The Format of Thought: a The Format of Thought: a Dynamical Systems Approach Dynamical Systems Approach

to Intentional Actionto Intentional Action

Susan SchneiderSusan Schneider Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive

Neuroscience, and Institute for Cognitive ScienceNeuroscience, and Institute for Cognitive ScienceUniversity of PennsylvaniaUniversity of Pennsylvania

AimAim

• DST purports to be a theory of the nature of DST purports to be a theory of the nature of thought. thought.

• View of DST in mainstream philosophy of mind: View of DST in mainstream philosophy of mind: Unclear on how low-level explanations in DST can Unclear on how low-level explanations in DST can inform traditional philosophical problems such as the inform traditional philosophical problems such as the mind-body problem, mental causation, the nature of mind-body problem, mental causation, the nature of mental states/events, and the free will-determinism mental states/events, and the free will-determinism debate. debate.

• Today: quick discussion of novel DST view of mental Today: quick discussion of novel DST view of mental causation. Use this view of mental causation to causation. Use this view of mental causation to develop a position on the free will debate for DST develop a position on the free will debate for DST (“Neurocompatibilism).”(“Neurocompatibilism).”

Approaches to the Nature of Approaches to the Nature of ThoughtThought

• Naturalism: explain how mental phenomena fit into the world that Naturalism: explain how mental phenomena fit into the world that scientific investigates.scientific investigates.

• Naturalistic approaches to conceptual thought:Naturalistic approaches to conceptual thought:

• Connectionism: conceptual thought is a species of pattern Connectionism: conceptual thought is a species of pattern recognition in which activation patterns spread though a recognition in which activation patterns spread though a connectionist network (Paul and Patricia Churchland, Paul connectionist network (Paul and Patricia Churchland, Paul Smolensky). Smolensky).

• Symbol processing approach. Conceptual thought is the Symbol processing approach. Conceptual thought is the manipulation of symbols according to algorithms (Fodor, Pinker).manipulation of symbols according to algorithms (Fodor, Pinker).

• DST – cognitive systems are kinds of dynamic systems, and as such, DST – cognitive systems are kinds of dynamic systems, and as such, they are best understood from the perspective of DST.they are best understood from the perspective of DST.

DST Approach to Mental DST Approach to Mental CausationCausation• Normal model of causation is “linear causation” Normal model of causation is “linear causation”

(“efficient causation”, “billiard ball causation”) in (“efficient causation”, “billiard ball causation”) in which event E1 brings about E2. DST: different which event E1 brings about E2. DST: different approach.approach.

• Freeman: “Linear causality fails most dramatically in Freeman: “Linear causality fails most dramatically in studies of the relations between microscopic studies of the relations between microscopic neurons and the mesoscopic populations in which neurons and the mesoscopic populations in which they are embedded...Such interactions are not they are embedded...Such interactions are not particular to neurons in neuropil, being common in particular to neurons in neuropil, being common in familiar systems such as hurricanes, lasers, fires, familiar systems such as hurricanes, lasers, fires, herds…In each of these cases, particles making up herds…In each of these cases, particles making up the ensemble simultaneuously create a mesoscopic the ensemble simultaneuously create a mesoscopic state and are constrained by the very state they state and are constrained by the very state they have created.” (p. 129)have created.” (p. 129)

DST and Mental Causation, DST and Mental Causation, cont.,cont.,• Scott Kelso, “In synergetics, the order parameter is Scott Kelso, “In synergetics, the order parameter is

created by the cooperation of the individual parts of the created by the cooperation of the individual parts of the system, here the fluid molecules. Conversely, it governs or system, here the fluid molecules. Conversely, it governs or constrains the behavior of the individual parts. This is a constrains the behavior of the individual parts. This is a strange kind of circular causality (which is the chicken and strange kind of circular causality (which is the chicken and which is the egg?), but we will see that it is typical of all which is the egg?), but we will see that it is typical of all self-organizing systems. What we have here is one of the self-organizing systems. What we have here is one of the main conceptual differences between the circularly causal main conceptual differences between the circularly causal underpinnings of pattern formation in nonequilibrium underpinnings of pattern formation in nonequilibrium systems and the linear causality that underlies most of systems and the linear causality that underlies most of modern physiology and psychology…” (Kelso, 9)modern physiology and psychology…” (Kelso, 9)

• ““Circular Causation”: higher-level emergent patterns Circular Causation”: higher-level emergent patterns generate downward causal influence on the physical level.generate downward causal influence on the physical level.

• Philosophers: Is circular causation coherent? Philosophers: Is circular causation coherent?

Kim’s Exclusion ProblemKim’s Exclusion Problem• Not presented against DST specifically, but I’ll apply to case of Not presented against DST specifically, but I’ll apply to case of

circular causation. circular causation.

• Idea behind problem: Whenever a mental event is proposed as a Idea behind problem: Whenever a mental event is proposed as a cause of another event, whether physical or mental, its status as cause of another event, whether physical or mental, its status as cause is in danger of being preempted by a physical event—that cause is in danger of being preempted by a physical event—that is, a mental cause is liable to be excluded by a physical cause.is, a mental cause is liable to be excluded by a physical cause.

• Causal Closure of Physical (i.e., microphysical) Domain. General Causal Closure of Physical (i.e., microphysical) Domain. General idea, quoting Kim:, “the physical domain is causally and idea, quoting Kim:, “the physical domain is causally and explanatorily self-sufficient—that is, to explain a physical event, or explanatorily self-sufficient—that is, to explain a physical event, or to identify its cause, there is no need to look outside the physical to identify its cause, there is no need to look outside the physical domain.”domain.”

• Ex) The biological domain is not causally self-sufficient since Ex) The biological domain is not causally self-sufficient since nonbiological events (e.g., purely physical events such as nonbiological events (e.g., purely physical events such as exposure to strong radiation, natural disasters) can cause exposure to strong radiation, natural disasters) can cause biological changes. biological changes.

• Physical Causal Closure (Kim)Physical Causal Closure (Kim). If a physical event has a sufficient . If a physical event has a sufficient cause occurring at t, then it has a physical sufficient cause cause occurring at t, then it has a physical sufficient cause occurring at t.occurring at t.

Exclusion Problem, cont.,Exclusion Problem, cont.,• Now consider circular causation. Suppose that a mental event M, occurring at Now consider circular causation. Suppose that a mental event M, occurring at

t, causes a physical event P. From the Causal Closure Principle, it follows that t, causes a physical event P. From the Causal Closure Principle, it follows that there is a physical event, P*, occurring at t, which is a sufficient cause of P. there is a physical event, P*, occurring at t, which is a sufficient cause of P.

• Kim. This already is an “uncomfortable picture”: Whenever a mental event Kim. This already is an “uncomfortable picture”: Whenever a mental event has a physical effect, the physical effect has a purely physical cause as well. has a physical effect, the physical effect has a purely physical cause as well. So there is causal overdetermination (and making the supposed mental cause So there is causal overdetermination (and making the supposed mental cause dispensable). dispensable).

And consider:And consider:

• Causal Exclusion. No event has more than one sufficient cause occurring at t—Causal Exclusion. No event has more than one sufficient cause occurring at t—unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination.unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination.

• ““Unless one opts for the strange view that every case of mental causation is a Unless one opts for the strange view that every case of mental causation is a case of causal overdetermination, the exclusion principle must be applied to case of causal overdetermination, the exclusion principle must be applied to the present case. Since each of M and P* is claimed to be a sufficient cause of the present case. Since each of M and P* is claimed to be a sufficient cause of P, either M or P* must be excluded as a cause of P. But which one?” P, either M or P* must be excluded as a cause of P. But which one?”

• Kim: M must go. “The reason is simple: if we let P go, the Causal Closure Kim: M must go. “The reason is simple: if we let P go, the Causal Closure Principle kicks in again, requiring us to posit a physical sufficient cause, say Principle kicks in again, requiring us to posit a physical sufficient cause, say P**, for P. (What could P** be if not P*?) And we are off to an unending P**, for P. (What could P** be if not P*?) And we are off to an unending regress….”regress….”

• Consequence: Circular causation is incoherent. M doesn’t cause P.Consequence: Circular causation is incoherent. M doesn’t cause P.

DST Response to KimDST Response to Kim

• DST has two options:DST has two options:

(1) Drop causal closure principle.(1) Drop causal closure principle.(2) Drop notion of circular causation, accepting linear (2) Drop notion of circular causation, accepting linear causation instead. Saying that higher-level states are causation instead. Saying that higher-level states are realized byrealized by complexes of physical states, and the physical complexes of physical states, and the physical states really do the casual work. (Important: consistent with states really do the casual work. (Important: consistent with explanatory import of higher-order vocabulary).explanatory import of higher-order vocabulary).

• DST wants first option, but which is one correct? Depends DST wants first option, but which is one correct? Depends on your metaphysical views about the nature of properties.on your metaphysical views about the nature of properties.

Debate Over Property Natures Debate Over Property Natures (in Metaphysics)(in Metaphysics)• Are property natures a matter of their purely “intrinsic” or internal Are property natures a matter of their purely “intrinsic” or internal

natures, or their causal powers/dispositions? (Lewis vs. Shoemaker).natures, or their causal powers/dispositions? (Lewis vs. Shoemaker).

• Categoricalism/Categorialism: property natures are not determined Categoricalism/Categorialism: property natures are not determined by any causal powers, they are “internal” to the property itself by any causal powers, they are “internal” to the property itself (Armstrong, Lewis).(Armstrong, Lewis).

• Ask: how are fundamental particles taxonomized? By what they do.Ask: how are fundamental particles taxonomized? By what they do.

• Can property natures really be separated from their causal powers? Can property natures really be separated from their causal powers? (What would it be like to say that F is a mass property but F does (What would it be like to say that F is a mass property but F does not do what it does in our world).not do what it does in our world).

• Dispositionalism: property natures are determined by causal Dispositionalism: property natures are determined by causal powers/dispositions of properties (Schoemaker).powers/dispositions of properties (Schoemaker).

““Dispositionalist” OptionDispositionalist” Option

• Suppose property natures are determined by their Suppose property natures are determined by their causal powers. Then, microphysical property causal powers. Then, microphysical property dispositions could determine the causal powers of dispositions could determine the causal powers of complexes of particles that realize macroscopic complexes of particles that realize macroscopic brain events that seem to be exhibiting “circular brain events that seem to be exhibiting “circular causation”.causation”.

• In such a case, the causal closure principle is TRUE. In such a case, the causal closure principle is TRUE. Physical properties, because they are complexes of Physical properties, because they are complexes of causal powers, determine the causal powers of the causal powers, determine the causal powers of the order parameter. (The causal power of the order order parameter. (The causal power of the order parameter is a higher level property that is parameter is a higher level property that is metaphysically comprised of the lower level metaphysically comprised of the lower level properties).properties).

Categoricalism: Causal Closure Categoricalism: Causal Closure is False (DST Option)is False (DST Option)• Now let’s look at other option. The causal powers of Now let’s look at other option. The causal powers of

a property are irrelevant to property natures.a property are irrelevant to property natures.

• In this case, it is difficult to see how (micro)physics In this case, it is difficult to see how (micro)physics is causally closed. The laws of microphysics, is causally closed. The laws of microphysics, together with the pattern of microphysical together with the pattern of microphysical properties in a brain, wouldn’t determine the brain’s properties in a brain, wouldn’t determine the brain’s higher-level patterns (e.g., that there is a certain higher-level patterns (e.g., that there is a certain order parameter).order parameter).

• I’m going to take this option. DST thinks it has I’m going to take this option. DST thinks it has irreducibly higher-level causation. I’ll now apply this irreducibly higher-level causation. I’ll now apply this novel form of causation to the problem of free will.novel form of causation to the problem of free will.

The Problem of Free WillThe Problem of Free Will

• Humans are unique creatures, at Humans are unique creatures, at least relative to other creatures least relative to other creatures on Earth, as we are at a high on Earth, as we are at a high enough stage of intellectual enough stage of intellectual development to reflect on development to reflect on whether our actions are truly whether our actions are truly free. free.

• We recognize a conflict between We recognize a conflict between two perspectives we have on two perspectives we have on ourselves. We see ourselves as ourselves. We see ourselves as free agents; yet we also see our free agents; yet we also see our behavior as being determined by behavior as being determined by underlying causes that we at least underlying causes that we at least sometimes are not fully aware of.sometimes are not fully aware of.

• Problem of Free Will: Are my Problem of Free Will: Are my intentional actions genuinely free, intentional actions genuinely free, or are they determined by laws of or are they determined by laws of nature, together with antecedent nature, together with antecedent states of my brain?states of my brain?

Why Does the Problem of Free Why Does the Problem of Free Will Matter?Will Matter?• Free will is associated with a cluster of related Free will is associated with a cluster of related

themes:themes:• Genuine creativityGenuine creativity

• Self-controlSelf-control• Self-dignitySelf-dignity

• A sense of desert: we deserve what we getA sense of desert: we deserve what we get• AutonomyAutonomy

• Moral responsibilityMoral responsibility

• And related to this, free will is associated with And related to this, free will is associated with various attitudes that we have toward our own and various attitudes that we have toward our own and other’s behavior: gratitude, vengefulness, other’s behavior: gratitude, vengefulness, resentment, admiration, desire to see resentment, admiration, desire to see them/ourselves punished.them/ourselves punished.

The Deterministic The Deterministic Perspective Perspective • On the other hand, we also view ourselves from On the other hand, we also view ourselves from

various impersonal, scientific, or objective various impersonal, scientific, or objective perspectives. For instance:perspectives. For instance:

• Our ability to think depends upon the well-being of Our ability to think depends upon the well-being of our brains. Aren’t our decisions to act in a certain our brains. Aren’t our decisions to act in a certain way determined by the underlying forces at work in way determined by the underlying forces at work in our brains?our brains?

• A simplified view (not the DST picture): At any time A simplified view (not the DST picture): At any time t, the configuration of particles in your brain is t, the configuration of particles in your brain is determined by where the particles were located (at determined by where the particles were located (at t-1), together with the laws of physics. t-1), together with the laws of physics.

Determinism DefinedDeterminism Defined

• Determinism: Any event is Determinism: Any event is determined just in case there are determined just in case there are conditions (e.g., acts of God, the laws conditions (e.g., acts of God, the laws of nature, social pressure, states in of nature, social pressure, states in the brain) whose joint occurrence is the brain) whose joint occurrence is sufficient for the occurrence of the sufficient for the occurrence of the event: it must be the case that if event: it must be the case that if these conditions jointly obtain, the these conditions jointly obtain, the determined event occurs.determined event occurs.

Quantum MechanicsQuantum Mechanics

• How can How can determinism even determinism even aspire to being aspire to being true given that true given that quantum quantum mechanics says mechanics says the fundamental the fundamental nature of the nature of the world is world is indeterministic?indeterministic?

• Visualization of Visualization of wave function of wave function of hydrogen atomhydrogen atom

Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics and DeterminismDeterminism• Det: given that event e occurs, event f must occur. Det: given that event e occurs, event f must occur.

• If QM is true, strictly speaking, determinism is false If QM is true, strictly speaking, determinism is false at the quantum level. at the quantum level.

• Where does this leave the free will debate?Where does this leave the free will debate?

• Philosophers: not much of a change. The chance of a Philosophers: not much of a change. The chance of a given particle decaying in say, 2 hours, is still given particle decaying in say, 2 hours, is still “determined” by the laws of QM. That is, events “determined” by the laws of QM. That is, events are probabilistically constrained, or guided by, are probabilistically constrained, or guided by, antecedent conditions, together with the laws.antecedent conditions, together with the laws.

What Position should DST take What Position should DST take on Free Will?on Free Will?

• Suspicion? Would renouncing linear causation as Suspicion? Would renouncing linear causation as model of mental causation dissolve the problem of model of mental causation dissolve the problem of free will? free will?

• The problem of free will arises with circular causation The problem of free will arises with circular causation too: too: – Suppose M is a mental event and that further, we act in virtue Suppose M is a mental event and that further, we act in virtue

of M, picking up a coffee cup. Further suppose that (as per of M, picking up a coffee cup. Further suppose that (as per circular causation) M brings about physical event P1 by circular causation) M brings about physical event P1 by downward causation. P1 then causes the picking up of the downward causation. P1 then causes the picking up of the cup. cup.

– The free will problem emerges: Is the happening of M The free will problem emerges: Is the happening of M determined by the laws of nature, together with antecedent determined by the laws of nature, together with antecedent events? Or does M somehow “break free” of the laws?events? Or does M somehow “break free” of the laws?

The Sense in Which We Think The Sense in Which We Think We Have “Free Will”We Have “Free Will” • To answer the question of whether we act freely for DST, we must To answer the question of whether we act freely for DST, we must

ask: What is ask: What is genuine free willgenuine free will to begin with? Standard view: to begin with? Standard view:

• From a subjective standpoint, we perceive ourselves as free From a subjective standpoint, we perceive ourselves as free agents who are able to influence the world in numerous ways. In agents who are able to influence the world in numerous ways. In many cases, we see before ourselves a field of possible actions, many cases, we see before ourselves a field of possible actions, out of which, we freely choose one.out of which, we freely choose one.

• There’s a sort of “up to us-ness” associated with our actions: our There’s a sort of “up to us-ness” associated with our actions: our actions are under our control. For any action A, we might have actions are under our control. For any action A, we might have done otherwise.done otherwise.

• S has free will when: S has free will when: (a), it is “up to us” what we choose from a field of possibilities(a), it is “up to us” what we choose from a field of possibilities(b), the origin of our choices and actions is in us and not in (b), the origin of our choices and actions is in us and not in anyone/anything else over which we have no control.anyone/anything else over which we have no control.

DST and Free WillDST and Free Will

• Suppose DST can give a plausible account of intentional action (e.g., Suppose DST can give a plausible account of intentional action (e.g., Freeman, Ch. 5, 2000). Freeman, Ch. 5, 2000).

• At first blush, this doesn’t limit DST to a certain position on the free At first blush, this doesn’t limit DST to a certain position on the free will debate.will debate.

• An account of intentional action doesn’t require that the actions be An account of intentional action doesn’t require that the actions be “genuinely free”; they could be determined. Indeed, DST explains “genuinely free”; they could be determined. Indeed, DST explains action in terms of the evolution of a dynamic system – this sounds action in terms of the evolution of a dynamic system – this sounds sympathetic to a kind of determinism. sympathetic to a kind of determinism.

• On the other hand, most of us think that there is a sense in which On the other hand, most of us think that there is a sense in which some actions are free and others are not: e.g., Joe doesn’t act freely some actions are free and others are not: e.g., Joe doesn’t act freely when a gun is pointing at him, but he does when he picks a vacation when a gun is pointing at him, but he does when he picks a vacation spot. A neurobiological theory of intentional action should explain spot. A neurobiological theory of intentional action should explain such differences, giving a sense in which certain actions are free.such differences, giving a sense in which certain actions are free.

Taxonomy of the Positions on Taxonomy of the Positions on the Debate over Free Willthe Debate over Free Will

• There are two primary ways one can be a proponent of Free There are two primary ways one can be a proponent of Free Will or Determinism:Will or Determinism:

• 1. One can be a Compatibilist: Free Will and Determinism are 1. One can be a Compatibilist: Free Will and Determinism are compatible with each other.compatible with each other.

• 2. One the other hand, one can be an Incompatibilist. In this 2. One the other hand, one can be an Incompatibilist. In this case, either (a), you believe in free will and you don’t believe case, either (a), you believe in free will and you don’t believe in Determinism (“Libertarian”); or (b), you believe in in Determinism (“Libertarian”); or (b), you believe in determinism and reject free will (“Hard Determinism”).determinism and reject free will (“Hard Determinism”).

• Argue: DST is incompatible with Libertarianism. Develop a Argue: DST is incompatible with Libertarianism. Develop a novel Compatibilist position for DST: “Neurocompatibilism.” novel Compatibilist position for DST: “Neurocompatibilism.”

• (We could also develop a Hard Determinist view).(We could also develop a Hard Determinist view).

INCOMPATIBILISM INCOMPATIBILISM (Libertarian/Free Will Version)(Libertarian/Free Will Version)

• ““Libertarians”: free will is incompatible with Libertarians”: free will is incompatible with determinism. Further, free will exists (thus, determinism. Further, free will exists (thus, determinism is false). determinism is false).

• Libertarians often urge that free intentional Libertarians often urge that free intentional action involves a form of causation that is action involves a form of causation that is unique to mental causation, and not normal unique to mental causation, and not normal event causation (i.e., linear causation). event causation (i.e., linear causation). Perhaps circular causation is such?Perhaps circular causation is such?

Randomness Problem for Randomness Problem for LibertarianismLibertarianism

• A major task the Libertarian faces is showing A major task the Libertarian faces is showing that there is a real sense in which there is free that there is a real sense in which there is free will that is not compatible with determinism. will that is not compatible with determinism.

• What is it for an event to be an act of free will What is it for an event to be an act of free will but not determined? Would it be random? Truly but not determined? Would it be random? Truly random events aren’t under the control of random events aren’t under the control of anyone or anything. How would that be free will anyone or anything. How would that be free will worth having? No one would be responsible for worth having? No one would be responsible for their actions. their actions.

Libertarian ReactionLibertarian Reaction• There are a few ways that the Libertarian reacts to the worry that There are a few ways that the Libertarian reacts to the worry that

if events aren’t determined, they are merely random, not giving if events aren’t determined, they are merely random, not giving us true freedom or moral responsibility. One is of interest:us true freedom or moral responsibility. One is of interest:

• There is a new form of causation by an agent that is not normal There is a new form of causation by an agent that is not normal event causation. This was developed by Rodrick Chisholm, who event causation. This was developed by Rodrick Chisholm, who contrasted normal event causation with ‘agent causation’ (a contrasted normal event causation with ‘agent causation’ (a special form of causation minds employed). special form of causation minds employed).

• Big Issue for these theories: We have a physical world of physical Big Issue for these theories: We have a physical world of physical causes, on the one hand, and a distinct realm, of agent causes, on causes, on the one hand, and a distinct realm, of agent causes, on the other. But how do agents causally interact with the physical the other. But how do agents causally interact with the physical world of event causation? How do our freely willed thoughts enter world of event causation? How do our freely willed thoughts enter into the world of physical causes and effects? (Like interaction into the world of physical causes and effects? (Like interaction problem with Cartesian Dualism).problem with Cartesian Dualism).

• DST can answer this in a naturalistic way. Introduce circular DST can answer this in a naturalistic way. Introduce circular causation as a novel form of causation associated with intentional causation as a novel form of causation associated with intentional action. It is not a mystery how emergent features effect the action. It is not a mystery how emergent features effect the microphysical realm. Avoids problems with Chisholm’s account.microphysical realm. Avoids problems with Chisholm’s account.

NeurocompatibilismNeurocompatibilism

– Is DST really compatible with a Libertarian Is DST really compatible with a Libertarian position? If causal closure was violated by mental position? If causal closure was violated by mental features there is a sense in which one breaks free features there is a sense in which one breaks free of of physical physical laws. If “Determinism” means laws. If “Determinism” means “determined by physical laws,” then the view is “determined by physical laws,” then the view is genuinely Libertarian. But if determinism means genuinely Libertarian. But if determinism means “determined by laws” (including special science “determined by laws” (including special science laws) then the view is Compatibilist. This is a laws) then the view is Compatibilist. This is a more common way of formulating Determinism, more common way of formulating Determinism, and was how I formulated it . and was how I formulated it .

– So: Let’s see what a Compatibilist DST view looks So: Let’s see what a Compatibilist DST view looks like. (Compatibilism: FW and Det. are compatible).like. (Compatibilism: FW and Det. are compatible).

Problems for Problems for NeurocompatibilismNeurocompatibilism

1. Emergent phenomena in general 1. Emergent phenomena in general can exhibit downward causation, can exhibit downward causation, but, intuitively, only minds exhibit but, intuitively, only minds exhibit free will. free will.

So, exhibiting downward causation So, exhibiting downward causation is a necessary condition for a system is a necessary condition for a system acting on the basis of free will, but it acting on the basis of free will, but it is not a sufficient condition.is not a sufficient condition.

Problems, cont.,Problems, cont.,

2. Content of beliefs, desires, etc. are both 2. Content of beliefs, desires, etc. are both reasons for the action and causes of the action – reasons for the action and causes of the action – Davidson, Fodor.Davidson, Fodor.

What are the correlates of concepts according to What are the correlates of concepts according to DST? DST?

Need these for a DST theory of FW as Need these for a DST theory of FW as Compatibilism is supposed to accommodate our Compatibilism is supposed to accommodate our ordinary framework of attribution of blame, ordinary framework of attribution of blame, praise, etc.praise, etc.

3. Recent Revolution in Free 3. Recent Revolution in Free Will Debate: the work of Will Debate: the work of Benjamin LibetBenjamin Libet• - Bigger Problem: - Bigger Problem:

Neurocompatibilism will Neurocompatibilism will need to deal with need to deal with Benjamin Libet’s work on Benjamin Libet’s work on free will. free will.

• Libet. Freely voluntary Libet. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a acts are preceded by a specific electrical change specific electrical change in the brain (the in the brain (the “readiness potential”, RP) “readiness potential”, RP) that begins 550 msec. that begins 550 msec. before the act. (This is before the act. (This is almost the same amount almost the same amount of time it takes to utter of time it takes to utter two syllables).two syllables).

• Now, humans only Now, humans only become aware of the become aware of the intention to act 350-400 intention to act 350-400 msec. after RP starts, msec. after RP starts, but still before the but still before the motor act.motor act.

Libet Revolution, cont.Libet Revolution, cont.

• As Bill Banks and Sue As Bill Banks and Sue Pocket explain: “The Pocket explain: “The issue is this. Libet’s issue is this. Libet’s clear-cut finding was clear-cut finding was that his subjects that his subjects consciously and freely consciously and freely ‘decided’ to initiate an ‘decided’ to initiate an action only after the action only after the neurological neurological preparation to act was preparation to act was well under way. This well under way. This implies that the implies that the conscious decision was conscious decision was not the cause of the not the cause of the action.” action.”

Banks/Pockett on Libet, Banks/Pockett on Libet, cont.,cont.,• ‘‘If conscious decisions are not the cause of If conscious decisions are not the cause of

actions, it follows that we do not have actions, it follows that we do not have conscious free will. Even worse, because the conscious free will. Even worse, because the ability consciously to initiate actions is an ability consciously to initiate actions is an essential property of self, the denial of essential property of self, the denial of conscious, personal origination of action is a conscious, personal origination of action is a challenge to our sense of selfhood. The challenge to our sense of selfhood. The implication is that we, our conscious selves, implication is that we, our conscious selves, are not free actors with control over our are not free actors with control over our choices in life. We are only conduits for choices in life. We are only conduits for unconsciously made decisions. Libet’s one unconsciously made decisions. Libet’s one simple experiment has slipped our entire simple experiment has slipped our entire self-concept from its moorings.”self-concept from its moorings.”

Is Compatibilism Dead?Is Compatibilism Dead?

• At first blush at least, this is a clear attack At first blush at least, this is a clear attack on free will, (both the Libertarian and on free will, (both the Libertarian and Compatibilist versions). Seems to support Compatibilist versions). Seems to support Hard Determinism.Hard Determinism.

• The “volitional” process is initiated The “volitional” process is initiated unconsciously!unconsciously!

• We seem to closely associate consciousness We seem to closely associate consciousness with free will, so it seems like this isn’t a with free will, so it seems like this isn’t a case of free will.case of free will.

Carving out a Free Will Carving out a Free Will position?position?

• Libet is saying that Libet is saying that consciousness could still control consciousness could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. the outcome; it can veto the act. So do we have a more limited So do we have a more limited sort of free will? sort of free will?

Libet Revolution, cont.,Libet Revolution, cont.,

• Some say it is only “free wont”. On the other Some say it is only “free wont”. On the other hand, if you can veto something, there’s a hand, if you can veto something, there’s a sense in which for the relevant action that sense in which for the relevant action that you did not veto, you ‘could have done you did not veto, you ‘could have done otherwise’ (you could have vetoed it).otherwise’ (you could have vetoed it).

• For many, free wont will not be sufficient for For many, free wont will not be sufficient for free will.free will.

• Try to do a bit more for Compatibilism. Try to do a bit more for Compatibilism. Nonconsciously initiated actions can be free.Nonconsciously initiated actions can be free.

Libet, cont.,Libet, cont.,

Ex) Tennis match with Venus Williams.Ex) Tennis match with Venus Williams.

- Did you consciously intend to return her serve before action initiation? No - Did you consciously intend to return her serve before action initiation? No way.way.

- As you learned to play tennis, you consciously intended to master actions - As you learned to play tennis, you consciously intended to master actions that, due to all your practice, you now initiate involuntarily and non-that, due to all your practice, you now initiate involuntarily and non-consciously. So, in a sense, the actions are initiated freely. To go back to our consciously. So, in a sense, the actions are initiated freely. To go back to our def. of FW, “the origin of the choice is in you.” It is not as though, contra your def. of FW, “the origin of the choice is in you.” It is not as though, contra your purpose in the game, you mysteriously initiated a “return the serve” move purpose in the game, you mysteriously initiated a “return the serve” move when you were at the net. Your returning the serve is very much a part of when you were at the net. Your returning the serve is very much a part of you.you.

- Although the paradigm cases of free will are conscious ones (ones in the - Although the paradigm cases of free will are conscious ones (ones in the global workspace before initiation of motor action); non-consciously initiated global workspace before initiation of motor action); non-consciously initiated actions can be acts of free will (in a derivative sense) as we freely chose to actions can be acts of free will (in a derivative sense) as we freely chose to develop these skills. develop these skills.

- They just aren’t the paradigm cases.- They just aren’t the paradigm cases.

- Conclusion: Libet’s results are not contrary to Neurocompatibilism.- Conclusion: Libet’s results are not contrary to Neurocompatibilism.

ConclusionConclusion

• Looked at the novel view that DST has of mental Looked at the novel view that DST has of mental causation.causation.

• Applied it to FW, noting relation to issue about Applied it to FW, noting relation to issue about property natures. property natures.

• Suggested a possible view on FW debate and Suggested a possible view on FW debate and replied to the Libet issue.replied to the Libet issue.