The Capabilities-based Analysis of Diver-gence in Alliance Transformation

Divergent Evolution of US Alliances in Asia and the Pacific:

A Comparative Perspective

Contents1. Research Puzzle and Questions2. Literature Review and Critical Examination of Alternative Hypothe-

ses1. Divergence in Threat Perceptions2. Political Leadership3. Shared Democratic Values and Identities

3. Research Design1. Formulating Analytical Framework thru Neoclassical Lens2. Comparability Assessment in Comparative Case Studies3. Indicators of Dependent Variable (Divergence in Alliance

Transformation)4. Indicators of Independent Variable (Capabilities Gap) - Devis-

ing “Interoperability Capabilities Index”4. Summary of Major Findings

Introduction: The Same Path for Similar Couples during Cold War Era

• Geopolitical order that has brought political stability and economic prosperity

American leadership

• Security-Autonomy Tradeoff• Unconditional security assistance

in return for provision of their ter-ritory for US military bases

• Opportunity to embark on vigorous economic development

US Allies as Beneficiaries • “Their military security role was

geographically restricted to the area immediately surrounding their territories, and limited functionally to providing a defensive "shield" to support the US offensive "sword" in the region.”

Asymmetrical reciprocity

Same Path in the Immediate Aftermath of Cold War in the Proliferation of Loose Aligned Arrangements

Unipolar American leadership •The US, the world's only superpower, stood in a more advantageous position and took full advantage of their advantageous position.

•As a result, we have witnessed the proliferation of the US-led loose aligned arrangements such as Ac Hoc Coalitions and Partnerships as vividly exemplified by the first Gulf War in 1990-1991

Many predicted that "US foreign policy will experi-ence an end of alliances or at the least a paradigm shift away from formal military alliances towards more flexible and less binding agreements.”

Formal, Treaty-bound Alliances seemed on the verge of drifting apart due to lack of common threat, but were apparently back on track after 9/11

Puzzle: Why Some traditional US alliances are thriving, while others have not fared as well? Japan, Australia, and South Korea take on greater responsibility

within the bilateral relationship, which challenges the funda-mental asymmetry that has characterized each alliance, and em-brace the situation where alliance cooperation expands in scope beyond the specific requirements outlined in the mutual defense treaties to include a broader range of security issues and threats.

The Philippines and Thailand are sitting back in a passive state. Their primary interest seems to be limited to using the bilateral alliance to reinforce their own security agenda as during the years of the Cold War. They seem satisfied with remaining as beneficiaries of the benefits provided through the maintenance of their bilateral alliances with the US as during the times of the Cold War.

Research Questions Why have the security alliances of the United States with Japan,

South Korea, and Australia expanded in scope beyond the spe-cific requirements outlined in the mutual defense treaties to in-clude a broader range of security issues and threats, while the security alliances of the United States with the Philippines and Thailand have failed to move beyond the confines of the Cold War interpretations of the mutual defense treaties that formed the basis for their respective bilateral alliances with the US?

What is an appropriate variable in explaining the unprecedented phenomenon of divergence in alliance transformation in the Asia-Pacific region?

What do the divergent trajectories of alliance transformation mean for the future regional security architecture for the Asia-Pacific?

A Critical Review of Theoretical Approaches Three Ways of Looking at Alliance

1. Neorealism/Neoclassical Realism: Military alliances will fade away soon due to lack of common threat although the time is not set accu-rately.

2. Liberalism/Neoliberal Institutionalism/Liberal Intergoverntalism: Mil-itary alliances as an institution, once formed, have a staying power in-dependent of the material condition that gives rise to them.

3. Constructivism: Over the course of years, similar values and sense of we-feeling acquired by the longstanding alliance partnership in turn became the source of durability for alliance partnership

Alternative Ways of Looking at Alliance1. Order Insurance (insurance against any attempt of other regional

states to pursue undesirable exclusive East Asian regional order-build-ing)

2. Threat Substitution (A new rationale for old Alliance)

Limitations of Dominant Threat-Centric Rationales Each realist, liberal, and constructivist theory has offered their

own convincing explanations for why they have survived the end of the Cold War but can only partially account for why US’ five alliances in the Asia-Pacific have diverged into separate paths.

Undoubtedly, threat-centric explanations are sufficient in account-ing for alliance revitalization but insufficient in explaining the di-vergent fates of US alliances in the post-9/11 world.

Although Thailand and Philippines are geographically closer to China and almost inevitably feel more threatened by China’s mili-tary aggression than faraway states, their alliances have not really flourished, while US alliances with faraway states such as S. Ko-rea, Japan, and Australia are flourishing as opposed to threat-cen-tric explanations.

Therefore, this represents an important research gap, which this study sets out to fill.

H1: Divergence in Threat Perceptions The fact that both the Philippines and Thailand face a multitude of internal security threats and

governance challenges including, inter alia, numerous types of terrorism, organized crime, and corruption might have caused the Philippines and Thailand to take different paths.

The Philippine Communist Insurgency of the CPP-NPA-NDF (Communist Party of Philip-pines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front), the South China Sea Dispute with China, the ambiguity of 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty provisions including its executory mech-anisms, and US “strategic ambivalence” in the case of conflict may serve as “disconnecting factors” of the Philippine-US alliance.

The threats facing Thailand have become mostly domestic and transboundary, where the US-Thailand alliance no longer plays the key role unlike during the Cold War. Those that primarily come from the border areas in the forms of smuggling, drugs, and hu-

man trafficking; Protracted armed violence between insurgent groups within the state, as the insurgency in the deep South where Muslims are the majority has continued since 2004; and Prolonged political crisis which began with the 2006 coup d’état, several violent riots, and military crackdowns causing hundreds of casualties which happened as recent as 2010.

The Thai–Cambodia dispute over the Preah Vihear temple is a thorny issue that may cause re-lations between the US and Thailand to further deteriorate, as Washington is cultivating good relations of mutual understanding with Indochinese countries like Cambodia, including mili -tary cooperation

Rebuttal: Divergence in Threat Perceptions There is still a reasonable likelihood that both the United States

and its major allies, especially Japan and South Korea, may have diverging strategic interests and priorities particularly regarding the North Korean escalating aggression, as North Korea poses a more credible threat to South Korea and Japan than to the United States.

The United States, who seeks to stay ahead of the fierce competi-tion for regional hegemony with China, has consistently urged Australia, South Korea, and Japan to provide for their own secu-rity, given that they have ample resources to deal with their prob-lems on their own.

Divergence in threat perception has led them to fear being trapped in a possible deadly strategic rivalry between the US and China, given the fact that China has grown to become an indispensable part of the well-being of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

H2: Political Leadership Political leadership is one of the most important factors that af-

fect the post-Cold War dynamics of alliance politics as attested by the fact that a change in political leadership in one state may accompany fundamental changes in the nature of the alliance re-lationship with another state.

America's Cold War-era alliances have undergone a stress test under the liberal political administrations as exemplified by the US-South Korea alliance under the liberal Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations during 1998 to 2006; the US-Japan alliance under the Hatoyama administration in 2009; the US-Philippines alliance under the anti-American Philippine sen-ate during mid-1990s; and the US-Australia alliance under the nominally "centre-left" Australian labor party administrations.

Rebuttal: Political Leadership Many important decisions aimed at improving ties with

the United States, such as decisions concerning strategic flexibility of the US military and free trade deal, have been made during the liberal, anti-American political ad-ministrations.

They have decided to bear a larger share of the burden within the alliance and assumed the political risk of dis-patching troops to US-led missions overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan.

H3: Shared Democratic Values and Identities

Democratic values - the fundamental drivers behind the evolution of NATO from a relic of the Cold War Era into a community of like-minded states, pointing out that NATO is united not just by their opposition to Soviet communism but also by their determina-tion (as the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 stated) "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”?

They value highly the role of similar values and sense of we-feel-ing acquired over the course of years by the longstanding alliance partnership.

Rebuttal: Shared Democratic Values and Identities

Despite the 'similar values and sense of we-feeling' acquired by the longstanding alliance partnership, the fact that New Zealand broke off a multilateral alliance with the US and Australia and ANZUS came to an abrupt end.

The United States provides unwavering support to Mr. Abe’s adminis-tration which denies that imperial Japan ran a system of human traffick-ing and coerced prostitution, implying that comfort women were simply camp-following prostitutes.

Despite Cambodia’s poor human rights record, the Obama Administra-tion has taken steps to increase once-limited ties for a number of years with the Kingdom of Cambodia, even including military ties, partly in response to China’s growing diplomatic and economic influence in Cambodia and the Lower Mekong Delta region.

Despite the Obama administration’s past proclamations regarding jus-tice and ‘accountability’ for alleged wartime abuses during the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, Washington and Colombo has already com-menced an annual “partnership dialogue.”

US Purposeful Selection of Capable Allies Determines Divergent Fates of US alliances in the Asia-Pacific

1. Changing threats (as threats became more dispersed and more difficult to track down )⇒ Paradigm shift in US defense plan-ning from threat-based to capabilities-based one that requires the maintenance of alliances and loose aligned arrangements such as coalitions and/or partnerships that promise high efficiency;

2. Deep cuts in defense spending, economic woos, negative public opinions about US overseas military operations also contributed to their renewed emphasis on the role of capable and interoperable allies.

US, the only "managing state" which is responsible for facilitating closer ties among its longtime allies and friends, needs capable, inter-operable, and trustworthy partners who will be able to close the widen-ing capabilities gap and improve interoperability with the highly tech-nology-oriented US military.

Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies of US Al-liances in Asia-Pacific

• Changing threat landscape re-quires the maintenance of capa-ble and interoperable alliances as well as ad hoc coalitions and/or partnerships

• Regional balance of power shift-ing in China's favor: Shifting Balance of Threats in the Asia-Pacific

Paradigm Shift in US For-eign Policy From Threat-

based to Capabilities-based

• Driven by domestic fiscal challenges, US Purposeful Selection of Capable, Inter-operable, and Trustworthy Partners

Capabilities Gap among US allies • High-end Allies: The Most Capable

and Most Interoperable (or more Symmetrical and Reciprocal)

• Middle-end Allies: Provision of Niche Capabilities

• Low-end Allies: Still Asymmetrical and Unequal Partnership

Divergence in Alliance Transformation

If My hypothesis is valid, then I would observe that….. For an argument that divergence in alliance transformation in

the Asia-Pacific has largely resulted from the capabilities gap among US allies to be valid, its contra-positive argument that convergence in alliance transformation has largely resulted from the absence of the capabilities gap among US allies should also be persuasive.

The intensity of the factors related to US allies' capabilities that have been at play to facilitate the transformation of the al-liances of the United States with Japan, South Korea, and Aus-tralia should be found to be low, if not negligible, in the al-liances of the United States with the Philippines and Thailand.

Research Design: Most Similar Systems Design

US-Philippines vs. US-S. Korea Al-liances

US-Thailand vs. US-Australia Al-liances

US-Japan Alliance as Supplementary Single Case Study

Indicators of Dependent Variable (Divergence in Alliance Transformation

1. Alliance Burden Sharing: Degree of Equality in bearing burdens that take shape in the forms of the Host Nation Support (HNS) program, the contribution to multina-tional forces operations in ad hoc coalitions, and support for the US global defense strategy

2. Alliance Compromise: Acceptability of US defense and security strategy and Acceptability of US-led Security Architecture-building in the Asia Pacific

3. Reciprocity: Transition from “material/personnel” to “personnel/personnel” cooperation

Devising “Interoperability Capabilities Index” with which to categorize US allies into high, mid, and low-end ones.

1. Capability Assessments: Human, Physical, Technical, In-formational and Financial

Size and quality of the military workforce associated with the ability of a given military force to integrate and exploit the kind of sophisti-cated military technologies

Extent and quality of military infrastructure, such as military bases and installations

Number and quality of academic research institutions engaged in re-search, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities involv-ing combat

Structure, extent, and quality of a country’s defense industrial base, which essentially consists of firms or industries

Military inventory and its combat support capabilities, such as infor-mation pertaining to the number and kinds of tanks, guns, ships, air-planes

Devising “Interoperability Capabilities Index” with which to categorize US allies into high, mid, and low-end ones.

2. Operational Interoperability Interoperable command centers with standardized communications

and computerized data networks, intelligence, surveillance, and re-connaissance (ISR) systems, and force elements, or through ad hoc techniques, procedures, and linkages that include extensive use of li-aison officers

Senior-level consultations and policy coordination to increase bilat-eral defense and security cooperation and help avoid wasteful dupli-cation of efforts and ensure effective joint operations

3. Politico-Strategic Interoperability The degree of harmonization in world views, strategies, doctrines,

and force structures between US and its allies, which is primarily represented by lack of domestic political or cultural impediments to working effectively together

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Philip-pines Alliance vs. US-S. Korea Alliance

1. Divergence between alliance partners in threat perception The Philippine Communist Insurgency of the CPP-NPA-NDF (Communist Party of

Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front), the South China Sea Dispute with China, the ambiguity of 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty provisions includ-ing its executory mechanisms, and US “strategic ambivalence” in the case of conflict

During the standoff between the Philippines and China in the Scarborough Shoal, the South China Sea, in April 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clarified that "the US would cautiously not take sides on the competing sovereignty claims to land fea-tures in the South China Sea... would oppose the threat or use of force by any party to advance its claim.”The mutual defense treaty forged in 1952 between the US and the Philippines does not extend to territorial disputes involving the Spratly Islands.

There is still a reasonable likelihood that both the United States and South Korea may have diverging strategic interests and priorities particularly regarding the North Korean escalating aggression, as North Korea poses a more credible threat to South Korea than to the United States.

The United States who seeks to stay ahead of the fierce competition for regional hegemony with China has consistently urged South Korea to deal with the North Ko-rean problem on its own and bolster its capabilities to conduct virtually any expedi-tionary operation.

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Philippines Alliance vs. US-S. Korea Alliance

2. Political Leadership The ruling elites within the progressive Roh Moo-hyun adminis-

tration seemed unwilling to give the alliance a more central role in the country's grand strategy, as graphically attested by the fact that President Roh put forward a concept called “the Balancer of Northeast Asia Initiative,” which presented South Korea as a "Northeast Asian balancer."

The Philippine Senate, exercising nationalistic sentiments, voted down the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security in Sep-tember 1991 that would have allowed the US 10 years to phase out its bases. This has brought about grave military consequences for both states in the form of the discontinuation of port visits by the US Navy in 1996 as well as the holding of no joint military exercises in Philippine territory after the Philippine Supreme Court failed to approve the extension of a pre-existing Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that December.

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Philippines Alliance vs. US-S. Korea Alliance

2. Political Leadership Ironically, the impasse in the alliance relationship continued until Presi-

dent Joseph Estrada and Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, both of whom voted against the new bases agreement in 1991 as senators, sent the Visiting Forces Agreement to the Senate for approval, and the Senate ratified it on May 1999, which played a pivotal role to rejuvenate and strengthen the long-dormant US-Philippines alliance.

President Roh Moo-hyun acceded to a number of important US policy initiatives including flexibility of the United States Forces in Korea and relocation of military bases, and initiated Republic of Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement deal at the expense of his own domestic po-litical capital.

During the governance of the Kim and Roh administrations from 1998 to 2007 that tried to settle the peace in the Korean peninsula through mutual confidence building and economic cooperation, the South Korean gov-ernment provided roughly 0.8 percent of its total GDP with the USFK as cost sharing of the US-South Korea alliance."

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Philippines Alliance vs. US-S. Korea Alliance

3. Shared democratic values and common identities constructed by long-term alliance relationships

As South Korea's democracy evolved in generally positive ways, its economy matured in ways transforming the ROK from a third world state to a dynamic player in global capitalism, and its international standing grew in keeping with these political and economic trends.

Since the 1946 independence from the United States, the Philippines persisted as an oligarchic democracy though civil society has grown strong, although the Philippines’ democratic consolidation process has been difficult due to the state’s weak capacities, vibrant but con-tentious civil society, and slow growth economy that accentuated class, regional, and religious cleavages. The Philippines is a vibrant democ-racy with a robust civil society, given that under President Benigno Aquino III, the Philippine government has become somewhat more transparent and accountable, it has reached a settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the south, and the economy has experienced solid growth.

Authoritarian trends from 1946 to 2013 of the Philippines and South Korea, Polity IV Country Regime Trends 2013.

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Australia Alliance vs. US-Thailand Alliance

1. Divergence between alliance partners in threat perception The threats facing Thailand have become mostly domestic and transboundary, where the

US-Thailand alliance no longer plays the key role unlike during the Cold War. As border trade with neighboring countries is burgeoning, Thailand’s current threats most primar-

ily come from the border areas in the forms of smuggling, drugs, and human trafficking. Another big challenges for Thailand are how to cope better with protracted armed violence be-

tween insurgent groups within the state, as the insurgency in the deep South where Muslims are the majority has continued since 2004, and how to manage the nation's prolonged political crisis which began with the 2006 coup d’état, several violent riots, and military crackdowns causing hundreds of casualties which happened as recent as 2010.

The Thai–Cambodia dispute over the Preah Vihear temple is a thorny issue that may cause relations between the US and Thailand to further deteriorate, as Washington is cul-tivating good relations of mutual understanding with Indochinese countries like Cambo-dia, including military cooperation, although Thailand has voiced their concerns to the US especially about joint military exercises between Cambodian and US forces.

Thailand has long advocated a far more hard-line policy toward the United States and appeared to seek security by pursuing a pronounced “tilt” more toward China in the post-Vietnam War period. Thailand has a long and strong relationship with China when com-pared to other Southeast Asian nations. In April 2012, the Thai defense minister who led a military mission, including chiefs of the army, navy, and air force, embarked on a visit to China is indicative in this regard.

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Australia Alliance vs. US-Thailand Alliance

1. Divergence between alliance partners in threat perception Australia, a large country with a relatively small population, feels exposed

to its significantly more populous Asian neighbors, which requires the continued support from a security guarantor, such as a powerful friend which would come to its aid in a crisis.

However, Washington would not always support any Australian led intervention with American ground troops as primarily exemplified by its unwillingness to in-tervene in the Australian-led intervention during the 1999 crisis in East Timor, un-less the region is critical to its national security.

The United States who seeks to stay ahead of the fierce competition for regional hegemony with China has consistently urged Australia to deal with the proliferat-ing security challenges facing the nation on its own, given that Australia has ample resources to provide for their own security.

The US is now urging Australia to bolster its expeditionary capabilities to conduct virtually any expeditionary operation, which is widely regarded as aiming at containing China. As a consequence, this divergence in threat perception has led Australia to fear being trapped in a possible deadly strategic rivalry between the US and China.

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Australia Alliance vs. US-Thailand Alliance

2. Political Leadership The Thai ruling class seems to be distinctly reluctant to acknowledge the influence

of the alliance in shaping the nation's security and military strategy, as there is a widely shared view that Thailand was abandoned by the US in its hour of need dur-ing the 1997 Asian financial crisis and thus the US has not been a completely faith-ful partner.

The ruling elites within the center-left labor party administrations of Australia seemed unwilling to give the alliance a more central role in the country's security thinking.

The Labor government under Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1985 brought an end to initial plans to use Australian territory for testing the U.S. MX intercontinental ballistic missile. In addition, many security analysts expected that Australia under the Rudd government could become a reluctant actor in the American-led "long war" against international terrorism and push for multilateral regional security dialogues and mechanisms in Asia, which would con-sequently contribute to undermining a uniquely intimate relationship with Washington that former Prime Minister John Howard has cultivated during his eleven-plus years in office.

However, evidence abounds that both the US-Australia and US-Thailand alliances appear to be making progress toward realizing their goals of advancing the bilateral security and defense cooperation, although the alliance is not under the stewardship of conservative leaders in both capitals.

Comparability Assessment in Comparative Study of US-Australia Alliance vs. US-Thailand Alliance

3. Shared Democratic Values and Identities Australia is a representative democracy which is organized in such

a way as to define and limit power so as to promote legitimate government within a framework of justice and freedom and where eligible people vote for candidates to carry out the business of governing on their behalf.

For many years, Thailand was also seen as a model of stable democracy in Southeast Asia, although this image, along with US relations, has been complicated by deep political and economic in-stability in the wake of two military coups in the past eight years.

Authoritarian trends from 1946 to 2013 of Australia and Thai-land, Polity IV Country Regime Trends 2013.

Fundamental Driver behind Alliance Revitalization Increasing Prevalence of Region-wide Strategic Hedging

1. Power transition theory (ambiguity in power transition trajectory)

2. Multipolar neorealism (region-wide military modernization, trust deficit, etc.)

3. Network complexity (strong linkages among nodes on an issue-by-issue ba-sis)

Regional states avoid making a long-term commitment to either overtly balance or bandwagon; instead pursue hedging strategies.

They spare no effort to cultivate productive relations with China in many respects, while reinforcing a strong US diplomatic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Convergence of Strategic Perceptions as Fundamental Driver behind Al-liance Revitalization Jaechun Kim insists that: “It was the divergent strategic perceptions that mostly

frayed the alliance in the first place, and it was the convergence of strategic perceptions that brought the alliance back together......The convergence of strategic perceptions toward North Korea and China had been indispensable to reinvigorating the alliance.”

Outcomes of Comparative Case Studies I and II Despite the aforementioned similarities in both cases, however, their trajectories

of transformation diverged so that the US alliances with South Korea and Aus-tralia have evolved into a comprehensive strategic alliance with deep cooperation extending beyond territorial defense into multinational expeditionary missions, while the US alliances with the Philippines and Thailand remain within the agreed and stipulated confines of the Cold War interpretations of its mutual defense treaty.

What is characteristically different now than during the previous eras is that the United States takes a capability-based approach by which they increasingly view the Philippines and Thailand as an undesirable ally who lacks sufficient capacity to meet any of the desirable criteria to become one of the most capable, interoper-able, and trustworthy ally states of the United States but continues to expect spe-cial favors of treatment as if the Cold War is not over.

Strong anti-American sentiments still lingers in the minds of the Filipinos and the Philippine constitution disallows the stationing of foreign armed forces on their soil unless under a treaty approved by the Philippine Senate. Strong anti-American sentiments still lingers in the hearts and minds of all Thai people and the Thai constitution disallows the stationing of foreign armed forces on their soil.

Succinctly summarized, although their historical trajectories were obviously simi-lar, however, they are obviously currently on different tracks.

Fundamental Driver behind Divergence in Al-liance Transformation

Whether they have sufficient capability to expend ma-terial support or resources to narrow the capabilities gap and improve interoperability with the US military is a key to understanding why they have diverged into separate paths.

It was US’ purposeful selection of capable, interoper-able, and trustworthy allies that has caused its al-liances in the Asia Pacific to diverge into separate paths.

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