the contest between simplicity and efficiency in asynchronous byzantine agreement
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The Contest between Simplicity and Efficiency in Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement. Allison Lewko. The University of Texas at Austin. TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: A A A A. Byzantine Agreement. n parties each has an input bit - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
The Contest between Simplicity and Efficiency in Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement
Allison Lewko
The University of Texas at Austin
Byzantine Agreement• n parties• each has an input bit• t corrupt parties
Goal: agree on a bit equal to input of some ``good” party
0 0 0 0 0
1
Byzantine Agreement• Simple problem, worst case adversary
HistoryImpossibility Constraints:
• >= 1/3 corrupted processors• deterministic algorithm, 1 crash failure [FLP]
Algorithms:
• termination with prob =1• adaptive adversary• exponential expected running time
[Ben-Or, Bracha]
[KKKSS]• termination/correctness with prob 1 – o(1)• non-adaptive adversary• polylogarithmic running time
Landscape of possible algorithms?
[Ben-Or, Bracha]
[KKKSS]
???
LLas Vegas polytime algorithm?
LAdaptive adversary polytime algorithm?
Our Result
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚
𝑒[Ben-Or, Bracha]
Simple Algorithm Recipe
One Round:
bit b
broadcast b
validate set of responses = S
Compute b’ = N(S)b’
Repeat
Randomized function
Ben-Or, Bracha AlgorithmsS = Set of bits
• overwhelming majority
• strong majority
• mixed
Decide
Fix b’ to majority
Define b’ randomly
N = b
Why Exponential Time?
Decide 0 Fix 0 Random Decide 1Fix 1
S: mostly 0 . . . . . . . . mixed . . . . . . . . . mostly 1
N := number of processorsN := number of participantsT = eg= t
𝑛 :𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡=Ω (𝑛) :𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
± O(
Exponential Loop!
Generalizing the Algorithm Recipe
t = gg= tx = yg= x
Round i:
bit b
broadcast b
validate set of responses = S
Compute b’ = N(S)
Randomized function
value v
broadcast v
i
S1 , S2 , …, Si
Compute v’ = N(S1, S2, … ,Si )
Randomized function with constant size range
Key Restrictions
• S1, . . . , Si are considered as sets
• N(S1 , . . . , Si) chooses randomly from a constant number of possible values
- messages divorced from senders
- values themselves can vary
How to Prove Exponential Time?Classic strategy:
Executiondeciding 0
Executiondeciding 1Indistinguishable
to some uncorruptedprocessor
Chain of executions, each execution of exponential length
Not deciding!
Challenge for Randomized Algorithms
Any single execution may be unlikely
Takes a class of executions to add up to constant probability
Execution ClassesDivide processors into groups
S
S
SClass defined by sets pergroup per round
Source of Adversary’s ControlSuppose Ω(n) processors receive the same sets:
S1, S2, . . . , Si S1, S2, . . . , Si S1, S2, . . . , Si
. . . N(S1 , . . . , Si) N(S1 , . . . , Si) N(S1 , . . . , Si). . .
Independent samples from same distribution
Chernoff Bound
D - a distribution on R valuesR - a constant
X 1; : : : ;X k - independent samples from D
\ k balls in R bins":
. . . p1 p2 p3 pR
bin i \ far" from pik with probabability exponentially small in k
Adversary Can Match Expectations
S1, S2, . . . , Si
Output = Expectation [N(S1, … , Si)]
Chain of Execution Classes• Each group kept in sync• Output sets match expectations
Execution classdeciding 0
Execution classdeciding 1
Execution class
Execution class…
Indistinguishableto some group One of these must
be non-deciding
Generating the Chain of Execution ClassesE rounds
…
0
0
0
1
1
1
Change group inputs onegroup at a time:
Adversary Strategy
• adversary divides processors into groups of t
• corrupts constant fraction per group
• all group members see same message sets
• tries to stay in the non-deciding execution class
Adversary’s Success ProbabilityS1, S2, … , Si Z1, Z2, … , Zi
V1, V2, …,Vi
Output = ExpectationWith Prob = 1 – 1/exp
Output = ExpectationWith Prob = 1 – 1/exp
Output = ExpectationWith Prob = 1 – 1/exp
By Union bound over groups and rounds, # of rounds = Exp with constant probability
Observations
• Adversary Strategy :
- Only leverages message schedulingand random coins of bad processors- No hope to detect bad behavior without risk
• Impossibility proof crucially leverages:
- Received messages treated as sets- Random Variables have bounded support
Open Problems
[KKKSS]
???
LLas Vegas polytime algorithm?
LAdaptive adversary polytime algorithm?
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑖𝑚
𝑒
• Still simple structure, unbounded randomness?• Weaken symmetry in processing received messages?
[Ben-Or, Bracha]
Thank you!
Questions?