointmentsCommission would vet candidates for theHouse for suitability, and would be able toreject those they did not feel met the criteriafor appointment.

8.35 However, some argue that, beyondthe Prime Minister submitting the StatutoryAppointments Commission’s list of nomineesto the Monarch, and his or her role in selectingparty-political nominations as leader of theirparty, there should be no other role for thePrime Minister in appointments to the Lords.The Government agrees with this.

8.36 In this circumstance, Ministers couldonly be drawn from the already appointedand elected membership of the House. This isdiscussed further in Chapter 9. Distinguishedformer public servants and those that theGovernment felt would be suitable to beMinisters would be considered by the StatutoryAppointments Commission as part of its usualappointment round (with potential Ministersbeing part of the governing party’s allocationof appointed seats). Former such publicservants would be likely to rate highly againstthe Statutory Appointments Commission’sappointment criteria, as would individualsnominated to serve as Ministers, but thecurrent situation, where the holders of certainoffices are always offered a seat in the Lordson retirement, would end.


43

9. A Reformed Chamber:Membership

Size of the Chamber

9.1 Before the 1999 changes, the House ofLords had a membership of over 1000. TheHouse of Lords currently has a membershipconsisting of around 740 Members, 92 ofwhom are hereditaries. This is larger than theHouse of Commons which has 646 MPs andis one of the largest Parliamentary chambersin the world. It is highly unusual for a secondchamber to be larger than the first. However,not all members of the Lords attend on aregular basis. For instance, taking the 2005-2006 session, the average attendance wasaround 408, which better reflects the ‘working’size of the House of Lords.

9.2 It would be practical and, in our view,desirable for the size of a reformed House tobe reduced from its current membership, and itshould be smaller than the House of Commonsto reflect its status as the second chamber. Thisin turn suggests that a form of remunerationmight be needed to ensure that a higherproportion of members attend regularly thancurrent attendance figures show.

9.3 There is no precise science for determiningthe exact size of the House but it must belarge enough to allow for the right proportionof non party-political members for the Houseto be effective, but in its final form not largerthan the House of Commons.

9.4 Suggestions for the size of a reformedHouse have ranged from 350 members in thePASC report and in “Breaking the Deadlock”,to the 550 mark suggested by the WakehamCommission.

9.5 The Government believes that a Houseof 540 members, near Wakeham’s suggestion,is a realistic target and an appropriate size.Given the lengthy transitional arrangementswe are proposing (see Chapter 10) it is likely tobe the middle of the century before the Housereduces to the desired size. A House of 540members on a 50/50 model would see 90elected members being replaced at eachelection, and 84 appointed members beingreplaced in each round of appointments(36 non party-political, and 54 party-politicalappointments). Lords Spiritual would counttowards the appointed total (which is whythe number of appointed members at eachelection is lower than the number of electedmembers), but would be appointed on differentterms to the remainder of the House.

9.6 Based on the percentages of votescast at the last three General Elections,and assuming a House of 50% elected, 30%party-political appointments, and 20% nonparty-political appointments, Table 5 belowshows the possible makeup of the Housein numerical and percentage terms45. Notethat this is an estimate of the “steady state”composition of the Lords under the proposednew arrangements, once any effects of thetransition mechanism have dissipated.

The House of Lords: Reform | 9. A Reformed Chamber: Membership

44

45 Proportion based on parties average share of the vote in all General Elections since 197046 In the tables ‘other’ refers to those members currently described as such by the Lords Information Office, and to minor parties

Table 5: Possible makeup of the Lords in numerical and percentage terms46

Group Number of Seats Percentage share Percentage of all of Party-Political Seats

Seats

Conservative 159 37 29

Labour 166 38 31

Liberal Democrat 78 18 15

Other 29 7 5

Non party-political 108 n/a 20

Minimum age limit

9.7 Traditionally membership of the Houseof Lords has consisted of individuals who havemade a significant contribution to the role oftheir chosen profession and to society. Thoseindividuals tend to be older, having worked forthe majority of their career in their chosen field.It is important that in a reformed House of Lordsthe experience of fields other than politics isretained to achieve a broadly representativemembership. Whether or not this would beachieved by introducing a minimum age limitis debatable.

9.8 The Wakeham Report highlighted thatmany overseas second chambers, includingthe USA, Canada, France and India, have aminimum age requirement higher than that setfor the lower House. However the report didnot suggest that a minimum age should beintroduced for a reformed House of Lords,suggesting instead that the appointmentscommission should ensure that thosenominated had the requisite experience andexpertise to make an effective contributionto the work of the House. The Governmentagrees that this is the most sensible wayforward, and that the minimum age to enterthe House of Lords should be the same asfor the House of Commons (currently 18).

Payment and Resourcing of Members

9.9 Currently the expenses of membersattending the House are reimbursed up to certainmaxima per sitting day as detailed in Table 6.

9.10 A new system of remuneration for membersof a reformed House should be considered. Thequestion of levels of remuneration is properlyone that should be subject to considerationand recommendation by the Review Body onSenior Salaries (SSRB) once the final shape ofthe reforms has been decided.

9.11 However, recommendations 119-124and recommendation 126 of the WakehamCommission47 are likely to be the guidingprinciples for any changes to the remunerationof members of the Lords.

• “Recommendation 119: The financialarrangements which apply to members ofthe second chamber should make regularattendance economically viable for peoplewho live outside the South East of Englandand who do not have a separate source ofincome. (Paragraph 17.7.)

• Recommendation 120: Payment should bemade for the time members of the secondchamber devote to their Parliamentaryduties. (Paragraph 17.9.)

• Recommendation 121: Financial supportfor members of the reformed secondchamber should be related to attendancein Parliament. (Paragraph 17.10.)

• Recommendation 122: Total paymentsmade to members for time and lost incomeshould be less than the basic salary of an MPover an average session. (Paragraph 17.11.)

• Recommendation 123: Chairmen ofsignificant Committees of the secondchamber should receive a salary in respectof their additional duties. (Paragraph 17.12.)

• Recommendation 124: The SSRB shouldconsider the issue of severance paymentsand pension arrangements for membersof the reformed second chamber.(Paragraph 17.13.)

• Recommendation 126: The SSRB shouldreview the rules governing the paymentof expenses incurred in respect of traveland overnight costs by members of thesecond chamber in the course of theirParliamentary duties with a view to ensuringthat regular attendance is economicallyviable for people who live outside London.(Paragraph 17.17.)”

9.12 It will also be important that any newarrangements are flexible enough to allowmembers to attend the House on a full or parttime basis.


45

47 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm. 4534, January 2000, pg. 193

Table 6: Allowance Provided To MembersAttending The House

Overnight accommodation £159.50

Day subsistence £79.50

Office cost £69.00

9.13 The Wakeham Commission recommendedthat resources should be provided for additionaloffice resources for Members of a reformedLords. This is properly a matter for Parliamentto consider. However, any future discussions onthis particular aspect of resourcing will need totake into account the threat to complementaritywhich could result from a package whichencouraged individuals to start working on aconstituency basis, and which might distractmembers’ attention from the work in the Houseand its Committees.

9.14 Consideration will have to be given towhether the existing members of the Lords couldand should remain on the existing arrangementsor transferred onto any new ones. TheGovernment will give careful considerationas to whether a retirement package could beprovided for existing members who wish toleave the House of Lords.

9.15 The Government believes that theremay be a case for additional remuneration forleaders of the opposition parties in Lords, inaddition to that already provided, and for theConvenor of the Cross-Bench peers, both inrecognition of their hard work, and to make iteasier for them to attend as often as possible.The Government will consider asking the ReviewBody on Senior Salaries to look at these postsin any review of remuneration in the Lords.

Ministers in the Lords

9.16 Two questions arise over the position ofMinisters in the House of Lords. First, shouldthere be any? Secondly, if so, how should theyget there, and should they have special termsof membership?

9.17 It has been suggested that there should beno Government Ministers in a reformed House.This would further underline the distinctionbetween the Commons, which gives aGovernment the authority and resources togovern and the Lords, which scrutinises andrevises legislation and policy proposals.

9.18 If there were no Ministers in the Lords,arrangements could be put in place to allowCommons Ministers to appear in the Lords toanswer questions on Government policy andlegislation, so that the role of the Lords inhelping to hold Government to account isnot diminished.

9.19 However, the Government proposes tomaintain the current place of Ministers in theHouse of Lords, where they play a valuablerole. As well as more easily allowing the Lordsto hold the Government to account, andimproving the Lords’ understanding of theposition of the Government, it also enhancesthe Lords’ role in scrutinising legislation,because Ministers and Whips in the Lords helptake legislation through. It also means that theGovernment has a better understanding of theconcerns of the Lords because Ministersspend time there.

9.20 Ministers would be drawn from theelected and appointed members of the partyof Government. In a House with a very highproportion of elected members, there is apossibility, albeit extremely slim, that theparty of Government might not have enoughmembers of the Lords from which to drawMinisters. The question of how Ministers enterthe Lords may therefore need to be returnedto if Parliament decides upon a very highproportion of elected members for a reformedHouse of Lords.

9.21 In making nominations for appointment,as noted by the Wakeham Report, it is likelythat anyone nominated because they werefelt suitable to serve as Ministers would easilymeet the nomination criteria. It would bevery unusual for a Statutory AppointmentsCommission to reject someone who wasnominated to serve as a member of theGovernment.

Law Lords and Retired Justices of theSupreme Court

9.22 With the creation of the Supreme Court in2009 to take over the appellate jurisdiction ofthe House of Lords, judges will no longer needto be members of the second chamber inorder to be members of the United Kingdom’shighest court. Indeed the ConstitutionalReform Act 2005 will prevent any Justice ofthe Supreme Court and other holders ofjudicial office from sitting and voting in theHouse of Lords while they hold office.

9.23 There is, however, no doubt that retiredLaw Lords make a very valuable contributionto the work of the current House of Lords, andthe non party-political peers have 19 retiredLaw Lords in their ranks.


46

9.24 Offering every retiring Justice of theSupreme Court a seat in the House of Lordswould ensure the continuity of the kind ofcontribution brought by the current retired LawLords. The value of the expertise brought tothe work of the House by the retired Law Lordswould justify the offer of a seat in the reformedHouse to retiring Justices. They would becomepart of the non party-political cohort of thereformed House, and would be appointedby the Statutory Appointments Commissionat the next appointment round followingtheir retirement.

9.25 It must also be remembered that thepeerage, and a seat in the House of Lords,will be separate things in a reformed House.The question of whether all Justices of theSupreme Court should be offered an automaticpeerage either on appointment or retirement istherefore separate from the question of a seatin the Lords, but will also be considered aspart of the question of Lords reform.

Lords Spiritual

9.26 At present, the Church of England isrepresented in the House of Lords by theArchbishops of Canterbury and York, theBishops of London, Durham and Winchesterand the 21 Bishops next in seniority in order ofappointment to a diocesan see (a Bishop whochanges diocese keeps his seat in the Lordsonce he has entered it). This arrangementdates back to 1878, when it was agreedthat the need to increase the number ofChurch of England dioceses should not leadautomatically each time to an increase in theirrepresentation in the House of Lords. Whenthe 1878 Act was passed, there were fourqualifying Welsh Bishoprics. When the Churchin Wales was disestablished, there were nochanges in the number of seats allocated tothe Lords Spiritual; instead, any seats thenoccupied by Welsh Bishops were re-allocatedto the next qualifying English Bishops.

9.27 The Government has always recognisedthat the nature of diocesan Bishops’ workmeans that it is very difficult for many of themto attend the House of Lords with regularityand therefore that their overall representationneeds to be higher than would otherwise beappropriate. However, a smaller number than26 would still deliver this. Much of the work in

the House is already done by a smaller coreteam of Bishops. For example, of the LordsSpiritual between April 2005 and March 2006,11 attended more than 25 times (out of apossible total of 134). 12 attended fewerthan 20 times. 42% of the total number ofattendances was accounted for by just 5 ofthe Bishops and the top 16 Bishops accountedfor 89% of total attendances.

9.28 In the light of these figures, and takinginto the account the reduction in the overallsize of the House, the Government believesthat the Church could continue to be wellrepresented with fewer Bishops. It proposesreducing their number in discussion with theChurch of England.

9.29 However, given that it would then bemore important that those who were membersof the House were those who were best ableto contribute, the Government sees a strongcase for the Church of England to have thelegal flexibility to decide itself which Bishopsshould sit in the House, rather than this beingdetermined on seniority.

Resignation

9.30 Members of the House of Lords shouldbe able to relinquish their membership, shouldthey wish to do so, irrespective of how theyarrived in the House. This could be for anumber of reasons, including ill health. It wouldalso help address the current anomaly underwhich members cannot become MEPs, arisingfrom the rules preventing an existing memberof a domestic legislature from pursuing acareer with the European Parliament at thesame time.

9.31 No grounds should be required for amember to resign. It should be a formal butstraightforward process.

Leave of Absence

9.32 The Government believes that ifresignation provisions are introduced, togetherwith a remuneration package based onattendance, then there is little case forcontinuing the present arrangements throughwhich peers can seek leave of absencefrom the House, and that the system shouldbe abolished.


47

Restriction on Former Members ofthe Lords Standing as MPs

9.33 To ensure that the complementary role ofthe House is enhanced it is important that anindividual should not use his or her membershipof the Lords to build a political base for a careerin the House of Commons. The intention wouldbe that the House of Lords should attract thosewho have wider interests outside politics,including among the members representingpolitical parties. To counteract the possibility ofmembers using the House of Lords to build apolitical base, members who have held a seatin the House of Lords could be prevented fromseeking election to the House of Commonsfor a certain period of time after their Lords’term expired.

9.34 It would remain open to former membersof the Lords to seek election to other politicalbodies, or to serve in politics in anothercapacity, but a gap between service in thetwo Houses of Parliament is important inmaintaining good relations between them,and in ensuring that members of the House ofLords are dedicated to the work of the House.

9.35 Both the Wakeham Commission andPASC proposed a waiting period of ten years.“Breaking the Deadlock” proposed a periodof five years, and the Government is mindedto agree with this, and that the period shouldbe calculated from the moment when themember’s term was due to expire, whetherthe member served the full term or resignedbeforehand.

Breaking the Link with the Peerage

9.36 If, in a reformed House of Lords,members (whether appointed or elected) wereto serve for a fixed number of years rather thanfor life, it would seem odd for those individualsto be given a lifetime honour simply to enablethem to do a job for a fixed period of time.The automatic link between the peerage andmembership of the House of Lords shouldtherefore come to an end. The peerage wouldcontinue as an honour but unconnected with aseat in Parliament, though it is highly probablethat many people of distinction holding a seatin the reformed Lords would receive this honour.

Franchise

9.37 Current rules prevent a member ofthe House of Lords (which includes all lifepeers) from voting in a General Election.This prohibition would no longer make senseif all peers did not automatically qualify formembership of the Lords. Therefore allmembers of the peerage and members of thereformed House of Lords (whether membersof the peerage or not) should be allowed tovote in all elections, and members of eitherHouse would not be prohibited from votingin elections to the other House. Allowingmembers of the peerage outside the Houseto vote would also address the anomaly wherethe current Law Lords, who will eventuallytransfer to the Supreme Court, will not beable to vote in General Elections becauseof their peerages.

9.38 Hereditary peers outside the House canalready vote.

Disqualification

9.39 MPs who are convicted of a criminaloffence and sentenced to more than 12 monthsimprisonment are disqualified from the Houseof Commons, and their seat is automaticallydeclared vacant (ex-MPs in these circumstanceswishing to return to the House would need toseek re-election). Current rules however, allowa member of the House of Lords in the samecircumstances to resume their seat immediatelyupon release from prison.

9.40 To address this anomaly provisions couldbe brought in to bring the disqualification ofmembers of the House of Lords into line withthose of the House of Commons. Arrangementscould be brought in as for the House ofCommons in relation to members who aresubject to a bankruptcy restriction order (BRO)or detained under the Mental Health Acts.Members currently cannot sit and vote in thosecircumstances but are free to return to theHouse immediately the condition is lifted. Itwould be more consistent to bring all theseprovisions in line with the Commons so thatthe member will lose his or her seat, ratherthan simply being disqualified for sittingand voting.


48

9.41 There may be an argument for having aminimum sitting requirement which membershave to fulfil, and the Government will listen tosuggestions, particularly from the House ofLords, on this issue.

Name of Reformed Chamber

9.42 For the time being, the future Houseof Lords will be referred to as the ‘reformedchamber’ but we will consult on the namein the lead up to legislation. Decisions onthe name will partly depend on what finaldecisions Parliament reaches on composition.This was the approach adopted by theWakeham Commission.


49

10. A Reformed Chamber:Transition

10.1 Although there is a range of differentoptions for managing the transition to areformed House, the Government believesthat a long transitional period, where newmembers are introduced but none of thecurrent members of the Lords are forcedto leave, is the best way forward.

10.2 The current members have entered theHouse in the expectation that they will stay forlife. Some will have given up careers and otherroles to do so. It would be unfair to requirethem to leave in these circumstances.

10.3 A long transition period also helpsensure the continuity of the work of the Lords,blending the experience of the currentmembership with the qualities that newmembers would bring to the House.

10.4 The United Kingdom also has a history ofgradual change, with institutions and practicesadapting over time to changes in circumstances,and a long transition is in keeping with thistradition. It will allow the House of Lords,and Parliament as a whole, to adapt to thereform over time, moulding their proceduresand traditions onto the new shape of thelegislative process.

10.5 Critics will argue that the transitionalperiod, which could last into the middle of thecentury, is too long. However, if the changesargued for in this paper are the right ones, thenthey are likely to last well beyond this relativelyshort period of change. As stated in theintroduction, any change must be gradual orreform will not take place at all. We must learnfrom the lessons of previous efforts to reformthe Lords. Of course, once reform has beddeddown, it will be up to Parliament in the futureto decide whether the proportion of the electedto appointed members settled on after the freevote continues to be the right one.

10.6 It is also important to remember that thetransition period is not a period until reformstarts and the first new members arrive, it is aperiod until the House is constituted only ofmembers who have entered under the newarrangements.

10.7 Tables 7 and 8 below show what theHouse could look like. As can be seen, as newmembers are introduced, the size of the Housestarts to increase, and then fall away again inline with the decline in number of the currentmembership.

10.8 The modelling work for the transitionalperiod is based on the eventual total size ofthe House being 540 (108 non-party, 432party) with 50% elected, 30% party appointed,20% non party-political appointed. Previouspost-war General Election results have beenused to generate estimates of the strength ofthe parties in the House.

10.9 The modelling is based on Europeanelection dates, where the first election date is2014, the second 2019, the third 2024, and soon every five years. The decline in the size ofthe current House (including the hereditarypeers) has been mapped onto these dates,and the appropriate number of elected andappointed party members added in. Themodelling assumes that 36 non party-politicalmembers will be appointed when an electionto the Lords takes place. It also assumes that20% of the existing House will resign or retire.

10.10 It is important to remember that thesefigures represent all members eligible to sit.Attendance in the chamber may be lower.Under this model the maximum size of theHouse during the transition period is 751.Although this is still lower than the numberof members eligible to sit before the 1999reforms (which was well over a thousand) thiscould still create difficulties in terms of officespace for that many active members. However,this will not arise as a question for some years,so there will be time for the House to decidewhat approach it wishes to take to this issue.

The House of Lords: Reform | 10. A Reformed Chamber: Transition

50


51

Tab

le7:

Ove

rall

Mem

ber

ship

Pro

ject

ednu

mb

erre

tired

,res

igne

do

rd

ecea

sed

2006

by

2014

2014

2019

2024

2029

2034

2039

Exi

stin

gH

ous

eo

fLo

rds

mem

ber

s(a

tD

ec20

06)

Con

serv

ativ

e20

489

115

8356

3520

10La

bou

r21

181

130

101

7247

2714

Lib

eral

Dem

ocra

t77

2948

3828

1912

7C

ross

ben

ch20

298

104

7449

3017

9O

ther

122

108

64

21

Bis

hop

s26

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Tota

l73

240

730

421

113

578

41N

ewH

ous

eo

fLo

rds

mem

ber

sC

onse

rvat

ive

5310

615

915

915

915

9La

bou

r55

111

166

166

166

166

Lib

eral

Dem

ocra

t26

5278

7878

78C

ross

ben

ch36

7210

810

810

810

8O

ther

1019

2929

2929

Tota

l18

036

054

054

054

054

0C

om

bin

edto

tal

Con

serv

ativ

e20

416

818

921

519

417

916

9La

bou

r21

118

521

223

821

319

318

0Li

ber

alD

emoc

rat

7774

9010

697

9085

Cro

ssb

ench

202

140

146

157

138

125

117

Oth

er12

2027

3533

3130

Tota

l70

658

766

475

167

561

858

1P

erce

ntag

eo

fse

ats

Con

serv

ativ

e29

2829

2929

29La

bou

r32

3232

3231

31Li

ber

alD

emoc

rat

1314

1414

1515

Cro

ssb

ench

2422

2120

2020

Oth

er3

45

55

5To

tal

100

100

100

100

100

100

Removing the Hereditary Peers

10.11 The Government has been clear that ina modern democracy it is unacceptable thatindividuals still qualify for a seat in Parliamenton the basis of their ancestry. The transitionalarrangements made in 1999 should thereforecome to an end by formally ending the rightof the remaining hereditary members tomembership of the second Chamber.

10.12 If Parliament indicates support for thefurther reform of the composition of the Houseof Lords (see Chapter 11 on Next Steps), thenthe Government intends formally to end theright of the hereditary peers to sit in the Houseof Lords, whatever the precise outcome ofthe Free Vote on the composition. This is anexplicit commitment of its 2005 manifesto.

10.13 Removing the hereditary peers istechnically straightforward. Legislation couldbe brought forward either (a) to remove theirright to sit and vote (by cancelling the relevantprovisions of the 1999 House of Lords Act),or (b) to cancel the provision for by-electionof hereditary peers, effectively placing theexisting 92 hereditary peers who sit in theLords in the same position as the existing life peers.

10.14 The first alternative would be themost direct and obvious way of removing theremaining sitting hereditaries from membershipof the Lords. This could be done with immediateeffect as soon as the legislation came into force.Conversion of the existing sitting hereditariesinto life peers would have the same formaleffect – the removal of the hereditary peeragefrom the Lords, but it would mean that its fullimpact would take many years.

10.15 The first alternative is the one withthe obvious advantage of fairness betweenthe political parties – but for one importantconsideration. The Conservative group inthe Lords relies disproportionately on sittinghereditary peers compared to the other parties,as table 9 below shows48. So if the firstalternative were chosen, it is the Government’sview that in order to maintain the balance ofthe parties, the Leader of the ConservativeParty would be entitled to nominate anequivalent number of life peers – some ofwhom of course might be existing hereditarypeers (there could be much smaller rights ofnomination to the Leaders of the other partiesand a special invitation to the AppointmentsCommission to consider the claims of theoutgoing non-party sitting hereditary peersto become life peers).


52

48 House of Lords Information Office

Table 8: House Of Lords Hereditary Peers

Party Hereditary: Hereditary: Hereditary: TotalElected Elected Office Royal Office

by Party Holders Holder

Conservative 39 9 0 48

Labour 2 2 0 4

Liberal Democrat 3 2 0 5

Crossbench 29 2 2 33

Other 2 2

TOTAL 75 15 2 92

10.16 Currently, the membership of the threemain parties breaks down as shown in Table 9.49

10.17 Removing the hereditary peers changesthis picture to what is shown in Table 10.

10.18 The removal of the hereditary peers willdisadvantage the Conservatives much morethan the other parties, not just because thereare more Conservative hereditary peers butbecause the average age of Conservative lifepeers is higher than that of the other parties –74 compared to 67 for Labour and 65 for theLiberal Democrats. Given a long overalltransitional period this will not correct itselfuntil around 2050.

10.19 Converting the existing hereditarypeers into life peers goes some way to dealingwith the imbalance in average ages. This isbecause the average age of Conservativehereditary peers is 62, which brings the overallaverage age of Conservatives down to 70.

10.20 Of course, if the hereditary peers wereto be removed immediately, and new membersappointed in their place, the Leader of theConservative Party could chose to appointyounger members in order to bring down theparty’s average age.

10.21 Currently the non party-political peers,excluding the minor parties but including theLords Spiritual, make up 28% of the wholeHouse. Discussions thus far have indicatedthat at least 20% of a reformed Houseshould be non party-political. If the hereditarypeers were removed, the number of nonparty-political members would decline to23% of the total House.

10.22 In terms of the percentage of nonparty-political peers in the House, there is norequirement to replace any hereditaries wholeave. Nor does the removal of the hereditarypeers bring the percentage fully down towardsthe 20% mark.

10.23 In a reformed House, the StatutoryAppointments Commission would make enoughnon party-political appointments to ensure thatthe proportion of non party-political memberswas maintained at least the 20% mark.Initially, it might therefore make relatively fewappointments to the non party-political peers.

10.24 The question of what to do about thenon party-political hereditary peers is thereforea fairly open one. However, it might bethought invidious if the non party-politicalhereditary peers were treated in a differentway to the party-political hereditary peers.The arrangements should therefore be thesame, party affiliation or not.

10.25 The Government believes that bothoptions for removing the hereditary peers havetheir benefits and their disadvantages, and willdiscuss further the best way to proceed.

Titles10.26 Existing hereditary titles, and theinheritance of such titles, will continueunchanged. The power vested in the Crownto create new hereditary peerages is little used(save for members of the Royal Family). Sincethe power when exercised confers no rightto sit in the Lords we make no proposals inthe White Paper in relation to the continuanceof this process. That could properly beconsidered alongside any wider reviewof the honours system.


53

49 This table, and other related material that models the possible future composition of the House of Lords, draws on theGovernment Actuary’s Department (GAD) Life Tables to project the decline of the current members of the House. GAD’stables provide general-purpose estimates of life expectancy drawn from demographic analysis of the whole population.There are likely to be differences between actual and projected life expectancies when the tables are applied to a small,distinct population such as the current membership of the House of Lords

Table 10: Forecast Membership Of The Three Main Parties Of The House

Percentage of Percentage of3 Main Parties Whole House

Conservative 36 25

Labour 47 32

Liberal Democrat 17 11

Table 9: Current Membership Of The Three Main Parties Of The House

Percentage of Percentage of3 Main Parties Whole House

Conservative 41 28

Labour 43 29

Liberal Democrat 16 10

Royal Office Holders10.27 It would not be necessary for the EarlMarshal or Lord Great Chamberlain to bemembers of the House of Lords in order toperform their duties. There is a question as towhether or not these two posts should continueto be linked to a seat in a reformed House ofLords. We are consulting further on this point.

Costs

10.28 It is difficult to assess the overall costof any reform to the House of Lords until thefinal shape of reform is known. Therefore theestimates provided are based on some of theaspects of reform, where this has been possible.

Statutory Appointments Commission10.29 Assuming there is an appointed elementin a reformed House, one-off costs will beincurred in establishing the new independentStatutory Appointments Commission. Theexpenditure for the current AppointmentsCommission in its first year of operation in2000-2001 was £248,000. In addition theCabinet Office incurred further costs inrecruiting the Commissioners – approximately£100,000 on top of the running costs for thefirst year.

10.30 The initial start-up costs for the newUnited Kingdom body will be higher than thecurrent non-statutory Appointments Commission.This reflects the new body having a muchbroader remit, with powers over both non-party and party-political appointments andthe overall size of the new body.

10.31 The annual expenditure for the currentAppointments Commission for 2005/2006was £103,000, which includes staff costs,and other administration costs including theCommission members’ fees, travel andsubsistence, communication advice, stafftraining and IT equipment. Annual expenditureon the new body will also be higher than theexisting Appointments Commission.

10.32 It is difficult to estimate the one-offestablishment, the first year running costs andthe on-going running costs of the new body atthis stage until it is clear what proportion of theHouse will be appointed. The proportion ofappointed members will have cost implicationson a number of other factors including thenumber of staff to recruit and accommodation.

Elections10.33 Assuming there is an elected element ina reformed House any likely costs incurred willdepend mainly on the election system chosen.An advantage of holding the House of Lordselections alongside the European Parliamentelections, as set out in Chapter 6 of the paper,is the efficiency saving it produces. Costscould be reduced in relation to polling staff,buildings and promotion, although the numberof ballot boxes would increase significantly.We estimate the additional cost for House ofLords elections held alongside another nationalelection to be in the region of £30m, and thereare likely to be additional consequential callson the public purse – for example the provisionof free postage for campaign leaflets.

Members’ Expenses10.34 Members’ expenses of £15.6maccounted for 15% of the total budget of£106.4m for the House of Lords in 2005-2006.It is difficult to estimate members’ remunerationunder any system of reform to the House ofLords at this stage. The levels of remunerationare likely to be affected by a change in the sizeof the House, and will of course be affectedby changes to the way that members of theLords are paid. There may be a requirementfor additional staff in Parliament to support areformed chamber. A reformed House willcertainly cost more than the current House.

10.35 Once there are firmer decisions oncomposition, and whether members of areformed House should be salaried ratherthan receive expenses, the Government woulddiscuss proposals with the other parties, andthen invite the SSRB to consider the matter indetail and make recommendations.


54

11. Next Steps

11.1 This paper is designed to inform thefree votes in the House of Commons andthe House of Lords on the composition ofa reformed House.

11.2 As discussed, the Government believesthat it is important that Parliament is able toexpress its preference on the composition ofa reformed House. To enable a clear outcome,it is proposing that this be done using analternative vote (AV) process. The detailedproposed arrangements for the vote itself areoutlined at Annex B. But the process used forthe free vote would ultimately be a matter foreach House to decide

How would the process work?

Commons11.3 The Government proposes two stagesseparated by at least a week.

Stage 1: ‘Paving’ Motion11.4 The Government would move a Motionsetting out the procedure for the ballot onoptions for composition at Stage 2. Thispaving motion would include reference to threeMotions for debate at Stage 2: to take noteof the White Paper; for the retention of abicameral Parliament; and for further reformto the composition of the House of Lords(including the establishment of the StatutoryAppointments Commission for any appointedmembers and the removal of the remainingretained places for hereditary peers). It wouldthen make provision for the House to use thealternative vote procedure for the options forcomposition of a reformed House. The Motionwould set out (by reference to Annex B of thisWhite Paper) the rules for the ballot and theballot paper. Members would have theopportunity at this discussion on the pavingmotion at Stage 1 to move amendments to thepattern outlined and to the ballot paper. Nosubstantive votes would take place at thisstage on the White Paper or on any potentialfinal outcome for a reformed House of Lords.

Stage 2: Main Debate and Free Vote11.5 There would be 4 motions precedingthe alternative vote ballot itself – a ‘take note’Motion for the White Paper; a Motion toseek approval for retention of a bicameralparliament; a Motion to approve further reformto the composition of the House of Lords(including the establishment of the StatutoryAppointments Commission for any appointedmembers and the removal of the remainingretained places for hereditary peers); and aMotion to proceed to the AV ballot. Only if theHouse agreed to the retention of a bicameralParliament would it move to a vote on the callfor further reform (including the establishmentof the Statutory Appointments Commission forany appointed members and the removal ofthe remaining retained places for hereditarypeers). If the House agreed to the Motionfor further reform, it would then proceed toagree to move to the AV procedure, using theballot paper and the process agreed to in theearlier resolution.

11.6 Explanatory memoranda will set out,in more detail, the distribution of the ballotpapers, the duration of the ballot, thearrangements for counting the votes, theannouncement of the results the next dayand placing the ballot papers in the publicdomain after the vote has been countedand the result announced. The detailedarrangements for the ballot would be underthe direction of the Speaker.

LordsStage 1: ‘Paving’ procedure11.7 The House will be invited to considerwhether it wishes to adopt a procedure for thefree vote which is similar to that being proposedfor the Commons. No recommendations forany procedural change would be madewithout first being considered by theProcedure Committee. Any recommendationsmade by the Procedure Committee would beembodied in a report, and submitted forconsideration by the House as a whole.

Stage 2: Main debate and Free Vote11.8 There would be a full debate to take noteof the White Paper, followed by the free voteusing the process agreed by the House.

The House of Lords: Reform | 11. Next Steps

55

12. Conclusion

12.1 Reform of the House of Lords is an issuewhich has been on the political agenda formany years. The Government believes that,with the three main parties now committed toreform, there is currently an unusual opportunityto find a lasting solution to this question.

12.2 The Government believes that the centreof gravity on opinions for a reformed Houselies around the hybrid option, with electionsrun on a partially-open list system in Europeanconstituencies at the same time as Europeanelections. A hybrid House can deliver a secondchamber which is a complement to the Houseof Commons, and delivers the importantprinciples of representation which are essentialfor an effective House of Lords.

12.3 The benefits that would accrue fromcombining the two methods of entry to theLords far outweigh the losses that, as with anycompromise, come with a hybrid House. Sucha House can deliver a chamber which properlyrepresents the regions of the United Kingdom,and its gender, religious and ethnic balance.This system would ensure that the balanceof support for the parties in the country isproperly reflected in the membership of theLords. And a hybrid House would be moredemocratically legitimate, while ensuring thatthe membership of the House is not overlypolitical in the relatively partisan way of theHouse of Commons. It is the best compromise,and a sensible system for reform of the Houseof Lords.

The House of Lords: Reform | 12. Conclusion

56

Annex A – Membership ofthe Cross-Party WorkingGroup on Lords Reform

The Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Leader of the Houseof Commons and Lord Privy Seal (Chair)

The Rt Hon Lord Falconer of Thoroton,Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State forConstitutional Affairs (Labour)

The Rt Hon Lord Strathclyde, Shadow Leaderof the House of Lords (Conservative)

The Rt Hon Theresa May MP, Shadow Leaderof the House of Commons (Conservative)

Oliver Heald MP, Shadow Secretary of Statefor Constitutional Affairs (Conservative)

The Rt Hon Lord McNally, Leader of theLiberal Democrats in the House of Lords(Liberal Democrats)

Simon Hughes MP, Constitutional AffairsSpokesman and Shadow Attorney General(Liberal Democrats)

David Heath MP, Shadow Leader of the Houseof Commons (Liberal Democrats)

The Bishop of Chelmsford

Lord Williamson of Horton (Convenor of theCrossbench Peers)

The House of Lords: Reform | Annex A – Membership of the Cross-Party Working Group on Lords Reform

57

Annex B – Arrangementsfor the Free Vote Using anAlternative Vote Ballot

1. The aim of the free vote proposal is to seeka clear final preference on the options putbefore the two Houses. The alternative voteprocedure should encourage Members to vote‘for’ a particular option, rather than against,as MPs did in 2003. Although it is an unusualmethod of voting, both Houses have decidedto use a similar approach to choosing theirSpeakers (through a single ballot in the Lordsand sequential votes in the Commons). TheHouse of Lords used its adopted system in itsSpeakership election in 2006. A differencebetween those processes and that proposedhere is that, whereas the votes in Speakershipelections are anonymous, the votes for theproposed free vote on reform of compositionof the House of Lords, as with normalParliamentary votes, would be put into thepublic domain after the vote has been countedand the result has been announced.

Ballot by Alternative Vote for Optionson Composition of a Future Houseof Lords

2. Members would, under this process, beinvited to express their preferences on sevenoptions, as set out on the ballot paper below.Members would indicate on the ballot papertheir preferred option, or options, in order ofpreference, marking their first choice with a 1,their second choice with a 2 and so on, downto their lowest preference. Members would nothave to allocate a preference to all the options.They could vote for a single option only or fora number of the 7.

3. In the initial count, any option that obtainedmore than 50% of the first preference votescast would become the endorsed option. If thiswas not achieved in the first round there wouldbe a series of counts, with the lowest scoringoption eliminated at each count and the votesredistributed to the next preference. All lowscoring options which did not jointly reachthe next highest option in total would beeliminated. If there was a tie for the optionwith the lowest number of votes in any round,then all tied options would be eliminated. Thisprocess of elimination and redistribution of thevotes would continue until one option obtainedmore than 50% of the votes in that round.

4. It is proposed that the ballot papers inboth Houses would take the form shown inTable 12 below.

The House of Lords: Reform | Annex B – Arrangements for the Free Vote Using an Alternative Vote Ballot

58

Table 12: Proposed Format of Ballot PapersBALLOT ON COMPOSITION OF A FUTURE HOUSE OF LORDS

Option: Order of preference:

Fully appointed

80% appointed and 20% elected





Fully elected

Members may indicate on the ballot paper their preferred option or options in order of preference,marking their leading preference with a 1 and so on down to their lowest preference; Membersneed not allot a preference to all options.

5. The options reflect the analysis describedin this White Paper. Accordingly, where theoptions on the ballot include appointedmembers, this includes the 20% of the Housewho would be the non party-political members.So for example, under the 80% elected 20%appointed option, none of the appointedmembers would come from the parties –they would all be non party-political.

6. The options on the ballot take account ofthe Bishops and the retired Justices of theSupreme Court, who would enter the House aspart of the appointed element. The exceptionis the 100% elected option, which wouldcontain no places for the Bishops or the retiredSupreme Court Justices.

The House of Lords: Reform | Annex B – Arrangements for the Free Vote Using an Alternative Vote Ballot

59

Bibliography

Clarke K, Cook R, Tyler P, Wright T, Young G,Reforming the House of Lords: Breaking theDeadlock, (London, The Constitution Unit, 2005).

Government’s Consultation Paper,Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for theHouse of Lords, (CP 14/03, 2003).

House of Lords Hansard, 4th February 2003,Vol. 399, Col. 166.

House of Lords Act 1999, (London, TheStationery Office, 1999).

House of Lords Hansard, 16th August 1945,Vol. 137, Col. 47.

House of Lords Reform 1968, Cmnd. 3799.

House of Lords, Completing the Reform AGovernment White Paper Presented to Parliamentby the Prime Minister by Command of HerMajesty 7 November 2001 (This consultationclosed on 31 January 2002) Cm. 5291.

Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventionsof the UK Parliament, Report of Session2005-06, Volume I, HL Paper 265-I, HC 1212-I(London, The Stationery Office Limited, 2006).

Joint Committee on Conventions, First SpecialReport, 2005-06, HL Paper 189, HC 1151(London, The Stationery Office Limited, 2006).

Government Response to the Joint CommitteeOn Conventions' Report of Session 2005-06:Conventions of the UK Parliament Cm. 6997,(London, The Stationery Office, 2006).

Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform,House of Lords Reform: First Steps, Session2001-2002, HL Paper 151, HC 1109 (London,The Stationery Office Limited, 2002).

Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform,House of Lords Reform: First Report, Session2002-03, HL Paper 17, HC 171 (London, TheStationery Office Limited, 2003).

Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform,House of Lords Reform: Second Report,Session 2002 _ 2003, HL Paper 97, HC 668(London, The Stationery Office Limited, 2003).

Labour Party General Election Manifestos,1900-1997, General Election Manifestos, Vol. 2,(London, The Stationery Office, 1999).

Labour Party Manifesto 2005, Britain ForwardNot Back, (London, The Stationery Office, 2005).

Modernising Parliament – Reforming theHouse of Lords Cm. 4183 (London, TheStationery Office, 1999).

Parliament Act, 1949: 12, 13 & 14 George VI,Ch. 103.

Parliament Bill, 1947: Agreed Statement onConclusion of Conference of Party Leaders,February-April, 1948, Cm. 7380.

Parliaments across frontiers a short history ofthe Inter-Parliamentary Union (London, TheStationery Office 1975).

Peerage Act, 1963 Ch. 48 (London, TheStationery Office, 1963).

Public Administration Select Committee, FifthReport, The Second Chamber: Continuing theReform, Session 2001-2002, 14 February2002, HC 494-I (London, The Stationery OfficeLimited, 2002).

Report of the Joint Committee on House ofLords Reform, HL Paper 125, HC 262, Session1961-62.

Royal Commission on Reform of the Houseof Lords, A House for the Future, Cm 4534,(London, The Stationery Office, 2000).

The Standing Orders of the House of LordsRelating to public business (1958) No. 21.

Stansgate Case, House of Commons 142,Session 1960-61.

The House of Lords Bill, Bill 34 of 1998-99.

The Life Peerages Act, 1958: 6 & 7 Elizabeth II.Ch. 21 (London, The Stationary Office, 1980).

The Parliament Act, 1911 (1&2) George V, Ch.13.

The Report of the Independent Commissionon the Voting System Cm. 4090-I, Cm. 4090-II,(London, The Stationery Office, October 1998).

The Salisbury Doctrine, House of Lords LibraryNote, LLN 2006/006, June 2006.

The Standing Orders of the House of Lords:Leave of Absence, 16 June 1958. House ofLords, No. 23, (1).

The House of Lords: Reform | Bibliography

60

Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limitedon behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office

ID5455497 02/07

Printed on Paper containing 75% fibre content minimum.

the house of lords: reform cm 7027 - gov.uk · the house of lords act 1999 13 the royal commission...

Documents