the economic and social councils of the member states of ... · defend its interests, i.e....
TRANSCRIPT
© s
hutt
erst
ock:
Vec
tor F
rank
enst
ein
European Economic and Social Committee
The Economic and Social Councils of the Member Statesof the European Union:the different models of dialogue
The Economic and Social Councils of the Member
States of the European Union:
the different models of dialogue
Study by Ignacio Hoces Íñiguez
Doctor of Law (UCAM), Bachelor of Law (UCM), Bachelor of History (UCM),
Correspondent member of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation of Spain
The information and views set out in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee. The European Economic and
Social Committee cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study.
Neither the European Economic and Social Committee nor any person acting on its behalf may be
held responsible for any use that may be made of the information that the study contains.
2
The study aims to outline the most significant features of the national economic and social councils of
the Member States of the European Union in the light of the doctoral thesis defended by the author at
the Catholic University of Murcia (Spain).
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT
2. REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS
2.1. Socioeconomic groups as means of representation
2.2. Participation models
2.2.1. Non-institutional representation
2.2.2. Institutional representation
3. CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
4. BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILS AND THE REASONS FOR
THEIR ESTABLISHMENT
5. CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTIC
FEATURES
5.1. Composition and structure
5.1.1. Representation in the councils: workers and employers
5.1.2. Other types of special representation: organisations representing other socioeconomic
interests, experts, regions, public administrations and other interests
5.1.3. Competences
5.2. Organisation of work
5.2.1. Individual offices: presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries-general
5.2.2. Collective bodies: plenaries, bureaus, working groups and other bodies
5.3. Competences
5.3.1. Principally advisory functions
6. INSTITUTIONS FOR DIALOGUE AND GOVERNANCE. AN INSTRUMENT OF
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
7. CLASSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILS
8. CONCLUSIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
4
1. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT
The economic and social councils (ESCs) are currently the most significant examples existing in
democratic countries applying the rule of law of economic and social stakeholder participation in
public decision-making processes. They are, without a doubt, institutions which, in addition to coming
from Europe, serve with reasonable success as channels for the opinions of European society in
economic and social affairs, through the groups to which the citizens belong, to yield this form of
dialogue between organisations with totally opposed interests with the aim of achieving solutions,
agreements or compacts where possible.
In any case, the economic and social councils, as institutions representing economic and social
interests, operate in Europe with a number of organisational differences and other differences in
operation or nature, which, logically, reflect different national traditions1.
That said, we would like to start by saying that in contemporary democracies after the Second World
War platforms and structures grew up in the Member States which resulted in the multiple
organisations making up the social fabric, with the emergence of what the literature commonly terms
neo-corporatism2. This is a particularly sensitive development in socioeconomic terms as the state-
capital-work interplay continues, even with the passage of time, to be crucial in advanced societies,
and essential for Member States to shape and implement public policy.
On the other hand, moreover, pluralism, which is an indisputable fact that enhances the Western
world, of necessity requires the existence of many organisations or groups which want to be listened to
in order to assert their claims and interests as far as possible. Similarly, satisfying those interests
clearly impacts on the public and increases public well-being, which is why after World War II
socioeconomic groups became exceptionally influential, especially as a result of the power which
those groups had achieved in complex contemporary societies, from the occupational and economic
and social perspectives, successes which were more than enough for government administrations to
use them for the public good, involving them in political decision-making processes, which gives
meaning to Forsthoff's statement that the State has to share its power with organised social partners3.
This neocorporatist situation inevitably receives legal support, to the extent that, as KAISER indicated
1 Not all these institutions are called economic and social councils: only eleven of the 22 countries which have
this kind of institution call it by this name. Other Member States prefer to describe their institutions using other
names such as National Council for Economics and Labour (Italy), Economic, Social and Environmental
Council (France), Council for Economic and Social Development (Malta), Social Dialogue Councils (Poland),
Economic Council (Denmark and Finland), Council of Economic and Social Agreement (Czech Republic),
Tripartite Council (Lithuania), National Labour Council and Central Economic Council (Belgium), Council for
Economic and Social Partnership (Slovakia), and Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs (Austria). 2 The term is not entirely peaceful as for some it evokes experiences under anti-democratic regimes. Other terms
used to describe the same thing are "company corporatism", just corporatism or liberal corporatism. MAESTRO,
G., "Acerca del neo-corporativismo", in Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), No 48, 1985, page 154.
SOLÉ, C., "El debate corporativismo-neo-corporativismo", in Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas,
Vol. 26, No 84, 1984, page 11. SERRANO RUIZ-CALDERÓN, J. M., "Neocorporativismo", in Revista de la
Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense, No 74, 1988-1989, page 808. PÉREZ YRUELA, M., y
GINER, S., "Corporatismo: El estado de la cuestión", in Revista Española de Investigaciones Científicas, No 31,
pages 19-20. For an extremely interesting contribution on the subject see PÉREZ DÍAZ, V., El retorno de la
sociedad civil, Instituto de Estudios Económicos, Madrid, 1987, pages 122-123. 3 FORSTHOFF, E., Sociedad industrial y Administración Pública, ENAP, Madrid, 1967.
5
in 1956, the importance of interest groups is the main constitutional feature in the world today4. In the
same vein, García-Pelayo, the former Spanish president of the Constitutional Court, stressed, agreeing
with the German master, that the relationship between state and organised interests is the same as that
between the state and society5.
At any event, this neocorporatism built with a view to better communication between organised
interests and the state, is now divorced from ideologies, or in other words, the relevant interest groups
are not part of or represented in parliamentary structures but in bodies compatible with the
representative institutions of liberal democracy, and do not fit into the pre-set, exclusive system of
power as in some of the old regimes, but on the contrary are organised freely and coexist with social
pluralism. It is a way of integrating associations and other models of societal self-organisation into
Member States' public affairs within the field of democratic parliamentary policy.
In this way, the political archetype of our democracy was reorganised throughout Europe, making it
possible for the groups to participate in a specific or continuous way through permanent institutions
such as national economic and social councils and similar institutions, which, despite existing in
22 EU Member States and having enormous democratic value, are not sufficiently well-known, even
when, despite the institution encouraging public participation, the separation of political and civil
society, and with it representative democracy, seems at times to be increasing .
4 KAISER, J. H., La rappresentanza degli interessi organizzati, MANGIAMELI, S. (Trad.), Giuffrè, Milan,
1993. 5 GARCÍA-PELAYO, M., Las transformaciones del Estado Contemporáneo, Alianza, Madrid, 1982, p. 110.
6
2. REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS
It is common, and even usual, for constitutionalist literature to present representation of interests as a
class of representation distinct from modern political representation. Representation of interests aims
to ensure the involvement of socioeconomic groups – unlike political parties therefore – with the aim
of influencing public decisions, contributing to them, or even gaining power similar to that of parties6.
Representation of interests is therefore closely related to legal and political positions. On the one hand,
it seeks to represent groups and organisations, while also catering to the interests of particular sectors
and sections of the population. In other words, representation of interests is concerned with the will of
particular groups that are deemed worthy of special protection within a political community.
In contrast, the contemporary notion of political representation, historically shaped by the main
European revolutions of the eighteenth century, is based on the denial of representation of political
questions under the "ancien regime", which was concerned with the nation and not any specific faction
or group. It is general, not limited to specific issues, and is also free, i.e. it is not subject, as under the
"ancien regime", to a restrictive or binding mandate.
The differences between political representation and representation of interests are therefore
indisputable. The former takes into account the interests of the collective. It therefore equates to
representation of general or political interests, and is exercised through political parties, which receive
the votes of individual citizens. As Bobbio7 explains, representation of interests, on the other hand,
entails the representation of the interests of groups and sections of the population.
In this light, the first point we can make is that the characteristic roots of representation of interests
can be divided into two parts: firstly, it is a genuine form of representation structured around interest
groups; and secondly, it can be used to various ends.
Representation of interests thus bears a number of similarities to what Sartori referred to as
sociological representation, an inherent feature of which is the similarity that exists between
representatives and those they represent. In this form of representation, representatives embody the
characteristics of those they represent8.
2.1. Socioeconomic groups as means of representation
The protagonists of Western democracies are the people, with each citizen therefore being a key
player. This means that citizens have the possibility of participating in public affairs. This channelling
of participation is mainly achieved through political parties as the main contemporary instruments for
participation in public affairs. Alongside political parties, however, relations between states and
citizens can nowadays also be conducted through groups and organisations which, as we have seen,
are genuine players in social and political life.
These relations between the state and society are for the most part organised around the activities of
groups. However, in contrast to political parties, which make up democratic systems as the key
instruments of participatory democracy; and to social movements, whose forms of collective action
6 DE ESTEBAN, J., La representación política y su variante, la representación de intereses, unpublished
doctoral thesis, U.C.M., 1953, p. 217. 7 BOBBIO, N., Teoría General de la Política, Trotta, Madrid, 2003, p. 496.
8 SARTORI, G., Elementos de teoría política, Alianza Universidad Textos, Madrid, 1992, pp. 225-226.
7
focus on bringing about social change, interest groups seek to influence political systems, particularly
in areas that have a bearing on socioeconomic issues.
The emergence and development of socioeconomic interest groups have been studied in the context of
contemporary historiography. Here, it is useful to highlight the contributions made by the North
American School, with Maier9 and Schmitter
10 at the forefront, as well as those of the Italian School,
headed by Pizzorno11
.
Without delving into the impact that the bourgeois revolutions had on intermediary groups and bodies,
it is necessary to understand the effect the growing tensions in the context of the well-known
capital/labour problem of early modern capitalism had on employers and workers during the Industrial
Revolution. As a result of this, the working class became acutely aware of the need to form groups to
defend its interests, i.e. collective interests, or in the words of Santoro-Passarelli12
, the interest of a
group of people in something capable of meeting a shared need, limited in this case to purely
socioeconomic issues.
Indeed, once the restrictions on association imposed by early liberalism had been overcome13
, it was
not long before associations and groups began to form, with the aim of seeking help and security in the
areas of economic/occupational affairs. At the same time, a clear feeling emerged within society that
this system was incapable of protecting people's social and labour conditions, especially when the
interests of working class people were marginalised in national parliaments, and since, as is well
known, the only occupational interests that could be represented in political assemblies were those of
bourgeois employers.
This is not the place to discuss the gradual recognition across Europe of the right of association.
However, it is useful to point out that it was precisely amidst the conflict between capital and labour
that the legal and political recognition of collective action began to thrive once again in Europe,
following the "liberal parenthesis". It was in that context that the law of European states embraced the
possibility of representation for these groups so as to improve social harmony14
.
9 Among others, MAIER, C. S., "Los vínculos ficticios… de la riqueza y de la ley: sobre la teoría y la práctica de
la representación de los intereses", in BERGER, S. (Comp.), La organización de los grupos de interés en Europa
Occidental. El pluralismo, el corporativismo y la transformación de la política, Publications Centre of the
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Madrid, 1988. 10
Among other articles, SCHMITTER, P. C., "La mediación entre los intereses y la gobernabilidad de los
regímenes en Europa Occidental y Norteamérica en la actualidad", in BERGER, S. (Comp.), La organización de
los grupos de interés en Europa Occidental. El pluralismo, el corporativismo y la transformación de la política,
Publications Centre of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Madrid, 1988. 11
PIZZORNO, A., "Los intereses y los partidos en el pluralismo", in BERGER, S. (Comp.), in La organización
de los grupos de interés en Europa Occidental. El pluralismo, el corporativismo y la transformación de la
política, Publications Centre of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Madrid, 1988. 12
SANTORO-PASSARELLI, F., Notion de Derecho del Trabajo, Institute of Political Studies, Madrid, 1963,
p. 19. 13
The Le Chapelier Law of 14 June 1791 completed the work begun in France by Turgot's Edict of 1776 and
continued by the Allard Decree of March 1791. In Great Britain, laws restricting the freedom of association of
workers had appeared from 1744, but the definitive blow came in 1799 and 1800 with the Combination Acts.
Similarly, the third article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen established that "[t]he
principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exert authority which
does not emanate expressly from it." 14
It is for this reason that representation of interests was based first and foremost around socioeconomic
interests. Similarly, this is also why, in the twenty-first century, special recognition is still given to occupational
8
It was at that point that representation of interests came into play. Initially it was limited to
establishing mechanisms for cooperation between corporations that were strictly sectoral in nature.
However, new forms of representation of interests began to be organised, at the initiative of the state,
with the aim of improving society, as called for throughout the modern age by legal experts such as
Duguit15
and Romano16
, sociologists such as Durkheim17
, and schools of thought such as the German
Historical School, the teachings of the Catholic Church, and European socialism18
.
The German Historical School's exploration of medieval history and philosophy led Gierke19
to apply
the notion of corporations to contemporary political law, which subsequently opened the way to
Durkheim, who considered the corporation as the core body of political life. Similarly, the Catholic
Church took steps to have group interests taken into account by the public authorities, encouraging
collaboration between various interests with the aim of ensuring the common good and social
harmony. Likewise, other schools of thought, such as socialism and traditionalism, began politicising
socioeconomic affairs, seeking to have representatives of corporations included in chambers designed
for political representation. For example, figures such as Saint-Simon, Blanc, Laski and Rigola, along
with others from varying ideological spectrums, such as Renan, Benoist and Aparisi y Guijarro, were
in favour of mixed representation within political institutions. Following on from this, in the next
section we will examine the various forms that representation of interests may take.
2.2. Participation models
In the contemporary age, various models or channels have been put in place to enable socioeconomic
interest groups to participate in public life. A particular part of European and Ibero-American
literature20
has been concerned with the specific issue by bringing together deserving groups. In the
1960s, French lawyer Trotabas summarised the involvement of these groups, dividing them into four
types21
. However, Loewenstein's classification has had the greatest influence in recent times22
. For this
interest groups, precisely because they have played, and continue to play, a major role in solving political
problems in our societies. 15
DUGUIT, L., Manual de Derecho Constitucional, ACUÑA, J. G., (Trad.), Madrid, 1926, pp. 167-170. 16
ROMANO, S., Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi: saggi di diritto costituzinale, Giuffrè, Milan, 1969. 17
DURKHEIM, É., La división del trabajo social, Akal, Madrid, 2001. 18
FERNÁNDEZ RIQUELME, S., "La historia del corporativismo en Europa. Aproximación a las formas
jurídico-políticas de representación del trabajo", in Diálogos, Revista electrónica de Historia, vol. 13 No 1,
February-August, 2012. p. 155. For a basic overview of this issue, see GARCÍA CUADRADO, A. M., "La
representación parlamentaria de intereses socio-económicos en la doctrina constitucional", in Revista de Derecho
Político, UNED, No 88, 2013, pp. 169-214. 19
PENDÁS, B., "Estudio preliminar", in GIERKE, O., Teorías políticas de la Edad Media, Centro de Estudios
Constitucionales, Madrid, 1995. XLVII. 20
In the Latin American context, the classifications outlined by both Delfino de Palacios and Cueto Rúa stand
out. DELFINO DE PALACIOS, M., "La institucionalización del pluralismo socioeconómico a nivel
parlamentario", in VALADÉS, D. (Coord.), Constitución y grupos de presión en América Latina, UNAM,
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Mexico City, 1977, pp. 61-84. CUETO RÚA, J., "La representación de
intereses económicos en el Estado moderno" in Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas, Buenos Aires,
1966, p. 177-185. 21
TROTABAS, L., "Le rôle de la représentation des intérêts professionnels dans la vie politique française", in
Travaux du VI colloque des facultés de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Toulouse, May 1958, Dalloz, Paris,
1959, p. 165 et seq. He drew a distinction between rearranging voting to introduce representation of interests,
including representatives of socioeconomic interests in chambers of political representation, establishing
Economic Councils, and including the representatives of those interests in administrative committees. 22
LOEWENSTEIN, K., Teoría de la Constitución, Ariel, Barcelona, 1970. Followers of this teaching include
the Argentine constitutionalist VANOSSI, J. R., El Estado de Derecho en el Constitucionalismo social, Eudeba,
Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 311 et seq.
9
German master constitutionalist, there are five channels through which groups are involved: via
political parties dealing with economic interests; through inclusion in a second parliamentary chamber;
by combining political assemblies with economic assemblies; through the corporatist experiences of
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; or through group involvement in the economic and social
councils.
However, with regard to the issue at hand, in the context of Spanish constitutional doctrine it is
Professor Gutiérrez Nogueroles that has summarised with surgical precision the various instruments
through which socioeconomic interest groups take part in the Spanish political process23
, a
classification that we shall adopt here, despite it not being the standard in all EU Member States.
2.2.1. Non-institutional representation
In terms of non-institutional representation, socioeconomic interest groups normally take part in public
decision-making through two channels: either via ad hoc, pre-normative agreements or consultation
with governments24
, or, in some countries, through their activities as lobbyists25
.
The first channel refers to cases where the executive negotiates an agreement with one or more
socioeconomic interest groups; while the second, formal or informal representation, involves states,
along with lobbyists, providing a means of expression for socioeconomic interests.
2.2.2. Institutional representation
Contemporary European history demonstrates that types of institutional representation for
socioeconomic interest groups are both very varied and common. Three types can be outlined as
follows:
The first is the inclusion of groups in the government administration's bodies or administrative
structures. The composition of such bodies tends to meet tripartite criteria, which enables governments
to participate in these committees, councils or commissions that generally have a consultative role.
These are often sectoral bodies dealing with a specific socioeconomic issue, such as the Executive
Council of the Spanish Wage Guarantee Fund.
Representation may also take place through parliamentary institutions. In some cases, some members
of a chamber of parliament come from interest groups, or the whole chamber may be made up of
members of these groups. Both examples have been seen during the twentieth century, under liberal-
democratic and anti-democratic systems. Examples can also be seen nowadays, such as the Irish
Senate, or the Slovenian National Council.
General De Gaulle's project for reforming the Senate was interesting in this regard. He put it to a
referendum in 1969, with the aim of providing the Senate of the Fifth Republic with greater
23
GUTIÉRREZ NOGUEROLES, A., El Consejo Económico y Social en el ordenamiento constitucional
español, UNED, Madrid, 2004, pp. 41-49. 24
For example the 1977 Pactos de la Moncloa in Spain or the Economic and Social Agreement of 1984 to 1986
(AES). There are plenty of examples in the European Union Member States. See Avdagic,S., Rhodes, M, Visser,
F., Social Pacts in Europe. Emergence, evolution, and institutionalization, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2011. 25
Von Beyme, K., Los grupos de presión en la democracia, Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1986. Rubio Nuñez, R.Los
grupos de presión, Centre for Constitutional Studies, Madrid, 2003.
10
socioeconomic and cultural representation by integrating the Economic and Social Council into the
Senate. In the end the proposal was defeated by just over a million votes.
Lastly, there are also economic and social councils – the majority of which are public and have a
consultative role – which generally offer the opportunity for citizens to participate through groups
representing them. They deal with general socioeconomic issues and in the vast majority of cases are
the main consultative bodies on such matters.
11
3. CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
The national economic and social councils in European Union Member States are not a homogeneous
group; on the contrary, there are sometimes marked differences between them, which inevitably leads
to difficulties in establishing a definition that encompasses all of their characteristics.
Even so, it is helpful to note some of the definitions that can be found in the best literature on the
subject. In Spain, Montavalo Correa and Peña Pinto have provided descriptions as follows: The former
defines the councils as consultative bodies composed of representatives of organised civil society,
mainly employers' and trade union organisations, the purpose of which is to guide public policies on
social, labour and/or economic issues26
. Marcos Peña similarly proposed a current description of the
councils, emphasising that: they are institutions of participatory democracy, given that they are
formed by the social partners and representatives of organised civil society and because they
participate in public affairs via consultation, or where appropriate, bargaining processes27
.
In France, Jean-Paul Delevoye proposes a definition that stresses the empowering nature of ESCs in
liberal democracies, describing them as the democratic institution in charge of social and civic
dialogue tasked with supporting the institutions responsible for political life: the government and the
parliament28
.
In other words, many definitions of the economic and social council have been offered, some from the
Americas29
. However, in reality they are institutions which, due to their individual features, can be
defined in many ways and there have also been many observations on their nature, composition,
function and structure worth mentioning.
If we are looking for a definition that covers the various types in the European Union, it is clear that
they are institutions generally provided for in national legal texts and constitutions – though this is not
always the case – that usually advise governments, parliaments and other institutions on
socioeconomic issues, and that bring together the social partners (employers and employees) and, in
many cases, other sectors of organised civic life.
26
MONTALVO CORREA, J., "Los consejos Económicos y Sociales u otros órganos similares", ponencia en X
Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Santiago de
Chile, 2005. 27
Peña Pinto, M., "Democracia participativa y cooperación internacional: la experiencia de los Consejos
Económicos y Sociales en EUROsociAL II", in Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales en América Latina y en la
Unión Europea. Experiencias prácticas de diálogo social, Collection of working documents, No 14,
EUROsociAL, Madrid, 2014, page. 13. 28
Delevoye, J-P., ""Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales frente al reto de responder a las cuestiones
fundamentales que se plantean nuestras sociedades y de mejorar su capacidad para expresar las expectativas de
los ciudadanos (CESE de Francia)", in Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales en América Latina y en la Unión
Europea. Experiencias prácticas de diálogo social, Collection of Working Documents No 14, EUROsociAL,
Madrid, 2014, page 163. 29
Njaim sees them as institutions that represent important (if not the most important) sectors of the economy and
society, carrying out important duties such as advising the government in connection with economic legislation,
and laying the basis for public procurement, wage and minimum price bargaining between capital and labour,
and agreements between political forces that will be recognised by the parliament at a later stage. (Njaim, H.,
"La regulación constitucional de los grupos de presión: la crisis de los Consejos Económico-sociales ilustrada
por el caso venezolano", in Valadés, D. (coord.), Constitución y grupos de presión en América Latina, UNAM,
Institute of Legal Research, Mexico City, 1977, p. 92.) For Ermida Uriarte, the key feature of the councils is that
they are public bodies with a diverse membership representing occupational interests. (Ermida Uriarte, O., "Los
CES: antecedentes para el Foro Consultivo Económico-Social del Mercosur", in Revista de Relasur, No 8,
Montevideo, 1995, pp. 45-62.)
12
The Councils are also official forums, usually with high institutional importance within the
administrative structures of a state, through which the most powerful socioeconomic interest groups in
the country take part in designing public policies on socioeconomic matters, generally by performing
advisory or other tasks. They therefore act as channels that enable stakeholders to participate in the
policy decision-making process on economic and/or labour issues, enhancing democracy by creating a
dialogue between the state and society.
13
4. BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILS AND THE
REASONS FOR THEIR ESTABLISHMENT
Bodies tasked with providing advice on socioeconomic matters have existed since ancient times,
although it was not until the modern age that advisory work took on a prominent role. In France under
Henry IV, for example, a committee known as the Supreme Council for Trade was set up in 1601 to
restore domestic and external trade. An important example of professional representation in these
advisory institutions is the General Council for Trade, which was set up in France in 1710 by Louis
XIV and involved the main traders in the kingdom.
However, it was during the nineteenth century, particularly the latter half, that institutions bearing a
clear resemblance to our modern economic and social councils took root in European states, bringing
together representatives of economic interest groups (employers and trade unions) in an advisory
capacity. This was the case of the Government Commission for the Workers, chaired by Jacques Blanc
and known as the Luxembourg Commission, which was formed in 1848 by representatives of the
government, workers and employers.
Other states, such as the newly created Italian state, as well as France and Belgium, established sister
institutions. The first Economic Council, however, was established in Prussia in 1880 by King
William I with the clear intention of moving away from liberal assumptions30
. He therefore set up a
body comprising 75 members appointed by the King for five years, comprising 45 delegates elected by
the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture on the one hand and thirty members, half of
whom were workers and craftsmen freely appointed by the executive, on the other hand. As
masterfully stated by Bismarck in his opening speech, the task of the Council was to put forward
expert opinions on legislative texts on economic matters31
, and to defend the interests of the various
corporations32
.
These pioneering advisory bodies on socioeconomic interests, such as the early economic councils and
later the economic and social councils, originated and experienced their initial major expansion on the
Old Continent.
The first example of an economic council being constitutionalised was in the Weimar Republic in
1919. The Weimar Constitution was the inaugural text of social constitutionalism in Europe and was
vitally important in that it was also the first constitution to provide for institutions involving the social
partners. Thus, Article 165 of the Constitution of 11 August 1919 provided for the creation of workers'
councils in workplaces and districts, as well as a national Economic Council, based on the notion that
collective interests could be addressed in the general interest.
30
Wolfe, J. H., "Corporatism in German political life: functional representation in the GDR and Bavaria",
Heisler, M. O. (Dir.), Politics in Europe. Structures and processes in some postindustrial democracies, McKay,
New York, 1974, p. 324 31
Lataud, C., and Poudenx, A., La représentation professionnelle. Les Conseils économiques en Europe et en
France, Marcel Rivière, Paris, 1927, p. 81. 32
Prélot, M., La Représentation professionnelle dans la Constitution de Weimar et le Conseil économique
national, Doctoral Thesis of 29 January 1924, Éditions Spes, Paris, 1924, pp. 35-36.
14
This Economic Council spelt the end of the radical class struggle advocated by more extreme German
socialism33
, bringing together 326 members divided into ten groups by different economic sector
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries, industry, trade, transport, communications, civil servants, etc.) with
representatives of employers and workers, and members appointed by the government34
.
The Constitution entrusted the Council with tasks relating to the country's economic policy. Similarly,
the Council was given consultative power whereby it was to advise the government in connection with
draft laws on matters of economics and social protection of general interest (the most common type),
and even had the right of legislative initiative vis-à-vis the government and the Reichstag.
It is interesting to note that the organisational structure of the Council was quite similar to the one
commonly used today. Some internal bodies were single member bodies, such as the chair and the first
and second vice-chair, while others were collegiate, notably the assembly, the bureau and the special
and standing committees.
This Economic Council was an extraordinary example that would be emulated by other states, leading
to the first major proliferation of councils during the interwar period in Europe. Some Councils
followed the example set in Weimar and were constitutionalised (Poland in 1921, Danzig in 1922, the
former Yugoslavia in 1921 and Austria in 1934), but for the vast majority no constitutional provision
was made.
As pointed out by Linder in 1932 in an excellent League of Nations study on the economic councils
that were springing up in countries around the world at that time35
, in the vast majority of cases the
economic councils brought together the most prominent occupational groups in each country and their
role was primarily advisory. This is not the time to analyse each and every Economic Council of the
interwar period, but it may be interesting to emphasise the importance and influence of the National
Economic Council of France of 1925, an institution that was established, as set out in its mission
statement, with the aim of bringing together all social and productive forces in the country and tasking
them with carrying out a technical study on the economic problems in France. The French trade union
movement, led by Jouhaux, had a major impact on Herriot's final decision to set up, via a decree, a
medium-sized council (made up of forty-seven members) with a structure similar to that of Weimar.
After the Second World War there was a renewed interest in economic c, when the various ideological
groups became aware of the urgent need for political reforms that included the social partners, since
their cooperation was necessary in the shattered economies of the time, and because socioeconomic
groups had been heavily involved in the victory over the Axis powers.
This cooperation with the state led to the agreement on the National Economic Council in
Luxembourg on 4 August 1945, and on the Central Economic Council and National Labour Council in
Belgium in 1952. Other countries were soon to follow suit, such as France, which enshrined its
Council in its Constitution of 27 October 1946, and likewise Italy, in its Constitution of 27 December
1947.
33
Heller, H., "El Derecho Constitucional en la República de Weimar. Derechos y deberes fundamentales.
Sección V: de la Economía", in Escritos políticos, Alianza, Madrid, 1985, p. 280. 34
This structure was established by the Ordinance of 4 May 1920. 35
Linder, E., Review of the Economic Councils in the Different Countries of the World, League of Nations,
Geneva, 1932.
15
It is worth taking even a brief look at which elements had the greatest influence on the creation of the
economic councils. The reasons behind the state authorities' decision to consider setting up these
bodies are twofold.
Firstly, there is no doubt that at the end of the nineteenth century there was a recognition by the
government, and prior to that, among the general population, that the constitutional structures of
political representation had proved incapable of representing group interests in state processes. Indeed,
the structures of political representation had proved to be insufficient, in the eyes of certain classes, for
several reasons. Possibly the most substantial reason is that the political process, by virtue of being
exclusively individual and inorganic, only took into account each person's individual position,
therefore sidelining the interests of the groups and organisations that make up the social fabric.
Another reason was that liberal political representation, which from the outset had represented
bourgeois interests, was showing itself to be incapable of addressing workers' demands.
This process hindered social relations between the various social groups, ultimately citizens, and the
state which, coupled with the perception of insufficiently representative institutions, led to a growing
feeling of institutional marginalisation, eventually resulting in the restructuring of state bodies in order
to accommodate the strongest economic groups and include the most prominent groups in decision-
making processes. Thus emerged what has been referred to as "economic democracy" and "social
democracy". This phenomenon led to the emergence of numerous proposals for the creation of public
spaces to be used by economic and occupational interest groups. Many variations of these were set up,
although the initial outline of economic and social councils can be said to have been conceived on the
basis of social democratic ideas.
The first economic council in Europe in its modern format emerged as a result of the project known as
Cohen-Kaliski, a project which took its theoretical basis from the notebooks of Die Sozialistischen
Monatshefte and which, despite its early reticence, eventually won the support of the German Social
Democratic Party. This project, together with that of Sinzheimer, supported retaining formal
parliamentary institutions in addition to the system of councils as an expression of economic
democracy, thus rejecting the call by some old trade unionists to create an occupational or economic
parliament on an equal footing with the political parliament36
.
Similarly, the first Economic Council in France was driven by trade unionists of such standing as
Jouhaux, Vlois and Boncour. Motivated by an express wish to unionise the Third Republic, they
developed programmes and collective proposals which paved the way for what became known as "the
transition from political democracy to social democracy37
" and thus for representation of France's
various economic forces in a council. Following the decision taken by Herriot in 1924, this became a
reality in 1925 with the National Economic Council.
Viewed in this way, therefore, the economic councils addressed a real and sincere concern for
improving the democratic system, its representativeness and the legitimacy of public decisions. This
enrichment of democracy became clear when the two dimensions of the citizen became integrated
institutionally: the individual dimension, within the institutions of political representation; and the
36
Medina Echevarría, J., "La representación profesional en las Asambleas Legislativas" in Anales de la
Universidad de Valencia, Year VII-15, 1926, pp. 228-234. 37
CHATRIOT, A., "Les apories de la représentation de la société civile. Débats et expériences autour des
compositions successives des assemblées consultatives en France au XX siècle", in Revue française de droit
constitutionnel, No 71, July 7, p. 540.
16
social dimension, with institutions such as the councils, made up of the socioeconomic groups that
citizens themselves belong to.
The second major reason for the Councils was a desire to achieve social harmony. Taking into account
the complex demands of workers to have their interests taken into account, and faced with the pressure
of possible conflicts in the event of failing to achieve social harmony, the public authorities
understood that this would require some cooperation between employees, employers and the state.
Such cooperation in shared spaces aimed at reconciling interests and improving working conditions
and productivity. This eventually turned into a state interest in intervening in the economy via certain
advisory or collaborative bodies. In this sense, the councils also respond to the pressing need for states
to create places where groups with conflicting interests can meet, leading to dialogue and cooperation
and thereby to improved social relations. Without doubt, the presence of organisations and interest
groups in the Councils encourages negotiation and agreements on their demands, within the legal-
public framework of the constitutional state rather than outside it, as other channels can disrupt the
social environment38
.
Yet it must be said clearly that these institutions are far from being a second or third chamber with
legislative decision-making power. Western ESCs are designed as bodies for participation,
consultation, study, debate39
and, in some cases, concertation, and therefore carry out work that is far
removed from the competences of institutions of political representation. ESCs represent
socioeconomic interests; they do not represent the political will of a state, and groups are only
represented in proportion to their economic and social importance.
38
Enrique Herrera attributes the emergence of the councils to these factors to some degree. Herrera, E., Los
Consejos Económicos y Sociales. La participación democrática de los grupos socio-profesionales, EUDEBA,
Buenos Aires, 1972. 39
Monereo Pérez, J., Concertación y diálogo social, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 1999, p. 99.
17
5. CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILS AND THEIR
CHARACTERISTIC ELEMENTS
Our contemporary national economic and social councils and similar institutions in the Member States
of the European Union40
feature elements and characteristics that differentiate them from other bodies.
What stands out above all in these institutions are a number of features relating to their membership
and structure, and others relating to their functions and powers.
5.1. Composition and structure
Since the creation of the first economic councils, the issue of membership has been an important one
since, not surprisingly, one of their greatest appeals is precisely their membership.
Since the beginning, the councils have had a corporate structure, with members appointed based on
business-related (although not always occupational) criteria, on the understanding that organisations
and groups are the legitimate representatives of citizens' socioeconomic interests. These early
economic councils were structured along two lines: firstly, those that were set up as bodies of
technical experts, the example being the National Economy Council of Latvia of 192941
; and those
which, alongside experts, also included professional organisations that determined their rules of
application, as in the case of the National Economic Council of Weimar, among others, as well as
those with government representation, as, for example, in the Economic Council of Finland of 192842
.
It is clear that the states that launched an economic council as a forum for participation adapted its
structures to the economic structure they wished to have. Today, as in the beginning, the Councils
include sectors that public authorities wish to give an institutional voice to; however, as of a few
decades ago, they are generally speaking no longer limited to economic organisations and now include
groups with social importance, as well as some from other sectors; as a result, many of these bodies
are known as economic and social councils.
As these are participatory bodies, the expectation is that they should be sufficiently representative. It is
therefore crucial that the groups representing the areas covered by the council's remit are given the
correct representation. There is no doubt that the effectiveness of a council depends on it having the
right representation, which brings us on to the issue of the legitimacy of ESCs.
It seems logical that the task of identifying the interests to be represented should be a major concern if
the aim is to legitimise these institutions of participatory democracy. This representativeness will be
appropriate and effective if the most representative socioeconomic players are accommodated, as this
will make the councils representative of the socioeconomic society they claim to represent. In reality,
the authority of these institution, as well as that of many others of a similar nature, resides in the fact
40
The following are distinguished studies that have carried out a comparison of Economic and Social Councils:
Martínez Abascal, V., Pérez Amorós, F., Rojo Torrecilla, E., Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales (España y
otros países comunitarios), Ibid, Madrid, 1993, and Chabanet, D., and Trechsel, A.H., EU National Economic
and Social Councils and Similar Institutions, Eudo, Florence, 2011. 41
This was a consultative body made up of experts, state officials and professionals of high standing and
accredited experience, separate from social organisations. 42
This was made up of twenty members, of which sixteen were from economic sectors and four were
representatives of various ministries.
18
that they represent the most relevant socioeconomic and civil society groups, as well as in the work
they carry out43
.
Unlike institutions that deal with political representation, whose legitimacy stems from votes as a form
of expression of universal suffrage, the legitimacy of economic and social councils resides in the
representativeness of their member groups and in the real clout and standing they enjoy within society.
Likewise, estimating clout is an important but also arduous task, as it is possible to make the
calculation using different methods, with varying results, for example, according to social utility,
structure, influence, members or votes, while the gauge for assessing the clout of individual groups is
also complex.
Irrespective of the system used to measure the interests that should be represented in the councils,
which generally claim to be the leading representative bodies for socioeconomic interests in a given
territory (supranational, national, regional or local), it is ultimately up to the public authorities to
determine what interests are to be represented. If the wrong decision is taken, the council's legitimacy
will be called into question and active public participation via these groups will be weak or only
partially effective. It must not be forgotten that the Councils are forums for dialogue between the
major economic and social interests of society, and between them and the state.
The stakeholders in economic and social councils are, logically speaking, groups of a sufficient size
that defend citizens' socioeconomic interests. They are also the ones that select, propose or appoint
members to be representatives. The main players in the councils are therefore the organisations,
groups and associations that form the backbone of society. Examples of these include the social
partners (trade unions and employers), environmental organisations and non-governmental
organisations, consumer and agricultural organisations, and others such as family, religious and youth
organisations.
As permanent institutions, the Councils usually include social stakeholders as well as other organised
civil society groups. The latter is limited to various socioeconomic organisations – so far only groups
that enjoy permanent status – as well as groups that have a large number of supporters via information
and communication technology channels, as these are believed to be closer to what we know today as
public opinion.
However, society is also changing, dynamic and pluralistic, meaning that councils have to face the
challenge of adapting to these changes. Changes in structures occasionally require (sometimes
complex) changes to the rules, but these must necessarily be addressed if, as intended, the aim is to
give society a voice by making the institution truly reflect the socioeconomic situation in the Member
State.
5.1.1. Representation in the councils: workers and employers
All the national economic and social councils in the Member States of the European Union include
representatives of employers and workers. This is a universal feature of the councils. In general, they
include major federations and confederations of trade unions and employers. By including only those
43
Rubio Núñez explains that the main challenge of these institutions concerns the legitimacy of the
representation they claim to have, which many call into question, as well as the work they carry out. Rubio
Núñez, R., "La guerra de las democracias", in Asamblea: revista parlamentaria de la Asamblea de Madrid, No
16, 2007, p. 95.
19
that are most representative at national level, it is possible to represent the entirety of both workers and
employers. In cases where only general trade union or business interest organisations are represented,
these cover all socioeconomic sectors and, for this reason, some councils choose to dispense with
individual representation for each economic sector or occupational field.
In Poland's Council, for example, the workers' group and the employers' group do not distinguish
between different sectors. They include the most representative organisations at national level active in
various sectors of the economy. The Malta Council for Economic and Social Development includes
the most representative trade unions and workers' organisations at national level. Similarly, in the
Economic and Social Council of Luxembourg the most representative workers' and employers'
organisations are the main players, holding 36 out of a total of 39 seats available in the Council.
But it is also true that while some councils have chosen to include the most representative general
employers' and workers' organisations, many more councils also provide for a small degree of very
specific labour sector participation.
In the Economic and Social Council of Spain, for example, the first group (workers) and the second
group (employers) include the most representative organisations, some national and others with a more
regional scope. However, they are not exclusively dedicated to a specific occupational sector. The
third group, on the other hand, includes bodies and associations representing specific socioeconomic
sectors such as agriculture, maritime-fisheries, consumers and users, and the social economy. The
Economic, Social and Environmental Council of France also specifically includes, in addition to many
other interests, specific occupational organisations, such as those linked to agriculture, trade, crafts
and the self-employed. The Economic and Social Council of Portugal is no exception to this trend, as
it includes representatives, for example, from agriculture, banking and trade, among others; nor is the
Economic and Social Council of Greece, whose Group A and Group B include occupational
employers' and workers' associations from different sectors, such as construction, tourism, the public
sector and others.
While the separate representation of multiple occupational sectors should not be seen as a common
denominator, in many cases the aim was not to include a single union but those that are most
representative. Thus, today, as observed in the 1970s44
, in countries where several trade union
associations coexist at national level, legislatures seek to distribute seats on the council among
sufficiently representative trade unions. This is significant in that it allows for greater pluralism by
including workers' organisations with their often varying ideologies.
Of all the possible examples, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of France stands out
on account of its large scale, in that it includes trade union representatives of different ideological
persuasions, for example communist, socialist and social-Christian. The Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain, among others, have councils that accommodate ideological diversity among workers'
representatives.
5.1.2. Other types of special representation: organisations representing other socioeconomic
interests, experts, regions, public administrations and other interests
44
Herrera, E., Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales. La participación democrática de los grupos socio-
profesionales, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, 1972, p. 95.
20
Council structures usually include other organisations representing a particular socioeconomic area
relevant to society. Here we are referring to organisations representing other socioeconomic interests,
such as issues relating to consumption, religious issues, women's issues and organisations that
advocate for causes such as the environment or human rights, as well as many others.
The French example is typical. It also includes members of different organisations such as family
associations, associations of young people, students, consumers, cooperatives, the self-employed and
others. Another good example is Bulgaria. Bulgaria's Economic and Social Council is divided into
three groups: an employers' group, an employees' group and a third group representing various sectors,
such as agriculture, production, consumers, women's rights, pensioners and environmental
organisations, etc. Similarly, the Economic and Social Council of Portugal has a pluralistic
membership that includes tourism, insurance, finance, the self-employed, families, young
entrepreneurs, universities and representatives of people with disabilities. To quote some interesting
recent examples, based on the model of the European Economic and Social Committee Romania
includes, in its third group, civil society bodies such as human rights organisations, organisations
relating to health, people with disabilities, pensioners and the self-employed, as well as bodies
campaigning for the eradication of poverty. Meanwhile, the Greek Economic and Social Council's
group c includes an interesting combination of societal and cooperative interests, representatives of
lawyers, doctors, various chambers, people with disabilities, municipalities, organisations dealing with
gender equality issues, and parents of large families. Finally, the Council for Economic and Social
Partnership of the Slovak Republic has a third group that represents civil society interest groups other
than employers and trade unions, made up of associations and representative institutions whose
activities are carried out at national level, which are accredited by the European Union and have been
active for at least three years.
It is notable that a certain number of councils give speaking and voting rights to experts or
practitioners of recognised standing. There are various examples of this. France is again among them,
with 10 experts in economic affairs, 15 experts in social, cultural, sport and scientific areas, and 15
environmental experts. The Economic and Social Council of the Netherlands has 11 independent
experts, generally professors of economics, law, finance or sociology, as well as the Director of the
Central Bank of the Netherlands and the Director of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis. Italy's National Council for Economics and Labour includes 10 experts, while the Economic
and Social Councils of Spain and Portugal have, respectively, six and five prominent figures of
recognised standing and with experience of economic and social issues.
Sometimes, the regions have specific representation within a council. Portugal's Economic and Social
Council clearly stipulates that the island autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores have seats.
The Economic and Social Council of Greece also makes use of this option, including two members of
the Association of Greek Regions.
It is worth noting the number of councils where the government administration's interests are
represented: this is the case in the tripartite economic and social councils, such as in Croatia, Slovenia,
Lithuania, Finland and the Czech Republic. In any event, as is the case with the Polish Social Dialogue
Council, the government has a significantly smaller presence than the other stakeholders (workers and
employers).
5.2. Organisation of work
21
The economic and social councils are organised along quite similar lines. In fact, since the first
councils – at least since the council set up during the Weimar Republic – all of them have had similar
governance structures.
Keeping in mind each council's specific characteristics, their internal organisation falls into two
categories: collective bodies and individual offices.
5.2.1. Individual offices: presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries-general
There are three offices that are usually occupied or represented by individuals: president, vice-
president and secretary-general. At the same time, this does not rule out the possibility that people
might work for the president or secretary-general following a council's establishment plan. In fact,
most staff typically work for the secretaries-general, due to the tasks that the latter have to carry out.
All councils have a president who normally fulfils a range of duties, ranging from representing the
institution to convening meetings and leading discussions.
Sometimes, the presidents are full members of the government (as in the case of the Economic
Council of Finland and the Council of Economic and Social Agreement of the Czech Republic – their
presidents are also that country's prime minister), while in other cases they are directly appointed by
the government (e.g. in Greece and Italy), or by parliament (Portugal). In many cases, they are
appointed by the plenary (as in France, Romania and Slovakia), while in others the consent of the
government and the council's plenary is needed, as is the case, for example, in the Economic and
Social Council of Bulgaria or Spain.
In addition, presidents generally hold office for the same period of time as members. However, this is
sometimes different, such as when the presidency is rotating, e.g. in the case of the Advisory Council
for Economic and Social Affairs of Austria, which has a presidency that rotates every six months
between the four constituent organisations; in Croatia, which has an annual rotation between the three
parties involved (government, employers and trade unions); in Poland (annual rotation among each of
the three groups); in Lithuania (six-monthly rotation between the three groups); in Luxembourg (two
years, in line with the principle of alternation between the groups); and in Slovenia (rotation between
the stakeholders for one year, or less, where appropriate).
Most commonly, the councils elect one of their members to be president, but in rare cases a president
independent of the council is chosen, such as in the National Labour Council of Belgium, whose
president is appointed by the monarch from among independent figures. Similarly, the president of the
Spanish Economic and Social Council is appointed by the government following a joint proposal of
the ministries of labour and the economy and after consulting the three groups making up the council;
the candidate must have the support of at least two thirds of the institution's members. Italy and
Portugal take a similar approach. In Portugal, the president is nominated by the Assembly of the
Republic and needs a two-thirds majority of the members present at the vote, who must represent an
absolute majority of members effectively performing their duties. Meanwhile, in Italy, the president of
the National Council for Economics and Labour is appointed by the President of the Republic upon a
proposal of the President of the Council of Ministers, and following a discussion by the Council of
Ministers.
Although, as has just been noted, the presidency of economic and social councils is an individual
office, Denmark is an exception: the Economic Council shares its chairmanship with the
22
Environmental Economic Council, and this chairmanship consists of four members appointed by the
government and independent of the organisations represented. A president is elected from among
them.
In terms of the role of vice-president(s), they are often responsible for the tasks entrusted to the
president when the latter cannot fulfil them. The Economic and Social Council of the Netherlands, and
the Economic and Social Council of Spain, for example, have two vice-presidents, but most
commonly, there are as many vice-presidents as there are groups; or, in cases where the president
belongs to a group, the vice-presidents tend to be from the remaining groups, as is the case, for
example, in the Netherlands and Luxembourg. On the other hand, each of the two councils in Belgium
– the National Labour Council and the Central Economic Council – has four vice-presidents, two for
each group.
Meanwhile, the role of the secretaries-general is to handle the technical, administrative and staffing
matters related to the councils' work. The holder is an individual, except in the case of Austria, where
there are two secretaries: one each for the employers' and workers' group.
5.2.2. Collective bodies: plenaries, bureaus, working groups and other bodies
The main decision-making entity of the vast majority of the councils is a plenary or assembly that
involves all members of the council. The characteristics of these plenaries differ widely from country
to country, particularly in terms of their organisation and role.
Some councils' sessions are generally public, which is more often the case in the economic and social
councils in southern Europe (Spain, France, Italy and Portugal); in others, the general rule is for
sessions to be held in private (for example in Austria, Bulgaria and Finland).
A more common element is to require a minimum number of participants for decisions taken in
plenary to be valid; in many cases, consensus is also needed for a resolution to be adopted (as is the
case, for example, with Lithuania, Ireland, Croatia and Slovenia).
Plenaries or assemblies meet in either regular or extraordinary sessions. The frequency of regular
plenaries can be quite different. They take place monthly in the Economic and Social Council of
Spain, in the case of Croatia, in the Economic Council of Finland, in Lithuania's Tripartite Council and
in the Economic and Social Council of the Netherlands – in this case normally on the third Friday of
the month. Austria's Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs also has monthly meetings,
with the peculiarity that the meeting takes place at the headquarters of the organisation of the member
currently exercising the role of president. The plenaries of other countries' councils have less frequent
regular meetings. In the case of the Council of Economic and Social Agreement of the Czech Republic
and the Social Dialogue Council in Poland, the plenary generally meets every two months. The
plenary of Portugal's council has its regular meetings at least six times a year, once every two months.
Once per quarter is the usual minimum rule for plenary meetings in both the Central Economic
Council and the National Labour Council of Belgium; the general assembly of the Economic and
Social Council of Greece meets at least twice a year; and National Economic and Social Council of
Hungary once every six months, no other frequency being possible.
Other councils' plenaries have more frequent regular meetings. This is the case for the Romanian
Economic and Social Council, which has regular weekly meetings of its plenary, while in France, the
23
Economic, Social and Environmental Council has its regular meetings on the second and fourth
Tuesday and Wednesday of each month, with one session per day.
Similarly, there are often bodies known as "bureaus" or "standing committees" (other names also
exist) that are responsible for the councils' more day-to-day operations, as well as their broad
orientation. They comprise fewer members than the plenaries to enable them to be more flexible; the
membership of such bodies is in proportion to the groups.
The councils also have working committees and sections; while each of them works differently, they
are responsible for handling and studying the issues and then, once agreement has been reached,
passing their decisions on to the final decision-making body (plenary). They truly are the "engine
rooms" of the council, formulating the decisions that are to be adopted. These committees, sections or
working groups – to give some of the names used – can, and usually do, take various forms. Some are
more permanent, while others are formed specifically if the issue to be examined is unusual or does
not fall within the areas studied by these committees. There is one unique exception: in Denmark,
neither the Economic Council nor the Environmental Economic Council have such committees. In
both cases, it is the chairmanship (consisting of four members), together with the required experts, that
draw up draft reports.
5.3. Competences
5.3.1. Principally advisory functions
The councils are generally advisory institutions. However, they do not always act solely in an advisory
capacity, as advisory bodies that make proposals but do not take decisions45
. They issue their opinions
and judgements on issues referred to them by other bodies. Where they are advisory bodies, they fulfil
an institutional advisory role that clearly distinguishes them from other advisory bodies in the Member
States of the European Union, as their task is permanent and general. The councils generally do not
evaluate the legality of the consultations made; rather, they issue an opinion on the specific matters
that have been referred to them.
In many cases, obtaining their opinions is mandatory, but in a great deal of cases their reports and
opinions concern issues on which the public authority has made an optional referral.
By the same token, a large number of councils have the ability to present own-initiative opinions
within their areas of activity.
As part of this advisory role, the opinions they issue are not binding, although in some cases, if a
requesting body subsequently deviates from the opinion a council has issued, this must be specifically
justified, as is the case in Poland if the Council of Ministers does not follow the Council's view or
makes major changes to the proposal in comparison to the proposal that was initially submitted for
consultation. In the case of Poland, this justification takes place before parliament.
As mentioned, resolutions are not binding; nonetheless, the councils' decisions always help to publicly
formulate an expert opinion – in this case, as drawn up by the organisations represented within the
45
DUVERGER, M., Instituciones políticas y Derecho Constitucional, Ariel, Barcelona, 1988, p. 137.
24
institution – which clearly makes a certain contribution to exercising what some46
have termed a
corrective function in relation to political decision-making.
The economic and social councils do not supplant parliaments' legislative functions, although there are
(rare) cases where they are granted regulatory powers. In Italy, for example, the National Council for
Economics and Labour has the constitutional right of legislative initiative – the law enables it, within
its area of competence, to transmit its legislative initiatives to the government, parliament, the regions
and the autonomous provinces. In Poland's Social Dialogue Council, the employers' and workers'
groups can conclude widely applicable collective labour agreements. For its part, the National Labour
Council of Belgium can conclude compulsory collective agreements, while Slovenia's Economic and
Social Council can propose the adoption of new laws or ask for current legislation to be amended.
Ultimately, they in no way replace parliaments in terms of their composition or role, but they do
represent interest groups – in this case, economic and social interest groups – which complement and
complete the liberal system of representation.
This advisory role, fulfilled by the vast majority of councils, can be exercised in relation to the
government (as is the case in Spain, Luxembourg, Malta and Poland), or, more commonly, in relation
to parliament and the government (as in Slovenia, Portugal, Romania, Greece and the Netherlands).
Ireland is a special case as its council does not issue opinions on decisions; instead, its regular task is
to carry out analyses and inform the prime minister (to whom it is subordinate) about the overall
development of the economy.
By way of conclusion, and given the variety of the ESCs' different roles, it is interesting to note the
possibility introduced in 2008 in the case of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of
France: if they have the support of at least 500 000 French citizens, people can exercise their right to
petition the Council on any matter connected to economic, social or environmental issues.
Councils with a legislative advisory role are undoubtedly in the majority in Europe. However, some
also – or exclusively – play a coordinating role (the Netherlands), or provide information on strategic
issues relating to the economy (Ireland).
46
CALVO ORTEGA, R., Estado Social y participación asociativa, Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2009, p. 85.
25
6. INSTITUTIONS FOR DIALOGUE AND GOVERNANCE. AN
INSTRUMENT OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
Currently, states are becoming increasingly complex and societies are becoming more diverse all the
time. In our area of interest, this complexity and diversity can be seen in the increasingly dynamic and
far-reaching interests expressed by citizens, whose calls need to be taken into account by public
authorities. From the perspective of governance, this broad situation is viewed as a complex task:
identifying issues, proposing solutions and implementing measures and taking decisions in an
effective and efficient way are certainly challenging.
Therefore, dialogue between people who hold different views, discussion and attempts to reach
consensus are necessary in a democratic system. These all form part of how the economic and social
councils work every single day. It follows that as sometimes opposed or rival interests are represented
in the ESCs, the representatives of these various interests need to talk to each other in order to be able
to take decisions, and for a debate to happen in the first place. This is why the councils have often
been described as institutionalised forums for dialogue47
. They are expected to provide a setting for
committed and lively participation, with dialogue as the fundamental working method. This dialogue
generally bears fruit and gives rise to positive outcomes. These positive results are reflected in
consensual documents taking the form of opinions, reports, resolutions, statements, etc. The Economic
and Social Council of Slovenia is a prime example: all its decisions are unanimous, meaning that
negotiations on a particular issue continue until consensus is reached or, alternatively, until the
previously set deadline for reaching consensus.
Many councils allow dissenting votes to register disagreement with all or part of a resolution.
As has been seen, the councils are institutions set up for the sake of dialogue, to foster the "dialogic
democracy" written about by Giddens48
– and ultimately to be a place where different positions can
come together and reach a consensus. This dialogue is commonly known as "social dialogue", a
characteristic shared by the vast majority of councils and even highlighted in some councils' founding
statutes, such as the Economic and Social Council of Greece and the councils of Romania, Poland,
Malta and the Czech Republic49
.
Social dialogue is a political and legal notion that has recently been becoming more widespread,
emphasising negotiations in the social field or, at least, in labour relations, and involving an exchange
of views between both sides of industry and a willingness to reach similar positions. In any case,
social dialogue is further-reaching than consultation, as it entails the presence of the public authority50
as an additional party to the dialogue.
47
DURÁN LÓPEZ, F., (Coord.), El Diálogo social y su institucionalización e España e Iberoamérica, Consejo
Económico y Social, Madrid, 1998. 48
GIDDENS, A., Más allá de la izquierda y la derecha. El futuro de las políticas radicales, Ediciones Cátedra,
Madrid, 1996. 49
In Greece, Article 82(3) of the constitution. In Romania, Article 1(2) of the law governing its organisation and
functioning (Law 222/2015 of 24 July). In Malta, Article 5(3) of Law XV of 2001. In Poland, the Social
Dialogue Council is the name of the institution created by the law of 24 July 2015. In the case of the Czech
Republic, it is clearly incorporated into Article 1 of the statutes. 50
SCHMITTER, P.C., "La concertación social en perspectiva comparada", in ESPINA, A. (Comp.),
Concertación social, neocorporatismo y democracia, Madrid, 1991, p. 67.
26
Since their very inception, the economic and social councils have been dedicated to dialogue and to
reaching agreement. However, given the above-mentioned distinctions, the national economic and
social councils are either institutions in which the executive is a constituent part, or are institutions
where the government is not a central part of the dialogue process. In the first case, consultation often
takes place within the council; in the second case, the council plays a primarily advisory role, leaving
consultation to other bodies.
By the same token, some EU Member States distinguish between two types of dialogue according to
the participants: thus it is customary to speak of "social dialogue" when the participants are social
organisations, primarily trade unions and employers' associations, while the concept of "civic
dialogue" is used when other civil society actors are involved. For countries that make this distinction,
civic dialogue has a wider scope, helping to pinpoint civil society's position on economic and social
policies. It takes place in this form in the Economic and Social Council of Bulgaria, which addresses
issues related to civic dialogue; meanwhile, social dialogue is handled by the National Council for
Tripartite Cooperation.
Councils, as tools for dialogue, also play a crucial role within the new ways of exercising power, or
"governance". This term – nowadays quite frequent – reflects a more horizontal way of exercising
power which increases dialogue among stakeholders and steps up citizens' involvement in the
decisions that affect them. It is, therefore, a style and a specific method of managing public affairs that
enables public and private figures to get involved. The councils have a major role to play: in a way,
they channel society's desire to take part in political processes without the need to come together in an
organisation such as a political party.
Meanwhile, it is well known that there is public apathy in some European countries, and a certain
suspicion of institutions, which are viewed as being remote from citizens and as operating behind their
backs and without taking their interests into account. Thus it is worth considering the possibilities
offered by the economic and social councils as a refuge for economic and social interests and a safe
haven where citizens can participate via their own organisations. A stable structure, such as the
councils, can be used to strengthen ties between citizens and institutions, and to increase (as
Rosanvallon would put it) legitimacy and, in turn, trust in institutions51
, as economic and social
councils and similar bodies can have a real impact on public decision-making, thus fostering
participatory democracy and acting as a complement to representative democracy. Ultimately, these
institutions can improve the quality of democracy, which is why they have sometimes been described
as a bridge between organised civil society and the institutions52
.
51
ROSANVALLON, P., La legitimidad democrática. Imparcialidad, reflexividad y proximidad, Paidós, Madrid,
2010. 52
The European Economic and Social Committee – many aspects of which have been imitated by the national
economic and social councils – is a good example in this regard, as it describes itself as "a bridge between
Europe and organised civil society".
27
7. CLASSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILS
The literature provides some models of the economic and social councils; we could mention here the
brilliant classifications drawn up in the early 1990s by Ojeda Avilés53
in Europe and Villavicencio
Ríos54
in America. But the EU Member States' economic and social councils have changed since these
classifications were published. In my view, this justifies rethinking the models, although we have to
keep in mind that it would be possible to come up with any number of comparative classifications. In
any case, the following classifications are suggested, together with their results.
a) An initial and obvious classification is the territorial jurisdiction in which the council can
act. In Europe, there are supranational councils – such as the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Economic and Social Committee of the Greater Region – and national,
regional and/or local councils.
b) Another method of classification must take into account the legal nature of the council.
Today, a distinction can be made between economic and social councils that are specifically
recognised in their country's constitution, as in Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, Romania, and,
according to some of the literature, Spain; those economic and social councils based only on a
legal provision and established by law, as in Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland; and those that have been
established by means of a formal agreement – e.g. Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Lithuania and
the Czech Republic – or by an informal agreement, such as in Austria.
It therefore seems that economic and social councils have more of a constitutional status in
southern European countries, as well as in France and Romania. Another remark is that the
vast majority of countries do not make provision for them in their constitutions, and that
councils set up by means of an agreement predominate in Eastern Europe.
The following consists of brief remarks about the economic and social councils that are
recognised in their countries' constitution:
Italy
The most important legal basis for the National Council for Economics and Labour is
the Italian constitution of 1947 (Article 99). It survived – nominally, at least – the
referendum of 4 December 2016, which proposed constitutional reform and, more
relevantly for our purposes, the abolition of the council. The legal provision – which
does not need to be quoted verbatim here – stipulates that the institution must be made
up of experts and representatives of the productive sectors, according to their size and
qualitative importance, as established by law. Similarly, it sets out the body's advisory
nature in relation to parliament and the government in matters entrusted to it by law;
notably, it grants the right of legislative initiative, thus enabling the council to
contribute to national social and economic legislation.
53
OJEDA AVILÉS, A., "¿Qué Consejo Económico y Social?", in OJEDA AVILÉS (Coord.), Los Consejos
Económicos y Sociales, Trotta, Madrid, 1992, p. 93-112. 54
VILLAVICENCIO RÍOS, A., "Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales en los países europeos", in OJEDA
AVILÉS (Coord.), Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales, Trotta, Madrid, 1992, p. 53-71.
28
France
The 1958 constitution of the French Fifth Republic contains three articles on the
Economic and Social Council (Articles 69 to 71), which were amended in the 2008
reform to change the name to the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, set a
maximum number of members (233), and enshrine citizens' right to petition. It
stipulates that the council is a body that advises the government on draft laws,
ordinances and decrees, and is a body that advises the government and parliament on
any economic, social or environmental issues. From among all these different tasks, it
is worth noting that the constitutional text itself states that a member of the Council
can be designated to present, to the houses of parliament, the Council's opinion on the
drafts or proposals submitted to it.
Portugal
The Economic and Social Council of Portugal was not mentioned in the original
version of the constitution from 1976. It was the constitutional reform of 1989 that
first included this body, in Article 95; meanwhile, the reform of 1997 put the council
in its current location of Article 92.
The Economic and Social Council is stipulated to be an advisory and consultative
body in the domain of economic and social policy, and is invited to take part in
drafting the major options and economic and social development plans, and any other
functions allocated to it by law. The constitution stipulates that it include
representatives of the government; organisations that represent workers, economic
activities and families; the autonomous regions; and local authorities.
Greece
The Greek Economic and Social Council, created in 1994, is more recent. However, it
was enshrined in the constitution with the 2001 reform of the constitution of 1975: the
Economic and Social Council was written into Article 82(3), which sets out its
mission to conduct social dialogue in relation to economic and social policies, as well
as with regard to legislative bills and proposals.
Romania
Similarly, Romania has a constitutionally enshrined Economic and Social Council
(CES). Article 141 of the Constitution of 1991, as revised in 2003, defines it as a
consultative body advising the parliament and the government in areas defined by the
relevant organic law.
Spain
Finally, in Spain there is an interesting discussion in the literature about the
constitutional significance of the Economic and Social Council (CES), which was set
up by law in 1991. There are differences of opinion as to whether this council
complies with Article 131(2) of the Spanish Constitution. There are, in my opinion,
convincing arguments for believing that the current council is not based on this
29
constitutional provision, in that its membership, powers and the intentions of the
legislative authorities, as reflected in parliamentary debates, differ from those set out
in the Constitution55
.
On the other hand, some councils have been established by law without any express
constitutional provision; these constitute the great majority. Others, however, are the result of
agreements between different entities. Thus, the Economic and Social Council of Slovenia
(ESS) was set up under the Agreement on Social Policy signed in Ljubljana on 25 April 1994
by representatives of workers, employers and the government, and this forms the main legal
basis for the Council, establishing it as the main body for consultation and coordination of the
social dialogue in Slovenia.
Similarly, the Council of Economic and Social Agreement (RHSD) of the Czech Republic was
set up under a 1990 agreement between the executive and social organisations and is today the
main body for negotiation between employers, workers and the government with the aim of
arriving at agreements on essential socio-economic questions. In Croatia social dialogue is
cross-cutting and, although the Labour Code allows for the possibility of creating such a body
(i.e. it has a legal basis), it was set up under the agreement between the government, trade
unions and employers' associations. In the Slovak Republic the Council for Economic and
Social Partnership (HSV SR) arose as a result of the pact between the government and a
number of legal entities in the socio-economic field including representatives of employers
and workers. The Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania (LRTT) was the result of a
tripartite agreement based on ILO provisions on tripartite consultations. And, finally, in
Austria the country's highly neo-corporatist model of industrial relations resulted in the
Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs (BWS) being set up on the basis of an
informal voluntary agreement between four large industrial groups.
c) The size of the councils' membership varies from large (France, 233), via medium-sized - the
great majority - (ranging from Portugal, 66, to Ireland, 32) to small (ranging from Denmark's
Economic Council, 26, to Croatia's Social Partnership body (SP), 14).
d) In accordance with their membership and representative structure, there are four main
models of ESC. On the one hand there is the joint or bipartite model, where only workers' and
employers’ organisations are represented. Another model is a bipartite model with the addition
of experts or members of the government administration, which is not truly tripartite.
The third model is tripartite in nature, i.e. representatives of the government, employers’
organisations and trade unions. The fourth and final model can be termed multipartite, with
various national socio-economic sectors and interests represented.
The first type, the bipartite, includes the two Belgian councils, so that both the
National Labour Council (CNT-NAR) and the Central Economic Council (CCE-CRB)
55
For clarification see Pérez Anaya, R. M., "La institucionalización del diálogo social: los Consejos
Económicos y Sociales", in González Ortega, S., García Murcia, J., Elorza Guerrero, F., (Coords.),
Presente y futuro de la intervención pública en las relaciones laborales y de seguridad social: libro
homenaje al profesor Fermín Rodríguez-Sañudo Gutiérrez, Labour Relations Council of Andalucía,
No. 47, Seville, 2011, pp. 203-222.
30
have a bipartite membership consisting of workers’ and employers’ representatives
only.
The National Labour Council, which is limited to advisory task and collective
bargaining, has equal, cross-sectoral membership, with thirteen representatives of
employers' organisations and thirteen workers' representatives. The Central Economic
Council, which deals with economic issues, is also a bipartite, with 27 members from
each side.
Other councils are made up of representatives of workers and employers but also
include experts. These include the Austrian BWS (16 members of social
organisations and five experts), the Luxembourg Economic and Social Council (CES)
with 36 representatives of employers' and workers' organisations and three experts,
and finally the Netherlands Economic and Social Council (SER) with eleven experts,
none of whom represent the government or its administration.
A third way to categorise councils by representative structure is the classic tripartite
model. This includes all councils where only employers, workers and the government
are represented. This type includes the councils of the Czech Republic, Poland,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia, Malta and Finland.
The Czech Republic's RHSD is currently a body engaged in tripartite negotiation,
which aims to achieve agreement on important socio-economic issues. It has 22
members (eight representing the government, and seven each for employers and trade
unions). Croatia's SP is also a tripartite body. It has four representatives each from
social organisations, the government having more representatives. Lithuania's LRTT
has 21 members, seven per group. Poland's Social Dialogue Council (RDS) has 59
members representing the same three interest groups. Malta's Council for Economic
and Social Development (MCESD) has five representatives each of employers and
workers, with the rest of the members coming from the government. Slovenia's
tripartite ESS has equal representation of the three interest groups. Finland's
Economic Council (VNK) also has representatives of the government, employers’
organisations and trade unions.
Finally, there are a number of councils, the majority, based on a multipartite model
of socio-economic interests, as is the case in Spain, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Denmark
and Greece, and especially Portugal, Romania, France and Bulgaria. All these states
have representatives of many interests in their councils, although some, like Ireland,
have fewer - representatives of employers, trade unions, arable and livestock farming
organisations, voluntary organisations, environmental and civil servants' organisations
and various other interests.
We shall begin with Bulgaria's Economic and Social Committee (ISS). Briefly, this is
an independent advisory body giving a voice to civil society organisations on issues
related to national economic and social development; it is known as a "civil
parliament", bringing together diverse interests. The institution has 36 members
31
divided into three groups, the first two representing employers and workers
respectively, while the twelve members of the third group represent farmers,
cooperatives, craftsmen, consumers, women, the environment, organisations of people
with disabilities, pensioners and welfare service providers, with two experts from the
fields of economic and social policy.
Portugal has a constitutional text, referred to above, that specifies a minimum of
interests to be represented, such as workers, employers, regions and local authorities,
although, as the Constitution requires, the actual membership is determined by the
law. Thus, this council, which has 66 members, currently represents the following
interests: the government, workers, employers, regional and local authorities, experts
and various interests, including, inter alia, protection of the environment, consumer
protection, social solidarity, family associations, universities, young entrepreneurs,
family-based agriculture, gender equality, people with disabilities, tourism and the
financial sector.
Romania's CES has the same characteristics. Among its 45 members and three
groups there is significant participation by civil society associations, such as human
rights organisations, health and people with disabilities, social services and poverty
eradication, rural and environmental organisations, professional and academic
associations, consumer protection, the professions, farmers, pensioners and other
NGOs carrying out activities in the CES's areas of responsibility.
But it is France's Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) that most
closely fits this model. Its 233 members are divided among different and conflicting
interests. Thus, there are members representing workers in general and in particular
those working for private companies, as well as representatives of trade, services,
farmers, craftsmen, the professions, public undertakings, mutual associations and
other interests such as family associations, foundations, youth and students, and
experts in economics, sports and culture. There are also members of associations for
nature protection, including hunting associations.
e) It is also possible to classify councils according to the other institutions with which they
maintain close cooperative relations or a functional link. There are, for example, ESCs with a
functional relationship to government, such as those of Spain, Luxembourg, Poland, Malta,
the two Danish councils, the consultative councils and Ireland, through the prime minister. On
the other hand there are others (the majority) that have as close a relationship to parliament as
to the government - the ESCs of Belgium, Slovenia, Romania, Greece, France, Slovakia, the
Netherlands, Hungary, Bulgaria, Portugal and Italy.
Luxembourg's CES, for example, is a permanent consultative body to the government, tasked
with studying, either on its own initiative or at the request of the government, national
economic, social and financial issues. On the other hand, the Netherlands' SER is an advisory
body to the government and the parliament, as well as a supervisory body for standards, but
essentially an adviser to the executive and legislature on the broad outlines of socio-economic
policy.
32
f) Another classification system is based on functions. The vast majority are essentially
consultative, some exist in order to solve conflicts, some have powers of legislative initiative
and others are for consultation and tripartite pacts.
Consultation is a very significant task of ESCs. This consultative role, as seen above, involves
expressing an opinion on documents, normally draft legislation, on economic and social
policies.
In addition, ESCs, which generally perform other functions, such as proposal,
recommendation or analysis, may have other distinctive functions. Belgium's National Labour
Council (CNT-NAR) resolves labour disputes and finalises collective agreements, which are
an important source of Belgium's obligations. In Poland's Social Dialogue Council (RDS) the
employers' and workers' groups can conclude multi-company collective agreements that are
binding on their members, they can submit joint applications for the approval or amendment
of rules relating to the country’s economic and social development, the improvement of
competitiveness or social cohesion. Italy's National Council for Economics and Labour
(CNEL) also has the power of legislative initiative, submitting contributions to the chambers
of parliament and the government in areas within its remit in the form of a draft law.
The Netherlands' SER, apart from being a consultative body, is also a supervisory authority
for trades and standards, and is thus a co-determination, supervisory and advisory body.
Supervision of mergers between companies, promotion of regulation between entrepreneurs
and consumers, and worker participation in businesses. There are ESCs that are mainly
dedicated to consultation and the conclusion of - usually tripartite - pacts, such as Portugal's
CES, the constituent bodies of which include a Standing Committee on Social Consultation,
which, interestingly, is consulted before the guaranteed minimum monthly income is
determined.
g) In terms of their discussion methods, some ESCs have to achieve consensus, while others do
not always. Some councils require full consensus before expressing an opinion, while others
operate on the basis of a majority.
Ireland's National Economic and Social Council (NESC), for example, takes all its decisions
by consensus, while Spain's CES operates by majority.
33
8. CONCLUSIONS
1. From a historical perspective, it was during the second half of the nineteenth century that a
debate, initially intellectual and then political, began in Europe on the position of socio-
economic interest groups in the public arena, with different sections of the political spectrum
contributing ideas about the institutional representation of these groups.
Thus, very different political groupings have over the last two centuries advocated the
representation of civil society organisations in the machinery of the State, entailing the
representation not only of political interests but also those of the economic, social, cultural and
regional interest groups that make up society.
2. The representation of socio-economic interest groups is today recognised in constitutional
law; thus individual citizens can ensure that their interests and situation in society are
recognised through civic participation via the socio-economic groups to which they belong.
This kind of representation is closely linked to social democracy, which involves the
participation of intermediary groups and bodies in the machinery of government.
3. The purpose of representation of interests is to communicate sectional or group interests to
government bodies, while political representation is concerned with general interests.
Similarly, political representation is incompatible with mandatory instructions, while interest
representation is tied to the interests of a group. Moreover, recent European history shows that
interest representation can be seen as a complement to, or substitute for, political
representation.
4. Economic councils, and economic and social councils and similar institutions, are some of the
vehicles most often chosen by EU Member States as a form of socio-economic interest
representation to give a voice to interest groups, as an alternative to including them in political
representative bodies, thus improving social harmony and productivity and enhancing
democracy.
5. The first economic council was set up in Germany under Bismarck, and the first with
constitutional backing was established by the German Constitution of 1919 as a consultative
body made up of various socio-economic interest groups from the whole country in a
democratic system. Following the establishment of this first economic council, the States of
Europe set up councils involving economic and social stakeholders, initially during the inter-
war period but particularly after the Second World War, when economic and social councils
were officially established as neo-corporatist institutions par excellence.
6. The economic and social councils are institutions which represent the main socio-economic -
i.e. sectoral and sectional - interests, to ensure that their views are taken into account by the
decision-making bodies seeking to act in the general interest. These institutions thus do not
replace democratic decision-making bodies but are, rather, specifically intended to
complement the institutions of representative democracy.
34
7. The economic and social councils active in Europe have different characteristics. Each council
is unique in terms of its membership and functions.
From the point of view of their legal nature, some councils are enshrined in national
Constitutions, some (the majority) have been established by non-constitutional laws and some
even by pacts or agreements between social interest groups, or between these and the
government.
8. Their membership is a key distinguishing feature. The Councils are made up of representatives
of the socio-economic groups that each Member State considers particularly important and
worthy of representation. A few of them only include the most representative employers'
associations and trade unions, but the vast majority include other vocational interests and
social interest groups.
The distribution of seats in the councils is controversial, as it clearly reflects the intentions of
the political authority by which the council was established. I believe that economic and social
councils should be a faithful reflection of the economic and social interest groups of the State,
providing stable, institutionalised participation with the backing of the social organisations.
9. Economic and social councils are institutions typical of European neo-corporatism, and
through them interest organisations cooperate with public authorities on socio-economic
issues. Such collaboration may involve a form of consultation leading to binding pacts, or an
advisory role with non-binding opinions and criteria. In the latter case, these bodies advise the
main institutions of the State: the parliament, the government and other decision-making
bodies.
10. Economic and social councils are a tool that helps to build trust between citizens and the
public authorities, forums for participation and consultation of the social partners and
organised civil society, which have contributed and continue to contribute to achieving key
objectives such as greater social cohesion, higher productivity and the socio-economic
development of States. Their activities and decisions can be used by governments and
parliaments as a social thermometer to measure public support for their legislative proposals.
The consensual nature of their decisions makes it possible to strengthen social dialogue
between interest groups with positions that are by definition divergent, and the agreements
they achieve are of fundamental importance for socio-economic progress and democratic
stability. Finally, they facilitate citizen participation in public life and are, therefore, an
instrument of participatory democracy and a promoter of good governance.
35
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AVDAGIC, S., RHODES, M, VISSER, F., Social Pacts in Europe. Emergence, evolution, and
institutionalization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
BOBBIO, N., Teoría General de la Política, Trotta, Madrid, 2003.
CALVO ORTEGA, R., Estado Social y participación asociativa, Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2009.
CHABANET, D., and TRECHSEL, A.H., EU National Economic and Social Councils and Similar
Institutions, Eudo, Florence, 2011.
CHATRIOT, A., "Les apories de la représentation de la société civile. Débats et expériences autour
des compositions successives des assemblées consultatives en France au XX siècle", in Revue
française de droit constitutionnel, No 71, July 2007.
CUETO RÚA, J., "La representación de intereses económicos en el Estado moderno" in Academia
Nacional de Ciencias Económicas, Buenos Aires, 1966.
DE ESTEBAN, J., La representación política y su variante, la representación de intereses,
unpublished doctoral thesis, U.C.M., 1953.
DELEVOYE, J-P., "Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales frente al reto de responder a las cuestiones
fundamentales que se plantean nuestras sociedades y de mejorar su capacidad para expresar las
expectativas de los ciudadanos (French CESE)", in Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales en América
Latina y en la Unión Europea. Experiencias prácticas de diálogo social, Colección Documentos de
Trabajo, No 14, EUROsociAL, Madrid, 2014.
DELFINO DE PALACIOS, M., "La institucionalización del pluralismo socioeconómico a nivel
parlamentario", in VALADÉS, D. (Coord.), Constitución y grupos de presión en América Latina,
UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Mexico City, 1977.
DUGUIT, L., Manual de Derecho Constitucional, ACUÑA, J. G., (Trad.), Madrid, 1926, pp. 167-170.
DURÁN LÓPEZ, F., (Coord.), El Diálogo social y su institucionalización e España e Iberoamérica,
Consejo Económico y Social, Madrid, 1998.
DURKHEIM, È., La división del trabajo social, Akal, Madrid, 2001.
DUVERGER, M., Instituciones políticas y Derecho Constitucional, Ariel, Barcelona, 1988.
ERMIDA URIARTE, O., "Los CES: antecedentes para el Foro Consultivo Económico-Social del
Mercosur", in Revista de Relasur, No 8, Montevideo, 1995.
FERNÁNDEZ RIQUELME, S., "La historia del corporativismo en Europa. Aproximación a las
formas jurídico-políticas de representación del trabajo", in Diálogos, Revista electrónica de Historia,
vol. 13 No 1, February-August, 2012.
FORSTHOFF, E., Sociedad industrial y Administración Pública, ENAP, Madrid, 1967.
36
GARCÍA CUADRADO, A. M., "La representación parlamentaria de intereses socio-económicos en la
doctrina constitucional", in Revista de Derecho Político, UNED, No 88, 2013.
GARCÍA-PELAYO, M., Las transformaciones del Estado Contemporáneo, Alianza, Madrid, 1982.
GUTIÉRREZ NOGUEROLES, A., El Consejo Económico y Social en el ordenamiento constitucional
español, UNED, Madrid, 2004.
HELLER, H., "El Derecho Constitucional en la República de Weimar. Derechos y deberes
fundamentales. Sección V: de la Economía", in Escritos políticos, Alianza, Madrid, 1985.
HERRERA, E., Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales. La participación democrática de los grupos
socio-profesionales, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, 1972.
KAISER, J. H., La rappresentanza degli interessi organizzati, MANGIAMELI, S. (Trad.), Giuffrè,
Milán, 1993.
Lataud, C., and Poudenx, A., La représentation professionnelle. Les Conseils Économiques en Europe
et en France, Marcel Rivière, Paris, 1927.
Linder, E., Étude sur les Conseils Économiques dans les différents pays du monde, League of Nations,
Geneva, 1932.
LOEWENSTEIN, K., Teoría de la Constitución, Ariel, Barcelona, 1970.
MAESTRO, G., "Acerca del neo-corporativismo", in Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), No
48, 1985.
MAIER, C. S., "Los vínculos ficticios… de la riqueza y de la ley: sobre la teoría y la práctica de la
representación de los intereses", en BERGER, S. (Comp.), La organización de los grupos de interés
en Europa Occidental. El pluralismo, el corporativismo y la transformación de la política, Centro de
Publicaciones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Madrid, 1988.
MARTÍNEZ ABASCAL, V., PÉREZ AMORÓS, F., ROJO TORRECILLA, E., Los Consejos
Económicos y Sociales (España y otros países comunitarios), Ibidem, Madrid, 1993.
MEDINA ECHEVARRÍA, J., "La representación profesional en las Asambleas Legislativas" en
Anales de la Universidad de Valencia, Año VII-15, 1926.
MONEREO PÉREZ, J., Concertación y diálogo social, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 1999.
MONTALVO CORREA, J., "Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales u otros órganos similares",
ponencia en X Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración
Pública, Santiago de Chile, 2005.
Njaim, H., "La regulación constitucional de los grupos de presión: la crisis de los Consejos
Económico-sociales ilustrada por el caso venezolano", in Valadés, D. (coord.), Constitución y grupos
de presión en América Latina, UNAM, Institute of Legal Research, Mexico City, 1977)
PENDÁS, B., "Estudio preliminar", in GIERKE, O., Teorías políticas de la Edad Media, Centro de
Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1995.
37
PEÑA PINTO, M., "Democracia participativa y cooperación internacional: la experiencia de los
Consejos Económicos y Sociales en EUROsociAL II", in Los Consejos Económicos y Sociales en
América Latina y en la Unión Europea. Experiencias prácticas de diálogo social, Colección
Documentos de Trabajo, No 14, EUROsociAL, Madrid, 2014.
PÉREZ DÍAZ, V., El retorno de la sociedad civil, Instituto de Estudios Económicos, Madrid, 1987.
PÉREZ YRUELA, M., and GINER, S., "Corporatismo: El estado de la cuestión", in Revista Española
de Investigaciones Científicas, No 31.
PIZZORNO, A., "Los intereses y los partidos en el pluralismo", in BERGER, S. (Comp.), in La
organización de los grupos de interés en Europa Occidental. El pluralismo, el corporativismo y la
transformación de la política, Centro de Publicaciones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social,
Madrid, 1988.
PRÉLOT, M., La Représentation professionnelle dans la Constitution de Weimar et le Conseil
économique national, Doctoral Thesis of 29 January 1924, Éditions Spes, Paris, 1924.
ROMANO, S., Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi: saggi di diritto costituzinale, Giuffrè, Milan, 1969.
RUBIO NÚÑEZ, R., Los grupos de presión, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 2003.
RUBIO NÚÑEZ, R., "La guerra de las democracias", in Asamblea: revista parlamentaria de la
Asamblea de Madrid, No 16, 2007.
SANTORO-PASSARELLI, F., Nociones de Derecho del Trabajo, Instituto de Estudios Políticos,
Madrid, 1963.
SARTORI, G., Elementos de teoría política, Alianza Universidad Textos, Madrid, 1992.
SCHMITTER, P. C., "La mediación entre los intereses y la gobernabilidad de los regímenes en Europa
Occidental y Norteamérica en la actualidad", in BERGER, S. (Comp.), La organización de los grupos
de interés en Europa Occidental. El pluralismo, el corporativismo y la transformación de la política,
Centro de Publicaciones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Madrid, 1988.
SCHMITTER, P.C., "La concertación social en perspectiva comparada, en ESPINA, A. (Comp.),
Concertación social, neocorporatismo y democracia, Madrid, 1991.
SERRANO RUIZ-CALDERÓN, J. M., "Neocorporativismo", in Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de
la Universidad Complutense, No 74, 1988-1989.
SOLÉ, C., "El debate corporativismo-neo-corporativismo", in Revista Española de Investigaciones
Sociológicas, Vol. 26, No 84, 1984.
TROTABAS, L., "Le rôle de la représentation des intérêts professionnels dans la vie politique
française", in Travaux du VI colloque des facultés de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Toulouse,
May 1958, Dalloz, Paris, 1959.
VANOSSI, J. R., El Estado de Derecho en el Constitucionalismo social, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 2000.
VON BEYME, K., Los grupos de presión en la democracia, Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1986.
38
WOLFE, J. H., "Corporatism in German political life: functional representation in the GDR and
Bavaria", HEISLER, M. O. (Dir.), Politics in Europe. Structures and processes in some postindustrial
democracies, Mckay, New York, 1974.
Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 991040 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË
Published by: “Visits and Publications” UnitEESC-2018-22-EN
www.eesc.europa.eu
© European Union, 2018Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
For any use or reproduction of the cover page photo permission must be sought directly from the copyright holder.
European Economic and Social Committee
ENREG.NO. BE - BXL - 27
PrintQE-04-18-193-EN-C
ISBN 978-92-830-3970-9doi:10.2864/007992
OnlineQE-04-18-193-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-830-3972-3doi:10.2864/072824