the army's stryker vehicle - a costly mistake rasser

8/6/2019 The Army's Stryker Vehicle - A Costly Mistake RASSER

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The Armys Stryker Vehicle: A Costly Mistake

By

Martijn Rasser

May 3, 2005


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Stryker: A Costly Mistake

1

The Stryker light armored vehicle is the centerpiece of the Interim Brigade Combat Team

envisioned in current Army transformation plans. This paper analyzes the procurement

decision behind Stryker, assesses the theoretical suitability of the vehicle for its declared

use, and investigates the actual performance of the vehicle in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

I begin by placing Stryker in the context of the Armys ambitious transformation

plan that culminates in the fielding of the Objective Force. The Stryker-equipped

brigades are designed to serve as an interim force that is readily deployable, survivable

and lethal. The decision by Army leaders to procure Stryker generated significant

controversy with detractors decrying the vehicles deficiencies in armor, durability,

maneuverability, and questionable transportability by C-130 aircraft I conclude, after

weighing these criticisms and assessing Strykers performance and use in Operation Iraqi

Freedom, that these vehicles are not warfighting platforms. Procuring Stryker for the

centerpiece of the Interim Brigades is a costly mistake.

What Stryker Is

Stryker is the third generation version of an 8-wheel light-armored vehicle (LAV-III)

manufactured by a consortium of General Motors Defense of Canada and General

Dynamics Land Systems of the United States (GM/GDLS). The vehicle is named after

two eponymous Medal of Honor winners. The United States Army will deploy two

major variants of the vehicle: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun

System (MGS) armed with a 105 mm cannon. The ICV, equipped with a remote-

controlled 12.7 mm machine gun, features a two-man crew and the space to transport

nine fully equipped troops.1

1LAV-III to Provide Army with Rapid-response Capability,Janes, July 9, 2001. Accessed at

http://server2.janes.com/press/pc010709_1.shtml


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Sub-variants of the ICV are a mortar carrier, reconnaissance vehicle, anti-tank

guided missile vehicle, fire-support vehicle, engineer support vehicle, command-and-

control vehicle, medical-evacuation vehicle and the nuclear/biological/chemical weapons

(NBC) reconnaissance vehicle.2 All variants are powered by a Caterpillar 3126 diesel

engine producing 350hp, propelling the vehicle to over 60 mph. The vehicle has a range

of approximately 300 miles on a full 53-gallon tank. Standard equipment includes a

hydro-pneumatic suspension, a central tire-inflation system, a fire-detection and fire-

suppression system, passive night vision and a winch.3 The vehicles are thus designed to

travel significant distances at higher speeds and greater comfort than tracked vehicles.

Army Transformation and the Interim Force

On October 12, 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of the

Army Louis Caldera announced their vision for a transformed Army for the 21st century,

a force more strategically responsive, agile, deployable, versatile, lethal, survivable, and

sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations.4 The transformation plan

calls for force modernization in three areas: upgrading the legacy force of current

equipment, fielding of an interim force to fill the near to mid-term capabilities gap, and

the development of the Objective Force (now termed Future Force), the future Army.5 In

Shinsekis words, the purpose of this transformation is to [prepare] this Army for its

future warfighting responsibilities, technologically, materially and professionally.6

2 Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Global Security.org. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm3 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle USA,Janes Defence Weekly, February 19, 2003.4 Objective Force, Global Security.org. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/objective-force.htm5 Ibid.6 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the

Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.


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Shinseki viewed the medium-force interim combat brigades as filling a critical

gap in the Armys bifurcated structure of easily deployed light units and slow-to-deploy

heavy units. In Congressional testimony Shinseki, referring to the plight of the heavily

outgunned 82nd Airborne Division during Desert Storm, emphasized the urgency and

need for the procurement of these new vehicles: My requirement is an operational

capacity that keeps us from having to leave another airborne brigade sitting in the desert

waiting for a heavy division to come. That is what Im trying to fill here.7 In other

words, the Army needs a robust force designed for use in a range of contingencies that

can be deployed as quickly as light forces yet have the firepower comparable to heavy

forces.

Army leaders subsequently formally codified the primary purpose and use of the

interim brigade. According to the 2003 Army Modernization Plan, Strykers are

designed and optimized primarily for employment in SSCs (smaller scale contingencies)

in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end to midrange threats that may combine

both conventional and asymmetric qualities.8 I will analyze Strykers attributes and

performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom in the context of this mission statement.

Cold War-era platforms and equipment will nevertheless remain Army combat

mainstays for at least 15 years. Shinseki intended the interim force to fill the gap

between light early-entry forces and heavier follow-on forces and serve as a stepping-

stone to the ultimate Objective Force with a planned initial operational deployment

7 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the


8 Department of the Army, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: p. 27. Accessed at

http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf


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capability in 2015.9 The interim force should be agile, lethal and mobile enough to

dominate combat during that interval.10

A major goal for the interim force is to place brigade combat teams anywhere in

the world with 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five

divisions within 30 days.11 A main criterion for the interim force armored vehicle is air

portability by C-130 transport planes.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that fielding of the

IBCT also serves to test and validate the concepts, doctrine and training the Objective

Force may ultimately adopt.

12

Senator Lieberman (D-CT), a member of the Senate

Armed Services Committee, raised concerns during a Congressional hearing, however,

whether General Shinseki had formulated new operational concepts for the interim

brigade, and an overlying vision for transformation and its end-goal Objective Force.

Shinseki did not answer his question directly, merely citing desirable features agility,

versatility and lethality the Objective force should have.13 Shinseki described a plan to

better prepare the Army for a variety of contingencies, not a fundamentally new concept

of joint warfare.

9 Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19,

2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html10United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force, not dated. Accessed at

http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhitePaper.pdf; also see: Stryker Brigade

Combat Team (SBCT), Global Security.org. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm11 Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki,Federation of AmericanScientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm12 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-96, Military Transformation: Army Has a

Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges (November 2001): p.23.13 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the

Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. See also remarks by COL

Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, Should the U.S. Army Lighten Up? Cato Institute Policy Forum,

December 18, 2000.


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Choosing the IAV

The IAV selection process for the interim brigade proved contentious. General Shinseki

desired to equip the Interim Combat Brigades with a single vehicle to reduce the logistics

footprint upon deployment. Senator Lieberman questioned whether Army leadership

gave enough consideration to the various vehicle options available and asked whether it

was wise to forgo a mix of platforms and capabilities. Shinseki proclaimed an immediate

operational requirement for a robust, rapidly deployable force to be composed of a single

platform featuring off-the-shelf technologies.14

The Army had three main options to consider for its interim vehicle: procuring the

Marine LAV, upgrading its existing C-130 air portable armored vehicles like the M113 or

procuring a new platform. Ultimately Army leaders formally compared 4 vehicles in the

final evaluation round: the existing M113, and the new LAV-III, Pandur 6x6 LAV, and

Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle (see Table 1).

Table 1: Comparison of Possible and Actual Candidates for Army Interim Armored Vehicle

M113

A3 Varianta MTVLVariant

b

MarineLAV

c

LAV-III

(InfantryCarrier

Vehicle)d

Pandur II6x6

Bionix InfantryFighting Vehicle

Type 25f

Powerplant DetroitDiesel

6V53T

DetroitDiesel

6V53T

DetroitDiesel

6V53T

Caterpillar3126B

diesel

CumminsISC 350

diesel

Detroit DieselDDC 6V 92TA

Power (horsepower)

275 400 275 350 285 475

Wheels/Tracks Tracks Tracks 8 wheels 8 wheels 6 wheels Tracks

Top Speed 41 mph 41mph 62 mph 60 mph 68 mph 43 mph

CombatWeight (lbs)

27,000 40,000 28,000 36,000 28,600 50,705

PrimaryArmament

.50 cal MG M24225mm

chaingun

M24225mm

chain gun

.50 cal MG 12.7 mmMG

M242 25 mm chaingun

C-130

Transportable

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

TurningRadius

Pivot (17 ft.circle)

Pivot(20 ftcircle)

25.5 ft* 58 ft. 29.5 ft. Pivot (19.3 ft.circle)

IAV Candidate No Yes No Yes Yes Yes




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a: M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org: Accessed athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113a3.htm

b: MTVL,Janes Defence Weekly, September 20, 2000 andc: Light Armored Vehicle-25 Specifications, Global Security.org: Accessed athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav-25-specs.htm

d: LAV Gen III,Federation of American Scientists. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-gen3.htme: Austrian Pandur APC, accessed at http://www.d-2-128.org/armorid/pandur.html and Pandur WAV, accessed at http://www.army-technology.com/projects/pandur/

f: Bionix IFV Technical Specifications. Accessed at http://www.one35th.com/bionix/bi_spec.htm

Option 1: Acquire the Updated Marine LAV

The United States Marine Corps took delivery of its first LAV in November 1984.15 The

program to develop the LAV commenced in 1980, originally as an Army-Marine Corps

venture, though the Army backed out in 1983 stating the vehicle did not fit their needs at

that time.16

Designed as a versatile, expeditionary warfare vehicle, the USMC LAV

weighs only 14 tons and is readily air transportable by C-130, C-141, and C-5 aircraft and

CH-53E helicopters.17 The vehicle is also capable of amphibious operations, which the

LAV-III/Stryker is not.

A Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), largely completed by 2001, ensured

the LAVs would remain in service until at least 2015. The objectives of SLEP were to

improve survivability, sustainability, lethality and mobility, improve the readiness of the

LAV Family of Vehicles and reduce Fleet Operation and Sustainment (O&S) costs.18

COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, program manager for the Marine LAV, outlined

substantial enhancements to the turret and gun as well as mechanical and electrical

improvements to the auto-hull in a presentation at the 1998 Combat Vehicle Conference.

He also indicated the Army showed interest in the upgraded vehicle for its own use.19

15 General Dynamics Land Systems Canada LAV (8x8),Janes Military Vehicles and Logistics,January 17, 2005.16 Harold Kennedy, Marine Corps Sprucing Up I ts Light Armored Vehicles,National Defense,

September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=25717 Ibid.18 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), Global Security.org. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav.htm19 COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, LAV Program Update, presented at National Defense Industrial

Association, Tank-Automotive Division Combat Vehicles Section, 1998 Combat Vehicles Conference, Fort


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The Marine vehicle should have been an obvious candidate for the Armys

consideration. Engineers designed the LAV largely for the types of operations Army

leaders envisioned. With the addition of a 25mm chain gun the vehicles carry reasonable

firepower. The decision by Marine Corps leaders to upgrade and maintain the vehicle for

at least an additional decade and a half is a testament to the durability of the vehicle.

The LAV is truly an off-the-shelf option, reducing procurement costs. Since the

vehicle is already a part of the Marine inventory, an additional advantage is parts

commonality with the USMC fleet, thereby reducing the Armys operations and

maintenance costs.

Option 2: Update the Deployed M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

The M113 is a tracked armored vehicle manufactured by United Defense LP of

Arlington, VA and was first deployed in the 1960s. The recent A3 variant contains a

275hp engine capable of speeds up to 41mph. At a combat weight of less than 14 tons

and with small dimensions it is readily transportable by the C-130 Hercules, even when

using unimproved airstrips.20 The newest variant, Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light

(MTVL), sports a 400hp engine capable of 41 mph, allowing heavier payloads and more

armor protection. It features greater internal volume than the LAV and LAV-III despite

significantly smaller external dimensions. MTVL was one of four finalists under

consideration for the interim armored vehicle.21

Upgrading the M113 is the most cost-effective option. The Army already owns at

least 24,000 of these vehicles, many sitting unused in storage. Upgrade costs per unit

Knox, Kentucky, September 22, 1998. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/lytle.pdf20 M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org. Accessed at

http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113.htm21 Harold Kennedy, Armys New Combat Vehicle To Undergo Additional Tests,National Defense,

December 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm


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would be approximately $210,000 and up to $500,000 if a hybrid-electric drive is

installed.22 A rapidly deployable M113-based force in fact already exists. The United

States Army Europe (USAREUR) created an Immediate Ready Force (IRF), composed of

light, medium and heavy companies. The light force is deployable within 24 hours and

can be quickly reinforced by the M113-equipped Medium Ready Company via C-130

aircraft belonging to USAF Europe.23 The M113 is a battle-proven vehicle already

employed in a manner mirroring Shinsekis vision. Since the Army owns thousands of

these vehicles there is no need to procure additional ones unless they decided to augment

the fleet with the MVTL.

Option 3: Acquire a New Vehicle Platform

Three of the four finalist candidates for IAV selection were new vehicle platforms. In

addition to the deployed M113, the other primary contenders included the wheeled LAV-

III, the wheeled Pandur 6x6 LAV made by Steyr-Daimler Puch (now owned by General

Dynamics) of Austria and the tracked Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle produced by

Singapore Technologies Kinetics.24 These vehicles are well-regarded in international

defense circles and are able and durable. The downside in procuring a new vehicle is the

long-term vehicle delivery schedule, the greater costs involved and a lack of parts

commonality with other vehicles in the U.S. armed forces.

22 Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades,Defense Week, Volume 24,

Number 50, December 22, 2003.23 MAJ Paul Swiergosz, USA, USAREURs Ready Force, November 2001: Accessed at

http://www.army.mil/soldiers/nov2001/pdfs/lariat.pdf24 Harold Kennedy, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle,National Defense,

September 2000. Accessed at

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm


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Selecting the LAV-III/Stryker

The selection process for the Army IAV remains tainted by controversy. The four

challengers for selection faced stringent testing in June 2000 at Fort Knox. Army

officials tested each vehicle for a range of abilities including being C-130 deployable, on-

and off-road capabilities and overcoming obstacles such as barricades and chain-link

fences. Testing officials released no publicly accessible data on each vehicles

performance but many industry analysts expected the LAV-III to come out on top.25 The

fact that units at Fort Lewis, Washington trained with Canadian Army-supplied LAV-IIIs

in September before an official decision was announced in November hints that Army

leaders had already made up their minds.26

LG Paul J. Kern, military deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition,

Logistics and Technology announced the official selection for the IAV on November 17,

2000.27 GM/GDLS won a contract to build 2,131 LAV-IIIs over 6 years at an initial

estimated cost of nearly $4 billion.28 On December 22, 2003 the Pentagon announced

final approval for the Army to fund two additional Stryker Brigade Combat Teams for a

total of six brigades to be procured. The total cost for the vehicles was revised upwards

to $7.2 billion.29

25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program,DefenseLINK

News, November 17, 2000. Accessed at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html28 Army Unveils Interim Armored Vehicles,Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1.29 Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades,Defense Week, Volume 24,

Number 50 (December 22, 2003)


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General Kern refused to divulge source selection criteria during his presentation

claiming that information is protected by the federal acquisitions regulations.30 There

is no public information as to why Army procurement officials selected the LAV-III over

the other contenders. He did highlight several key attributes of the LAV-III: C-130

transport plane transportability; 14.5mm armor providing all-around protection as the

vehicle rolls of the plane, 60mph-sustained speeds; a reduced logistics footprint; fuel

economy and reliability.31

United Defense LP, manufacturer of the M113, protested the award decision,

asserting that the evaluation and resulting cost-technical tradeoff were inconsistent with

the evaluation scheme set forth in the [request for proposal] and were otherwise

unreasonable.32 The GAO denied the protest but many Stryker detractors still accuse

Army testers of questionable performance evaluations for the vehicles, as we will see

below. More importantly, the GAO decision contains evidence that Army acquisition

officials may have turned a blind eye to shortcomings in GM/GDLS ability to meet the

criteria of the contract. The GAO decision states the awardees schedule for deploying

[the mobile gun system (MGS) variant] were very disadvantageous and evaluation did

not fully reflect certain disadvantages with respect to ammunition storage in awardees

MGS.33 Army officials apparently de-emphasized the immediate and urgent need34

for the vehicles emphasized in the proposal request to be able to award the full contract to

GM/GDLS.

30 LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program,DefenseLINK

News (November 17, 2000): Accessed at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html31 Ibid.32 United States Government Accountability Office, Decision in Matter of United Defense LP, File B-

286925 et al., (Washington, DC: GAO, April 9, 2001): p. 2.33 Ibid: p. 1.34 Ibid: p. 2.


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Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) attempted to intervene by sponsoring the 2001

defense authorization bill mandating a comparative test between the LAV-III and the

M113, which is manufactured in Santorums home state. The tests were held in 2002.

Prior to the evaluation, an unnamed Army Major General said it wont prove

anything.35 The Army apparently already made its decision: Wed rather spend the test

money on something else.36 The GAO deemed these tests sufficient, although GAO

representatives only witnessed and analyzed one half of the tests and exercises, and their

results.37

Budget Concerns

The Armys ambitious transformation strategy raised significant concerns about its

funding soon after General Shinsekis October 1999 announcement. Not only would the

Army procure and field a large interim force and spend billions on research and

development for its objective force, the Army planned to sustain, re-capitalize and

modernize most its legacy force until 2032. Even in 2000, the infancy stages of the

transformation plan, the service had only 68 percent of the funds necessary to recapitalize

current weapons systems.38

Lawmakers voiced concerns about budget shortfalls during Shinsekis testimony

to the AirLand subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2000.

35 Sandra I. Erwin, Army Confident About Move to Wheeled Combat Vehicle,National Defense,(September 2001): Accessed at

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Sep/Army_Confident.htm36 Ibid.37 United States Government Accountability Office, Military Transformation, Armys Evaluation of

Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated

Comparison (May 2003)38 Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19,

2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html


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Shinseki acknowledged he required substantial additional monies to achieve his goals.39

A May 2001 GAO study identified substantial challenges ahead in realizing Army

transformation plans and concluded Army leadership would face significant investment

trade-offs.40

GAO analysts reached these conclusions before significant cost overruns

dramatically raised the price tag of the Stryker contract. When Army officials first

unveiled its selection for the IAV, the average price per vehicle was $1.87 million.41 The

most recent budget figures indicate the average unit cost of a Stryker vehicle variant to be

over $2.85 million (see Table 1), while the average acquisition cost (includes military

construction, and research, development, test & evaluation) per vehicle exceeds $4

million.42

Table 2: Procurement Funds for Stryker Vehicle

PreviousYears

FY03* FY04* FY05* FY06* FY07* FY08*

Stryker1583.6

(754)

742.4

(281)

962.7

(371)

1524.2

(576)

878.4

(240)

719.5

(130)

549.2

(87)

Source: Department of the Army FY 2006-2007 Budget Estimates, February 200543

*Figures in millions of dollars. Number in parentheses reflects total number of vehicles procured that year.

Prior to General Shinsekis accession as Army Chief of Staff Army budget planners

never allocated a penny to an interim armored force so they needed to review all budget

allocations to find money to fund it. As GAO analysts predicted, Army leaders faced

difficult trade-offs. Budget officials cancelled and downsized several systems to release


Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.40 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces WeaponSystems Challenges (May 2001): p. 12.41 Based on the announced contract of $4 billion for 2,131 vehicles as stated in Army Unveils Interim

Armored Vehicles,Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1.42 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces Weapon

Systems Challenges (August 2004): p. 13.43 Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007 Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked

Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-

07/pforms/wtcv.pdf


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funds for transformation programs. Recent Army Modernization Plans termed this

process balanced modernization.44

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld worried about the trade-offs and intervened on

several occasions. He forced the Army to kill the Crusader artillery system and

demanded steep cuts in the Comanche helicopter program. Rumsfeld seriously

considered slashing funding for Stryker, though he ultimately spared the program.45

Army leaders eventually cancelled the Comanche program in February 2004.46 Despite

these efforts, recent Army budgets still faced substantial shortfalls.

Modernization programs for the legacy forces were cut 16% for the Armys FY04

budget. It terminated 24 systems, including upgrades to M-1 Abrams tanks and Bradley

fighting vehicles to free up R&D funds for the Future Combat System.47 These are

precisely the platforms proving so effective and important in Operation Iraqi Freedom.48

Yet even in wartime Army leaders prioritized transformation programs over improving

vehicles with a demonstrated relevance today.

Criticizing Stryker

The Armys choice of a wheeled armored vehicle for its interim brigades remains a

controversial issue. Detractors point out several weaknesses of the Stryker and wheeled

vehicles in general. The primary deficiencies identified by critics are insufficient armor

protection for the troops riding in the vehicle, the inferior performance of wheeled

44 Department of the Army, 2002 Army Modernization Plan, Accessed at

http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2002/wMP_mainv03b.pdf45 John Hendren, Army Holds Its Ground in Battle With Rumsfeld,Los Angeles Times, November 29,

2002. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021129-sbct.htm46 Army Cancels Comanche Helicopter Program, Government Services Administration, February 23,2004: Accessed at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0204/022304cdpm2.htm47 Extra $3B for Army, But That Wont Be Enough,Army Times, February 10, 2003. Accessed at

http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1554345.php48 Alex Berenson, Fighting the Old-fashioned Way in Najaf,New York Times, August 29, 2004.

Accessed at www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/weekinreview/29bere.html


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vehicles in off-road situations, and the questionable deployability of Strykers in C-130

aircraft.

Insufficient Armor Protection

A significant concern raised by critics of the Styker is the lack of sufficient armor and its

vulnerability to common weapons like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a weapon of

choice for Iraqi insurgents. Tom Christie, the Pentagons director of Operational Testing

and Evaluation, in fact recommended not sending the vehicles to Iraq precisely due to

their susceptibility to attacks with RPGs and other explosives.49

This vulnerability is striking since Shinseki himself cited RPG survivability as an

important feature for the new IAV.50 To remedy this shortcoming the Army is installing

a cage of ballistic steel slat armor around the vehicle. While the cage does offer

protection against RPGs it also adds an additional 2.5 tons in weight51, impairing

maneuverability, off-road performance, speed, fuel efficiency and C-130

transportability.52 Furthermore, the top of the vehicle and the shoulder-height wheel

wells remain exposed and vulnerable. Each upgrade adds $300,000 to the cost of the

vehicle.53

The rationale behind lightly armored vehicles playing significant combat roles is

the notion that superior access to information offers the United States military distinct

battlefield advantages. As MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret.) observes, Perhaps the only

49 Jon E. Dougherty, Controversy Surrounds Armys Stryker,NewsMax.com (January, 28, 2004):Accessed at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/1/28/151543.shtml50 Heike Hasenauer, Reaching the Army Vision, Soldiers (June 2000): Accessed at

http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jun2000/features/ausa1.html.51 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare,

(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p . 51.52 Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War(A report written for Congressman Jim

Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 58.53 Ibid: p. 11.


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way to achieve the desired degree of self-protection for lightly armored vehicles will be

to replace reliance on heavy armor with an indirect form of protection, achieved through

superior situational awareness. If the enemy can be identified, tracked, and destroyed

will outside the enemys lethal range, then substantial self-protection from heavy armor

might no longer be necessary.54 This vision proved attainable and successful in combat

situations like Desert Storm and the major combat period of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The problem, however, lies in fighting in rough mountainous terrain like Afghanistan or

urban combat like the Fallujah and Najaf uprisings in Iraq. Strykers, and the fighting

style Stryker brigades are designed for, are ineffective in these situations because that is

where the long-range sensors cannot see, where smart weapons are dumbfounded, where

air strikes are impaired, and where ground troops are essential.55

Even heavily armored vehicles prove vulnerable under persistent attack in

asymmetrical warfare. To-date Iraqi insurgents have knocked a staggering number of 69-

ton M1A1 Abrams tanks out of the fight using low-tech improvised explosives and

rocket-propelled grenades by targeting the thinner armor at the sides and top of the

vehicles. At least 80 Abrams were so heavily damaged they were shipped back to the

United States.56 Nevertheless, the heavy tanks have the lowest casualty rates of all

deployed vehicles in Iraq despite their heavy use and frequent attacks they sustain. They

remain the platform of choice for fighting insurgents.57

54 Robert H. Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke: the Future of Land Warfare for Americas Military (Lanham,

Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003): p. 151.55 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5, January 31, 2004: p.34.56 Steven Komarow, Tanks take a Beating in Iraq, USA Today, March 29, 2005. Accessed at

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-03-29-abrams-tank-a_x.htm57 Steven Komarow, Tanks Adapted for Urban Fights they Once Avoided, USA Today, March 29, 2005.

Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-03-29-tank-inside_x.htm


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Wheels vs. Tracks

The debate over the relative benefits of wheeled and tracked armored vehicles is decades

old. COL Donald Schenk of the Armys Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command

(TACOM) declared in the performance area to date, there is no remarkable benefit for

either wheels or tracks in straight, technical performance.58 Wheeled vehicles are in fact

quicker and quieter in on-road situations and more comfortable for the troops inside, the

main reasons they are the platforms of choice for peacekeeping and paramilitary

operations.

The issue at hand, however, is whether wheeled armored vehicles are effective

warfighting platforms. Douglas MacGregor, a retired Army colonel and author of

Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation under Fire, put it bluntly: A tank, or any

armored track vehicle for that matter, is vastly superior to a wheeled vehicle as a

warfighting platform.59 Victor OReilly, a defense analyst, cites a January 2000 study

conducted by the United Kingdom Defence Procurement Agency (DPA)/United States

Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) program reaching these

same conclusions. OReilly claims Shinseki ignored the findings and terminated the joint

program.60

There are three primary critiques of wheeled armored vehicles. First, their off-

road performance is poor compared to tracked vehicles. Tracked vehicles excel in muddy

conditions where wheeled vehicles tend to get stuck, in part due to their better weight

distribution. Tires tend to wear quickly on hard ground and are not as durable as tracks.

58 Harold Kennedy, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle,National Defense,September 2000. Accessed at

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm59 COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA Ret, email correspondence with the author, March 8, 2005.60 Victor OReilly,Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress), December 16, 2003. Accessed at

http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf: p. 63.


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Tracked vehicles also feature a lower center-of-gravity because ground clearance is not a

significant issue in non-wheeled vehicles. The Stryker in particular is purportedly prone

to rollovers in off-road environments.61 If as a result of poor off-road performance

Strykers employed in combat situations primarily stay on roads their effectiveness may

be significantly reduced.62 Enemy fighters could mine the roads and then seek refuge in

roadless areas.

A second criticism is the inferiority of a wheeled vehicles maneuverability,

which is especially important in urban combat situations. While the Stryker has a turning

radius of 58.5 feet (wider than many city streets), a tracked vehicle can pivot steer by

turning on its axis. The Stryker is vulnerable to being blocked or trapped in an urban

setting by enemy fighters. A wheeled vehicle like the Stryker is unlikely to successfully

negotiate rubble without puncturing at least one tire, impacting its speed and mobility.

Tracked vehicles easily traverse rubble-strewn areas and can surmount substantially

higher vertical obstacles (24 for the Stryker vs. 36 for the MTVL).63

A third criticism of wheeled vehicles is that they cannot carry additional weight

from up-armoring, other improvements and load-carrying without significantly degrading

off-road performance. Tracks distribute the overall weight of the vehicle much better.

Wheels tend to sink in soft surfaces or wet ground.64

61 Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus The Reality of War(A report written for Congressman JimSaxton), August 22, 2003: p. 20.62 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare,

(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p . 51.63 COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, unpublished information provided in correspondence with the

author, April 27, 2004. See also Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War(A report

written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: pp. 22-23.64 Victor OReilly,Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress), December 16, 2003: pp: 64-64, 68.

Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf


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Tracked vehicles do fall short in certain areas of performance. Wheeled vehicles

are faster and quieter on paved roads and dry unpaved roads.65 They typically also

feature better fuel efficiency. Shinseki displayed a preference for wheeled vehicles for

these reasons. During his speech announcing Army Transformation in October 1999 he

observed heavy tracked vehicles like armored personnel carriers and tanks could be

phased out by lighter, faster, more fuel-efficient wheeled vehicles during the next

century.66 In another speech he asked: Can we, in time, go to an all-wheeled vehicle

fleet, where even the follow-on to todays armored vehicles come in at 50- to 70 percent

less tonnage? I think the answer is yes, and were going to ask the questions and then go

where the answers are.67[Authors emphasis]

C-130 Transportability

A primary justification and selling point for the IAV was the capability to deploy a

brigade in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.68 To meet this

goal, according to the Armys IAV solicitation from April 2000, the vehicle should have

the capability of entering, being transportable in, and exiting a C-130 aircraft under its

own power and be capable of immediate combat operations.69

[Authors emphasis]

Furthermore, vehicle weight should not exceed 38,000 lbs.70

65 Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military,

Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004: p. 9.66 Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki,Federation of American

Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm67 As quoted in: Harold Kennedy, Armys New Combat Vehicle to Undergo Additional Tests,National

Defense, December 2000. Accessed at

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm68 See Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki,Federation of American

Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm69 As quoted in Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus The Reality of War(A report written for

Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 62.70 Ibid.


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Soon after the selection of the LAV-III/Stryker as the IAV, critics charged the

vehicle was too heavy and too large for C-130 deployment.71 While the original LAV-III

was light enough, various add-ons and upgrades to the vehicle caused Strykers weight to

balloon significantly. Army officials themselves admitted in early 2002 that certain

Stryker variants exceeded the weight limit, the MGS variant by as much as 3,000 lbs.72

Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich criticized the Stryker and sent several

emails to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilian leaders in

September and October 2002 urging him to cancel the program.73 In an effort to silence

critics, Army officials organized a demonstration for senior Army leaders, government

officials and journalists at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. After a C-130 taxied to

a stop, an 11-man squad retrieved a Stryker from the plane and prepared the vehicle for

combat operations in eight minutes. The Air Force required a special waiver to fly the

vehicle on the plane, however, as it was heavier than the official cargo capacity limit.74

Army officials also backtracked from their original specifications that the vehicle be

combat ready upon arrival. They never envisioned the Stryker to roll off a C-130 with

guns blazing, but rather be capable of conducting combat operations after a short period

of preparation.75

71 See for example Benjamin C. Works, The U.S. Armys Light Armored Vehicle, Strategic Issues

Research Institute, Report issued May 19, 2001. Accessed at http://www.siri-us.com/backissues/2001/SIT-

Rep%2001-05-19%3B%20armyveh.txt72 Frank Tiboni, Most New Armored Vehicles Exceed U.S. Armys Medium-Weight Needs,Defense

News (March 4-10, 2002): p. 6.73 Sean D. Naylor, Digging in on Stryker,Army Times (November 4, 2002): Accessed athttp://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1232529.php74 Joe Burlas, Stryker Demo Debunks Critics,Army News Service, October 25, 2002. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/10/mil-021025-usa01.htm

75 Ibid.


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A 2002 RAND study concluded the 96-hour deployment window for a Stryker

brigade (about 366 vehicles) was unfeasible76, delivering another blow to the

deployability argument. GAO reported in June 2003 that five to 14 days, depending on

destination, with a huge commitment of Air Force resources, was a more realistic

figure.77

A December 2004 memorandum from TRADOC chief Gen. Kevin Burns to

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker again raised concerns over the weight of the

vehicle. A stripped down version of Stryker still tips the scales at 24 tons, far short of

Army leaderships stated goal of 20 tons and straining the carrying capacity of a C-130.

According to the memo, it would take four to six hours per vehicle to reload them with

the fuel, ammunition and other supplies necessary for combat.78 Byrnes further noted

that even at 24 tons it is doubtful that the Army will meet its survivability

requirements on most of the eight vehicle variants.79 Stryker advocates like Dan Gour

of the Lexington Institute, a defense polity think tank, admit that the vehicles cannot be

airlifted into a contested area as a result.80

From Theory to Practice: Stryker in Combat in Iraq 2003-present

The true test for Strykers capabilities is how the vehicle performs in actual combat

situations. According to General Schoomaker the Stryker Brigades have proven their

76 Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: RethinkingStrategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, (Santa Monica, Calif.:RAND, 2002).77 Ray Rivera and Hal Bernton, Stryker Readiness Questioned, Seattle Times, September 6, 2003.

Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030906-stryker01.htm78 Megan Scully, U.S. Armys FCS: Too Heavy for C-130?DefenseNews.com, January 31, 2005.

Accessed at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20050131/atpc16154722.sgml79 Ibid.80 Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military,

Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004: p. 11.


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worth.81 He recently hailed their extraordinary performance in Operation Iraqi

Freedom.82 A careful analysis of unclassified sources will determine the merits of his

claim.

The 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division (3/2 SBCT) from Fort Lewis, Wash. was the

first Stryker Brigade deployed to Iraq. The unit arrived in Kuwait in November 2003 and

entered Samarra, Iraq in December. Subsequent a month of operations in Samarra the

unit was reassigned to Mosul in northern Iraq.

A GAO study conducted prior to deployment identified several weaknesses in the

brigades performance. Among the findings, GAO analysts highlighted operational

weaknesses in the unit, primarily due to insufficient training. Army officials conducted

additional training to address this issue before deploying the unit to Iraq.83

Two issues with long-term, potentially deadly implications were not addressed for

the 3/2 SBCT or the currently deployed brigade. One concern is the survivability and

mobility of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently this person is

assigned to a HMMWV.84 These vehicles, even the up-armored version, have proven

very susceptible to enemy fire and explosives, unnecessarily endangering the lives of

critical members of the Stryker brigade.85

81 Ann Roosevelt, Strykers Turning in Extraordinary Performance, Schoomaker Says,Defense Daily,

January 18, 2005: p. 7.82 Ibid.83 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-188 Military Transformation: The Army and

OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain forFuture Brigades (December 2003): p. 33.84 Ibid: p. 34.85 Numerous reports have cited the vulnerability of HMMWVs. See for example Craig Gordon, Troops

seen vulnerable in Humvees,Boston Globe, December 18, 2003. Accessed at

http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2003/12/18/troops_seen_vulnerable_in_humvees/


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The second issue of significant concern is that only half of the Stryker vehicles

were equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment.86 FBCB2 is the

information system providing soldiers with real-time and near real-time battle command

information.87 Half of the Stryker vehicles deployed in December 2003 thus did not have

the very tools to master situational awareness that Army leaders, including Shinseki,88

touted would offer combat advantage on the battlefield and negate the effects of reduced

armor protection.

A further difficulty Stryker brigades face is that, in trying to come as close as

possible to the desired 96-hour deployment goal, they had to shed critical elements. The

brigade gave up its heavy armored vehicles, helicopters, long-term logistical support, and

even lacked adequate staff to coordinate with Air Force squadrons. It appears the lone

Stryker brigade first deployed in Iraq had to supplement its headquarters with 100

additional personnel.89 Currently a Stryker brigade cannot be self-sufficient and air

deployable, undermining the entire rationale for procuring the vehicles in the first place.

As a result, Strykers have not been airlifted inside Iraq.90 The C-130 transportability

requirement may in fact be dropped altogether.91

The 3/2 SBCTs Strykers and other vehicles arrived in Kuwait City on November

12, 2003. Ironically the vehicles were not transported via strategic airlift but by ship.

Two USN supply ships departed the Port of Tacoma on October 19 for the three-week

86 Ibid.87Federation of American Scientists tutorialaccessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/docs/A2C2S_Tutorial_RevA1a/sld010.htm88 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the

Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.89 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5 January 31, 2004: p.

36.90 Jefferson Morris, C-130 not used by Stryker Brigades for In-theater Movement, PM says,AerospaceDaily & Defense Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed through Lexis Nexis.91 Ibid.


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voyage. Logistics crews needed an additional two days to unload the ships and prepare

the fleet for the long drive to Samarra.92 From there the 3/2 Brigade was reassigned to

the northern city of Mosul as the insurgency in central Iraq grew more violent in early

2004.

Analysis of Stryker Brigade Accidents, Attacks and Casualties (to May 2, 2005)

The following data are compiled from a variety of official Pentagon reports as well as

newspaper articles. The compiled incidents include only those where the Stryker vehicle

itself was attacked or involved in an accident. I did not include attacks on Stryker

Brigade soldiers once they had disembarked from the vehicles while on patrol or in

battle. It is important to note, though, that this method of fighting greatly limits the

utility of Stryker Brigades in close combat situations when lacking heavy firepower for

backup. Dismounted light infantry stand to suffer significant casualties in penetration

attacks on defended urban areas.93

Any damage sustained to the vehicle is reported when available, though this

information is usually lacking in official Pentagon news releases. The list is incomplete

as well. According to Lt. Col. Gordie Flowers, commander of 2nd

Battalion, 3rd

Infantry

Regiment, over 50 percent of his Strykers were hit with RPGs and IEDs during his

twelve month deployment.94 I only listed incidents, however, for which I obtained

reliable and specific details.95

92 Michael Gilbert, Last of 5,000 Stryker Soldiers due in Kuwait as Brigade Gears up for Forward

Deployment, The Tacoma News Tribune, November 16, 2003. Accessed athttp://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872881p-3466602c.html93 COL Douglas MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, July

15, 2004.94 As quoted in Lisa Burgess, Army Looks to Give Stryker a Facelift, Stars & Stripes, December 22,

2004. Accessed at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_122204_Stryker,00.html95 Blogs often cite news of incidents but rarely provide reliable sourcing. For example, see Minstrel Boys

account of a 4 April 2005 IED attack on a Stryker in Mosul:

http://minstrelboy.blogspot.com/2005/04/securing-scene-of-damaged-stryker-hit.html


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Table 3: A Compilation of Stryker Vehicle Attacks and Accidents, and Resulting Casualties.

Date LocationIncident

Type*Description Casualties Sources#

12/08/2003 Duluiyah (near

Samarra)

Rollover Two Strykers plunge into

a canal.

3 killed 1, 2, 3, 4

12/13/2003 Samarra IED One Stryker destroyed

after secondaryexplosion.

1 injury. 2, 24

12/16/2003 Not specified Rollover One Stryker rolls into

irrigation pond.

1 suffers minor

injuries

1

12/20/2003 Samarra IED Explosion knocks left

front wheel off oneStryker.

Driver suffers

broken foot

2, 24

01/31/2004 Mosul RPG RPG attack inflicts

vehicle damage.

No serious

injuries.

22, 23

02/01/2004 Mosul RPG RPG attack inflicts minor

vehicle damage.

No serious

injuries.

22

02/20/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker swerves to

avoid collision.

Undisclosed damage tovehicle

Undisclosed 1

03/28/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker rolls over

during off-road

maneuvers.

2 suffer

unspecified

injuries

1

04/04/2004 Mosul IED An unspecified vehicle

(possibly a Stryker) hit byan IED during a patrol.

1 killed, 1

injured

3, 21

04/28/2004 Mosul RPG An unspecified vehicle

(possibly a Stryker) hit byRPG during a patrol.

1 killed 3, 20

07/14/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker swerves to

avoid collision, rolls over

down embankment.

2 killed 1, 3

07/15/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker swerves toavoid collision.

3 sufferunspecified

injuries

1

09/04/2004 Tal Afar (near

Mosul)

RPG One Stryker disabled

(broken transmission) due

to heavy RPG fire duringa rescue mission.

No major

injuries.

26

09/21/2004 Mosul IED A military vehicle (not

specified, possibly a

Stryker) was hit by an

IED during a patrol.

1 killed 3, 19

10/11/2004 Mosul VBIED A car bomb detonated

alongside a Strykerconvoy.

1 killed, 9

injured

3, 17, 18

12/04/2004 Mosul Unspecifi

ed enemy

fire.

Stryker vehicle attacked

during convoy

operations.

2 killed 3, 14

12/30/2004 Mosul VBIED A convoy of 4 Strykers

was ambushed by a carbomb during an attack on

a Stryker Brigade outpost

15 wounded 8, 12, 13

01/04/2005 Mosul RPG A Stryker patrol came 1 killed, 2 3, 15, 16


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In Samarra the 3/2 SBCT was divided into two company-sized battalions of

approximately 20 vehicles and 170 men. The Brigade would receive intelligence and

targeting information from the 4th Division stationed there. A battalion would then move

rapidly into town, but the infantry would run a few blocks to the target.97 The infantry

is thus exposed to enemy fire protected only by Kevlar vests and helmets.

The first month of the Stryker Brigades deployment in Samarra was marred by

two rollovers and two IED attacks. According to Gilbert, the Brigade Commander

prohibited his soldiers to take Strykers off-road near water subsequent the second rollover

incident

98

, thus greatly limiting the areas of operation for the vehicles in this well-

irrigated area. This also means that the patrol routes for Strykers becomes more

predictable to observant insurgents.

The IED attacks demonstrated that Strykers are indeed vulnerable to such attacks

and probably contributed to the decision to redeploy the 3/2 SBCT to Mosul in January

2004. The Kurd-dominated area in northern Iraq was relatively peaceful at the time and

required little more than stabilization forces.

Gen. Larry Ellis, head of the U.S. Army Forces Command, requested more

Strykers be put in the field around this time to offset the general lack of armor in Iraq. A

Newsweek magazine article cites sources claiming that Army leadership in Washington

was hesitant to approve this. The rubber-tire Strykers are thin-skinned and dont

maneuver through dangerous streets as well as the fast-pivoting, treaded Bradley.

According to a well-placed Defense Department source, the Army was so worried about

the Strykers vulnerability that most of the 300-vehicle brigade was deployed up in the

97 Ibid.98 Ibid.


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safer Kurdish region around Mosul. Any further south and the Army were afraid the

Arabs would light them up, he said.99

Even in Mosul during early 2004 limits were placed on where Strykers could be

used despite the comparative tranquility. According to Gilbert, Strykers were not

allowed in the old section of the city during his time there. The streets are quite narrow,

and the vehicle could not turn around in the event of an ambush. Fears of grenade attacks

from above and behind were also major concerns.100 Again the operational area for the

Stryker Brigade was curtailed, offering insurgents opportunities to establish a safe haven.

The 3/2 SBCT experienced two RPG attacks in late January and early February

2004. In the first attack the grenade impact just above the slat armor cage, causing minor

damage. The grenade wedged into the slat armor in the second attack and exploded away

from the body of the vehicle, thus working as advertised. It is unclear whether the RPG

and IED attacks of April 2004 involved Strykers.

There were 4 rollover accidents during the February-July 2004 time frame, one

during off-road maneuvers and three when swerving to avoid collisions. Michael Gilbert

noted that, in addition to these rollovers, Strykers were also involved in many accidents

with Iraqi civilian vehicles. The 3/2 SBCT commander offered financial compensation to

the victims families as a gesture of goodwill.101 There are no further reports of rollovers

and the number of accidents decreased after the Brigade Commander ordered his soldiers

99 Melinda Liu, John Barry and Michael Hirsh, The Human Cost,Newsweek(May 3, 2004). Online

version accessed at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4825948/100 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.101 Ibid.


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to reduce their patrol speed.102 The Army also changed its training for Stryker drivers in

response to the frequent accidents.103

Whether the Stryker is more prone to roll-overs than other military vehicles,

particularly with the addition of slat armor, is still an open question. COL Peter Fuller,

program manager for the Stryker vehicle program, claims they are not.104 Michael

Gilbert indicated that Stryker drivers he spoke with determined the main issue with the

slat armor was not so much that the vehicle was more top-heavy, but that the vehicle was

more unwieldy due to its greater width and length. The added weight also greatly

increased the stopping distance.

105

The official report on the roll-over accidents

conducted by the U.S. Army Safety Center is not yet available for public release.106

In April 2004 3/2 SBCT participated in operations in Najaf and Kut. Army Chief

of Staff General Schoomaker touted the operational agility of a Stryker battalion citing an

operation where the Army moved a Stryker battalion 420 miles through Iraq in 48 hours,

all the while maintaining situational awareness and conducting battle planning on the

move.107

Gilbert noted a similar operation where a battalion-size task force moved from

Najaf to Kut as part of Operation Danger Fortitude. The Stryker battalion covered over

102 Ibid.103 Jefferson Morris, Army Taking Steps to Solve Stryker Rollover Problem,Aerospace Daily & Defense

Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed at Lexis Nexis.104 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune,February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p-

4288984c.html105 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.106 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune,

February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p-

4288984c.html107 Megan Scully, The Squeeze on Transformation,Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed at

www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php


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300 miles in 14 hours while its commanders conducted operational planning en route.108

While the distance traveled is noteworthy and the fact that operational planning on the

road took place is convenient, Strykers still served only as troop transports. The soldiers

involved in the Najaf and Kut battles dismounted their vehicles well outside of town to

join up their fellow soldiers.

The latter half of 3/2 SBCTs deployment in Mosul witnessed relatively few

additional incidents, though they were very violent. One Stryker was targeted and

heavily damaged by a car bomb in October 2004. Reports on the 3-hour battle in Tal

Afar on September 4, 2004 following the downing of a Kiowa helicopter is one of the

few detailed accounts of the 3/2 SBCT in action.109

That morning insurgents attacked two Kiowa helicopters with RPGs, hitting one

in the engine. A Scout Platoon consisting of 4 Strykers was within 1000 meters of the

crash site and arrived on site in less than 5 minutes. Soldiers dismounted from the

vehicles at 75 meters from the Kiowa and set up a perimeter. One of the two pilots was

carried to the Stryker medical evacuation vehicle.

The perimeter meanwhile came under heavy RPG and small arms fire and the

defenders were outnumbered and in danger of being overrun. Bravo Company, another

Stryker patrol, was 1500 meters west of the crash site, but faced a hostile urban jungle of

blind alleyways and two- and three-story buildings.110

Bravo Company crept along a road heading toward the crash site under heavy fire

erupting from seemingly every doorway and window, including at least 15 RPGs. One

108 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.109 The described sequence of events is based on Matthew Cox, They Werent Going to get this Bird,

Army Times, November 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-

452676.php; and Bill Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 12, 2005.

Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4552351p-4264302c.html110 Cox, They Werent Going to Get this Bird.


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slammed into one of the leading vehicles, damaging the transmission. The column

grounded to a halt a few hundred meters later when the damaged Stryker could go no

further. The soldiers had to hook up the disabled vehicle to another with a tow bar under

enemy fire to continue on.

An overhead UAV monitored the evolving battle continuously and its controllers

observed a new influx of insurgents armed with RPGs and machine guns heading toward

the area. Another determined group of insurgents also placed themselves between Bravo

Company and the crash site. Basically what I did then was call in the Air Force,

according Lt. Col Reed, commander of the forces in battle.

111

Two F-16s provided close air support and targeted the insurgents with JDAMs.

Bravo Company was able to link up with Scout Patrol at the Kiowa crash site in the

ensuing lull in fighting but again came under heavy mortar fire, puncturing Strykers

tires. The pinned down soldiers repeatedly returned to their vehicles for additional

ammunition and launched two TOW missiles to slow the attack. It was not until an F-16

strafed the area, however, that the Stryker troops could dismantle the helicopter and

depart the area in relative safety.

This battle highlights two shortcomings of Stryker-centered brigades. First is the

vehicles primary use as an infantry transport/paramilitary vehicle, as opposed to a

warfighting platform. The troops must dismount the vehicle to effectively fight, thereby

exposing themselves to enemy fire. While such tactics are effective in situations like riot

control, the predicament of the Scout Platoon clearly shows the inadequacy of this

approach in close urban combat as they were pinned down by heavy enemy small arms

and RPG fire.

111 As quoted in Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes.


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Second is the Brigades heavy reliance on airpower for effectiveness and survival

in the face of determined insurgent attacks.112 The soldiers were only able to extract

themselves after multiple close air strikes on the opposing forces. Blasting their way out

in their Strykers was clearly not an option, even though the insurgents were relatively

lightly armed with small arms, RPGs and 60mm mortars.

The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (1/25 SBCT) relieved the 3/2 SBCT in

November 2004 at a time when the security situation in the area deteriorated

significantly. There appears to be an alarming trend of insurgents deliberately targeting

Stryker convoys with IEDs and RPGs. From December 2004 through March 2005 the

1/25 SBCT suffered at least 199 such attacks113, some with deadly consequences, at a

time when overall attacks on coalition forces dropped across the rest of Iraq. The brigade

suffered at least 3 deadly attacks in April 2005, killing 5 and wounding 4 soldiers. This

is a worrying development since it is clear Strykers are not well-equipped to withstand

such large explosions.

A recent incident in Mosul demonstrates another use for Stryker: that of a pursuit

vehicle. Insurgents there recently began launching attacks on Iraqi government building

and Iraqi and American troops from cars. The car enables them to attempt a quick

getaway, often seeking shelter in the narrow alleys of the old city. On several occasions

soldiers of the Stryker Brigade pursued insurgents in their Stryker vehicles, though there

is no indication that any chase yielded results. The pursuit on March 12 ended when a

112 See COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Army Transformation, Washington Times, February

11, 2005: p. 20.113 Albert Eisele, Improvised Explosives Becoming more Common in Iraq, The Hill, March 28, 2005.

Accessed at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/032305/explosives.html


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Stryker ground to a halt due to a broken axle, though the soldiers were able to destroy one

insurgents vehicle when he doubled back through the area a few minutes later.114

In the midst of this influx in attacks on Strykers, the Washington Post leaked

details of an internal Army Report completed in December 2004.115 The report, entitled

Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul Iraq (3/2 SBCT), chronicles numerous

complaints about Stryker drawn from confidential interviews with 3/2 SBCT soldiers.

Among the more important findings are shortcomings in the slat armor, situational

awareness system and the remote weapon system.

Army investigators found the slat armor cages to be effective only against 50% of

total rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and not effective at all against anti-personnel and

anti-tank grenades.116 The additional weight of the armor seriously impacted vehicle

handling and performance in wet conditions and muddy terrain, caused significant tire

wear, and made the central tire inflation system, used to adjust tire pressure according to

terrain, inoperable.117

The FBCB2 battlefield information system proved ineffective in battle. The

commanders heads-up display, a helmet-mounted display used to access the tactical

battlefield intelligence computer, was rarely used because it was too large and difficult to

use inside the vehicle and caused blind spots to its wearer in urban environments. It was

used effectively, however, during long convoy movements.118

114 Monte Morin, In Mosul, Insurgents Have Become Road Warriors,Los Angeles Times, March 13,2005. Accessed at ht tp://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-

mosul13mar13,1,2134295.story?coll=la-iraq-complete&ctrack=1&cset=true115 R. Jeffrey Smith, Study Faults Army Vehicle, The Washington Post, March 31, 2005: p. A01.116 Center for Army Lessons Learned,Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq: p. 48.

Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/iir-mosul-ops_stryker-

bde_21dec2004.pdf117 Ibid: pp: 50-1, 53.118 Ibid: p. 55.


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The computer providing situational awareness requires numerous improvements

itself. Its processor is too slow, the computer locks up when multiple vehicles attempt to

access the system while moving at high speed and many of the overhead photos were

outdated.119 Additionally, soldiers complained that the digital systems overheated easily.

The reports authors conclude air conditioning units will have to be installed in all

Strykers120. This will impact the vehicles fuel efficiency, acceleration and add additional

weight.

Strykers remote weapon system, its main armament, also suffers significant

deficiencies. A lack of stabilization for the gun and sight makes it extremely difficult to

hit targets while moving, the lack of a color display makes it difficult to identify specific

targets (e.g. a car of a particular color), and the slow slewing of the guns turret impairs

the gunners ability to quickly engage a target. The gun is only marginally effective at

night even when standing still because the thermal sensors used for firing accuracy dont

work well then.121 While the remote weapon system serves as an effective area

suppression weapon when standing still122, its shortcomings underline Strykers lack of

effective firepower in combat.

In an apparent response to these problems, the Army Engineering School will

soon outfit the 1/25 SBCT with a new radio-frequency kit to allow soldiers to detonate

mines from as far as several kilometers away. The units, called Matrix, are designed to

work with Claymore antipersonnel mines that feature a lethal radius of 50 meters. Matrix

119 Ibid: p. 56.120 Ibid.121 Ibid: p. 58.122 Ibid.


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can also be paired with a non-lethal version of the mine for crowd control purposes.123

This emphasis on static, stand-off defenses nevertheless underscores Strykers liabilities

in close-quarter combat.

Despite the spate of incidents and the negative internal Army report, soldiers of

the deployed Stryker Brigade remain enthusiastic supporters of the vehicle124, often citing

the vehicles speed, safety and quietness: Being quiet is an advantage because [the

insurgents] dont know where were at. If they attack us, we can circle around behind

without hearing us, because the firefights are loud. You cant even notice us driving

up.

125

According to Lt. Col Michael Kurilla of the 1

st

Battalion, 24

th

Infantry Regiment

in urban combat, no better vehicle exists for delivering a squad of infantrymen to close

in and destroy the enemy.126 Indeed, Stryker is useful as an infantry transport vehicle.

It is, however, not suitable for combat in urban and complex settings it was intended for

as described in the 2003 Army Modernization Plan.

Conclusions

Stryker is not a warfighting platform. They are inherently unsuitable for the small-scale

contingencies, particularly urban operations, they were designed and optimized for.127

Stryker has not proven particularly agile or versatile in its missions in Operation Iraqi

Freedom. My analysis of operations in Iraq indicates that, in reality, the vehicles are used

only for paramilitary missions like patrols and light infantry transport.

123 Michael Peck, Stryker Brigade will Protect Bases with Remote-controlled Mines,National Defense,

March 2005. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Mar/UF-Stryker_Brigade.htm124 Robert Burns, Stryker has Proven its Worth,Associated Press , April 21, 2005. Accessed at

http://www.usarpac.army.mil/news/xform/ap_042105.asp125 Edward Harris, Soldiers Hail New Army Troop Transport, The Associated Press, April 5, 2005.

Accessed at http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0405/218502.html126 Michael Kurilla, Stryker Gets the Job Done, The Washington Post, April 5, 2005: p. 22.127 Department of the Army, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: pp. 26-27. Accessed at

http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf


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The vehicles lack adequate firepower for fast-paced and close-quarter urban

combat. In the one well-documented case where Stryker Brigades were drawn into

serious urban combat the troops were not able to dominate the battlefield until after the

bulk of the opposing force had been wiped out by strong displays of air power. An

internal Army report also raised serious concerns about the deficiencies of its main

armament.

Strykers inadequate armor and large exposed wheel wells make them

unnecessarily vulnerable to weapons like rocket-propelled grenades and improvised

explosive devices commonly employed in guerilla tactics and urban combat situations

American troops face daily in Iraq. The vehicles large turning radius hinders its

maneuverability on narrow city streets. Off-road mobility has proven problematic as well,

especially with the additional weight of appliqu armor.

Due to restrictions on use off-road around Samarra and in the narrow streets of

Mosuls old quarter, large areas became relatively safe havens for insurgents and Stryker

areas of operation became predictable. Worryingly, Stryker patrols in Mosul now appear

to be specifically targeted by insurgents using improvised explosive devices.

The ability of Stryker Brigades to perform independently at the higher end of the

combat spectrum is limited as well. A root cause of this miscalculation is the underlying

assumption of the battlefield advantage of situational awareness. We simply do not

possess the technological capabilities to achieve a clear picture of enemy movement and

intentions. The edge in information superiority our forces currently do enjoy is generally

negated in close-quarter urban combat.

Transport by C-130 within the theater, a primary reason for procuring the vehicle,

has proven entirely unrealistic. Even Strykers stripped down to the bare essentials are


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only just light enough for air transport but require an unacceptable amount of time to

prepare for operations upon landing. It is telling the 2/3 SBCT drove to Najaf rather than

be flown there.128 TRADOC analysts concluded a Stryker unit is capable of winning

decisively in major combat operations (MCO) only with significant augmentation.129 In

other words, Stryker brigades would need accompaniment of a heavy division to be truly

effective, undermining the utility of being C-130 transportable.130

General Shinseki was right to emphasize the need for rapidly deployable, lethal,

and survivable brigades. He got it wrong by insisting on equipping them with wheeled

LAVs. Transformation does not necessarily necessitate a new platform or new

technologies. It often means employing the tools you have in a different manner.

Pursuing Stryker as the platform for the all-purpose Interim Brigade was a costly mistake.

Policy Implications

In light of the preceding analysis I propose the following five policy changes:

Cancel the Stryker Program

The Department of Defense should terminate the Stryker program after FY2005.

Restricting procurement of additional vehicles frees up $2.1 billion131

for upgrades to and

new purchases of existing platforms, as well as additional funds for body armor,

ammunition and vehicle maintenance. An average per unit cost of nearly $3 million for a

new platform used only for paramilitary missions is a poor use of resources. The United

128 Megan Scully, The Squeeze on Transformation,Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed atwww.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php; and Authors interview of Michael

Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.129 As quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land

Warfare, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p. 52.130 Ibid.131 Based on estimated budget figures outlined in Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007

Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at

http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/wtcv.pdf


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States military already owns a fleet of highly-capable, and less expensive, vehicles for

this purpose in the Marine LAV.

There is, however, a considerable political hurdle to be dealt with when canceling

the Stryker as they provide significant economic benefits to the areas where they are

based.132 It is not a coincidence that the Stryker Brigades are located in or near the

districts of powerful members of Congress. Three brigades are to be based in Fort Lewis,

Wash., in the district of Representative Norm Dicks (D-WA), a senior member of the

House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. One unit is based at Fort Wainwright,

Alaska, represented in Congress by Representative Don Young, 3

rd

ranking Republican

Member of the House, and Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), a commanding force in the

upper chamber. The fifth U.S.-based brigade will be at Oahus Schofield Barracks just

outside the district of Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), ranking member of the House

Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee. Taking on their vested interests in

maintaining all five U.S.-based Stryker Brigades will undoubtedly be difficult, but a

compelling argument must be made.

Upgrade Existing Fleet of M113s133

The Army can achieve its goal of forming rapidly deployable, robust brigades by

upgrading its current fleet of C-130 transportable M113 armored vehicles and

augmenting them by procuring the MTVL variant. These vehicles are much better suited

132 Stryker-related projects such as construction of roads and training facilities on Oahu and the Big Island

alone will cost nearly $700 million through 2010, with much of these funds benefiting the local economy.Gregg K. Kakesako, Stryker Projects On,Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 1, 2005. Accessed at

http://starbulletin.com/2005/05/01/news/133 See Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades,Defense Week, Volume 24,

Number 50, December 22, 2003 and Victor OReilly Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress):

December 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf


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for the asymmetric challenges posed during urban warfare and stability operations. 134

The M113 A3 is significantly lighter and smaller than a Stryker for greater

maneuverability in tight urban quarters. As a tracked vehicle it provides superior off-

road capabilities. The Army currently has over 11,000 M113s in storage and could be

up-armored and updated to the specifications of the A3 for under $500,000.135 This

policy recommendation has two precedents. First is the aforementioned existence of a

rapid reaction force centered on the M113. Second, LG Thomas Metz, US Army ground

force commander in Iraq, requested hundreds of M113s be sent to Iraq earlier this year

because it was more useful, cheaper and easier to transportthan Stryker.

136

General

Casey, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, approved the request. The newly-

deployed M113s received armor upgrades to better withstand RPG attacks.137

Augment the Interim Brigades with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle

No light armored vehicle can withstand large-caliber tank fire. Outfitting the Interim

Brigade solely with lightly armored vehicles, therefore, greatly limits the operational

scope of the unit. The Army should enhance the firepower and survivability of its

Interim Brigades with a mechanized task force.138

I propose the Interim Brigades be reconfigured by adding M2 Bradley Fighting

Vehicles. The M2 has armor protection similar to that of an M1 Abrams tank and can

134 BG David Grange, USA (Ret), interview with Lou Dobbs, CNN. Broadcast April 26, 2004. Transcript

accessed at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0404/26/ldt.00.html.135 Jack Kelly, Newly Armored Humvees Still Fail to Protect,Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 29, 2005.

Accessed at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05029/449831.stm136 Joseph L. Galloway, Army to send Older Armored Personnel Carriers to Iraq After Upgrading Armor,

Stars and Stripes, January 4, 2005. Accessed at

http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_010405_Armor,00.html137 Ibid.138 The authors of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report for Operation Iraqi

Freedom allude to such a solution. See: Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003: p. 88. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf


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withstand 30mm projectiles on all sides (compared to 14.5mm only on top, the rear and

the sides above the wheel wells for an up-armored Stryker).139

Continue Research & Development of Combat Survivability Technology

The quest for better combat survivability is more imperative than ever. Army scientists

should continue to research advanced technologies but be realistic about the timeframe

for development and the shortcomings of such new technology.140 One promising arena

is finding light-weight substitutes for steel armor. Ceramic armor, such as silicon

carbide, features many desirable attributes but its current cost is prohibitive. Another

important shortcoming is that ceramic armor tiles are thicker the lighter they are, thus

impacting the size and interior space of the vehicle sporting it.141

Other interesting avenues of research include active defenses and electronic

countermeasures. Scientists at the Tank-Automotive Research Development and

Engineering Center (TARDEC) believe applying a set of such defenses could contribute

to the goal of manufacturing lighter but durable armored vehicles.142

Reevaluate the Objective Force

Senator Lieberman (D-CT) presciently questioned the wisdom of centering the vehicular

components of the Objective Force on a single platform in early 2000.143 Army leaders

are beginning to articulate this point of view now as well. According to BG David

Fastabend, a senior officer responsible for long-range planning at the Armys Future

139 M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems, Global Security.org. Accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2.htm140 Sandra Erwin, Future Combat Systems Technologies Not Keeping Pace with Expectations,NationalDefense, October 2004. Accessed at

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/oct/Future_Combat.htm141 Ibid.142 Sandra Erwin, Survival in Combat Zones Requires Layers of Protection,National Defense,

December 2004. Accessed at

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Dec/SurvivalInCombat.htm143 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the



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Center, the answer to complexity, volatility and uncertainty is always diversity.144

Both the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ensuing

insurgency point to the value of maintain

the army's stryker vehicle - a costly mistake rasser

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