the effect of earning management on firm value and good

The Effect of Earning Management on Firm Value and

Good Corporate Governance as a Moderating Variable

Sri Wahjuni Latifah1*, Fina Novitasari2

1,2 University of Muhammadiyah Malang *Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

This research aims to testing and proved the earnings management to the firm value by implementing Good

Corporate Governance (GCG). The components of GCG include managerial ownership, institutional ownership, the

size of the board of commissioners, the board of independent commissioners, and the audit committee. This research’s

object is a manufacturing corporation listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange(SEC). These results indicate that an

independent board of commissioners and an audit committee can moderate earnings management's effect on firm value

with managerial ownership. Descriptive analysis results are the average value of managerial ownership is 23%, an

independent board of commissioners is 42%, and an audit committee is 3%.

Keywords: earnings management, firm value, good corporate governance

1. INTRODUCTION

The tight competition in the business or business

world is currently a strong trigger for company

management to show the best performance for the

company they lead because the good or bad performance

of the company will give an effect to company's market

value and also affect investors to invest or withdraw their

investment from a company. The financial report results

from the company's operational activities and

performance to be reported to internal and external

parties with the parameter in the form of profit. Earnings

information that is available in financial statements is the

main requirement of investors in making decisions.

Earnings information is often the target of

engineering through management's opportunistic actions

to maximize their satisfaction because some of the parties

pay more attention to earnings. It is realized by

management, especially managers whose performance is

measured based on earnings information. (Savitri, 2014).

Therefore, earnings are often engineered to beautify

financial reports known as earning management

(Indracahya and Faisol, 2017). Earnings management

practices have been carried out in many countries,

including Indonesia (SUKARTHA, 2008). The

information available in financial reports is an essential

requirement for investors in making decisions

(Widayanti et al., 2014).

The selection of accounting policies is shown so that

the company can increase or decrease the profits obtained

following the needs and desires of management so that

the company's financial statements look good in users'

eyes. Sometimes these actions are contrary to the main

principles in the company. Such management behavior is

known as earning management. (Agustia and Suryani,

2018).

On the contrary, The agent now knows more about

their capacity, workplace, and overall

company.(Anggraeni and Hadiprajitno, 2013). Agency

theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), (Sunarto, 2009) is

a theory that explains the existence of two individuals,

namely agents or managers who carry out the duties of

the principal or capital owner in maximizing company

results.

Several factors that can be used as indicators to

minimize earnings management are by doing GCG. GCG

itself is an effort that can be made by all parties to direct

or control the company in order to achieve company

balance. So, corporate value can be increased by

implementing GCG (Ferial and Handayani, 2016). GCG

implementation mechanisms include managerial

Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 173

Proceedings of the 7th Regional Accounting Conference (KRA 2020)

Copyright © 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press B.V.This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license -http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/. 61

mailto:[email protected]

ownership, ownership structure, board members, a board

of independent commissioners, and an audit committee.

Based on (Dwija, 2012), the concept of GCG, is a tool to

give investors confidence that they will receive a return

on their invested funds.

Several previous research results state that companies

can reduce information asymmetry by improving

financial reporting quality (Biddle et al., 2009). The

impact of earnings management on firm value was

investigated by (Herawaty, 2008) who found that

earnings management positively influences firm value.

(Darwis, 2012) proves that earnings management does

not affect firm value; it means that managers' earnings

management actions will not influence firm value.

Besides, (Shen et al., 2015) proves that companies in

China that carry out earnings management positively

affect overinvestment. It means that earnings

management is negatively related to investment

efficiency. A sample of companies in ASEAN (Ferial and

Handayani, 2016) proves that the financial reporting

quality negatively impacts underinvestment, but it has no

effect on overinvestment.

From some of the explanations above, it can be

concluded that this study is critical because the previous

studies regarding Based on some of the primary

justifications, it is reasonable to conclude that this

research is essential because prior studies on the impact

of earnings management on firm value have yielded

inconsistent results. As a result, the researcher wishes to

review this research by connecting the role of GCG,

which consists of managerial ownership, institutional

ownership, the size of the board of commissioners, and

the size of the board of commissioner, and the audit

committee, which are intended to reduce the prospect of

earnings practices, which nowadays often occur within

the scope of companies carried out by company

management.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Effect of Earnings Management on Firm

Value with GCG as a Moderating Variable

The agency theory perspective occurs when there are

differences in interests between principals and agents

who tend to be selfish in allocating investment sources.

(Darwis, 2012). Compared to the owners (shareholders),

the manager of a company has the advantage of knowing

more about the company's internal information and

prospects, resulting in asymmetric information. Because

of the information asymmetry among management and

owners, managers can perform earnings management so

the firm value at a particular time will increase to mislead

owners (shareholders) regarding the actual value of the

company.

The results of previous research conducted

(Wiralestari and Fitriyani, 2012) proved that the

independent commissioner and audit committee

variables as proxies of GCG positively affect earnings

management. Therefore, based on the theory's

description and previous research, the proposed

hypothesis is:

H-1: Managerial ownership, institutional ownership,

size of the board of commissioners, the board of

independent commissioners, and the audit committee can

moderate the effect of earnings management on firm

value.

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework

3. RESEARCH METHOD

The sampling method is using purposive sampling

method, with the following criteria: (1) It is a

manufacturing company that listing on the IDX for the

2018 period, (2) The company has audited financial

reports that ended on December 31 and were published

in 2018, (3) The company’s financial statements report in

rupiah currency during the observation period in 2018,

(4) The company has data that related to the variables

needed for the 2018 research period. So that companies

that meet the criteria are 60 companies.

Variable and measurements:

Earning Management : 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 - 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1)/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1

Firm Value: 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝑄 = (𝐸𝑀𝑉+𝐷

𝐸𝐵𝑉+𝐷)

GCG: :

Managerial ownership:

𝐾𝑀 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔× 100%

Institutional ownership :

𝐼𝑁𝑆 =𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔× 100%

Size of the Board of Commissioners:


62

--- ____________

GCG (M) Managerial ownership(MO) Ins�tu�onal Ownership(IO), The size of the Board of Commissioners(BOC), Independent Commissioner(IC), Audit Commi�ee(AC)

Earning management (X) Discretionary Accrual

(DAC)

Firm value (Y) Tobin’s Q

DK = Total members of the company's board of

commissioners

Independent board of commissioners:

𝐷𝐾

=𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚× 100%

Audit Committee:

KA = The entire number of existing audit members

This research uses secondary data types, namely

quantitative data sourced from the company’s annual

financial reports of manufacturing companies listed on

the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2018. This

research data was obtained by accessing the IDX’s

official website (www.idx.co.id). This study's data

analysis technique consisted of four stages, namely, by

conducting a descriptive analysis. Furthermore,

performing a classical assumption test with several tests:

the normality test, the multicollinearity test, the

heteroscedasticity test, and the autocorrelation test. It was

then continued with the Moderated Regression Analysis

(MRA) test. If analysis requirements through the

classical assumption test. Later, the hypothesis testing is

the partial t statistical test and the simultaneous F

statistical test, which can be done based on calculations

from Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA), which is

carried out using SPSS.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Descriptive Data

Results of descriptive statistical analysis can be seen

through the following explanation:

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Test

N Minimum

Maximu

m Mean

Std.

Deviatio

n

TOBINS'Q 60 .197 .773 .42730 .127578

DAC 60 .010 .606 .10912 .103689

KM 60 .016 .558 .23988 .138989

INST 60 .131 .898 .64188 .192750

DK 60 2.000 10.000

3.7000

0

1.69045

2

DKI 60 .050 .667 .42190 .106747

KA 60 3.000 4.000

3.0333

3 .181020

Valid N

(listwise) 60

Source: SPSS output processed, 2019

Table 1 point out that the average of firm value is

0.42730 and the standard deviation is 0.127578. It means

that the company value has a low score. Based on the

interpretation of Tobin's Q score, it states that Tobin's Q

<1. The average of earnings management variable is

0.10912 and the standard deviation is 0.103689. It means

that companies tend to do income increasing or increase

profits. The average managerial ownership variable is

0.23988, and the standard deviation is 0.138989. It means

that the average managerial ownership is above 20%. The

average institutional ownership variable is 0.64188 and

the standard deviation is 0.192750. It means that the

average institutional ownership is above 20%. The

average of the board of commissioners' size is 3,70000

and the standard deviation is 1.690452. As a result, the

greater the number of board members, the easier it will

be to control the CEO and the more influential the

monitoring will be. The independent board of

commissioners' variable average has an is 0.41470 and

the standard deviation is 0.097125. OJK regulation, no.

33 / PJOK. 04/2014 stating that the number of

independent commissioners is not less than 30% of the

board of commissioners' total members. The average

audit committee variable has an average value of 3.033,

with the standard deviation being 0.181020. The

companies are included in the sample of this study are

following the requirements of the audit committee

members, namely three people.

4.2 Normality Test

Based on (Ghozali, 2016), the regression model is

normally distributed if the probability > 0.05. The

following is a picture of the normality test.

Table 2. Normality Test

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

Unstandardized

Residual

N 60

Normal

Parametersa,b

Mean .0000000

Std. Deviation .10208445

Most Extreme

Differences

Absolute .071

Positive .042

Negative -.071

Test Statistic .071

Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200 Source: SPSS output processed, 2019

Table 2 above shows that the Kolmogorov Smirnov

test results show that data obtained is 0.200. These results

indicate that the probability > 0.05.


63

http://www.idx.co.id/

4.3 Multicollinearity Test

Based on (Ghozali, 2016) the Variance Inflation

Factor (VIF) value of each independent variable on the

dependent variable can be used to detect the presence or

absence of multicollinearity. If the VIF value is less than

10 and the tolerance value is greater than 0.01, the model

is said to be free of multicollinearity symptoms.

Fiurthermore, the VIF value is less than 10, and the

tolerance value is greater than 0.01. As a result, it is

possible to conclude that there is no multicollinearity.

4.4 Heteroscedasticity Test

Based on (Ghozali, 2016) ,criteria for

heteroscedasticity testing with the Scatter Plot states that

if the residual points are randomly spread out, then the

heteroscedasticity test is fulfilled. So, the results of the

heteroscedasticity test is:

Table 3. heteroscedasticity test

Table 4. Scatter plot test


Table 4 shows that the residual points spread randomly,

so it can be stated that the heteroscedasticity test is

fulfilled, and there are no heteroscedasticity symptoms.

4.5 Autocorrelation Test

Based on (Ghozali, 2016) The criteria for

autocorrelation testing using the Run Test are if the

Asymp. Sig value is< 0.05. Then there are autocorrelation

symptoms. And if the Asymp.Sig value is> 0.05. There

are no autocorrelation symptoms. The Run Test results

are shown in the table below.

Table 5. The Run Test

Runs Test

Unstandardized

Residual

Test Value -.00723

Cases < Test Value 30

Cases >= Test Value 30

Total Cases 60

Number of Runs 33

Z .521

Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .602


Table 5 shows that the Run Test test indicates that the

Asymp.Sig value is 0.602. It means that Asymp.Sig>

than 0.05. So, it can be concluded that there are no

autocorrelation symptoms.

4.6 Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) Test

The Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) test is a

subset of multiple linear regression. This regression

equation contains an interaction element, namely the

multiplication of two or more independent variables,

strengthening or weakening the relationship between the

independent and dependent variables. The following are

the results of the Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA)

test:

Model

Unstandardized

Coefficients

Collinearity

Statistics

B Std. Error

Toleranc

e VIF

1 (Constant

) 1.572 .353

DAC .035 .158 .916 1.091

KM -.277 .126 .797 1.255

INST -.189 .089 .830 1.205

DK -.007 .010 .781 1.280

DKI -.181 .161 .833 1.201

KA -.283 .104 .692 1.446


64

Table 6. MRA Regression Test


Table 6 shows the results of the Moderated

Regression Analysis (MRA) Test. A regression equation

can be drawn up as follows:

1. Y= 1,373 + −0,874 𝑋1 + 1,993 𝑋2 + −0,519 𝑋1𝑋2

2. Y=1,373 + −0,874 𝑋1 + −0,211 𝑋3 +−0.250 𝑋1𝑋3

3. Y= 1,373 + −0,874 𝑋1 + −0,15 𝑋4 + 0,110 𝑋1𝑋4

4. Y= 1,373 + −0,874 𝑋1 + 0,290 𝑋5 + −4,300 𝑋1𝑋5

5. Y= 1,373 + −0,874 𝑋1 + 0,658 𝑋6 + −0,249 𝑋1𝑋6

The conclusion drawn from the estimated regression

results is that managerial ownership, an independent

board of commissioners, and an audit committee, as

moderating factors, can strengthen or weaken the impact

of earnings management on firm value.

4.7 Determination Coefficient Test

The coefficient of determination test assesses the model's

ability to explain variation in the dependent variable. The

results of the determination coefficient test are shown in

the table below:

Table 7. Regression Coefficient Test

Table 7 illustrates the R Square is 0.360 or 36%. It

means that the contribution of earnings management and

GCG to firm value is 36%.

4.8 T- Partial Test

Based on (Ghozali, 2016) the criteria for this partial

significance test are that if the probability is 0.05, it

indicates that the independent variable (X) has a partial

effect on the dependent variable (Y). The following table

is the results of the partial significance test:

Table 8. Partial T-test

Table 8 above shows that the level of significance

between earnings management on firm value and

managerial ownership as a moderating variable results in

0.008 less than 0.05. It shows an interaction effect

between earnings management variabel and managerial

ownership variables on firm value. Level of significance

between earnings management variable on firm value

with institutional ownership as a moderating variable is

0.847, greater than 0.05. It indicates that there is no

interaction effect between earnings management and

institutional ownership on firm value. The level of

significance between the earnings management variable

on firm value and the board of commissioners' size as a

moderating variable is 0.653, greater than 0.05. It shows

that earnings management is not affecting the size of the

board of commissioners on firm value. Level of

significance between earnings management on firm value

with the independent board of commissioners as a

moderating variable is 0.046 less than 0.05. It shows an

interaction effect between earnings management and the

independent board of commissioners on firm value. The

level of significance between earnings management on

firm value with the audit committee as a moderating

variable is 0.032 less than 0.05. It shows an influence of

the interaction between earnings management and the

audit committee on firm value.

4.9 F – Simultaneous Test

Based on (Ghozali, 2016) The criteria for this

simultaneous f test is if the probability <0.05, it means

that the independent variable (X) is simultaneously

affecting the dependent variable (Y). The following are

the results of the simultaneous f test:

Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients

T Sig. B Std. Error Beta

1 (Constant) 1.373 .368 3.736 .000

DAC -.874 2.756 -.711 -.317 .752

KM 1.993 1.565 .617 1.274 .209

INST -.211 .124 -.318 -1.700 .096

DK -.015 .021 -.199 -.705 .484

DKI .290 .258 .243 1.125 .266

KA .658 .783 1.613 .840 .405

DAC*KM -.519 .187 -.566 -2.778 .008

DAC*INST -.250 1.291 -.130 -.194 .847

DAC*DK .110 .244 .309 .452 .653

DAC*DKI -4.300 2.103 -1.619 -2.045 .046

DAC*KA -.249 .113 -.354 -2.212 .032

a. Dependent Variable: TOBINS'Q

Summary Model

Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 .600a .360 .213 .113179


Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients

T Sig. B Std. Error Beta

1 (Constant) 1.373 .368 3.736 .000

DAC -.874 2.756 -.711 -.317 .752

KM 1.993 1.565 .617 1.274 .209

INST -.211 .124 -.318 -1.700 .096

DK -.015 .021 -.199 -.705 .484

DKI .290 .258 .243 1.125 .266

KA .658 .783 1.613 .840 .405

DAC*KM -.519 .187 -.566 -2.778 .008

DAC*INST -.250 1.291 -.130 -.194 .847

DAC*DK .110 .244 .309 .452 .653

DAC*DKI -4.300 2.103 -1.619 -2.045 .046

DAC*KA -.249 .113 -.354 -2.212 .032

a. Dependent Variable: TOBINS'Q



65

Table 9. F-Test


From table 9 above, it can be seen that the

significance value of 0.016 is under 0.05. So, the

conclusion is simultaneous earnings management

moderated by managerial ownership, institutional

ownership, size of the board of commissioners, the

independent board of commissioners, and the audit

committee significantly affecting firm value.

5. DISCUSSION

5.1 Effect of Earnings Management on Firm

Value with MO as a Moderating Variable

This research’s result shows that managerial

ownership can moderate the effect of earnings

management on firm value. Thus, the first hypothesis,

which states that managerial ownership can moderate the

effect of earnings management on firm value, is accepted.

The explanation related to this is based on evidence from

descriptive analysis results by producing an average

managerial ownership value of 23%, meaning that

managerial ownership can control the company's

internal. It shows that managerial ownership can control

the company in increasing firm value. This reseach’s

results are inconsistent with the previous studies

conducted by (Darwis, 2012) which state that managerial

ownership cannot moderate the impact of earnings

management on firm value.


Value with IO as a Moderating Variable

Based on this research’s results, it states that

institutional ownership cannot moderate the effect of

earnings management on firm value. The first hypothesis

states that institutional ownership can moderate earnings

management's effect on firm value is rejected. The

explanation related to this is based on evidence from the

descriptive analysis test results with an average value of

64% of institutional ownership. In this study, institutional

ownership has a high percentage but cannot reduce

earnings management actions on firm value. This

research’s results are consistent with previous research

from (Wiralestari and Fitriyani, 2012) which proves that

institutional ownership cannot moderate the relations

between earnings management variables on firm value.


Value with BOC Size as a Moderating Variable

Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded

that the board of commissioners' size is incapable of

moderating the effect of earnings management on firm

value. As a result, the first hypothesis, which states that

the board of commissioners' size is incapable of

moderating the effect of earnings management on firm

value, is denied. Explanation related to this is based on

evidence from the descriptive analysis test results with an

average value of the board of commissioners of 3%,

meaning that a small number of commissioners in a

company cannot monitor the performance of the directors

to be run. This study's results are consistent with previous

research from (Handayani et al., 2016), which states that

since the formation of the commissioners' formation is

only from applicable regulations. This study's results are

also consistent with (Hijriani et al., 2017), stating that the

average board attendance rate does not affect tax

avoidance.


Value with the IC as a Moderating Variable

This research’s results that have been done, states that

the independent board of commissioners can moderate

the impact of earnings management on firm value. So, the

first hypothesis stating that the independent board of

commissioners can moderate the effect of earnings

management on firm value is accepted. The explanation

related to this is based on the descriptive analysis test

results with an average value of the independent board of

commissioners of 42%. This results shows that the

independent board of commissioners has more power

than board of commissioners. The study results are

inconsistent with previous studies from (Ridwan and

Gunardi, 2014), stating that the independent board of

commissioners is not a variable that can moderate the

effect of earnings management on firm value.

Meanwhile, research of (Limantauw, 2012) states that the

higher the proportion of independent commissioners to

the total number of commissioners, then the level of

accounting conservatism being measured is also more

significant.


Value with the AC as a Moderating Variable

Based on research’s results, it is stated that the audit

committee can moderate the effect of earnings

management on firm value. Thus the first hypothesis

states that the audit committee can moderate the effect of

earnings management on firm value is accepted. The

explanation related to this is based on the descriptive

analysis test results with the average value of the three

(3) audit committee's average value. It shows that the

company included in the research sample has three audit

ANOVAa

Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression .345 11 .031 2.452 .016b

Residual .615 48 .013

Total .960 59


66

committee members and according to the audit

committee's criteria. This study's results are consistent

with previous research form (Wiralestari and Fitriyani,

2012), which states that a company’s audit committee can

influence management to carry out real earnings

management activities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This research is using manufacturing companies that

listing on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Based on the

results of analysis data and discussion that has been

carried out, the conclusion is GCG with Managerial

Ownership (KM) indicators, the Independent Board of

Commissioners (DKI), and the Audit Committee (KA)

moderates the effect of Earning Management on Firm

Value. This is because the percentage of shares that

owned by the company is high, the percentage of

independent commissioners is high, and the number of

audit members who are fit with the criteria of the audit

committee. However, Institutional Ownership (INST)

and Size of the Board of Commissioners (DK) do not

moderate the effect between Earning Management on

Firm Value. This is due to the low percentage of

institutional ownership and the small number of

commissioners.

This study's limitation is the existence of outlier data so

that the data is deleted and cannot be examined optimally.

There are many large-scale manufacturing companies,

which means that they have high financial capacity

compared to small-scale manufacturing companies, so

that the resulting data varies. Also, this study's limitation

is that earnings management's measurement does not pay

attention to fair value measurement.

6.1 Suggestion

The suggestions are further researchers can increase

the number of periods, the number of company samples,

and try to use other moderating variables or add

components of GCG to determine which are variables

that also can moderate the influence of management

profit against firm value. This study's results can be a

management consideration in adding to the board of

commissioners because it is still within the minimum

limit, and the board of commissioners’s role needs to be

improved in supervising so that the applied earnings

management does not violate the law.

REFERENCES

[1]. Agustia, Y. P., dan E. Suryani. 2018. "Pengaruh

Ukuran Perusahaan, Umur Perusahaan,

Leverage, Dan Profitabilitas Terhadap

Manajemen Laba (Studi Pada Perusahaan

Pertambangan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek

Indonesia Periode 2014-2016)". Jurnal ASET

(Akuntansi Riset), Vol. 10, No. 1, hlm: 71-82.

[2]. Anggraeni, R. M., dan B. Hadiprajitno. 2013.

"Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan Manajerial,

Ukuran Perusahaan, dan Praktik Corporate

Governance terhadap Manajemen Laba".

Diponegoro Journal of Accounting, Vol., No.,

hlm: 754-766.

[3]. Biddle, G. C., G. Hilary, dan R. S. Verdi. 2009.

"How does financial reporting quality relate to

investment efficiency?". Journal of accounting

and economics, Vol. 48, No. 2-3, hlm: 112-

131.

[4]. Darwis, H. 2012. "Manajemen laba terhadap

nilai perusahaan dengan corporate governance

sebagai pemoderasi". Jurnal keuangan dan

Perbankan, Vol. 16, No. 1, hlm.

[5]. Dwija, I. G. A. M. A. 2012. "Pengaruh

Kebijakan Dividen dan Good Corporate

Governance terhadap Manajemen Laba".

Buletin Studi Ekonomi, Vol., No., hlm.

[6]. Ferial, F., dan S. R. Handayani. 2016.

"Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance

Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Dan Efeknya

Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan (Studi Pada Badan

Usaha Milik Negara Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa

Efek Indonesia Periode 2012-2014)". Jurnal

Administrasi Bisnis, Vol. 33, No. 1, hlm: 146-

153.

[7]. Ghozali, I. 2016. "Aplikasi Analisis

Multivariete dengan Program IBM SPSS 23,

Edisi Delapan". Penerbit Universitas

Diponogoro. Semarang, Vol., No., hlm.

[8]. Handayani, U. T., S. V. Siregar, dan E.

Tresnaningsih. 2016. "Kualitas pelaporan

keuangan, mekanisme governance, dan efisiensi

investasi". Jurnal Akuntansi Multiparadigma,

Vol. 7, No. 2, hlm: 270-287.

[9]. Herawaty, V. 2008. "Peran praktek corporate

governance sebagai moderating variable dari

pengaruh earnings management terhadap nilai

perusahaan". Jurnal akuntansi dan keuangan,

Vol. 10, No. 2, hlm: 97-108.

[10]. Hijriani, A. N., S. W. Latifah, dan S.

Setyawan. 2017. "Pengaruh Koneksi Politik,


67

Dewan Komisaris dan Karakteristik Perusahaan

terhadap Penghindaran Pajak (Perusahaan

BUMN Yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek

Indonesia)". Jurnal Reviu Akuntansi dan

Keuangan, Vol. 4, No. 1, hlm.

[11]. Indracahya, E., dan D. A. Faisol. 2017.

"The Effect of Good Corporate Governance

Elements, Leverage, Firm Age, Company Size

and Profitability on Earning Management

(Empirical Study of Manufacturing Companies

in Bei 2014–2016)". Profita, Vol. 10, No. 2,

hlm: 203-227.

[12]. Jensen, M. C., dan W. H. Meckling.

1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,

agency costs and ownership structure". Journal

of financial economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, hlm:

305-360.

[13]. Limantauw, S. 2012. "Pengaruh

karakteristik dewan komisaris sebagai

mekanisme good Corporate govenance terhadap

tingkat konservatisme akuntansi Pada

perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI".

Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa Akuntansi, Vol. 1,

No. 1, hlm: 48-52.

[14]. Ridwan, M., dan A. Gunardi. 2014.

"Peran Mekanisme Corporate Governance

sebagai Pemoderasi Praktik Earning

Management terhadap Nilai Perusahaan".

Trikonomika Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, hlm: 49-

60.

[15]. Savitri, E. 2014. "Analisis Pengaruh

Leverage Dan Siklus Hidup Terhadap

Manajemen Laba Pada Perusahaan Real Estate

Dan Property Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek

Indonesia". Jurnal Akuntansi, Vol. 3, No. 1,

hlm: 72-89.

[16]. Shen, C.-H., F. Luo, dan D. Huang.

2015. "Analysis of earnings management

influence on the investment efficiency of listed

Chinese companies". Journal of Empirical

Finance, Vol. 34, No., hlm: 60-78.

[17]. Sukartha, I. M. 2008. "Pengaruh

Manajemen Laba, dan Kepemilikan Manajerial

pada Kesejahteraan Pemegang Saham

Perusahaan Target Akuisisi". Jurnal Ilmiah

Akuntansi dan Bisnis, Vol., No., hlm.

[18]. Sunarto, S. 2009. "Teori Keagenan dan

Manajemen Laba". Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian

Akuntansi, Vol. 1, No. 1, hlm: 13-28.

[19]. Widayanti, C. A., M. Vestari, dan D.

N. Farida. 2014. "Faktor-faktor yang

mempengaruhi kualitas laba pada perusahaan

high profile yang terdaftar di BEI". Jurnal

Dinamika Ekonomi & Bisnis, Vol. 11, No. 1,

hlm.

[20]. Wiralestari, W. T., dan D. Fitriyani.

2012. "Analisis Pengaruh Komisaris

Independen, Komite Audit dan Kepemilikan

Institusional terhadap Manajemen Laba". Jurnal

Penelitian Universitas Jambi: Seri Humaniora,

Vol. 14, No. 1, hlm.


68

the effect of earning management on firm value and good

Documents