the breakdown of authoritarian regimes

7/30/2019 The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes

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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

The Breakdown of Authoritarian RegimesAuthor(s): Robert H. DixSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), pp. 554-573Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447341 .

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THE BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMESROBERT H. DixRiceUniversity5Y EARS ofscholarlyoncernwith heconditionsfdemocracyavebeen followedratherbelatedlyby recent attention n the part ofstudents fcomparative olitics o theclearly elated, houghhardlyidentical, uestionof the breakdown fdemocratic egimes. Similarly,moststudents fmilitary overnments,nd of authoritarian egimes generally,have been farmore interestedn the reasons formilitarynterventionnpolitics han n thecauses orprocess fthedemiseofauthoritarianism.

Onlylatelyhas thisbeguntochange. In recentyears,for xample,therehave been a spateofscholarly nalysesof Latin America's latestversionofauthoritarianism,he bureaucratic-authoritarianB-A) regime.2 In theearlierwritings oncerning uch regimesit was oftenat least implicitlytreated s the new paradigmofLatin America's politicalfuture, ollowingupon thoseearlier,failedparadigmsofdemocracy nd socialistrevolution.That is,B-A regimeswerepresumed obe boththe wave ofthe future nd asemi-permanentondition, elated s theywereto Latin America's situationof nternationalependency nd thesupposedendof the mport-substitutionphase of economic development.More recentscholarship,however,hasbeguntoquestionorqualify omeofthose formulationsnd to address suchquestions s theweaknesses ndvulnerabilitiesf uchregimes, s wellas thecausesand conditions ftheir ossibledemise.3Nonetheless, herestill has been remarkablyittle omparativettentionpaid to how and why uthoritarianovernmentsreak down4 apart,that s,from tudiesof certainparticular ases). Can somegeneralpatterns e dis-

'For the conditions ofdemocracysee, in particular,Dahl (1971); for hepioneeringwork on democraticbreakdowns see Linz and Stepan (1978).2Suchregimeswould include contemporaryBrazil, Argentina,Chile, and Uruguay, as well as, by somedefinitions,Mexico, and Peru (1968-80). Their characteristics re usually said to include domina-tionby a coalition consistingof themilitaryacting as an institution n contrastto military eadersacting personalistically), civilian technocrats, the industrial bourgeoisie, and the agents andmanagers offoreign apital. B-A regimesare "exclusivist" in thattheyremove from heeffectivepoliticalsystemmany (particularly mong the ower classes) of thepreviouslymobilized; theyare,in addition, typicallyhighlyrepressive.On B-A regimessee especially Collier (1979), especiallythechapterbyGuillermoO'Donnell; also Malloy (1977), and O'Donnell (1973).3This is particularlytrue of Collier (1979), though also see the chapter by Douglas Chalmers inMalloy (1977), and Chalmers and Robinson (1980).4The term"breakdown" willbe used here toencompass overthrow, ollapse, "voluntary" exit or anycombination thereof hat mpliesthe demise ofa regime. "Breakdown" at any givenpoint in timedoes notofcourse necessarily mplyan indefinitely rolongedcondition. However, in three of ourcases (see below), breakdown has (so far)meant a "permanent" change in the political system.Thus, two countries, .e., Colombia and Venezuela, have become democracies (afterbrief nter-regnums); Cuba has become Communist (at the least, a verydifferentorm fauthoritarianism).The other three countries-Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Peru-have experiencedvarying periods of democratic and authoritarian rule since the "breakdown" discussed here.See Wiarda (1980: chapter 2) for n analysisof suchcyclical patterns n Latin American politics.

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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 555cerned? s there ven a kind of model of breakdown?And ifso, howmightsucha pattern r modeldiffer rom hat fdemocratic reakdown?In an initial ttempt o throw ome ight n suchquestions, hefollowingsix cases of dictatorship ave been selected:Juan Per6n in Argentina,Manuel Odria in Peru, GustavoRojas Pinilla in Colombia, Marcos PerezJimenez nVenezuela, FulgencioBatista nCuba, and RafaelTrujillo n theDominicanRepublic. Together hey onstitute he universe f clearcut asesof uthoritarianreakdownwithin specified egion nd timeperiod.All are fromLatin America,thusmaking tpossibleto hold such vari-ables as culture nd historical ackgroundrelativelyonstant.Too, each ofthecountriesnquestionfalls roadlywithin hemiddle"stages" ofdevelop-ment,as do most Latin Americancountries, t least as measuredby suchstandard ndicators s GNP percapita, level ofurbanization, nd literacy.5All our cases are from heyears 1955-61. The international ontext s thusheld roughly onstant,while thedistance n time from hepresentpermitsreliance on substantialaccumulated scholarship.Each of the regimesinquestionwas ledbya militarytrongman. ogether hey epresent particu-lar variantofauthoritarianism,hepersonalistic ictatorshipi.e., in whichtheregime learly enters n oneman, as distinct rom hemilitarys a cor-poratebody).Six cases have theadvantageofconstituting much broaderempiricalbasis for heconstruction fgeneralizablepropositions han the singlecasestudy,while stillremainingmanageable in number and allowingfor omefairly etailedtreatment.Obviously,thereare limitations o thedesignaswell. Six cases maybe better han one in certainrespects, ut they re stillonlysix; and they re confined oone time,one region, nd one sub-type fthe uthoritarianhenomenon.Anyderivedpatterns an onlybe suggestive,and a call for urtheromparisons hereforeerymuch tothepoint.Our immediatepurpose, then, is to analyze the above-citedcases ofauthoritarianollapsewith viewtoextractingommon causes and patterns(as well as to denotedifferences)hat eem toapply nat least these nstances.The larger,moretentative,ntent s to providesome comparative eferentsforthe analysisof the breakdownof authoritarian egimes generally, ndeven perhaps forthe breakdown of regimesof whateverkind,whereverfound.

THE CASES IN BRIEFWe beginwith hort escriptionsfthesixcases ofbreakdownnorder oprovidean evidentialbase forour analysis.6These follow n chronologicalorder f hefinal ollapseoftherespective egimes.

5Basing theircategorizationon data from he 1950s and veryearly 1960s, Bruce Russett et al., (1964:293-303) classified henations oftheworld into five"stages ofdevelopment." All of the countriesanalyzed here were classified s eitherStage III ("transitional" societies)or Stage IV ("industrialrevolution" societies). Within this middle range, however,therewas considerable variation, fromPeru and theDominican Republic at its owerreaches, toArgentinaand Venezuela at thehigher.6Descriptionsof the rise and fall of five of the six regimesdiscussed here (all except that of Trujillo)appeared in Szulc (1959).



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556 Westernolitical uarterlyArgentinauan DomingoPeron)7ColonelJuan Peron was a member of a groupofofficers ho in 1943engineered coup againstthe civiliangovernment fArgentina.Fromhisposition s thehead of thedepartmentf abor in addition o hispost nthewarministry) er6n was able touse the nfluence e acquiredoverthe abormovement, lus hiswife,Eva's, timely ssistance n mass mobilization, owinthepresidencyn a substantially ree lection n 1946. Per6n's victorycame despite heopposition f mostof the extantArgentine oliticalparties,the United States government, nd even some among Per6n's erstwhilemilitaryomrades.Peron'searlyyears npowerwerecharacterized ythe nationalization fvariousforeign nterprisesas well as by othermanifestations fnational-ism), by extensivewage increasesand otherbenefits orworkers, nd byincreasinglyepressivemeasures aken gainsthisopponentsnthepress, heuniversities,hecourts,and elsewhere.Reelected in a somewhat ess thanfree lection n 1951, Per6nbegan to experience ncreasing pposition o hisrule. He had alienatedArgentina's lites,muchof tsmiddleclass,and eventheChurch,whichhad initiallyooked on him with favor.The economyfoundered or everalreasons: lavishconcessions o labor and an attendantdeclinein productivity, enalties mposedon the agricultural ector n theinterestfwould-be ndustrialization,nd theexhaustion fforeign xchangereserves uiltup duringWorldWar II. Even Peron's nationalismbecamesuspectwhenhe agreedto foreign articipationn domestic il exploration.Attemptedmilitaryoupsoccurred n 1951,again inJune 1955,and finally,theone that oppledhim, nSeptember1955.PeruManuel Odria)8

Strikes,a deteriorating conomic situation,and an attempted coupagainst a civiliangovernment y leftist lements of the Alianza PopularRevolucionaria Americana (APRA) party,triggered military oup inOctober 1948, led byGeneral Manuel Odria, in at leasttacitalliancewithPeru's landed and commercial elites. Though confirmed n power by asingle-candidateelection in 1950, Odria's alliance with the so-calledoligarchybecame more and more tenuous as the result of actionswhichincluded ometentative ffortso build his own base ofsupport, specially ntheslumsofLima, and an increasing eluctance n thepartof somemilitaryofficersocontinue heirde facto upport f the"oligarchy." Initialstepstoeffectheelection fa compliant uccessorproved bortive n the faceofbothmilitarynd civilian pposition,with he result hatOdria peacefully ieldedoffice o an electedciviliannotofhis choice at the end of his scheduledtermin 1956.

7Principalsources for the followingdescriptionof Peron's fall,and the subsequent analysis, included:Potash 1972, 1980), and Whitaker(1956, 1964)."Principal sources on Odria's fall, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Collier (1975); ArnoldPayne (1968); James Payne (1965); and Pike (1967).



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 557ColombiaGustavoRojas Pinilla)9In 1953 Colombia was under thecivilian,though ssentially uthoritar-ian, rule of the faction ftheConservativeparty ed by Laureano Gomez.With the countrywrackedby violencebetweenLiberal and Conservativepartisans, and with the Conservatives sharply factionalized,GeneralGustavoRojas Pinilla rather eluctantlyssumed powerinJune 1953 withthe connivanceoftheanti-G6mezwingof the Conservatives nd thegoodwishes fmostLiberals.It was not long,however,before t became clear thatRojas was moreinterestedn perpetuating imselfn power-and even in founding ThirdForcepoliticalmovement nd a government-sponsoredabor confederationto help accomplish that end-than he was in returningpower to thecountry's ivilianpoliticiansn anynear future.Repressiveactionsnotablyincluded hecensoring,nd eventual losing, f severalof the eadingorgansof the nation'spress,and the so-called"bullringmassacre" ofFebruary5,1956,whenagentsoftheregime ttacked nd killed ritics f theregimewhodared to demonstrate hat criticismn public. By 1956 most Liberals, theChurch,most tudents, nd evenmany amongtheConservative action ndsome in themilitarywhohad originally upportedhim,had turned gainstRojas. Oppositioncrystallized henearly n 1957Rojas sought o legitimizehis rule through regime-selectedonstituentAssembly)for notherfouryears.The resultswere studentdemonstrations, "civic strike" nvolvingthevoluntarylosing fmanybanks and businesses, nd thedefectionfthearmyfromhedictator's ause. Rojas fell rom ower May 10, 1957.VenezuelaMarcos PerezJimenez)'0Marcos PerezJimenezwas one ofa militaryriumviratehat succeededto power when the armyoverthrew civiliangovernmentn November1948. By 1950he had become theclearlydominant eaderupon theassassi-nation of thehead ofthe unta. In 1952 Perez Jimenezhad himself on-firmedn power by means of a blatantlyfraudulent lectoralcount. Hisregimewas characterizedby the brutal repressionof the main civilianoppositionparty,Accion Democratica (AD) and its affiliatedabor andpeasant organizations, y the construction f massivepublicworks, nd byblatantcorruption. n the process Perez Jimenez alienatedmany amongcivilianpoliticians nd theclergywho had originally ympathizedwith themilitary's eposition f thepre-1948AD government.Massive civilianpro-testdemonstrations nd strikes, s well as business opposition, ed to hisdeposition ythemilitarynJanuary1958.Cuba FulgencioBatista)"IWhenFulgencioBatistarelinquished hepresidencyn 1944he had been9Principal sources on the fall of Rojas Pinilla, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Berry,Hellman and Solaun (1980); Dix (1967); and Martz (1962).'?Principal sources on the fall of PerezJimenez, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Alexander(1964); Blank (1973); Levine (1973) and Taylor (1968)."Principal sources on the fallofBatista, and for hesubsequent analysis, included: Dominguez (1978);Gonzalez (1974); MacGaffeyand Barnett 1962); Gude (1969); Perez (1976); and Thomas (1971).



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558 Westernolitical uarterlythe predominantfigure n Cuban politicssince 1933 when, as an armysergeant,he had led a revolt f noncommissioned fficers. ollowing eightyears fcivilian albeitrather orrupt) ule,Batista ought o return opowerby running s a candidate n the1952election.Facingcertaindefeatand bynow a colonel),he assumedpoweras the eader ofa militaryoup. A sub-sequent election" (1954) sought ogivean aura of egitimacyo his rule.Students, nd civilianpoliticians f theOrtodoxoparty includingFidelCastro) actively pposed Batistafrom he start,withan uprising ccurringonJuly26, 1953, ed byCastro. Actsofurbanterrorism,s well as guerrillawarfare,plagued Batista fromseveral quartersthroughouthis rule, butespecially fter astro's return rom xile nDecember 1956to ead the 26thofJulymovement rom hemountainsof easternCuba. Withhis army n-creasingly neffectivegainst the guerrillas, nd with the United States'militaryid withdrawn arly n 1958, Batista'sregimemore or less disinte-grated.The attempt o forestall he end by installing puppet president(chosen n a rigged lection nNovember1958) failed, nd BatistafledCubaonJanuary1, 1959.DominicanepublicRafael Trujillo)12As commander oftheNational Guard which had been organizedandtrainedby United StatesMarines duringthe 1920s, Rafael Trujillo seizedpower in 1930 and for the ensuing thirty ears remaineddictatorof theDominican Republic. At times he personallyoccupied the presidency; totherunctureshe ruledthrough elatives r otherpuppets. ncreasinglyvertheyearshe (and hisfamilynd closeassociates)tightenedheir oldover theeconomy, s well as over thepolitical ystem nd mostother reas ofnationallife,making fthecountry kindofpersonalfiefdom.Considerablemodernization f a materialkindtookplace intheDomini-can RepublicduringTrujillo'syears npower;at thesame timethemethodsof rule were unusuallyharshand tyrannical.Trujillo was finally roughtdownbyassassinationn 1961,triggered ya conspiracy hat ncluded omeofhis erstwhileloseassociates, lthoughmembers f hisfamily arried n abrief ost-regnumor everalmonths hereafter.

THE CAUSES OF BREAKDOWNTo what, then,maywe attribute he causes ofbreakdownofthesesixauthoritarian egimes generation go? Clearly therewere differencesndetailand circumstance. ut weretherefactors n common? s there uch athing s a generalizableprocessofbreakdown at least as applied to thesecases)?Failuref erformanceAn initial,and plausible, suppositionwould be thatpoor regime per-

formance-especially n theeconomic area-had playeda majorrole n thecollapseofthegovernmentsnquestion.After ll, inflation, nemployment,'2Principal sources on the fall of Trujillo, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Wiarda(1968, 1980).



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 559declines n ratesofgrowth rpersonal ncome,and other conomic llsseemtohave been associatedwithunscheduled hangesofgovernment hroughoutmuchofmodernhistory.13The evidencein our six cases is nonetheless istinctlymixed. There islittlendication, or xample,thateconomic factorswerean importanton-tribution o the fall of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, althoughthere wasresentmentt some of hisextravagantxpendituresn publicworks nd hisneglect frural reas; and therewas a modesteconomicslump n 1957. Butby such standard ndicators s economicgrowth ates,foreignnvestment,governmentevenues, nd the ike,theyears1950-57 n the maincompriseda boom era. Unemployment, houghalways high in Venezuela, was nohigher hanusual; nor was there particular nflationaryroblem.Althoughn Peru after 953 therewas some falling ffn economicper-formance,specially ntheexport ector, he Odria yearswereon thewholeprosperousones.14 There is, moreover, ittleevidence that oppositiontoOdria's continuation n office enteredaround questionsof the country'soverall conomicperformance.The Cuban economy duringtheBatistayearsperformedn a satisfac-tory, funspectacular, ashion, nd many analysts ccord economicsonlyasmall role in the downfall f the BatistadictatorshipDraper, 1962: 3-59;Suarez, 1967: xiii). Dominguez, however,attributes onsiderable thoughstillsecondary) mportance o an economic decline in Batista's last year(1958) thathelpedto alienatemanyin the businesscommunitynd amongorganized labor who had previously cquiesced in his rule (Dominguez,1978: 121-22).Coffeepricesrose sharplyduringthe early years of the Rojas Pinillaregime, henslumpedbyearly1957. That "bad luck," plus a higher nfla-tion rate and various signs of economicmismanagement, ontributed obusiness' disaffection ithRojas. Yet thegroundswell fopposition o thedictatorship as well underway before uch economicdownturn, nd formost ofRojas' antagonists heopposition ppeared to have primarily on-economicroots.In the case of the Dominican Republic there was a distinct all-offneconomicperformancefter bout 1955,which eems to have led to increas-ingindifferencemongbusinessmen o thefateof theTrujilloregimeand,eventually,ooutright pposition n thepartof someofthem. nterestingly,however,Wiarda arguesthateconomic declinewas in this nstance n sub-stantialpart only the indirect result of both internaland internationalpressures n Trujillowhich nturned to variouseconomiccosts nd excesses(e.g., lavish expenditures n armamentsand security orces)thatproveddamaging o theregimeWiarda, 1968: 160).3For example, most Latin American countriesexperienced one or more such changes in the wake oftheworldwidedepressionthatbegan in 1929.14Though a depression hit Peru's exports followingthe end of the Korean War in 1953, the ochenio(eight-yearrule) was on thewhole an economic success. The rate of increase in the cost of livingdeclined, and real wages rose, in almost every year between 1948 and 1956. Foreign investment,and with it industrial,mining, and petroleum production, soared, while governmentrevenuestripled; seeJames Payne (1965: 20, 24, 33); Pike (1967: 290-93); and Szulc (1959: 194, 200).



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560 Westernolitical uarterlyOn the faceof t the Peronregime's conomicperformanceid appeartohavea direct nd primary mpacton thestabilityfthegovernment. aving

expendedArgentina'swartime oreign urrency eservesn the nationaliza-tionoftheBritish-ownedailways nd other nterprises,nd havingdecreeda seriesofgenerouswage and benefit ncreasesforArgentineworkers-re-sultingn a gain in realwages-Peron after 949 (and especially fter 952)was faced with increasing nflationary ressures,declines in productivity(especiallyin agriculture),foreign nvestment, nd foreign xchange re-serves, nd a partialreversal ftheearlier ncreases n realwages. Not onlydid such setbacks erveto solidifyheearlyopposition fArgentina'smiddleand upper classes to Per6n, but theymade it impossibleto continue hislargesseto his favoreddescamisadosworkers, iterally shirtless nes"). Hiseconomicwoes also led Per6n to sanction n oil exploration ontractwithaU.S. companyand to seek generally o encourageforeignnvestment on-trary o his highly outednationalism.Even so, it remainsdoubtful hateconomic failureswere the leading cause ofoppositionto Per6n, or ofhisfinal verthrow.15In short, conomicperformance id tend to weaken toward the end ofvirtuallyll of our cases, comparedto thestrong howings n theearlyyearsof therespective egimes.There mayhave been something fa "J-curve"effectt workwhere, oJamesDavies (1969: 690) has argued,"a prolongedperiodofraising xpectationsnd gratificationss followed ya shortperiodofsharpreversalduringwhich thegap betweenexpectations nd gratifica-tionsquicklywidens and becomes intolerable,"resultingn "revolution."Yet theeconomic downturnswerenotreallyvery harpin mostcases, andoverall conomicperformance as more mpressive han nmostof thepre-vious or subsequentregimes.More important, he preponderanceof theevidence indicates that serious oppositiontended to precede weakeningeconomicperformancend to center n other,moredirectly olitical, on-cerns, s we shall see. In all, economicperformance as for hemostpartasecondarythoughnotnecessarily nimportant) ause ofthefallof at leastthese) uthoritarianegimes.16To be sure,there reaspectsofeconomicperformancether hangrowthrates, nflation, alance oftrade,unemployment,nd the ike-income re-distribution,or xample,oragrarianreform. et there s little uggestionnthe literature hat failure o carryout such policieswas a factor n regimebreakdown unless one were to argue thatthoroughgoingevolutionmighthave assured long-term tability).17 ttemptsby Per6n and, much morehesitantly, ojas and Odria, to favorworkers r the "popular classes" inone or anotherrespectprobablydid help to alienateimportant roupsand'5Thus, according to Potash (1972), there was little nvolvement n policy mattersduring the Peronyears on thepart of themilitary hat overthrewhim, and there s everyindication in his analysis(and others') thatthemotivationsfor Peron's overthrowwere primarilynoneconomic. In fact,asPotash concludes elsewhere, the economic situation in 1954-55 was much improved over that of1951-52 and "the economywas not in a stageof mminent risis" (Potash, 1980: 170-71).'6In general, according to Nordlinger (1977: 199), the economic growth performanceof militaryregimes n the Third World isneithermuchbetter,nor muchworse,thanthatofcivilianregimes.'7See Huntington 1968: chapter 5) for hisgeneral argument.



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimesthus contribute o the demise of theirgovernments. uch considerationsdraw us somewhat way from conomicperformance, owever, nd willbetreatedater nanother onnection.A critical spectofregimeperformancetherthan theeconomicis themaintenance fpublic order.Withbut one exception,however,failure opreserve he domesticpeace was nota principalfactorn breakdown otherthantheobvious fact hat ll butOdria wereeventually verthrownyforce,and that nBatista's case violent ffortsodeposehimwerecontinuous or tleast twoyearsbeforehiscollapse). The exceptionwas Colombia, wherethefact thatruralviolence had once more accelerated after year or two ofdecline was an important"negative" in the eyes of Rojas' eventualopponents.18n noneofour caseswas defeat n waror similar oreign ailurea significantactor nbreakdown.Regime elegitimationIfnot,at leastfor hemostpart,performance,henwhat?Most Latin American ocieties end tobe "praetorian" in Huntington'ssense thattheirgovernments,fwhatever olitical tructure r complexion,tendto lack legitimacyn theprocedural ense that there s no commonly-agreedor definitivemeans ofwinning nd retaining ower. Everypoliticalactor mployshisor her own means and resources omakehimself r herselffelt irectlynthepolitical rocess,mediated nlyweakly rintermittentlyysuch entities s aggregative oliticalpartiesor legislatures.Everygovern-mentor governing oalition s necessarily tentative."19 his problem s, ifanything,ccentuated n thecase ofauthoritarianegimes hat nitiallyakepowerwithout ven a formal onstitutional andate.Thereis,however, nother ense nwhichmostoftheregimes nderdis-cussion had a fairlywidely accepted claim to rule. That is, theywereregarded s thenecessary r appropriate overnment nderthepolitical ir-cumstancesby a significantegmentof the society. n the cases of at leastPer6n and Rojas Pinilla, supportfortheir nitialclaims to office robablycomprised n absolutemajority fthepopulation.The Venezuelan coup of1948 had the active or tacitsupport f mostnon-AD sectors, nd the 1948Peruviancoup thebacking fmost nti-Apristas,ho wereweeking n endtopolitical urmoil nd defense fthesocioeconomic tatusquo. BothTrujilloand Batista at first acked the same kind of "secondary" or "crisis" legiti-mationas theothers;bothessentially orced heirway to power n ordertoforestall lectoraldefeat. Yet Trujillo, at least, was able over the ensuingyearsto establish real aura of egitimacy orhis rule in theeyesofa greatmanyDominicans. Even Batistadidnotaltogetherack claimstothiskindof"legitimacy," lthough heywere theweakest mongthesixdictatorships.Yet in the absence of a generally ccepted mode of attainingpower,regimes ependent n suchsecondaryegitimacy,f t can be calledthat, resThe violence,when itresumed in 1954, also appeared to take on a new potentialformass mobilizationand class warfare, n addition to itsbasic nature ofa partisan conflict mong the followers ftheelite-ledConservative and Liberal parties; see in thisconnectionDix (1980)."gFor heconcept ofpraetorianism ee Huntington 1968: chapter 4); for the tentative nature of LatinAmerican regimes ee Anderson 1967: chapter 4).

561



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562 Westernolitical uarterlyofcourseextraordinarilyependent n regimebehavior, nd effectivenessncarryingutpromised asks,whether heybe opposition ocorruption,r tocommunism;the enforcement f orderand stability; r the promotion fnationalism,materialprogress, r social ustice.20 hus Peron,who ustifiedhisactions nparton thegrounds hathe would build a newArgentina reeofforeign omination,nthe atteryearsofhisregime urned ncreasinglyoforeignnvestors o pull his country ut of its economicdifficulties. ojasPinilla,as earliernoted,failed oputan endtotheviolence.Pressure obringan end to theregimes fRojas, PerezJimenez,and Odria came to a headwhen it became clear thattheir laims to temporary ule in orderto rightcertainwrongs ftheprevious rderhad beenforgottennthe nterest fper-petuating hemselvesnpower.Batista's claimstoanysort f egitimacy ereweakfrom hestart, utthe blatant orruptionftheregime, ts ties both totheU.S. governmentnd to U.S. private nterests,nd its failure o main-tainpublicorder,notonly n thecountrysideagainstCastro's guerrillas) utin the cities s well,helpeddissipate uch claimsas he did have. Lastly, nTrujillo's case it was in the internationalrena where his rule was at firstmostseriously nd importantlyuestioned.Of this,however,morewillbesaidlater nanother onnection.Each of the dictatorships id seek formal egitimation, hrough uchdevices as elections, egislatures, onstitutionalhanges,and the ike. Suchdevicesdid not n anycase reflecthe realbases ofpower,nordid they on-stitute hedictators' rincipal laim tolegitimacyexcept perhaps nthecaseof the 1946 election n Argentina). n fact,some of these "legal" actionsactuallyacceleratedthe downfallof the regime by making its fraudulentclaim to power, or the prospectfor ts indefiniteontinuance,thatmuchmorepatent.This was notoriouslyhe case in Venezuela wheretheaborted1952 electiondrove a number of the regime'serstwhile ollaborators ntoopposition, nd again in 1957 when a plebiscitewhich "re-elected" PerezJimenezproved hefinal traw ormany.An additional ourceofputative egitimacy ormostoftheseregimeswasthe mprimaturftheCatholicChurch,granted ither ecause ofreal orpro-claimedactionson behalfof Churchinterestsnd values, or because ofthecommonpolicyoftheChurchofaccommodatingtself o incumbentsn theinterestf nstitutionalurvival.Yet invirtually very ase state nd Churchcame into conflict nd the regime ost that important anction of morallegitimacys well. Thus Peron,for xample,eventually urned gainsttheChurch,whose blessinghe had earliersoughtto invoke n supportof hisclaimtoembody hetraditional aluesoftheArgentine ation.Illegitimaten the sensethatmostregimes n anycase are in praetorianpolitical ystems,hese uthoritarianovernmentslso tendedto lose-somemuch morerapidly hanothers-their nitial laims torepresenthenationalinterest r to resolvecriticalnationalproblems. Regimes of exceptiontobeginwith, hey ailed o iveup totheir roclaimed easonsfor eing. It wasin thissense that theirperformance ellshort.They came increasingly oappear as merepersonalistic ictatorshipseeking ittle eyondtheperpetu-ation npowerofa manand a clique.20For he rade-offetweenegitimacyndeffectiveness,eeLipset1959).



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 563RegimeNarrowingandthe NegativeCoalitionA kind ofdelegitimation as, then,one aspectof theprocessof break-down.Another, losely inkedbutanalytically istinct,was the erosionoftheregimes' initial support coalition and its replacementby a "negativecoalition"based largely n theperceived elf-interestf thegroups nd indi-viduals nvolved.Whiledeligitimation,n the sense we have used theterm,served o loosen themoorings ftheregime n thepopular magination, ndtohave a broadlydiffusempact,regimenarrowingmoredirectlyffected hemakeupoftheregime tself.Militarycoups in modernLatin America are seldom the workof anindividual audillond his band of followers. ach ofour sixdictators ame topowerwith he activesupport, r at leastthe tacitacquiescence,of an arrayof interests, roups,and social classes (fairlybroad in scope in cases likePeronandRojas Pinilla, east so inthecases ofTrujilloand Batista).Regimebreakdownwhen t camewas notprimarilyheresult f thestrengtheningftheoriginalforces fopposition, lthough hisof courseoccurred,butofthe"narrowing"ofthe nitial upport oalition o thepointwhereusuallyonlyaclique ofregime ntimates nd hangers-on dheredto thewaningcause.21Concomitantly,herewas an attendant ormationfa "negativecoalition"opposed in common to the continuanceof the regime, even when itsmembersmayhave agreedon little lse.Thus politicians ftenbecame disaffected hen armyofficersheyhadcountedon to assuage a tumultuouspolitical situationand then shortlyrestore hemopowernotonlyfailed odo so, butbegantoextendrepressionof the oppositionto critics mong theirerstwhile llies. Efforts y Peron,Rojas, and Odria to broadenor solidify mass base for heirgovernmentsadditionally ntensified he oppositionof those among theiroriginalsup-porterswho saw a threat othemselvesn such actions.Policiesand budgets as distinct rom heregime'soveralleconomicper-formance)wereofcourse also typically t issue.22Money spent,and taxeslevied, norder obuythecontinued upport fthearmedforces, r on lavishpublicworks,or to hold theallegianceofmass publics,werefrequentlye-sentedby businessmen nd themiddle sectors. Policies promoting reaterstate nvolvementntheeconomy ften an counter obusinessmen'spercep-tions of appropriate conomicbehavior.Thus the editorof one of Peru'sleadingnewspapers-originally backer of the Odria coup-came to viewthe restorationfdemocracy s theonlysuitablecontext or he aissez-faireapproachhe favoredCotler,1978).The Church, fitially t leasta tacit dherent feach of ourregimes, ndinthe cases ofPer6n,-Perez imenez,Trujillo,and Rojas clearlymore thanthat, ooner or later became in these cases an elementof thenegative oali-tion. The dictators' construction f their own ideologies,mystiques, nddependent rganizations ame in somecases intodirect onflict ithparallelattributesftheChurch. n all four ases the usually ncreasingly)epressive2See Fitch1979)for gooddiscussion f he rosion f he riginal ro-coupoalition.22Forhisdistinctionetween utputsnd outcomes,eeAlmond nd Powell 1978), and Schmitter(1971).



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564 Westernolitical uarterlynatureof theregimes, nd theirgrowing strangement rommanyoftheircitizens,ed theChurchtoidentifyoth tsmission nd the ong-run equire-ments f nstitutionalurvivalwithforces ther hanthoseofthedictatorship.Thus the dictators ost notonlythe aura of egitimacynitially ccordedbythe Church as notedearlier)but thesupport f Church-related esources swell. In at least two of our cases (Peron, Rojas Pinilla) the cause of theChurchevenbecame something f a focusfor hecounter-legitimacylaimsof heopposition.In every ase at theheartof thenarrowing rocess eemsto have been atendency o centerboth the decisions and perquisitesof the regimeon asmaller nd less representativeroupof the dictator's ntimates. artly hiswas a matter fpersonal elf-indulgence,eflectedn the dictator'snotoriousenjoyment f the "high life," or gross personal mmoralityas withPeronand PerezJimenez),orpersonal orruptionas in all of ourcases exceptthatof Odria). Partlyit was a matter of favoritism, epotism,or the lavishexpenditure f public funds on "show" projectsof questionable generalutility.n anyevent,therewas a diversion f resourcesfrom hepresumedpurposesof theoriginal upport oalition howeverbroad or narrow)to theparticularisticenefit fa narrowernd narrower lique. Therewas, as well,an increasingsensitivityo criticism n the part of the dictatorand hiscohorts, sensitivity hichoften ed to extreme nd counter-productiveinthesense thatthey tirred etfurtherpposition) cts ofrepression.23uchseem to be inherent ices of at least thekindofpersonalistic ictatorshipsunderdiscussionhere.The self-indulgencend paranoia of thedictator ndhis associates ndeed seemtobe central otheprocess fbreakdown.TheDefectionfRegimelites

Absolutely rucialto the breakdownofauthoritarian egimes althoughcertainlynot unrelated to the processesof delegitimation nd narrowingalreadydiscussed) s the ultimate oliticaldissolution fthekeyregime lite,the rmed forces.The leadersofall sixregimeswereprofessionalmilitarymenand came topower nitiallywithkeybackingfrom hearmedforces.On theotherhand,some,atleast, nthemilitary ere nevery ase either eluctantupportersfthe seizure of power or opponentsof the coup leader. To retaincrucialmilitary upport,and to keep to a minimumthe inevitabledivisionsandoppositionwithinthe armed forces,were therefore aramountconsidera-tions for ll of theseregimes.Each of thedictatorswent out of his way tocurrymaterialfavorwith the military.Most increasedmilitary udgets;severalbuilt avishmilitary lubs and hospitals;other pecialprivileges ndservices e.g., access to importedgoods at discountprices)werecommon.Yet in theend the same militaryhatplayeda keyrole in institutingheseregimes,and was pampered by them,played an important art in theirultimate emise,eitherbytheir pposition, heir nternal ivisions, r theirvirtualdisintegrationn the faceofmilitarilyweak opposition the case of23Afew xamples mongmanythatcouldbe cited nclude heabove-noted ull-ringmassacre nColombia nFebruary956;Batista's arshmeasuresincluding orture)gainst ubanstudents;and some fPeron's ctionsgainstheCatholic hurch.



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 565Batista'sCuba). In fact, nevery nstance, venwellbefore he final ollapsethere were one or more attemptedmilitarycoups, or at least seriousinternal ressure,24rom hiskeyregime litedemanding n early nd tothedictatorship.One element n disaffectioneems to have been the processwe havealreadydiscussed:theweakening ftheregime'srationale frulershipntheeyesofthegeneralpublicor ofkeycivilianelites,and thenarrowing ftheregime'scivilian upport oalition.The resultwas an increasingsolation fthearmed forces rom he rest fthesociety nd, often, n increasing ostureofconfrontations the armed forceswerecalled upon to suppress herisingcivilianopposition.This is not a positionthatthe armed forces re com-fortable ithover a long periodoftime i.e., fightingheir wn citizenry,sitwere,and thus osingthemilitary's laim tobe the embodiment f nationalinterestnd unity).Something lse was atwork,however.For there ppearsto have been aninclination or thesedictatorshipso have become more exclusivist,morepersonalistic ithrespectnotonlytothesociety t large,but withrespect othe armed forces s a bodyor institution.n severalof the cases-those ofPer6n, PerezJimenez,Rojas, and Odria, quote clearly-therewas a realsense inwhichthearmedforces t first ad collegially ssumedthe reins ofgovernment. et as timewenton each ofthedictatorshipsecame more andmore closelycontrolledby one man and an attendantclique of militaryofficersplus some civilians),withpromotions, ppointments, nd otherfavorsgoing preferentiallyo familymembersor close personalassociates.The mostnotorious ase was thatofTrujillo,whobythe astyearsofhisrulecontrolledeitherpersonally r throughhis family nd friends) erhapsasmuch as three-quarters f the means of production n the DominicanRepublic.25Yet another ourceofmilitaryesentment as the effortymostof thesemento establishbases ofpoweror control partfrom hose i.e., the armedforces)who had made themwhattheywere. In the case of Per6n itwas theunions; n the case ofRojas Pinilla t was a so-calledThirdForce; inthe caseofPerezJimenezit was a dreaded secretpolice apparatus thatsoughtoutdissidentswithin hearmedforces s well as inother ectors fsociety.Finally, hereweretheattempts t continuismo,i.e., self-perpetuationnoffice)whichmade theregime ppear more a vehicleofa personthan of thearmed forces nd, not incidentally, lockedaccess to powerfor hepoten-tially mbitiouswithin hemilitarytself.Whateverthespecific eason or circumstances, heleadersof all of theregimes n questionbecamemore and more ntent n building hemselvescircle fpersonalpower,and lessand lessbroadlybased on the armedforces.In the end thedictators ouldnotrely n what had originally een theprinci-24Thus nAugust 1956, some nine monthsbeforehis fall frompower,Rojas Pinilla was forced omake anumber ofpolicyconcessions including droppingthe idea of a Third Force as a new movement orpartydistinctfrom hetraditionalLiberals and Conservatives) in the face ofmilitary emands forhis resignation;cf.Szulc (1959: 238-40).25Trujillo'sassets included an estimated 50-60 percentof the arable land in the country, nd control of80 percentof the volume ofbusiness in thecapital city;Wiarda (1968: 83 and chapter5 generally).



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566 Westernolitical uarterlypal instrumentf their ommand. "Narrowing" had occurrednotonlyinrelation o thesociety t large,but withrespect o important egments f thekeyregime lite, hemilitary.OppositionoalescenceElements of civilianoppositionwere of course presentfrom he start,especially n thepartofthosepoliticians r partiesdeposed bythemilitary.Students,too, oftencame intoearlyconflictwithdictatorship.Moreover,oppositionnaturally rewand broadened n tandemwith hedelegitimationoftheregime nd thenarrowing f tssupport oalition.Yet suchoppositiontended to be fragmented,ocusedon theparticular bjectives nd perspec-tives fvariousgroups nd parties. nitiallymanysoughtprimarilyoreverseindividual oliciesoractions,nottobringdownthegovernmenttself.t wasonlywhentheopposition fa numberofdifferentroupscame to center nthenecessity fdismantlingheregime tself,nd whenthediverse trands fcivilian pponents f thedictatorshipither ormednto a coalition rtacitlyacceptedthedominance of one of them e.g., Castro and his 26thofJulyMovement n theCuban case) that heregime's ollapsewas madepossible.Such cohesionoftheoppositionhad theadded consequenceofcreatingnew counter-legitimacyo the incumbentswhichclearlywentbeyondthemeredelegitimationotedabove. Perceiving his, hemilitaryould then ctto givethefinalpush to thedictator n the name of the new national con-sensus. Not merelythe strength f opposition,then, but its coalescencearound the agreed minimumgoal of riddingthe countryof a particulardictator,was critical otheend ofauthoritarianism.Thenternationalimension

Oppositioncan of course come from nternational s well as domesticsources, in the formof overt ntervention,r, more often, hroughwith-drawal of militaryor economic aid or of political approval. There is,however, ittle videncethatopposition eriving rom oreignnotablyU.S.)sourcesplayedanysignificantole n the fallof four f our sixdictatorships.In fact,U.S. aid or sanctionwas continued ight p totheend in three f thecountries-Argentina despite initial effortso preventPer6n's election n1946),26Venezuela, and Peru. In a fourth, olombia, oppositionwas littlemore thansymbolic nd playedno apparentrole in Rojas' overthrow.27nfact, hecontrarymightwell be argued in thesecases, i.e., thattheUnitedStatesplayed something fa role in sustaining heregimes.On thewhole,though, nd despitesuch gestures s awardinga decoration s "honorarysubmariner" oPerezJim6nez, nd somemeasure ofeconomic nd militaryaid, it s improbable hat heU.S. playeda critical ole either n the aunch-ing,maintenance, roverthrowfthesefourgovernments.26Shortly efore Per6n's fall in September 1955, one U.S. official, upon being received by Peron,

made a speech comparing him with Lincoln to the disadvantage of Lincoln." See Porter andAlexander(1961: 192).27U.S. displeasure withRojas was shown in several ways: Ambassador Philip Bonsal's attendance atan affairhonoringan opposition newspaper editor,and threatsto withdraweconomic assistance;cf. Szulc (1959: 11, 236). There is no evidence, however,that such pressures played any significantrole nRojas' downfall.



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 567It is rather n the two instanceswherethe U.S. had the clearestsup-portiverole at one stage that the withdrawal f its support proved highly

damaging,even fatal,to the regime.This was the case in Cuba and theDominican Republic. Thus theU.S., as chiefmilitary upplier,haltedallarms shipmentsto Cuba in March 1958, thus probablyhasteningthedemoralization nd disintegrationfBatista'sarmy, lthoughhardly n itselfbeingthecause. ExternalsupportforCastro fromCuban exile politiciansand from therLatin American countriesmeanwhileprovedinvaluable tothe Castro forces,while the famous interviewswith Castro by HerbertMatthews,published ntheNew York imesnFebruary1957,gaveCastroavisibilitynd credibilityebadlyneededatthe time.In thecase ofTrujillo,theforeignmpacton his demise bothpersonaland political)was even moredirect nd dramatic. n fact,Howard Wiarda,probablythe leadingNorth American student ftheTrujillo dictatorship,adjudges the pressuresfromthe international nvironment o have beenlargely esponsible or ctionsbythegovernmenthattriggeredor at leastgreatly ntensified)he forces hateventuated n theassassination fTrujilloin 1961. Thus inthewake ofdiplomatic nd economic sanctionsmposedontheDominicanRepublic in 1960bytheOrganizationof AmericanStatesforaggressive ctsagainstVenezuela (i.e., theattempted ssassination fPresi-dent Romulo Betancourt)Trujillobegan to spendlavishly or rms, n turnimposingheavytaxes on manyofthosewho had been his chief upporters.Moreover, accordingto Wiarda, "the United States Central IntelligenceAgency CIA) assisted n bringing ogether he conspirators nd, in laterstages,mayevenhave provided ncouragementnd evenarmsto theassas-sination [ofTrujillo]. '28In sum,theexternal nvironment layeda significantole n thebreak-down ofauthoritarianismn onlytwo ofour six cases-those two whichbysize, propinquity, nd economics weremost vulnerableto U.S. and otheroutside nfluences."Exit" Guarantees

A finalelement n our would-be model would seem to be morenearlyuniversal. t is the need for exit" guaranteesforkey elements-especiallybutnotnecessarily nlythemilitary-originallyupportive ftheregimebutsubsequentlywilling o desert t,thustipping hebalance offorces inallynfavor f theopposition.Thus Peron,Rojas Pinilla,and PerezJimenezwereeach followedby a periodofmilitary ule, or by a military-civilianunta,with short-termbjective fa return o electoral olitics.The deposition fthe dictatorwas thus less traumaticforthose in the military eluctant orestore ivilianrule.Other,oftenmplicit, uarantees ssured that ssociatesof the former ictatorwould notbe treated ooharshlye.g., theymightbe28Wiarda 1968: 171). The exact U.S. role in theassassination plot is unclear; thus there s some indica-tionthat the U.S. tried to abort theconspiracyat the last moment see Diedrich, 1978). However,therestillseems little uestion thattheUnited States had withdrawn ts imprimaturfromTrujilloand that ts actions played a major role in effecting is downfall. The primaryU.S. motive seemsto have been the desire to avoid "another Cuba" in thewake ofreactionto a repressivedictator-ship. Too, Venezuela was insistent n action against Trujillo if twas to oin a united AmericanfrontgainstCastro.



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568 Westernolitical uarterlyforciblyetired ut notbrought o trial for llegedmisdeeds),and thatthemilitary ouldbe assuredan honoredplace in the successor ivilianregime.In Odria's case, themajor candidatesin the successor electionapparentlyafforded omewhat similar guarantees (Pike, 1967: 294-95). Batista, ofcourse,was ultimatelyverthrownydefeat fhisarmyon the battlefieldormoreaccurately erhapsbythearmy'sinternal isintegration).29owever,the relevant uarantees n thiscase werethedemocratic ssurancesgivenbyCastro to Cuba's upper and middle classes as an incentiveto forsakeBatista.30. n fact,moderatesdominatedthe first ost-Batista overnment.The fact that the apparent guaranteesultimatelywere not keptdoes notdetract rom heirmportancet the time.The circumstancesnthe Domini-can case were,finally, uiteunusual. Trujillo'sassassins, mongwhomwereformer loseassociates, aw guaranteesfor hemselvesn an exitplan that tthe ast momentwentawry.The consequencewas that otherTrujilloasso-ciatesand familymemberswere able to retainpowerfor everalmonths, tthecostofthe ivesofa number ftheconspiratorsWiarda, 1968: 172).The point,however,remains: in everycase the factthatkeyerstwhilesupporters f the dictatordefected o the oppositionwas in part cruciallydependent n at least theperception hat heywould notbe ill-treatedytheregimewhichfollowed.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONSTheBreakdownrocess

The end oftheauthoritarianegimeswithwhichwe have beenconcernedcame in a variety fways:Peronbyaction of themilitary; ojas PinillaandPerezJimenezby street emonstrationsnd "civic strikes"whichin turnprecipitatedmilitary oups; Odria by"voluntary"exit nd elections;Batistabypopularrevolution nd thecollapseofhisarmy;and Trujillo byassassina-tion.The duration ftheregimes lso varied,from rujillo's thirty-oneearsto Rojas' four.The governmentshat mmediately ucceeded the dictator-shipsalso differed,rom hreeyearsofmilitary ule, followedby elections(butwithout hePeronists)nArgentina, odemocratic lectionsnPeru andrevolutionaryocialism n Cuba. There were likewise ome contrastsn thenatureoftheregimes hemselves,heir ases ofsupport, nd theoppositionsthateventually oalesced to overthrow hem. Thus Trujillo's rule was inmany way a classic dictatorshipn the predatory tyle the rule of theSomozas in Nicaragua havingbeen anotherprimeexample),whilePer6n'srule had a strongmass base and was legitimized n 1946 by genuineelections.In spiteof such contrasts, heseessentially uthoritarian overnmentsshared a numberofkeyelements n a commonprocessofbreakdown.Noneof themcame to power throughcommonly accepted, constitutional ro-cedures, lthoughPerondid confirm hepowerhe alreadyheldbymeans of29SeePerez (1976) for n analysisof thereasons for hatdisintegration.30Attempts y top military fficials, purred by the United States, to arrange a transfer f power to amilitary uccessor failed Perez, 1976: 164-65).



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 569a substantiallyree lection.Each did stake claimto the kindof"secondarylegitimacy."Yet each proceededto lose eventhat measureof egitimacy yactionswhichran counterto those nitialclaims,often ncludingblatantlyfraudulentttempts t continuismo.imilarly, ach of theregimes egan witha significantegreeofsupport r at least ofacquiescence.Atwhatever evelof adherence heybegan,however, ll sooneror laterunderwent conspicu-ous "narrowing"as they ame more and moreto center round thepersonofthe dictator nd hiscloseassociates,militarynd civilian.Time tended tobring ncreasing elf-indulgence,solation, nd paranoia,leading typicallyounwise actionswhichfurther ndermined the regime e.g., Per6n's waragainst heChurch,PerezJimenez'1957plebiscite).Under these circumstances two other things eventually occurred.Opposition grewnotonlystronger, ut most mportant,more unified ndmore concertedtoward the goal of the dictator'sdeposition.And seriousdivisions egantoappearinthekeyregime lite, hemilitary.When,finally,erstwhile ey supporters fthedictatorship ho had the most to lose by itsdemise were afforded pparent guaranteesthat a new order would notunduly hreatenhem, hefate ftheregimewas sealed.The steps in the processhave theirown sequence in logic, though nreality heymay of courseoverlap,and their imingmay be hastyor pro-longed.Delegitimationnd narrowingonstituteheprior tagesand tend tooccur moreor less in tandem.Oppositioncoalescenceand military isaffec-tionare thenext,again roughly arallel,steps.Exitguarantees re the ast,precipitatingondition fregime ollapse.The model stherefores follows:

OppositionDelegitimation Coalescence_ _ 0 Exit _RegimeGuarantees BreakdownRegimeNarrowing EliteDivisions

Surprisingly, erformancen such areas as economics and publicorderwas earlier een as contributoryn some cases todelegitimationrnarrowingoftheregime's upport oalition, utnot for he mostpartas direct auses ofbreakdown. n fact, egimeperformancen this ense was onlyofsecondaryimportancenmostof hecases wehave examined.Similarly, xternal ctors,whileplaying n important ole in thefall ofBatista and a probablycritical ne in Trujillo's case, were not a generallysignificantlement.Wherepresent, hey endedto have an impacton suchphasesof thebreakdownprocessas delegitimation, egimenarrowing, ndelitedivisions.ComparisonsndResearchirectionsThe questionremains fwhether, r to whatextent, ucha modelmightinform ur understanding f otherregimebreakdowns,authoritarian rotherwise.A modelof authoritarian reakdownwhichplacesitsemphasisonthe increasinglysolativeand self-indulgentehaviorof a dictator r ruler



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570 Westernolitical uarterlywouldappear largely ofit uch recent ases as thoseofAnastasio Somoza inNicaragua and theShah ofIran. There is one major qualification: hekeymilitary lites n these cases remained more or less loyal and more or lesseffectiveirtuallyo thevery nd, thus n turnrenderingxitguaranteesnotparticularlyelevant.Cuba's Batistawas, ofcourse,similarly rought ownby an opposition ed by personswithrevolutionaryntent nd was, in asense,defeated in the field." But, as noted,his armydid for ll practicalpurposesdeserthim, and Castro had given implicit xitguaranteesto thenon-revolutionariesmonghissupporters.Revolution,nonetheless, an adda dimensionto breakdown not fully onsideredin our more consensualmodel. Thus revolutionmay interrupt o short-circuithe model if themilitaryails o defect rom heregime.31Any parallelsbetweenourmodel of authoritarian reakdown nd thoseofcontemporaryureaucratic-authoritarianB-A)regimesikeBrazil,Argen-tina, Chile, and Mexico that are more corporate n nature is more prob-lematic. Less dependenton the whims or capacities of one man, theseregimes ould be expected obe lesssusceptible o suchproblems s isolation,self-indulgence,nd individualparanoia. More firmlyooted n institutions-or at any rate one institution,hemilitary-they houldgenerally rovemore stable and long-lasting,nd less susceptible o international ressuresthan in two of our cases.32Given the technocratic haracterof the B-Aregimes, and the central support role typicallyplayed by foreignanddomesticbusinesselites, twould be logical to hypothesize hatfailures neconomicperformancewould play a largerrole in thebreakdownofB-Aregimes han nthecasesdiscussedhere.Lastly,thegreater egreeof nstitu-tionalizationn regimeswhererulerships morecorporaten nature,as wellas the new self-perceivedmilitary ole of permanent nvolvementn thepoliticalprocess, may mean that"liberalization" or "opening" is a morelikely utcomefor uchregimes han soutrightollapseordeposition.33Proof of any parallels in the patternsof breakdownbetween the twovarieties f authoritarian egimemust remainforanothertime and place;and in the end the contrastsmight utweigh hesimilarities.n any event,theclearcut ases ofthebreakdown fcorporate uthoritarianuleare as yet31On the otherhand, theperceivedprospectof radical change, and the apparent failureon the part oftheopposition to offer redible exitguarantees, may have foreclosed hemilitary'sdefectionfromthe regime and made a more revolutionaryoutcome all but inevitable in the cases of bothNicaragua and Iran.32Anexception to the latter could be defeat in foreignconflict, s potentiallywithArgentina in theFalkland (Malvinas) Island disputewithGreat Britainduringthespringof 1982.33Theclearestcase of the breakdownof a B-A regime to date in Latin America has been the regimeinitiatedby the military n Argentina n 1966. It ended in 1973 when themilitary voluntarily"gave way to a returnofJuan Peron and his supporters;a more thoroughoingB-A regime, againdominated by the military,was restored in 1976. Performance failures and mounting populardemands, not isolative behavior, were the causes of the regime's breakdown. International

pressures played no discerniblerole; see Snow (1979). The Peruvian military lso made a volun-taryexit froma regime (1968-80) of a corporate militarytype (although it was reformist,notconservative or reactionary, in nature); see Palmer (1980). The 1974 demise of a Portugueseregimewhichmightbe dubbed B-A in nature-see, e.g., Graham (1975)-came as theresultofacoup by elements of a key regimeelite-the military.The motiveswere primarilyobjections toregime performance, histime n thearea ofPortuguesecolonial policy.



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TheBreakdownfAuthoritarianegimes 571scatterednd few, nd little tudied.For thepresentwe willmerely ypothe-size that thebasic lineaments f our model would remain in place forthemorecorporate ypesof authoritarian ulership.34 onetheless, hemore aregime nclined toward thepersonalistic nd of the continuumof authori-tarianrule,the more ikely t would be to accordwithourmodel; the morenearly it was based on institutionalmilitaryrule (or partyrule, as inMexico), themorelikelywe would have to modify ur expectations f thebreakdown rocess n thedirectionsuggested bove.Any parallelswithbreakdowns n democraticregimesare necessarilymoretenuous.Thus thekindsof macro-factorsfwhichAlfred tepan andothers peakin TheBreakdownfDemocraticegimesppearto be lessgermaneinthecases of the authoritarianegimes xaminedhere.35 o wit, ncreasingpopulardemands on governmentre ingoodpartforeclosed ythe natureofthe regimes,while variations n the government's xtractive apabilities,whilehardly rrelevant,may in themain be supersededby more directlypolitical onsiderations.Nonetheless, he eadership ariable on whichmostofthe contributorsoTheBreakdownfDemocraticegimeslace preeminenttress oes appear to beimportant, et n a rather ifferentense. Thus it was not so muchthe dic-tators'choice ofstrategynd tactics n handling supportersnd enemies oftheregimethatbrought bout theirpoliticaldemise, as was the case withdemocratic reakdowns, ut rather heirbehavioras personalistic ulers. twas not the swornopponentsof authoritarianism hich caused thesementheir reatest oliticaldifficulties,or their deological pponents,but rathertheir wn erstwhileupporters lienatedbythe dictators' ggrandizing ndisolative behavior. Our analysis would therefore end to confirmtheemphasisplacedon the eadership ariablebytheauthors fBreakdown.In conclusion, hen,we have tried oputforward tentativemodelofthebreakdown of authoritarian egimes,based on an analysis of six LatinAmerican ases from heyears1955-61. We have also brieflyuggested omedifferencesn the processes of breakdown between differentarieties ofauthoritariangovernmentand between authoritarian and democraticregimes.What is still erymuchat issue,however, s theextent owhich hesystematicnalysisofotherkindsofauthoritarianegimes, r of democraticgovernments,would confirm, efine,or discard the proferredmodel ofbreakdown. Extensionof thecomparativeuniverse n bothspace and timewould ikewise e inorder.The agenda is long,with he ultimate bjectivetheoryfregime reakdown, othauthoritariannd democratic.

34For he basic problemsof egitimation n such regimes,see O'Donnell (1979) and Linz (1973).35See particularly Stepan's section on the overthrow ofJoao Goulart in Brazil in 1964, where hedevelops a kind of model involvingbothmacro-factors, uch as increasingdemands on the systemand declining governmental xtractive apabilities, and micro-factors uch as the skills and tacticsof ndividual eaders.



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572 WesternoliticalQuarterlyREFERENCES

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