THE

CONSEQUENCESOF SYRIA

HERBERT AND JANE DWIGHT WORKING GROUPON ISL AMISM AND THE INTERNAT IONAL ORDER

Many of the writings associated with thisWorking Group will be published by the Hoover Institution.

Materials published to date, or in production, are listed below.

ESSAY SER IES:THE GREAT UNRAVEL ING: THE REMAKING OF THE MIDDLE EAST

In Retreat: America’s Withdrawal from the Middle EastRussell A. Berman

Israel and the Arab TurmoilItamar Rabinovich

Refl ections on the Revolution in EgyptSamuel Tadros

Th e Struggle for Mastery in the Fertile CrescentFouad Ajami

Th e Weaver’s Lost ArtCharles Hill

Th e Consequences of SyriaLee Smith

ESSAYS

Saudi Arabia and the New Strategic LandscapeJoshua Teitelbaum

Islamism and the Future of the Christians of the Middle EastHabib C. Malik

Syria through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect EnemyNibras Kazimi

Th e Ideological Struggle for PakistanZiad Haider

Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah: Th e Unholy Alliance and Its War on Lebanon

Marius Deeb

[For a list of books published under the auspices of the WORKING GROUP ON ISLAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER,

please see page 57.]

THE

CONSEQUENCESOF SYRIA

Lee Smith

H O O V E R I N S T I T U T I O N P R E S SStanford University Stanford, California

HERBERT & JANE DWIGHT WORKING GROUP ON ISLAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

ESSAY SERIES: THE GREAT UNRAVELING: THE REMAKING OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Th e Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, foundedat Stanford University in 1919 by Herbert Hoover, who went onto become the thirty-fi rst president of the United States, is aninterdisciplinary research center for advanced study on domesticand international aff airs. Th e views expressed in its publications areentirely those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the viewsof the staff , offi cers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

www.hoover.org

Hoover Institution Press Publication No. 651

Hoover Institution at Leland Stanford Junior University,Stanford, California, 94305-6010

Copyright © 2014 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher and copyright holders.

For permission to reuse material from Th e Consequences of Syria, by Lee Smith, ISBN 978-0-8179-1775-3, please access www.copyright.com or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profi t organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of uses.

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Th e Hoover Institution gratefully acknowledgesthe following individuals and foundationsfor their signifi cant support of the

HERBERT AND JANE DWIGHT WORKING GROUP

ON ISLAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER:

Herbert and Jane Dwight

Beall Family Foundation

Stephen Bechtel Foundation

Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation

Mr. and Mrs. Clayton W. Frye Jr.

Lakeside Foundation

vii

Series Foreword by Fouad Ajami and Charles Hill / ix

Th e Consequences of Syria / 1

I. Looking at Syria, Seeing Iraq / 1 II. History’s Seeds / 8 III. Th e Devil We Know / 13 IV. Th e Jihadist Alibi / 28

About the Author / 53About the Hoover Institution’s Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on Islamismand the International Order / 55Index / 59

CONTENTS

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It’s a mantra, but it is also true: the Middle East is being unmade and remade. Th e autocra-cies that gave so many of these states the appear-ance of stability are gone, their dreaded rulers dispatched to prison or exile or cut down by young people who had yearned for the end of the despotisms. Th ese autocracies were large prisons, and in 2011, a storm overtook that stagnant world. Th e spectacle wasn’t pretty, but prison riots never are. In the Fertile Crescent, the work of the colonial cartographers—Gertrude Bell, Winston Churchill, and Georges Clemenceau—are in play as they have never been before. Arab

SERIES FOREWORD

The Great Unraveling: The Remaking of the Middle East

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nationalists were given to lamenting that they lived in nation-states “invented” by Western pow-ers in the aft ermath of the Great War. Now, a cen-tury later, with the ground burning in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq and the religious sects at war, not even the most ardent nationalists can be sure that they can put in place anything better than the old order.

Men get used to the troubles they know, and the Greater Middle East seems fated for grief and breakdown. Outside powers approach it with dread; merciless political contenders have the run of it. Th ere is swagger in Iran and a belief that the radical theocracy can bully its rivals into submission. Th ere was a period when the United States provided a modicum of order in these Middle Eastern lands. But pleading fatigue, and fi nancial scarcity at home, we have all but announced the end of that stewardship. We are poorer for that abdication, and the Middle East is thus left to the mercy of predators of every kind.

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We asked a number of authors to give this spectacle of disorder their best try. We imposed no rules on them, as we were sure their essays would take us close to the sources of the malady.

fouad ajamiSenior Fellow, Hoover Institution—Cochairman, Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on Islamism and the International Order

charles hillDistinguished Fellow of the Brady-Johnson Programin Grand Strategy at Yale University;Research Fellow, Hoover Institution—Cochairman, Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on Islamism and the International Order

1

I: LOOKING AT SYRIA, SEEING IRAQ

Since August when he demanded that Bashar al-Assad step aside, the president of the United States has refused to make good on his own professed policy of regime change in Syria. Barack Obama has ignored both domestic crit-ics of his position on Syria as well as Washing-ton’s traditional regional partners clamoring for American leadership. In failing to intervene in the Syrian civil war for humanitarian reasons while also seizing a strategic opportunity to topple Assad, Obama has had to face down even members of his own administration, virtually all of whom, including cabinet offi cials and some of

Th e Consequences of SyriaLEE SMITH

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his closest aides, eventually came to argue for arming the anti-Assad rebels. Although Obama contends that he has on his side the vast major-ity of a war-weary America, an electorate that loathes the idea of yet another entanglement in the Middle East, the reality is that it was Obama himself who consistently undercut any alterna-tives. Th e US public, never eager for foreign adventures in the fi rst place, was simply follow-ing the lead of a president who never made the case for a policy that could advance American interests and help save those destined for Assad’s meat grinder, without having to land tens of thousands of US troops.

Th e many apparent turns, nuances, and shift s in the administration’s Syria policy—for instance, repeated promises of enhanced military aid to the rebels, the red line drawn over Assad’s use of chemical weapons, the threat to strike regime targets aft er Assad used his unconventional arse-nal, and the decision not to—were parts of a messaging campaign intended to further protect Obama’s steel-like determination to stay out of the Syrian confl ict no matter what. Regardless of what one may think of his policy, the fact that

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Obama defl ected every argument, entreaty, enticement, and forecast of impending doom to preserve that policy cannot fail to impress. How-ever, history off ers confl icting evidence as to whether single-mindedness and obstinacy are necessarily desirable character traits in a man whose job also requires fl exibility, the willing-ness to listen to seasoned advisers, and the ability to change course—in short, the practical talent of democratic politics. He owns his decisions on the Syrian confl ict so singly and so starkly that perhaps the judgment on his policy can only be equally absolute: either he was right and kept the United States clear of a prolonged confl ict in Syria and built the foundations of a new Middle East; or he was wrong and in ruining Washing-ton’s decades-long position in the region ushered in an era of instability whose ripples will reach far past the Persian Gulf littoral and aff ect all the world.

What is diffi cult about assessing the president’s Syria policy is that there is not much evidence of how Obama sees the Middle East in general and America’s role there. Compare Obama’s regional strategy, for instance, to that of his predecessor.

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Shortly aft er the 2003 invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush laid out his freedom agenda for the Middle East in a series of speeches that made a clear case for why promoting democracy was not only good for Arab societies but also in the American national interest. In contrast, Obama’s speeches, starting with his June 2009 Cairo address, have been vague on specifi cs. To be sure, his speeches and offi cial statements have touched on various priorities—like Arab-Israeli peace, as he explained in his 2013 address to the UN General Assembly, and Iran’s nuclear program—but they lack an integrated vision of the region and Amer-ica’s purpose there. Accordingly, it’s been diffi -cult for many observers to discern whether this White House has a coherent Middle East policy or if it is simply improvising on the fl y.

However, the Obama administration as a whole has tended to favor communicating with the public in settings less structured than public addresses and offi cial statements. It is in Obama’s interviews with the press, as well as information leaked aft er informal off -the-record briefi ngs with select journalists, where we can fi nd at least

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some inkling of his grand strategy for the Middle East. Th e outline started to become clearer in his second presidential term. His goal, as he has explained to David Remnick of the New Yorker in January 2013 and Jeff rey Goldberg of Bloom-berg News in March 2014, is to create a “geopo-litical equilibrium.” By balancing traditional American partners like Saudi Arabia and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Obama hopes to create a new regional security architec-ture, one ensuring American interests and alle-viating the sectarian confl ict now ravaging the Middle East, from the deserts of Iraq to the shores of Lebanon. Obama sees the Syrian confl ict in the framework of this larger picture.

Whether Obama turns out to be right or wrong, his critics, including this writer, made a fundamental error in their early assessment of his Syria policy. We questioned his ability to read the strategic landscape of the Middle East. For at least two years into the uprising, his oppo-nents—from US senators like John McCain to the Saudi royal family—pounded their heads in frustration. Doesn’t he get it? Toppling Assad, as

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retired Marine Corps General James Mattis put it, “would be the biggest strategic setback for Iran in 25 years.”

As it turns out, Obama did see the big picture. Like his many critics, he, too, saw Syria primarily in the larger context of Iran. He refused to take serious action against Assad not only because he saw himself as the president elected to extri-cate America from Middle Eastern confl ict rather than further implicate us, but also because it was central to his concept of US policy in the Middle East.

If Obama’s gambit, his big idea about geopo-litical equilibrium, and subsequent decision to stay out of Syria turn out to be right, then they will eventually entail a historical reconsidera-tion of much of the American policy establish-ment’s common wisdom. Obama will have been right to believe that the oil-rich Middle East and America’s long-standing allies there, from Israel and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, were for a number of factors no longer as important as US policy-makers had come to believe over the past half-century. Among other things, with the United States perhaps on the verge of energy

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independence, it will mean Obama was right to see that the region was still important but no longer vital to American interests, and the US could aff ord to draw down. And in minimizing the American footprint, Obama will have been right to have bequeathed to the region a new arrangement balancing Washington’s traditional Sunni Arab allies in the Persian Gulf against Iran. Although it will continue to be impossible to regard the Syrian civil war as anything but a tragedy, in balancing the Gulf ’s two great pow-ers, Obama’s success here will be to have pre-cluded the possibility of a similar confl ict from ever erupting again. If the Middle East was still nothing like Scandinavia, Obama’s big idea had nonetheless worked to stabilize it.

If on the other hand Obama turns out to be wrong, then failing to stop Bashar al-Assad will forever stain his historical legacy. It will have been the broad mainstream of the US policy establishment and America’s Middle East allies who were right. Sure Obama stood fi rm, but for what purpose? By allowing the Syrian civil war to drag on and Assad to stay in power, he was idle as Syria’s neighbors, including US allies, suff ered

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catastrophic refugee crises, while Iran extended its reach across the Levant. Obama’s manifest weakness, underscored by his dealings with Russia, his treatment of allies, and his exertions to shrink America’s profi le in the region unraveled the American-backed order of the Middle East. Washington’s position as a great power and a power broker was established and maintained by generations of Americans—presidents, policy-makers, diplomats, soldiers, educators, business-men, and missionaries—who understood the region not only in terms of the energy resources that made postwar America possible, but also as a testing ground of the country’s political, military, historical, and cultural role in the world. What right did Obama have to toss away a national pat-rimony, and for what purpose?

II: HISTORY’S SEEDS

Th e seeds of both the Syrian rebellion and the Obama administration’s response were planted long before the uprising started. Regarding the former, it’s useful to turn to the post–World War I

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