The Grammatical Structure of Propositions

Ulrich Reichard, University of Durhamulrich.reichard@durham.ac.uk

Semantics and Philosophy in Europe 610-14 June 2013, Saint Petersburg

Outline

1. Grammar is Meaningful2. A Problem for Propositions3. Soames’ Cognitive-Realist Account4. Propositions are Grammatically Structured

1. GRAMMAR IS MEANINGFUL

Autonomous Syntax

• Syntax is – autonomous– formal (concerned with well-formedness)

• ‘The question […] of what the syntactic structure (underlying or superficial) of a sentence [is] is entirely independent of the question of what its semantic structure may be.' (Radford 1981: 167)

• But, according to Chomsky 2012, the generative tradition has always been concerned with aspects of meaning including compositionality and scope.

What Grammar does

‘The goal of grammar is to express the association between representations of form and representations of meaning.’ (Chomsky 1981: 17)

Meaning Grammar

GrammarMeaning Sound

Sound

Generativity in Grammar Only

• Grammar is the origin of discrete infinity. • Conceptual-intentional (C-I) systems are – ‘performance systems’ (Chomsky 1995: 168)– ‘purely interpretive (Chomsky 1965: 21)Very much like the articulatory-perceptual (A-P)

systems.• ‘As if syntax carved the path interpretation

must blindly follow.’ (Uriagereka 1999)

Strict Interfaces (Roeper 2007)

• Nonsense-sentences vs. word-salad:– Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.– Furiously sleep ideas green colourless

• We cannot help interpreting nonsense. Only the interpretation determines that the meaning is deficient. (Mukherji 2010, Roeper p.c.)

Syntax and Semantics,Language and Thought

• A decision as to the boundary separating syntax and semantics (if there is one) [...] will clearly remain open until these fields are much better understood.’ (Chomsky 1965: 159)

• ‘The systems of thought […] use linguistic expressions for reasoning, interpretation, organizing action, and other mental acts’ (Chomsky 2009: 19).

• ‘There may be a single internal language [generated by grammar], effectively yielding the infinite array of expressions that provide a language of thought.’ (Chomsky 2009: 32)

UG is Optimized for Semantics

• UG is ‘optimized relative to the CI interface.’ (e.g. Chomsky 2007)

• ‘Mapping to the sensorimotor interface appears to be a secondary process […]. If so, then it appears that language evolved, and is designed, primarily as an instrument of thought’ (Chomsky 2009: 28-29).

Structural Meaning

• ‘The syntactic component specifies an infinite set of abstract formal objects, each of which incorporates all information relevant to a single interpretation of a particular sentence.’ (Chomsky 1965: 16)

• Ambiguities have to be disambiguated in syntactic structure. (Chomsky 1965: 21)– The president called the senator from Texas.

(Pietroski 2005: 257)

The senator is from Texas

The president called the senator from Texas

The call is from Texas

The president called the senator from Texas

The president is from Texas

The president from Texas can form a constituent only if word order is changed:

The president from Texas called the senator

Explaining Structural Meaning

• If you want to work out the syntax of an expression, you need to consider its meaning.

• If you want to know why an expression can mean what it does (and cannot mean what it cannot), you need to look at its syntax.

• An additional semantic layer, could just reiterate this information.

• Examples of grammatical explanations of semantic phenomena: Hinzen (2007), Reichard (2012, 2013), Hinzen and Reichard (2011), Reichard and Hinzen 2012).

Summing Up

• GG is usually taken to draw a rigid distinction between syntax and semantics (syntax is autonomous and formal).

• But much of GG seems to be concerned with meaning:– Grammar is generative, CI only do what grammar tells

them.– Grammar generates a language of thought.– UG is optimized for the C-I interface.– Grammar explains certain aspects of meaning.

2. A PROBLEM FOR PROPOSITIONS

Propositions are needed...

• as meanings of sentences– According to the structured propositions camp,

truth-conditions are not fine grained enough.• as objects of propositional attitudes• as bearers of truth and falsity• as bearers of modal properties

What kinds of things are propositions?

• Neo-Russellians: Propositions as structured n-tuples consisting of objects, properties and relations.

• ‘Thoughts are neither things in an external world, nor are they representations. [/] A third realm must be recognized.’ (Frege 1918: 353)– Positing third-realm entities is not explanatory.

(e.g. Soames 2010:107)

How can propositions represent?• Benacerraf style problem (King 2007: 7):

‘There are a number of distinct n-tuples, all of which seem to be equally good candidates for being the proposition that Annie likes Carl.’

Which structure is the proposition that Annie likes Carl?

Annie liking Carl

Carl Annie liking

LikingAnnie Carl

The Problem

• It is hard to see how ‘any formal structure of this, or any other, sort could be that proposition.’

• ‘There is nothing intrinsic to such structures that makes them representational, and so capable of being true or false.’ (Soames 2010: 31)

• We could assign a meaning to these structures and make them interpretable.

• But then their meaning is not intrinsic to them.

SOAMES’ COGNITIVE REALIST ACCOUNT

Soames’ proposal:Reverse the direction of explanation

• ‘Sentences, mental states and utterances are not representational because of the relation they bear to inherently representational propositions. Rather, propositions are representational because of the relations they bear to inherently representational mental states and cognitive acts of agents.’ (Soames 2010: 7)

The ‘cognitive realist’ account of propositions (Soames 2010, 2010a, forthcoming)

1. Cognitive acts/events in which we predicate something of something else are inherently meaningful.

2. Propositions are types of cognitive events the instances of which are agents’ predicating something of something else.

3. Types are abstractions from their tokens (Soames 2010:3).4. Propositions then inherit their meaning from (purportedly)

inherently meaningful cognitive event-tokens.– ‘The representationality, and hence truth conditions, of the

propositions are due to the representational features of these possible instances.’ (Soames: forthcoming: 9)

5. So, there is nothing mysterious about propositions.

Recent Developments...

• Soames has recently given up some of the above: what is now inherently meaningful are act-types.– Why are cognitive act-/event-types inherently

meaningful?• Moltmann’s account of propositions is based

on similarity-classes of products of acts.

How to distinguish propositions from other cognitive act types?

• Soames recognizes several different cognitive acts: predication, function application, conjunction, etc.

• What makes a certain cognitive event token a predication (as opposed to a conjunction)?

• Probably that it realizes a certain kind of structure.Whether an event token is a predication depends on the

type it realizes.According to Soames, types are abstractions from

tokens.Þ We are in a circle.

A problem for Soames’ cognitive realist account of propositions

‘Mere abstractions from predications do not explain why the instances realize the predication features they do. What appears to explain that is the agents’ realization of a system that coordinates and constrains their possible predications.’ (Collins 2011: 156)

How can propositions be individuated?

• Predications are tokens of the same propositions iff they have the same constituents, structured in the same way.– Annie likes Carl ≠ Carl likes Annie– Why are they different propositions?– Because they have different structures.

• The structure cannot be a pure abstraction, otherwise it remains unexplained why the two propositions are different propositions.

In Sum

• Without act-types, we cannot distinguish– propositions from non-propositions– different propositions from one another.

-> Way out: Give up the doctrine that structures cannot be inherently meaningful.

4. PROPOSITIONS ARE GRAMMATICALLY STRUCTURED

The Structure of Propositions• Proposal: Grammar structures propositions.

– Propositions are the meanings of sentences, and sentences are structured grammatically. • Soames (2010: 102) on ‘propositions’ vs. ‘act-types’, which unpack as

CPs (clauses) vs. gerunds.• Gaskin (2008: 15): different functions of propositions ‘guaranteed by

grammar’ via the distributional properties of that-clauses.– Grammar is meaningful.

• In virtue of what are grammatical structures inherently meaningful, rather than just theoretical devices for tracking facts about meaning and well-formedness?– Grammatical structures as natural objects.

Grammar as an analogue to DNA

‘You can map any DNA sequence of an organism to bottles and pancakes. The question is why you should [...]. The DNA codes for the proteins it codes for, playing a particular causal role in an organismic process [...]. An LF/SEM is, equally, a particular organismic structure. [Due to structural differences, different] expressions will play a different causal role in our mental life and behaviour.’ (Hinzen 2006: 228-229)

Grammar and natural laws

• The relation between a grammatical structure and its meaning is not logically necessary.

• It is, however, biologically necessary: it is a matter of natural law.

• Grammatical structure is in this sense inherently meaningful.

Conclusion I• Soames (2010):

– The origin of meaning is to be found in cognition.– Propositions are cognitive-act types.– Types are abstractions from their tokens.

• The problem:– Abstractions are arbitrary, depending on a theoretician.– Whether a certain act is a predication or conjunction is thus

arbitrary.– But this result is not acceptable.

• Question: Are there inherently meaningful types, and hence inherently meaningful structures?

Conclusion II

• The proposal: grammatical structures are inherently meaningful.– The grammar of sentences is closely related to

propositions.– Grammar is meaningful.

• Grammar can only be determined with the help of meaning.• Aspects of meaning are explained by grammatical structure.

– If grammar is a natural object, the relation between grammatical form and content is secured by natural law.

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