Is House of Lords Reform Necessary?

Paul Williams

Supervisor: Jon Gorry

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Abstract This is written as an attempt to determine whether House of Lords reform is necessary. The dissertation is written after the 2007 White Paper on House of Lords Reform and reflects a growing movement towards a partially or wholly elected second chamber. This work sets out to determine whether the House of Lords is in need of reform, or whether the status quo represents the best model for a second chamber. In order to achieve this, the dissertation is separated into three key components. The first component looks at the role the House of Lords performs in the British system and compares it with examples of systems practiced elsewhere. The second component looks at a history of the House of Lords, focusing primarily on how the chamber has developed during the growth of democracy. The third component assesses the impact New Labour has had on the House of Lords and examines how the chamber has changed, while also considering proposals for further reforms. The work brings these three components together, attempting to determine whether it is possible to justify an unelected second chamber existing in the twenty first century. Consideration is then given to alternative systems and whether it is necessary to reform the Lords into a fully democratic chamber.

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Contents

1. Introduction 4

2. Bicameral Britain 6

3. A History of Reform 11

4. New Labour, New Lords 15

5. Conclusion 19

6. Bibliography 22

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Introduction

In the summer of 2007, I was fortunate enough to be placed on an internship in Westminster. One benefit of this placement was the opportunity to tour the Palace of Westminster and admire the history which seemingly pervades every inch of the building. Nowhere is this more true than in the House of Lords chamber, where the fascinating history of the room is matched only by its astounding opulence. Having previously had little interest in the House of Lords, I became fascinated with the history of the chamber and the role it plays in the British political system. I used my internship as an opportunity to view committee proceedings and to discover how the chamber functions. I also began to question the growing consensus, which suggests reform of the chamber is long overdue. In my view, Lords reform is not a dull topic to be discussed solely by politicians. The issue of Lords reform poses interesting and important questions about how a state should be governed in the twenty first century. Having become fascinated with the question of Lords reform, I therefore decided my dissertation would be the ideal opportunity to explore this interest further. It is my hope the following chapters will add to the debate on House of Lords reform. The House of Lords has a very long history. The chamber has existed for centuries, with many dating its origins back to Anglo Saxon times (Norton, 378). In the early days of its history, the Lords existed solely to assist the monarch of the day. However since the chambers early days as an advisory body, the role of the House of Lords has changed significantly. The Lords has evolved and adapted over many centuries and has become a central component of Britains democratic system. The Lords now plays an important role in scrutinising legislation, as well as holding the Government to account. However the House of Lords has been the subject of severe criticism, with many suggesting it is wrong for such an influential body to remain wholly appointed. Many have suggested the time is now right for the House of Lords to be reformed into a democratic second chamber. The Government has committed itself to creating a democratic House of Lords and as a result, the chamber has undergone a number of dramatic changes in recent years. However, despite these changes, the House of Lords remains an unelected chamber. A recent White Paper on Lords Reform stated, it is difficult in a modern democracy, to justify a second chamber where there is no elected element and in which the public has no direct input into who sits in it (HM Government: 6). The White Paper is part of a growing consensus, favouring the creation of a democratic House of Lords. This is also supported by a poll which claimed 82% of those questioned, believed the House of Lords should contain at least some elected members (YouGov, 2007). In the same year, the House of Commons voted for a 100% elected House of Lords. Faced by a growing consensus supporting the creation of a democratic House of Lords, I intend to thoroughly examine the issue to determine whether reform is necessary. The work will be library based, in

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recognition of the difficulty in speaking to politicians. Even if interviews with politicians were feasible, they may not be useful if the individuals stuck with supporting party policy. The dissertation will be divided into several chapters examining different aspects of Lords reform. Chapter Two of this study will examine the role of a second chamber, in a bicameral system and closely examine how the House of Lords fulfills this role. This recognises that before the House of Lords is dramatically reformed, it is first important to discover whether the chamber is already well equipped to fulfill its role as Britains second chamber. The chapter will closely examine the main functions performed by the House of Lords today and will attempt to assess whether further reforms are likely to disrupt the chamber's ability to perform effectively. I also intend to compare Britains appointed House of Lords, with the elected second chambers in both Italy and the United States. Comparing the British model to other political systems, should highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the British system. This should demonstrate whether the most effective way of governing Britain, is using a wholly appointed second chamber, or whether radical reform of the House of Lords is required. Chapter Three will examine the history of House of Lords reform, up until the election of New Labour in 1997. A brief analysis of the origins of the House of Lords should determine the original purpose of the chamber and demonstrate why the chamber was originally unelected. The chapter will then attempt to ascertain why the chamber remained untouched by the growth of democracy up until the beginning of the 20th century. However the primary focus of the chapter will be on the events of the past century. This will involve looking at successful attempts at reforming the House of Lords, as well as looking at attempts which have been unsuccessful. This should demonstrate the reasons for many of the reforms of the past century and show how these reforms have influenced the way the chamber functions today. Analysis of attempts to reform the Lords in the 20th century should also demonstrate why the chamber has not seen more radical reform and remains unelected. Chapter Four will examine House of Lords reform after the election of New Labour. This recognises that the past decade has seen significant progress towards the creation of a democratic second chamber. The chapter will examine the promises made by New Labour before coming to power and will investigate whether these promises are likely to be fulfilled. The effects of recent reforms will be examined to determine how they have changed the way the chamber currently functions. This should demonstrate whether reforms have made the chamber more effective, or whether further reform is required. The chapter will also examine proposals for further reform and make an attempt to envisage how the House of Lords will look in the future. The aim is to give a detailed analysis of the House of Lords, examining how its history has influenced how the chamber functions today. This is to be done at the same time as examining theories of bicameral government and assessing whether an appointed second chamber most effective as part of a bicameral government.

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Bicameral Britain

Britains system of government, including its bicameral legislature, developed under unique circumstances occurring over many centuries. The House of Lords is one example of this, having developed to become a central component of Britains democratic system. However many claim the House of Lords needs to develop further and become more democratic, if it is to remain relevant in the twenty first century. Any significant changes to Britains political system need to be considered carefully, in case reform initiates adverse consequences. Therefore, to decide whether reform is indeed necessary, it is first important to examine the role currently performed by the House of Lords. This should highlight how effective the House of Lords is in fulfilling its role and suggest changes which may be beneficial. However it is also useful to recognise Britain is just one example of bicameralism in action, with many states offering alternative methods of implementing bicameral government. These states have also developed their systems under unique circumstances. However analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these systems, can still be of great help in determining the strengths and weaknesses in Britains system. A comparative approach could also help to formulate and test hypotheses about the British political system (Hague and Harrop, 2001). The House of Lords performs an important role in Britains political system. The most important task performed by the chamber is the scrutiny of legislation. While the Commons acts as a talking chamber, the Lords serves as an important revising chamber, trying to ensure that a bill is well drafted and internally coherent (Norton, 2001: 384) The focus of scrutiny in the Lords, is therefore usually on the details of a bill rather than on principles. It has been suggested that the wholly appointed composition of the chamber aids this process. Members appointed to the Lords tend to be experts in a variety of fields and are therefore able to offer their expertise to suggest amendments. Members of the Lords also have more time to scrutinise bills, as they dont represent a constituency and are less likely to hold ministerial positions (Norton, 2001). The main reason for the Lords focusing on the details rather than principles, is largely because of the chambers composition. The Lords is wholly appointed meaning the chamber lacks democratic legitimacy. It is therefore extremely difficult for the Lords to justify rejecting measures proposed by the House of Commons, which is wholly elected. It is not unknown for the Lords to oppose legislation on principle. However the chamber is bound by the Salisbury convention, which states that the Lords will not oppose legislation proposed in a governing partys manifesto. The powers of the House are further limited by only being able to veto legislation in extremely rare cases. Instead of the absolute veto, the Lords is able to delay legislation for up to a year. These measures, limiting the powers of the House of Lords, firmly establish the House of Commons as the primary chamber in Britains bicameral legislature. Despite the chambers diminished powers, it still fulfils many of the classic functions of a second chamber. The presence of a second chamber is said to provide checks

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and balances, which serve to protect the interests of sections of society from an oppressive majority (Tsebelis, 1997). In Britain the House of Lords checks the powers of the majoritarian House of Commons, preventing the implementation of excessive legislation. Critics may argue this amounts to protecting the interests of the upper classes at the expense of the popular will of the majority, however the appointment of life peers has arguably altered the class composition of the chamber (Norton, 2001). Members of second chambers are often elected on longer terms than those present in the lower chamber. The House of Lords may be described as an extreme example of this, as its members are usually present for life. Lord Salisbury, a British Prime Minister in the nineteenth century, claimed the upper chamber represents the permanent, as opposed to the passing, feelings of the nation (Hague and Harrop, 2000: 220). It is also claimed that a second chamber can protect against tyranny of the minority (Tsebelis, 1997). When a unicameral legislature votes on legislation, a majority can often represent less than half of the population. The requirement for legislation to pass through a second chamber adds more checks and ensures more rigorous scrutiny of legislation, thereby giving bills greater legitimacy. This argument may be particularly relevant to the British system, as members of the Commons are elected using the single member plurality system. This effectively means that a party with a majority of members within the chamber can be voted in by a minority of the population (Rogers and Walters, 2006). In fact some have suggested that the House of Lords may be more representative than the House of Commons (Russell, 2007). Certainly the composition of the Lords could be argued to more accurately reflect the 2005 General Election results, than the composition of the Commons. There are also now a large number of women and ethnic minority members in the Lords, something which still isnt the case in the House of Commons. Sections of society, poorly represented in the Commons, are therefore better represented in the Lords giving legislation passed through both chambers greater legitimacy. Tsebelis also states that a bicameral system prevents tyranny of an individual, suggesting it is often the case that charismatic leaders become powerful figures in unicameral legislatures (Tsebelis, 1997). In Britain the political executive, controlled by the Prime Minister, is very powerful. The Prime Minister will almost always command a majority of members of the House of Commons. It is therefore extremely rare for legislation initiated by the Prime Minister, to be defeated in the Commons (Kavanagh, 2001). The House of Lords often uses its powers to scrutinise the powers of the executive, often hindering the passage of controversial legislation. However some are critical of the British example of bicameral government. Lijphart states that a strong bicameral legislature must contain two characteristics. Firstly the two chambers powers should be symmetrical, in other words possessing equal or only moderately unequal constitutional powers and democratic legitimacy (Lijphart, 1999: 206). Lijphart then suggests the composition of the two chambers should be incongruent, elected by different methods or designed to do so as to overrepresent certain minorities (Lijphart, 1999: 207). If we apply Lijpharts theory to our own House of Lords, this leads us to some quite interesting conclusions.

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Firstly the powers of the two chambers in Britain can be said to be asymmetrical, with the Commons having far greater powers than the Lords. This is due to the unelected composition of the House of Lords, preventing the chamber from possessing any democratic legitimacy. When considered against Lijpharts theory, this would suggest reform of the Lords is necessary. However one could argue the House of Lords does fulfil Lijpharts second stipulation for an ideal second chamber. Although the Lords is not elected, it has served as a way of over representing minorities. Originally the chamber protected the interests of the upper classes, although more recently the chamber has seen the addition of many women and ethnic minority members. If the House of Lords was to become a wholly elected chamber, the chamber may potentially contain less minorities, arguably making the chamber less representative. The Italian system is one example of a bicameral legislature containing chambers with symmetrical powers. The current system was established after Mussolini had briefly ended democracy in Italy. Having suffered under a dictatorship for a several years, there was a desire to spread power as widely as possible to make Italy a truly democratic country. The most significant aspect of the system was that both chambers in the legislature were given equal powers. The use of a symmetrical bicameral system was designed to provide checks and balances, making it difficult for a totalitarian regime to once again take power. The electoral system for both houses was also highly democratic. In the Senate, three quarters of members were to be elected via a plurality voting system. However 65% of the vote was required to attain a seat and this was rarely achieved. The composition of the Senate was therefore usually determined via proportional representation (lvarez-Rivera, 2008). One significant problem with the Italian system was that it often created unstable governments. This was because a party needed to gain a majority in both chambers, to effectively run the country. The proportional system present in both chambers made achieving a majority exceedingly difficult. Reform was therefore introduced in 1993 to remedy this problem, with three quarters of both chambers, being elected using a plurality voting system. Many felt this had solved the problem and heralded a new era of stable Italian governments (The Economist, 2008). However reform introduced in 2005, by the outgoing Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, re-established proportional representation. This resulted in the election of one of the shortest living Italian governments in modern history and perhaps demonstrates the ease with which parties can implement self serving legislation. Lijpharts theory on bicameralism suggests two chambers sharing symmetrical powers is beneficial to a political system. However in this instance, it appears giving both chambers equal powers has had a negative impact. Lijphart may argue the system has been undermined by using identical electoral systems for both chambers. Membership of the two chambers is highly congruent, which Lijphart has argued leaves minorities unrepresented and effectively means Italy is governed using a majoritarian system. The use of identical electoral systems for both chambers also gives both chambers equal legitimacy. To form a legitimate government, able to effectively govern the country, it has therefore become essential for parties to obtain majorities in both chambers. This was demonstrated

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by the events of January 2008, which saw a vote of no confidence in the Senate force the resignation of the Prime Minister. The Italian example of bicameral government demonstrates that reform of the House of Lords should be undertaken with caution. When compared with our own House of Lords, the Italian Senate is highly democratic. However this also means the Senate has greater legitimacy and is able to challenge the lower chamber more effectively using its significant powers. The collapse of the socialist coalition in 2008 is just one of many examples, demonstrating the instability of the Italian system. The current system in Britain may be undemocratic but it has usually produced stable governments. The introduction of an elected element to the House of Lords could threaten that stability, giving the chamber greater legitimacy and threatening the primacy of the Commons. However the presence of a democratic second chamber doesnt necessarily result in unstable government. There are several examples of states, which possess elected second chambers, while also possessing stable effective governments. The United States is one notable example. The political system of the United States was influenced by the views of the philosopher Baron de Montesquieu, who believed there should be a separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary (McKay, 2005). When writing his theory on the separation of powers, Montesquieu had been referring to the British system. However the Americans used the separation of powers theory to create a system very different to the British model. The founding fathers of the United States were highly critical of the power the British king possessed and wanted to create a system where no single component could dominate. The American system was therefore created with many checks and balances, including a bicameral legislature where both chambers had symmetrical powers. The assent of both chambers is needed to pass legislation, or amend the Constitution. However it is important to note the two chambers do not possess equal powers, such as in the Italian system. The two chambers in the American system have different responsibilities. To remove a president for example, two thirds of the House of Representatives must vote to impeach the President. The Senate then trys the President and two thirds of members must agree for the President to be dismissed. The assent of the Senate is also required in order to approve treaties, while tax raising powers are the sole preserve the House of Representatives. As McKay states, the Constitution was designed to provide the basic framework for such a system of stable and above all, limited political power (McKay, 2005: 48). The electoral systems used to elect both chambers are also significant. The Senate is elected using a federal system, which came about as a result of debate between the smaller and larger states. The smaller states feared a government determined by a popular vote would leave them at a severe disadvantage. The result of this debate was the Connecticut Compromise, which entitled each state to two seats in the Senate regardless of size (McKay, 2005). This differed from elections to the House of Representatives, where seats are assigned to districts. The borders of each district being determined by population size, with members being selected using a plurality voting system (McKay, 2005) Lijphart would describe the membership of

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the two chambers as incongruent, which in his view was important for strong government. The American electoral system promotes stability, with only a third of Senators facing elections every two years. Members of the Senate also serve a term of six years before facing re-election. This prevents the Senate being subject to the immediate passions of the electorate, therefore differing greatly from the Italian system. The American electoral system therefore shows in is entirely possible for a state to have a democratic second chamber, while still maintaining stable government. The use of different electoral systems for both chambers ensures different regions are well represented, while still maintaining an element of majoritarian government. The system also promotes stability by ensuring government is not a hostage to the immediate passions of the electorate. Also significant is the separation of powers, differing from the equal powers enjoyed by both chambers in the Italian system. These give each component their separate responsibilities, reducing the possibility of conflict within the system. With the consequences of a poorly constructed political system demonstrated by the Italian example, it may well be worth considering the American example when implementing further reforms in Britain. The House of Lords performs several important functions in Britains political system. The chamber ensures detailed scrutiny of legislation is carried out. The presence of various experts within the chamber, ensures any amendments are proposed by well informed individuals. The chamber also regularly holds the government to account, insuring against the executive abusing its powers. Examination of the Italian system also illustrates the role the House of Lords plays in ensuring stable Government. The lack of an elected element in the House of Lords ensures the Commons remains the primary chamber, as the only democratically legitimate chamber in Parliament. However the American system demonstrates a fully democratic political system does not have to result in unstable government. The separation of powers and the use of separate electoral systems for each chamber, ensures democratic and effective government. It is now widely accepted that the population should have a say over who governs them. The presence of an appointed House of Lords is therefore no longer acceptable. The Government should therefore press on with reforms, with caution. Carefully considered reforms will increase Britains democratic credentials while also preserving strong stable government.

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A History of Reform

The House of Lords has remained an unelected chamber since its creation in Anglo Saxon times. However this doesnt mean the House of Lords has remained entirely unchanged. The growth of democracy in Britain has meant the chamber now looks very different to its Anglo Saxon predecessor. Within the last two centuries, there have been several significant events which have influenced how the House of Lords functions today. These include the establishment of conventions within the Lords itself, as well as attempts at full scale reform. When considering the difficult issue of Lords reform, it is helpful to consider how these past events have influenced how the chamber functions today. Analysis of these landmark moments may explain why the chamber remains in its present form and why more radical reform has not taken place. This may in turn indicate whether further reform is indeed required, whilst also indicating the best way to proceed with reform if it is deemed necessary. The House of Lords was once a dominant institution in British politics, a reflection of the fact that it represented the powerful aristocracy (Dearlove and Saunders, 1991). However as democracy began to develop in Britain, the status of the House of Lords began to diminish significantly. The Reform Acts of the nineteenth century allowed many more people to participate in elections to the House of Commons, while the House of Lords remained unelected. This meant the Commons became increasingly more representative and democratic than the Lords, giving the Commons greater legitimacy and establishing it as the primary chamber of Britains legislature. As Norton explains in his assessment of the Lords, the lack of any representative capacity led to the House occupying a position of political and later legal inferiority to the House of Commons (Norton, 2001: 378). The House of Commons could therefore claim to be the chamber representing the will of the people, while the Lords protected the interests of the aristocracy. This state of affairs has existed to the present day, with the Lords remaining a wholly unelected chamber. However there have been a number of significant changes to the Lords, starting in the early twentieth century. The Parliament Act of 1911 was the first attempt to reform the Lords through statute. Legislation was deemed necessary after the Finance Bill of 1909 had been rejected by the Lords, preventing the Government from implementing the Budget. It was felt that the House of Lords had overstepped the mark and the use of legislation was motivated by pragmatism rather than any desire to promote democratic values. The Act ensured any future bill dealing exclusively with money, would become law a month after leaving the Commons, with or without the Lords approval. This meant the House of Commons were confirmed as masters of the public purse, thereby firmly establishing the Commons supremacy. However this was not the only important aspect of the Act, which has a substantial influence on how the Lords functions today. The Act also ensured the House of Lords could delay a non-money bill for no longer than two parliamentary sessions. The power of the Lords to veto legislation was therefore removed and to this day the House of Lords is only able to delay legislation. One

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could argue that this made the House of Lords a relatively powerless institution. As power now firmly resides with the democratically elected House of Commons any radical reform of the Lords might be viewed as unnecessary. Another significant moment for the future of the House of Lords was the formation of the Labour Party in 1900. Unlike the Liberals and Conservatives, were highly critical of the House of Lords up until the 1911 Parliament Act. Labours anger towards the House of Lords was well illustrated in their election manifesto of 1910, which proclaimed the people are no longer willing to live on the sufferance of the Lords [] the Lords must go (Dorey, 2006: 600). The reason for the Labour Partys anger towards the Lords, may have been because of the chambers composition. The Lords was predominantly made up of Conservative peers and Labour feared these peers would always oppose the legislation of a Labour Government. However the 1911 Parliament Act meant the Labour Party became less concerned, as the powers of the Lords were severely curtailed. In the 1930s the Labour Party no longer proclaimed the Lords must go, instead suggesting the Lords should be abolished if it opposed a Labour Government (Dorey, 2006). Therefore the party most likely to initiate radical reform of the House of Lords had been appeased by legislation restricting the Lords powers. However this did not prevent the Labour Party pursuing reform of the chamber when it came to power in 1945. The restrictions put on the House of Lords powers meant the Labour Party were no longer determined to abolish the House of Lords. However fears remained that a Conservative dominated Lords could delay important legislation. These fears were partially alleviated by the Salisbury Convention, an agreement made between the Labour and Conservative leaders of the Lords. The agreement has since been crucially important to how the Lords functions, ensuring that the Lords does not oppose legislation which has been part of an elected Governments manifesto. The Salisbury Convention recognised the Labour Government of the day had been given a huge mandate to carry out its policies and that it would be undemocratic for a Conservative dominated Lords to obstruct progress. The Convention was therefore designed to ensure the will of the people took precedent over the will of the House of Lords. The Salisbury Convention may also have been created in the knowledge that disrupting the Governments policies could be catastrophic for the House of Lords. When the Lords disrupted the Budget in 1909 it resulted in the 1911 Parliament Act, which drastically curtailed the powers of the chamber. Disrupting the policies of a Labour Government, when Labour had called for the chambers abolition in the past, may have spelt the end for the House of Lords. With the Lords suggesting they would always support the will of the people, further reform of the Lords could have been deemed unnecessary. Many Labour ministers even began to accept the usefulness of the House of Lords. Clement Attlee noted that many Labour MPs and ministers realised the practical advantage of a revising chamber, provided that it had not the power of defeating the popular will (Dorey, 2006: 601). However when the Government decided to defer nationalisation of the iron and steel industries to the 1948-49 session, in favour of more pressing legislation, they were faced with a dilemma.

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The Conservative dominated House of Lords were certain to oppose nationalisation, meaning the legislation faced being delayed until after the next general election. The Labour Government therefore decided it needed to further restrict the Lords powers by reducing the length of time a bill could be delayed from two sessions to one, thereby allowing the Government to carry out its nationalisation plans. Therefore once again the use of legislation to reform the Lords was born out of pragmatism, rather than any democratic mission. However as Dorey explains, having agreed to reduce the House of Lords power of delay by a further year, the Cabinet found itself obliged to consider whether this alone would suffice or whether other reforms ought to be pursued (2006: 601). It was argued that if it was undemocratic for the Lords to be delaying legislation initiated in the elected Commons. Surely the composition of the Lords also needed to be considered in any reform proposals (Dorey, 2006). Lord Addison proposed the reduction in the Lords delaying powers, should be coupled with denying hereditary peers the right to vote and replaced them with Life Peers,. However the Cabinet were split over the best course of action, while also believing lengthy debate over the future of the Lords would distract from important legislation. Therefore when the Parliament Act of 1949 was passed, it simply reduced the Lords power of delay to one parliamentary session and to let hereditary peers remain in the chamber. The Government decided more radical reform of the Lords could be discussed at a later date. The election of a Conservative Government in 1951 put House of Lords reform temporarily on hold, meaning an opportunity to radically reform the House of Lords had been missed. However, despite Labour being the principle advocates of Lords reform, it was the Conservatives who initiated the next stage of reform. The Life Peerages Act of 1958 allowed for people to be made members of the House of Lords for life, without the peerage being passed on to the next generation. The creation of life peers demonstrated how hereditary peerages were becoming increasingly difficult to justify in a democratic country. However the Conservatives stopped short of abolishing hereditary peers, perhaps realising this would halt the Conservative dominance of the chamber. As Norton states, the reform was simply designed to strengthen the House by allowing people who objected to the hereditary principle to become members (Norton, 2001: 378). It was not intended as a radical method of reforming the chamber. The Life Peerages Act was followed by the 1963 Peerages Act, introduced after Tony Benn was forced to quit as a member of the Commons. Prior to the Peerages Act, if any MP inherited a peerage from the Lords, they would be forced to resign from the Commons to take up their seat in the House of Lords. The 1963 Peerage Act allowed an MP to renounce their peerage and continue their service in the Commons. Although not a massively important moment in the history of the Lords, it did highlight how archaic the system was and demonstrated the need for dramatic change. Further reform of the House of Lords was attempted in 1969. However as the issue was considered, it began to be realised that the power of the House of Lords could not be considered in isolation from its composition (Dorey, 2004: 604).The existence of an undemocratic second chamber was unacceptable to

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many, although there was disagreement over what should replace it. This disagreement meant further reforms were abandoned and another opportunity to reform the chamber had been missed. An important influence, especially on the Labour Party, was the political turmoil of the 1970s. February 1974 briefly saw the election of a minority Labour Government and another election in October, only gave Labour a majority three (Lowe, 1998). As Dorey explains, Labours lack of a working parliamentary majority for most of this period raised serious doubts about the extent to which the government could claim to have a mandate from the electorate, which in turn meant that the House of Lords felt less constrained by the Salisbury Doctrine (Dorey, 2006: 609). This resulted in the Lords obstructing a number of the Labour Governments policies. It is important to note that minority governments are extremely rare in Britain. However with many currently claiming the Salisbury Convention to be less valid, due to the perceived unrepresentative composition of the Commons, the election of a minority government would make such claims even more legitimate. The turmoil of the 1970s also demonstrated to the Labour Party that a Conservative dominated Lords, would always have the potential to disrupt the policies of a Labour Government, unless radical reform was carried out. The Labour Party attached growing importance to House of Lords reform and the ascendancy of the left within the party led to a number of radical proposals for reform. As Dorey (2006: 610) states abolition of the House of Lords [] remained official Labour Party policy during the first half of the 1980s, when the Left was temporarily ascendant in the Party, although as Labour was in Opposition from 1979 onwards, this radical commitment was never translated into legislative action. The House of Lords has seen many changes, with the growth in democracy leading to the powers of the chamber being severely curtailed. However these changes have failed to extend the growth of democracy to the House of Lords itself, merely strengthening the power of the House of Commons. This demonstrates the fact that members of the Commons have been unwilling to countenance democratic reform of the Lords, fearing it may threaten the primacy of the Commons. The limited reforms which have been implemented have usually occurred when the primacy of the Commons has been threatened. With the powers of the Lords strictly limited and the primacy of the elected Commons unquestioned, it could be suggested a democratic second chamber is unnecessary. However it is difficult to justify the lack of any elected element in an institution as important as the House of Lords. Although the Commons may not want to be distracted from more pressing issues, the saga of House of Lords will continue until the chamber is made truly democratic. In recent years, with the election of a New Labour Government, the creation of a democratic second chamber has finally seemed a realistic prospect.

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New Labour, New Lords When New Labour swept to power in 1997, it seemed the House of Lords would finally become a modern democratic chamber. The party had promised, in its election manifesto, that the House of Lords would be made more democratic and representative (Norton, 2004). However ten years after New Labour came to power, the House of Lords remains a wholly appointed chamber. Despite the House of Lords remaining unelected, the past decade has seen a number of important developments. The Lords has experienced unprecedented reforms which have significantly altered the character of the chamber. There has also been considerable debate on the chambers future, including proposals put forward by the Government. When considering the future of the Lords, it is useful to look at the events of the past ten years and consider why full scale reform is yet to take place. This should demonstrate the difficulty in reforming a second chamber and indicate whether further reform of the House of Lords is indeed necessary. It is unsurprising that the most dramatic change to the House of Lords in centuries, occurred under a Labour Government. If Labour had gained power earlier, reform of the Lords may have been even more dramatic. However when Tony Blair became leader of the Labour Party in 1994, the left were no longer controlling party policy. The Labour Party had abandoned the class based politics which had kept the party in opposition for almost three decades, and were now seeking election as New Labour. Several left wing policies including abolition of the House of Lords had been abandoned. However there remained a strong desire to reform the House of Lords. Approaching the twenty first century, the House of Lords still remained dominated by Conservative hereditary peers. It is therefore unsurprising that the Labour Party desired change, with the most important change being the removal of the hereditary peers. This was reflected in the two stage programme of reform advocated by Blair, which stated that the first stage of reform should be the removal of the hereditary peers. There would then be discussions on the implementation of the second stage, which would see the chamber made more democratic (Norton, 2004). The decision to first remove the hereditary peers before deciding on further reforms, also demonstrated the disagreement over what a democratic second chamber should look like. When the Labour Party swept to power in 1997, it seemed the House of Lords would at last be reformed into a modern democratic second chamber. However reform was delayed for two years, calling into question Labours commitment to Lords reform. Having suffered many years in opposition, the newly formed Labour Government claimed to have other priorities. Dorey suggests that with the benefit of hindsight, Tony Blairs apparent commitment to House of Lords reform, now seems questionable, (Dorey, 2006: 611). The lack of any reforms during Labours first two years of government may have been an early indication of the Governments questionable commitment. However it is perhaps understandable for the Government to be cautious in its attitude towards Lords reform. As

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demonstrated earlier, previous attempts at reforming the Lords have proved difficult. There was also a great deal of opposition to reform within the Lords itself. Viscount Cranbourne, leader of the Conservatives in the Lords at the time, was one example of this opposition. Cranbourne lambasted the Governments plans to abolish the hereditary peers, arguing the Government had not made adequate plans to determine what they were to be replaced with. This criticism pushed the Government into establishing a Royal Commission, which would make recommendations on the second stage of reform (Norton, 2004). The existence of significant opposition which existed in the Lords, understandably made the Government fearful that Conservative peers would obstruct Lords reform. The Government therefore decided it needed to enter into negotiations with the Conservative peers. The product of these negotiations was the 1999 Parliament Act, Labours first stage of its proposed two stage programme of Lords reform. The Act ended centuries of tradition, by ensuring the House of Lords would no longer be dominated by hereditary peers. However hereditary peers were not to be abolished entirely. As a compromise to ensure the Act would be passed by the House of Lords, the Government allowed ninety two peers to remain in the chamber. Assurances were made that these remaining peers would be removed once the second stage of reform was completed. This once again calls into question, New Labours commitment to a democratic and representative House of Lords. However one should not underestimate the impact of the 1999 Parliament Act. Many expected the removal of many Conservative peers would create a weaker chamber, which would be less likely to challenge a Labour Government (Russell, 2007b). This would also have made sense when considering the views of Lijphart, who claimed bicameral governments were stronger when the two chambers consisted of incongruent memberships. However the 1999 Parliament Act actually had the effect of making the Lords stronger, encouraging peers to more readily challenge government legislation. Since 1999 the House of Lords has defeated the government over 350 times and is more likely to insist on its amendments being carried out, rather than giving in to the will of the elected Commons (Russell, 2007b). The main reason for this is because, although the chamber remains wholly appointed, the reforms have given the Lords greater legitimacy. The balance of the chamber altered significantly, as no single party is able to hold a majority in the chamber. It has even been suggested that the party balance in the House of Lords now more closely reflects the balance of votes cast at general elections than does that in the House of Commons (Russell, 2007a: 7). However this increased legitimacy has also had consequences for the Salisbury Convention. The convention had ensured that legislation proposed in a governing partys election manifesto, could pass through the Lords unhindered. However the Conservatives have indicated they no longer feel bound by the convention, pointing out it had been created to counter Conservative dominance of the Lords. With the chamber no longer dominated by Conservative peers, it is argued the convention is no longer applicable. The Liberal Democrats have never been bound by the convention, something which has become an issue now that no single party holds a majority in the chamber. The Liberal Democrats have also attempted to claim the

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Lords has greater legitimacy than the Commons, suggesting the composition of the Lords better reflects voting at the last general election (Riddell, 2006). If the second stage of reform introduced an electoral system more representative than that used for the Commons, this could potentially challenge the primacy of the House of Commons. Almost a decade after the first stage of reform was implemented, it is still unclear what the second stage of reform will involve. The Government set up the Wakeham Commission, prior to the passing of the 1999 Parliament Act, in order begin the process of initiating the second stage of reform. However rather than initiating further reforms, the commission demonstrated the apparent lack of agreement over the chambers composition (Dorey, 2006). Three options were put forward for consideration. The most radical proposal suggested 35% of the membership could be elected. The other two options were for 16% and 12% of the membership to be elected, with the commission favouring the 16% option (Norton, 2004). Members would be elected every five years and serve a fixed term of fifteen years. The options proposed by the commission supported retaining a chamber dominated by appointed members, meaning the chamber would remain undemocratic and unrepresentative. making questionable any claims the chamber would become more democratic. Therefore it is unsurprising that the recommendations of the Wakeham Commission pleased nobody. Advocates of reform claimed the proposals did not go far enough, while supporters of the Lords felt that it went too far (Norton, 2004). However in an encouraging sign for advocates of reform, the Government has persisted in its attempts to complete its reform of the House of Lords. New Labour were elected for a second term in 2001, once again promising a democratic second chamber it its election manifesto (Norton, 2004). In the same year, the Government published its White Paper proposing a 20% elected second chamber (Norton, 2004). Once again the proposals failed to please either side of the debate, with many claiming a partially elected chamber would result in a two tier chamber (Norton, 2004) Elected members would inevitably have more legitimacy than their unelected counterparts. The Government were forced to abandon the proposals and instead set up a joint committee to make recommendations. Once again, disagreement over composition had blocked further reform. The Committee offered seven options on composition, which it proposed should be debated and voted on by both Houses. Options proposing a largely elected House of Lords were also included, giving MPs the opportunity to vote for a fully democratic second chamber. The Commons vote was held in 2003 and further confirmed the extent of disagreement on how the Lords should be reformed. The vote once again confirmed the extent of disagreement over Lord reform, with none of the options receiving a majority in the House of Commons. However the option for an 80% elected House of Lords was only defeated by three votes. This suggested that if reform was deemed necessary, MPs would favour a largely elected second chamber. The failure to come to gain a majority in the Commons on any of the options, together with the Lords overwhelming vote in favour of an appointed

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chamber, meant reform had once again stalled. With agreement on House of Lords reform seemingly impossible, it would have been understandable if the Government had scrapped plans for further reform. However the Government chose to persist with its attempt to reform the Lords, publishing another White Paper in 2007. The White Paper suggested a hybrid House, with some members elected by regions via a list system and the remaining members being appointed. (HM Government, 2007) This proposal would ensure a more representative second chamber, while also ensuring the primacy of the Commons was not threatened. In March 2007 the two chambers debated the White Paper and voted on the same options suggested in 2003. In the Commons the vote produced a staggering result as a majority voted for a 100% elected House of Lords. Many claimed this was merely an attempt by some to sabotage House of Lords Reform (Woodward, 2007). However the vote was still a historic moment, giving the first indication that a democratic second chamber may be a real possibility. Since the vote reform has stalled once more. The Government has indicated it wishes to include a commitment to reform the Lords in its election manifesto, allowing it force through reform with help from the Salisbury Convention. The House of Lords has also been surrounded by controversy, after allegations of peerages being sold for political donations led to a lengthy criminal investigation. Despite the absence of any prosecutions, the case has further damaged the reputation of politicians. The election of New Labour has precipitated reform of the Lords unprecedented in its long history. The hereditary peers, who once dominated the chamber, are now reduced to a minority. The House of Lords is also no longer dominated by Conservatives and is unlikely to be dominated by any other party, after the Government committed itself to forming a chamber where no single party has a majority. Despite these promising steps towards a democratic House of Lords, reform stalled. Attempts made to determine the next stage of Lords reform, appeared to have ended in failure. However in recent times the prospects for a democratic House of Lords have seemed far rosier. The recent vote in the Commons, where MPs voted for a 100% elected House of Lords, is an encouraging development for those wanting a democratic second chamber. This has been coupled with the cash for honours controversy, which demonstrated that appointed chambers are particularly vulnerable to corruption. The susceptibility of an appointed chamber to corruption, together with the growing consensus favouring a democratic second chamber, demonstrates how it has now become unacceptable for a second chamber to remain unelected.

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Conclusion

The House of Lords is a relic of Britains totalitarian past. As Britain became a democracy the powers of the House of Lords diminished. However the chamber still maintains a central function within the British political system, despite remaining an undemocratic institution. Many have claimed that reform of the House of Lords into a fully democratic chamber is long overdue. However it is important to recognise the difficulty in constructing a new political system. One must first consider whether the current system works effectively, before demolishing it to construct something new. Very few people would suggest the current House of Lords does a poor job. As has been demonstrated, the House of Lords performs several important functions. Of primary importance is the chambers role in scrutinising legislation and the actions of the executive. This is especially important in the British system, where the executive dominates the lower chamber. The House of Lords therefore plays an important role in preventing Britain from being governed as an elective dictatorship, where the Prime Minister could implement legislation which had gone through very little scrutiny. Some of the features which make the chamber undemocratic have also been suggested to enhance its ability to scrutinise legislation. The lack of any commitment to a constituency or government department, means the House of Lords has more time for close scrutiny of legislation than the Commons. The ability to appoint a multitude of experts to the chamber, also ensures detailed scrutiny of legislation by people knowledgeable on relevant subjects. The lack of any elected element to the chamber, has also not stopped the House of Lords from standing up to the Government over a number of widely controversial issues. In many cases, the chambers ability to delay legislation has frightened the Government enough to force the acceptance of amendments. One should also not forget that the House of Lords is part of a political system which has consistently produced stable governments, aside from a blip in the 1970s. Some states are much less fortunate, with the Italians being a perfect example of this. The Italians set out to create a highly democratic political system, after suffering the horrors of totalitarian government. However the laudable aim of creating a truly democratic political system, in truth produced decades of unstable governments. The continued instability, demonstrated by Romano Prodis forced resignation earlier this year, acts as a potent warning for those wanting to make the House of Lords truly democratic. It demonstrates that any changes to a political system need to be carefully considered. With careful consideration a democratic second chamber, need not lead to unstable government. The United States is one example of how a state can have a fully democratic legislature which also functions effectively. Unlike the Italian system, in which both chambers exercise the same powers, each component in the American system has its own responsibilities. The use of a different electoral system for elections to each chamber, also gives both chambers democratic legitimacy without

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causing conflict. In this system one chamber represents the will of the majority, while the other ensures each state gets equal representation. The Italian example clearly demonstrated that a poorly thought out system can have severe consequences. Therefore it may be worth considering adopting a tried and tested system which is both democratic and effective, such as the system used in the United States. However it is important to recognise that attempts to reform the House of Lords have been made throughout its history. The fact that the House of Lords remains unelected, with debate over its future still raging, demonstrates just how difficult it is to reform the chamber. Successful attempts at reforming the Lords have usually been initiated for pragmatic reasons, designed to protect the primacy of the House of Commons. This was certainly true with the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, which were designed to prevent the Lords from hindering the passage of legislation. Therefore reforming the House of Lords has not been a priority. A democratic House of Lords may in fact have been considered dangerous, threatening the primacy of the House of Commons. As the merits of democratic government became more accepted over the course of the twentieth century, the undemocratic composition of the House of Lords became increasingly indefensible. The Life Peerages Act of 1958, despite not making the chamber any more dramatic, was born out of a realisation that change was necessary. Attempts to further limit the powers of the House of Lords in 1969 were scuppered by those advocating a democratic House of Lords. This perhaps supports the theory that the Government fears a democratic House of Lords would threaten the primacy of the House of Commons. However the political turmoil of the 1970s demonstrated that the House of Lords can already cause problems for the Commons. The Salisbury Convention had ensured legislation proposed in a governing partys election manifesto, would be passed unhindered. The convention was created on the understanding that the House of Commons represented the will of the people. However this leaves ambiguity in times of minority government, when it is less clear whether the Government represents the will of the majority. This proved to be the case in 1974, when the Lords obstructed many policies of the minority Labour Government. Despite the rarity of minority governments in Britain, it is still a possibility this could happen again in future. With some claiming the current composition of the Lords now better reflects the voting share at the last election, a minority Government may be even more vulnerable than in the 1970s. With polls suggesting a hung parliament is a very real possibility after the next election, this issue needs to be given serious consideration when deciding if further reform is necessary. The turmoil of the 1970s may well have been in the minds of those controlling the Labour Party, as they swept to power in 1997. The Labour Party had remained in opposition since 1979, and their landslide victory finally gave the party the opportunity to abolish the predominantly Conservative hereditary peers from the Lords. Some have questioned the Governments commitment to Lords reform, highlighting the two year delay in implementing the first stage of reform. However it is understandable that the government would want to focus on other priorities, after

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being in opposition for so long. The compromise, allowing seventy two hereditary peers to remain in the chamber, has also been severely criticised. However the 1999 Parliament Act was still a step in the right direction. The compromise allowed the Government to make progress on the issue, without it taking up too much time of parliaments time. Supporters of a democratic House of Lords have understandably been highly critical of the decision to allow some hereditary peers to remain in the chamber. However it should be recognised the Government has indicated its intention to remove the remaining peers, as part of the second stage of reform. Any decisions on the second stage of reform, need to consider how removing the hereditary peers has affected how the chamber functions. Many believed the removal of the predominantly Conservative hereditary peers, would make the chamber less likely to oppose a Labour Government. However the reforms actually encouraged the remaining peers to frequently challenge the Government. It appears that the removal of the hereditary peers, together with the insistence that no single party should have a majority in the chamber, has given the House of Lords added legitimacy. It must be recognised that the introduction of an elected element to the chamber, would give the chamber even greater legitimacy. An elected House of Lords would have more authority to challenge the executive, potentially causing the Government even greater problems. The electoral system used would also need serious consideration. If the composition of the House of Lords is deemed more representative than that of the House of Commons, the Lords could challenge the primacy of the Commons. The House of Lords performs an excellent job, scrutinising legislation and holding the Government to account. However it is difficult to argue that it is appropriate, in the twenty first century, for such an influential institution to remain unelected. It is true that the House of Lords is part of a political system, which has almost always produced strong governments. However other states, such as the United States, have demonstrated that democratic systems can also produce effective governments. At the same time, the Italian example demonstrates that any changes should be made with caution. It is therefore entirely right for the Government to take plenty of time considering what form further reforms should take. Poorly thought out reform could have severe consequences for the stability of the British political system. Therefore it may be worth considering adapting a tried and tested system, which would make the chamber democratic while maintaining stability. The creation of an American style Senate could be the ideal solution to the issue of House of Lords reform, as well as the separate issue of devolution. Whatever solution is adopted, it is important that the Government continues its commitment to creating a democratic second chamber. Hopefully the recent vote in favour of a 100% elected chamber, is the next step towards the creation of a democratic second chamber fit for the twenty first century.

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