The Georgian - South Ossetian Conflict

1 Methodological Considerations and Formulation of the Problem

This thesis is the story of the so-called Georgian - South Ossetian ethno-

nationalist conflict. In this thesis I will cast some theoretical light on the

conflict, trying to reach an understanding of the specific features, roots and

processes of the conflict. By the experienced conflict I will try to demystify

and decipher the so commonly used an accepted notion of ethnic conflict.

Among journalists but also some academics, the most conventional

explanations for the ethnic conflicts that arose in Eastern Europe after the

collapse of the communist regimes are the ones that can be called the "pot-lid-

theories" or the "refrigerator-theories" (Sampson 1992, p.395, Brown 1993,

p.5-6 and Suny 1993, p.3). The communist regimes, especially the Soviet

Union, are said to have repressed national and ethnic sentiments and

differences and frozen down national identity. The ethnic/national differences,

grievances and/or conflicts that existed were repressed, and have now re-

emerged, hence the metaphor of the pot-lid that has been lifted.

These explanations generally see communism as a parenthesis, something that

has interrupted a natural historical course. In this light ethnic conflict is seen

as something almost natural, logically diverted by differences and as

something which was frozen down by communist repression. Now that

communism, and with that repression, have ended and the lid removed, nature

can evolve as it should, and the eternal historical hatred will be expressed

freely.

In this explanation lies two main assumptions. One is that ethnic conflict is

more or less natural, that when you have different ethnic groups in one setting

conflict is inevitable. Hence that heterogeneous areas are unnatural. The

multi-national states, such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, are in this

light seen as artificial constructions. The homogeneous nation-state is

generally seen as the natural state - as things should be. Hence the titles of

numerous articles and books on the Balkans or the Caucasus using the words

ethnic powderkeg, mosaic, or puzzle. The other assumption is that the

communist regimes of Eastern Europe and especially the Soviet Union did not

tolerate expression of national or ethnic identity and hence suppressed it and

instead tried to create an artificial Homo Sovieticus. In this view the recent

conflicts are seen as a reaction to this artificial situation. The nations and the

ethnic groups are now moving towards the natural situation of one state - one

nation.

1.1 The Problems of the Thesis

The overarching aim of the thesis will be to demystify and decipher the notion

of ethnic conflict. Understanding specific features and processes of ethnic

conflicts. The thesis will however be two-stringed in the way that it will

consist of a theoretical and empirical understanding of ethnic conflict. The

emphasis will be put on an understanding of the experienced Georgian - South

Ossetian conflict. The theoretical part should thus be seen as developing

concepts in order to shed some theoretical light on the experienced ethnic

conflict. In the urge to understand the phenomenon of nationalism and ethnic

conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as such I thus put

strong emphasis on an understanding of the actual experienced conflict and

this in its Soviet context.

The aim of this report is exactly to question the above mentioned conventional

explanations for the rise of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union, using the experienced example of the Georgian - South

Ossetian conflict. To try to question the inevitability of ethnic conflict and to

show that national and ethnic identities are constructions in themselves. That

nations and ethnic groups do not, with Benedict Anderson's words, loom out

of an immemorial past. That we are dealing with a socio-political and cultural

phenomenon rather than a nature given. And in fact that we are dealing with a

phenomenon that is multidimensional and only be can fully grasped if

analysed contextually. In this respect I will try to show that the policies of the

Soviet Union played an active part in the developing of national and ethnic

identities and furthermore elaborated a system, which was inherently

conflictual in respect to these identities. That in fact one even might say that

the Soviet political system nursed and cultivated ethnic/national differences

and inherent conflictual structures and identities rather than putting a lid on

them or freezing them down.

Furthermore it has been shown that wars defined as ethnic conflicts on an

avarage have a significant longer duration than other types of war; that they

are more vicious of nature and uncontrollable, and that more frequently than

other forms of conflict, ethnic conflicts do not end by negotiated solutions but

by outright military victory by either side (King 1997, p.13 and Scherrer 1997,

p.42). The common explanations for this intractability and protracted nature of

ethnic conflict are often ascribed to the uncontrollable irrational behaviour

motivated by deeply rooted ancient hatreds and incompatible deeply felt

values and identities of the belligerents in ethnic conflict (King 1997, p.13 and

52). An explanation not only found in journalistic writings but also in

arguments by the so-called international community for not intervening in

these kind of conflicts (Snyder 1993, p.79 and King 1997, p.26).

I shall look for alternative explanations to the nature of ethnic conflict.

Looking specifically on the structure of conflict or armed conflict/warfare to

be more precise; determining structural factors that can help explain the

protracted nature and intractability of ethnic conflict in another light than the

above mentioned explanations.

Summing up this thesis will be about the Georgian - South Ossetian conflict.

A conflict with the label of an ethno-nationalist conflict. Determining what it

is that makes this conflict an ethno-nationalist conflict. Looking specifically

on theories of nationalism and ethnicity, the dynamics of armed ethnic intra-

state conflict and on the specific roots and processes in the Georgian - South

Ossetian conflict. But let us turn to some methodological considerations

where I also will argue for the choice of theories and empirical material.

1.2 Methodological Considerations

The first theoretical part of this thesis, nationalism and ethnicity, is more an

attempt to give an overview and an interpretation of the theoretical approaches

to the phenomenon of nationalism and ethnicity, rather than lining up a couple

of different theories and use them on the experienced conflict. In doing so I

am aware of the fact that I may reduce the complexity of the different theories

and thus a previous knowledge on the subject of nationalism may be required.

At the same time it should be mentioned that my purpose is not to give an

exhaustive typology or genealogy of the theories of ethnicity and nationalism

but rather to show that nationalism is a contested and heterogeneous

phenomenon. Though extensive enough to serve the purpose of this thesis, not

to say that nationalism is really... but to show that nationalism can have several meanings, depending on space and time and is changeable depending

on context and purpose. Therefore the purpose of this chapter should be seen

as that of elaborating an applicable theoretical framework for the analysis.

The second theoretical part of the thesis, the dynamics of armed ethnic intra-

state conflicts, is an attempt to theorise on the more structural and inherent

components of conflict as a counterweight to the more socio-political and

cultural explanations of ethnic conflict, which should be given by the first

theoretical part. To try and grasp the basic nature and extract the

particularities of this kind of conflicts, but also to compare it to other forms of

intra-state conflicts in order to demystify and decipher the notion of ethnic

conflict.

The empirical part also consists of two parts. The first part will deal with the

actual experienced ethnic conflict, the so-called Georgian - South Ossetian

conflict. Here I will line up the actual course of events based on interviews,

first hand experience and written material. This will in effect be an attempt

expose and describe the circumstances in which this conflict evolved, but also

at the same time to line up the different perceptions on behalf of the involved

parties.

The second part will so to speak focus a level back and up, looking on the

Soviet setting in which you also will have to analyse the conflict. As written

above one of my hypotheses is that the Soviet Union by its intended policies

played an active role in the developing of national and ethnic identities and

furthermore elaborated a system, which was inherently conflictual in respect

to these identities. In this chapter I will thus look on both Marxist-Leninist

theory on the nationalities question and the principle of national self-

determination on the one hand, and the actual way the system functioned in

practice on the other hand. In this putting more emphasis on how the system

was implemented on the ground rather than putting emphasis on the

theoretical aspects and historical developments in these discussions. This of

course with an emphasis on the experienced conflict. Hence the part on

Marxist-Leninist theory will be least studied, the principle of national self-

determination more and the actual implementation and functioning most.

As mentioned above this thesis is a linking of theory on nationalism and

conflict dynamics to the specific experienced conflict. Linking theory and

empirical material is however not just something you do without further

methodological considerations. Without entering the apparently never-ending

discussion within social sciences on the relation between theory and empirical

material I will still try to argue for my chosen method.

The theoretical parts will first of all be a rewriting or reconstruction of the

theories to a form that makes these applicable as steering-tools in the analysis

of the empirical material. The aim of the project is not to confirm the

existence of nationalism or its prominent role in the conflict, but to use

theories on nationalism and internal conflict to shed some theoretical light on

the conflict and to determine what role ethnicity and nationalism play in this

conflict.

It is not a verification or falsification, of the theories I will make, which would

be methodological inappropriate as you would, so to speak, operate within the

realm of the theories themselves, and as the saying goes in Danish som man rber i skoven fr man svar. But still it is to use the theories (or the rewritten theories) to shed an explaining and interpreting light on the conflict. In other

words to use the theories to decipher the notion of ethnic conflict and in this

way extract from the theories some analytical tools to be used in analysis of

the phenomena and the case. But on the other hand also to look for the

possibility of the empirical material to provide background for possible

critique of the theoretical apparatus.

The theoretical part on nationalism and ethnicity consists of an overview of

the landscape of theories of nationalism, were I will try to reach my

understanding of nationalism. Of course it has been impossible for me to get

acquainted with all contributions to the theoretical debate on nationalism over

the years. The chosen theorists represent what others and I call, the modern classics, and these theories are building on previous contributions and cover the vast part of the theoretical space. It should however, also be mentioned

that I draw on additional theoretical material where I find it necessary.

Although most of these theoreticians deal with the subject in order to seek and

understand the historical roots of nationalism, they also describe the nature of

nationalism and its conflictual aspects, which is the main focus of this project,

and thus what I will focus on.

The first theoretical part is mainly based on more general theories of

nationalism, namely Benedict Anderson "Imagined Communities", Eric J.

Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Anthony D. Smith "National Identity", Ernest Gellner "Nations and Nationalism", and last but

not least Paul R. Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism from 1991, who more specifically deals with ethnicity.

I have made use of the chosen theories because they say something about

nationalism and ethnicity. But one could easily ask the question, why use

theories about nationalism and ethnicity to shed light on an ethnic conflict,

why not use theories on class struggle, modernisation, state theory, theories on

international politics etc.?

On the one hand the point is exactly to look at ethnic conflict as a specific

theoretical problem. One can choose to look at ethnic conflict or ethnic

politics as just another form of politics where other theoretical approaches can

be used to explain the phenomenon. But one can also choose, as I do, to look

at ethnic conflict, or ethnic mobilisation, as a special form of politics, where

exactly the culture, or more specifically ethnicity, functions as the mobilising

basis. Then it is interesting to use theories on ethnicity and nationalism as

something different from other more general theories of social sciences, which

probably can explain a deal, but not the processes and dynamics in the

conflicts, which are specific because they are articulated in ethnic terms. Here

it is not a question of taking the arguments of the participants in ethnic

conflicts for granted, but to accept that it leads to specific conflict patterns,

which theories dealing exactly with nationalism can shed light on.

On the other hand I should also state that one of the aims of this thesis, as

mentioned initially, is to demystify and decipher the notion of ethnic conflict.

Therefore I have chosen to use theories of nationalism and ethnicity to so to

speak play their ballgame in order to see what this framework offers. I exactly

want to study the specifities of ethno-national conflict, demystifying and

deciphering the ethno-national elements, and therefor I have to study ethnicity

and nationalism.

At the same time I have felt the necessity of drawing on another theoretical

approach. Besides making use of theories of nationalism I have decided to use

theoretical work on what you could call the dynamics and nature of armed

ethnic intra-state conflicts. This I have chosen to do not from the start but as I

went deeper into the jungle of this study. This need appeared because of the

fact that several questions surfaced as I went along. The question of what

makes an ethnic conflict different from other internal conflicts and the

questions of the possible presence of inherent structural factors in intra-state

conflict situations that makes ethnic conflicts more protracted and severe.

Hence looking at other explanations than culture and identity which is offered

by the theories of nationalism. Trying to find something rational or logical in a seemingly or at least depicted irrational phenomenon.

The fact that there does not, to my knowledge, exist comprehensive

theoretical works on this[1] have made this chapter a bit of a puzzle, taking

bits and parts mainly from working papers, articles and journalistic writings.

Comprehensive literature retrieval has made this chapter possible and

hopefully not puzzle-like to read.

The main sources of this part is based on Charles King Ending Civil Wars, Michael Ignatieff Blood and Belonging, several working papers from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), and literature from

international relations theory and peace research theory that in a more indirect

manner deals with intra-state/ethnic conflicts.

1.3 Method of Gathering Empirical Material

The second empirical part of this thesis - the Soviet Setting - is mainly written

on a documentary style of method. Gathering information on the Soviet

setting from books and articles written by scholars focused on the Soviet

Union and its policies on the national question and not least area specialists of

the region. Furthermore I have made use of Soviet and Georgian/South

Ossetian empirical data on population figures and ethnic compositions in

different arenas. This of course raises certain questions as to the validity of

such empirical data, since some of it can be interpreted as biased.

First of all most, if not all, scholars dealing with the nationality question of the

former Soviet Union agrees to the fact that the Soviet Union had fairly reliable

census data at least when it comes to the recognised nationalities as the ones I

am dealing with (see for example Gurr 1993, p.12-13). Secondly this data I

shared and discussed with the parties and others on location, and found no

mayor discrepancies or objections.

This part of the thesis has on my part been carefully written, knowing that

ethnic composition figures often are at the hart of the matter in ethnic conflict.

Comparing and double-checking all statistical data where possible. Where this

has not been possible or there has been a high danger of apparent biased data I

have used it as an indication rather than as fixed and precise figures. However,

I should also state that as I had most of the empirical data gathered when I was

in the area I confronted the different parties with the data and found no mayor

objections. At the same time I should also mention that incorrect' statistical material is also of relevance since ethnic conflict is not necessarily about facts

but more important about perceived facts.

As for the first part of the empirical material, the actual conflict, it is first of

all important to state that I was in Georgia to fulfil a certain job position not to

do research on Georgia and the specific Georgian - South Ossetian conflict.

This in itself laid down some restrictions on my other role as a student of

ethnic conflict. However I came to Georgia as well with the agenda to study

ethnic conflict and my job created certain opportunities to study this conflict

not as an observer but rather as a participant, as you must include international

organisations and NGOs on this side[2].

However in late 1995 I was asked by my organisation to write a small paper

on the history and course of conflict (which is also the basis of these two

sections in this thesis), to be published as background material for the

international community (international organisations and embassies). This

gave me a change to study the conflict a bit closer and to learn how sensitive it

is put such events and perceptions of history down on paper. I made an effort

not to present this as the objective truth, as this of cause is impossible, but as

the perceptions of both the Georgian and South Ossetian side. This was one of

the first times, if not the first, that the South Ossetians had their perspective on

the history of the conflict presented on paper in English. This I state to

emphasise that this, regardless of its obvious small scope, was a kind of

pioneer work. Not only did I get the label of professor of history I also

experienced how history change according to present circumstances as I on

several occasions was asked to change certain previously stated facts.

The restrictions and dangers of the position of an employee of a foreign NGO

were that the conflicting parties of course could become more cautious as to

how close they would let me in into their worlds so to speak, as I through this

position became a small part of the overall political game. However, at the same time this got me into a position where I could operate with more

authority and generally they were very forthcoming. This has also something to do with the fact that very little international attention was directed towards

the South Ossetian issue. In this way I had weekly meetings with senior

officials and other administrative personnel through my job position.

Arranging practical things like setting up meetings and conferences with

South Ossetian participation, which of course led to more opportunities of

informal talks on the overall issue of the Georgian - South Ossetian conflict.

I am making a clear distinction between my contact with the Georgians and

South Ossetians because there was a clear difference in the way of having

contact with them. First of all I lived in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, not in

Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. They all saw me as an outsider, a

stranger, but at the same time the South Ossetians were conscious about the

fact that I lived on the other side. The South Ossetian authorities would at first not let me stay for a period of time in South Ossetia as I requested. But as

they got used to my organisation intentions and me they asked me to stay for a

longer period of time, but unfortunately then I had run out of time to do so.

Hence my freedom of movement was restricted in South Ossetia, it was

simply not save to move around on your own without local escort and the authorities preferred to control the situation. Therefore my contact was limited

to official and semi-official persons, but on the other hand my work with

youth organisations and journalists gave me a broader insight as well as the

writing of the small paper.

In Georgia proper I had no such restrictions, I lived there, and made contact

with all sorts of people, I felt the atmosphere of the place in a different way.

Having said this it is important to note that I made good contacts and

friendships on both sides. And in a way I got intimate in another way with the

South Ossetians because of their isolated position, especially as I at a couple

of occasions functioned as an international escort to Georgia proper at meetings and conferences arranged by my organisation.

Writing this I have to say something about the way of getting close to the

people of the Caucasus, Georgian or South Ossetian. I had plenty of official

meetings and formal interview situations, but in Caucasus this is not the way

of getting close to the heart of the matter. To get to the heart of the matter

requires intimacy and in the Caucasus intimacy is inseparably connected to

food and drinking.

You can read methodological books about how to do an interview or how to

observe but in the Caucasus you must drink and eat your way to the core of

the matter. If you dont like Caucasian food or the smell and taste of Georgian wine, South Ossetian beer or vodka and its local variants then dont bother doing research in the Caucasus. It can sound very unscientific on paper but I

would not have been honest to my method and the truth if I had not written this. On the other hand one could also see this as part of an anthropological

method where it precisely is about being in the centre and not on the side line.

Observing but also participating and thereby acquire the experience necessary

to reflect and understand.

Of course I got a lot of information and empirical material from written

sources from both sides and formal interviews, not to mention material written

by other scholars. The point is however that I had been no where if I had not

been there in the Caucasus, smelling the fresh air from the Caucasian

Mountain Range, the gasoline in the streets of Tbilisi, listening to the personal

stories told around the Caucasian Table after having been forced to eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol. These were the situations were I began

to see and understand the situation, this was the intimacy required, on the

behalf of the involved parties, if they were to let me into their understanding,

perceptions and views on the situation. This is part of my method, or maybe

should I say their required condition for doing research in the region.

[1] Christian P. Scherrer states in a working paper from COPRI that

this field is far from as advanced as for instance inter-state conflicts and

this especially concerning ethnic intra-state conflicts (Scherrer 1997,

p.4 and 34).

[2] This was however only one of the many tasks I had within the organisation.

See in appendix 2 for a description of my work at the organisation.

2 Nationalism and Ethnicity - A Theoretical Overview

A great deal of ambiguity and confusion surrounds the use of terms like ethnic group, nation, state, and nationalism. The different terms are being used and understood in a variety of often related, but different meanings by academics, nationalists, journalists and in everyday language.

The idea of this chapter is to shed an explaining light on these terms and concepts and to give an

overview of the theories of nationalism and my interpretation of the phenomenon.

What I would call the modern classics of theory of nationalism, have mostly dealt with the subject from a historical point of view, explaining the emergence of nationalism and the nation-

state. In this chapter I will try to focus on the nature of nationalism and on the conflictual aspects

of this. Nevertheless I will also draw on the historical angle because it shows, as we shall see, that

we are not dealing with one phenomenon but several forms and shapes formed by the last 200

years.

The different theories of nationalism evolves around certain focal points which are also the main

elements in an understanding of the phenomenon:

- Nationalism as a political phenomenon legitimising actions or systems as opposed to

nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, providing meaning/raison dtre.

Nationalism as either a modern phenomenon inseparably connected to the emergence of the

modern centralising state or nationalism as a primordial phenomenon, something natural and

rooted in the past.

These two sets of opposing views are furthermore reflected by the angle of analysis either

primarily from a structural or an actor-oriented angle.

In order to understand these different aspects of nationalism better, I will start off with the

classical distinction of nationalism, as either a political or an organic phenomenon, which then

later hopefully should give us a better opportunity of understanding the conflictual aspects of

nationalism.

2.1 The Genealogy of Nationalism

The nation-state and democracy are so to speak twins born out of the French and American

revolutions. With the French Revolution the nation became the source of state sovereignty. Not

understood as if each nation is supposed to be granted the right to political self-determination, but

rather, in the way that the people living within the given territory of the state constitute the nation.

This is the so-called French or political-civic notion or principle of the nation. According to this

notion the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic or cultural

characteristics, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights and

duties (Habermas 1992, p.2-3). Hence the primary meaning of nation was political, patriotism

was conceived as love to the nation (in the meaning of state and state-patriotism) expressed by the

wish to renew it by reform or revolution, and thereby breaking with former loyalties. In this way

their patrie, opposed to an existential, pre-existing unit, was a nation created by their free choice.

American are those who wish to be. French nationality was French citizenship and the nation was un plbiscite de tous les jours. Ethnicity, language and history were irrelevant to the French nation (Hobsbawm 1990, p.87-88). It was the ideals of the Age of Enlightenment that were

pronounced - universalism and rationality. It represented the common interests against particular

interests. This kind of nationalism is aimed to extend and unify, rather than to restrict and

separate (Hobsbawm 1992, p.23), or in the words of Mary Kaldor, to unify and centralise rather

than decentralise and fragmentize (Kaldor 1993, p.108). The Romantic Movement, mainly

German, reacted on the ideas of the Enlightenment, with its mechanical and rational view on

society and humanity.

The Romantic Movement stood for the defence of the national characters; what was unique had value and with these ideas emerged a romantic worship and study of genuine volks-art, and the notions of a Volk and its Volksgeist. In this way the so-called German notion of the nation, or the organic-ethnic, is to be seen in opposition to the French, political-civic notion of the nation.

It is an objective ethnic definition of the nation which draws the conclusion that there should be a

congruency between the nation and the state (in ethnic terms), understood in the manner that

every nation (ethnic group) has the right to its own state. Hence the concept encompasses

collective self-determination and expression of national character. In conclusion nations are seen

as natural entities and with the development of national consciousness, nations, by the laws of

nature, have the right to express themselves in a national idiom.

Many of the authors I deal with in this chapter have developed typologies of nationalism evolving

around this distinction, calling it political/organic, French/German, official/vernacular,

revolutionary-democratic/ethnic etc. One of the first and, according to Smith, most influential

typologies was made by Hans Kohn, in which he distinguishes between a Western and an Eastern version:

Fig 1.: Kohns Dichotomy[1]:

Western Nationalism Eastern Nationalism

Great Britain, France, America. Eastern Europe (east of the Rhine).

Rational. Mystical.

A product of the middle classes (bourgeoisie),

whom came to power at the end of the 18th

century.

Eastern Europe had no developed middle class;

instead nationalism became a product of a few

intellectuals, which made it more authoritarian.

An association of human beings living on the

same territory, under the same government and

laws.

The nation as a seamless, organic unit with a

mystical 'soul' and 'mission'.

Smith has several reasons for criticising this typology. First of all because of its geopolitical

dimension which overlooks the influence of both kinds of nationalisms in different European

communities: the organic version in Ireland and later 19th century France, the rational ideal in

some versions of Czech, Hungarian and Zionist nationalism, as well as in early West African

nationalisms (Smith 1991, p.81). Furthermore the western nationalisms owe much to the earlier

monarchies (as seen as well in Andersons chapter on official nationalism, where the old monarchies of Europe tried to legitimise themselves by naturalisation (Anderson 1983, p.86-87)). Finally Smith states that there should be made a distinction between German and Italian

nationalisms opposed to the relatively underdeveloped Balkan and Eastern Europe. But despite

these criticisms, Smith finds Kohns distinction between a more rational and a more organic version valid and useful. But it is important, he stresses, that both models can be found in the

East and in the West, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and as a mixture with greater or lesser emphasis on one or the other (Smith 1991, p.79-82).

Like Smith I also find it appropriate for analytical purposes to describe the two different (in a

Weberian understanding) ideal types of the nation, the cultural or organic and the political or the

civic. As seen in the figure below:

Fig. 2:[2]

Nation

The Political-Civic The Organic-Cultural

A juridical-political community of laws and

institutions with a single political will.

Ethnic comprehension of the community as

common descent.

Political territory. Homeland - Vaterland.

Social contract between citizen and state,

individual, subjective consciousness. Volksgeist/descent, fictive super-family,

collective, objective consciousness.

Inclusive, in the way that it tries to unify and

extend.

Exclusive, in the way that it tries to restrict and

fragmentize.

Rational Irrational

The nation is a choice; the nations are created

by the will of the members.

The individual is born into and organically

connected to the nation, the will of the members

is determined by the belonging to the specific

nation.

In this way the organic-cultural notion of the nation has as its basic assertion that the nation

should be defined on the basis of ethnic criteria, and that every nation, ethnically defined, should

be gathered in their own state. Contrary to this, the political-civic notion of the nation has as its

basic assertion that everyone that lives within the boundaries of the state should become a part of

the nation, which is what lies in the concept of nation-building. Both principles then stress the

cultural similarity of their adherents but in fundamentally different manners. The political-civic in

an inclusive way and the organic-cultural in an exclusive way.

Let us now turn to look a little bit closer at the different aspects of the phenomenon, as they are

described by the different theories, and in this way see that this distinction is also reflected in the

different views of nationalism. The typology I will return to later.

2.2 Nationalism as a Political Doctrine

Some authors view nationalism as a political phenomenon legitimising actions or systems. In this

way nationalism is primarily viewed as a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner 1983, p.1 and Hobsbawm 1990, p.9). According to this view the nation and nationalism can only be understood in relation to a certain kind of

modern territorial state; the nation-state. In this understanding the state plays a central role in the

process of building the nation. As Hobsbawm writes: It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state (Hobsbawm 1990, p.44-45). Nations and nationalism are hence in this perspective seen as something constructed mainly from above.

In this respect it is interesting to see that both Gellner and Hobsbawm, refuses a fixed definition

of the nation (Gellner 1983, p.6-7 and Hobsbawm 1990, p.7-10). According to Hobsbawm the

question ought not to be what is the nation? but rather what has the notion - the nation - meant in different, often competitive, contexts, in different periods, for different groups with different

political strategies?

Hobsbawm generally sees the national question as situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation. He states that nationalism should be seen as

something essentially constructed from above but not only as that. According to Hobsbawm, it is

also necessary to analyse it from below. Thus he criticises Gellner for being to one-sided, making

it difficult to analyse nationalism from below, in terms of the assumptions and feelings of the

ordinary people. However, although Hobsbawm mentions this duality of nationalism, he is mostly

concerned with analysing nationalism from above and neglects to analyse it from below.

Anderson deals in his book with what he calls official nationalism. Originally it is something that should be understood in connection to the decline of the monarchies of Western Europe,

during which nationalism could function as legitimising the continuation of dynastic rule. The

purpose was to unite dynasty and subjects. The king was no longer ruling as Gods representative on earth, but now as a number one among his fellow countrymen. In this way official nationalism

was used to make the king a symbol of the nation. Furthermore the official nationalism developed

after, and in response to the national/popular movements, the aim of the official nationalism being

not only to legitimise the king, but also the empire, as Anderson writes: These official nationalisms can best be understood as a means for combining naturalisation with retention of dynastic power, in particular over the huge polyglot domains accumulated since Middle Ages, or,

to put it another way, for stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of

the empire (Anderson 1983, p.86).

What is important here is that Anderson have a layer upon layer conception of nationalism, so

that the different nationalisms that he speaks of (Creole nationalism, vernacular nationalism, etc.),

can be copied, refined and mixed and then be used differently, depending on time, place and the

concrete contents. In this way official nationalism can be seen as a model used for its

manipulating abilities by those who are in control of the political apparatus, as he writes: The one persistent feature of this style of nationalism was, and is, that it is official - i.e. something emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost (Anderson 1983, p.159). In this way you can state that Anderson also (but not only as we shall see) view

nationalism as a political doctrine, legitimising actions or systems.

An extreme, but nevertheless fruitful, version of viewing nationalism as something political we

find at Paul R. Brass. He understands basically nationalism as something political. As a social and

political creation by elites, whereby ethnic groups, or rather their elites, uses ethnic/national

identity when it comes to put forward demands on the political or economical level to obtain

political power or economic gains. A modern phenomenon inseparably connected to the activities

of the modern centralising state.

Brass sees two ways in which nations can be created. Either by the transformation of an ethnic

group to a self-consciousness political identity in a multi-ethnic state or by the fusion of different

ethnic groups creating a homogenous national culture by the modern state as promoter. An ethnic

group he defines as a subjective self-conscious community that establishes criteria for in- or

exclusion using cultural symbols in order to differentiate themselves from other groups (Brass

1991, p.18-20)[3].

Ethno-nationalism and state-centred or generated nationalism can therefore both be seen as

subtypes of a general identity creating process, defined as a process whereby the subjective

meaning of a number of symbols is intensified, and as a strive for obtaining a multisymbol congruence among a group of people defined initially by one or more central symbols, whether

those symbols are ethnic attributes or loyalty to a particular state (Brass 1991, p.20).

Brass instrumental approach is made clear when he states that ethnicity can be activated in special contexts or/and at specific times. The main point is that the formation or politicisation of

ethnicity is seen as a process created in the dynamics of lite competition. The elites make use of

the attributes of the ethnic groups as resources, intensifies them and thereby creates a political

identity, which is used in the competition for political power and economic gain (Brass 1991,

p.15-16). Basically he sees ethnic groups as mobilised by disgruntled elites to a growing sense of

group solidarity (Brass 1991, p.41). Hence ethnic groups, or rather their elites, are using the

ethnicity to put demands to the political system in order to improve their status, economic

situation, civil rights or educational/job possibilities.

2.3 Nationalism as a Modern Phenomenon

In continuation of the view of nationalism as a political doctrine it is easy to view nationalism as

a modern phenomenon, something understood in connection to the emergence of the modern

centralising state.

To illustrate what nationalism has meant in Europe, Gellner asks the reader to imagine two

ethnographic maps, one drawn up before the age of nationalism and one after. The first would be

a chaos of different colours, where no clear pattern would be found and where it would be

difficult to make out, where one colour stops and the other takes over. In the other the colours are

clearly separated, neat flat surfaces clearly separated from each other and there is little if any

ambiguity or overlap. If one shifts to reality, one will discover that the prevailing part of the

political authority has been placed in a certain kind of institution - the modern centralising nation

state. This always identifies itself with one kind of culture and one style of communication within

its boundaries. In order to exist, the state is dependent of a centralised educational system, the

content of which it dictates as well as finances.

If we look at the economy in a society with such a state, it will become clear why it has to be this

way. Its economy depends on communication between the individuals and their mobility at a

level it would not be capable of maintaining, if the individuals had not been socialised into the

culture of the concerned society (Gellner 1983, p.139-140).

In this way Gellner sees nationalism as the organisation of human groups into large, centrally

educated, culturally homogeneous units. Its roots should not be found in the human psyche but in

the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society and modes of production (Gellner

1983, p.34-35). The requirements of a mobile division of labour, and sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in

a standard idiom and in writing when required (Gellner 1983, p.34).

Also Hobsbawm views nations as new phenomenon, invented and socially produced, it belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it

relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state, but it is not exclusively a function of this. The emergence of nationalism should also be seen in the context of a particular

stage of technological and economic development (Hobsbawm 1990, p.9-10), whereby he is in

line with Gellners thesis.

Anderson however, as we shall see, holding a primarily cultural understanding of nationalism,

also relates the emergence of nationalism to the processes of modernisation and the emergence of

capitalism, but this he relates to the weakening of two cultural systems. That of the kings divine

right and the religious community. In this way the imagination of the nation was made possible

by changes of some fundamental cultural conceptions. Anderson puts special emphasis on the

role of print-capitalism, which made it possible for a rapidly growing numbers of people to think

about themselves, and to relate themselves to others. Although he speaks of cultural systems he

puts emphasis on some structural changes, in connection with the processes of modernisation,

which made it possible to imagine the new community.

Brass stresses specifically the relevance of the nature of the modern centralising nation-state in

explaining ethnic conflict. He writes that there is nothing natural or inevitable about ethnic

conflict, the answers should be found in the relations between the centralising state and the

regional ethnic elites (Brass 1991, p.242 and 244). Brass sees the state, especially in societies

undergoing secularisation, modernisation and industrialisation, as both a resource and as a

distributor of resources and at the same time as promoting new values. Therefore, the state and its

policies are described as a potential advantage for some groups and societies and a threat for

others, especially for local elites and societies whose values differ (Brass 1991, p.272).

The processes of modernisation in a society consists of a dual fight for control of resources and

values between bureaucracies and political organisations at the centre and between the elites of

the centre and local elites. The ethnic elites function as effective rivals to the civil and military

bureaucracies because of their ability to mobilise popular support, exactly because they control

symbolic resources and values on the grounds of their cultural fundament. In this way the

necessity for local collaborators arises - in the sense that the state makes alliances and coalitions

with local ethnic elites, both because of state intrusion by its centralising policies, but also

because of the fact that the ethnic groups pose a threat to the state due to their position as

competing systems.

As to the fight over resources Brass states that the objective existence of disparity is an

indispensable explanation of ethnic conflict but not an explanation in itself. The mere presence of

disparity is not enough to explain or produce a nationalistic movement, nor can it explain why

dominant groups develop a such (Brass 1991, p.41-42). In Brass understanding elites and competition among elites and the relation to the state are the essential elements in ethnic group

conflict and political mobilisation. All other factors, including size and richness of available

cultural symbols, regional economic disparities or the like, are just background material for the

elites to draw from to their aims. Without the elites these differences or disparities will just vanish

or be accepted or maybe be the cause of sporadic or isolated incidents of conflict or disorder. In

this way Brass explains the rise of Croatian nationalism, not as a feeling of relative deprivation or

deprivation at all, but due to the fact that there existed advantages for the lite that could be

gained by emphasising Croatian distinctiveness (Brass 1991, p.44).

Basically Brass puts emphasis on the interaction between the state and the peripheral ethnic elites

in times of modernisation and drastic changes in the society, such as changes in the political

context and in the balance of the centre-periphery relations. Ethnic conflicts emerge especially

under three types of conditions: ...during transfer of power from colonial to post-colonial states, during succession struggles, and at times when central power appears to be weakening or the

balance in centre-periphery relations appears to be changing (Brass 1991, p.244).

2.4 Nationalism as a Cultural Phenomenon

Other authors put more emphasis in explaining nationalism from the angle of fulfilling a basic

need in people, meaning from a more actor-oriented angle. Benedict Anderson, who takes the task

of explaining, what it is that make people love and die for nations - as well as hate and kill for it,

finds it necessary, like Gellner and Hobsbawm, to understand how nations have come into

historical being. In this sense you can say that he too holds a structuralistic historical approach.

Unlike the other theorists, Anderson looks closely at the emotional power nationalism holds, and

in this way he states that it would, I think, make things easier if one treated it (nationalism) as if it belonged with kinship and religion, rather than with liberalism or fascism (Anderson 1983, p.5).

Andersons definition of the nation as an imagined political community - imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 1983, p.6) reveals that he as well puts emphasis on the political aspect of nationalism and the importance of the emergence of the modern

centralising state. But unlike especially Gellner, he seeks to understand the emotional appeal and

cultural nature of nationalism, this is especially underlined in his descriptions on the effects of

print-capitalism, as a structural condition, but in the light of making it possible to imagine the

community in a different way.

Theories, like Gellners, are good for explaining the changes in linguistic and cultural standardisation that happened during the transition from agrarian society to industrial society.

Gellners theoretical construction suffers however, from a very instrumentalist understanding of nationalism as such. It is as if he has never known the feeling or felt the need to confront with

people that have felt it. Gellner lacks the ability to explain the emotional appeal nationalism

holds. Therefore, as much as you can agree with his definition of nationalism as a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent as much you can disagree with his definition of nationalist sentiment as the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of this principle and a nationalist movement as one acurated by a sentiment of this kind (Gellner 1983, p.1).

The imagination of the community plays a central role in Andersons understanding of nationalism. The community of the nation reaches beyond social and religious layers in society.

In spite of inequality and exploitation, the community is always imagined as a deep horizontal

brotherhood. Thus Anderson looks at the strength of the community as a brotherhood, assuming a

common past and destiny, in the course of which enormous sacrifices in the name of the nation

was made in wars. Nationalism is strong as opposed to ideologies because these are not capable

of giving answer to human sufferings and basic questions such as the meaning of death, illness

and life in general.

In this way nationalism is viewed as a transverse, cultural phenomenon which offers a feeling of

community and identity in the nation which religion previously could offer (Anderson 1983,

p.12). The nation is eternal, it offers a feeling of common destiny - it is worth dying for. Anderson points to the fact that nearly every West-European nation has a tomb for the Unknown Soldier. A symbol of the continuance of the nation, in spite of the fact that the soldier is dead and even not in the tomb. Because of the nature of the nation, the soldier is so to say still alive and the

sacrifice that he made for his country is not forgotten (Anderson 1983, p.9). This is also the case

when one refers to his homeland. This often happens in the style and vocabulary of kinship:

Motherland, Vaterland, Patria, etc. These terms refer to something natural that one is naturally - by birth - tied to (Anderson 1983, p.143). In everything natural there is always something not chosen, things are just as they are. You are a part of the above-mentioned community of destiny.

As a result, the nation can appeal for sacrifice and patriotism.

Anderson makes in this way a comparison between family and patriotism/nation-ness. The nation

calls for unselfish love and solidarity. This is what the family traditionally has been conceived as

being the domain of. His conclusion is that patriotism is the same form of unselfishness, and that

the nation therefore - via peoples patriotism - can make people sacrifice their life in war.

Another important exponent of viewing nationalism as a cultural phenomenon rather than as an

ideology or form of politics is Anthony D. Smith. According to him national identity provides for

the individual a satisfying answer to the problem of personal oblivion, through the creation of a community of history and destiny which saves the individual from obliviation and restores collective faith (Smith 1991, p.160-161).

He stresses the close relationship between the family, the ethnic community and the nation. He

sees nationalism as a collective cultural identity, a sense of continuity over generations of a given

cultural unit (the myth of common descent, rather than actual continuity of cultural patterns), as

shared memories of earlier events, and as the idea of a collective destiny entertained by each

generation. The pattern is the myths, symbols, collective memories and values which bind the

generations together and demarcates the outsiders (Smith 1991, p.25). In this way it is as to become part of a political super-family, to realise the ideal of fraternity. Nations are in this way understood simply as families writ large, a large sum of many interrelated families, brothers and sisters all (Smith 1991, p.162).

However, Smith still terms nationalism as an ideological movement, but here it is important to

stress that he sees it as an ideology of the nation rather than the state. Smiths definition of the nation, as a named human population sharing an historic, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all

members...sets it clearly apart from any conception of the state (Smith 1991, p.14). In this connection it is also interesting that his definition of nationalism does not necessarily include the

wish for statehood but for maximal control of the homeland and its resources. But still this

definition makes it possible to see national identity and nationalism as multi-dimensional and

hence easily connected to political ideologies like liberalism, fascism, and communism.

Furthermore Smith does not deny the close historical relationship between the state and the

nation, but he sees them as two clearly separated concepts. Nationalism in this way is seen as a

sort of culture rather than a political doctrine and should not be mixed up with the fact that states

use nationalism for legitimising purposes, which they have done and still do. The main difference

then between Smith and Anderson is that Smith ascribes nationalism a cultural inner core while

Anderson consistently views nationalism as an abstract phenomenon.

2.5 Nationalism as a Primordial Phenomenon

As noted above most of the theoreticians of nationalism understand the phenomenon in

connection with the emergence of the modern centralising state and the related processes of

modernisation. However, some of the authors put, more or less, emphasis on the so-called

primordial aspects of nationalism in their understanding of the phenomenon. Primordialism

means that the modern nation is seen as a representation of age-old cultural patterns. A modern

form of group belonging formerly expressed in clans, kinship and ethnic groups. In this lies the

understanding that nationalism should be seen as an expression for the human need of group

belonging (which we also can recognise from Anderson).

The rhetoric of nationalists themselves is the closest we come a pure primordial understanding.

From this perspective nations are regarded as natural phenomena of great antiquity, to this picture

we can add the nationalist myths of the nation waiting, Sleeping Beauty-like, to be awaken from its slumber, to fulfil its predestined goal of attaining freedom and autonomy (Anderson 1983,

p.195 and Gellner 1983, p.48). As we have seen, Gellner views nationalism and nations as

creations, and in describing them as such, he pictures the nationalist rhetorics and myths well.

The myth of the nation as nature-given and eternal is false, he states, and goes on by writing that

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns

them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a

reality... (Gellner 1983, p.48-49).

In Smiths book National Identity he focuses exactly on the continuity between pre-modern ethnic identity and the modern nations. This puts him within the primordial school, although, as

we shall see, he holds a more differentiated view. Contrary to the modernist, who claims that

nations are inventions, Smith stresses that nationalism is not more invented than other forms of

culture, ideology or social organisation (Smith 1991, p.71). Smith argues for a view in between

the primordialists and modernists, stating that an ethnie (the French word he uses for ethnic

communities) is formed, neither by actual ancestry nor by lines of physical descent (which is

irrelevant). But through a sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny. Ethnies are

so to speak formed by lines of cultural affinity, expressed in distinctive myths, memories,

symbols, and values which are maintained and retained by a given cultural unit of the population

(Smith 1991, p.29).

Collective cultural identity, he writes, refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but

rather, to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to

notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture (Smith 1991, p.25).

Smith is of the opinion that there is a relation between the modern nation and the premodern

ethnie; ...many nations have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie, which

annexed or attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and a

cultural charter (Smith 1991, p.39). But the connection is complex because of the fact that not all modern nations are based on this, i.e. United States of America, Australia and most of the African

post-colonial states.

Despite this fact, Smith states that there are some reasons why, the origins of the nation should be

looked for in the pre-modern ethnic ties. First of all, the first nations were formed on the basis of

pre-modern ethnic cores, and because they were so powerful and culturally influential, they

became models for other cases of nation-formation. The second reason is that the ethnic model of

the nation became increasingly popular and widespread, because it fitted so well to the premodern

demotic kind of community that had survived into the modern era. The ethnic model was hence

sociologically fertile. Third, even in the cases where there were no ethnic antecedents of

importance, nations anyway need to create a certain coherent mythology and symbolism around a

historical-cultural community (Smith 1991, p.41-41).

2.6 Ethnicity

In this section I would like to expand on the issue of ethnicity. First of all the difference between

ethnicity and nationalism, an ethnic group and a nation. This mainly because of the fact that the

chosen theoretical writings I have used so far are not specifically focused on ethnicity. Secondly

from my point of view they also generally lack, what one might call, a social comprehension of

ethnicity and national identity. I have therefore allowed myself to seek some answers from an

anthropological perspective using mainly Thomas Hylland Eriksen Ethnicity and Nationalism.

Basically the difference between nations and ethnic groups is seen to be a question of size but that

the structural composition and functioning are of the same kind. Hylland Eriksen states that yes

they are kindred conceptions but a distinction is worthwhile because of the relationship to the

modern state (Eriksen 1993, p.98-99 and 105).

In this respect you can speak of the difference between the notions of nation and ethnic group

corresponding to the earlier mentioned distinction (section 2.1), between the nation seen as either

political-civic or organic-cultural. In the organic-cultural the nation is defined in ethnic terms. In

the political-civic the nation is defined in political terms inseparably connected to the notion of

the nation state.

But as we have seen, nations defined initially political-civic still are not to be understood

exclusively as political organisations. They also have had and have to draw on symbolic resources

in order to uphold a collective identity. Nations are thus seldom defined only by citizenship, but

also by culture. Nations can contain different ethnic groups or be defined mainly or only by the

dominant ethnic group. Both nationalism and ethnicity strives for and stresses the cultural

similarity of their adherents, but in different ways. When we speak of this in relation to the two

ideal types, the important difference is as mentioned, that the political-civic, is unifying and

expanding, striving for inclusion. So even though we are dealing with ideal types, in the way that

they are seldom found in a pure form, this does not make the distinction irrelevant. The

governments of Mandela and Yeltsin are not nationalistic in the same way, as the governments of

Tudjman or Landsbergis, who contrary to the first mentioned, have had an exclusive

understanding of the nation and thus have agitated for fragmentation and restriction.

The term ethno-nationalism should therefore be used to refer to the claim, of an ethnic group or a

state, to an ethnically homogenous state. The conflictual aspect lies thus in the fact that many

states or ethnic groups do strive towards this goal or behave as if it was the case. In this way

nationalism differentiate from ethnicity by its relation to the state, even though Smith have a point

in not including the state in his definition of the nation and speak of maximal control of the

homeland and its resources.

Smith is one of the few who include this in his definition of the nation, whereas most others have

it as the major difference between nation and ethnic group. In this way ethnicity is exactly not

necessarily about attaining statehood. The statistics of the former Soviet Union spoke of 104

nations comprising the union, they were in fact ethnic groups in as much as they didnt want full independence (Eriksen 1993, p.119). On the other hand however, one could also state, as Hylland

Eriksen point out, that the phenomenon of ethnicity like nationalism is inseparable from the

notion of the modern centralising territorial nation state since this has meant a politicisation of

culture (Eriksen 1993, p.125). Ethnic groups become relevant because of the homogenising nature

of the modern centralising nation state.

Still we have to account for the differences between nation and ethnic group or what Anthony

Smith calls an ethnie, the latter, according to Smith, being a premodern basis on which most

nations are formed. Both Smith and Brass describes levels of ethnicity, from ethnic category

through ethnic community to nations, which imply a focus on consciousness but also more or less

on objective criteria. Objective criteria - since the starting point of this ladder is a set of criteria -

which separate the different groups from each other. Smiths starting point is the ethnic category, which by others are seen to constitute a separate entity without any special self-consciousness to ethnie defined by believed common cultural traits and a self-consciousness and finally to the nation. Brass also operates with the difference between ethnic category and ethnic community defined by ethnicity as self-consciousness and then finally the nation. The ethnic category being defined by some more or less objective but chosen criteria, amongst many

possible, which through the ethnic community to the nation increases in number as well as

subjective meaning.

Hylland Eriksen also operates with different levels of ethnicity but with another agenda. That is

looking specifically on the relationship between groups and in this way showing that ethnicity can

have different social importance, be up- or downgraded according to the social context (Eriksen

1993, p.41).

Brass also states, as we have seen, that ethnicity can be activated in special context or/and at

specific times. The difference is however, that Hylland Eriksen has a more social angel than, as

Brass, a mere instrumental angel to this. Before entering this discussion I have to dwell a bit on

Hylland Eriksens overall position on ethnicity, which will shed some light on the subject.

Hylland Eriksen defines ethnicity as a special kind of consciously communicated and manifested

cultural identity. An identity building on the consciousness of being different. However, cultural

difference between two groups is not the decisive feature of ethnicity, only in so far as cultural

differences are perceived as being important, and are made socially relevant do relationships have

an ethnic element. Ethnicity is rather constituted through social interaction than cultural content

(Eriksen 1993, p.18 and p.36). Hence ethnic groups does necessarily emerge because of contacts

between groups. Ethnicity is therefore an aspect of a social relation between groups (Eriksen

1993, p.11-12). To speak of an isolated ethnic group is like to hear a sound from one hand

clapping as he writes (Eriksen 1993, p.1).

Hylland Eriksen also draws on the work of Frederik Barth from 1969, which can be characterised

as a watershed within the study of ethnicity. Barth precisely turned the focus from the cultural

content to looking at ethnicity as emerging in the borderland between groups. Therefore it is the

boundaries - as a social and not territorial phenomenon upon, which the focus should be put.

Ethnicity is always about culture - people or groups that subjectively maintain cultural

peculiarity. The problem is precisely that cultures, which subjectively differentiate from each

other, not always do so objectively. But when the mutual subjective understanding is such that the

groups do differ from each other, then it constitutes a social reality, which is manifested as ethnic

identity. The maintenance of ethnic boundary is therefore, from the point of view of Barth, a

social phenomenon, rather than a cultural, and therefore it is exactly the life and movements of

the boundary that must be studied and not the cultural content. Cultural variation is rather an

effect then a cause of boundaries. Hence a focus on the social relations, the way the borders are

maintained and changed over time and in that way also how the meaning changes.

This corresponds to the view on culture as complex, something fluid and dynamic. Culture is not

something that is, but something that takes place in a constant process of change and negotiation.

This also implies a view on persons as complex entities with several social identities, which are

created, undergo change and that is activated in different social situations. In this paradigm

ethnicity is defined as fluid and negotiable. The importance varies situational. The we category can be expanded and contracted according to the situation and the individual can choose to

emphasise different social identities at different times (Eriksen 1993, p.20-35).

Although somewhat unfair to most of the theories, as their main focus rest upon other aspects, we

may use this discussion to criticise the body of theoretical work so far used. They have, I would

not say a too categorical view on nations and ethnic groups, but do exactly not stress this fluid,

situational and negotiable aspect of ethnicity and national identity. Most of them, as we have

seen, do emphasise the constructed aspect of ethnic and national identity but roughly speaking I

would still say that they treat nations in a too fixed and categorical manner.

Thus I find this anthropological approach by Hylland Eriksen and Barth very useful because they

turn the focus on boundaries rather than cultural content and by doing so particularly points to the

fluid or situational character of ethnicity. This opens up for a more complex view on these

collective categories. Not just as something that is not static but also not treated as a totality. This

point became very obvious to me in the field, working closely with the different UN agencies and

the OSCE. These organisations, as well as several NGOs, very often treated the different ethnic groups almost as if they were singular actors. Thereby playing along in the continuos

entrenchment of the us and them dichotomy.

Of cause one could say to their defence that this is exactly what nationalism and ethnicity is

about, as the Croatian writer Slavenka Draculic so nicely puts it: The problem with this nationalism is however, that where I previously was defined by my education, profession, my

thoughts, my personality - and yes also my nationality, - I now feel deprived from all of this. I am

nothing, no longer a person. I am one of 4.5 million Croats (Draculic 1993, p.49-50, my translation).

But academically, and in the field for that sake, it is still important to have an eye for the fact that

...identities are never completed, never finished, that they are always as subjectivity itself is, in process...all of us are composed of multiple social identities not of one (Stuart Hall 1991, p.47 and p.57). In this lies the assumption that identities can crosscut one another and sometimes even

be contradictory. This opens up for not just treating these aggregated groups as totalities, but to

look at the internal role-divisioning and the possibility for individuals to not only over- or under-

communicate their ethnic or national identity but to shift between different identities and in some

instances even change affiliation[4].

2.7 Summing Up and Conclusions

Nationalism as we have seen above has not one, but several meanings depending on space and

time and is changeable as well. Nationalism or rather nationalisms are multidimensional and

ambiguous phenomena. Most of the theoreticians not only emphasise one aspect of nationalism

but include several different aspects, although to a greater or lesser extend.

Nevertheless nationalism can broadly be understood as a socio-political phenomenon, as an

emotional affiliation to a country and/or a group of people, as a form of collective consciousness.

I.e. the nation-state can be understood as a territory where the population is united in a nation by

the bond of nationalism, that being mainly defined in a civic-political or in a mainly organic-

ethnic manner. But nationalism can also be attached to people or ethnic groups across or within

the framework of the state and might be expressed in demands of grades of autonomy of own

affairs or in the more extreme cases, as ours, separatism.

Nationalism is a relatively modern phenomenon, but it is a mixture of old and new, politics and

culture. Nationalism would not possess the strength in emotional appeal if it couldnt draw on the feelings of a shared community, cultural, historical memories and fulfil a need in the individual.

This is a very important fact to note in relation to ethnic conflict; ethnic mobilisation is only

possible where these symbolic resources have been continuously maintained and developed in

order to command its emotional strength and thus function as the basis of mobilisation. The

nation is imagined and a construction, but also a social reality, and it should not be treated as

something false and unreal.

The argument, that states such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia are artificial implies that there are natural nations. As we have seen the nation is a modern phenomenon, all nation states are artificial, i.e. social and political constructions. In fact only 10 per cent of states can claim to be true nation-states, in the sense that the boundaries of the state coincide with the nation, defined ethnically (Smith 1991, p.15). And then again ethnicity is, as we also have seen, no less imagined,

but also a social phenomenon. Culture is not something, which is but something we do.

Although I agree up to a point, that contrary to many nationalist ideologies, it is not nations that

make states, it is at the same time important not to reverse the argument and simply claim the

opposite like Hobsbawm does, when he writes that Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around (Hobsbawm 1990, p.10). Nations can be developed without the agencies of the state and strive for statehood. One should not only see nations as creations, or

something made imaginable by the elites of the state-apparatus. This can also happen through

ethnic elites without a state-structure at hand. Here it is often intellectuals or academics that are

having an important role in shaping and maintaining the symbolic resources of the group. But it is

a point worth stressing, in the spirit of Brass that this is often happening exactly as a consequence

of the policies of the modern centralising nation state.

Already now we can thus draw some conclusions. Ethnic conflict does not steam from old ancient

hatreds. Ethno-national identities are a modern phenomenon. Multinational or heterogeneous

states are not artificial constructions. The idea of the nation is artificial - a construction or an

imagination - a social reality - yes - but the idea of the homogeneous nation-state is an illusion.

The fact is that 90 percent of present days states are ethnic heterogeneous makes homogeneity an

illusion. And this illusion or strive towards homogeneity is the conflictual aspect - not

heterogeneity.

Finally it should be mentioned that despite the acknowledged strength in the emotional appeal of

nationalism and its spread as a principle all over the world, most of the authors however, agree

with the point, that nationalism is theoretically and ideologically weak, especially due to its

abstract and multidimensional character.

In this way Anderson notes the philosophical poverty and incoherence of nationalism (Anderson

1983, p.5). But this emptiness also reflects the strength of nationalism (besides its emotional

appeal), which lies in its chameleon-like nature and its facility in combing with other issues and

ideologies (Smith 1991, p.144). Nationalism ...once created, they (different forms of early nationalisms) became modular, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations (Anderson 1983, p.4).

Because of the emptiness, it becomes possible to fill the void with other elements like ideologies

and political programmes. So the conclusion must be that in order for nationalism to have success

it needs more than cultural differences it must be attached to political questions. As Gellner

writes, nationalism is not as strong as it seems like, who for the simplicity of his argument

mentions language as the criteria for culture, and states that then we have 8000 potential

nationalisms but only around 200 states (Gellner 1983, p.44-45). Cultural, national, and linguistic

etc. differences are constituent parts of nationalism, but in themselves not enough to produce

nationalism. As even Smith writes ...national aspirations tend to combine with other non-national economic, social or political issues, and the power of the movement often derives from

this combination (Smith 1991, p.145).

In further continuation of this it is a theoretical point that an analysis of ethno-national conflicts

must be contextual. The specificity of the individual ethnic conflict is thus interesting, i.e. socio-

economic, historic, political etc. conditions and relations. At the same time I want to stress that

one should not only focus on rational calculations in an understanding of ethnic conflict. The

power of nationalism lies in the combination of the rational with the irrational. You might see the irrational as being the fuel of nationalism and the rational the catalyst. In this way the

imagination of the community, the feeling of belonging, the shared myths, collective memories of

earlier events in history, symbols etc. should be understood as the irrational fuel of nationalism in

order to give it or uphold its emotional strength.

[1] Based on Smith 1991, p.80-81.

[2] This figure is made on the basis of Smith 1991, Hobsbawm 1990 and Marlene Wind

1992, p.41-51.

[3] I will return to a closer definitional discussion of ethnic groups and ethnicity in section

2.6.

[4] The latter part of this section I owe a great deal from the article by Stuart Hall, Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities.

3 The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict

t has been shown that wars defined as ethnic conflicts on an average have a

significant longer duration than other types of war; that more frequently ethnic

conflicts do not end by negotiated solutions but by outright military victory by

either side, and finally that ethnic civil war is of a more vicious nature (though

not necessarily more destructive) than other forms of conflict (King 1997,

p.13 and 24-25 and Scherrer 1997, p.42). The common explanations for this

intractability and protracted nature of ethnic conflict have often been ascribed

to the uncontrollable irrational behaviour motivated by deeply rooted ancient

hatreds and incompatible deeply felt values and identities of the belligerents in

ethnic conflict (King 1997, p.13 and 52).

In this chapter I shall look for alternative explanations to the nature of ethnic

conflict. Looking specifically on the structure of conflict or armed

conflict/warfare to be more precise; determining structural factors that can

help explain the protracted nature and intractability of ethnic conflict in

another light than the above mentioned. Some of these factors may be

applicable to inter-state conflicts and other intra-state conflicts as well. The

purpose of this chapter is however, not only to determine and characterise the

specific nature of ethnic conflicts but in fact mainly to focus on conflict

dynamics of ethnic conflict contrary to the previous theoretical chapter which

focused on ethnicity and nationalism. The specific characteristics or relevant

differences between ethnic conflict and other kinds of intra-state conflicts I

shall return to at the end of this chapter, for now I will use the different terms

for intra-state conflicts more or less indiscriminately.

A final opening remark should be made about the fact that despite that most of

the wars since 1945 has been intra-state conflicts there exist little, if any,

comprehensive theoretical research on the dynamics and even the causes of

intra-state conflicts (Scherrer 1997, p.50 and Nielsen 1997, p.2). This is

therefore based mainly upon working papers and articles and should therefore

be seen as theoretical reflections rather than as a coherent theoretical chapter

in comparison to the previous theoretical chapter on nationalism and

ethnicity.

3.1 The Scene of Conflict

One of the most distinguishing features of ethnic conflict is that it is typically

a non-state conflict wholly or partly (Hobsbawm 1993, p.41). The main

characteristic of intra-state conflict is the absence of a state structure or the

existence of a weak one. They are mainly taking place in either collapsing

states or emerging states in the process of state building. This is according to

all the authors I have encountered in this field the key to an understanding of

intra-state conflict (Brown 1993, p.6, Mller 1996, p.20, King 1997, p.50-51,

Vorkunova 1997, p.49, Hobsbawm 1993, p.41-42 and Snyder 1993, p.86).

This factor may not be sufficient for conflicts to break out, but definitely

makes them possible, and of interest for the present purpose, determine the

specific course of these conflicts (Brown 1993, p.12).

Hobsbawm writes in an article that almost everyone, who have experienced

both civil wars and ordinary inter-state wars, are likely to think that civil wars

are worse:

The major reason why this should be so lies precisely in the disappearance of the accepted mechanisms of public order. The Hobbesian argument that,

however deficient and unjust the state, it is better than its absence, the

Hobbesian state of nature or public anarchy, carries substantial force, as many people in ex-Yugoslavia and the ex- USSR will confirm (Hobsbawm 1993, p.42).

Eric Hobsbawm sees the existence of a functioning state as the most important

condition or perhaps as indispensable for the control of ethnic conflicts. Here

it is not so much the question whether the institutional anarchy is a cause of

ethnic conflict or a prerequisite, this I will return to later. But that it is in this

anarchical setting that ethnic conflict unfolds and this determine the dynamics

and nature of this form of conflict. As Michael Ignatieff writes:

Thomas Hobbes would have understood Yugoslavia...There is one type of fear more devastating in its impact than any other: the systemic fear which

arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of the terror

which arises when legitimate authority disintegrates (Ignatieff 1994, p.16).

Even though he implies the collapse of state-structure as a reason for conflict

(which we for now will keep in mind), the main point here is his emphasis on

terror - or in other words the brutal way this kind of conflict evolves - the way

anarchy prevails (Brown 1993, p.6).

This, which by some has been called the institutional anarchy of civil war

(King 1997, p.51), brings me to a description of the nature of conflict.

3.2 The Nature of Conflict

Inter-state wars can be characterised by more or less clear-formed parties, not

necessarily of same strength, but of same structure. It is fought between

recognised states and their respectively subordinated regular armed forces,

which usually are identifiable from each other and from the civilian

population (Wallensteen 1994, p.74). The application of the Geneva

Convention is unproblematic (Scherrer 1997, p.8, though not always followed

I would add), and the conflict is taking place in an overall international state-

system where certain rules are followed and observed.

In the institutional anarchy of intra-state war, which of course can be of

different degrees, there is a lack or absence of organisational or

institutionalised practises. No sharply defined borderlines, which simplify

inter-state confrontations, even when it comes to the uniforms or other

identifying marks which, distinguish combatant from non-combatant

(Hobsbawm 1993, p.41).

In intra-state wars we are not dealing with two or more national armies. Combatants in civil wars are most often of a very non-traditional nature

without a traditional military line of command. This is again often exacerbated by the fact that the communication network is in a bad shape or

even non-existing. Guerrilla fighters, child soldiers and soldier bandits can

moreover, in contrast to professional soldiers or conscripts, be very difficult to

control (King 1997, p.33-35 and Mller 1996, p.iv).

In short intra-state wars tend to be more messy and bloody, even just because

of the fact that at least one of belligerents is a non-state actor, operating under

more permissive rules than states tend to (Mller 1996, p.23). However, as

another author points out, its is not only, or in fact it is often, the states (read

weak states) rather than the insurgents, that are the main actors in a not

spontaneous but organised brutal warfare (Scherrer 1997, p.47).

Furthermore, in comparison to inter-state conflicts it is often more difficult or

sometimes made deliberately difficult to determine who the belligerent sides

are in intra-state conflicts. Who are the leaders in charge or spokespersons,

who represents the real interests at stake in the conflict and who are entitled to

negotiate, compromise and enforce of reached decisions (Mller 1996, p.39

and King 1997, p.33).

This may be further complicated by the fact that factionalism is likely to be

more intense in intra-state conflicts. The argument here is that intra-state

conflicts overall is about legitimacy and/or sovereignty and once this has been

questioned, factionalism can continue to the smallest nucleus (Rana 1995, p.9

and King 1997, p.34). Several parties and likely leaders can emerge and the

question is then who should and can sign a final peace-agreement. This of

course also deepens mutual suspicions and prolongs the way to peace (Mller

1996, p.39).

The above mentioned factors makes an assessment of military costs and

benefits with the overall political objectives extremely difficult. Superior

logistics is the hallmark of war