the facts of the disaster and related

8/14/2019 The Facts of the Disaster and Related

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PART II

The Factsof the Disaster andRelated Issues


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C H A P T E R 3

General Introduction to the Disaster

3.1.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n

To assist in an understandingof the evidence relating to the factsof the disaster it is proposedin this Chapter to describe the situationof W hi dd y Island in Bantry Bay, Gu lfs term inal onthe Island, and the offshore jetty at which the "Betelg euse" was berthed wh en the casualtyoccurred. An outline of the mode of operations carried on at the terminal, i ts fire-fightingsystems, the position of the tug and oth er vessels involved in the events of the nigh t of thedisaster will then be giv en, and the duties of Gu lfs personnel and their means ofcom mu nication with on e another w ill then be described. An outline of the layout of the"Be telgeu se" and its meth od of taking on cargo and ballast will then be given (and areference mad e to its sister ship, the "Ca ssio pce ") an d the Chap ter w ill end with adescription of the weathe r cond itions. It will be appreciated th at it will be necessary toconsider a num ber of the topics touched on in this Chap ter in much greater detail later inthis Report.

3.2.1 W hid dy I s l and and Ban t ry Bay

On the 24th Jun e, 1966, Cork Cou nty Coun cil granted permission under the provisions ofthe Local Go vern me nt (Plan ning and Devel opm ent) Act, 1963, to Gulf Oil T erminals(Ireland) Ltd. for the constructionof an oil terminal at Whiddy Island. Whiddy Island lies atthe head of Bantrv Bay wh ich is situated on the south-w est coast of Ireland.

Bantry B ay, which is entered betw een Sheep Head and Black Ball Head , about 1\ miles(12.1 km) wes t-nor th-w estw ard, extends north-eastw ard for about 20 miles (32.2 km) to itshead. The Bay is easy of access, free from dangers in the fairway, and w ith scarcely any tidalstreams. The holding ground is good but the Bay is exposed to westerly winds. Theharbours of Glengarriff nd Bantry lie at the head of the Bay with W hid dy Islandsom ethree miles (4.8 km)1 in lengthlying in a south-westerly/north-easterly aspect,approximately 2 miles;(3.2 km) from Bantry and 4 miles (6.4 km) from Glengarriff.

The prevailing win d is from the soutb-west and the shore at the headof Bantry Bay betweenGlengarriff harbour and Whiddy Island is subject to heavy swell. The tidal range at Bantryis appro xim ately 10 feet (3 m) at Spring tides and 9.5 feet (2.6 m) at neap tides.

The area of the entire Island is 1,005 acres (406 hectares). It bad at the timeof the disaster apopulation of 63.

The map reproduced inAppendix 7, part 1, shows the principal features of Wh id dy Islandand its position at the head o f the Bay. It is to be bo rne in min d that the Island is no t flat, andthat an elevationof that part of the Island facing the tow nof Bantry means that the view ofthe terminal and theoffshore jetty is obscured from anyone on the mainland south and eastof the Island. A person travelling along the coast from Bantry to wn does not g et a view ofthe offshore jett y un til in the region of Ballylick ey, and th e witnesses in that area wh o sawthe disaster we re ov er four miles from the jett y and we re look ing at the stern of the vessel.Ot her witnesses w ho saw the disaster from the nor ther n coast of the Bay had a clear viewacross the water, and as the tanker was berthed on the north berth their view was

_ uninterrupted by the jetty or the superstructure of the centre platform. But again it shouldf bt remembered that the witnesses on that partof the coast were distances ranging from over

tw o to over three miles from the vessel.

rati


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Th e O i l Te rm ina l

The oil terminal is situated at the south-westof W hi dd y Island. It comprises a tank farm another onshore works occupyin g an area of approxim ately 120 acres (48.6 hectares). F

There are twelve crude oil storage tanks in the tank farm, each capableof holding 80,000tons (81,280t). In additio n th ere are tw o tanks for ballast, two for b unk er oil and one fordiesel oil.

The position of the tanks is show n on the map contained inAppendix 7, part 2.

The map also shows the posit ion of the pow er-hous e, the pum p-hou se, the fire station andwarehouse. The posit ion of these buildings has particular relevance as two of the witnesseswere in the power-house when they were alerted to the emergency and another stated hehad been in the warehouse prior to it. There is a clear viewof th e offshore jetty as one leavesthe power- house and travels down towar ds the wareho use, but the view of the jetty fromthe wa rehou se is obscured by a steep hill wh ich rises bet we en the coastline and thewa rehou se. O n to p of the hill is a building described on the m ap as the "co ntr ol office".This is a one-storied structure, in the front of which is si tuated the Contro l R oom withuninterrupted viewsof the offshore jetty and any ship berthed there. An employee known asa dispatcher, whose duties will be described later in the Chapter, works in the ControlRoom. It will be readily appreciated that the evidenceof the dispatcher on duty on the nightof the disaster was of crucial imp ortance for this Inquiry. The C ontro l R oom and thedispatcher w orking in it a re f requently referred to as "Gulf Con trol" ,

O n the shore opp osite the jetty are the remains of a Bailey brid ge. [Witnesses refer to these asthe "Ba iley Brid ge" but in fact there was no connec tion betwe en.the Island and the offshoreje t ty.

A road leads do wn from the "contro l office" to join the road wh ich runs from thewarehouse to the small craft harbo ur kno wn as A scon Jetty. But a simpler and quicker meansof access to the control office from the wareh ouse existed; a flightof steps which could betraversed in a matter of seconds led directly from the vicinity of the road up the hil l . Th esignificance of this route to the control office will be considered later in the Report .

Ascon Jetty is on the south-western shore of Wh idd y Island. This location figuresprom inently in the narrative of events of the night of the disaster, for a number of reasons.Mo ored at Ascon Jetty was a vessel kno wn as the "D on em ar k" whic h, on the night inquestion, had a crewof tw o. Also moore d there was a l ine-boat kno wn as the "Sn ave ". T his

was also mann ed o n the night of the disaster, and the crew s of both these vessels hadimportant evidence to give to the Inquiry- In addition, a security hut was situated at AsconJetty a nd the t wo security men on d uty on the 7th/8th January rested in this hut w hen nftt onpatrol around the Island.

The pumps for the fire-fighting system were placed close to one of the piers at Ascon Jetty.These, too, were referred to in the course of the evidence and the significance of theirlocation will be assessed.

The o ff sho re j e t t y

Ap proxim ately 1,300 feet (396 m)off wh at is genera lly referred to as the no rth shore is anisland-type berth.

T he offshore jetty is som e 1,600 feet (488 m) in length and consists basicallyof centre island-

like structures standing on piles. These grou ped together are referred to as "do lphi ns". O neither sideof the centre platform are piled structures whic h provid e m ooring facili ties. Theseare kno wn as "br eas ting " dolphins and "m oo ri ng " dolphins. Dolphin 1 is the most westerlydolphin (i.e. the dolphin nearest to the open sea) and Dolphin 22 (i.e. the dolphin nearest thehead of the Bay) the most easterly.

A drawing reproduced inAppendix 7, part 3 shows the layout of the offshore jetty.

Particular n ote should be taken of two locations on the jetty.

(a) Th e centre loading platform. This contained a personnel building, the principal f ire-fighting systems and the Chiksan arms used for loading and unloa ding cargo.


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(b ) Dolphin 22. This contain ed a small hut in whic h the security officer stayed when notpatrolling the jetty. It also contained a telephone kiosk (the property of theDepar tment of Posts and Teleg raphs ) from which calls direct to the mainland c ouldbe made by means of a coin-operated telephone. This dolphin was the means ofaccess to the offshore jet ty. All boats bring ing personne l to the jet ty called toDo lph in 22, and this location figures pro min ently in the evidence as the"Donemark" called to Dolphin 22 shortly prior to the disaster, and the bodies ofsome of the crewof the "B etelge use" were found on it after the disaster. Positionedon D olph in 22 (as on D olp hin 1) was an inflatable life-raft.

There was no direct physical connection betw een the offshore jetty and the Island.

Ships could be berthed on the north berth or the south berth. At the timeof the casualty the"B etelg euse " was berthed on the north berth, facing in a south-westerly direction (i .e.towa rds the open sea), with her p ort side to the offshore jetty.

The centre island comprises two platforms. On the upper was situated the personnel buildingas show n on the draw ing. O n the lowe r platform was situated a slop tank into whichdrainings from the Chiksan arms were pum ped. The possibility that the fire on the night ofthe disaster be gan in this slop tank or the slop tank pit und er it (a nd n ot on the ship) is amatter on w hich a considerable am oun t of evidence was given which is considered in detailin Chapter 18.

O n the day before the disaster the "Be telge use" was visited by two surveyors acting onbehalf of tw o prospective purchasers of the vessel. Both took photogra phs of their survey.Two are reproduced inAppendix 8.

Photog raph No . 2 inAppendix 8 is a photograph taken by Mr. Stewart (oneof the surveyorswhose evidence is considered in Chapter 15)of the deck of the "Betelgeuse" and the centreplatform of th e offshore jetty. Particular attention should be given to the following points inthe photograph:

(a) The top (second) floorof the personnel b uild ing will be seen on the left hand side.

(b) Ne xt to i t the control towe r and the foam mo nitor on to p of i t can be observed. Itwill be noted that the mo nitor is not poin ting in the direction of the deck.

(c) Next to the tower will be seen the Chiksan arms. It will be noted that two areconnected to the ship, at the ship's manifold.

(d) Beside the manifold is the por t S amson post of the ship. On the other side of thedeck w ill be seen the starbo ard Samson post. The riser for the ven t pipes from thecargo tanks came up the starboard Samson post. Particular note should be taken ofits position vis^-vis the personnel build ing, as conside ration was given to thepossibility that flammable vap our from the gas riser migh t have been ignited in thepersonnel building, which was pressurised and did not contain flame-proofequipment .

(e) Forw ard of the manifold will be seen the wave -breake r o n the ship's deck. On e ofthe fractures in the vessel occurre d in the area betw een the manifold and the w ave -break er; its exact location will be detailed later. O ne of the explosions in the vessel

occurred in the port permanent ballast tank known also as the No. 4(a) wing tank.This is located under the deck, forwardof the manifold and aftof the wave-breaker.

(f) Th e ga ngw ay betw een the centre platform and vessel can be seen on the left handside of the photograph.

1 The ope ra t ion o f the t e rmina l

Vessels berthe d with the aid of two , three o r four tugs, and the lateral speedof approach tothe jetty was monitored by a Dopple r Do cking system on the jetty, information beingrelayed to the pilot by a VHF walkie-talkie.

Larger tankers were usually moored to the north berth.


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Line-boats took the first m oorin g lines to the dolphins, the eyes of which were securedquick-release mooring hooks so designed that one man could trip them in an emergensituation to enable a tanker to m ove quickly away from the offshore jetty .

Conn ection to the tanker berthed at the offshore jetty was made by meansof articulatedChiksan loading arms connected to submarine pipelines which supplied the tank farm. Theconnection to the ship's manifold was made by means of a reducer attached to the end of the

Chiksan arm.There was also a ballast pipeline through which tankers could dischargeoily salt waterballast to a special tank ash ore, where facilities were av ailable to clean the ballast and returnit to any tanker requesting thisfacility.

On e of the matters of acute controversy in this Inquiry is the amou nt o f ballast which thetanker took on on the 7th/8th January. It is quite clear, however, that the vessel was ballastedfrom the sea, and that it took no ballast from the term inal.

It is also clear that the vessel had com pleted unloadin g its first parcel of Arabian Heavy crudeat 18.00 hours on the evening of the 7th Janua ry and that when the casualty occurred notransfer operations were taking place. The tw o Chiksan arms (used to unload the ArabianHeavy crude) had, however, remained connected to the ship's manifold.

Bunker oil and diesel oil could also be supplied to a tanker by meansof the Chiksan arms.

There were push buttons in the Control Room on the Island to activate nitrogen-controlledshut-dow n valves in the two m ain submarine crude o il pipe risers to the offshore platformand also in the bunker lines. Whether the dispatcher closet! the shut-down valves, and theeffect of the fire on them, are significant featuresof the evidence which will be consideredlater in this Report.

The fire-fighting system

(a) Th e offshore jetty

According to the initial designof the system, the fire-main was under con stant pressureby the automatic use ofa jockey-pum p which was followed by the automatic start-up ofthe main fire-pum p should hydrants be fully opened, causing a drop in pressure.

This system, how ever, was discontinued in the year 1970. As a result, on the nigh t of the

disaster the system was not being m aintained under constant pressure and before watercould be obtained for it the fire-pumps had to be started. Three of these were situated onthe Island at the Ascon Jetty. They could be started by the dispatcher in the ControlRoom . There was a fourth diesel-drivcn stand-by pum p at the other end of the tankfarm.

This alteration to the original design (resulting as it did in the inabilityof the jetty crewto obtain water for the system without the aidof the dispatcher) was criticised in thecourse of the evidence. Furthermore, it was suggested that the system, in fact, was neveroperated by the jetty crew on the nightof the disaster and the Tribunal was asked todraw certain conclusions from this fact.

Tw o water/foam monitors w ere located at the north-east and south-west cornersof thecentre platform at a heightof 55 feet( 16.8 m) above the upper platform. Tw o additionalwater/foam monitors w ere located on raised platforms 30 feet (3 m) above the upperplatform. Tw o hydrant monitors w ere located on the north-west and south-easthydrants at the centre platform.On the night of the disaster a temporary foam monitor had been installed.A pre-m ix foam ins ta l la t ion provid ed protec t ion for the low er p la t form.

A water spray system was designed to provide a water-curtain between a ship and thejetty.Acco rding to the system's in i t ia l des ign foam moni tors could be remote ly cont ro l led bythe dispatcher in the Control Room on the Island. But this system was discontinued in1971 and the system thereafter was operated m anual ly by the crew on the jett y (but th ey


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A sum ma ry of the radio facilities and of the telephone s available at the termin al is given inAppendix 9.

From the information given illAppendix 9and from other evidence in the case the followingpoints should be particularly noted:

(a) If an eme rgen cy arose on the jett y or th e ship and it the P C O on the jetty o r thepilot on the ship called on his walkie-talkie on Channel 90 then

th e dispatcher in Gulf Con trol wo uld n ot hear the callif he had left the C ontro l

Room and did not turn up the amplification; th e pum p men w oul d hear the call only if they were in the Land R ove r they

wo uld not hear it in the pow er-ho use (where, in fact, they wer e);

the crew of the l ine-boat , the "D on em ark ", or the "Sn ave " w ould not hear i t;

th e PP O on tour of inspection would not hear it . The P PO in the security hutwo uld hear it only if he had kept his walkie-talkie on;

(b) If an emerg ency arose on the jetty or the ship and if the P C O telephoned GulfCon trol from the jetty the dispatcher w ould not hear the call if he had left theCont ro l Room.

(c) If an emergency arose on the jetty or the ship andif the "Betelgeuse" sent a message

on Channel 16 i t would not be heard by the dispatcher if he had left the Con trolRoom. I t would, however, have been picked up by the M.T, "Bilbao" which wasanchored in the mouth of the Bay awaiting instructions to berth at the terminal. Itwo uld also have been picked up by the stand-by tug the "Bantry Ba y", as it keptChannel 16 open at all times. No message was picked up by either vessel on thenight of the disaster.

(d) The emergency telephone in the Control Room was situated on the wall somedistance from the telephone at the console. It wou ld be impossible for one person tooperate the two telephones simultaneously. This point isof considerab le significancewh en the evidence of the alert of Bantry Exchan ge comes to be considered.

T h e " B e t e l g e u s e "

Relevant particulars of the "Be telg eus e" will be given in detail in Cha pte r 15. In thisCha pter reference will be mad e to those aspects of the vessel wh ich are of particularrelevance to th e evideiicp relating to th e facts of the disaster.

11,2 A drawing show ing tha layout and n um berin g of the vessel 's tanks is reprodu ced inAppendix 10. >

It will be seen that there are eighte en cargo tanks. Th e tanks at the side of the vessel arereferred to as "wi ng tanks " and those in the centre as "centre tanks".

The N o. 4 wing tanks were divided into tw o parts. Originally the forward parts were usedexclusively for ballast, but in 1974 they were co nver ted so that they cou ld be used for certaintypes of cargo. O n her last voyage from Ras Tan ura no cargo had been pu t in these tanks,

and one of the issues which the Trib unal has to determine is whether or not they wereballasted whilst the ship was at Bantry.

These tanks have variously been described as the "permanent ballast tanks" or the "No. 4 (a)wing tank" (port or starboard as the case may be). In general the abbreviation PBT will beused in this Report to describe them. It should, however, be borne in mind that there areother ballast tanks on the vessel (forwardof the N o. 1 w ing tanks) but these are not relev antto the facts o f the disaster.

As has already been pointed out, the PBTs are about midships on the vessel. It was justforward of frame 77 (in the PBTs and the No. 4 centre tank) that the vessel broke her backin the disaster. A second ruptureof the vessel occu rred in way of the N o. 6 tanks. It is agreedthai an explosion occu rred in the port PB T. T otal, in their final submission, expressedloubts to whether such an explosion occurred in the starboard PBT.


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O n the journey from Ras Tanura the ship had carricd 77,098 metric tonnes of Arab1

Hea vy crude and 42,338 metric tonnes of Arabian Light crude. T hese figures areaccordingto the ship's manifest. A discrepa ncy arose betw een the bills of lading and theterminalfigures, but this discrepancy was notof significance for the purposes of this Inquiry. Ithad

resolving any dispute that might arise.

Th e Ara bian H eavy cru de wa s carried in the No . 1 tanks across, the No s. 2- 5 centre tanks,and the N o. 6 tanks across. This parce l was discharged first and unlo adin g w as completed by

the evening of the 7th Jan uar y. T his mean t that there w as Arabian Light crud e still on boardin wing tanks (port and starboard) Nos. 2-5, when the casualty occurred.

Th e vessel's design is a free-flow one and this means that discha rging carg o takes placetunnel al lows free-flow through the PBTs from the No . 3 wing tanks to the N o. 4 cargo /wing tank).

Ballasting direct from the sea into the PBT s was possible by meansof valves in the bottom ofthe tanks opening directly to the sea. However, ballasting by this means could only beachieved to sea-level.If further ballast was required the tanks would be "topp ed u p' by useof the deck wash/fire l ines.

There is no doubt that the "Betelgeuse" took on ballast whilst berthed at the jetty, and thatshe was ballasting (or had just completed ballasting) at the timeof the disaster. Oneof the

issues wh ich has to be determ ined by the Tribu nal is whettfer she was impro perly ballasted,as a result of which excessive stresses were set up in the vessel. In this connection it will haveto be determined whether ballast was taken into the PBTs on the 7th January.

After the dischargeof the parcel of Arabian Heavy crude the1 tanks which had contained thiscarg o could have bee n ballasted. Sea water is draw n in thro ugh sea valves in the pum p-room, and then pumped on deck via the cargo pumps and then dropped into Tanks Nos. 2and 5 from whe nce the ballast may trave l via the bulkhea d sluice valves into the other centretanks. This is the operation that was being carried out when the disaster occurred. Whatquantities of ballast were taken on a nd into wh ich tanks are matters wh ich are considered inChapter 19. For the purposeof considering the evidence relating to the factsof the disaster, itis to be born e in min d that no transfer operations b etwe en the ship and the shore were takingplace when it occurred, and that it happened at a timeof inactivity as far as the jetty crewand the dispatcher at Gulf Control w ere concerned,

3.12.1 T h e " C a s s i o p e e "

A sister-ship of the "Be telgeuse ", the "C assiope e", ha d, by an unusual coincidence, arrivedat Wh idd y Island shortly before the "Be telgeuse " reached Ba ntry Bay . She left the terminalat 16.30 hours on the afternoonof 6th January and sailed for Formosa whe re she was brokenup for scrap. T he T ribuna l conc luded that it wo uld no t assist in ascertaining the condition o fthe "B etelge use" to receive evidence as to the condit ion of the "Cass iopee " and evidencewhich was tendered on this subject was accordingly not considered. The "Cassiopee" had,however, taken on ballast whilst at Whiddy Island and evidence on this matter was heardand is considered in Chapter 19.

3.13.1 Co nd i t ions on the n igh t o f the 7 th /8 th January

Evidence was given by Mr. E. J . Mu rph y, me teorologist , as to the weather condit ionsprev ailing on the 7th Jan uar y, 1979, and the nightof the 7th/8th January in Bantry Bay. Hisevidence was based on an exam ination of the hourly w eather charts and of the records ofobservations kept at Roche's Point and Valentia Observatory weather stations. It did notpurp ort to be a statement of what condit ions actually w ere in the Bayrather it was agene ral pic ture of wea ther co nditions in the area and an estimate based on the data ob tainedfrom the neighbouring weather stat ions.

According to this evidence, there were generally cloudy condit ions in the Bay between16.00 and 24.00 hours, visibility was between 20 km and 30 km and air temperature was


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between 6 C and 7 C. On the 8th Janua ry from 00.00 hours to 06.00 hours it was part lyclou dy; visibi l i ty was between 20 km and 25 km and air temperatures were betw een 6 Cand 7 C . Th e wi nd from 20.00 hours on the 7th Jan ua ry to 12.00 on the 8th was westerly tosouth-w esterly, force 3 to 4.

I t was, howe ver , possible to establish from other evidence b oth the directionof the wind andthe state of the sea at the t ime of the disaster. From photo graph s taken by one of the ey e-witnesses, Frits van Os , it is clear that the wind was comi ng from a directio n w est by so uth,that th e w ind force was of the order of Force 3 on the B eaufort Scale ( i .e . 710 knots) andthat the nig ht w as f ine an d clear. High t ide at the jet ty was at appro xima tely 00.30 hours.

A n um ber of witnesses heard unusual sounds bo th in the early evening of the 7th and at thet ime of the com men cem ent of the casua l ty. The meteoro logica l ev idence leads to theconclu sion that i t was very u nlikely that the sounds heard were those of thun der. Th eTrib una l sought eviden ce as to whet her or not blast ing operation s might have been takingplace in the v ic in i ty. The ev idence of Mr. James Murp hy and Sergeant No el O 'Sul l iv anestablished that the sounds heard by the witnesses could not have been such operations.


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4.1.1

4.2.1

4.2.2

CHAPTER 4

Events of the 6th/7th January

Introduct ion

This Chapter outlines the principal eventsof the 6th/7th January which are relevant to thisInquiry. A num ber are of very considerable significance to different issues which areconsidered in detail in later Chapters.

Saturday, January 6th

The "Betelgeu se" had arrived in Bantry B ay at 10.25 hours on Thursday, 4th January, butwas unable to berth at theoffshore jetty until Saturday, 6th January . T he pilot who broughther to the jetty w as Captain Daly. He took up duty at 07.30 hours 'and went first to the"Cassiopee", a sister ship of the "B etelgeuse" which was then berthed at the jetty. H eremained on the "Cassiopee" until approximately 14.00 hours and then travelled out to the"Betelgeuse". He was accompanied by Mr. Ash, the terminal manager. There was nosignificance in the fact that M r. Ash accompanied the pilot to the "B etelgeuse "; he wen tbecause, as terminal manag er, he wished to acquaint himself with all operations at theterminal.

W hen Captain Daly went on board, the w ind was from the south-west, force 4 to force 5.Itwas, he considered, a fresh wind . Before going out to the vessel he had discussed w ithCaptain Kelly, the manager of tug m asters, as to w hich w ay the ship should be berthed, andit had been decided that it w ould be berthed facing west.

Th ere was nothin g unusual in this decision; no r in the fact that it was decided to use thenorth berth of the jetty.

Captain Daly, after arriving on b oard, obtained the M aster's signature to the Tow age Formand Cond itions of Entry. He had a conversation with him about the distribution of thecargo, in the course of w hich the Master mentioned the fact that the ship had perm anentballast tanks in the No. 4(a) wings. They had a discussion as to the manner in which thecargo would be discharged and Captain Daly's recollection is that the Captain said he wouldfirst discharge the centre tanks, wh ich contained Arabian H eavy crude, and then stopdischarging and take on ballast. The Master asked Captain Daly about the onshore ballastingfacilities and was told that there was not any ballast available onshore at that time. CaptainDaly mentioned particularly that at that time of year the prevailing winds were south-westerly and that, as the Bay was open to such conditions, it would not be possible todischarge the vessel completely witho ut first taking on some ballast.

The evidence of this witness relating to ballastingof the ship will be considered again inChapter 19.

The vessel was finally moored at 19.55 hours. Captain Daly remained on board until he wasrelieved the following morning.

Mr. Je rem iah D esm ond wen t on du ty a t the j e t ty as P C O a t20.00 hours on Saturday, 6thJanuary . T he "B e te lgeu se" had been m ade secure on ly five minu tes ea rl ie r. Mr. Desm ondwas rel ieving Mr. Tim Kingston, who told him that he had not had t ime to carry out thesafety checks (w hich a PC O is require d to carry ou t before the ship is a l low ed to dischargei ts cargo) .


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Th e Safety-check list is a docum ent wh ich is set out in Appen dix 7 of Gu lfs "Policy andPro cedu res" Man ual and it contains a detailed list of items wh ich the P C O is required tocheck on board the vessel. Mr. Desmond proceeded to carry out the check required by theManua l .

He noticed th at a fan in the pum p-r oo m was not wo rking , and he made it clear that the fanwo uld hav e to be put in work ing order before the cargo could be discharged. He observedthat on e of the-blanks on a manifold valve was missing and he had the blank replaced. Henoticed that rain was draining through the scuppers, and he had the scupper plugs madewat er-tigh t. Ther e w as a grating m issing from the fire m onitor d eck, and he got thisrectified.

Th e Safety-check list requires the PC O to ensure that the bonding cable is connected tightlyto bare metal on the vessel. Mr. Desmond stated that he recalled that the bonding cable hadnot been connected when he arrived at the jetty. He stated that he required the ship's rail tobe scraped clear of paint and oil to ensure that a proper connection was made. He was notable to confirm wh ethe r the cable was conn ected on the jetty side, but he stated that therewas an electrical switch at the topof the gangway which was operated and he assumed thebonding system was working properly,

The Safety-check list also requires the P C O to check that fire-hoses and equip men t on thevessel are ready for use. Mr. D esmo nd recalled that there w ere tw o or perhaps three hoses

available, and that he personally positioned a mo nitor forward and a monitor aft of themanifold. T he fire-hoses wrerc connec ted up to fire-hydrants, and there was a portab le foam-drum at the m anifold. Altho ugh the w itness did not test the hoses (he was not required to doso under the check-list system) there is no reason to suppose that they were in any waydefective.

He reached agreement with the Master on the allocationof smoking locations and the use ofcoo king facilities, and he ensured that the requisite notices relating to smok ing and co okin gwer e posted. H e also handed to the Master a copy of Gulfs "Instructions in case of fire".

After the check-list bad been com plete d the vessel com me nced d ischarg ing its parcel ofArabian He avy crude. It was stil l doing this wh en M r. D esmo nd was relieved at 08,00 hourson Sunday, 7th January.

Mr, Michael Ball and Mr. Michael Harris were cargo inspectors employed by Messrs.Mo ore Barrett & R edw ood Ltd. They boarded the "Betelgeu se" at 20.05 hours. Their firsttask was to check the' am ou nt o f cargo against the ship's papers and this invo lved takin gullages of all carg o tanks. T he figures w ere then agreed w ith theChief Officer and there wasno significant difference in the overall quantity of cargo aboard. D ischarge o f the A rabianHeavy began at 23.15 hours.

Sun day, Januar y 7 th

The Tribu nal heard evidence from Mr . Patrick Mur nane, the jetty foreman; M r. SeanO'B rien , the dispatcher (in Gulf Con trol ); Cap tain Phillips, the Mar ine Mana ger, wh o wasdoing rel ief duty as P C O on the je t ty and Mr. Chris topher O 'Sul l ivan, the je t ty PPO allof wh om were on duty on S unday the 7th until 20.00 hours.

The ir evidence was to the following effect:

(a) After tak ing u p dut y M r. M urn ane notic ed a small slick of oil on the sea. It waspresent from abou t 10.00 hour s to 18.00 hours.

He reported it to Captain Phillips. It transpired that it was lubricating oil which hadflowed from the deck from a brok en b arrel. It was not regarde d as anything ofsignificance by C aptain Phillips and is no t in any w ay significant for the purposes o fthis Inquiry.

(b) The dischargeof the Arabian Heavy continued all day, and was completed at 18.00hours. M r. Mu rnane then ensured that both valves on each of the lines at the jettyend were closed. His recollection was that the lines were not displaced; nor werethe outboard arms of the Chiksan arms drained into the slop tank.

39

fe.

4.2.3


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This evidence is of significance. Th e possible presence of oil in the Chiksan armfthe time of the disaster will be considered in C hap ter 18.

(c) Acc ordin g to the Con tro l Ro om log the ship began ballasting from the sea at18.35hours. Mr. O 'Br ien confirmed the accuracy of the log.

Th e matter is discussed further in Chapter 19. The t ime of the comm encementballasting isof imp ortan ce and th e Trib una l is satisfied th at the time recorded in ti llog is correct.

(d) At 18.35 the displacingof the bunker line began and at 19.30 hours bunkering itself?beg an. M r. O 'B rien und erstoo d tha t the vessel was only takin g on a limited amountof bunkers. A t 19.50 Mr. M urna ne saw a signal which he too k to mean thatbunke ring was to stop and he so advised Mr. O'B rien . This, how ever, was amisunderstanding and bun kering recomm enced and was comp leted at 20.40 hours,191 tonnes having been taken on.

(e) Mr. Murnane carried out the routine duties which he was required to performaccor ding to the Man ual. Th ese includ ed a check on the level of fluid in the sloptank. E verything was in order. At the stage of the Inquiry at which M r. Murnanegave eviden ce (the 22nd d ay of the oral testimony ) the possibility was being activelypursu ed by T otal's ex pert witnesses that the slop tank and the ven t pipe from theslop tank were corrod ed and that f lammable vapour could have been em itted fromthis source. Mr. Murnane stated that there was nothing wrong with the slop tank or

the vent pipe. This su bject is discussed further fn C hapte r 18.(f) At 11.00 hou rs Capta in Phillips was present in the vessel's cargo con trol roo m when

a conversation too k place betwe en the Master, , the Chief Officer and CaptainWarner, the ship's pilot. Captain Phillips stated that a ballasting programme wasdiscussed and that a decision was taken by the Master to take on ballast forthwithinto the PB Ts. He stated that ballasting of the PB Ts began at abou t 11.30 hours,

This evidence isof considerable imp ortan ce in the case, as ballast in the PBTs wou ldhave contributed to the sagging condition to which it is suggested the vessel wassubjected. Total submitted that this conversation never took place. The evidence inthis regard is examined in detail in Chapter 19 and the reasons are given why theTribunal accepts it.

(g) Mr, O'Sull ivan recollected that three or four m embers of the crew of the

"B etelg eus e" w ere still on shore whe n he left the jetty at about 20.00 hours. T heywere , in fact, b rou gh t back to the vessel by the "Sea Lance " wh ich arrived atDolphin 22 at about 23.35 hours that evening. The skipper exchanged greetingswith the PPO on Dolphin 22.

4.3.2 M r. Ball was the "sho re side" man i.e. he stayed at the terminal on Sunda y the 7th Janu arydipping the tanks ashore. Mr. Harris was the "ship man" and he returned to the"Betelgeuse" to take R.O.B. soundings on board. Mr. Ball went out to the vessel to pick upMr. Harris and he recalled that the ChiefOfficer commented to Mr. Harris that ballasting ofthe ship would be finished at about 01.00 hours the following mo rning .

An arrangement was made that Mr. Harris would return to the "Betelgeuse" beforeballasting was completed and i t was proposed that he would travel on the "Donemark",leaving Bantry Pier at midnight.

This e viden ce is of considerable significance: firstly, in relation to the time at w hich the"D on em ar k" left the pier at Bantry, and secondly as to the quanti ty of ballast taken onboard. It will be considered again in Chapter 6 and Chapter 19.

W he n M r. Ball and Mr. Harris left the vessel ballasting had started. Acco rdin g to the log ofthe "D on em ark ", they left Dolp hin 22 at 18.40 hours. This entry in the log is an accurateone.

4.3.3 Th e "Bete lgeus e" was visi ted by two surveyors acting for tw o different prospectivepurchasers of the vessel.


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Mr. Tsakos arrived on board the vessel at about 11.30 hours, Mr. Stewart at about 13.35.Both returned to Bantry at about 18.15 hours.

Mr. Tsakos and Mr. Stewart took photographsof the vessel which were put in evidence, andthey b oth ga ve oral evidenc e relating to their surveys. Th is evide nce is consid ered inChapter 15.

4.3.4 The jetty crew and the pilot were relieved at 20.00 hours. M r. Tim K ingston took up duty asPC O ; M r. James O'Sul l ivan as je t ty foreman; Mr. Denis O'Lear y as PP O; Mr. CharlesBrcnnan, M r. W il l iam Shanahan and Mr. Cornel ius O'She a, as ut il i ty men. Captain Dav idWarner at the same time took up duty on board the vessel as ship's pilot.

All perished in the disaster.

; Sum ma ry o f t he Tr ibuna l ' s con c lus ions

| The Tribunal concludes:

(a) that the "B etelg eus e" w as mo ored to the offshore jetty in a norm al ma nner on theevening of the 6th Janu ary. Before discharging any cargo the procedures requiredby Gulfs Safety-check list were carried out on board by the PC O conscientiouslyand efficiently. Th e discharge of the parcel of Arabian H eavy crude be gan at 23.15

hours and was completed the following day at 18.00 hours.(b) A discussion con cer nin g ballasting the vessel took place at 11.00 hours on S und ay,

1 7th Jan uar y, and as a result ballastingof the PBTs commenced at about 11.30 hours.I Ballasting of the vessel's centr e tanks bega n at 18.35 hours.

(c) Transfer operations w ere carried out in a norm al fashion and witho ut incident.

(d) The P C O on duty on the 7th Janua ry carried out in a prope r m anner therequirements of Gulfs manual , including a check of the contents of the centreplatform slop tank. W he n the jetty crew left at 20.00 hours nothing unusual hadoccurred either on the ship or on the jetty. Had anythin g of a hazardous natureoccurred be twee n then and 23.30 hours the P P O at Do lphin 22 wo uld have w arn edthe skipper of the "Sea L anc e" of its existence w hen he left return ing m emb ers ofthe ship's crew at the offshore jetty.

jsB*


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C H A P T E R 5

*

The Disaster: Eye-witness Evidence (Genera]

5.1.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n

On e person claimed to have seen the whole disaster from its com me cem cnt Mr . Connolly,!the dispatcher on duty on the nightof the 7th/8th January wh o was in the Contro l Room onW hi dd y Island over look ing the jetty . H e stated tha t he was seated at the control consoleobserving the jetty an d the "B etelg eus e" con tinuo usly up to the time the disaster began. Ifhis evidence is corre ct then if is possible accurately to ascertain (a) wh en th e disaster began(b) where it started (c) why it started and (d) its progress.If his evidence is accepted thenGulf clearly had n o responsibil ity for w hat happ ened and noneof its employees could havedone anything to minimise the effectsof the disaster or save any lives, in the log he kept thatevening he entered the com men ceme nt of the casualty as having occu rred at 00.55 hours.Significant partsof his testimony received corrobora tion,from four of his fellow-employees.Tw o of them were on the "Don em ark " , the personnel hu nch which brought M r. Harr isou t to the offshore jetty just before the disaster. Their evidence was to the effect that theyarrived at Dolp hin 22 at 00.40 hours (one of them stating that he checke d his watc h at thatmoment); at which t ime, according to their evidence, there was no signof any fire. Th e tw oPPOs on duty on the Island also corroborated the dispatcher's version in important details.

Th e ev idence o f the dispatcher and four of his colleagues is directly and irreconcilablycontradicted bv a large num ber of persons wh o saw or heard the disaster at a t ime muchearlier than that deposed to by the dispatcher and his colleagues.If the evidenceof these eye-witnesses is correct, th en a fire was ragin g on th e ship and the jetty at a time wh en thedispatcher says that he was watching the scene continuously and nothing untoward washapp ening, and at a t ime wh en, according to the crew of the "D on em ark ". a visi tor wasbeing left at Dolph in 22.

Th e Trib unal was fortunate in having"available to i t a considerable num ber o f witnesseswhose memory was accurate, whose powersof observation were well developed and whosetestimony could be cross-checked with other reliable evidence. With the aidof this evidence

\ f it has been possible to ascertain when the disaster began and obtain an accurate description of'its progress. T in Trib una l has nir liLSTTaliun in auc piin g"ilii s uvidcacu and iLji 'Uing fet of^ l ll f 1 " ^ ' r " 1 ' 1 | " fpH^.wM-ppl^i n in il m Ih HrMMwp WTOU^

'co ns ide r^ in p^ y'^ ' ' in the next Ch-apter.

5,1.2 In this Ch apte r, theNgeneral eye-witnesf; eviden ce will be conside red. Included in thisexamination will be thkevi den ce of the t a r d a witnesses whose evidence helps to establish

not on ly the t ime of the dkastcr but also tne t ime at which the dispatcher became aw areof it .The evidence clearly establishes that tha disaster can be divided into three phases. Phase 1lasted from abo ut 00.3100.32Shours to 0.40 hours a ppr oxi ma tely; Phase 2 lastpd from 00.40hours until the massive explosion at 0T.0601.08 hours approximately; and Phase 3 coversthe period from the massive explosion to th e final sinking of the vessel.

This Cha pter is divided into the following sections:

Section 1 deals with the evid ence of tho^e w ho witnessed the fire in Phase 1 i.e. from00.31-00.32 hours approximate ly^) 00 .40 hours approximate ly.


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-Section A deals with the evidence of those w ho saw the fjraârly in its second phase, i .e. atWJ.40 hours approxim ately and at 00.45 hpt(fs appr oxim ately.

Section 3 deals with the Garda ev idence, the alepôf the emerg ency services and the timeof \he major exp los ion ,t \

Section 4 considers the evidence of tha^'other witnesses wh o gave evidence conce rningtheir know ledg e of the disaster.

Section 5 deals w^th the evid^fee of the postmistress on W hid dy Island.

5.1.3 The re w ere a num ber V f pmtrtTs'on d uty on or near the Island on the night of the 7th/8thJanua ry and it is prop oêd 'to consider their evidence in the next Ch apter. On eof them wasMr . John D o w n e ^ S p innpm an on duty. He gave helpful evidence which will be detai ledlater. But pa pf of his testim ony assists in fixing the time of the disaster. It was to the ^ ^ fo llo wm e f f e c t : ^ 1 > ( I . ' J t ' i u ^ >< /? f M ^ M ) Ofii T faC A J r $H T O f

A4SBwi*fey was on duty w ith an assistant pum pm an, M r. McGee, Mr. M cGcc had takenthe Land Rover with which Ottcy were supplied and was carrying out routine checks in thetank farm area. Mr. D ow ne y stayed in the vicinityof the pump-house, the power-house , theheating plant, the wate r treatm ent area and the area of the ballast recove ry tank. H avin gmade routine checks on these parteof the plant, he left the pump -house to go to the po we r-

house. This jour ney brou ght him i s full viewof the jetty and the ship. He entered the doorof the power-house, walked s t ra igm throug h the main floor, p icked up the pow er-houselog, wr ote the date on it and he entered the time as "00.3 0". Before entering the particularsof the time as being 00.30 hours he Yhecked his watch (whic h he was satisfied was anaccur ate time keep er) and quite definitely, recalls rec ord ing the time from it. He was satisfiedthat "on ly seconds" had elapsed from theSfime he first entered the pow er-h ouse to the timehe made the log entry.

Mr. Do wn ey was qui te cer ta in that at the t im \h e entered the power-ho use everything at thejetty and on the ship was normal. Thus his evidence, which is completely acceptable, quitedefinitely establishes that the fire must have com me nced sometime after 00.29 hours on themorn ing of the 8thof January.

\-aftH ' m T /-A -c T A VJCL11U1N 1 \Th e f irs t phase of, the d isas ter : 00.31 hour s \ app rox ima te ly to 00 .40 hour sa p p r o x i m a t e l y. \The t^ j t imcny i r ' 'c t 'n rM k li i- hi np - Apr? nf rVip Pn ] liin .ifiln- dinnum-

*L?c?U Covlh &T6LrSft fnl A c r s ^ ^2 Mr. Joh n O 'Co nn or, Mrs . Do ro thy ^ ) 'C onn or and Mrs . Mary

& O'S ul l ivan . ' \

Mr. and M rs. O 'C on no r l ive a t Baro ny, Glengarr iff. Their bun galow is on the coast about220 feet (67 m) a bove sea level and has a direct v iew on to G arnish Island an d across toW hid dy Island 3.5 miles (5.6 km ) aw ay. Th ey have french win dow s in their lounge but the

view of the jetty from these win dow s is som ewh at obscured by \trees . From their westbedroom window, however, an unobstructed viewof the jetty can b \ obtained. O n Somfeyex i l in g Mr. tilld Mrs . O ^ o n n o r had been' ou t . "T iny lUuincd-a f tokmidn igh t . W hen k r

-M r, O' C on no r noticed the time on clock on the mantelpiece \ i t war 00.30 hours.-iuiiursuppci, l ie

* As she wasMt!). O'C uia iut askiTHrcHiusbandT-as-they a im e d homo,if he would

ltd, 1)LH M is,


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the lounge and wen t in to the k i tchen. She was prepa r ing to boi l a ke t t le and had jus t puon when he r husband ca ll ed ou t f rom the wes t bed roo m " I t is a fi re t h e re" . She p u t |ke t tl e on the Ag iVo ok er and fo l lowed he r husband th rou gh the f rench win dow s o f tlounge and in to the garden. W he n M rs . O 'C o n n o r go t on to the ter raCe outs ide the f ren^wind ows she saw qie fi re . She is qui te cer ta in i t was on the ta nke r. Sh /d es cr ib ed i t as "novery b ig " when shV f irst saw i t , but she and her husb and we nt d ow n to a rock which"lsi tuated in their garde n ab out 30 or 40 yards (27 or 36 m) from the ir h ous e to get a betteview of the f ire. She^could see the tanker c lear ly ( i t was , she sa id , a "beau t i fu l moo nl ightnigh t") and the f ire was to the r ight o f the cent re of the tanker. Th e f i re was s t il l not vervbig (she expressed the View that the f ire then was of "ma na ge ab le p ro po r t io ns ") but as shewas looking a t it "suddenly there was a roar l ike win d and the f lame w en t to th e lef t-handside of the tanker r ight \across i t . "

She descr ibed the even t ^ a "b ig f l a sh" . W hen th is happ end M rs . O 'C o n n o r r anoff th erock back in to the house , fii the house she decided to r ing the G lengarr i ff Ex cha ng e to ra isethe a larm and she p icked lip the phon e and spoke to the op era tor , M rs . O 'S ul l iva n.

Obv iously it is impor tant to \cs tabl ish the t ime a t wh ich Mrs . O 'C o n n o r te le pho ned Mrs .O'Sul l ivan as this would h elp \ to es tabl ish the d ura t io n of the f irst phase o f the f i re . In th isconnect ion Mrs . O 'Sul l ivan 's evidence is he lpful . She p laces the ca l l f rom Mrs . O 'C o n n o r a tbetween 00.40 and 00.45 hours , ^he had a f riend vis i t ing her hom e tha t even ing . Sh e recal lstha t when he got up to leave she looked a t her c lock and the t ime was 00.30 hours . Herhusband went to the hal l door wi th the i r v is i tor and s tayed ta lk ing there wi th h im for"near ly ten minutes" . When he came in he remarked "we 'are going to have a busy t ime inthe phone because we heard thundei \ whi le we w ere a t the doo r" . H e w en t to the back d ooro f t he k i tchen and re tu rned a ft er ^ m in u te and said " i t l ooks ve ry s t r an ge" and Mrs .O'Sul l ivan we nt out and saw a red g low which seemed to be fl icker ing. She tho ug ht i t mustbe the aurora borealis but her husband, tho ug ht that i t was a f ire an d said he w ou ld go tolook elsewhere . Jus t as Mrs . O 'Sul l iv an r e turned the te leph one r ang and i t was Mrs .O' Co nn or on the l ine repor t ing the fi re whic h she had seen. Mrs . O 'Su l l iv an th inks th is wasbetw een 00.40 and 00.45 hours. \

It is c lear, howe ver, tha t the time of Mr s \ O 'C on no r ' s ca ll must hav e been v ery c lose to00.40 hours . Mrs . O 'C on no r cou ld no t be e^act as to the length of t ime she was ou t of thehouse and on the rock look ing at the fire, antfishe is notof course in any way to be cr i t ic isedfor this , but she thoug ht tha t i t could havo. been for abo ut s ix or seven min utes . Sheremembers qui te c lear ly tha t the ket tle was not fo i l in g wh en she re tu rned to the k i tchen andthat she then decided to r ing the Glengarri ff Exc hang e. She ex pla ine d tha t the fi re in theAga cooker is low at night and that she wou ld n o\ exp ect the ke tt le to boil in 4 or 5 m inu tesas i t wou ld do normal ly. This evidence wou ld tend to es tablish tha t the dram at ic sp read ofthe f ire a long the tanker ( the beginnin g of the second phase of the d isas ter ) occ urre d in theregion of 00 .40 hours and not any la ter. This is cons is tent wi th evide nce of o th er wi tnesses .

Mr. O 'C on no r remembers quite c learly tha t the time n^ re turn ed ho m e was 00.30 hou rs . Heheard what he recall s as a " ru m bl i ng " outs ide which seem ed to be prol on ged , an d i t was l ike"muffl ed thunde r " and he d rew the cu rt a in s o f the f rench win dow s o f t he l oun ge . He saw ared g low in the sky f rom the d i r ec t ion o f W hid dy . H e wen t from the re t o t he w in do w o fthe west bedro om to get a better vi ew . From there he wasV^uite definite tha t ther e w as a f ire

"on the Is land" . No t only did he see a g low but he saw f lames as wel l " w i t h yel l ow t ips " .He then went out to the garden and do wn to the rock f rom wh ich he could see the fi re qu i teplainly. He was quite definite that the fire w as on the tank er Vnd n ot the je t t y ^H e said it w asin the centre of the tanker. H e tho ug ht i t was not a small Vire and th at in an in stant "i ts eemed to go the who le l eng th o f t he t anke r " . M r. O ' Co nn or ' s r eco l l ec t ion o f t he t ime h esaw the fire and the lengthof t ime he was looking a t i t before inspread was not accu ra te . Bu this evidence is helpful in two respects. It confirms th at the disaster com m en ce d at sh ortlvafter 00.30 hours , tha t the com men cem ent of the f ire w as acco mp anied by a c ont inu ou srum bling sound l ike thund er, and that the fire w as on the ship (st its cen tre) and n ot on thejetty. \

Mrs . O 'Co nn or ' s evidence is pr inc ipal ly of impor tan ce in re la t ion\ to the fi rs t phase of thedisaster. But it is also helpful in confirmin g othe r evide nce in rela tion to the sec ond pha se.After Mrs . O 'C on no r had ta lked to Mrs . O 'Su l l ivan she was put throu gh to the Glengarr i ff


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Ga rda Statio n, w here she alerted the sergeant's wife to the disaster. She then we nt back tothe garden. B y then the fire had spread and was "h ug e" ,and "frighten ing" . She hadexpressed the opin ion that even after the sudden spreadof the fire that i t was in her opin ion"m ana gea ble" . It is clear that even after the fire had sprca'd there was an interval o f t imebefore it otvclo ped into a ma jor conflagration. This supports the evidenceof the pumpman,Mr. D ow ne y, which will be considered in the next chapter, as well as other eye-witnessevidence toV he early part of the second phase of the disaster.

The ev id ence \ o f Mr. Pa t r i ck H o l l and and Mrs . E l i zabe th Ho l l and

M r. and M rs, Patrick Holla nd live at Derr ycreha , Glengarriff. Their house affords a perfectview of the jetty \ which is about three miles (4.8 km) distant. O n Sunday evenin g the 7thJanu ary Mrs. H olland had been out of her hom e visiting with some mem bersof her family.She recalls arriving\home at midnight. This is the only time on which she can give definiteevidence. She and some of the m embers of her family said the rosary and she then p reparedto go to bed. She wa&sitting on her bed when she heard an unusual noise. It was a rumblingand crackling noiseS omething completely different to the noises which usually em anatedfrom the jetty. O ne of her children asked her if i t was thunde r. She looked out of herbedro om wi nd ow to sec the cause of the noise and she saw a fire on the tanker . Sheremarked "It looks as if the tanker is on fire". Ha ving looked at the fire for a short t ime shewent into her daughter ' s bsdro om (her daughter work ed for the Bantry To wi ng Com pany)and she and her daughter thm looked at the fire from her daughter 's b edroo m w ind ow . M rs.Holland cannot be certain on the time she first saw the fire, but estimates that i t was betw een00.40 hours and 00.45 hoursA

Mr. H olland was in bed w hen nis wife we nt to the wi nd ow and first noticed the fire. H e gotup imm ediately and looked for Himself. He cann ot say what time it was when he first sawthe fire. Th e evidence of these Y/itnesses does not help in establishing the time of theoutbreak of the fire. But it isof considerable assistance in describing the natureof the fire inits first phase, as it is clear that M r m d Mrs, H ollan d saw th e fire whilst it was localised andbefore it had spread. Mr . H olland s\id that wh en he first saw it the blaze "seemed to becom ing ou t of the hold in the cen trc\of the tanker, mor e to the front, but I could see thegunwales on both sides". It was more to the front of the tanker than the centre. It appearedto be small "asif i t was a Cortina car bluing". He insisted that he could see the ship plainlyand that the fire was in the centre of it . As he w as watchin g the fire it got big ger, slowly atfirst . Then wh en it got to a certain size it suddenly spread at an "aw ful pace . . . all over thetanker". Clearly what Mr. Holland was describing was the same scene which Mr. and Mrs.O 'C on no r had witnessed, (see: Paragrap h 2).

Mrs. Holland wasof the same opinion as her Vusband as to the positionof the fire wh en shefirst saw it. She was satisf?ed that the fire was a Small one wh en she first saw it and that it wason the deck of the ship and a bit forwardof the Centre of the ship. She, too, thought the sizeof the fire wh en she first saw it was that as ifV mo tor car was on fire.

4 The ev idenc e o f Mr. R icha rd Dea rd en and Mrs . Marge ry Dea rden

Mr . and Mrs. Dea rden live at Seal Ha rb ou r. T his is fotir miles (6.4 km) on the western side

of Glengarriff. Their house is situated on the water 's edge w ith a clear viewof the terminaland the jetty , a distance of abo ut thre e miles (4.8 km )V cro ss th e sea.

Mr. Dearden was interested in ships (he had served in the Blutish N a w " a long time a go "he said) and he recalled w ell seeing the tanker on the nom a side of the jet ty o n Sun daymorning, the 7th of Janu ary, after some fog had cleared a t\ b o u t 11.00 hours. H e gaveevidence of hearing sounds on Sunday evening at about 21 .3 0\ ou rs. The sounds were, hethought, like thunder and he did not associate them with the talker. He retired to bed asusual and was awakened by a flickering light on the ceiling of hi s\ cd ro om . H e got up andwent to the wind ow from wh ich he had a clear view of the tanker. H e saw w hat heescribed as a "sm all" fire on th e tank er itself. He placed the fire as aft of wh ere th e ship's

bow section comes up. H e was qu ite definite that the fire was on the deckof the ship. W he n *e saw it first i t covered a very small area. There was no reflection from the fire on the. ater. Its colour was "y ello wy w hit e" and he was able to see the outline of the ship. T he


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tihe car, reversed it a short distance and w hen it stoppe d they bo th saw a fire at W hi dd yIsland. In M r, V aug han 's view "it w as a small flame ". He said that from the distance fromwhich he was " it appeared to m e to be six foot high and in the shape of a pyramid, threefoot wide and six foot high com ing to a po int" . They remained there for about tw o minutesand thers move d do wn to the Green Acres Hotel from which they had a better view. Thefire thenVtarted to get bigger and smoke started to rise in the shape of a mushro om . Mr.Vau ghan th oug ht that they remained there for a bout ten minutes and then they setoff todrive to tha hom e of Mr. Br ennan, w ho was living not far away in Kilkeel. Mrs. V aughan

also expre sses th e view that the fire was very small wh en first she saw it. She estimated thatthey stayed ab out ten minutes at Green Acres Hotel looking at the fire d uring which time itwas getting bigrger. They could not be certain (which indeed is not surprising, in viewof th elocation from whic h they w ere observing the fire) whe re exactly it was situated.

M r. and Mrs. V augha n th oug ht that they saw the fire before 00.30 hours. Th ey base thisestimate on the fafit (a) that they left G lengarriff after notin g that the time was 00.20 hoursand (b) that it would take about 7 or 8 minutes to reach the point on the road, near the smallchurc h at Snave, at Vh ich they first saw th e fire. But it is quite possible that they may notfully have taken in to \c co un t the time it took them to get into their car after n oticing thelateness of the hou r, and their evidence is not necessarily irreco ncilable with that of M r.Do wn ey w ho establishes\hat the fire was not in existence at 00.29 hours. But in viewof thedistance they had travelleaSthe time must have been ve ry shortly after 00.30 hours wh en theyfirst saw the fire, and the ir evidence is consistent with thatof Mrs. and Mr. O'Connor whichplaces the b egin ning of the (disaster very close to 00.30 hours.

Support for the view that MX and Mrs. Vau ghan saw the fire at about 00.30 hours isobtained from the evidenceof M . Bren nan. Ha ving watched the fire for some time Mr. andMrs. Vaughan drove to M r. Brenrian's house. He remem bers being awake ned by a noise atthe w in do w and that he loo ked at rajs wa tch and saw that it was 00.45 hours . He then lookedou t of his w in do w and saw "th e wHble sky on fire". He go t dressed and travelled with theVaughans back to Green Acres. Fromythere Mr. Brennan saw that Dolphin 22 and "west ofit was just a mass of flames". "T he sky", he said, "w as full of black, very thick, blacksm oke ". It is clear, therefore, that aboutVifteen min utes could have elapsed from the time theVaughans first saw the fire to the time\the y k nocked at Mr. B rennan 's wi nd ow .

Mrs. Va ugh an's tes timo ny assists on ano ther aspect of the disaster. She rem em bers wa iting inthe car whilst her husband wen t to fetch MV B rennan . Just as her husband and M r. Brennanwere return ing an explosion occu rred. T h\s was the first explosion that they heard tha tevening. It would seem that this explosion must have occurred at about 00.50 hours and itcould well have been the explosion described by the Deardens as a "w hoo shin g soun d"which Mrs. Dearden said occurred at 00.50 houts. That an explosion occurred at this time isborne out by other testimony, and will be considered again when the evidence of thepump man on the Island, Mr. Do wn ey , is beinAdiscu ssed (see: paragra ph 6.2.1).

2.6 Mr. Frits van Os \

Mr. van Os is a Dutch national and by occ upation aVrofessional p hoto grap her. He servedfor a time as an officer in the Dutc h arm y. H e arrive d irVBantry in Jun e, 1978, and lives w ithhis wife and tw o children in a house at Dr om leig h Sou tV B antry , w hich is almost due eastof the terminal. It is on a hillside ov erloo king the tow n a\id the Bay and ab out 4 miles (6.4

P km) from the jetty. From his house Mr. van O s can sec the \op s of the tanksof the tank farmat the termin al, but he has no view of the jetty itself. \

On Sunday evening he was in his l iving room a room whicia faces straight on to W hid dyIsland. His wife and childre n had g one to bed an d he was listening to m usic, lying on abench with the lights of the roo m turnedoff except for a readmg light over his head. H enoticed "to his astonishm ent" a glow com ing up unde r the \tando w. H e took off theearphones and got into an upright position. As he was doing so he^ooked at his watch andsiw that the time was 00.35 hours. H e looke d ou t throu gh the wi nd ow and saw a fire at

iiddy Island. He imme diately aw oke his wife and the t wo of thVn look ed at the fire.-en he first saw the flame he described it as bein g " in the formof a cVidle", coming from

ind the Island or on the Island itself. It was, he thou gh t, "ra ther co nc en tra ted " bu t risingt!ite a distance in the air. He could see the reflectionof the flame in a cl o\dof smoke above


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the flame. T her e was a slight wind and the smoke had risen very high but was ngexactly vertical, bu t bent over to the right d rifting a little bit in the w ind. As he watctrfire it deve loped in width . T he fire e xten ded both sides from its original position

\ri nc ip al ly to the witness 's r ight . This developm ent of the f ire was a gradual one an*is occurring he heard m inor cracks and sounds of explosions which h e described as "m

plo ts" . Ha ving w atched the fire for some short while he obtained oneof his cameras, p-150 millim etre lens in it, we nt to the fence wh ich surround s the terraceof his house and t-two pictures. He took the camera into his house and put in another lens (an 80 millimetlens) and too k a third ph oto gra ph. W hilst th e witness was certain that he first saw the fire'00.35 hours he was not certain as to the times at which he took the photographs,estimatecnthat the first pho togr aph was taken abou t 10 minutes after he first n oted the fLThe witness recalls the major explosion.

just after itVent off, he heard the fire siren at Bantry Bay Fire Station. H e recalledthaffwhe n these events happe ned his wife looke d at her watch and said "i t is eight m inutes pasf*on e". The witness was not certain w hethe r the third p hotogra ph was taken before or afterthe ma jor explosrbn bu t expressed the v iew that it could h ave been before it. Th e relevance;^of this evidence is\h at i t is possible to make o ut from the photog raph that the bowof the ,ship was at what tha witness described as a "very unusual angle". As to the major explosion,the witness describecKthe shock wave s from it as causing his house to trem ble. T he explosionwas so severe that it caused Mr. van Os to consider the necessityof evacuating his nouse withhis wife and children . ftrom the position of Mr. va n O s's house it was not possible for him tosee the exact locationoR the fire, bu t other e viden ce am ply establishes that the fire which he

first saw was on the "Betelgeu se". H is evidence, how ever,verf accurately establishes thatthe fire w as in existence ^t 00.35 hours. It also corro borate s oth er evide nce that the majorexplosion o ccurre d at 01.OS hours. U nde rstan dab ly e nou gh, the witness could n ot be certainas to how exactly the f ire develope d. B ut his evidence shows thHat the develop men t was agradual one, and that i t wa\ accompanied by minor explosions.

Mrs . Brenda Elph ick

Mrs- Elphick is a ma rried wo m an\ an d a nurse. O n the nigh t of the disaster she was on dutyin the Ba ntry Co un ty H ospital from 20.30 hours . The hosp ital is situated to the east of thetow n c entre in a slightly elevated po sition. She recalled being in the office attache d to thefemale surgical wa rd prep aring chaXts, an office-which is on the first floor o f the hospitalfacing east. It was a calm nig ht ancn wh at first a ttracted her attention to the existence ofsom ething unusua l w as a strange noisa. She found it difficult to describe the noise but saidthat it was a sortof "crac kling so und" .\She first w ent to check her patients and then went tothe sluice room on the same corridor bat which gives a view in a north-easterly direction.The window was open and she could see\smoke when she looked through i t . She decided togo to another win dow on the corridor. Asvshe went from the sluice room to this windo w shechecked the clock in the hospital corridoV and also her own watch. The time was 00.40hours. From the corridor w indo w she had av ie w facing W hid dy Island. She could then seesmoke whic h w as very high in the sky and fiames wh ich lit up the wh ole sky. In her o pinionit was a very large fire w hen first she saw

As to the interval wh ich had elapsed from hea ring the unusual sound to the time wh en shelooked through the corridor window (00.40 houre) she said that "only minutes" elapsed. Sheagreed that in a written statement which she had made to the Gardai she had estimated that"approximately ten minutes" had elapsed but she stated in evidence that i t would not havebeen this length of t ime. She expressed the o pinio mth at the fire must have started a "few

minu tes" before she saw it .This evide nce establishes that by 00.40 hours the fire Wa s $ large one . It was at that timeaccompanied by a " t reme ndously h igh " column of smoke which had obviously t ravelledsome distance from the sceneof the disaster as it was seen Vy N urse Elphick wh en she loo kedthrough the windowof the sluice room . This w indo w faces in a north-easterly direction andnot directly over Whiddy Island and the smoke must have travelled some distance to permither to see it from this position. H er evide nce s how s that the fire must have started someapprec iable tim e before 00.40 hours and is consistent w ith the evidence that it started sh ortlyafter 00.30 ho urs.


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5.2.8 T h e e v i d e n c e o f M is s M a r y H o l l a n d

Miss Holland had been at a dance in the West Lodge^Hotel. She was sitting in her car in theforecourt of the hotel wh en she noticed tw o unujidal happen ings. She noticed fit-stly somemem bers of the Garda Siochana running in tWIo rec our t as i f there was an em ergen cy apiece of evidence w hich is corr obor ated amK -xplained by the evidenceof Garda Byrne andGarda Joy. She then not iced smoke com ing from the Wh idd y direct ion. She f irs t tho ughtthat the smoke was coming from a finîn a hayshed. In a few seconds, how eve r, i t appea redto be very black sm oke and th ere wâs a great deal of it. She look ed at her w atch and recalls

that the time was nearly twen twfiv e to one (00.35 hours). She decided to drive d ow n to thebeach road to get a better vk>wof the fire and she drove dow n to "the B eache s" (partof th ecoast just bey ond the airstrip and w hich is close to W hi dd y Island). From there she cou ld seethe g low of the fire but no t the fire i tself. She saw wh en she got the rea distance ofmiles (2,4 km) from/fhe hotel appro xim ately a lot of smoke travelling in the direction ofBallylicke y. A slight discrepanc y exists betw een the oral evidenc e of this witness and thestatement w hi^n she made to the Gardai on the 19th Janu ary. In her written statement shesaid that thp^time she first saw the fire w as "12.38 a. m ." (i.e. 00.38 hour s). The discrep ancyis, howe ver , a min or one, and in no wa y affects the conclusion that this witness saw a fire ator cloJr to 00.35 hours. Her view of the location of the fire was, how eve r, obscured b y the

w r J>*K r*B ^ ^TJUl Tii il lil il I "lln T i il ii ii il1 i i in lin inir

T h e disaster began very shortly after 00.30 hours, in the regionof 00.31-00.32 hours . Whenit began it was accompanied by sounds like distant thunder. At i ts commencement the fireappeared to be a small one and localised just forward of the centreof the ship, but graduallyincreased in intensity. It was accom panied by a large plum e of smoke. Its transition to thesecond phase was sudden and dram atic. T he fire was seen to spread aft along the wh olelength of the tanker. Th is happene d at about 00.40 hours.

S E C T I O N 2

Th e second phase of the d isas ter : 00 .40 hou rs appr oxim ate ly t o 01 .06-01.08 hours

The evidence of the w itnesses \Uiich will m m be considered: SCfftS-WTthêae wh o first sawthe fire at about 00.40 hou rs, It tejclear that these witnesses saw the fire wh en it had reach edits second phase, tha t is to say, wh en it was no lon ger a small fire but ha d sprea dconsiderab ly. From the eviden ce n ow c onside red it is clear that the fire was on the sea atboth sides of the ship from abou t 00.40 hours onwa rds. T.hu evidence of thoso w ho im r rh efire feom no 45 oryr-ird- "-il lthen-be " - t r i ' l ' T M

The second phase lasted dntil 01.08 hours when the massive explosion occurred. Evidenceit /"nri-irlrrrrd lntn- clearly establishes that this explosion occurred in wayof the No. 6

tanks and the No . 5 centre tank . The second phase was accomp anied by a num ber ofexplosions, oneof w h i c hat about 00.50 hoursresulted in a very considerable increase inthe intensity of the fire (see paragr aph 6.2.2). Othe r ev ide nce , hiih will be Lomidcm dlafwr establishes that these explosion s did no t take plac e in the vessel but outside it. fanthci

nf thf sernnd phnrr m iT - l- i i i ivi j ;n "' 1 n " ' l i inh '"ill l, n " ii i 1 'i 1f l i n t f r nn n t

c h a p u r.

The disas ter as seen a t 00 .40 f iours approximate ly

Doc to r A lexandra O 'Mahony and Mr. F rank O 'Mahony

Doctor O 'Ma hony and Mr. 0 'M a h o n \ l iv e a t Drom kea l which i s a shor t d is tance to thenorth-west of Ballylickey. From their h o W they can see the jetty w hich is about 4.4 milesOr 7 km away. D octor O 'M aho ny recalls g o W to bed at 00.35 hours . Both before she w ent

^ e d and as she was in bed she was aware o ûnu sual noises. She described these as bein^l- thunder in the distance or the boomingof Concorde or heavy lorries passing outside' .

^ r e c a l l s p u t t i n goff the light to go to sleep at OttyO. The clock was at the sideof her bedput out the light she clearly remembers noticing the time and was mildly irritated

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at the lateness of the ho ur b ecause she had an ea rly start the following morning.'do wn in bed an d as she had some pins in her hair she was uncomfortab le and decided {up to take the m out.As she did so she pulled back th e curtain and saw the fire out 1Bay . The fire was a big on e with smoke rising to the left goin g tow ards B antry. She cfnot see wh at w as on fire but it look ed like the tan ker.

Mr. O 'M ah on y was oozing when he was awakened by his wife. H e got out ofimm ediately and lo ok ed at the clock wh ich was beside him . It was a little after 00.404clock had not reached 00.45. He saw the fire whic h he though t w as "to the r ight of!offshore je tty ". The nigh^ was a very clear one a nd he had a perfect view of the terminf

Th e w ind was negligible* Th e w itness could not be certain w heth er the fire was on ftanke r or o n the jet ty. He ^iad the impression tha t the fire was not on the sea when he fir|saw it but c ould n ot be certain abou t this. Th e witness wen t into the garden and watched tHflame and smoke from there,^He w itnessed the major explosion. "A vast wh ite sheetof flam-soared into the sky and at thak stage the floor un der my feet shook a nd the w ind ow shook!'.Th e flames then spread to the, no rth . The impression whic h the w itness had was that the.wh ole length o f the tanker, w^ ich th e witness tho ug ht was at right angles to the jetty, wasthen com pletely on f ire. After that explosion there were con tinuous creaking and tearingsounds which he had not heard, before the exp losion took place.

Dr. and M r. O 'M ah on y had bee A und er the impression that the tanker had been moored atright angles to the jett y, and thev\ tho ugh t that w hat th ey were look ing at was the wholelength of the tanker on f ire. After the majo r explosion there were continuo us creakingsounds and tearing sounds which M r. O 'M ah on y had no t heard before the explosion tookplace. (

i tM r. and Mrs, O' M ah on y w ere, in fa&t, looking at the sternof the vessel from a distance ofover four miles. It was therefore veAy difficult for them to describe or kno w the exactlocation of the fire. B ut the ir testimon y ysof considerable importance in establishing the timeof the second phaseof the fire. It is clean that w hen they saw the fire it was a little after 00.40and before 00.45 hours. T he fire was then in its second phase. Both saw a "b ig " fire, a"subs tan t ia l" fi re . Doctor O 'M aho ny cont inued watching i t f rom the win dow and whi ls tshe cannot be sure, she considered tha t the fire did not ch ange until after the big e xplosion .Th e fire seen by these witnesses wasof different dimen sions to the "small fire' described bythe witnesses in Section 1of this chapter. Clearly, they were looking at the second phase ofthe disaster. The ir evide nce helps in confirming that the second phase bega n in the region of00.40 hours,

\

\^

5.3.3 T h e e v i d e n c e o f M r. J o h n C r o w l e yMr. and Mrs. Crow ley were visi t ing fr iends ( t l^ O'Sheas) in Gorties at a place kn ow n asBay View Farm. Mr. Crowley recalls that the programme on television had come to an endand the set was switched off. Mr. C row ley looke d at his watch and the t ime was 00.35. Asthey were standing up to leave a memb er of the family turned on the dishwasher. I t was anew one and i t was decided to wait and see ho w \it performed.As he was standing w ait ing to leave, someone pu lled y curtain aside and saw the fire at thejet ty. M r. Cro wle y im mediately wen t to the win dow and saw the f ire. H e est imates that thetime was then abo ut 00.40 hours. \

From the window he could see the sternof the tanker. He saw a "saddle of f ire" m idw ay onthe vessel and on bo th sides of it. He co uld see the to^s of the flames co mi ng ove r thesuperstructure of the tanker on occasions. It didn 't look "te rribly bi g" w hen he first saw it.

He saw a colu mn of smok e, very hig h, black and dense ancf rising at an angleof about forty-five degrees.

Mr. Crowley immediately drove to his home at Relane Poinjt , a distanceof some five milesfrom his friend's house. His route broug ht him throug h the tow n of Bantry and out past theWest Lodge Hotel . As he was going through the town he noticed the Garda patrol caroutside the Garda Station, and he could see the columnof smoloe passing over the town. Hishom e is 160 feet (49 m) abov e sea level and he had a clear view o f the jet ty. T he fire wasmuch stronger at the t ime he reached his hom e. After he got out of his car a "vic iou s"


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cxplosiorfsoccurred, the effects of which he actually felt and which caused his dog to rollover on th\ ground.

This witness observed the fire just after the disaster had en tered its second phase. Th e fire wasnot then very \gre at, but i t was both on the ship and on the sea on both sides of it .

I Mr. Rich ard Fi tzgera ld and Mr. Jam es O'Sh ea

Th e yi ew w hi ch tHfcse witnesses hadof the fire was from a car being driven from Glcngarriffto Ballylic key. Alt hou gh they saw the fire for a short time in its first phase, their eviden ce isof particular relevanse to the second phase of the disaster.

M r. Fitzgerald lives at^Ballylickey. O n the night o f the 7th/8th January a friendof his, Mr.O' Sh ea, was visiting him. S ome time after mid night tw o girls called to his house and askedfor a lift to the Castle Ho tel w hich is near Glengarriff and about six miles awa y. Mr.Fitzgerald thinks that the feme w as then 00.20 hours. It was on his return jour ney , at a pointin the road k no wn as Arda\urrish , that he first n oticed som ething unusual. He saw w hat hethou ght wer e tw o small fires in the vicinity of the tanker and the jetty. He did n ot stop hiscar and M r. O 'She a tho ugh t that he was mistaken about the existence of a fire. Mr.Fitzgerald continued on to G reen A cres, a distance of abou t three miles (4.8 km ), hereck one d, from the place he 3aw the fire first, and h avin g passed the hotel he noticed abrightness in the sky. He stopped and drove back a short distance and then saw what he

described as a massive fire. Th e view wh ich M r. Fitzgerald and Mr. O'S hea obtained fromthe moving car was an intermittent one. They cannot be certainof the time wh en first theynotic ed th e fire but place it at abcJut 00.40 hours. It is clear that w hen th ey w ere wa tchin gthe fire from Green A cres the firdh ad reached its second phase.

The vie w wh ich these witnesses hac was of the stern of the tank er. It was clearly visiblewh en they stopped the car. There w as, Mr. Fitzgerald said, a very bright bac kgr oun d, andhe saw balls of smoke and a "ma ssi ve \ir c". He could see that the sea was on fire on bothsides of the main fire, but mainly b etw een the jetty and the shore. Mr. O 'Sh ea tho ugh t thatthe fire was around the accomm odation a'icaof the ship, and that it was getting worse by thesecond. Th e fire "seemed to pou r over flpe side of the ship" and it was on the sea. Thewitnesses stayed about three minutes at Green Acres and then drove to Bantry Pier. Mr.Fitzgerald rem emb ers he aring a nu mb er o f Janall explosions w hilst he was at the Pier and

heard what he described as a "massive" explosion at 01.07 hours. He was able to state thetime of the massive explosion with accuracy because Mr. O'Shea looked at his watch whenit occurred and told him the time.

T h e e v i d e n c e o f M r. D e n i s C o n n o l l y

Mr. Denis Co nno lly resides at Blackrock Road in th at ow n of Bantry. Early in the morningof the 8th Janu ary he had left his hom e to drivet. a restaurant in the town. He recallsdriving thro ugh Wolfe To ne S quare. As he was approa ching the Bantry Bay H otel he saw ablack pall of smoke in front of him c om ing up fromWhiddy Island. He had looked at hiswatch a mi nute , or at most t w o m inutes, before he reached the Squ are. This was at 00.39hours. He is satisfied, then , that wh en he first saw tfte fire the time was 00.40 hoursapproximately. He described the sm oke as going straigh t up and towar ds the Ballylickey

direction, w ith some flames m ixed in the smoke. H e derived to drive to a better van tagepoint at "th e Beach es" closer to the Island. Ha ving view ed the fire from this point hereturned to the tow n to call at a friend's house. A s he was w aitin g to be let in there was aviolent explosion. He looked at his watch again. The time was then 01.05 hours.

Mr. C onno lly's testimony is further evidence of the existence \of the fire at 00.40 hours.

The ev idence o f Mr. Michae l W isem anf" \JVlr. Wisem an lives at Cahe r, abou t tw o m iles from the town of Bantry and on theballylickey sideof it. His house is on elevated groundoff the main Bantry/Glengarr iff road.>e had been at the We st Lo dge Hotel on the evenin g of the 7th and Bad arrived hom e atbout 23.30 hours. He did no t go to bed imm ediately. He m ade himself a.cupof coffee an d

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sag

went to the front do orof his house at a time which he estimates was 00.30 hours. The5

then nothing unusual to be seen. He return ed indoors and f inished his coffee. He th$to the front door for a second t ime. W he n he opened i t he imme diately saw a f ire . He c4his brother and he looked at his watch. Th e t ime w as then 00.40 hours . W he n he fi rs the thought the f ireywas at a neigh bou r 's house. At that t ime the sky was "p ret ty redthere was black smoke hov ering straight o ver his house. H e w en t to a field b ehin d his ho'to get a bet ter viewsof the f ire and at 00.50 hours ap prox imate ly dro ve to Ard atu r l

Mr. Wisem an's evidence is obviously accurate and confirms the exis tence of the f ire a tODthours .

7 T h e e v i d e n c e o f M r. C o r n e l i u s C o n n o l l y

Mr. Con nolly had been a vfs itor in the Wast L odge H otel on Sunday the 7th of January . H precalled leaving the hotel a t 1)0.30 hours on the m orn ing of the 8th an d dr iv ing to the Old^Pier a t Bantry town where ho parked the van he was dr iving. He est imated that i t took hirabout f ive minutes to dr ive t


26/36

went to her parents ' room and awakened her fa therthree or four minutes having e lapsedfrom the t im e she first heard the noise to the t ime she went to her parents ' room . She calledher fa ther and as he got out of bed and came over to the wind ow of h is room he looked a this watch and he said "It is a quarter to one" (00.45 hours).

Mr. O 'Leary remembers h is daughter coming in to h is bedroom, waking him up and saying"D ad dy , there i s some thing w ron g w i th Gulf . I t is on fi re". Mr. O 'Leary jumpe d outof bedand as he did so he check ed his wa tch a nd the t ime was "practically a quarter to one" . H e

looked out the window and he couldsee smoke a nd flame. From his wi ndo w he could seethe tanker ana . the centre p la tform of the je t ty. There was fa ir ly in tense smoke which"seem ed to com e out of one patc h" . The f ire seemed to be conta ined in one area and thesmok e appeared ro be com ing f rom some whe re around the manifold of the ship . W hen hefirst saw the fire thine was no questionof i t spreading the lengthof the ship and it was in thearea of the centre pktf orm . He immed iate ly got dressed and went w i th h is son to a f ie ld a tthe back o f the house\a few hundre d yards away to get a bet ter v iewof the fire. At first thesmo ke was not h ea vy, un it as the minutes w ent by , both the smoke and the flames increased.The smoke sti l l blockeo\his vision and he decided to travel down to the sea level going in thedirec tion of a small rocft,off the Island know n as "Carr iga cloash" . W he n he got down tosea-level the fire was veny extensive. " T he w ho le area was covered in flame". He was,how eve r, o nly there for a few seconds whe n the big explos ion occurred. He was s tunned byit for a cou plc of minutes . l \ caused debris to fall a round him. H e was "absolutely terrified"

by th e exp losio n. H e ret urn ed to his house and collected his family to evacuate the Island.The witness was posit ive that irom the t ime he was awoken at no t ime did he hear the sirenon the Co ntro l b ui ld ing or on m e je t ty. The wi tness could not be sure whether the f ire wason the ce ntre platform or w he the r i t was on the ship. He estimated that i t wo uld have takenhim abo ut six or seven minu tes tA get to the hil l from wh ich he observed the smoke, andabo ut the same tim e again to get to. the posit ion on the shore from which he observed thema jor conf lagra t ion. He es t imated the big explos ion as having occurred between f ive andten past one.

Mrs. O'Learv corroborated her husbancKs testimony in relation to the t ime he was awoken.In addition she gave evidenceof a telephon e call from the postmistress in the postoffice. Thiscall cam e after her hu sban d ha d got dressed and left. She could not be certain as to the exacttime bu t she checked later w ith the postmistress in the post office w ho told her that she hadbook ed the call to her at one o'c lock . T he m essage she got from the postmistress was to theeffect that Mr. C onn ol ly had te lephoned andlae wanted the men col lec ted to go dow n andhelp fight the fire. As to the siren, she said she w ou ld hea r the siren on the termina l w hen itwent off bu t she did not hear i t on the ni gh tV f the disaster.

It is of relevance t o note that M rs. O 'Le ary was qdoted in the public press of 11th Janua ry asstating that her daughter^liad seen the fire at 00.45 nou rs and that, notwithsta nding the factthat Mr. O 'Leary was an employeeof Gulfs , no effost was made byGulf to contact him andto obta in a s ta tement f rom him or any me mbe r of \h is familya mat ter which wi ll beadverted to again in paragraph 8.5.6.

T h e e v i d e n c e o f M r s . A n n e M u r p h y

Mrs. Mur phy is the wife of D octo r Mat t Mu rphy and l ives a tViur teen R oe which is hal fwaybetween Ba ntry and Bal ly l ickey. O n S unday evening th ey th of January her husbandreceived a phone call at approximately 22.50 hours in connection with a drowning at thepier at Bantry. He left to atten d to i t . She recalls being in bed reading a newsp aper when shereceived a teleph one call from her husba nd. H er husband told her to look out the wind ow tosee the fire on W hi dd y Island. She is quite certain tha t she rcceivecMie call at 00.45 hours ashe looked at her clock by her bed-side when she received i t . She rooked out the windownd saw a lo t of flame com ing up over W hid dy Island from the direc t ion of the terminal .

ie wen t upstai rs and looked a t the fi re f rom an upsta irs wind ow fV "approxima tely 15~utes . She recalls coming down the stairs and as she was doinjz so she recalled a

nendous explos ion" . W he n she re turned upsta irs and looked ouA the wind ow " thejp le sky was alight and flames w ere sho oting up into the sky" . Before tne major explosion

were a lot of crackling sounds and smaller explosions.

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Th e ev idence o f Mr. Pe te r Tyn an O 'Ma hon y and Mr. Jack O 'Shea

Mr. T ynan O'M ah on y is a journalis t . On the night of the disaster he was staying!bunga low own ed by fr iends of his at Ardaturrish. The b ungalo w is about two hu ndred1

(61 m) above sea-level and affords an excellent view of the jetty and tankersberthedHe had noticed th ^ta nk er at 11.00 hours on the morn ing of Sunday the 7th JanuaryIdescribed her as "rams hack le" and as "loo kin g rus ty" and recalls tha

the facts of the disaster and related

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