THE 33 STRATEGIES OF WAR

OTHER TITLES BY ROBERTGREENE

The Art of Seduction (A Joost Elffers Production)

The 48 Laws of Power (A Joost Elffers Production)

THE 33 STRATEGIES OF WAR

ROBERT GREENEA JOOST ELFFERS PRODUCTION

VIKING

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To Napoleon, Sun-tzu, the goddess Athena, and mycat BRUTUS.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

PART I SELF-DIRECTED WARFARE1

DECLARE WAR ON YOUR ENEMIES: THEPOLARITY STRATEGY

Life is endless battle and conflict, and you cannotfight effectively unless you can identify yourenemies. Learn to smoke out your enemies, tospot them by the signs and patterns that revealhostility. Then, once you have them in yoursights, inwardly declare war. Your enemies canfill you with purpose and direction.

2 DO NOT FIGHT THE LAST WAR: THE

GUERRILLA-WAR-OF-THE-MIND STRATEGYWhat most often weighs you down and bringsyou misery is the past. You must consciouslywage war against the past and force yourself toreact to the present moment. Be ruthless onyourself; do not repeat the same tired methods.Wage guerrilla war on your mind, allowing nostatic lines of defense--make everything fluid andmobile.

3

AMIDST THE TURMOIL OF EVENTS, DO NOTLOSE YOUR PRESENCE OF MIND: THE

COUNTERBALANCE STRATEGYIn the heat of battle, the mind tends to lose itsbalance. It is vital to keep your presence of mind,maintaining your mental powers, whatever thecircumstances. Make the mind tougher byexposing it to adversity. Learn to detach yourselffrom the chaos of the battlefield.

4 CREATE A SENSE OF URGENCY ANDDESPERATION: THE DEATH-GROUND

STRATEGYYou are your own worst enemy. You wasteprecious time dreaming of the future instead ofengaging in the present. Cut your ties to the past;enter unknown territory. Place yourself on"death ground," where your back is against thewall and you have to fight like hell to get outalive.

PART II ORGANIZATIONAL (TEAM) WARFARE5

AVOID THE SNARES OF GROUPTHINK: THECOMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRATEGY

The problem in leading any group is that peopleinevitably have their own agendas. You have tocreate a chain of command in which they do notfeel constrained by your influence yet follow

your lead. Create a sense of participation, but donot fall into groupthink--the irrationality ofcollective decision making.

6 SEGMENT YOUR FORCES: THE CONTROLLED-

CHAOS STRATEGYThe critical elements in war are speed andadaptability--the ability to move and makedecisions faster than the enemy. Break yourforces into independent groups that can operateon their own. Make your forces elusive andunstoppable by infusing them with the spirit ofthe campaign, giving them a mission toaccomplish, and then letting them run.

7 TRANSFORM YOUR WAR INTO A CRUSADE:

MORALE STRATEGIESThe secret to motivating people and maintainingtheir morale is to get them to think less aboutthemselves and more about the group. Involvethem in a cause, a crusade against a hatedenemy. Make them see their survival as tied tothe success of the army as a whole.

PART III DEFENSIVE WARFARE8

PICK YOUR BATTLES CAREFULLY: THEPERFECT-ECONOMY STRATEGY

We all have limitations--our energies and skillswill take us only so far. You must know yourlimits and pick your battles carefully. Considerthe hidden costs of a war: time lost, politicalgoodwill squandered, an embittered enemy benton revenge. Sometimes it is better to wait, toundermine your enemies covertly rather thanhitting them straight on.

9 TURN THE TABLES: THE COUNTERATTACK

STRATEGYMoving first--initiating the attack--will often putyou at a disadvantage: You are exposing yourstrategy and limiting your options. Instead,discover the power of holding back and lettingthe other side move first, giving you the flexibilityto counterattack from any angle. If youropponents are aggressive, bait them into a rashattack that will leave them in a weak position.

10 CREATE A THREATENING PRESENCE:

DETERRENCE STRATEGIESThe best way to fight off aggressors is to keepthem from attacking you in the first place. Buildup a reputation: You're a little crazy. Fighting youis not worth it. Uncertainty is sometimes betterthan overt threat: If your opponents are neversure what messing with you will cost, they willnot want to find out.

11 TRADE SPACE FOR TIME: THENONENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

Retreat in the face of a strong enemy is a signnot of weakness but of strength. By resisting thetemptation to respond to an aggressor, you buyyourself valuable time--time to recover, to think,to gain perspective. Sometimes you canaccomplish most by doing nothing.

PART IV OFFENSIVE WARFARE12

LOSE BATTLES BUT WIN THE WAR: GRANDSTRATEGY

Grand strategy is the art of looking beyond thebattle and calculating ahead. It requires that youfocus on your ultimate goal and plot to reach it.Let others get caught up in the twists and turnsof the battle, relishing their little victories. Grandstrategy will bring you the ultimate reward: thelast laugh.

13 KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE INTELLIGENCE

STRATEGYThe target of your strategies should be less thearmy you face than the mind of the man orwoman who runs it. If you understand how thatmind works, you have the key to deceiving andcontrolling it. Train yourself to read people,

picking up the signals they unconsciously sendabout their innermost thoughts and intentions.

14 OVERWHELM RESISTANCE WITH SPEED ANDSUDDENNESS: THE BLITZKRIEG STRATEGY

In a world in which many people are indecisiveand overly cautious, the use of speed will bringyou untold power. Striking first, before youropponents have time to think or prepare, willmake them emotional, unbalanced, and prone toerror.

15 CONTROL THE DYNAMIC: FORCING

STRATEGIESPeople are constantly struggling to control you.The only way to get the upper hand is to makeyour play for control more intelligent andinsidious. Instead of trying to dominate the otherside's every move, work to define the nature ofthe relationship itself. Maneuver to control youropponents' minds, pushing their emotionalbuttons and compelling them to make mistakes.

16 HIT THEM WHERE IT HURTS: THE CENTER-OF-

GRAVITY STRATEGYEveryone has a source of power on which he orshe depends. When you look at your rivals,search below the surface for that source, thecenter of gravity that holds the entire structure

together. Hitting them there will inflictdisproportionate pain. Find what the other sidemost cherishes and protects--that is where youmust strike.

17 DEFEAT THEM IN DETAIL: THE DIVIDE-AND-

CONQUER STRATEGYNever be intimidated by your enemy'sappearance. Instead, look at the parts that makeup the whole. By separating the parts, sowingdissension and division, you can bring downeven the most formidable foe. When you arefacing troubles or enemies, turn a large probleminto small, eminently defeatable parts.

18 EXPOSE AND ATTACK YOUR OPPONENT'S

SOFT FLANK: THE TURNING STRATEGYWhen you attack people directly, you stiffen theirresistance and make your task that much harder.There is a better way: Distract your opponents'attention to the front, then attack them from theside, where they least expect it. Bait people intogoing out on a limb, exposing their weakness,then rake them with fire from the side.

19 ENVELOP THE ENEMY: THE ANNIHILATION

STRATEGYPeople will use any kind of gap in your defensesto attack you. So offer no gaps. The secret is to

envelop your opponents--create relentlesspressure on them from all sides and close offtheir access to the outside world. As you sensetheir weakening resolve, crush their willpower bytightening the noose.

20 MANEUVER THEM INTO WEAKNESS: THERIPENING-FOR-THE-SICKLE STRATEGY

No matter how strong you are, fighting endlessbattles with people is exhausting, costly, andunimaginative. Wise strategists prefer the art ofmaneuver: Before the battle even begins, theyfind ways to put their opponents in positions ofsuch weakness that victory is easy and quick.Create dilemmas: Devise maneuvers that givethem a choice of ways to respond-all of thembad.

21 NEGOTIATE WHILE ADVANCING: THE

DIPLOMATIC-WAR STRATEGYBefore and during negotiations, you must keepadvancing, creating relentless pressure andcompelling the other side to settle on your terms.The more you take, the more you can give backin meaningless concessions. Create a reputationfor being tough and uncompromising, so thatpeople are back on their heels before they evenmeet you.

22

KNOW HOW TO END THINGS: THE EXITSTRATEGY

You are judged in this world by how well youbring things to an end. A messy or incompleteconclusion can reverberate for years to come.The art of ending things well is knowing when tostop. The height of strategic wisdom is to avoidall conflicts and entanglements from which thereare no realistic exits.

PART V UNCONVENTIONAL (DIRTY) WARFARE

23 WEAVE A SEAMLESS BLEND OF FACT AND

FICTION: MISPERCEPTION STRATEGIESSince no creature can survive without the abilityto see or sense what is going on around it, makeit hard for your enemies to know what is goingon around them, including what you are doing.Feed their expectations, manufacture a reality tomatch their desires, and they will foolthemselves. Control people's perceptions ofreality and you control them.

24 TAKE THE LINE OF LEAST EXPECTATION: THE

ORDINARY-EXTRAORDINARY STRATEGYPeople expect your behavior to conform toknown patterns and conventions. Your task as astrategist is to upset their expectations. First do

something ordinary and conventional to fix theirimage of you, then hit them with theextraordinary. The terror is greater for being sosudden. Sometimes the ordinary is extraordinarybecause it is unexpected.

25 OCCUPY THE MORAL HIGH GROUND: THE

RIGHTEOUS STRATEGYIn a political world, the cause you are fighting formust seem more just than the enemy's. Byquestioning your opponents' motives andmaking them appear evil, you can narrow theirbase of support and room to maneuver. Whenyou yourself come under moral attack from aclever enemy, do not whine or get angry; fight firewith fire.

26 DENY THEM TARGETS: THE STRATEGY OF

THE VOIDThe feeling of emptiness or void--silence,isolation, nonengagement with others--is formost people intolerable. Give your enemies notarget to attack, be dangerous but elusive, thenwatch as they chase you into the void. Instead offrontal battles, deliver irritating but damaging sideattacks and pinprick bites.

27 SEEM TO WORK FOR THE INTERESTS OF

OTHERS WHILE FURTHERING YOUR OWN:

THE ALLIANCE STRATEGYThe best way to advance your cause with theminimum of effort and bloodshed is to create aconstantly shifting network of alliances, gettingothers to compensate for your deficiencies, doyour dirty work, fight your wars. At the sametime, you must work to sow dissension in thealliances of others, weakening your enemies byisolating them.

28 GIVE YOUR RIVALS ENOUGH ROPE TO HANG

THEMSELVES: THE ONE-UPMANSHIPSTRATEGY

Life's greatest dangers often come not fromexternal enemies but from our supposedcolleagues and friends who pretend to work forthe common cause while scheming to sabotageus. Work to instill doubts and insecurities in suchrivals, getting them to think too much and actdefensively. Make them hang themselvesthrough their own self-destructive tendencies,leaving you blameless and clean.

29 TAKE SMALL BITES: THE FAIT ACCOMPLI

STRATEGYOvert power grabs and sharp rises to the top aredangerous, creating envy, distrust, andsuspicion. Often the best solution is to take smallbites, swallow little territories, playing uponpeople's relatively short attention spans. Before

people realize it, you have accumulated anempire.

30 PENETRATE THEIR MINDS: COMMUNICATION

STRATEGIESCommunication is a kind of war, its field of battlethe resistant and defensive minds of the peopleyou want to influence. The goal is to penetratetheir defenses and occupy their minds. Learn toinfiltrate your ideas behind enemy lines, sendingmessages through little details, luring people intocoming to the conclusions you desire and intothinking they've gotten there by themselves.

31 DESTROY FROM WITHIN: THE INNER-FRONT

STRATEGYBy infiltrating your opponents' ranks, workingfrom within to bring them down, you give themnothing to see or react against--the ultimateadvantage. To take something you want, do notfight those who have it, but rather join them--then either slowly make it your own or wait forthe moment to stage a coup d'etat.

32 DOMINATE WHILE SEEMING TO SUBMIT: THE

PASSIVE-AGGRESSION STRATEGYIn a world where political considerations areparamount, the most effective form of aggressionis the best hidden one: aggression behind a

compliant, even loving exterior. To follow thepassive-aggression strategy you must seem togo along with people, offering no resistance. Butactually you dominate the situation. Just makesure you have disguised your aggressionenough that you can deny it exists.

33 SOW UNCERTAINTY AND PANIC THROUGHACTS OF TERROR: THE CHAIN-REACTION

STRATEGYTerror is the ultimate way to paralyze a people'swill to resist and destroy their ability to plan astrategic response. The goal in a terror campaignis not battlefield victory but causing maximumchaos and provoking the other side intodesperate overreaction. To plot the most effectivecounterstrategy, victims of terror must staybalanced. One's rationality is the last line ofdefense.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

PREFACE

We live in a culture that promotes democratic valuesof being fair to one and all, the importance of fittinginto a group, and knowing how to cooperate withother people. We are taught early on in life that thosewho are outwardly combative and aggressive pay asocial price: unpopularity and isolation. These valuesof harmony and cooperation are perpetuated in subtleand not-so-subtle ways--through books on how to besuccessful in life; through the pleasant, peacefulexteriors that those who have gotten ahead in theworld present to the public; through notions ofcorrectness that saturate the public space. Theproblem for us is that we are trained and prepared forpeace, and we are not at all prepared for whatconfronts us in the real world--war.

The life of man upon earth is a warfare.JOB 7:1

Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum (let himwho wants peace prepare for war)

VEGETIUS, A.D. FOURTH CENTURY

This war exists on several levels. Most obviously,we have our rivals on the other side. The world has

become increasingly competitive and nasty. Inpolitics, business, even the arts, we face opponentswho will do almost anything to gain an edge. Moretroubling and complex, however, are the battles weface with those who are supposedly on our side.There are those who outwardly play the team game,who act very friendly and agreeable, but whosabotage us behind the scenes, use the group topromote their own agenda. Others, more difficult tospot, play subtle games of passive aggression,offering help that never comes, instilling guilt as asecret weapon. On the surface everything seemspeaceful enough, but just below it, it is every man andwoman for him-or herself, this dynamic infecting evenfamilies and relationships. The culture may deny thisreality and promote a gentler picture, but we know itand feel it, in our battle scars.

It is not that we and our colleagues are ignoblecreatures who fail to live up to ideals of peace andselflessness, but that we cannot help the way we are.We have aggressive impulses that are impossible toignore or repress. In the past, individuals could expecta group--the state, an extended family, a company--totake care of them, but this is no longer the case, andin this uncaring world we have to think first andforemost of ourselves and our interests. What weneed are not impossible and inhuman ideals of peaceand cooperation to live up to, and the confusion thatbrings us, but rather practical knowledge on how todeal with conflict and the daily battles we face. Andthis knowledge is not about how to be more forceful in

getting what we want or defending ourselves butrather how to be more rational and strategic when itcomes to conflict, channeling our aggressiveimpulses instead of denying or repressing them. Ifthere is an ideal to aim for, it should be that of thestrategic warrior, the man or woman who managesdifficult situations and people through deft andintelligent maneuver.

[Strategy] is more than a science: it is theapplication of knowledge to practical life, thedevelopment of thought capable of modifyingthe original guiding idea in the light of ever-changing situations; it is the art of acting underthe pressure of the most difficult conditions.

HELMUTH VON MOLTKE, 1800-1891

Many psychologists and sociologists have arguedthat it is through conflict that problems are oftensolved and real differences reconciled. Oursuccesses and failures in life can be traced to howwell or how badly we deal with the inevitable conflictsthat confront us in society. The common ways thatpeople deal with them--trying to avoid all conflict,getting emotional and lashing out, turning sly andmanipulative--are all counterproductive in the long run,because they are not under conscious and rationalcontrol and often make the situation worse. Strategicwarriors operate much differently. They think aheadtoward their long-term goals, decide which fights toavoid and which are inevitable, know how to control

and channel their emotions. When forced to fight, theydo so with indirection and subtle maneuver, makingtheir manipulations hard to trace. In this way they canmaintain the peaceful exterior so cherished in thesepolitical times.

This ideal of fighting rationally comes to us fromorganized warfare, where the art of strategy wasinvented and refined. In the beginning, war was not atall strategic. Battles between tribes were fought in abrutal manner, a kind of ritual of violence in whichindividuals could display their heroism. But as tribesexpanded and evolved into states, it became all tooapparent that war had too many hidden costs, thatwaging it blindly often led to exhaustion and self-destruction, even for the victor. Somehow wars had tobe fought more rationally.

The word "strategy" comes from the ancient Greekword strategos, meaning literally "the leader of thearmy." Strategy in this sense was the art ofgeneralship, of commanding the entire war effort,deciding what formations to deploy, what terrain tofight on, what maneuvers to use to gain an edge. Andas this knowledge progressed, military leadersdiscovered that the more they thought and plannedahead, the more possibilities they had for success.Novel strategies could allow them to defeat muchlarger armies, as Alexander the Great did in hisvictories over the Persians. In facing savvy opponentswho were also using strategy, there developed anupward pressure: to gain an advantage, a generalhad to be even more strategic, more indirect and

clever, than the other side. Over time the arts ofgeneralship became steadily more sophisticated, asmore strategies were invented.

Although the word "strategy" itself is Greek inorigin, the concept appears in all cultures, in allperiods. Solid principles on how to deal with theinevitable accidents of war, how to craft the ultimateplan, how to best organize the army--all of this can befound in war manuals from ancient China to modernEurope. The counterattack, the flanking or envelopingmaneuver, and the arts of deception are common tothe armies of Genghis Khan, Napoleon, and the Zuluking Shaka. As a whole, these principles andstrategies indicate a kind of universal militarywisdom, a set of adaptable patterns that can increasethe chances for victory.

"Well, then, my boy, develop your strategy Sothat prizes in games won't elude your grasp.Strategy makes a better woodcutter thanstrength. Strategy keeps a pilot's ship on courseWhen crosswinds blow it over the wine-blue sea.And strategy wins races for charioteers. Onetype of driver trusts his horses and car Andswerves mindlessly this way and that, All overthe course, without reining his horses. But aman who knows how to win with lesser horsesKeeps his eye on the post and cuts the turnclose, And from the start keeps tension on thereins With a firm hand as he watches the

leader."THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURY

B.C.

Perhaps the greatest strategist of them all wasSun-tzu, author of the ancient Chinese classic The Artof War. In his book, written probably the fourth centuryB.C., can be found traces of almost all the strategicpatterns and principles later developed over thecourse of centuries. But what connects them, in factwhat constitutes the art of war itself in Sun-tzu's eyes,is the ideal of winning without bloodshed. By playingon the psychological weaknesses of the opponent, bymaneuvering him into precarious positions, byinducing feelings of frustration and confusion, astrategist can get the other side to break downmentally before surrendering physically. In this wayvictory can be had at a much lower cost. And the statethat wins wars with few lives lost and resourcessquandered is the state that can thrive over greaterperiods of time. Certainly most wars are not wagedso rationally, but those campaigns in history that havefollowed this principle (Scipio Africanus in Spain,Napoleon at Ulm, T. E. Lawrence in the desertcampaigns of World War I) stand out above the restand serve as the ideal.

War is not some separate realm divorced from therest of society. It is an eminently human arena, full ofthe best and the worst of our nature. War also reflectstrends in society. The evolution toward moreunconventional, dirtier strategies--guerrilla warfare,

terrorism--mirrors a similar evolution in society, wherealmost anything goes. The strategies that succeed inwar, whether conventional or unconventional, arebased on timeless psychology, and great militaryfailures have much to teach us about human stupidityand the limits of force in any arena. The strategicideal in war--being supremely rational and emotionallybalanced, striving to win with minimum bloodshed andloss of resources--has infinite application andrelevance to our daily battles.

Inculcated with the values of our times, many willargue that organized war is inherently barbaric--a relicof man's violent past and something to be overcomefor good. To promote the arts of warfare in a socialsetting, they will say, is to stand in the way of progressand to encourage conflict and dissension. Isn't thereenough of that in the world? This argument is veryseductive, but not at all reasonable. There will alwaysbe those in society and in the world at large who aremore aggressive than we are, who find ways to getwhat they want, by hook or by crook. We must bevigilant and must know how to defend ourselvesagainst such types. Civilized values are not furtheredif we are forced to surrender to those who are craftyand strong. In fact, being pacifists in the face of suchwolves is the source of endless tragedy.

The self is the friend of a man who mastershimself through the self, but for a man withoutself-mastery, the self is like an enemy at war.

THE BHAGAVAD GITA, INDIA, CIRCA A.D.

FIRST CENTURY

Mahatma Gandhi, who elevated nonviolence into agreat weapon for social change, had one simple goallater on in his life: to rid India of the British overlordswho had crippled it for so many centuries. The Britishwere clever rulers. Gandhi understood that ifnonviolence were to work, it would have to beextremely strategic, demanding much thought andplanning. He went so far as to call nonviolence a newway of waging war. To promote any value, evenpeace and pacifism, you must be willing to fight for itand to aim at results--not simply the good, warmfeeling that expressing such ideas might bring you.The moment you aim for results, you are in the realmof strategy. War and strategy have an inexorablelogic: if you want or desire anything, you must beready and able to fight for it.

Others will argue that war and strategy are primarilymatters that concern men, particularly those who areaggressive or among the power elite. The study ofwar and strategy, they will say, is a masculine, elitist,and repressive pursuit, a way for power to perpetuateitself. Such an argument is dangerous nonsense. Inthe beginning, strategy indeed belonged to a selectfew--a general, his staff, the king, a handful ofcourtiers. Soldiers were not taught strategy, for thatwould not have helped them on the battlefield.Besides, it was unwise to arm one's soldiers with thekind of practical knowledge that could help them toorganize a mutiny or rebellion. The era of colonialism

took this principle further: the indigenous peoples ofEurope's colonies were conscripted into the Westernarmies and did much of the police work, but eventhose who rose to the upper echelons were rigorouslykept ignorant of knowledge of strategy, which wasconsidered far too dangerous for them to know. Tomaintain strategy and the arts of war as a branch ofspecialized knowledge is actually to play into thehands of the elites and repressive powers, who like todivide and conquer. If strategy is the art of gettingresults, of putting ideas into practice, then it should bespread far and wide, particularly among those whohave been traditionally kept ignorant of it, includingwomen. In the mythologies of almost all cultures, thegreat gods of war are women, including Athena ofancient Greece. A woman's lack of interest in strategyand war is not biological but social and perhapspolitical.

Instead of resisting the pull of strategy and thevirtues of rational warfare or imagining that it isbeneath you, it is far better to confront its necessity.Mastering the art will only make your life morepeaceful and productive in the long run, for you willknow how to play the game and win without violence.Ignoring it will lead to a life of endless confusion anddefeat.

The following are six fundamental ideals you shouldaim for in transforming yourself into a strategic warriorin daily life.

Look at things as they are, not as your emotions

color them. In strategy you must see your emotionalresponses to events as a kind of disease that mustbe remedied. Fear will make you overestimate theenemy and act too defensively. Anger and impatiencewill draw you into rash actions that will cut off youroptions. Overconfidence, particularly as a result ofsuccess, will make you go too far. Love and affectionwill blind you to the treacherous maneuvers of thoseapparently on your side. Even the subtlest gradationsof these emotions can color the way you look atevents. The only remedy is to be aware that the pull ofemotion is inevitable, to notice it when it is happening,and to compensate for it. When you have success, beextra wary. When you are angry, take no action. Whenyou are fearful, know you are going to exaggerate thedangers you face. War demands the utmost inrealism, seeing things as they are. The more you canlimit or compensate for your emotional responses, thecloser you will come to this ideal.

Although a goddess of war, [Athena] gets nopleasure from battle...but rather from settlingdisputes, and upholding the law by pacificmeans. She bears no arms in time of peaceand, if ever she needs any, will usually borrow aset from Zeus. Her mercy is great.... Yet, onceengaged in battle, she never loses the day,even against Ares himself, being bettergrounded in tactics and strategy than he; andwise captains always approach her for advice.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 1, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

Judge people by their actions. The brilliance ofwarfare is that no amount of eloquence or talk canexplain away a failure on the battlefield. A general hasled his troops to defeat, lives have been wasted, andthat is how history will judge him. You must strive toapply this ruthless standard in your daily life, judgingpeople by the results of their actions, the deeds thatcan be seen and measured, the maneuvers they haveused to gain power. What people say aboutthemselves does not matter; people will say anything.Look at what they have done; deeds do not lie. Youmust also apply this logic to yourself. In looking backat a defeat, you must identify the things you couldhave done differently. It is your own bad strategies,not the unfair opponent, that are to blame for yourfailures. You are responsible for the good and bad inyour life. As a corollary to this, look at everything otherpeople do as a strategic maneuver, an attempt togain victory. People who accuse you of being unfair,for example, who try to make you feel guilty, who talkabout justice and morality, are trying to gain anadvantage on the chessboard.

Depend on your own arms. In the search forsuccess in life, people tend to rely on things that seemsimple and easy or that have worked before. Thiscould mean accumulating wealth, resources, a largenumber of allies, or the latest technology and theadvantage it brings. This is being materialistic and

mechanical. But true strategy is psychological--amatter of intelligence, not material force. Everything inlife can be taken away from you and generally will beat some point. Your wealth vanishes, the latestgadgetry suddenly becomes passe, your allies desertyou. But if your mind is armed with the art of war, thereis no power that can take that away. In the middle of acrisis, your mind will find its way to the right solution.Having superior strategies at your fingertips will giveyour maneuvers irresistible force. As Sun-tzu says,"Being unconquerable lies with yourself."

And Athena, whose eyes were as grey as owls:"Diomedes, son of Tydeus...You don't have tofear Ares or any other Of the immortals. Lookwho is here beside you. Drive your horsesdirectly at Ares And when you're in range, strike.Don't be in awe of Ares. He's nothing but Ashifty lout..."...And when Diomedes thrust next,She drove his spear home to the pit Of Ares'belly, where the kilt-piece covered it.... [Ares]quickly scaled the heights of Olympus, Satdown sulking beside Cronion Zeus, Showedhim the immortal blood oozing From his wound,and whined these winged words: "Father Zeus,doesn't it infuriate you To see this violence? Wegods Get the worst of it from each otherWhenever we try to help out men..." And Zeus,from under thunderhead brows: "Shifty lout.Don't sit here by me and whine. You're the most

loathsome god on Olympus. You actually likefighting and war. You take after yourhardheaded mother, Hera. I can barely controlher either.... Be that as it may, I cannot tolerateyou're being in pain..." And he called Paieon todoctor his wound...

Worship Athena, not Ares. In the mythology ofancient Greece, the cleverest immortal of them allwas the goddess Metis. To prevent her fromoutwitting and destroying him, Zeus married her, thenswallowed her whole, hoping to incorporate herwisdom in the process. But Metis was pregnant withZeus's child, the goddess Athena, who wassubsequently born from his forehead. As befitting herlineage, she was blessed with the craftiness of Metisand the warrior mentality of Zeus. She was deemedby the Greeks to be the goddess of strategic warfare,her favorite mortal and acolyte being the craftyOdysseus. Ares was the god of war in its direct andbrutal form. The Greeks despised Ares andworshipped Athena, who always fought with theutmost intelligence and subtlety. Your interest in war isnot the violence, the brutality, the waste of lives andresources, but the rationality and pragmatism it forceson us and the ideal of winning without bloodshed. TheAres figures of the world are actually quite stupid andeasily misled. Using the wisdom of Athena, your goalis to turn the violence and aggression of such typesagainst them, making their brutality the cause of theirdownfall. Like Athena, you are always one step

ahead, making your moves more indirect. Your goal isto blend philosophy and war, wisdom and battle, intoan unbeatable blend.

Elevate yourself above the battlefield. In war,strategy is the art of commanding the entire militaryoperation. Tactics, on the other hand, is the skill offorming up the army for battle itself and dealing withthe immediate needs of the battlefield. Most of us inlife are tacticians, not strategists. We become soenmeshed in the conflicts we face that we can thinkonly of how to get what we want in the battle we arecurrently facing. To think strategically is difficult andunnatural. You may imagine you are being strategic,but in all likelihood you are merely being tactical. Tohave the power that only strategy can bring, you mustbe able to elevate yourself above the battlefield, tofocus on your long-term objectives, to craft an entirecampaign, to get out of the reactive mode that somany battles in life lock you into. Keeping your overallgoals in mind, it becomes much easier to decidewhen to fight and when to walk away. That makes thetactical decisions of daily life much simpler and morerational. Tactical people are heavy and stuck in theground; strategists are light on their feet and can seefar and wide.

Spiritualize your warfare. Every day you facebattles--that is the reality for all creatures in theirstruggle to survive. But the greatest battle of all is withyourself--your weaknesses, your emotions, your lackof resolution in seeing things through to the end. You

must declare unceasing war on yourself. As a warriorin life, you welcome combat and conflict as ways toprove yourself, to better your skills, to gain courage,confidence, and experience. Instead of repressingyour doubts and fears, you must face them down, dobattle with them. You want more challenges, and youinvite more war. You are forging the warrior's spirit,and only constant practice will lead you there.

The 33 Strategies of War is a distillation of thetimeless wisdom contained in the lessons andprinciples of warfare. The book is designed to armyou with practical knowledge that will give you endlessoptions and advantages in dealing with the elusivewarriors that attack you in daily battle.

Then back to the palace of great Zeus CameArgive Hera and Athena the Protector, Havingstopped brutal Ares from butchering men.

THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURYB.C.

Each chapter is a strategy aimed at solving aparticular problem that you will often encounter. Suchproblems include fighting with an unmotivated armybehind you; wasting energy by battling on too manyfronts; feeling overwhelmed by friction, thediscrepancy between plans and reality; getting intosituations you cannot get out of. You can read thechapters that apply to the particular problem of themoment. Better still, you can read all of the strategies,absorb them, allowing them to become part of your

mental arsenal. Even when you are trying to avoid awar, not fight one, many of these strategies are worthknowing for defensive purposes and for makingyourself aware of what the other side might be up to.In any event, they are not intended as doctrine orformulas to be repeated but as aids to judgment in theheat of battle, seeds that will take root in you and helpyou think for yourself, developing the latent strategistwithin.

Against war it can be said: it makes the victorstupid, the defeated malicious. In favour of war:through producing these two effects it barbarizesand therefore makes more natural; it is thewinter or hibernation time of culture, mankindemerges from it stronger for good and evil.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844-1900

The strategies themselves are culled from thewritings and practices of the greatest generals inhistory (Alexander the Great, Hannibal, GenghisKhan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Shaka Zulu, WilliamTechumseh Sherman, Erwin Rommel, Vo NguyenGiap) as well as the greatest strategists (Sun-tzu,Miyamoto Musashi, Carl von Clausewitz, Ardant duPicq, T. E. Lawrence, Colonel John Boyd). Theyrange from the basic strategies of classical warfare tothe dirty, unconventional strategies of modern times.The book is divided into five parts: self-directed war(how to prepare your mind and spirit for battle);organizational war (how to structure and motivate your

army); defensive war; offensive war; andunconventional (dirty) war. Each chapter is illustratedwith historical examples, not only from warfare itselfbut from politics (Margaret Thatcher), culture (AlfredHitchcock), sports (Muhammad Ali), business (JohnD. Rockefeller), showing the intimate connectionbetween the military and the social. These strategiescan be applied to struggles of every scale: organizedwarfare, business battles, the politics of a group, evenpersonal relationships.

Without war human beings stagnate in comfortand affluence and lose the capacity for greatthoughts and feelings, they become cynical andsubside into barbarism.

FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, 1821-1881

Finally, strategy is an art that requires not only adifferent way of thinking but an entirely differentapproach to life itself. Too often there is a chasmbetween our ideas and knowledge on the one handand our actual experience on the other. We absorbtrivia and information that takes up mental space butgets us nowhere. We read books that divert us buthave little relevance to our daily lives. We have loftyideas that we do not put into practice. We also havemany rich experiences that we do not analyze enough,that do not inspire us with ideas, whose lessons weignore. Strategy requires a constant contact betweenthe two realms. It is practical knowledge of the highestform. Events in life mean nothing if you do not reflect

on them in a deep way, and ideas from books arepointless if they have no application to life as you liveit. In strategy all of life is a game that you are playing.This game is exciting but also requires deep andserious attention. The stakes are so high. What youknow must translate into action, and action musttranslate into knowledge. In this way strategybecomes a lifelong challenge and the source ofconstant pleasure in surmounting difficulties andsolving problems.

Nature has made up her mind that what cannotdefend itself shall not be defended.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON, 1803-1882

In this world, where the game is played withloaded dice, a man must have a temper of iron,

with armor proof to the blows of fate, andweapons to make his way against men. Life isone long battle; we have to fight at every step;

and Voltaire very rightly says that if we succeed,it is at the point of the sword, and that we die with

the weapon in our hand.--Arthur Schopenhauer, Counsels and Maxims,

1851

PART I

SELF-DIRECTED WARFARE

War, or any kind of conflict, is waged and won throughstrategy. Think of strategy as a series of lines andarrows aimed at a goal: at getting you to a certainpoint in the world, at helping you to attack a problemin your path, at figuring out how to encircle anddestroy your enemy. Before directing these arrows atyour enemies, however, you must first direct them atyourself.

Your mind is the starting point of all war and allstrategy. A mind that is easily overwhelmed byemotion, that is rooted in the past instead of thepresent, that cannot see the world with clarity andurgency, will create strategies that will always missthe mark.

To become a true strategist, you must take threesteps. First, become aware of the weakness andillness that can take hold of the mind, warping itsstrategic powers. Second, declare a kind of war onyourself to make yourself move forward. Third, wageruthless and continual battle on the enemies withinyou by applying certain strategies.

The following four chapters are designed to makeyou aware of the disorders that are probablyflourishing in your mind right now and to arm you withspecific strategies for eliminating them. Thesechapters are arrows to aim at yourself. Once you have

absorbed them through thought and practice, they willserve as a self-corrective device in all your futurebattles, freeing the grand strategist within you.

DECLARE WAR ON YOUR ENEMIESTHE POLARITY STRATEGY

Life is endless battle and conflict, and you cannotfight effectively unless you can identify yourenemies. People are subtle and evasive, disguisingtheir intentions, pretending to be on your side. Youneed clarity. Learn to smoke out your enemies, tospot them by the signs and patterns that revealhostility. Then, once you have them in your sights,inwardly declare war. As the opposite poles of amagnet create motion, your enemies--youropposites--can fill you with purpose and direction. Aspeople who stand in your way, who represent whatyou loathe, people to react against, they are asource of energy. Do not be naive: with someenemies there can be no compromise, no middleground.

Then [Xenophon] got up, and first calledtogether the under-officers of Proxenos. Whenthey were collected he said: "Gentlemen, Icannot sleep and I don't think you can; and Ican't lie here when I see what a plight we are in.It is clear that the enemy did not show us openwar until they thought they had everything wellprepared; and no-one among us takes the

pains to make the best possible resistance."Yet if we give way, and fall into the king's power,what do we expect our fate will be? When hisown half-brother was dead, the man cut off hishead and cut off his hand and stuck them up ona pole. We have no-one to plead for us, and wemarched here to make the king a slave or to killhim if we could, and what do you think our fatewill be? Would he not go to all extremes oftorture to make the whole world afraid of makingwar on him? Why, we must do anything to keepout of his power! While the truce lasted, I neverceased pitying ourselves, I never ceasedcongratulating the king and his army. What avast country I saw, how large, what endlessprovisions, what crowds of servants, how manycattle and sheep, what gold, what raiment! Butwhen I thought of these our soldiers--we had noshare in all these good things unless we boughtthem, and few had anything left to buy with; andto procure anything without buying was debarredby our oaths. While I reasoned like this, Isometimes feared the truce more than the warnow. "However, now they have broken the truce,there is an end both to their insolence and toour suspicion. There lie all these good thingsbefore us, prizes for whichever side prove thebetter men; the gods are the judges of thecontest, and they will be with us, naturally....

"When you have appointed as manycommanders as are wanted, assemble all theother soldiers and encourage them; that will bejust what they want now. Perhaps you havenoticed yourselves how crestfallen they werewhen they came into camp, how crestfallen theywent on guard; in such a state I don't know whatyou could do with them.... But if someone couldturn their minds from wondering what willhappen to them, and make them wonder whatthey could do, they will be much more cheerful.You know, I am sure, that not numbers orstrength brings victory in war; but whicheverarmy goes into battle stronger in soul, theirenemies generally cannot withstand them."

ANABASIS: THE MARCH UP COUNTRY,XENOPHON, 430?-355? B.C.

THE INNER ENEMYIn the spring of 401 B.C., Xenophon, a thirty-year-oldcountry gentleman who lived outside Athens, receivedan intriguing invitation: a friend was recruiting Greeksoldiers to fight as mercenaries for Cyrus, brother ofthe Persian king Ataxerxes, and asked him to goalong. The request was somewhat unusual: theGreeks and the Persians had long been bitterenemies. Some eighty years earlier, in fact, Persiahad tried to conquer Greece. But the Greeks,renowned fighters, had begun to offer their services tothe highest bidder, and within the Persian Empire

there were rebellious cities that Cyrus wanted topunish. Greek mercenaries would be the perfectreinforcements in his large army.

Xenophon was not a soldier. In fact, he had led acoddled life, raising dogs and horses, traveling intoAthens to talk philosophy with his good friendSocrates, living off his inheritance. He wantedadventure, though, and here he had a chance to meetthe great Cyrus, learn war, see Persia. Perhaps whenit was all over, he would write a book. He would go notas a mercenary (he was too wealthy for that) but as aphilosopher and historian. After consulting the oracleat Delphi, he accepted the invitation.

Some 10,000 Greek soldiers joined Cyrus'spunitive expedition. The mercenaries were a motleycrew from all over Greece, there for the money andthe adventure. They had a good time of it for a while,but a few months into the job, after leading them deepinto Persia, Cyrus admitted his true purpose: he wasmarching on Babylon, mounting a civil war to unseathis brother and make himself king. Unhappy to bedeceived, the Greeks argued and complained, butCyrus offered them more money, and that quietedthem.

The armies of Cyrus and Ataxerxes met on theplains of Cunaxa, not far from Babylon. Early in thebattle, Cyrus was killed, putting a quick end to thewar. Now the Greeks' position was suddenlyprecarious: having fought on the wrong side of a civilwar, they were far from home and surrounded byhostile Persians. They were soon told, however, that

Ataxerxes had no quarrel with them. His only desirewas that they leave Persia as quickly as possible. Heeven sent them an envoy, the Persian commanderTissaphernes, to provision them and escort themback to Greece. And so, guided by Tissaphernes andthe Persian army, the mercenaries began the longtrek home--some fifteen hundred miles.

A few days into the march, the Greeks had newfears: their supplies from the Persians wereinsufficient, and the route that Tissaphernes hadchosen for them was problematic. Could they trustthese Persians? They started to argue amongthemselves.

The Greek commander Clearchus expressed hissoldiers' concerns to Tissaphernes, who wassympathetic: Clearchus should bring his captains to ameeting at a neutral site, the Greeks would voice theirgrievances, and the two sides would come to anunderstanding. Clearchus agreed and appeared thenext day with his officers at the appointed time andplace--where, however, a large contingent of Persianssurrounded and arrested them. They were beheadedthat same day.

One man managed to escape and warn the Greeksof the Persian treachery. That evening the Greekcamp was a desolate place. Some men argued andaccused; others slumped drunk to the ground. A fewconsidered flight, but with their leaders dead, they feltdoomed.

That night Xenophon, who had stayed mostly on thesidelines during the expedition, had a dream: a

lightning bolt from Zeus set fire to his father's house.He woke up in a sweat. It suddenly struck him: deathwas staring the Greeks in the face, yet they lay aroundmoaning, despairing, arguing. The problem was intheir heads. Fighting for money rather than for apurpose or cause, unable to distinguish betweenfriend and foe, they had gotten lost. The barrierbetween them and home was not rivers or mountainsor the Persian army but their own muddled state ofmind. Xenophon didn't want to die in this disgracefulway. He was no military man, but he knew philosophyand the way men think, and he believed that if theGreeks concentrated on the enemies who wanted tokill them, they would become alert and creative. If theyfocused on the vile treachery of the Persians, theywould grow angry, and their anger would motivatethem. They had to stop being confused mercenariesand go back to being Greeks, the polar opposite ofthe faithless Persians. What they needed was clarityand direction.

Xenophon decided to be Zeus's lightning bolt,waking the men up and illuminating their way. Hecalled a meeting of all the surviving officers andstated his plan: We will declare war without parley onthe Persians--no more thoughts of bargaining ordebate. We will waste no more time on argument oraccusation among ourselves; every ounce of ourenergy will be spent on the Persians. We will be asinventive and inspired as our ancestors at Marathon,who fought off a vastly larger Persian army. We willburn our wagons, live off the land, move fast. We will

not for one second lay down our arms or forget thedangers around us. It is us or them, life or death, goodor evil. Should any man try to confuse us with clevertalk or with vague ideas of appeasement, we willdeclare him too stupid and cowardly to be on our sideand we will drive him away. Let the Persians make usmerciless. We must be consumed with one idea:getting home alive.

The officers knew that Xenophon was right. Thenext day a Persian officer came to see them, offeringto act as an ambassador between them andAtaxerxes; following Xenophon's counsel, he wasquickly and rudely driven away. It was now war andnothing else.

Roused to action, the Greeks elected leaders,Xenophon among them, and began the march home.Forced to depend on their wits, they quickly learned toadapt to the terrain, to avoid battle, to move at night.They successfully eluded the Persians, beating themto a key mountain pass and moving through it beforethey could be caught. Although many enemy tribes stilllay between them and Greece, the dreaded Persianarmy was now behind them. It took several years, butalmost all of them returned to Greece alive.

Political thought and political instinct provethemselves theoretically and practically in theability to distinguish friend and enemy. Thehigh points of politics are simultaneously themoments in which the enemy is, in concreteclarity, recognized as the enemy.

CARL SCHMITT, 1888-1985

InterpretationLife is battle and struggle, and you will constantly findyourself facing bad situations, destructiverelationships, dangerous engagements. How youconfront these difficulties will determine your fate. AsXenophon said, your obstacles are not rivers ormountains or other people; your obstacle is yourself. Ifyou feel lost and confused, if you lose your sense ofdirection, if you cannot tell the difference betweenfriend and foe, you have only yourself to blame.

Think of yourself as always about to go into battle.Everything depends on your frame of mind and onhow you look at the world. A shift of perspective cantransform you from a passive and confusedmercenary into a motivated and creative fighter.

We are defined by our relationship to other people.As children we develop an identity by differentiatingourselves from others, even to the point of pushingthem away, rejecting them, rebelling. The more clearlyyou recognize who you do not want to be, then, theclearer your sense of identity and purpose will be.Without a sense of that polarity, without an enemy toreact against, you are as lost as the Greekmercenaries. Duped by other people's treachery, youhesitate at the fatal moment and descend into whiningand argument.

Focus on an enemy. It can be someone who blocksyour path or sabotages you, whether subtly orobviously; it can be someone who has hurt you or

someone who has fought you unfairly; it can be avalue or an idea that you loathe and that you see in anindividual or group. It can be an abstraction: stupidity,smugness, vulgar materialism. Do not listen to peoplewho say that the distinction between friend and enemyis primitive and passe. They are just disguising theirfear of conflict behind a front of false warmth. They aretrying to push you off course, to infect you with thevagueness that inflicts them. Once you feel clear andmotivated, you will have space for true friendship andtrue compromise. Your enemy is the polar star thatguides you. Given that direction, you can enter battle.

He that is not with me is against me.--Luke 11:23

THE OUTER ENEMYIn the early 1970s, the British political system hadsettled into a comfortable pattern: the Labour Partywould win an election, and then, the next time around,the Conservatives would win. Back and forth thepower went, all fairly genteel and civilized. In fact, thetwo parties had come to resemble one another. Butwhen the Conservatives lost in 1974, some of themhad had enough. Wanting to shake things up, theyproposed Margaret Thatcher as their leader. Theparty was divided that year, and Thatcher tookadvantage of the split and won the nomination.

I am by nature warlike. To attack is among myinstincts. To be able to be an enemy, to be an

enemy--that presupposes a strong nature, it isin any event a condition of every strong nature.It needs resistances, consequently it seeksresistances.... The strength of one who attackshas in the opposition he needs a kind of gauge;every growth reveals itself in the seeking out ofa powerful opponent--or problem: for aphilosopher who is warlike also challengesproblems to a duel. The undertaking is tomaster, not any resistances that happen topresent themselves, but those against whichone has to bring all one's strength, supplenessand mastery of weapons--to master equalopponents.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844-1900

No one had ever seen a politician quite likeThatcher. A woman in a world run by men, she wasalso proudly middle class--the daughter of a grocer--in the traditional party of the aristocracy. Her clotheswere prim, more like a housewife's than a politician's.She had not been a player in the Conservative Party;in fact, she was on its right-wing fringes. Most strikingof all was her style: where other politicians weresmooth and conciliatory, she confronted heropponents, attacking them directly. She had anappetite for battle.

Most politicians saw Thatcher's election as a flukeand didn't expect her to last. And in her first few yearsleading the party, when Labour was in power, she did

little to change their opinion. She railed against thesocialist system, which in her mind had choked allinitiative and was largely responsible for the declineof the British economy. She criticized the SovietUnion at a time of detente. Then, in the winter of1978-79, several public-sector unions decided tostrike. Thatcher went on the warpath, linking thestrikes to the Labour Party and Prime Minister JamesCallaghan. This was bold, divisive talk, good formaking the evening news--but not for winningelections. You had to be gentle with the voters,reassure them, not frighten them. At least that was theconventional wisdom.

In 1979 the Labour Party called a general election.Thatcher kept on the attack, categorizing the electionas a crusade against socialism and as Great Britain'slast chance to modernize. Callaghan was the epitomeof the genteel politician, but Thatcher got under hisskin. He had nothing but disdain for this housewife-turned-politician, and he returned her fire: he agreedthat the election was a watershed, for if Thatcher won,she would send the economy into shock. The strategyseemed partly to work; Thatcher scared many voters,and the polls that tracked personal popularity showedthat her numbers had fallen well below Callaghan's. Atthe same time, though, her rhetoric, and Callaghan'sresponse to it, polarized the electorate, which couldfinally see a sharp difference between the parties.Dividing the public into left and right, she charged intothe breach, sucking in attention and attracting theundecided. She won a sizable victory.

Thatcher had bowled over the voters, but now, asprime minister, she would have to moderate her tone,heal the wounds--according to the polls, at any rate,that was what the public wanted. But Thatcher asusual did the opposite, enacting budget cuts that wenteven deeper than she had proposed during thecampaign. As her policies played out, the economydid indeed go into shock, as Callaghan had said itwould, and unemployment soared. Men in her ownparty, many of whom had by that point been resentingher treatment of them for years, began publicly toquestion her abilities. These men, whom she calledthe "wets," were the most respected members of theConservative Party, and they were in a panic: shewas leading the country into an economic disasterthat they were afraid they would pay for with theircareers. Thatcher's response was to purge them fromher cabinet. She seemed bent on pushing everyoneaway; her legion of enemies was growing, her pollnumbers slipping still lower. Surely the next electionwould be her last.

[Salvador Dali] had no time for those who didnot agree with his principles, and took the warinto the enemy camp by writing insulting lettersto many of the friends he had made in theResidencia, calling them pigs. He happilycompared himself to a clever bull avoiding thecowboys and generally had a great deal of funstirring up and scandalizing almost everyCatalan intellectual worthy of the name. Dali

was beginning to burn his bridges with the zealof an arsonist.... "We [Dali and the filmmakerLuis Bunuel] had resolved to send a poison penletter to one of the great celebrities of Spain,"Dali later told his biographer Alain Bosquet."Our goal was pure subversion.... Both of uswere strongly influenced by Nietzsche.... We hitupon two names: Manuel de Falla, thecomposer, and Juan Ramon Jimenez, the poet.We drew straws and Jimenez won.... So wecomposed a frenzied and nasty letter ofincomparable violence and addressed it toJuan Ramon Jimenez. It read: 'OurDistinguished Friend: We believe it is our dutyto inform you--disinterestedly--that your work isdeeply repugnant to us because of itsimmorality, its hysteria, its arbitrary quality....' Itcaused Jimenez great pain...."

THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY: ABIOGRAPHY OF DALI, MEREDITH

ETHERINGTON-SMITH, 1992

Then, in 1982, on the other side of the Atlantic, themilitary junta that ruled Argentina, needing a cause todistract the country from its many problems, invadedthe Falkland Islands, a British possession to which,however, Argentina had a historical claim. Theofficers of the junta felt certain that the British wouldabandon these islands, barren and remote. ButThatcher did not hesitate: despite the distance--eight

thousand miles--she sent a naval task force to theFalklands. Labour leaders attacked her for thispointless and costly war. Many in her own party wereterrified; if the attempt to retake the islands failed, theparty would be ruined. Thatcher was more alone thanever. But much of the public now saw her qualities,which had seemed so irritating, in a new light: herobstinacy became courage, nobility. Compared to thedithering, pantywaisted, careerist men around her,Thatcher seemed resolute and confident.

The British successfully won back the Falklands,and Thatcher stood taller than ever. Suddenly thecountry's economic and social problems wereforgotten. Thatcher now dominated the scene, and inthe next two elections she crushed Labour.

InterpretationMargaret Thatcher came to power as an outsider: amiddle-class woman, a right-wing radical. The firstinstinct of most outsiders who attain power is tobecome insiders--life on the outside is hard--but indoing so they lose their identity, their difference, thething that makes them stand out in the public eye. IfThatcher had become like the men around her, shewould simply have been replaced by yet another man.Her instinct was to stay an outsider. In fact, shepushed being an outsider as far as it could go: sheset herself up as one woman against an army of men.

At every step of the way, to give her the contrastshe needed, Thatcher marked out an opponent: thesocialists, the wets, the Argentineans. These enemies

helped to define her image as determined, powerful,self-sacrificing. Thatcher was not seduced bypopularity, which is ephemeral and superficial.Pundits might obsess over popularity numbers, but inthe mind of the voter--which, for a politician, is thefield of battle--a dominating presence has more pullthan does likability. Let some of the public hate you;you cannot please everyone. Your enemies, those youstand sharply against, will help you to forge a supportbase that will not desert you. Do not crowd into thecenter, where everyone else is; there is no room tofight in a crowd. Polarize people, drive some of themaway, and create a space for battle.

Everything in life conspires to push you into thecenter, and not just politically. The center is the realmof compromise. Getting along with other people is animportant skill to have, but it comes with a danger: byalways seeking the path of least resistance, the pathof conciliation, you forget who you are, and you sinkinto the center with everyone else. Instead seeyourself as a fighter, an outsider surrounded byenemies. Constant battle will keep you strong andalert. It will help to define what you believe in, both foryourself and for others. Do not worry aboutantagonizing people; without antagonism there is nobattle, and without battle, there is no chance of victory.Do not be lured by the need to be liked: better to berespected, even feared. Victory over your enemieswill bring you a more lasting popularity.

The opposition of a member to an associate is

no purely negative social factor, if only becausesuch opposition is often the only means formaking life with actually unbearable people atleast possible. If we did not even have the powerand the right to rebel against tyranny,arbitrariness, moodiness, tactlessness, wecould not bear to have any relation to peoplefrom whose characters we thus suffer. We wouldfeel pushed to take desperate steps--and these,indeed, would end the relation but do not,perhaps, constitute "conflict." Not only becauseof the fact that...oppression usually increases ifit is suffered calmly and without protest, but alsobecause opposition gives us inner satisfaction,distraction, relief...Our opposition makes us feelthat we are not completely victims of thecircumstances.

GEORG SIMMEL, 1858-1918

Don't depend on the enemy not coming;depend rather on being ready for him.

--Sun-tzu, The Art of War (fourth century B.C.)

KEYS TO WARFAREWe live in an era in which people are seldom directlyhostile. The rules of engagement--social, political,military--have changed, and so must your notion of theenemy. An up-front enemy is rare now and is actuallya blessing. People hardly ever attack you openlyanymore, showing their intentions, their desire to

destroy you; instead they are political and indirect.Although the world is more competitive than ever,outward aggression is discouraged, so people havelearned to go underground, to attack unpredictablyand craftily. Many use friendship as a way to maskaggressive desires: they come close to you to domore harm. (A friend knows best how to hurt you.) Or,without actually being friends, they offer assistanceand alliance: they may seem supportive, but in theend they're advancing their own interests at yourexpense. Then there are those who master moralwarfare, playing the victim, making you feel guilty forsomething unspecified you've done. The battlefield isfull of these warriors, slippery, evasive, and clever.

Understand: the word "enemy"--from the Latininimicus, "not a friend"--has been demonized andpoliticized. Your first task as a strategist is to widenyour concept of the enemy, to include in that groupthose who are working against you, thwarting you,even in subtle ways. (Sometimes indifference andneglect are better weapons than aggression,because you can't see the hostility they hide.) Withoutgetting paranoid, you need to realize that there arepeople who wish you ill and operate indirectly. Identifythem and you'll suddenly have room to maneuver. Youcan stand back and wait and see or you can takeaction, whether aggressive or just evasive, to avoidthe worst. You can even work to turn this enemy into afriend. But whatever you do, do not be the naivevictim. Do not find yourself constantly retreating,reacting to your enemies' maneuvers. Arm yourself

with prudence, and never completely lay down yourarms, not even for friends.

As one travels up any one of the large rivers [ofBorneo] , one meets with tribes that aresuccessively more warlike. In the coast regionsare peaceful communities which never fightsave in self-defense, and then with but poorsuccess, whereas in the central regions, wherethe rivers take their rise, are a number ofextremely warlike tribes whose raids have beena constant source of terror to the communitiessettled in the lower reaches of the rivers.... Itmight be supposed that the peaceful coastpeople would be found to be superior in moralqualities to their more warlike neighbors, but thecontrary is the case. In almost all respects theadvantage lies with the warlike tribes. Theirhouses are better built, larger, and cleaner; theirdomestic morality is superior; they arephysically stronger, are braver, and physicallyand mentally more active and in general aremore trustworthy. But, above all, their socialorganization is firmer and more efficientbecause their respect for and obedience to theirchiefs and their loyalty to their community aremuch greater; each man identifies himself withthe whole community and accepts and loyallyperforms the social duties laid upon him.

WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, 1871-1938

People are usually good at hiding their hostility, butoften they unconsciously give off signals showing thatall is not what it seems. One of the closest friends andadvisers of the Chinese Communist Party leader MaoTse-tung was Lin Biao, a high-ranking member of thePolitburo and possible successor to the chairman. Inthe late 1960s and early '70s, though, Mao detected achange in Lin: he had become effusively friendly.Everyone praised Mao, but Lin's praise wasembarrassingly fervent. To Mao this meant thatsomething was wrong. He watched Lin closely anddecided that the man was plotting a takeover, or atthe very least positioning himself for the top spot. AndMao was right: Lin was plotting busily. The point is notto mistrust all friendly gestures but to notice them.Register any change in the emotional temperature:unusual chumminess, a new desire to exchangeconfidences, excessive praise of you to third parties,the desire for an alliance that may make more sensefor the other person than for you. Trust your instincts: ifsomeone's behavior seems suspicious, it probably is.It may turn out to be benign, but in the meantime it isbest to be on your guard.

You can sit back and read the signs or you canactively work to uncover your enemies--beat the grassto startle the snakes, as the Chinese say. In the Biblewe read of David's suspicion that his father-in-law,King Saul, secretly wanted him dead. How couldDavid find out? He confided his suspicion to Saul'sson Jonathan, his close friend. Jonathan refused to

believe it, so David suggested a test. He wasexpected at court for a feast. He would not go;Jonathan would attend and pass along David'sexcuse, which would be adequate but not urgent. Sureenough, the excuse enraged Saul, who exclaimed,"Send at once and fetch him unto me--he deserves todie!"

David's test succeeded because it wasambiguous. His excuse for missing the feast could beread in more than one way: if Saul meant well towardDavid, he would have seen his son-in-law's absenceas no more than selfish at worst, but because hesecretly hated David, he saw it as effrontery, and itpushed him over the edge. Follow David's example:say or do something that can be read in more thanone way, that may be superficially polite but that couldalso indicate a slight coolness on your part or be seenas a subtle insult. A friend may wonder but will let itpass. The secret enemy, though, will react with anger.Any strong emotion and you will know that there'ssomething boiling under the surface.

Often the best way to get people to revealthemselves is to provoke tension and argument. TheHollywood producer Harry Cohn, president ofUniversal Pictures, frequently used this strategy toferret out the real position of people in the studio whorefused to show what side they were on: he wouldsuddenly attack their work or take an extremeposition, even an offensive one, in an argument. Hisprovoked directors and writers would drop their usualcaution and show their real beliefs.

Understand: people tend to be vague and slipperybecause it is safer than outwardly committing tosomething. If you are the boss, they will mimic yourideas. Their agreement is often pure courtiership. Getthem emotional; people are usually more sincerewhen they argue. If you pick an argument withsomeone and he keeps on mimicking your ideas, youmay be dealing with a chameleon, a particularlydangerous type. Beware of people who hide behind afacade of vague abstractions and impartiality: no oneis impartial. A sharply worded question, an opiniondesigned to offend, will make them react and takesides.

Man exists only in so far as he is opposed.GEORG HEGEL, 1770-1831

Sometimes it is better to take a less directapproach with your potential enemies--to be as subtleand conniving as they are. In 1519, Hernan Cortesarrived in Mexico with his band of adventurers.Among these five hundred men were some whoseloyalty was dubious. Throughout the expedition,whenever any of Cortes's soldiers did something hesaw as suspicious, he never got angry or accusatory.Instead he pretended to go along with them,accepting and approving what they had done.Thinking Cortes weak, or thinking he was on theirside, they would take another step. Now he had whathe wanted: a clear sign, to himself and others, thatthey were traitors. Now he could isolate and destroy

them. Adopt the method of Cortes: if friends orfollowers whom you suspect of ulterior motivessuggest something subtly hostile, or against yourinterests, or simply odd, avoid the temptation to react,to say no, to get angry, or even to ask questions. Goalong, or seem to turn a blind eye: your enemies willsoon go further, showing more of their hand. Now youhave them in sight, and you can attack.

An enemy is often large and hard to pinpoint--anorganization, or a person hidden behind somecomplicated network. What you want to do is take aimat one part of the group--a leader, a spokesman, akey member of the inner circle. That is how the activistSaul Alinsky tackled corporations and bureaucracies.In his 1960s campaign to desegregate Chicago'spublic-school system, he focused on thesuperintendent of schools, knowing full well that thisman would try to shift the blame upward. By takingrepeated hits at the superintendent, he was able topublicize his struggle, and it became impossible forthe man to hide. Eventually those behind him had tocome to his aid, exposing themselves in the process.Like Alinsky, never aim at a vague, abstract enemy. Itis hard to drum up the emotions to fight such abloodless battle, which in any case leaves your enemyinvisible. Personalize the fight, eyeball to eyeball.

Danger is everywhere. There are always hostilepeople and destructive relationships. The only way tobreak out of a negative dynamic is to confront it.Repressing your anger, avoiding the personthreatening you, always looking to conciliate--these

common strategies spell ruin. Avoidance of conflictbecomes a habit, and you lose the taste for battle.Feeling guilty is pointless; it is not your fault you haveenemies. Feeling wronged or victimized is equallyfutile. In both cases you are looking inward,concentrating on yourself and your feelings. Instead ofinternalizing a bad situation, externalize it and faceyour enemy. It is the only way out.

The frequent hearing of my mistress readingthe bible--for she often read aloud when herhusband was absent--soon awakened mycuriosity in respect to this mystery of reading,and roused in me the desire to learn. Having nofear of my kind mistress before my eyes, (shehad given me no reason to fear,) I frankly askedher to teach me to read; and without hesitation,the dear woman began the task, and very soon,by her assistance, I was master of the alphabet,and could spell words of three or fourletters...Master Hugh was amazed at thesimplicity of his spouse, and, probably for thefirst time, he unfolded to her the true philosophyof slavery, and the peculiar rules necessary tobe observed by masters and mistresses, in themanagement of their human chattels. Mr. Auldpromptly forbade the continuance of her[reading] instruction; telling her, in the firstplace, that the thing itself was unlawful; that itwas also unsafe, and could only lead to

mischief.... Mrs. Auld evidently felt the force ofhis remarks; and, like an obedient wife, beganto shape her course in the direction indicated byher husband. The effect of his words, on me,was neither slight nor transitory. His ironsentences--cold and harsh--sunk deep into myheart, and stirred up not only my feelings into asort of rebellion, but awakened within me aslumbering train of vital thought. It was a newand special revelation, dispelling a painfulmystery, against which my youthfulunderstanding had struggled, and struggled invain, to wit: the white man's power to perpetuatethe enslavement of the black man. "Very well,"thought I; "knowledge unfits a child to be aslave." I instinctively assented to theproposition; and from that moment I understoodthe direct pathway from slavery to freedom. Thiswas just what I needed; and got it at a time, andfrom a source, whence I least expected it....Wise as Mr. Auld was, he evidently underratedmy comprehension, and had little idea of theuse to which I was capable of putting theimpressive lesson he was giving to his wife....That which he most loved I most hated; and thevery determination which he expressed to keepme in ignorance, only rendered me the moreresolute in seeking intelligence.

MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM,

FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 1818-1895

The child psychologist Jean Piaget saw conflict asa critical part of mental development. Through battleswith peers and then parents, children learn to adapt tothe world and develop strategies for dealing withproblems. Those children who seek to avoid conflictat all cost, or those who have overprotective parents,end up handicapped socially and mentally. The sameis true of adults: it is through your battles with othersthat you learn what works, what doesn't, and how toprotect yourself. Instead of shrinking from the idea ofhaving enemies, then, embrace it. Conflict istherapeutic.

Enemies bring many gifts. For one thing, theymotivate you and focus your beliefs. The artistSalvador Dali found early on that there were manyqualities he could not stand in people: conformity,romanticism, piety. At every stage of his life, he foundsomeone he thought embodied these anti-ideals--anenemy to vent on. First it was the poet FedericoGarcia Lorca, who wrote romantic poetry; then it wasAndre Breton, the heavy-handed leader of thesurrealist movement. Having such enemies to rebelagainst made Dali feel confident and inspired.

Enemies also give you a standard by which tojudge yourself, both personally and socially. Thesamurai of Japan had no gauge of their excellenceunless they fought the best swordsmen; it took JoeFrazier to make Muhammad Ali a truly great fighter. Atough opponent will bring out the best in you. And the

bigger the opponent, the greater your reward, even indefeat. It is better to lose to a worthy opponent than tosquash some harmless foe. You will gain sympathyand respect, building support for your next fight.

Being attacked is a sign that you are importantenough to be a target. You should relish the attentionand the chance to prove yourself. We all haveaggressive impulses that we are forced to repress; anenemy supplies you with an outlet for these drives. Atlast you have someone on whom to unleash youraggression without feeling guilty.

Leaders have always found it useful to have anenemy at their gates in times of trouble, distractingthe public from their difficulties. In using your enemiesto rally your troops, polarize them as far as possible:they will fight the more fiercely when they feel a littlehatred. So exaggerate the differences between youand the enemy--draw the lines clearly. Xenophonmade no effort to be fair; he did not say that thePersians weren't really such a bad lot and had donemuch to advance civilization. He called thembarbarians, the antithesis of the Greeks. Hedescribed their recent treachery and said they werean evil culture that could find no favor with the gods.And so it is with you: victory is your goal, not fairnessand balance. Use the rhetoric of war to heighten thestakes and stimulate the spirit.

What you want in warfare is room to maneuver.Tight corners spell death. Having enemies gives youoptions. You can play them off against each other,make one a friend as a way of attacking the other, on

and on. Without enemies you will not know how orwhere to maneuver, and you will lose a sense of yourlimits, of how far you can go. Early on, Julius Caesaridentified Pompey as his enemy. Measuring hisactions and calculating carefully, he did only thosethings that left him in a solid position in relation toPompey. When war finally broke out between the twomen, Caesar was at his best. But once he defeatedPompey and had no more such rivals, he lost allsense of proportion--in fact, he fancied himself a god.His defeat of Pompey was his own undoing. Yourenemies force on you a sense of realism and humility.

Remember: there are always people out there whoare more aggressive, more devious, more ruthlessthan you are, and it is inevitable that some of them willcross your path. You will have a tendency to want toconciliate and compromise with them. The reason isthat such types are often brilliant deceivers who seethe strategic value in charm or in seeming to allow youplenty of space, but actually their desires have nolimit, and they are simply trying to disarm you. Withsome people you have to harden yourself, torecognize that there is no middle ground, no hope ofconciliation. For your opponent your desire tocompromise is a weapon to use against you. Knowthese dangerous enemies by their past: look for quickpower grabs, sudden rises in fortune, previous acts oftreachery. Once you suspect you are dealing with aNapoleon, do not lay down your arms or entrust themto someone else. You are the last line of your owndefense.

Authority: If you count on safety and do notthink of danger, if you do not know enoughto be wary when enemies arrive, this iscalled a sparrow nesting on a tent, a fishswimming in a cauldron--they won't last theday.--Chuko Liang (A.D. 181-234 )

REVERSALAlways keep the search for and use of enemies undercontrol. It is clarity you want, not paranoia. It is thedownfall of many tyrants to see an enemy in everyone.They lose their grip on reality and become hopelesslyembroiled in the emotions their paranoia churns up.By keeping an eye on possible enemies, you aresimply being prudent and cautious. Keep yoursuspicions to yourself, so that if you're wrong, no onewill know. Also, beware of polarizing people socompletely that you cannot back off. MargaretThatcher, usually brilliant at the polarizing game,eventually lost control of it: she created too many

enemies and kept repeating the same tactic, even insituations that called for retreat. Franklin DelanoRoosevelt was a master polarizer, always looking todraw a line between himself and his enemies. Oncehe had made that line clear enough, though, hebacked off, which made him look like a conciliator, aman of peace who occasionally went to war. Even ifthat impression was false, it was the height of wisdomto create it.

DO NOT FIGHT THE LAST WARTHE GUERRILLA-WAR-OF-THE-MIND

STRATEGY

What most often weighs you down and brings youmisery is the past, in the form of unnecessaryattachments, repetitions of tired formulas, and thememory of old victories and defeats. You mustconsciously wage war against the past and forceyourself to react to the present moment. Be ruthlesson yourself; do not repeat the same tired methods.Sometimes you must force yourself to strike out innew directions, even if they involve risk. What youmay lose in comfort and security, you will gain insurprise, making it harder for your enemies to tellwhat you will do. Wage guerrilla war on your mind,allowing no static lines of defense, no exposedcitadels--make everything fluid and mobile.

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas forsolving problems, nor can it mark the narrowpath on which the sole solution is supposed tolie by planting a hedge of principles on eitherside. But it can give the mind insight into thegreat mass of phenomena and of theirrelationships, then leave it free to rise into thehigher realms of action. There the mind can use

its innate talents to capacity, combining themall so as to seize on what is right and true asthough this were a single idea formed by theirconcentrated pressure--as though it were aresponse to the immediate challenge ratherthan a product of thought.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

THE LAST WARNo one has risen to power faster than NapoleonBonaparte (1769-1821). In 1793 he went from captainin the French revolutionary army to brigadier general.In 1796 he became the leader of the French force inItaly fighting the Austrians, whom he crushed that yearand again three years later. He became first consul ofFrance in 1801, emperor in 1804. In 1805 hehumiliated the Austrian and Russian armies at theBattle of Austerlitz.

For many, Napoleon was more than a greatgeneral; he was a genius, a god of war. Not everyonewas impressed, though: there were Prussian generalswho thought he had merely been lucky. WhereNapoleon was rash and aggressive, they believed,his opponents had been timid and weak. If he everfaced the Prussians, he would be revealed as a greatfake.

Among these Prussian generals was FriedrichLudwig, prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (1746-1818).Hohenlohe came from one of Germany's oldestaristocratic families, one with an illustrious military

record. He had begun his career young, serving underFrederick the Great (1712-86) himself, the man whohad single-handedly made Prussia a great power.Hohenlohe had risen through the ranks, becoming ageneral at fifty--young by Prussian standards.

To Hohenlohe success in war depended onorganization, discipline, and the use of superiorstrategies developed by trained military minds. ThePrussians exemplified all of these virtues. Prussiansoldiers drilled relentlessly until they could performelaborate maneuvers as precisely as a machine.Prussian generals intensely studied the victories ofFrederick the Great; war for them was a mathematicalaffair, the application of timeless principles. To thegenerals Napoleon was a Corsican hothead leadingan unruly citizens' army. Superior in knowledge andskill, they would outstrategize him. The French wouldpanic and crumble in the face of the disciplinedPrussians; the Napoleonic myth would lie in ruins, andEurope could return to its old ways.

In August 1806, Hohenlohe and his fellow generalsfinally got what they wanted: King Friedrich Wilhelm IIIof Prussia, tired of Napoleon's broken promises,decided to declare war on him in six weeks. In themeantime he asked his generals to come up with aplan to crush the French.

Hohenlohe was ecstatic. This campaign would bethe climax of his career. He had been thinking foryears about how to beat Napoleon, and he presentedhis plan at the generals' first strategy session: precisemarches would place the army at the perfect angle

from which to attack the French as they advancedthrough southern Prussia. An attack in obliqueformation--Frederick the Great's favorite tactic--woulddeliver a devastating blow. The other generals, all intheir sixties and seventies, presented their own plans,but these too were merely variants on the tactics ofFrederick the Great. Discussion turned into argument;several weeks went by. Finally the king had to step inand create a compromise strategy that would satisfyall of his generals.

He [Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini] --oftenquite arbitrarily--presses [the deeds ofNapoleon] into a system which he foists onNapoleon, and, in doing so, completely fails tosee what, above all, really constitutes thegreatness of this captain--namely, the recklessboldness of his operations, where, scoffing at alltheory, he always tried to do what suited eachoccasion best.

FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, 1849-1930

A feeling of exuberance swept the country, whichwould soon relive the glory years of Frederick theGreat. The generals realized that Napoleon knewabout their plans--he had excellent spies--but thePrussians had a head start, and once their warmachine started to move, nothing could stop it.

On October 5, a few days before the king was todeclare war, disturbing news reached the generals. Areconnaissance mission revealed that divisions of

Napoleon's army, which they had believed wasdispersed, had marched east, merged, and wasmassing deep in southern Prussia. The captain whohad led the scouting mission reported that the Frenchsoldiers were marching with packs on their backs:where the Prussians used slow-moving wagons toprovision their troops, the French carried their ownsupplies and moved with astonishing speed andmobility.

Before the generals had time to adjust their plans,Napoleon's army suddenly wheeled north, headingstraight for Berlin, the heart of Prussia. The generalsargued and dithered, moving their troops here andthere, trying to decide where to attack. A mood ofpanic set in. Finally the king ordered a retreat: thetroops would reassemble to the north and attackNapoleon's flank as he advanced toward Berlin.Hohenlohe was in charge of the rear guard, protectingthe Prussians' retreat.

On October 14, near the town of Jena, Napoleoncaught up with Hohenlohe, who finally faced the battlehe had wanted so desperately. The numbers on bothsides were equal, but while the French were an unrulyforce, fighting pell-mell and on the run, Hohenlohekept his troops in tight order, orchestrating them like acorps de ballet. The fighting went back and forth untilfinally the French captured the village ofVierzehnheiligen.

Hohenlohe ordered his troops to retake the village.In a ritual dating back to Frederick the Great, a drummajor beat out a cadence and the Prussian soldiers,

their colors flying, re-formed their positions in perfectparade order, preparing to advance. They were in anopen plain, though, and Napoleon's men were behindgarden walls and on the house roofs. The Prussiansfell like ninepins to the French marksmen. Confused,Hohenlohe ordered his soldiers to halt and changeformation. The drums beat again, the Prussiansmarched with magnificent precision, always a sight tobehold--but the French kept shooting, decimating thePrussian line.

Never had Hohenlohe seen such an army. TheFrench soldiers were like demons. Unlike hisdisciplined soldiers, they moved on their own, yetthere was method to their madness. Suddenly, as iffrom nowhere, they rushed forward on both sides,threatening to surround the Prussians. The princeordered a retreat. The Battle of Jena was over.

Like a house of cards, the Prussians quicklycrumbled, one fortress falling after another. The kingfled east. In a matter of days, virtually nothingremained of the once mighty Prussian army.

THE BAT AND THE HOUSE-FERRETSA bat fell to the ground and was caught by ahouse-ferret. Realizing that she was on the pointof being killed, she begged for her life. Thehouse-ferret said to her that she couldn't let hergo, for ferrets were supposed to be naturalenemies to all birds. The bat replied that sheherself was not a bird, but a mouse. Shemanaged to extricate herself from her danger

by this means. Eventually, falling a secondtime, the bat was caught by another house-ferret. Again she pleaded to the ferret not to eather. The second ferret declared that sheabsolutely detested all mice. But the batpositively affirmed that she was not a mouse buta bat. And so she was released again. And thatwas how she saved herself from death twice by amere change of name. This fable shows that it isnot always necessary to confine ourselves to thesame tactics. But, on the contrary, if we areadaptable to circumstances we can betterescape danger.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

InterpretationThe reality facing the Prussians in 1806 was simple:they had fallen fifty years behind the times. Theirgenerals were old, and instead of responding topresent circumstances, they were repeating formulasthat had worked in the past. Their army moved slowly,and their soldiers were automatons on parade. ThePrussian generals had many signs to warn them ofdisaster: their army had not performed well in itsrecent engagements, a number of Prussian officershad preached reform, and, last but not least, they hadhad ten years to study Napoleon--his innovativestrategies and the speed and fluidity with which hisarmies converged on the enemy. Reality was staringthem in the face, yet they chose to ignore it. Indeed,

they told themselves that Napoleon was the one whowas doomed.

You might find the Prussian army just an interestinghistorical example, but in fact you are likely marchingin the same direction yourself. What limits individualsas well as nations is the inability to confront reality, tosee things for what they are. As we grow older, webecome more rooted in the past. Habit takes over.Something that has worked for us before becomes adoctrine, a shell to protect us from reality. Repetitionreplaces creativity. We rarely realize we're doing this,because it is almost impossible for us to see ithappening in our own minds. Then suddenly a youngNapoleon crosses our path, a person who does notrespect tradition, who fights in a new way. Only thendo we see that our ways of thinking and respondinghave fallen behind the times.

Never take it for granted that your past successeswill continue into the future. Actually, your pastsuccesses are your biggest obstacle: every battle,every war, is different, and you cannot assume thatwhat worked before will work today. You must cutyourself loose from the past and open your eyes to thepresent. Your tendency to fight the last war may leadto your final war.

When in 1806 the Prussian generals...plungedinto the open jaws of disaster by using Frederickthe Great's oblique order of battle, it was not justa case of a style that had outlived its usefulnessbut the most extreme poverty of the imagination

to which routine has ever led. The result wasthat the Prussian army under Hohenlohe was

ruined more completely than any army has everbeen ruined on the battlefield.

--Carl von Clausewitz, ON WAR (1780-1831)

THE PRESENT WARIn 1605, Miyamoto Musashi, a samurai who hadmade a name for himself as a swordsman at theyoung age of twenty-one, was challenged to a duel.The challenger, a young man named Matashichiro,came from the Yoshioka family, a clan itself renownedfor swordsmanship. Earlier that year Musashi haddefeated Matashichiro's father, Genzaemon, in aduel. Days later he had killed Genzaemon's youngerbrother in another duel. The Yoshioka family wantedrevenge.

I never read any treatises on strategy.... Whenwe fight, we do not take any books with us.

MAO TSE-TUNG, 1893-1976

Musashi's friends smelled a trap in Matashichiro'schallenge and offered to accompany him to the duel,but Musashi went alone. In his earlier fights with theYoshiokas, he had angered them by showing uphours late; this time, though, he came early and hid inthe trees. Matashichiro arrived with a small army.Musashi would "arrive way behind schedule as usual,"one of them said, "but that trick won't work with usanymore!" Confident in their ambush, Matashichiro's

men lay down and hid in the grass. Suddenly Musashileaped out from behind his tree and shouted, "I'vebeen waiting long enough. Draw your sword!" In oneswift stroke, he killed Matashichiro, then took aposition at an angle to the other men. All of themjumped to their feet, but they were caught off guardand startled, and instead of surrounding him, theystood in a broken line. Musashi simply ran down theline, killing the dazed men one after another in amatter of seconds.

Musashi's victory sealed his reputation as one ofJapan's greatest swordsmen. He now roamed thecountry looking for suitable challenges. In one town heheard of an undefeated warrior named Baiken whoseweapons were a sickle and a long chain with a steelball at the end of it. Musashi wanted to see theseweapons in action, but Baiken refused: the only wayhe could see them work, Baiken said, was by fightinga duel.

REFRESHING THE MIND When you and youropponent are engaged in combat which isdragging on with no end in sight, it is crucial thatyou should come up with a completely differenttechnique. By refreshing your mind andtechniques as you continue to fight youropponent, you will find an appropriate rhythm-timing with which to defeat him. Whenever youand your opponent become stagnant, you mustimmediately employ a different method ofdealing with him in order to overcome him.

THE BOOK OF FIVE RINGS, MIYAMOTOMUSASHI, 1584-1645

Once again Musashi's friends chose the safe route:they urged him to walk away. No one had come closeto defeating Baiken, whose weapons wereunbeatable: swinging his ball in the air to build upmomentum, he would force his victim backward with arelentless charge, then hurl the ball at the man's face.His opponent would have to fend off the ball andchain, and while his sword arm was occupied, in thatbrief instant Baiken would slash him with the sickleacross his neck.

Ignoring the warnings of his friends, Musashichallenged Baiken and showed up at the man's tentwith two swords, one long, one short. Baiken hadnever seen someone fight with two swords. Also,instead of letting Baiken charge him, Musashicharged first, pushing his foe back on his heels.Baiken hesitated to throw the ball, for Musashi couldparry it with one sword and strike him with the other.As he looked for an opening, Musashi suddenlyknocked him off balance with a blow of the shortsword and then, in a split second, followed with athrust of the long one, stabbing him through and killingthe once undefeated master Baiken.

A few years later, Musashi heard about a greatsamurai named Sasaki Ganryu, who fought with avery long sword--a startlingly beautiful weapon, whichseemed possessed of some warlike spirit. This fightwould be Musashi's ultimate test. Ganryu accepted

his challenge; the duel would take place on a littleisland near the samurai's home.

It is a disease to be obsessed by the thought ofwinning. It is also a disease to be obsessed bythe thought of employing your swordsmanship.So it is to be obsessed by the thought of usingeverything you have learned, and to beobsessed by the thought of attacking. It is also adisease to be obsessed and stuck with thethought of ridding yourself of any of thesediseases. A disease here is an obsessed mindthat dwells on one thing. Because all thesediseases are in your mind, you must get rid ofthem to put your mind in order.

TAKUAN, JAPAN, 1573-1645

On the morning of the duel, the island was packed.A fight between such warriors was unprecedented.Ganryu arrived on time, but Musashi was late, verylate. An hour went by, then two; Ganryu was furious.Finally a boat was spotted approaching the island. Itspassenger was lying down, half asleep, it seemed,whittling at a long wooden oar. It was Musashi. Heseemed lost in thought, staring into the clouds. Whenthe boat came to shore, he tied a dirty towel aroundhis head and jumped out of the boat, brandishing thelong oar--longer than Ganryu's famous sword. Thisstrange man had come to the biggest fight of his lifewith an oar for a sword and a towel for a headband.

Ganryu called out angrily, "Are you so frightened of

me that you have broken your promise to be here byeight?" Musashi said nothing but stepped closer.Ganryu drew his magnificent sword and threw thesheath onto the sand. Musashi smiled: "Sasaki, youhave just sealed your doom." "Me? Defeated?Impossible!" "What victor on earth," replied Musashi,"would abandon his sheath to the sea?" Thisenigmatic remark only made Ganryu angrier.

Then Musashi charged, aiming his sharpened oarstraight for his enemy's eyes. Ganryu quickly raisedhis sword and struck at Musashi's head but missed,only cutting the towel headband in two. He had nevermissed before. In almost the same instant, Musashibrought down his wooden sword, knocking Ganryu offhis feet. The spectators gasped. As Ganryu struggledup, Musashi killed him with a blow to the head. Then,after bowing politely to the men officiating over theduel, he got back into the boat and left as calmly ashe had arrived.

From that moment on, Musashi was considered aswordsman without peer.

Anyone can plan a campaign, but few arecapable of waging war, because only a truemilitary genius can handle the developmentsand circumstances.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, 1769-1821

InterpretationMiyamoto Musashi, author of The Book of FiveRings, won all his duels for one reason: in each

instance he adapted his strategy to his opponent andto the circumstances of the moment. WithMatashichiro he decided it was time to arrive early,which he hadn't done in his previous fights. Victoryagainst superior numbers depended on surprise, sohe leaped up when his opponents lay down; then,once he had killed their leader, he set himself at anangle that invited them to charge at him instead ofsurrounding him, which would have been much moredangerous for him. With Baiken it was simply a matterof using two swords and then crowding his space,giving him no time to react intelligently to this novelty.With Ganryu he set out to infuriate and humiliate hishaughty opponent--the wooden sword, the nonchalantattitude, the dirty-towel headband, the enigmaticremark, the charge at the eyes.

Musashi's opponents depended on brillianttechnique, flashy swords, and unorthodox weapons.That is the same as fighting the last war: instead ofresponding to the moment, they relied on training,technology, and what had worked before. Musashi,who had grasped the essence of strategy when hewas still very young, turned their rigidity into theirdownfall. His first thought was of the gambit that wouldtake this particular opponent most by surprise. Thenhe would anchor himself in the moment: having set hisopponent off balance with something unexpected, hewould watch carefully, then respond with anotheraction, usually improvised, that would turn meredisequilibrium into defeat and death.

Thunder and wind: the image of DURATION.Thus the superior man stands firm And doesnot change his direction. Thunder rolls, and thewind blows; both are examples of extrememobility and so are seemingly the very oppositeof duration, but the laws governing theirappearance and subsidence, their coming andgoing, endure. In the same way theindependence of the superior man is not basedon rigidity and immobility of character. Healways keeps abreast of the time and changeswith it. What endures is the unswerving directive,the inner law of his being, which determines allhis actions.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

In preparing yourself for war, you must rid yourselfof myths and misconceptions. Strategy is not aquestion of learning a series of moves or ideas tofollow like a recipe; victory has no magic formula.Ideas are merely nutrients for the soil: they lie in yourbrain as possibilities, so that in the heat of themoment they can inspire a direction, an appropriateand creative response. Let go of all fetishes--books,techniques, formulas, flashy weapons--and learn tobecome your own strategist.

Thus one's victories in battle cannot berepeated--they take their form in response to

inexhaustibly changing circumstances.--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

KEYS TO WARFAREIn looking back on an unpleasant or disagreeableexperience, the thought inevitably occurs to us: if onlywe had said or done x instead of y, if only we coulddo it over. Many a general has lost his head in theheat of battle and then, looking back, has thought ofthe one tactic, the one maneuver, that would havechanged it all. Even Prince Hohenlohe, years later,could see how he had botched the retaking ofVierzehnheiligen. The problem, though, is not that wethink of the solution only when it is too late. Theproblem is that we imagine that knowledge is whatwas lacking: if only we had known more, if only wehad thought it through more thoroughly. That isprecisely the wrong approach. What makes us goastray in the first place is that we are unattuned to thepresent moment, insensitive to the circumstances.We are listening to our own thoughts, reacting tothings that happened in the past, applying theoriesand ideas that we digested long ago but that havenothing to do with our predicament in the present.More books, theories, and thinking only make theproblem worse.

My policy is to have no policy.ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1809-1865

Understand: the greatest generals, the most

creative strategists, stand out not because they havemore knowledge but because they are able, whennecessary, to drop their preconceived notions andfocus intensely on the present moment. That is howcreativity is sparked and opportunities are seized.Knowledge, experience, and theory have limitations:no amount of thinking in advance can prepare you forthe chaos of life, for the infinite possibilities of themoment. The great philosopher of war Carl vonClausewitz called this "friction": the differencebetween our plans and what actually happens. Sincefriction is inevitable, our minds have to be capable ofkeeping up with change and adapting to theunexpected. The better we can adapt our thoughts tochanging circumstances, the more realistic ourresponses to them will be. The more we loseourselves in predigested theories and pastexperiences, the more inappropriate and delusionalour response.

It can be valuable to analyze what went wrong in thepast, but it is far more important to develop thecapacity to think in the moment. In that way you willmake far fewer mistakes to analyze.

If you put an empty gourd on the water andtouch it, it will slip to one side. No matter howyou try, it won't stay in one spot. The mind ofsomeone who has reached the ultimate statedoes not stay with anything, even for a second.It is like an empty gourd on the water that ispushed around.

TAKUAN, JAPAN, 1573-1645

Think of the mind as a river: the faster it flows, thebetter it keeps up with the present and responds tochange. The faster it flows, also the more it refreshesitself and the greater its energy. Obsessionalthoughts, past experiences (whether traumas orsuccesses), and preconceived notions are likeboulders or mud in this river, settling and hardeningthere and damming it up. The river stops moving;stagnation sets in. You must wage constant war onthis tendency in the mind.

The first step is simply to be aware of the processand of the need to fight it. The second is to adopt afew tactics that might help you to restore the mind'snatural flow.

Reexamine all your cherished beliefs andprinciples. When Napoleon was asked whatprinciples of war he followed, he replied that hefollowed none. His genius was his ability to respondto circumstances, to make the most of what he wasgiven--he was the supreme opportunist. Your onlyprinciple, similarly, should be to have no principles. Tobelieve that strategy has inexorable laws or timelessrules is to take up a rigid, static position that will beyour undoing. Of course the study of history and theorycan broaden your vision of the world, but you have tocombat theory's tendency to harden into dogma. Bebrutal with the past, with tradition, with the old ways ofdoing things. Declare war on sacred cows and voicesof convention in your own head.

Our education is often a problem. During WorldWar II, the British fighting the Germans in the desertsof North Africa were well trained in tank warfare; youmight say they were indoctrinated with theories aboutit. Later in the campaign, they were joined byAmerican troops who were much less educated inthese tactics. Soon, though, the Americans began tofight in a way that was equal if not superior to theBritish style; they adapted to the mobility of this newkind of desert combat. According to Field MarshalErwin Rommel himself, the leader of the Germanarmy in North Africa, "The Americans...profited farmore than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming the axiom that education is easierthan reeducation."

What Rommel meant was that education tends toburn precepts into the mind that are hard to shake. Inthe midst of combat, the trained mind may fall a stepbehind--focusing more on learned rules than on thechanging circumstances of battle. When you arefaced with a new situation, it is often best to imaginethat you know nothing and that you need to startlearning all over again. Clearing your head ofeverything you thought you knew, even your mostcherished ideas, will give you the mental space to beeducated by your present experience--the best schoolof all. You will develop your own strategic musclesinstead of depending on other people's theories andbooks.

Erase the memory of the last war. The last war you

fought is a danger, even if you won it. It is fresh in yourmind. If you were victorious, you will tend to repeat thestrategies you just used, for success makes us lazyand complacent; if you lost, you may be skittish andindecisive. Do not think about the last war; you do nothave the distance or the detachment. Instead dowhatever you can to blot it from your mind. During theVietnam War, the great North Vietnamese general VoNguyen Giap had a simple rule of thumb: after asuccessful campaign, he would convince himself thatit had actually been a failure. As a result he never gotdrunk on his success, and he never repeated thesame strategy in the next battle. Rather he had tothink through each situation anew.

Ted Williams, perhaps baseball's greatest purehitter, made a point of always trying to forget his lastat-bat. Whether he'd gotten a home run or a strikeout,he put it behind him. No two at-bats are the same,even against the same pitcher, and Williams wantedan open mind. He would not wait for the next at-bat tostart forgetting: the minute he got back to the dugout,he started focusing on what was happening in thegame taking place. Attention to the details of thepresent is by far the best way to crowd out the pastand forget the last war.

Keep the mind moving. When we were children, ourminds never stopped. We were open to newexperiences and absorbed as much of them aspossible. We learned fast, because the world aroundus excited us. When we felt frustrated or upset, we

would find some creative way to get what we wantedand then quickly forget the problem as something newcrossed our path.

All the greatest strategists--Alexander the Great,Napoleon, Musashi--were childlike in this respect.Sometimes, in fact, they even acted like children. Thereason is simple: superior strategists see things asthey are. They are highly sensitive to dangers andopportunities. Nothing stays the same in life, andkeeping up with circumstances as they changerequires a great deal of mental fluidity. Greatstrategists do not act according to preconceivedideas; they respond to the moment, like children.Their minds are always moving, and they are alwaysexcited and curious. They quickly forget the past--thepresent is much too interesting.

Defeat is bitter. Bitter to the common soldier,but trebly bitter to his general. The soldier maycomfort himself with the thought that, whateverthe result, he has done his duty faithfully andsteadfastly, but the commander has failed in hisduty if he has not won victory--for that is his duty.He has no other comparable to it. He will goover in his mind the events of the campaign."Here," he will think, "I went wrong; here I tookcounsel of my fears when I should have beenbold; there I should have waited to gatherstrength, not struck piecemeal; at such amoment I failed to grasp opportunity when it was

presented to me." He will remember thesoldiers whom he sent into the attack that failedand who did not come back. He will recall thelook in the eyes of men who trusted him. "I havefailed them," he will say to himself, "and failedmy country!" He will see himself for what he is--adefeated general. In a dark hour he will turn inupon himself and question the very foundationsof his leadership and manhood. And then hemust stop! For if he is ever to command inbattle again, he must shake off these regrets,and stamp on them, as they claw at his will andhis self-confidence. He must beat off theseattacks he delivers against himself, and cast outthe doubts born of failure. Forget them, andremember only the lessons to be learned fromdefeat--they are more than from victory.

DEFEAT INTO VICTORY, WILLIAM SLIM,1897-1970

The Greek thinker Aristotle thought that life wasdefined by movement. What does not move is dead.What has speed and mobility has more possibilities,more life. We all start off with the mobile mind of aNapoleon, but as we get older, we tend to becomemore like the Prussians. You may think that what you'dlike to recapture from your youth is your looks, yourphysical fitness, your simple pleasures, but what youreally need is the fluidity of mind you once possessed.Whenever you find your thoughts revolving around a

particular subject or idea--an obsession, aresentment--force them past it. Distract yourself withsomething else. Like a child, find something new tobe absorbed by, something worthy of concentratedattention. Do not waste time on things you cannotchange or influence. Just keep moving.

Absorb the spirit of the times. Throughout thehistory of warfare, there have been classic battles inwhich the past has confronted the future in a hopelessmismatch. It happened in the seventh century, whenthe Persians and Byzantines confronted the invinciblearmies of Islam, with their new form of desert fighting;or in the first half of the thirteenth century, when theMongols used relentless mobility to overwhelm theheavy armies of the Russians and Europeans; or in1806, when Napoleon crushed the Prussians at Jena.In each case the conquering army developed a way offighting that maximized a new form of technology or anew social order.

You can reproduce this effect on a smaller scale byattuning yourself to the spirit of the times. Developingantennae for the trends that have yet to crest takeswork and study, as well as the flexibility to adapt tothose trends. As you get older, it is best toperiodically alter your style. In the golden age ofHollywood, most actresses had very short careers.But Joan Crawford fought the studio system andmanaged to have a remarkably long career byconstantly changing her style, going from siren to noirheroine to cult queen. Instead of staying sentimentally

attached to some fashion of days gone by, she wasable to sense a rising trend and go with it. Byconstantly adapting and changing your style, you willavoid the pitfalls of your previous wars. Just whenpeople feel they know you, you will change.

Reverse course. The great Russian novelist FyodorDostoyevsky suffered from epilepsy. Just before aseizure, he would experience a moment of intenseecstasy, which he described as a feeling of beingsuddenly flooded with reality, a momentary vision ofthe world exactly as it is. Later he would find himselfgetting depressed, as this vision was crowded out bythe habits and routines of daily life. During thesedepressions, wanting to feel that closeness to realityagain, he would go to the nearest casino and gambleaway all his money. There reality would overwhelmhim; comfort and routine would be gone, stalepatterns broken. Having to rethink everything, hewould get his creative energy back. This was theclosest he could deliberately come to the sense ofecstasy he got through epilepsy.

Dostoyevsky's method was a little extreme, butsometimes you have to shake yourself up, break freefrom the hold of the past. This can take the form ofreversing your course, doing the opposite of what youwould normally do in any given situation, puttingyourself in some unusual circumstance, or literallystarting over. In those situations the mind has to dealwith a new reality, and it snaps to life. The changemay be alarming, but it is also refreshing--even

exhilarating.

To know that one is in a certain condition, in acertain state, is already a process of liberation;but a man who is not aware of his condition, ofhis struggle, tries to be something other than heis, which brings about habit. So, then, let uskeep in mind that we want to examine what is, toobserve and be aware of exactly what is theactual, without giving it any slant, without givingit an interpretation. It needs an extraordinarilyastute mind, an extraordinarily pliable heart, tobe aware of and to follow what is; because whatis is constantly moving, constantly undergoinga transformation, and if the mind is tethered tobelief, to knowledge, it ceases to pursue, itceases to follow the swift movement of what is.What is is not static, surely--it is constantlymoving, as you will see if you observe it veryclosely. To follow it, you need a very swift mindand a pliable heart--which are denied when themind is static, fixed in a belief, in a prejudice, inan identification; and a mind and heart that aredry cannot follow easily, swiftly, that which is.

JIDDU KRISHNAMURTI, 1895-1986

Relationships often develop a certain tiresomepredictability. You do what you usually do, otherpeople respond the way they usually do, and around itgoes. If you reverse course, act in a novel manner,

you alter the entire dynamic. Do this every so often tobreak up the relationship's stale patterns and open itto new possibilities.

Think of your mind as an army. Armies must adapt tothe complexity and chaos of modern war by becomingmore fluid and maneuverable. The ultimate extensionof this evolution is guerrilla warfare, which exploitschaos by making disorder and unpredictability astrategy. The guerrilla army never stops to defend aparticular place or town; it wins by always moving,staying one step ahead. By following no set pattern, itgives the enemy no target. The guerrilla army neverrepeats the same tactic. It responds to the situation,the moment, the terrain where it happens to find itself.There is no front, no concrete line of communicationor supply, no slow-moving wagon. The guerrilla armyis pure mobility.

That is the model for your new way of thinking.Apply no tactic rigidly; do not let your mind settle intostatic positions, defending any particular place oridea, repeating the same lifeless maneuvers. Attackproblems from new angles, adapting to the landscapeand to what you're given. By staying in constantmotion you show your enemies no target to aim at.You exploit the chaos of the world instead ofsuccumbing to it.

REVERSALThere is never any value in fighting the last war. Butwhile you're eliminating that pernicious tendency, youmust imagine that your enemy is trying to do thesame--trying to learn from and adapt to the present.Some of history's worst military disasters have comenot out of fighting the last war but out of assuming thatthat's what your opponent will do. When SaddamHussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, he thoughtthe United States had yet to recover from "Vietnam

syndrome"--the fear of casualties and loss that hadbeen so traumatic during the Vietnam period--andthat it would either avoid war altogether or would fightin the same way it had, trying to win the fight from theair instead of on the ground. He did not realize thatthe American military was ready for a new kind of war.Remember: the loser in any battle may be tootraumatized to fight again but may also learn from theexperience and move on. Err on the side of caution;be ready. Never let your enemy surprise you in war.

AMIDST THE TURMOIL OF EVENTS,DO NOT LOSE YOUR PRESENCE OF

MINDTHE COUNTERBALANCE STRATEGY

In the heat of battle, the mind tends to lose itsbalance. Too many things confront you at the sametime--unexpected setbacks, doubts and criticismsfrom your own allies. There's a danger of respondingemotionally, with fear, depression, or frustration. It isvital to keep your presence of mind, maintainingyour mental powers whatever the circumstances.You must actively resist the emotional pull of themoment--staying decisive, confident, andaggressive no matter what hits you. Make the mindtougher by exposing it to adversity. Learn to detachyourself from the chaos of the battlefield. Let otherslose their heads; your presence of mind will steeryou clear of their influence and keep you on course.

[Presence of mind] must play a great role in war,the domain of the unexpected, since it isnothing but an increased capacity of dealingwith the unexpected. We admire presence ofmind in an apt repartee, as we admire quickthinking in the face of danger.... The expression"presence of mind" precisely conveys the

speed and immediacy of the help provided bythe intellect.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

THE HYPERAGGRESSIVE TACTICVice Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) hadbeen through it all. He had lost his right eye in thesiege of Calvi and his right arm in the Battle ofTenerife. He had defeated the Spanish at Cape St.Vincent in 1797 and had thwarted Napoleon'sEgyptian campaign by defeating his navy at the Battleof the Nile the following year. But none of histribulations and triumphs prepared him for theproblems he faced from his own colleagues in theBritish navy as they prepared to go to war againstDenmark in February 1801.

Nelson, England's most glorious war hero, was theobvious choice to lead the fleet. Instead the Admiraltychose Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson his second-in-command. This war was a delicate business; it wasintended to force the disobedient Danes to complywith a British-led embargo on the shipping of militarygoods to France. The fiery Nelson was prone to losehis cool. He hated Napoleon, and if he went too faragainst the Danes, he would produce a diplomaticfiasco. Sir Hyde was an older, more stable, even-tempered man who would do the job and nothingmore.

Nelson swallowed his pride and took theassignment, but he saw trouble ahead. He knew that

time was of the essence: the faster the navy sailed,the less chance the Danes would have to build uptheir defenses. The ships were ready to sail, butParker's motto was "Everything in good order." Itwasn't his style to hurry. Nelson hated his casualnessand burned for action: he reviewed intelligencereports, studied maps, and came up with a detailedplan for fighting the Danes. He wrote to Parker urginghim to seize the initiative. Parker ignored him.

More life may trickle out of men through thoughtthan through a gaping wound.

THOMAS HARDY, 1840-1928

At last, on March 11, the British fleet set sail.Instead of heading for Copenhagen, however, Parkeranchored well to the north of the city's harbor andcalled a meeting of his captains. According tointelligence reports, he explained, the Danes hadprepared elaborate defenses for Copenhagen. Boatsanchored in the harbor, forts to the north and south,and mobile artillery batteries could blast the Britishout of the water. How to fight this artillery withoutterrible losses? Also, pilots who knew the watersaround Copenhagen reported that they weretreacherous, places of sandbars and tricky winds.Navigating these dangers under bombardment wouldbe harrowing. With all of these difficulties, perhaps itwas best to wait for the Danes to leave harbor andthen fight them in open sea.

Nelson struggled to control himself. Finally he let

loose, pacing the room, the stub of his lost arm jerkingas he spoke. No war, he said, had ever been won bywaiting. The Danish defenses looked formidable "tothose who are children at war," but he had worked outa strategy weeks earlier: he would attack from thesouth, the easier approach, while Parker and areserve force would stay to the city's north. Nelsonwould use his mobility to take out the Danish guns. Hehad studied the maps: sandbars were no threat. Asfor the wind, aggressive action was more importantthan fretting over wind.

Nelson's speech energized Parker's captains. Hewas by far their most successful leader, and hisconfidence was catching. Even Sir Hyde wasimpressed, and the plan was approved.

So Grant was alone; his most trustedsubordinates besought him to change hisplans, while his superiors were astounded at histemerity and strove to interfere. Soldiers ofreputation and civilians in high placescondemned, in advance, a campaign thatseemed to them as hopeless as it wasunprecedented. If he failed, the country wouldconcur with the Government and the Generals.Grant knew all this, and appreciated his danger,but was as invulnerable to the apprehensions ofambition as to the entreaties of friendship, orthe anxieties even of patriotism. That quietconfidence in himself which never forsook him,

and which amounted indeed almost to a feelingof fate, was uninterrupted. Having oncedetermined in a matter that required irreversibledecision, he never reversed, nor even misgave,but was steadily loyal to himself and his plans.This absolute and implicit faith was, however, asfar as possible from conceit or enthusiasm; itwas simply a consciousness or conviction,rather, which brought the very strength itbelieved in; which was itself strength, and whichinspired others with a trust in him, because hewas able thus to trust himself.

MILITARY HISTORY OF ULYSSES S.GRANT, ADAM BADEAU, 1868

The next morning Nelson's line of ships advancedon Copenhagen, and the battle began. The Danishguns, firing on the British at close range, took a fiercetoll. Nelson paced the deck of his flagship, HMSElephant, urging his men on. He was in an excited,almost ecstatic state. A shot through the mainmastnearly hit him: "It is warm work, and this day may bethe last to any of us at any moment," he told a colonel,a little shaken up by the blast, "but mark you, I wouldnot be elsewhere for thousands."

Parker followed the battle from his position to thenorth. He now regretted agreeing to Nelson's plan; hewas responsible for the campaign, and a defeat herecould ruin his career. After four hours of back-and-forth bombardment, he had seen enough: the fleet

had taken a beating and had gained no advantage.Nelson never knew when to quit. Parker decided itwas time to hoist signal flag 39, the order to withdraw.The first ships to see it were to acknowledge it andpass the signal on down the line. Once acknowledgedthere was nothing else to do but retreat. The battlewas over.

On board the Elephant, a lieutenant told Nelsonabout the signal. The vice-admiral ignored it.Continuing to pound the Danish defenses, heeventually called to an officer, "Is number sixteen stillhoisted?" Number 16 was his own flag; it meant"Engage the enemy more closely." The officerconfirmed that the flag was still flying. "Mind you keepit so," Nelson told him. A few minutes later, Parker'ssignal still flapping in the breeze, Nelson turned to hisflag captain: "You know, Foley, I have only one eye--Ihave a right to be blind sometimes." And raising histelescope to his blind eye, he calmly remarked, "Ireally do not see the signal."

Torn between obeying Parker and obeying Nelson,the fleet captains chose Nelson. They would risk theircareers along with his. But soon the Danish defensesstarted to crack; some of the ships anchored in theharbor surrendered, and the firing of the guns beganto slow. Less than an hour after Parker's signal tostop the battle, the Danes surrendered.

The next day Parker perfunctorily congratulatedNelson on the victory. He did not mention hissubordinate's disobedience. He was hoping thewhole affair, including his own lack of courage, would

be quietly forgotten.

InterpretationWhen the Admiralty put its faith in Sir Hyde, it made aclassical military error: it entrusted the waging of awar to a man who was careful and methodical. Suchmen may seem calm, even strong, in times of peace,but their self-control often hides weakness: the reasonthey think things through so carefully is that they areterrified of making a mistake and of what that mightmean for them and their career. This doesn't comeout until they are tested in battle: suddenly they cannotmake a decision. They see problems everywhere anddefeat in the smallest setback. They hang back notout of patience but out of fear. Often these momentsof hesitation spell their doom.

There was once a man who may be called the"generalissimo" of robbers and who went by thename of Hakamadare. He had a strong mindand a powerful build. He was swift of foot, quickwith his hands, wise in thinking and plotting.Altogether there was no one who could comparewith him. His business was to rob people of theirpossessions when they were off guard. Once,around the tenth month of a year, he neededclothing and decided to get hold of some. Hewent to prospective spots and walked about,looking. About midnight when people had goneto sleep and were quiet, under a somewhatblurry moon he saw a man dressed in abundant

clothes sauntering about on a boulevard. Theman, with his trouser-skirt tucked up with stringsperhaps and in a formal hunting robe whichgently covered his body, was playing the flute,alone, apparently in no hurry to go to anyparticular place. Wow, here's a fellow who'sshown up just to give me his clothes,Hakamadare thought. Normally he would havegleefully run up and beaten his quarry down androbbed him of his clothes. But this time,unaccountably, he felt something fearsomeabout the man, so he followed him for a coupleof hundred yards. The man himself didn't seemto think, Somebody's following me. On thecontrary, he continued to play the flute with whatappeared to be greater calm. Give him a try,Hakamadare said to himself, and ran up closeto the man, making as much clatter as he couldwith his feet. The man, however, looked not theleast disturbed. He simply turned to look, stillplaying the flute. It wasn't possible to jump onhim. Hakamadare ran off. Hakamadare triedsimilar approaches a number of times, but theman remained utterly unperturbed.Hakamadare realized he was dealing with anunusual fellow. When they had covered about athousand yards, though, Hakamadare decidedhe couldn't continue like this, drew his sword,and ran up to him. This time the man stopped

playing the flute and, turning, said, "What in theworld are you doing?" Hakamadare couldn'thave been struck with greater fear even if ademon or a god had run up to attack him whenhe was walking alone. For some unaccountablereason he lost both heart and courage.Overcome with deathly fear and despite himself,he fell on his knees and hands. "What are youdoing?" the man repeated. Hakamadare felt hecouldn't escape even if he tried. "I'm trying torob you," he blurted out. "My name isHakamadare." "I've heard there's a man aboutwith that name, yes. A dangerous, unusualfellow, I'm told," the man said. Then he simplysaid to Hakamadare, "Come with me," andcontinued on his way, playing the flute again.Terrified that he was dealing with no ordinaryhuman being, and as if possessed by a demonor a god, Hakamadare followed the man,completely mystified. Eventually the manwalked into a gate behind which was a largehouse. He stepped inside from the verandahafter removing his shoes. While Hakamadarewas thinking, He must be the master of thehouse, the man came back and summonedhim. As he gave him a robe made of thickcotton cloth, he said, "If you need somethinglike this in the future, just come and tell me. Ifyou jump on somebody who doesn't know your

intentions, you may get hurt." Afterward itoccurred to Hakamadare that the housebelonged to Governor of Settsu Fujiwara noYasumasa. Later, when he was arrested, he isknown to have observed, "He was such anunusually weird, terrifying man!" Yasumasa wasnot a warrior by family tradition because he wasa son of Munetada. Yet he was not the leastinferior to anyone who was a warrior by familytradition. He had a strong mind, was quick withhis hands, and had tremendous strength. Hewas also subtle in thinking and plotting. So eventhe imperial court did not feel insecure inemploying him in the way of the warrior. As aresult, the whole world greatly feared him andwas intimidated by him.

LEGENDS OF THE SAMURAI, HIROAKISATO, 1995

Lord Nelson operated according to the oppositeprinciple. Slight of build, with a delicate constitution,he compensated for his physical weakness with fiercedetermination. He forced himself to be more resolutethan anyone around him. The moment he enteredbattle, he ratcheted up his aggressive impulses.Where other sea lords worried about casualties, thewind, changes in the enemy's formation, heconcentrated on his plan. Before battle no onestrategized or studied his opponent more thoroughly.(That knowledge helped Nelson to sense when the

enemy was ready to crumble.) But once theengagement began, hesitation and carefulness weredropped.

Presence of mind is a kind of counterbalance tomental weakness, to our tendency to get emotionaland lose perspective in the heat of battle. Ourgreatest weakness is losing heart, doubtingourselves, becoming unnecessarily cautious. Beingmore careful is not what we need; that is just a screenfor our fear of conflict and of making a mistake. Whatwe need is double the resolve--an intensification ofconfidence. That will serve as a counterbalance.

In moments of turmoil and trouble, you must forceyourself to be more determined. Call up theaggressive energy you need to overcome caution andinertia. Any mistakes you make, you can rectify withmore energetic action still. Save your carefulness forthe hours of preparation, but once the fighting begins,empty your mind of doubts. Ignore those who quail atany setback and call for retreat. Find joy in attackmode. Momentum will carry you through.

The senses make a more vivid impression onthe mind than systematic thought.... Even the

man who planned the operation and now sees itbeing carried out may well lose confidence in

his earlier judgment.... War has a way ofmasking the stage with scenery crudely daubedwith fearsome apparitions. Once this is clearedaway, and the horizon becomes unobstructed,

developments will confirm his earlier

convictions--this is one of the great chasmsbetween planning and execution.

--Carl von Clausewitz, ON WAR (1780-1831)

THE DETACHED-BUDDHA TACTICWatching the movie director Alfred Hitchcock (1899-1980) at work on a film set was often quite a surpriseto those seeing it for the first time. Most filmmakersare wound-up balls of energy, yelling at the crew andbarking out orders, but Hitchcock would sit in hischair, sometimes dozing, or at least with his eyes halfclosed. On the set of Strangers on a Train, made in1951, the actor Farley Granger thought Hitchcock'sbehavior meant he was angry or upset and asked himif anything was wrong. "Oh," Hitchcock repliedsleepily, "I'm so bored." The crew's complaints, anactor's tantrums--nothing fazed him; he would justyawn, shift in his chair, and ignore the problem."Hitchcock...didn't seem to direct us at all," said theactress Margaret Lockwood. "He was a dozing,nodding Buddha with an enigmatic smile on his face."

It was hard for Hitchcock's colleagues tounderstand how a man doing such stressful workcould stay so calm and detached. Some thought itwas part of his character--that there was somethinginherently cold-blooded about him. Others thought it agimmick, a put-on. Few suspected the truth: beforethe filmmaking had even begun, Hitchcock wouldhave prepared for it with such intense attention todetail that nothing could go wrong. He was completelyin control; no temperamental actress, no panicky art

director, no meddling producer could upset him orinterfere with his plans. Feeling such absolute securityin what he had set up, he could afford to lie back andfall asleep.

Hitchcock's process began with a storyline, whetherfrom a novel or an idea of his own. As if he had amovie projector in his head, he would begin tovisualize the film. Next, he would start meeting with awriter, who would soon realize that this job was unlikeany other. Instead of taking some producer's half-baked idea and turning it into a screenplay, the writerwas simply there to put on paper the dream trappedin Hitchcock's mind. He or she would add flesh andbones to the characters and would of course write thedialog, but not much else. When Hitchcock sat downwith the writer Samuel Taylor for the first scriptmeeting on the movie Vertigo (1958), his descriptionsof several scenes were so vivid, so intense, that theexperiences seemed almost to have been real, ormaybe something he had dreamed. Thiscompleteness of vision foreclosed creative conflict.As Taylor soon realized, although he was writing thescript, it would remain a Hitchcock creation.

Once the screenplay was finished, Hitchcock wouldtransform it into an elaborate shooting script.Blocking, camera positions, lighting, and setdimensions were spelled out in detailed notes. Mostdirectors leave themselves some latitude, shootingscenes from several angles, for example, to give thefilm editor options to work with later on. NotHitchcock: he essentially edited the entire film in the

shooting script. He knew exactly what he wanted andwrote it down. If a producer or actor tried to add orchange a scene, Hitchcock was outwardly pleasant--he could afford to pretend to listen--but inside he wastotally unmoved.

Nothing was left to chance. For the building of thesets (quite elaborate in a movie like Rear Window),Hitchcock would present the production designer withprecise blueprints, floor plans, incredibly detailed listsof props. He supervised every aspect of setconstruction. He was particularly attentive to theclothes of his leading actresses: according to EdithHead, costumer on many Hitchcock movies, includingDial M for Murder in 1954, "There was a reason forevery color, every style, and he was absolutely certainabout everything he settled on. For one scene he saw[Grace Kelly] in pale green, for another in whitechiffon, for another in gold. He was really putting adream together in the studio." When the actress KimNovak refused to wear a gray suit in Vertigo becauseshe felt it made her look washed out, Hitchcock toldher he wanted her to look like a woman of mysterywho had just stepped out of the San Francisco fog.How could she argue with that? She wore the suit.

Hitchcock's actors found working with him strangeyet pleasant. Some of Hollywood's best--JosephCotten, Grace Kelly, Cary Grant, Ingrid Bergman--said that he was the easiest director to work for: hisnonchalance was catching, and since his films wereso carefully staged as not to depend on the actor'sperformance in any particular scene, they could relax.

Everything went like clockwork. As James Stewarttold the cast of The Man Who Knew Too Much(1956), "We're in the hands of an expert here. Youcan lean on him. Just do everything he tells you andthe whole thing will be okay."

As Hitchcock sat calmly on the set, apparently halfasleep, the cast and crew could see only the smallpart each one played. They had no idea howeverything fit into his vision. When Taylor saw Vertigofor the first time, it was like seeing another man'sdream. The film neatly duplicated the vision Hitchcockhad expressed to him many months before.

InterpretationThe first film Hitchcock directed was The PleasureGarden, a silent he made in 1925. The productionwent wrong in every conceivable way. Hitchcockhated chaos and disorder; unexpected events,panicky crew members, and any loss of control madehim miserable. From that point on, he decided, hewould treat filmmaking like a military operation. Hewould give his producers, actors, and crew no roomto mess up what he wanted to create. He taughthimself every aspect of film production: set design,lighting, the technicalities of cameras and lenses,editing, sound. He ran every stage of the film'smaking. No shadow could fall between the planningand the execution.

Establishing control in advance the way Hitchcockdid might not seem like presence of mind, but itactually takes that quality to its zenith. It means

entering battle (in Hitchcock's case a film shoot)feeling calm and ready. Setbacks may come, but youwill have foreseen them and thought of alternatives,and you are ready to respond. Your mind will never goblank when it is that well prepared. When yourcolleagues barrage you with doubts, anxiousquestions, and slipshod ideas, you may nod andpretend to listen, but really you're ignoring them--you've out-thought them in advance. And your relaxedmanner will prove contagious to other people, makingthem easier to manage in turn.

It is easy to be overwhelmed by everything thatfaces you in battle, where so many people are askingor telling you what to do. So many vital matters pressin on you that you can lose sight of your goals andplans; suddenly you can't see the forest for the trees.Understand: presence of mind is the ability to detachyourself from all that, to see the whole battlefield, thewhole picture, with clarity. All great generals have thisquality. And what gives you that mental distance ispreparation, mastering the details beforehand. Letpeople think your Buddha-like detachment comesfrom some mysterious source. The less theyunderstand you the better.

For the love of God, pull yourself together anddo not look at things so darkly: the first step

backward makes a poor impression in the army,the second step is dangerous, and the third

becomes fatal.--Frederick the Great (1712-86), letter to a

general

KEYS TO WARFAREWe humans like to see ourselves as rationalcreatures. We imagine that what separates us fromanimals is the ability to think and reason. But that isonly partly true: what distinguishes us from animalsjust as much is our capacity to laugh, to cry, to feel arange of emotions. We are in fact emotional creaturesas well as rational ones, and although we like to thinkwe govern our actions through reason and thought,what most often dictates our behavior is the emotionwe feel in the moment.

We maintain the illusion that we are rational throughthe routine of our daily affairs, which helps us to keepthings calm and apparently controlled. Our mindsseem rather strong when we're following our routines.But place any of us in an adverse situation and ourrationality vanishes; we react to pressure by growingfearful, impatient, confused. Such moments reveal usfor the emotional creatures we are: under attack,whether by a known enemy or unpredictably by acolleague, our response is dominated by feelings ofanger, sadness, betrayal. Only with great effort canwe reason our way through these periods andrespond rationally--and our rationality rarely lasts pastthe next attack.

Understand: your mind is weaker than youremotions. But you become aware of this weaknessonly in moments of adversity--precisely the time whenyou need strength. What best equips you to cope with

the heat of battle is neither more knowledge nor moreintellect. What makes your mind stronger, and moreable to control your emotions, is internal disciplineand toughness.

No one can teach you this skill; you cannot learn itby reading about it. Like any discipline, it can comeonly through practice, experience, even a littlesuffering. The first step in building up presence ofmind is to see the need for it--to want it badly enoughto be willing to work for it. Historical figures who standout for their presence of mind--Alexander the Great,Ulysses S. Grant, Winston Churchill--acquired itthrough adversity, through trial and error. They were inpositions of responsibility in which they had todevelop this quality or sink. Although these men mayhave been blessed with an unusual amount ofpersonal fortitude, they had to work hard to strengthenthis into presence of mind.

The first quality of a General-in-Chief is to havea cool head which receives exact impressionsof things, which never gets heated, which neverallows itself to be dazzled, or intoxicated, bygood or bad news. The successivesimultaneous sensations which he receives inthe course of a day must be classified, andmust occupy the correct places they merit to fill,because common sense and reason are theresults of the comparison of a number ofsensations each equally well considered. Thereare certain men who, on account of their moral

and physical constitution, paint mental picturesout of everything: however exalted be theirreason, their will, their courage, and whatevergood qualities they may possess, nature hasnot fitted them to command armies, nor to directgreat operations of war.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, 1769-1821

The ideas that follow are based on their experienceand hard-won victories. Think of these ideas asexercises, ways to toughen your mind, each a kind ofcounterbalance to emotion's overpowering pull.

Expose yourself to conflict. George S. Pattoncame from one of America's most distinguishedmilitary families--his ancestors included generals andcolonels who had fought and died in the AmericanRevolution and the Civil War. Raised on stories oftheir heroism, he followed in their footsteps and chosea career in the military. But Patton was also asensitive young man, and he had one deep fear: thatin battle he would turn coward and disgrace the familyname.

Patton had his first real taste of battle in 1918, atthe age of thirty-two, during the Allied offensive on theArgonne during World War I. He commanded a tankdivision. At one point during the battle, Pattonmanaged to lead some American infantrymen to aposition on a hilltop overlooking a key strategic town,but German fire forced them to take cover. Soon itbecame clear that they were trapped: if they

retreated, they would come under fire from positionson the sides of the hill; if they advanced, they wouldrun right into a battery of German machine guns. Ifthey were all to die, as it seemed to Patton, better todie advancing. At the moment he was to lead thetroops in the charge, however, Patton was stricken byintense fear. His body trembled, and his legs turned tojelly. In a confirmation of his deepest fears, he had losthis nerve.

At that instant, looking into the clouds beyond theGerman batteries, Patton had a vision: he saw hisillustrious military ancestors, all in their uniforms,staring sternly down at him. They seemed to beinviting him to join their company--the company ofdead war heroes. Paradoxically, the sight of thesemen had a calming effect on the young Patton: callingfor volunteers to follow him, he yelled, "It is time foranother Patton to die!" The strength had returned tohis legs; he stood up and charged toward the Germanguns. Seconds later he fell, hit in the thigh. But hesurvived the battle.

From that moment on, even after he became ageneral, Patton made a point of visiting the front lines,exposing himself needlessly to danger. He testedhimself again and again. His vision of his ancestorsremained a constant stimulus--a challenge to hishonor. Each time it became easier to face down hisfears. It seemed to his fellow generals, and to his ownmen, that no one had more presence of mind thanPatton. They did not know how much of his strengthwas an effort of will.

The story of Patton teaches us two things. First, it isbetter to confront your fears, let them come to thesurface, than to ignore them or tamp them down. Fearis the most destructive emotion for presence of mind,but it thrives on the unknown, which lets ourimaginations run wild. By deliberately putting yourselfin situations where you have to face fear, youfamiliarize yourself with it and your anxiety grows lessacute. The sensation of overcoming a deep-rootedfear in turn gives you confidence and presence ofmind. The more conflicts and difficult situations youput yourself through, the more battle-tested your mindwill be.

There was a fox who had never seen a lion. Butone day he happened to meet one of thesebeasts face to face. On this first occasion hewas so terrified that he felt he would die of fear.He encountered him again, and this time hewas also frightened, but not so much as the firsttime. But on the third occasion when he sawhim, he actually plucked up the courage toapproach him and began to chat. This fableshows that familiarity soothes our fears.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

Second, Patton's experience demonstrates themotivating power of a sense of honor and dignity. Ingiving in to fear, in losing your presence of mind, youdisgrace not only yourself, your self-image, and yourreputation but your company, your family, your group.

You bring down the communal spirit. Being a leaderof even the smallest group gives you something to liveup to: people are watching you, judging you,depending on you. To lose your composure wouldmake it hard for you to live with yourself.

Be self-reliant. There is nothing worse than feelingdependent on other people. Dependency makes youvulnerable to all kinds of emotions--betrayal,disappointment, frustration--that play havoc with yourmental balance.

Early in the American Civil War, General Ulysses S.Grant, eventual commander in chief of the Northernarmies, felt his authority slipping. His subordinateswould pass along inaccurate information on theterrain he was marching through; his captains wouldfail to follow through on his orders; his generals werecriticizing his plans. Grant was stoical by nature, buthis diminished control over his troops led to adiminished control over himself and drove him todrink.

In the words of the ancients, one should makehis decisions within the space of seven breaths.Lord Takanobu said, "If discrimination is long, itwill spoil." Lord Naoshige said, "When mattersare done leisurely, seven out of ten will turn outbadly. A warrior is a person who does thingsquickly." When your mind is going hither andthither, discrimination will never be brought to aconclusion. With an intense, fresh and unde-

laying spirit, one will make his judgments withinthe space of seven breaths. It is a matter ofbeing determined and having the spirit to breakright through to the other side.HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI,

YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, 1659-1720

Grant had learned his lesson by the time of theVicksburg campaign, in 1862-63. He rode the terrainhimself, studying it firsthand. He reviewed intelligencereports himself. He honed the precision of his orders,making it harder for his captains to flout them. Andonce he had made a decision, he would ignore hisfellow generals' doubts and trust his convictions. Toget things done, he came to rely on himself. Hisfeelings of helplessness dissolved, and with them allof the attendant emotions that had ruined hispresence of mind.

Being self-reliant is critical. To make yourself lessdependent on others and so-called experts, you needto expand your repertoire of skills. And you need tofeel more confident in your own judgment.Understand: we tend to overestimate other people'sabilities--after all, they're trying hard to make it look asif they knew what they were doing--and we tend tounderestimate our own. You must compensate for thisby trusting yourself more and others less.

It is important to remember, though, that being self-reliant does not mean burdening yourself with pettydetails. You must be able to distinguish betweensmall matters that are best left to others and larger

issues that require your attention and care.

Suffer fools gladly. John Churchill, the Duke ofMarlborough, is one of history's most successfulgenerals. A genius of tactics and strategy, he hadtremendous presence of mind. In the early eighteenthcentury, Churchill was often the leader of an allianceof English, Dutch, and German armies against themighty forces of France. His fellow generals weretimid, indecisive, narrow-minded men. They balked atthe duke's bold plans, saw dangers everywhere, werediscouraged at the slightest setback, and promotedtheir own country's interests at the expense of thealliance. They had no vision, no patience: they werefools.

On a famous occasion during the civil war,Caesar tripped when disembarking from a shipon the shores of Africa and fell flat on his face.With his talent for improvisation, he spread outhis arms and embraced the earth as a symbolof conquest. By quick thinking he turned aterrible omen of failure into one of victory.

CICERO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROME'SGREATEST POLITICIAN, ANTHONY EVERITT,

2001

The duke, an experienced and subtle courtier,never confronted his colleagues directly; he did notforce his opinions on them. Instead he treated themlike children, indulging them in their fears while cutting

them out of his plans. Occasionally he threw them abone, doing some minor thing they had suggested orpretending to worry about a danger they hadimagined. But he never let himself get angry orfrustrated; that would have ruined his presence ofmind, undermining his ability to lead the campaign.He forced himself to stay patient and cheerful. Heknew how to suffer fools gladly.

We mean the ability to keep one's head attimes of exceptional stress and violentemotion.... But it might be closer to the truth toassume that the faculty known as self-control--the gift of keeping calm even under the greateststress--is rooted in temperament. It is itself anemotion which serves to balance the passionatefeelings in strong characters without destroyingthem, and it is this balance alone that assuresthe dominance of the intellect. The counter-weight we mean is simply the sense of humandignity, the noblest pride and deepest need ofall: the urge to act rationally at all times.Therefore we would argue that a strongcharacter is one that will not be unbalanced bythe most powerful emotions.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

Understand: you cannot be everywhere or fighteveryone. Your time and energy are limited, and you

must learn how to preserve them. Exhaustion andfrustration can ruin your presence of mind. The worldis full of fools--people who cannot wait to get results,who change with the wind, who can't see past theirnoses. You encounter them everywhere: theindecisive boss, the rash colleague, the hystericalsubordinate. When working alongside fools, do notfight them. Instead think of them the way you think ofchildren, or pets, not important enough to affect yourmental balance. Detach yourself emotionally. Andwhile you're inwardly laughing at their foolishness,indulge them in one of their more harmless ideas. Theability to stay cheerful in the face of fools is animportant skill.

Crowd out feelings of panic by focusing onsimple tasks. Lord Yamanouchi, an aristocrat ofeighteenth-century Japan, once asked his tea masterto accompany him on a visit to Edo (later Tokyo),where he was to stay for a while. He wanted to showoff to his fellow courtiers his retainer's skill in therituals of the tea ceremony. Now, the tea master kneweverything there was to know about the tea ceremony,but little else; he was a peaceful man. He dressed,however, like a samurai, as his high position required.

One day, as the tea master was walking in the bigcity, he was accosted by a samurai who challengedhim to a duel. The tea master was not a swordsmanand tried to explain this to the samurai, but the manrefused to listen. To turn the challenge down woulddisgrace both the tea master's family and Lord

Yamanouchi. He had to accept, though that meantcertain death. And accept he did, requesting only thatthe duel be put off to the next day. His wish wasgranted.

In panic, the tea master hurried to the nearestfencing school. If he were to die, he wanted to learnhow to die honorably. To see the fencing masterordinarily required letters of introduction, but the teamaster was so insistent, and so clearly terrified, thatat last he was given an interview. The fencing masterlistened to his story.

However, he perceived now that it did not greatlymatter what kind of soldiers he was going tofight, so long as they fought, which fact no onedisputed. There was a more serious problem.He lay in his bunk pondering upon it. He tried tomathematically prove to himself that he wouldnot run from a battle.... A little panic-fear grew inhis mind. As his imagination went forward to afight, he saw hideous possibilities. Hecontemplated the lurking menaces of the future,and failed in an effort to see himself standingstoutly in the midst of them. He recalled hisvisions of broken-bladed glory, but in theshadow of the impending tumult he suspectedthem to be impossible pictures. He sprang fromthe bunk and began to pace nervously to andfro. "Good Lord, what's th' matter with me?" hesaid aloud. He felt that in this crisis his laws of

life were useless. Whatever he had learned ofhimself was here of no avail. He was anunknown quantity. He saw that he would againbe obliged to experiment as he had in earlyyouth. He must accumulate information ofhimself, and meanwhile he resolved to remainclose upon his guard lest those qualities ofwhich he knew nothing should everlastinglydisgrace him. "Good Lord!" he repeated indismay.... For days he made ceaselesscalculations, but they were all wondrouslyunsatisfactory. He found that he could establishnothing. He finally concluded that the only wayto prove himself was to go into the blaze, andthen figuratively to watch his legs to discovertheir merits and faults. He reluctantly admittedthat he could not sit still and with a mental slateand pencil derive an answer. To gain it, he musthave blaze, blood, and danger, even as achemist requires this, that, and the other. So hefretted for an opportunity.

THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE, STEPHENCRANE, 1871-1900

The swordsman was sympathetic: he would teachthe poor visitor the art of dying, but first he wanted tobe served some tea. The tea master proceeded toperform the ritual, his manner calm, his concentrationperfect. Finally the fencing master yelled out inexcitement, "No need for you to learn the art of death!

The state of mind you're in now is enough for you toface any samurai. When you see your challenger,imagine you're about to serve tea to a guest. Take offyour coat, fold it up carefully, and lay your fan on it justas you do at work." This ritual completed, the teamaster was to raise his sword in the same alert spirit.Then he would be ready to die.

The tea master agreed to do as his teacher said.The next day he went to meet the samurai, who couldnot help but notice the completely calm and dignifiedexpression on his opponent's face as he took off hiscoat. Perhaps, the samurai thought, this fumbling teamaster is actually a skilled swordsman. He bowed,begged pardon for his behavior the day before, andhurried away.

When circumstances scare us, our imaginationtends to take over, filling our minds with endlessanxieties. You need to gain control of yourimagination, something easier said than done. Oftenthe best way to calm down and give yourself suchcontrol is to force the mind to concentrate onsomething relatively simple--a calming ritual, arepetitive task that you are good at. You are creatingthe kind of composure you naturally have when yourmind is absorbed in a problem. A focused mind hasno room for anxiety or for the effects of an overactiveimagination. Once you have regained your mentalbalance, you can then face the problem at hand. Atthe first sign of any kind of fear, practice thistechnique until it becomes a habit. Being able tocontrol your imagination at intense moments is a

crucial skill.

Unintimidate yourself. Intimidation will alwaysthreaten your presence of mind. And it is a hardfeeling to combat.

During World War II, the composer DmitryShostakovich and several of his colleagues werecalled into a meeting with the Russian ruler JosephStalin, who had commissioned them to write a newnational anthem. Meetings with Stalin were terrifying;one misstep could lead you into a very dark alley. Hewould stare you down until you felt your throat tighten.And, as meetings with Stalin often did, this one took abad turn: the ruler began to criticize one of thecomposers for his poor arrangement of his anthem.Scared silly, the man admitted he had used anarranger who had done a bad job. Here he wasdigging several graves: Clearly the poor arrangercould be called to task. The composer wasresponsible for the hire, and he, too, could pay for themistake. And what of the other composers, includingShostakovich? Stalin could be relentless once hesmelled fear.

Shostakovich had heard enough: it was foolish, hesaid, to blame the arranger, who was mostly followingorders. He then subtly redirected the conversation toa different subject--whether a composer should do hisown orchestrations. What did Stalin think on thematter? Always eager to prove his expertise, Stalinswallowed the bait. The dangerous moment passed.

Shostakovich maintained his presence of mind in

several ways. First, instead of letting Stalin intimidatehim, he forced himself to see the man as he was:short, fat, ugly, unimaginative. The dictator's famouspiercing gaze was just a trick, a sign of his owninsecurity. Second, Shostakovich faced up to Stalin,talking to him normally and straightforwardly. By hisactions and tone of voice, the composer showed thathe was not intimidated. Stalin fed off fear. If, withoutbeing aggressive or brazen, you showed no fear, hewould generally leave you alone.

The key to staying unintimidated is to convinceyourself that the person you're facing is a mere mortal,no different from you--which is in fact the truth. See theperson, not the myth. Imagine him or her as a child, assomeone riddled with insecurities. Cutting the otherperson down to size will help you to keep your mentalbalance.

Develop your Fingerspitzengefuhl (fingertip feel).Presence of mind depends not only on your mind'sability to come to your aid in difficult situations butalso on the speed with which this happens. Waitinguntil the next day to think of the right action to takedoes you no good at all. "Speed" here meansresponding to circumstances with rapidity and makinglightning-quick decisions. This power is often read asa kind of intuition, what the Germans call"Fingerspitzengefuhl" (fingertip feel). Erwin Rommel,who led the German tank campaign in North Africaduring World War II, had great fingertip feel. He couldsense when the Allies would attack and from what

direction. In choosing a line of advance, he had anuncanny feel for his enemy's weakness; at the start ofa battle, he could intuit his enemy's strategy before itunfolded.

To Rommel's men their general seemed to have agenius for war, and he did possess a quicker mindthan most. But Rommel also did things to enhance hisquickness, things that reinforced his feel for battle.First, he devoured information about the enemy--fromdetails about its weaponry to the psychological traitsof the opposing general. Second, he made himself anexpert in tank technology, so that he could get themost out of his equipment. Third, he not onlymemorized maps of the North African desert butwould fly over it, at great risk, to get a bird's-eye viewof the battlefield. Finally, he personalized hisrelationship with his men. He always had a sense oftheir morale and knew exactly what he could expectfrom them.

Rommel didn't just study his men, his tanks, theterrain, and the enemy--he got inside their skin,understood the spirit that animated them, what madethem tick. Having felt his way into these things, inbattle he entered a state of mind in which he did nothave to think consciously of the situation. The totalityof what was going on was in his blood, at hisfingertips. He had Fingerspitzengefuhl.

Whether or not you have the mind of a Rommel,there are things you can do to help you respond fasterand bring out that intuitive feel that all animalspossess. Deep knowledge of the terrain will let you

process information faster than your enemy, atremendous advantage. Getting a feel for the spirit ofmen and material, thinking your way into them insteadof looking at them from outside, will help to put you ina different frame of mind, less conscious and forced,more unconscious and intuitive. Get your mind into thehabit of making lightning-quick decisions, trustingyour fingertip feel. Your mind will advance in a kind ofmental blitzkrieg, moving past your opponents beforethey realize what has hit them.

Finally, do not think of presence of mind as a qualityuseful only in periods of adversity, something toswitch on and off as you need it. Cultivate it as aneveryday condition. Confidence, fearlessness, andself-reliance are as crucial in times of peace as intimes of war. Franklin Delano Roosevelt showed histremendous mental toughness and grace underpressure not only during the crises of the Depressionand World War II but in everyday situations--in hisdealings with his family, his cabinet, his own polio-racked body. The better you get at the game of war,the more your warrior frame of mind will do for you indaily life. When a crisis does come, your mind willalready be calm and prepared. Once presence ofmind becomes a habit, it will never abandon you.

The man with centre has calm, unprejudicedjudgment. He knows what is important, whatunimportant. He meets realilty serenely andwith detachment keeping his sense ofproportion. The Hara no aru hito [man with

proportion. The Hara no aru hito [man withcentre] faces life calmly, is tranquil, ready foranything.... Nothing upsets him. If suddenly firebreaks out and people begin to shout in wildconfusion [he] does the right thing immediatelyand quietly, he ascertains the direction of thewind, rescues what is most important, fetcheswater, and behaves unhesitatingly in the way theemergency demands. The Hara no nai hito isthe opposite of all this. The Hara no nai hitoapplies to the man without calm judgment. Helacks the measure which should be secondnature. Therefore he reacts haphazardly andsubectively, arbitrarily and capriciously. Hecannot distinguish between important andunimportant, essential and unessential. Hisjudgment is not based upon facts but ontemporary conditions and rests on subjectivefoundations, such as moods, whims, "nerves."The Hara no nai hito is easily startled, isnervous, not because he is particularlysensitive but because he lacks that inner axiswhich would prevent his being thrown off centreand which would enable him to deal withsituations realistically.... Hara [centre, belly] isonly in slight measure innate. It is above all theresult of persistent self-training and discipline,in fact the fruit of responsible, individualdevelopment. That is what the Japanese meanswhen he speaks of the Hara no dekita hito , the

man who has accomplished or finished hisbelly, that is, himself: for he is mature. If thisdevelopment does not take place, we have theHara no dekita inai hito, someone who has notdeveloped, who has remained immature, who istoo young in the psychological sense. TheJapanese also say Hara no dekita inai hito wahito no ue ni tatsu koto ga dekinai: the man whohas not finished his belly cannot stand aboveothers (is not fit for leadership).

HARA: THE VITAL CENTRE, KARLFRIEDGRAF VON DURCKHEIM, 1962

Authority: A great part of courage is thecourage of having done the thing before.

--Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82)

REVERSALIt is never good to lose your presence of mind, but youcan use those moments when it is under threat toknow how to act in the future. You must find a way toput yourself in the thick of battle, then watch yourself inaction. Look for your own weaknesses, and thinkabout how to compensate for them. People who havenever lost their presence of mind are actually indanger: someday they will be taken by surprise, andthe fall will be harsh. All great generals, from JuliusCaesar to Patton, have at some point lost their nerveand then have been the stronger for winning it back.The more you have lost your balance, the more youwill know about how to right yourself.

You do not want to lose your presence of mind inkey situations, but it is a wise course to find a way tomake your enemies lose theirs. Take what throws youoff balance and impose it on them. Make them actbefore they are ready. Surprise them--nothing is moreunsettling than the unexpected need to act. Find theirweakness, what makes them emotional, and givethem a double dose of it. The more emotional you canmake them, the farther you will push them off course.

CREATE A SENSE OF URGENCYAND DESPERATION

THE DEATH-GROUND STRATEGY

You are your own worst enemy. You waste precioustime dreaming of the future instead of engaging inthe present. Since nothing seems urgent to you, youare only half involved in what you do. The only wayto change is through action and outside pressure.Put yourself in situations where you have too muchat stake to waste time or resources--if you cannotafford to lose, you won't. Cut your ties to the past;enter unknown territory where you must depend onyour wits and energy to see you through. Placeyourself on "death ground," where your back isagainst the wall and you have to fight like hell to getout alive.

Cortes ran all that aground with the ten ships.Cuba, to be sure, was still there, in the blue sea,with its farms, its cows and its tame Indians; butthe way to Cuba was no longer through sunnyblue waves, rocked in soft idleness, oblivious ofdanger and endeavor; it was throughMotecucuma's court, which had to beconquered by ruse, by force, or by both; througha sea of warlike Indians who ate their prisoners

and donned their skins as trophies; at the strokeof their chief's masterly hand, the five hundredmen had lost that flow of vital memories andhopes which linked up their souls with theirmother-island; at one stroke, their backs hadbeen withered and had lost all sense of life.Henceforward, for them, all life was ahead,towards those forbidding peaks which rosegigantically on the horizon as if to bar all accessto what was now not merely their ambition, buttheir only possible aim--Mexico, mysteriousand powerful behind the conflicting tribes.

HERNAN CORTES: CONQUEROR OFMEXICO, SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA, 1942

THE NO-RETURN TACTICIn 1504 an ambitious nineteen-year-old Spaniardnamed Hernan Cortes gave up his studies in law andsailed for his country's colonies in the New World.Stopping first in Santo Domingo (the island todaycomprising Haiti and the Dominican Republic), then inCuba, he soon heard about a land to the west calledMexico--an empire teeming with gold and dominatedby the Aztecs, with their magnificent highland capitalof Tenochtitlan. From then on, Cortes had just onethought: someday he would conquer and settle theland of Mexico.

Over the next ten years, Cortes slowly rose throughthe ranks, eventually becoming secretary to theSpanish governor of Cuba and then the king's

treasurer for the island. In his own mind, though, hewas merely biding his time. He waited patiently whileSpain sent other men to Mexico, many of them neverto return.

Finally, in 1518, the governor of Cuba, Diego deVelazquez, made Cortes the leader of an expeditionto discover what had happened to these earlierexplorers, find gold, and lay the groundwork for thecountry's conquest. Velazquez wanted to make thatfuture conquest himself, however, so for thisexpedition he wanted a man he could control, and hesoon developed doubts about Cortes--the man wasclever, perhaps too much so. Word reached Cortesthat the governor was having second thoughts aboutsending him to Mexico. Deciding to give Velazquezno time to nurse his misgivings, he managed to slipout of Cuba in the middle of the night with elevenships. He would explain himself to the governor later.

The expedition landed on Mexico's east coast inMarch 1519. Over the next few months, Cortes put hisplans to work--founding the town of Veracruz, forgingalliances with local tribes who hated the Aztecs, andmaking initial contact with the Aztec emperor, whosecapital lay some 250 miles to the west. But oneproblem plagued the conquistador: among the 500soldiers who had sailed with him from Cuba were ahandful who had been placed there by Velazquez toact as spies and make trouble for him if he exceededhis authority. These Velazquez loyalists accusedCortes of mismanaging the gold that he wascollecting, and when it became clear that he intended

to conquer Mexico, they spread rumors that he wasinsane--an all-too-convincing accusation to makeabout a man planning to lead 500 men against half amillion Aztecs, fierce warriors known to eat theirprisoners' flesh and wear the skins as trophies. Arational man would take the gold they had, return toCuba, and come back later with an army. Why stay inthis forbidding land, with its diseases and its lack ofcreature comforts, when they were so heavilyoutnumbered? Why not sail for Cuba, back homewhere their farms, their wives, and the good lifeawaited them?

Cortes did what he could with these troublemakers,bribing some, keeping a close eye on others.Meanwhile he worked to build a strong enoughrapport with the rest of his men that the grumblerscould do no harm. All seemed well until the night ofJuly 30, when Cortes was awoken by a Spanish sailorwho, begging for mercy, confessed that he had joinedin a plot to steal a ship and return that very evening toCuba, where the conspirators would tell Velazquezabout Cortes's goal of conquering Mexico on his own.

Meditation on inevitable death should beperformed daily. Every day when one's bodyand mind are at peace, one should meditateupon being ripped apart by arrows, rifles, spearsand swords, being carried away by surgingwaves, being thrown into the midst of a greatfire, bring struck by lightning, being shaken todeath by a great earthquake, falling from

thousand-foot cliffs, dying of disease orcommitting seppuku at the death of one'smaster. And every day without fail one shouldconsider himself as dead.HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI,

YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, 1659-1720

Cortes sensed that this was the decisive momentof the expedition. He could easily squash theconspiracy, but there would be others. His men werea rough lot, and their minds were on gold, Cuba, theirfamilies--anything but fighting the Aztecs. He could notconquer an empire with men so divided anduntrustworthy, but how to fill them with the energy andfocus for the immense task he faced? Thinking thisthrough, he decided to take swift action. He seizedthe conspirators and had the two ringleaders hanged.Next, he bribed his pilots to bore holes in all of theships and then announce that worms had eatenthrough the boards of the vessels, making themunseaworthy.

Pretending to be upset at the news, Cortes orderedwhat was salvageable from the ships to be takenashore and then the hulls to be sunk. The pilotscomplied, but not enough holes had been bored, andonly five of the ships went down. The story of theworms was plausible enough, and the soldiersaccepted the news of the five ships with equanimity.But when a few days later more ships were runaground and only one was left afloat, it was clear tothem that Cortes had arranged the whole thing. When

he called a meeting, their mood was mutinous andmurderous.

This was no time for subtlety. Cortes addressed hismen: he was responsible for the disaster, headmitted; he had ordered it done, but now there wasno turning back. They could hang him, but they weresurrounded by hostile Indians and had no ships;divided and leaderless, they would perish. The onlyalternative was to follow him to Tenochtitlan. Only byconquering the Aztecs, by becoming lords of Mexico,could they get back to Cuba alive. To reachTenochtitlan they would have to fight with utterintensity. They would have to be unified; anydissension would lead to defeat and a terrible death.The situation was desperate, but if the men foughtdesperately in turn, Cortes guaranteed that he wouldlead them to victory. Since the army was so small innumber, the glory and riches would be all the greater.Any cowards not up to the challenge could sail theone remaining ship home.

There is something in war that drives so deeplyinto you that death ceases to be the enemy,merely another participant in a game you don'twish to end.

PHANTOM OVER VIETNAM, JOHN TROTTI,USMC, 1984

No one accepted the offer, and the last ship wasrun aground. Over the next months, Cortes kept hisarmy away from Veracruz and the coast. Their

attention was focused on Tenochtitlan, the heart of theAztec empire. The grumbling, the self-interest, and thegreed all disappeared. Understanding the danger oftheir situation, the conquistadors fought ruthlessly.Some two years after the destruction of the Spanishships, and with the help of their Indian allies, Cortes'sarmy laid siege to Tenochtitlan and conquered theAztec empire.

"You don't have time for this display, you fool,"he said in a severe tone. "This, whatever you'redoing now, may be your last act on earth. It mayvery well be your last battle. There is no powerwhich could guarantee that you are going to liveone more minute...." "...Acts have power," hesaid, "Especially when the person acting knowsthat those acts are his last battle. There is astrange consuming happiness in acting with thefull knowledge that whatever one is doing mayvery well be one's last act on earth. Irecommend that you reconsider your life andbring your acts into that light.... Focus yourattention on the link between you and yourdeath, without remorse or sadness or worrying.Focus your attention on the fact you don't havetime and let your acts flow accordingly. Let eachof your acts be your last battle on earth. Onlyunder those conditions will your acts have theirrightful power. Otherwise they will be, for as longas you live, the acts of a timid man." "Is it so

terrible to be a timid man?" "No. It isn't if youare going to be immortal, but if you are going todie there is not time for timidity, simply becausetimidity makes you cling to something thatexists only in your thoughts. It soothes you whileeverything is at a lull, but then the awesome,mysterious world will open its mouth for you, asit will open for every one of us, and then you willrealize that your sure ways were not sure at all.Being timid prevents us from examining andexploiting our lot as men."

JOURNEY TO IXTLAN: THE LESSONS OFDON JUAN, CARLOS CASTANEDA, 1972

InterpretationOn the night of the conspiracy, Cortes had to thinkfast. What was the root of the problem he faced? Itwas not Velazquez's spies, or the hostile Aztecs, orthe incredible odds against him. The root of theproblem was his own men and the ships in the harbor.His soldiers were divided in heart and mind. Theywere thinking about the wrong things--their wives,their dreams of gold, their plans for the future. And inthe backs of their minds there was always an escaperoute: if this conquest business went badly, they couldgo home. Those ships in the harbor were more thanjust transportation; they represented Cuba, thefreedom to leave, the ability to send forreinforcements--so many possibilities.

For the soldiers the ships were a crutch, something

to fall back on if things got ugly. Once Cortes hadidentified the problem, the solution was simple:destroy the ships. By putting his men in a desperateplace, he would make them fight with utmost intensity.

A sense of urgency comes from a powerfulconnection to the present. Instead of dreaming ofrescue or hoping for a better future, you have to facethe issue at hand. Fail and you perish. People whoinvolve themselves completely in the immediateproblem are intimidating; because they are focusingso intensely, they seem more powerful than they are.Their sense of urgency multiplies their strength andgives them momentum. Instead of five hundred men,Cortes suddenly had the weight of a much larger armyat his back.

Like Cortes you must locate the root of yourproblem. It is not the people around you; it is yourself,and the spirit with which you face the world. In theback of your mind, you keep an escape route, acrutch, something to turn to if things go bad. Maybe itis some wealthy relative you can count on to buy yourway out; maybe it is some grand opportunity on thehorizon, the endless vistas of time that seem to bebefore you; maybe it is a familiar job or a comfortablerelationship that is always there if you fail. Just asCortes's men saw their ships as insurance, you maysee this fallback as a blessing--but in fact it is a curse.It divides you. Because you think you have options,you never involve yourself deeply enough in one thingto do it thoroughly, and you never quite get what youwant. Sometimes you need to run your ships aground,

burn them, and leave yourself just one option:succeed or go down. Make the burning of your shipsas real as possible--get rid of your safety net.Sometimes you have to become a little desperate toget anywhere.

The ancient commanders of armies, who wellknew the powerful influence of necessity, and

how it inspired the soldiers with the mostdesperate courage, neglected nothing to

subject their men to such a pressure.--Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)

THE DEATH-AT-YOUR-HEELS TACTICIn 1845 the writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky, then twenty-four, shook the Russian literary world with thepublication of his first novel, Poor Folk. He becamethe toast of St. Petersburg society. But somethingabout his early fame seemed empty to him. He driftedinto the fringes of left-wing politics, attendingmeetings of various socialist and radical groups. Oneof these groups centered on the charismatic MikhailPetrashevsky.

Three years later, in 1848, revolution broke out allacross Europe. Inspired by what was happening inthe West, Russian radical groups like Petrashevsky'stalked of following suit. But agents of Czar Nicholas Ihad infiltrated many of these groups, and reports werewritten about the wild things being discussed atPetrashevsky's house, including talk of incitingpeasant revolts. Dostoyevsky was fervent about

freeing the serfs, and on April 23, 1849, he andtwenty-three other members of the Petrashevskygroup were arrested.

After eight months of languishing in jail, theprisoners were awakened one cold morning and toldthat today they would finally hear their sentences. Afew months' exile was the usual punishment for theircrime; soon, they thought, their ordeal would be over.

They were bundled into carriages and driventhrough the icy streets of St. Petersburg. Emergingfrom the carriages into Semyonovsky Square, theywere greeted by a priest; behind him they could seerows of soldiers and, behind the soldiers, thousandsof spectators. They were led toward a scaffoldcovered in black cloth at the center of the square. Infront of the scaffold were three posts, and to the sidewas a line of carts laden with coffins.

Lord Naoshige said, "The Way of the Samuraiis in desperateness. Ten men or more cannotkill such a man. Common sense will notaccomplish great things. Simply becomeinsane and desperate."HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI,

YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, 1659-1720

Dostoyevsky could not believe what he saw. "It's notpossible that they mean to execute us," he whisperedto his neighbor. They were marched to the scaffoldand placed in two lines. It was an unbelievably coldday, and the prisoners were wearing the light clothes

they'd been arrested in back in April. A drumrollsounded. An officer came forward to read theirsentences: "All of the accused are guilty as chargedof intending to overthrow the national order, and aretherefore condemned to death before a firing squad."The prisoners were too stunned to speak.

As the officer read out the individual charges andsentences, Dostoyevsky found himself staring at thegolden spire of a nearby church and at the sunlightbouncing off it. The gleams of light disappeared as acloud passed overhead, and the thought occurred tohim that he was about to pass into darkness just asquickly, and forever. Suddenly he had another thought:If I do not die, if I am not killed, my life will suddenlyseem endless, a whole eternity, each minute acentury. I will take account of everything that passes--Iwill not waste a second of life again.

The prisoners were given hooded shirts. The priestcame forward to read them their last rites and heartheir confessions. They said good-bye to one another.The first three to be shot were tied to the posts, andthe hoods were pulled over their faces. Dostoyevskystood in the front, in the next group to go. The soldiersraised their rifles, took aim--and suddenly a carriagecame galloping into the square. A man got out with anenvelope. At the last second, the czar had commutedtheir death sentences.

It had long been known, of course, that a manwho, through disciplined training, hadrelinquished any desire or hope for survival and

had only one goal--the destruction of hisenemy--could be a redoubtable opponent and atruly formidable fighter who neither asked noroffered any quarter once his weapon had beenunsheathed. In this way, a seemingly ordinaryman who, by the force of circumstances ratherthan by profession, had been placed in theposition of having to make a desperate choice,could prove dangerous, even to a skilledfencing master. One famous episode, forexample, concerns a teacher of swordsmanshipwho was asked by a superior to surrender aservant guilty of an offense punishable bydeath. This teacher, wishing to test a theory ofhis concerning the power of that condition wewould call "desperation," challenged thedoomed man to a duel. Knowing full well theirrevocability of his sentence, the servant wasbeyond caring one way or the other, and theensuing duel proved that even a skilled fencerand teacher of the art could find himself in greatdifficulty when confronted by a man who,because of his acceptance of imminent death,could go to the limit (and even beyond) in hisstrategy, without a single hesitation ordistracting consideration. The servant, in fact,fought like a man possessed, forcing his masterto retreat until his back was almost to the wall. Atlast the teacher had to cut him down in a final

effort, wherein the master's own desperationbrought about the fullest coordination of hiscourage, skill, and determination.SECRETS OF THE SAMURAI, OSCAR RATTI

AND ADELE WESTBROOK, 1973

Later that morning, Dostoyevsky was told his newsentence: four years hard labor in Siberia, to befollowed by a stint in the army. Barely affected, hewrote that day to his brother, "When I look back at thepast and think of all the time I squandered in error andidleness,...then my heart bleeds. Life is a gift...everyminute could have been an eternity of happiness! Ifyouth only knew! Now my life will change; now I will bereborn."

A few days later, ten-pound shackles were put onDostoyevsky's arms and legs--they would stay therefor the length of his prison term--and he was carted offto Siberia. For the next four years, he endured themost abysmal prison conditions. Granted no writingprivileges, he wrote novels in his head, memorizedthem. Finally, in 1857, still serving the army period ofhis sentence, he was allowed to start publishing hiswork. Where before he would torture himself over apage, spend half a day idling it away in thought, nowhe wrote and wrote. Friends would see him walkingthe streets of St. Petersburg mumbling bits ofdialogue to himself, lost in his characters and plots.His new motto was "Try to get as much done aspossible in the shortest time."

Some pitied Dostoyevsky his time in prison. That

made him angry; he was grateful for the experienceand felt no bitterness. But for that December day in1849, he felt, he would have wasted his life. Right upuntil his death, in 1881, he continued writing at afrantic pace, churning out novel after novel--Crimeand Punishment, The Possessed, The BrothersKaramazov--as if each one were his last.

InterpretationCzar Nicholas had decided to sentence thePetrashevsky radicals to hard labor soon after theirarrest. But he wanted to teach them a harsher lessonas well, so he dreamed up the cruel theater of thedeath sentence, with its careful details--the priest, thehoods, the coffins, the last-second pardon. This, hethought, would really humble and humiliate them. Infact, some of the prisoners were driven insane by theevents of that day. But the effect on Dostoyevsky wasdifferent: he had been afflicted for years with a senseof wandering, of feeling lost, of not knowing what to dowith his time. An extremely sensitive man, that day heliterally felt his own death deep in his bones. And heexperienced his "pardon" as a rebirth.

The effect was permanent. For the rest of his life,Dostoyevsky would consciously bring himself back tothat day, remembering his pledge never to wasteanother moment. Or, if he felt he had grown toocomfortable and complacent, he would go to a casinoand gamble away all his money. Poverty and debtwere for him a kind of symbolic death, throwing himback on the possible nothingness of his life. In either

case he would have to write, and not the way othernovelists wrote--as if it were a pleasant little artisticcareer, with all its attendant delights of salons,lectures, and other frills. Dostoyevsky wrote as if hislife were at stake, with an intense feeling of urgencyand seriousness.

Death is impossible for us to fathom: it is soimmense, so frightening, that we will do almostanything to avoid thinking about it. Society isorganized to make death invisible, to keep it severalsteps removed. That distance may seem necessaryfor our comfort, but it comes with a terrible price: theillusion of limitless time, and a consequent lack ofseriousness about daily life. We are running awayfrom the one reality that faces us all.

As a warrior in life, you must turn this dynamicaround: make the thought of death something not toescape but to embrace. Your days are numbered. Willyou pass them half awake and halfhearted or will youlive with a sense of urgency? Cruel theaters staged bya czar are unnecessary; death will come to youwithout them. Imagine it pressing in on you, leavingyou no escape--for there is no escape. Feeling deathat your heels will make all your actions more certain,more forceful. This could be your last throw of thedice: make it count.

While knowing that we will die someday, wethink that all the others will die before us andthat we will be the last to go. Death seems along way off. Is this not shallow thinking? It is

worthless and is only a joke within a dream....Insofar as death is always at one's door, oneshould make sufficient effort and act quickly.

--Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai,Yamamoto Tsunetomo (1659-1720)

KEYS TO WARFAREQuite often we feel somewhat lost in our actions. Wecould do this or that--we have many options, but noneof them seem quite necessary. Our freedom is aburden--what do we do today, where do we go? Ourdaily patterns and routines help us to avoid feelingdirectionless, but there is always the niggling thoughtthat we could accomplish so much more. We wasteso much time. Upon occasion all of us have felt asense of urgency. Most often it is imposed fromoutside: we fall behind in our work, we inadvertentlytake on more than we can handle, responsibility forsomething is thrust into our hands. Now everythingchanges; no more freedom. We have to do this, wehave to fix that. The surprise is always how muchmore spirited and more alive this makes us feel; noweverything we do seems necessary. But eventually wego back to our normal patterns. And when that senseof urgency goes, we really do not know how to get itback.

Leaders of armies have thought about this subjectsince armies existed: how can soldiers be motivated,be made more aggressive, more desperate? Somegenerals have relied on fiery oratory, and thoseparticularly good at it have had some success. But

over two thousand years ago, the Chinese strategistSun-tzu came to believe that listening to speeches, nomatter how rousing, was too passive an experience tohave an enduring effect. Instead Sun-tzu talked of a"death ground"--a place where an army is backed upagainst some geographical feature like a mountain, ariver, or a forest and has no escape route. Without away to retreat, Sun-tzu argued, an army fights withdouble or triple the spirit it would have on openterrain, because death is viscerally present. Sun-tzuadvocated deliberately stationing soldiers on deathground to give them the desperate edge that makesmen fight like the devil. That is what Cortes did inMexico, and it is the only sure way to create a real firein the belly. The world is ruled by necessity: Peoplechange their behavior only if they have to. They willfeel urgency only if their lives depend on it.

Taking advantage of the opportunity, theybegan to question Han Hsin. "According to TheArt of War , when one fights he should keep thehills to his right or rear, and bodies of water infront of him or to the left," they said. "Yet todayyou ordered us on the contrary to draw up rankswith our backs to the river, saying 'We shalldefeat Chao and feast together!' We wereopposed to the idea, and yet it has ended invictory. What sort of strategy is this?" "This is inThe Art of War too," replied Han Hsin. "It is justthat you have failed to notice it! Does it not sayin The Art of War : 'Drive them into a fatal

in The Art of War : 'Drive them into a fatalposition and they will come out alive; placethem in a hopeless spot and they will survive'?Moreover, I did not have at my disposal troopsthat I had trained and led from past times, butwas forced, as the saying goes, to round upmen from the market place and use them tofight with. Under such circumstances, if I had notplaced them in a desperate situation whereeach man was obliged to fight for his own life,but had allowed them to remain in a safe place,they would have all run away. Then what goodwould they have been to me?" "Indeed!" hisgenerals exclaimed in admiration. "We wouldnever have thought of that."

RECORDS OF THE HISTORIAN, SZUMACHIEN, CIRCA 145 B.C.-CIRCA 86 B.C.

Death ground is a psychological phenomenon thatgoes well beyond the battlefield: it is any set ofcircumstances in which you feel enclosed and withoutoptions. There is very real pressure at your back, andyou cannot retreat. Time is running out. Failure--aform of psychic death--is staring you in the face. Youmust act or suffer the consequences.

Understand: we are creatures who are intimatelytied to our environment--we respond viscerally to ourcircumstances and to the people around us. If oursituation is easy and relaxed, if people are friendlyand warm, our natural tension unwinds. We may evengrow bored and tired; our environment is failing to

challenge us, although we may not realize it. But putyourself in a high-stakes situation--a psychologicaldeath ground--and the dynamic changes. Your bodyresponds to danger with a surge of energy; your mindfocuses. Urgency is forced on you; you are compelledto waste no more time.

The trick is to use this effect deliberately from timeto time, to practice it on yourself as a kind of wake-upcall. The following five actions are designed to put youon a psychological death ground. Reading andthinking about them won't work; you must put theminto effect. They are forms of pressure to apply toyourself. Depending on whether you want a low-intensity jolt for regular use or a real shock, you canturn the level up or down. The scale is up to you.

Stake everything on a single throw. In 1937 thetwenty-eight-year-old Lyndon B. Johnson--at the timethe Texas director of the National YouthAdministration--faced a dilemma. The Texascongressman James Buchanan had suddenly died.Since loyal Texan voters tended to return incumbentsto office, a Texan congressional seat generally cameavailable only every ten or twenty years--and Johnsonwanted to be in Congress by the time he was thirty; hedid not have ten years to wait. But he was very youngand was virtually unknown in Buchanan's old district,the tenth. He would be facing political heavyweightswhom voters would heavily favor. Why try somethingthat seemed doomed to failure? Not only would therace be a waste of money, but the humiliation, if

Johnson lost badly, could derail his long-termambitions.

Unlimited possibilities are not suited to man; ifthey existed, his life would only dissolve in theboundless. To become strong, a man's lifeneeds the limitations ordained by duty andvoluntarily accepted. The individual attainssignificance as a free spirit only by surroundinghimself with these limitations and bydetermining for himself what his duty is.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

Johnson considered all this--then decided to run.Over the next few weeks, he campaigned intensely,visiting the district's every backwater village and town,shaking the poorest farmer's hand, sitting indrugstores to meet people who had never come closeto talking to a candidate before. He pulled every trickin the book--old-style rallies and barbecues,newfangled radio ads. He worked night and day--andhard. By the time the race was over, Johnson was in ahospital, being treated for exhaustion andappendicitis. But, in one of the great upsets inAmerican political history, he had won.

By staking his future on one throw, Johnson puthimself in a death-ground situation. His body andspirit responded with the energy he needed. Often wetry too many things at one time, thinking that one ofthem will bring us success--but in these situations our

minds are diffused, our efforts halfhearted. It is betterto take on one daunting challenge, even one thatothers think foolish. Our future is at stake; we cannotafford to lose. So we don't.

Act before you are ready. In 49 B.C. a group ofRoman senators, allied with Pompey and fearing thegrowing power of Julius Caesar, ordered the greatgeneral to disband his army or be considered a traitorto the Republic. When Caesar received this decree,he was in southern Gaul (modern-day France) withonly five thousand men; the rest of his legions were farto the north, where he had been campaigning. He hadno intention of obeying the decree--that would havebeen suicide--but it would be weeks before the bulk ofhis army could join him. Unwilling to wait, Caesar toldhis captains, "Let the die be cast," and he and his fivethousand men crossed the Rubicon, the river markingthe border between Gaul and Italy. Leading troopsonto Italian soil meant war with Rome. Now there wasno turning back; it was fight or die. Caesar wascompelled to concentrate his forces, to not waste asingle man, to act with speed, and to be as creativeas possible. He marched on Rome. By seizing theinitiative, he frightened the senators, forcing Pompeyto flee.

Death is nothing, but to live defeated is to dieevery day.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, 1769-1821

When danger is greatest.--It is rare to break

one's leg when in the course of life one is toilingupwards--it happens much more often when onestarts to take things easy and to choose theeasy paths.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844-1900

We often wait too long to act, particularly when weface no outside pressure. It is sometimes better to actbefore you think you are ready--to force the issue andcross the Rubicon. Not only will you take youropponents by surprise, you will also have to make themost of your resources. You have committed yourselfand cannot turn back. Under pressure your creativitywill flourish. Do this often and you will develop yourability to think and act fast.

Enter new waters. The Hollywood studio MGM hadbeen good to Joan Crawford: it had discovered her,made her a star, crafted her image. By the early1940s, though, Crawford had had enough. It was alltoo comfortable; MGM kept casting her in the samekinds of roles, none of them a challenge. So, in 1943,Crawford did the unthinkable and asked out of hercontract.

Be absolute for death; either death or life Shallthereby be the sweeter. Reason thus with life: If Ido lose thee, I do lose a thing That none butfools would keep: a breath thou art, Servile to allthe skyey influences, That dost this habituation,where thou keep'st, Hourly afflict: merely, thou

art death's fool; For him thou labour'st by thyflight to shun And yet runn'st toward him still.Thou art not noble; For all the accommodationsthat thou bear'st Are nursed by baseness.Thou'rt by no means valiant; For thou dost fearthe soft and tender fork Of a poor worm. Thybest of rest is sleep, And that thou oft provokest;yet grossly fear'st Thy death, which is no more.

MEASURE FOR MEASURE, WILLIAMSHAKESPEARE, 1564-1616

The consequences for Crawford could have beenterrible; to challenge the studio system wasconsidered highly unwise. Indeed, when she thensigned up with Warner Brothers, predictably enoughshe was offered the same mediocre sorts of scripts.She turned them down. On the verge of being fired,she finally found the part she had been looking for: thetitle role in Mildred Pierce, which, however, she wasnot offered. Setting to work on the director, MichaelCurtiz, she managed to change his mind and land therole. She gave the performance of her life, won heronly Best Actress Oscar, and resurrected her career.

In leaving MGM, Crawford was taking a big chance.If she failed to succeed at Warner Brothers, andquickly, her career would be over. But Crawfordthrived on risk. When she was challenged, when shefelt on edge, she burst with energy and was at herbest. Like Crawford, you sometimes have to forceyourself onto death ground--leaving stale relationships

and comfortable situations behind, cutting your ties tothe past. If you give yourself no way out, you will haveto make your new endeavor work. Leaving the pastfor unknown terrain is like a death--and feeling thisfinality will snap you back to life.

Make it "you against the world." Compared tosports like football, baseball is slow and has fewoutlets for aggression. This was a problem for thehitter Ted Williams, who played best when he wasangry--when he felt that it was him against the world.Creating this mood on the field was difficult forWilliams, but early on, he discovered a secretweapon: the press. He got into the habit of insultingsportswriters, whether just by refusing to cooperatewith them or by verbally abusing them. The reportersreturned the favor, writing scathing articles on hischaracter, questioning his talent, trumpeting theslightest drop in his batting average. It was whenWilliams was hammered by the press, though, that heplayed best. He would go on a hitting tear, as if toprove them wrong. In 1957, when he carried on ayearlong feud with the papers, he played perhaps hisgreatest season and won the batting title at what for abaseball player is the advanced age of forty. As onejournalist wrote, "Hate seems to activate his reflexeslike adrenaline stimulates the heart. Animosity is hisfuel!"

For Williams the animosity of the press and, withthe press, of the public, was a kind of constantpressure that he could read, hear, and feel. They

hated him, they doubted him, they wanted to see himfail; he would show them. And he did. A fighting spiritneeds a little edge, some anger and hatred to fuel it.So do not sit back and wait for people to getaggressive; irritate and infuriate them deliberately.Feeling cornered by a multitude of people who dislikeyou, you will fight like hell. Hatred is a powerfulemotion. Remember: in any battle you are putting yourname and reputation on the line; your enemies willrelish your failure. Use that pressure to make yourselffight harder.

Keep yourself restless and unsatisfied. Napoleonhad many qualities that made him perhaps history'sgreatest general, but the one that raised him to theheights and kept him there was his boundless energy.During campaigns he worked eighteen to twenty-hourdays. If necessary, he would go without sleep forseveral days, yet sleeplessness rarely reduced hiscapacities. He would work in the bath, at the theater,during a dinner party. Keeping his eye on every detailof the war, he would ride endless miles on horsebackwithout tiring or complaining.

O gentlemen, the time of life is short! To spendthat shortness basely were too long, If life didride upon a dial's point, Still ending at thearrival of an hour. An if we live, we live to treadon kings; If die, brave death, when princes diewith us!

KING HENRY IV, PART I, WILLIAM

SHAKESPEARE, 1564-1616

Certainly Napoleon had extraordinary endurance,but there was more to it than that: he never let himselfrest, was never satisfied. In 1796, in his first realposition of command, he led the French to aremarkable victory in Italy, then immediately went onanother campaign, this time in Egypt. There, unhappywith the way the war was going and with a lack ofpolitical power that he felt was cutting into his controlover military affairs, he returned to France andconspired to become first consul. This achieved, heimmediately set out on his second Italian campaign.And on he went, immersing himself in new wars, newchallenges, that required him to call on his limitlessenergy. If he did not meet the crisis, he would perish.

When we are tired, it is often because we arebored. When no real challenge faces us, a mental andphysical lethargy sets in. "Sometimes death onlycomes from a lack of energy," Napoleon once said,and lack of energy comes from a lack of challenges,comes when we have taken on less than we arecapable of. Take a risk and your body and mind willrespond with a rush of energy. Make risk a constantpractice; never let yourself settle down. Soon living ondeath ground will become a kind of addiction--youwon't be able to do without it. When soldiers survive abrush with death, they often feel an exhilaration thatthey want to have again. Life has more meaning in theface of death. The risks you keep taking, thechallenges you keep overcoming, are like symbolic

deaths that sharpen your appreciation of life.

Authority: When you will survive if you fightquickly and perish if you do not, this iscalled [death] ground.... Put them in a spotwhere they have no place to go, and theywill die before fleeing. If they are to die there,what can they not do? Warriors exert theirfull strength. When warriors are in greatdanger, then they have no fear. When thereis nowhere to go, they are firm, when theyare deeply involved, they stick to it. If theyhave no choice, they will fight.

--The Art of War, Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALIf the feeling of having nothing to lose can propel youforward, it can do the same for others. You must avoidany conflict with people in this position. Maybe theyare living in terrible conditions or, for whateverreason, are suicidal; in any case they are desperate,

and desperate people will risk everything in a fight.This gives them a huge advantage. Already defeatedby circumstances, they have nothing to lose. You do.Leave them alone.

Conversely, attacking enemies when their morale islow gives you the advantage. Maybe they are fightingfor a cause they know is unjust or for a leader they donot respect. Find a way to lower their spirits evenfurther. Troops with low morale are discouraged bythe slightest setback. A show of force will crush theirfighting spirit.

Always try to lower the other side's sense ofurgency. Make your enemies think they have all thetime in the world; when you suddenly appear at theirborder, they are in a slumbering state, and you willeasily overrun them. While you are sharpening yourfighting spirit, always do what you can to blunt theirs.

PART II

ORGANIZATIONAL (TEAM)WARFARE

You may have brilliant ideas, you may be able toinvent unbeatable strategies--but if the group that youlead, and that you depend on to execute your plans, isunresponsive and uncreative, and if its membersalways put their personal agendas first, your ideas willmean nothing. You must learn the lesson of war: it isthe structure of the army--the chain of command andthe relationship of the parts to the whole--that will giveyour strategies force.

The primary goal in war is to build speed andmobility into the very structure of your army. Thatmeans having a single authority on top, avoiding thehesitancy and confusion of divided leadership. Itmeans giving soldiers a sense of the overall goal tobe accomplished and the latitude to take action tomeet that goal; instead of reacting like automatons,they are able to respond to events in the field. Finally,it means motivating soldiers, creating an overall espritde corps that gives them irresistible momentum. Withforces organized in this manner, a general can adaptto circumstances faster than the enemy can, gaining adecided advantage.

This military model is extremely adaptable to anygroup. It has one simple requirement: beforeformulating a strategy or taking action, understand the

structure of your group. You can always change it andredesign it to fit your purposes. The following threechapters will help you focus on this critical issue andgive you strategic options--possible organizationalmodels to follow, as well as disastrous mistakes toavoid.

AVOID THE SNARES OFGROUPTHINK

THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRATEGY

The problem in leading any group is that peopleinevitably have their own agendas. If you are tooauthoritarian, they will resent you and rebel in silentways. If you are too easygoing, they will revert to theirnatural selfishness and you will lose control. Youhave to create a chain of command in which peopledo not feel constrained by your influence yet followyour lead. Put the right people in place--people whowill enact the spirit of your ideas without beingautomatons. Make your commands clear andinspiring, focusing attention on the team, not theleader. Create a sense of participation, but do notfall into Groupthink--the irrationality of collectivedecision making. Make yourself look like a paragonof fairness, but never relinquish unity of command.

How very different is the cohesion between thatof an army rallying around one flag carried intobattle at the personal command of one generaland that of an allied military force extending 50or 100 leagues, or even on different sides of thetheater! In the first case, cohesion is at itsstrongest and unity at its closest. In the second

case, the unity is very remote, often consistingof no more than a shared political intention, andtherefore only scanty and imperfect, while thecohesion of the parts is mostly weak and oftenno more than an illusion.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

THE BROKEN CHAINWorld War I began in August 1914, and by the end ofthat year, all along the Western Front, the British andFrench were caught in a deadly stalemate with theGermans. Meanwhile, though, on the Eastern Front,Germany was badly beating the Russians, allies ofBritain and France. Britain's military leaders had to trya new strategy, and their plan, backed by First Lord ofthe Admiralty Winston Churchill and others, was tostage an attack on Gallipoli, a peninsula on Turkey'sDardanelles Strait. Turkey was an ally of Germany's,and the Dardanelles was the gateway toConstantinople, the Turkish capital (present-dayIstanbul). If the Allies could take Gallipoli,Constantinople would follow, and Turkey would haveto leave the war. In addition, using bases in Turkeyand the Balkans, the Allies could attack Germanyfrom the southeast, dividing its armies and weakeningits ability to fight on the Western Front. They wouldalso have a clear supply line to Russia. Victory atGallipoli would change the course of the war.

The plan was approved, and in March 1915,General Sir Ian Hamilton was named to lead the

campaign. Hamilton, at sixty-two, was an ablestrategist and an experienced commander. He andChurchill felt certain that their forces, includingAustralians and New Zealanders, would out-match theTurks. Churchill's orders were simple: takeConstantinople. He left the details to the general.

Hamilton's plan was to land at three points on thesouthwestern tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, secure thebeaches, and sweep north. The landings took placeon April 27. From the beginning almost everythingwent wrong: the army's maps were inaccurate, itstroops landed in the wrong places, the beaches weremuch narrower than expected. Worst of all, the Turksfought back unexpectedly fiercely and well. At the endof the first day, most of the Allies' 70,000 men hadlanded, but they were unable to advance beyond thebeaches, where the Turks would hold them pinneddown for several weeks. It was another stalemate;Gallipoli had become a disaster.

All seemed lost, but in June, Churchill convinced thegovernment to send more troops and Hamiltondevised a new plan. He would land 20,000 men atSuvla Bay, some twenty miles to the north. Suvla wasa vulnerable target: it had a large harbor, the terrainwas low-lying and easy, and it was defended by only ahandful of Turks. An invasion here would force theTurks to divide their forces, freeing up the Alliedarmies to the south. The stalemate would be broken,and Gallipoli would fall.

To command the Suvla operation Hamilton wasforced to accept the most senior Englishman

available for the job, Lieutenant General Sir FrederickStopford. Under him, Major General FrederickHammersley would lead the Eleventh Division.Neither of these men was Hamilton's first choice.Stopford, a sixty-one-year-old military teacher, hadnever led troops in war and saw artillerybombardment as the only way to win a battle; he wasalso in poor health. Hammersley, for his part, hadsuffered a nervous breakdown the previous year.

In war it is not men, but the man, that counts.NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, 1769-1821

Hamilton's style was to tell his officers the purposeof an upcoming battle but leave it to them how to bringit about. He was a gentleman, never blunt or forceful.At one of their first meetings, for example, Stop-fordrequested changes in the landing plans to reducerisk. Hamilton politely deferred to him.

Hamilton did have one request. Once the Turksknew of the landings at Suvla, they would rush inreinforcements. As soon as the Allies were ashore,then, Hamilton wanted them to advance immediatelyto a range of hills four miles inland, called TekkeTepe, and to get there before the Turks. From TekkeTepe the Allies would dominate the peninsula. Theorder was simple enough, but Hamilton, so as not tooffend his subordinate, expressed it in the mostgeneral terms. Most crucially, he specified no timeframe. He was sufficiently vague that Stopfordcompletely misinterpreted him: instead of trying to

reach Tekke Tepe "as soon as possible," Stopfordthought he should advance to the hills "if possible."That was the order he gave Hammersley. And asHammersley, nervous about the whole campaign,passed it down to his colonels, the order became lessurgent and vaguer still.

Also, despite his deference to Stopford, Hamiltonoverruled the lieutenant general in one respect: hedenied a request for more artillery bombardments toloosen up the Turks. Stopford's troops wouldoutnumber the Turks at Suvla ten to one, Hamiltonreplied; more artillery was superfluous.

The attack began in the early morning of August 7.Once again much turned bad: Stopford's changes inthe landing plans made a mess. As his officers cameashore, they began to argue, uncertain about theirpositions and objectives. They sent messengers toask their next step: Advance? Consolidate?Hammersley had no answers. Stopford had stayed ona boat offshore, from which to control the battlefield--but on that boat he was impossible to reach quicklyenough to get prompt orders from him. Hamilton wason an island still farther away. The day was fritteredaway in argument and the endless relaying ofmessages.

The next morning Hamilton began to sense thatsomething had gone very wrong. Fromreconnaissance aircraft he knew that the flat landaround Suvla was essentially empty and undefended;the way to Tekke Tepe was open--the troops had onlyto march--but they were staying where they were.

Hamilton decided to visit the front himself. ReachingStopford's boat late that afternoon, he found thegeneral in a self-congratulatory mood: all 20,000 menhad gotten ashore. No, he had not yet ordered thetroops to advance to the hills; without artillery he wasafraid the Turks might counterattack, and he neededthe day to consolidate his positions and to landsupplies. Hamilton strained to control himself: he hadheard an hour earlier that Turkish reinforcements hadbeen seen hurrying toward Suvla. The Allies wouldhave to secure Tekke Tepe this evening, he said--butStopford was against a night march. Too dangerous.Hamilton retained his cool and politely excusedhimself.

Any army is like a horse, in that it reflects thetemper and the spirit of its rider. If there is anuneasiness and an uncertainty, it transmitsitself through the reins, and the horse feelsuneasy and uncertain.

LONE STAR PREACHER, COLONEL JOHNW. THOMASON, JR., 1941

In near panic, Hamilton decided to visitHammersley at Suvla. Much to his dismay, he foundthe army lounging on the beach as if it were a bankholiday. He finally located Hammersley--he was at thefar end of the bay, busily supervising the building ofhis temporary headquarters. Asked why he had failedto secure the hills, Hammersley replied that he hadsent several brigades for the purpose, but they had

encountered Turkish artillery and his colonels had toldhim they could not advance without more instructions.Communications between Hammersley, Stopford,and the colonels in the field were taking forever, andwhen Stopford had finally been reached, he had sentthe message back to Hammersley to proceedcautiously, rest his men, and wait to advance until thenext day. Hamilton could control himself no longer: ahandful of Turks with a few guns were holding up anarmy of 20,000 men from marching a mere four miles!Tomorrow morning would be too late; the Turkishreinforcements were on their way. Although it wasalready night, Hamilton ordered Hammersley to senda brigade immediately to Tekke Tepe. It would be arace to the finish.

Hamilton returned to a boat in the harbor to monitorthe situation. At sunrise the next morning, he watchedthe battlefield through binoculars--and saw, to hishorror, the Allied troops in headlong retreat to Suvla.A large Turkish force had arrived at Tekke Tepe thirtyminutes before them. In the next few days, the Turksmanaged to regain the flats around Suvla and to pinHamilton's army on the beach. Some four monthslater, the Allies gave up their attack on Gallipoli andevacuated their troops.

InterpretationIn planning the invasion at Suvla, Hamilton thought ofeverything. He understood the need for surprise,deceiving the Turks about the landing site. Hemastered the logistical details of a complex

amphibious assault. Locating the key point--TekkeTepe--from which the Allies could break the stalematein Gallipoli, he crafted an excellent strategy to getthere. He even tried to prepare for the kind ofunexpected contingencies that can always happen inbattle. But he ignored the one thing closest to him: thechain of command, and the circuit of communicationsby which orders, information, and decisions wouldcirculate back and forth. He was dependent on thatcircuit to give him control of the situation and allowhim to execute his strategy.

The first links in the chain of command wereStopford and Hammersley. Both men were terrified ofrisk, and Hamilton failed to adapt himself to theirweakness: his order to reach Tekke Tepe was polite,civilized, and unforceful, and Stopford andHammersley interpreted it according to their fears.They saw Tekke Tepe as a possible goal to aim foronce the beaches were secured.

The next links in the chain were the colonels whowere to lead the assault on Tekke Tepe. They had nocontact with Hamilton on his island or with Stopford onhis boat, and Hammersley was too overwhelmed tolead them. They themselves were terrified of acting ontheir own and maybe messing up a plan they hadnever understood; they hesitated at every step. Belowthe colonels were officers and soldiers who, withoutleadership, were left wandering on the beach like lostants. Vagueness at the top turned into confusion andlethargy at the bottom. Success depended on thespeed with which information could pass in both

directions along the chain of command, so thatHamilton could understand what was happening andadapt faster than the enemy. The chain was broken,and Gallipoli was lost.

When a failure like this happens, when a goldenopportunity slips through your fingers, you naturallylook for a cause. Maybe you blame your incompetentofficers, your faulty technology, your flawedintelligence. But that is to look at the world backward;it ensures more failure. The truth is that everythingstarts from the top. What determines your failure orsuccess is your style of leadership and the chain ofcommand that you design. If your orders are vagueand halfhearted, by the time they reach the field theywill be meaningless. Let people work unsupervisedand they will revert to their natural selfishness: they willsee in your orders what they want to see, and theirbehavior will promote their own interests.

Unless you adapt your leadership style to theweaknesses of the people in your group, you willalmost certainly end up with a break in the chain ofcommand. Information in the field will reach you tooslowly. A proper chain of command, and the control itbrings you, is not an accident; it is your creation, awork of art that requires constant attention and care.Ignore it at your peril.

For what the leaders are, that, as a rule, will themen below them be.

--Xenophon (430?-355? B.C.)

REMOTE CONTROLIn the late 1930s, U.S. Brigadier General George C.Marshall (1880-1958) preached the need for majormilitary reform. The army had too few soldiers, theywere badly trained, current doctrine was ill suited tomodern technology--the list of problems went on. In1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had to selecthis next army chief of staff. The appointment wascritical: World War II had begun in Europe, andRoosevelt believed that the United States was sure toget involved. He understood the need for militaryreform, so he bypassed generals with more seniorityand experience and chose Marshall for the job.

The appointment was a curse in disguise, for theWar Department was hopelessly dysfunctional. Manyof its generals had monstrous egos and the power toimpose their way of doing things. Senior officers,instead of retiring, took jobs in the department,amassing power bases and fiefdoms that they dideverything they could to protect. A place of feuds,waste, communication breakdowns, and overlappingjobs, the department was a mess. How could Marshallrevamp the army for global war if he could not controlit? How could he create order and efficiency?

What must be the result of an operation which isbut partially understood by the commander,since it is not his own conception? I haveundergone a pitiable experience as prompter athead-quarters, and no one has a betterappreciation of the value of such services than

myself; and it is particularly in a council of warthat such a part is absurd. The greater thenumber and the higher the rank of the militaryofficers who compose the council, the moredifficult will it be to accomplish the triumph oftruth and reason, however small be the amountof dissent. What would have been the action ofa council of war to which Napoleon proposedthe movement of Arcola, the crossing of theSaint-Bernard, the maneuver at Ulm, or that atGera and Jena? The timid would have regardedthem as rash, even to madness, others wouldhave seen a thousand difficulties of execution,and all would have concurred in rejecting them;and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted,and had been executed by any one butNapoleon, would they not certainly have provedfailures?

BARON ANTOINE-HENRI DE JOMINI, 1779-1869

Some ten years earlier, Marshall had served as theassistant commander of the Infantry School at FortBenning, Georgia, where he had trained manyofficers. Throughout his time there, he had kept anotebook in which he recorded the names ofpromising young men. Soon after becoming chief ofstaff, Marshall began to retire the older officers in theWar Department and replace them with theseyounger men whom he had personally trained. These

officers were ambitious, they shared his desire forreform, and he encouraged them to speak their mindsand show initiative. They included men like OmarBradley and Mark Clark, who would be crucial inWorld War II, but no one was more important than theprotege Marshall spent the most time on: Dwight D.Eisenhower.

The relationship began a few days after the attackon Pearl Harbor, when Marshall asked Eisenhower,then a colonel, to prepare a report on what should bedone in the Far East. The report showed Marshall thatEisenhower shared his ideas on how to run the war.For the next few months, he kept Eisenhower in theWar Plans Division and watched him closely: the twomen met every day, and in that time Eisenhowersoaked up Marshall's style of leadership, his way ofgetting things done. Marshall tested Eisenhower'spatience by indicating that he planned to keep him inWashington instead of giving him the field assignmentthat he desperately wanted. The colonel passed thetest. Much like Marshall himself, he got along well withother officers yet was quietly forceful.

In July 1942, as the Americans prepared to enterthe war by fighting alongside the British in NorthAfrica, Marshall surprised one and all by namingEisenhower commander in the European Theater ofOperations. Eisenhower was by this time a lieutenantgeneral but was still relatively unknown, and in his firstfew months in the job, as the Americans fared poorlyin North Africa, the British clamored for areplacement. But Marshall stood by his man, offering

him advice and encouragement. One key suggestionwas for Eisenhower to develop a protege, much asMarshall had with him--a kind of roving deputy whothought the way he did and would act as his go-between with subordinates. Marshall's suggestion forthe post was Major General Bradley, a man he knewwell; Eisenhower accepted the idea, essentiallyduplicating the staff structure that Marshall hadcreated in the War Department. With Bradley inplace, Marshall left Eisenhower alone.

Marshall positioned his proteges throughout theWar Department, where they quietly spread his way ofdoing things. To make the task easier, he cut thewaste in the department with utter ruthlessness,reducing from sixty to six the number of deputies whoreported to him. Marshall hated excess; his reports toRoosevelt made him famous for his ability tosummarize a complex situation in a few pages. Thesix men who reported to him found that any report thatlasted a page too long simply went unread. He wouldlisten to their oral presentations with rapt attention, butthe minute they wandered from the topic or saidsomething not thought through, he would look away,bored, uninterested. It was an expression theydreaded: without saying a word, he had made itknown that they had displeased him and it was timefor them to leave. Marshall's six deputies began tothink like him and to demand from those who reportedto them the efficiency and streamlinedcommunications style he demanded of them. Thespeed of the information flow up and down the line

was now quadrupled.

"Do you think every Greek here can be a king?It's no good having a carload of commanders.We need One commander, one king, the one towhom Zeus, Son of Cronus the crooked, hasgiven the staff And the right to make decisionsfor his people." And so Odysseus mastered thearmy. The men all Streamed back from theirships and huts and assembled With a roar.

THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURYB.C.

Marshall exuded authority but never yelled andnever challenged men frontally. He had a knack forcommunicating his wishes indirectly--a skill that wasall the more effective since it made his officers thinkabout what he meant. Brigadier General Leslie R.Groves, the military director of the project to developthe atom bomb, once came to Marshall's office to gethim to sign off on $100 million in expenditures.Finding the chief of staff engrossed in paperwork, hewaited while Marshall diligently compared documentsand made notes. Finally Marshall put down his pen,examined the $100 million request, signed it, andreturned it to Groves without a word. The generalthanked him and was turning to leave when Marshallfinally spoke: "It may interest you to know what I wasdoing: I was writing the check for $3.52 for grassseed for my lawn."

The thousands who worked under Marshall,

whether in the War Department or abroad in the field,did not have to see him personally to feel hispresence. They felt it in the terse but insightful reportsthat reached them from his deputies, in the speed ofthe responses to their questions and requests, in thedepartment's efficiency and team spirit. They felt it inthe leadership style of men like Eisenhower, who hadabsorbed Marshall's diplomatic yet forceful way ofdoing things. In a few short years, Marshalltransformed the War Department and the U.S. Army.Few really understood how he had done it.

InterpretationWhen Marshall became chief of staff, he knew that hewould have to hold himself back. The temptation wasto do combat with everyone in every problem area:the recalcitrance of the generals, the political feuds,the layers of waste. But Marshall was too smart togive in to that temptation. First, there were too manybattles to fight, and they would exhaust him. He'd getfrustrated, lose time, and probably give himself aheart attack. Second, by trying to micromanage thedepartment, he would become embroiled in pettyentanglements and lose sight of the larger picture.And finally he would come across as a bully. The onlyway to slay this many-headed monster, Marshallknew, was to step back. He had to rule indirectlythrough others, controlling with such a light touch thatno one would realize how thoroughly he dominated.

Reports gathered and presented by the General

Staff, on the one hand, and by the StatisticalBureau, on the other, thus constituted the mostimportant sources of information at Napoleon'sdisposal. Climbing through the chain ofcommand, however, such reports tend tobecome less and less specific; the morenumerous the stages through which they passand the more standardized the form in whichthey are presented, the greater the danger thatthey will become so heavily profiled (andpossibly sugar-coated or merely distorted bythe many summaries) as to become almostmeaningless. To guard against this danger andto keep subordinates on their toes, acommander needs to have in addition a kind ofdirected telescope--the metaphor is an apt one--which he can direct, at will, at any part of theenemy's forces, the terrain, or his own army inorder to bring in information that is not only lessstructured than that passed on by the normalchannels but also tailored to meet hismomentary (and specific) needs. Ideally, theregular reporting system should tell thecommander which questions to ask, and thedirected telescope should enable him to answerthose questions. It was the two systemstogether, cutting across each other and wieldedby Napoleon's masterful hand, which made therevolution in command possible.

COMMAND IN WAR, MARTIN VAN CREVELD,1985

The key to Marshall's strategy was his selection,grooming, and placement of his proteges. Hemetaphorically cloned himself in these men, whoenacted the spirit of his reforms on his behalf, savinghim time and making him appear not as amanipulator but as a delegator. His cutting of wastewas heavy-handed at first, but once he put his stampon the department, it began to run efficiently on itsown--fewer people to deal with, fewer irrelevantreports to read, less wasted time on every level. Thisstreamlining achieved, Marshall could guide themachine with a lighter touch. The political types whowere clogging the chain of command were eitherretired or joined in the team spirit he infused. Hisindirect style of communicating amused some of hisstaff, but it was actually a highly effective way ofasserting his authority. An officer might go homechuckling about finding Marshall fussing over agardening bill, but it would slowly dawn on him that ifhe wasted a penny, his boss would know.

Like the War Department that Marshall inherited,today's world is complex and chaotic. It is harder thanever to exercise control through a chain of command.You cannot supervise everything yourself; you cannotkeep your eye on everyone. Being seen as a dictatorwill do you harm, but if you submit to complexity andlet go of the chain of command, chaos will consumeyou.

The solution is to do as Marshall did: operatethrough a kind of remote control. Hire deputies whoshare your vision but can think on their own, acting asyou would in their place. Instead of wasting timenegotiating with every difficult person, work onspreading a spirit of camaraderie and efficiency thatbecomes self-policing. Streamline the organization,cutting out waste--in staff, in the irrelevant reports onyour desk, in pointless meetings. The less attentionyou spend on petty details, the more time you willhave for the larger picture, for asserting your authoritygenerally and indirectly. People will follow your leadwithout feeling bullied. That is the ultimate in control.

Madness is the exception in individuals but therule in groups.

--Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

KEYS TO WARFARENow more than ever, effective leadership requires adeft and subtle touch. The reason is simple: we havegrown more distrustful of authority. At the same time,almost all of us imagine ourselves as authorities inour own right--officers, not foot soldiers. Feeling theneed to assert themselves, people today put their owninterests before the team. Group unity is fragile andcan easily crack.

These trends affect leaders in ways they barelyknow. The tendency is to give more power to thegroup: wanting to seem democratic, leaders poll thewhole staff for opinions, let the group make decisions,

give subordinates input into the crafting of an overallstrategy. Without realizing it, these leaders are lettingthe politics of the day seduce them into violating oneof the most important rules of warfare and leadership:unity of command. Before it is too late, learn thelessons of war: divided leadership is a recipe fordisaster, the cause of the greatest military defeats inhistory.

Among the foremost of these defeats was theBattle of Cannae, in 216 B.C., between the Romansand the Carthaginians led by Hannibal. The Romansoutnumbered the Carthaginians two to one but werevirtually annihilated in a perfectly executed strategicenvelopment. Hannibal, of course, was a militarygenius, but the Romans take much of the blame fortheir own defeat: they had a faulty command system,with two tribunes sharing leadership of the army.Disagreeing over how to fight Hannibal, these menfought each other as much as they fought him, andthey made a mess of things.

Nearly two thousand years later, Frederick theGreat, king of Prussia and leader of its army,outfought and outlasted the five great powers alignedagainst him in the Seven Years' War partly becausehe made decisions so much faster than the alliancegenerals, who had to consult each other in everymove they made. In World War II, General Marshallwas well aware of the dangers of divided leadershipand insisted that one supreme commander shouldlead the Allied armies. Without his victory in thisbattle, Eisenhower could not have succeeded in

Europe. In the Vietnam War, the unity of commandenjoyed by the North Vietnamese general Vo NguyenGiap gave him a tremendous advantage over theAmericans, whose strategy was crafted by a crowd ofpoliticians and generals.

Divided leadership is dangerous because peoplein groups often think and act in ways that are illogicaland ineffective--call it Groupthink. People in groupsare political: they say and do things that they think willhelp their image within the group. They aim to pleaseothers, to promote themselves, rather than to seethings dispassionately. Where an individual can bebold and creative, a group is often afraid of risk. Theneed to find a compromise among all the differentegos kills creativity. The group has a mind of its own,and that mind is cautious, slow to decide,unimaginative, and sometimes downright irrational.

This is the game you must play: Do whatever youcan to preserve unity of command. Keep the strings tobe pulled in your hands; the over-arching strategicvision must come from you and you alone. At thesame time, hide your tracks. Work behind the scenes;make the group feel involved in your decisions. Seektheir advice, incorporating their good ideas, politelydeflecting their bad ones. If necessary, make minor,cosmetic strategy changes to assuage the insecurepolitical animals in the group, but ultimately trust yourown vision. Remember the dangers of group decisionmaking. The first rule of effective leadership is neverto relinquish your unity of command.

Tomorrow at dawn you depart [from St. Cloud]and travel to Worms, cross the Rhine there, andmake sure that all preparations for the crossingof the river by my guard are being made there.You will then proceed to Kassel and make surethat the place is being put in a state of defenseand provisioned. Taking due securityprecautions, you will visit the fortress of Hanau.Can it be secured by a coup de main? Ifnecessary, you will visit the citadel of Marburgtoo. You will then travel on to Kassel and reportto me by way of my charge d'affaires at thatplace, making sure that he is in fact there. Thevoyage from Frankfurt to Kassel is not to takeplace by night, for you are to observe anythingthat might interest me. From Kassel you are totravel, also by day, by the shortest way to Koln.The land between Wesel, Mainz, Kassel, andKoln is to be reconnoitered. What roads andgood communications exist there? Gatherinformation about communications betweenKassel and Paderborn. What is the significanceof Kassel? Is the place armed and capable ofresistance? Evaluate the forces of the PrinceElector in regard to their present state, theirartillery, militia, strong places. From Koln youwill travel to meet me at Mainz; you are to keepto the right bank on the Rhine and submit ashort appreciation of the country around

Dusseldorf, Wesel, and Kassel. I shall be atMainz on the 29th in order to receive yourreport. You can see for yourself how important itis for the beginning of the campaign and itsprogress that you should have the country wellimprinted on your memory.

NAPOLEON'S WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TOFIELD GENERAL, QUOTED IN COMMAND IN

WAR, MARTIN VAN CREVELD, 1985

Control is an elusive phenomenon. Often, theharder you tug at people, the less control you haveover them. Leadership is more than just barking outorders; it takes subtlety.

Early in his career, the great Swedish film directorIngmar Bergman was often overwhelmed withfrustration. He had visions of the films he wanted tomake, but the work of being a director was so taxingand the pressure so immense that he would lash outat his cast and crew, shouting orders and attackingthem for not giving him what he wanted. Some wouldstew with resentment at his dictatorial ways, othersbecame obedient automatons. With almost every newfilm, Bergman would have to start again with a newcast and crew, which only made things worse. Buteventually he put together a team of the finestcinematographers, editors, art directors, and actors inSweden, people who shared his high standards andwhom he trusted. That let him loosen the reins ofcommand; with actors like Max von Sydow, he couldjust suggest what he had in mind and watch as the

great actor brought his ideas to life. Greater controlcould now come from letting go.

A critical step in creating an efficient chain ofcommand is assembling a skilled team that sharesyour goals and values. That team gives you manyadvantages: spirited, motivated people who can thinkon their own; an image as a delegator, a fair anddemocratic leader; and a saving in your own valuableenergy, which you can redirect toward the largerpicture.

In creating this team, you are looking for peoplewho make up for your deficiencies, who have theskills you lack. In the American Civil War, PresidentAbraham Lincoln had a strategy for defeating theSouth, but he had no military background and wasdisdained by his generals. What good was a strategyif he could not realize it? But Lincoln soon found histeammate in General Ulysses S. Grant, who sharedhis belief in offensive warfare and who did not havean oversize ego. Once Lincoln discovered Grant, helatched on to him, put him in command, and let himrun the war as he saw fit.

Be careful in assembling this team that you are notseduced by expertise and intelligence. Character, theability to work under you and with the rest of the team,and the capacity to accept responsibility and thinkindependently are equally key. That is why Marshalltested Eisenhower for so long. You may not have asmuch time to spare, but never choose a man merelyby his glittering resume. Look beyond his skills to hispsychological makeup.

Rely on the team you have assembled, but do notbe its prisoner or give it undue influence. Franklin D.Roosevelt had his infamous "brain trust," the advisersand cabinet members on whom he depended for theirideas and opinions, but he never let them in on theactual decision making, and he kept them frombuilding up their own power base within theadministration. He saw them simply as tools,extending his own abilities and saving him valuabletime. He understood unity of command and was neverseduced into violating it.

A key function of any chain of command is to supplyinformation rapidly from the trenches, letting youadapt fast to circumstances. The shorter and morestreamlined the chain of command, the better for theflow of information. Even so, information is oftendiluted as it passes up the chain: the telling detailsthat reveal so much become standardized andgeneral as they are filtered through formal channels.Some on the chain, too, will interpret the informationfor you, filtering what you hear. To get more directknowledge, you might occasionally want to visit thefield yourself. Marshall would sometimes drop in onan army base incognito to see with his own eyes howhis reforms were taking effect; he would also readletters from soldiers. But in these days of increasingcomplexity, this can consume far too much of yourtime.

What you need is what the military historian Martinvan Creveld calls "a directed telescope": people invarious parts of the chain, and elsewhere, to give you

instant information from the battlefield. These people--an informal network of friends, allies, and spies--letyou bypass the slow-moving chain. The master of thisgame was Napoleon, who created a kind of shadowbrigade of younger officers in all areas of the military,men chosen for their loyalty, energy, and intelligence.At a moment's notice, he would send one of thesemen to a far-off front or garrison, or even to enemyheadquarters (ostensibly as a diplomatic envoy), withsecret instructions to gather the kind of information hecould not get fast enough through normal channels. Ingeneral, it is important to cultivate these directedtelescopes and plant them throughout the group. Theygive you flexibility in the chain, room to maneuver in agenerally rigid environment.

The single greatest risk to your chain of commandcomes from the political animals in the group. Peoplelike this are inescapable; they spring up like weeds inany organization. Not only are they out for themselves,but they build factions to further their own agendasand fracture the cohesion you have built. Interpretingyour commands for their own purposes, findingloopholes in any ambiguity, they create invisiblebreaks in the chain.

Try to weed them out before they arrive. In hiringyour team, look at the candidates' histories: Are theyrestless? Do they often move from place to place?That is a sign of the kind of ambition that will keepthem from fitting in. When people seem to share yourideas exactly, be wary: they are probably mirroringthem to charm you. The court of Queen Elizabeth I of

England was full of political types. Elizabeth's solutionwas to keep her opinions quiet; on any issue, no oneoutside her inner circle knew where she stood. Thatmade it hard for people to mirror her, to disguise theirintentions behind a front of perfect agreement. Herswas a wise strategy.

Another solution is to isolate the political moles--togive them no room to maneuver within theorganization. Marshall accomplished this by infusingthe group with his spirit of efficiency; disrupters of thatspirit stood out and could quickly be isolated. In anyevent, do not be naive. Once you identify the moles inthe group, you must act fast to stop them from buildinga power base from which to destroy your authority.

Finally, pay attention to the orders themselves--theirform as well as their substance. Vague orders areworthless. As they pass from person to person, theyare hopelessly altered, and your staff comes to seethem as symbolizing uncertainty and indecision. It iscritical that you yourself be clear about what you wantbefore issuing your orders. On the other hand, if yourcommands are too specific and too narrow, you willencourage people to behave like automatons andstop thinking for themselves--which they must dowhen the situation requires it. Erring in neitherdirection is an art.

Here, as in so much else, Napoleon was themaster. His orders were full of juicy details, whichgave his officers a feel for how his mind worked whilealso allowing them interpretive leeway. He would oftenspell out possible contingencies, suggesting ways the

officer could adapt his instructions if necessary. Mostimportant, he made his orders inspiring. His languagecommunicated the spirit of his desires. A beautifullyworded order has extra power; instead of feeling likea minion, there only to execute the wishes of a distantemperor, the recipient becomes a participant in agreat cause. Bland, bureaucratic orders filter downinto listless activity and imprecise execution. Clear,concise, inspiring orders make officers feel in controland fill troops with fighting spirit.

Authority: Better one bad general than twogood ones.

--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

REVERSALNo good can ever come of divided leadership. If youare ever offered a position in which you will have toshare command, turn it down, for the enterprise willfail and you will be held responsible. Better to take alower position and let the other person have the job.

It is always wise, however, to take advantage ofyour opponent's faulty command structure. Never be

intimidated by an alliance of forces against you: if theyshare leadership, if they are ruled by committee, youradvantage is more than enough. In fact, do asNapoleon did and seek out enemies with that kind ofcommand structure. You cannot fail to win.

SEGMENT YOUR FORCESTHE CONTROLLED-CHAOS STRATEGY

The critical elements in war are speed andadaptability--the ability to move and make decisionsfaster than the enemy. But speed and adaptabilityare hard to achieve today. We have moreinformation than ever before at our fingertips,making interpretation and decision making moredifficult. We have more people to manage, thosepeople are more widely spread, and we face moreuncertainty. Learn from Napoleon, warfare's greatestmaster: speed and adaptability come from flexibleorganization. Break your forces into independentgroups that can operate and make decisions ontheir own. Make your forces elusive and unstoppableby infusing them with the spirit of the campaign,giving them a mission to accomplish, and thenletting them run.

Finally, a most important point to be consideredis that the revolutionary system of commandemployed by Napoleon was the outcome not ofany technological advances, as one mightexpect, but merely of superior organization anddoctrine. The technical means at the emperor'sdisposal were not a whit more sophisticated

than those of his opponents; he differed fromthem in that he possessed the daring andingenuity needed to transcend the limits thattechnology had imposed on commanders forthousands of years. Whereas Napoleon'sopponents sought to maintain control andminimize uncertainty by keeping their forcesclosely concentrated, Napoleon chose theopposite way, reorganizing and decentralizinghis army in such a way as to enable its parts tooperate independently for a limited period oftime and consequently tolerate a higher degreeof uncertainty. Rather than allowing thetechnological means at hand to dictate themethod of strategy and the functioning ofcommand, Napoleon made profitable use of thevery limitations imposed by the technology.COMMAND IN WAR, MARTIN VAN CREVELD,

1985

CALCULATED DISORDERIn 1800, by defeating Austria in the Battle of Marengo,Napoleon gained control of northern Italy and forcedthe Austrians to sign a treaty recognizing Frenchterritorial gains there and in Belgium. For the next fiveyears, an uneasy peace held sway--but Napoleoncrowned himself emperor of France, and many inEurope began to suspect that this Corsican upstarthad limitless ambitions. Karl Mack, the Austrianquartermaster general and an older and influential

member of the Austrian military, advocated apreemptive strike against France, with an army largeenough to guarantee victory. He told his colleagues,"In war the object is to beat the enemy, not merely toavoid being beaten."

Mack and like-minded officers slowly gainedinfluence, and in April 1805, Austria, England, andRussia signed a treaty of alliance to wage war onFrance and force her to return to her pre-Napoleonicborders. That summer they formulated their plan:95,000 Austrian troops would attack the French innorthern Italy, redressing the humiliating defeat of1800. Another 23,000 troops would secure the Tyrol,between Italy and Austria. Mack would then lead aforce of 70,000 men west along the Danube intoBavaria, preventing this strategically located countryfrom allying itself with France. Once encamped inBavaria, Mack and his army would await the arrival afew weeks later of 75,000 troops from Russia; the twoarmies would link up, and this unstoppable forcewould march west into France. Meanwhile the Englishwould attack the French at sea. More troops wouldlater be funneled into each war zone, making for anarmy totaling 500,000 men overall--the largest militaryforce ever assembled in Europe up to that point. Noteven Napoleon could withstand an army more thantwice the size of his own, moving in on him from allsides.

In the middle of September, Mack began his phaseof the campaign by advancing along the Danube toUlm, in the heart of Bavaria. Having established his

camp there, he felt hugely satisfied. Mack loatheddisorder and uncertainty. He tried to think ofeverything in advance, to come up with a clear planand make sure everyone stuck to it--"clockworkwarfare," he called it. He thought his plan was perfect;nothing could go wrong. Napoleon was doomed.

Mack had once been captured and forced to spendthree years in France, where he had studiedNapoleon's style of war. A key Napoleonic strategywas to make the enemy divide his forces, but now thetrick was reversed: with trouble in Italy, Napoleoncould not afford to send more than 70,000 Frenchtroops across the Rhine into Germany and Bavaria.The moment he crossed the Rhine, the Austrianswould know his intentions and would act to slow hismarch; his army would need at least two months toreach Ulm and the Danube. By then the Austrianswould already have linked up with the Russians andswept through the Alsace and France. The strategywas as close to foolproof as any Mack had everknown. He savored the role he would play indestroying Napoleon, for he hated the man and all herepresented--undisciplined soldiers, the fomenting ofrevolution throughout Europe, the constant threat tothe status quo. For Mack the Russians could notarrive in Ulm too soon.

We find our attention drawn repeatedly to whatone might call "the organizational dimension ofstrategy." Military organizations, and the statesthat develop them, periodically assess their own

ability to handle military threats. When they doso they tend to look at that which can bequantified: the number of troops, the quantitiesof ammunition, the readiness rates of keyequipment, the amount of transport, and so on.Rarely, however, do they look at the adequacyof their organization as such, and particularlyhigh level organization, to handle thesechallenges. Yet as Pearl Harbor and othercases suggest, it is in the deficiency oforganizations that the embryo of misfortunedevelops.

MILITARY MISFORTUNES: THE ANATOMYOF FAILURE IN WAR, ELIOT A. COHEN AND

JOHN GOOCH, 1990

Near the end of September, however, Mack beganto sense something wrong. To the west of Ulm lay theBlack Forest, between his own position and theFrench border. Suddenly scouts were telling him thata French army was passing through the forest in hisdirection. Mack was bewildered: it made the bestsense for Napoleon to cross the Rhine into Germanyfarther to the north, where his passage east would besmoother and harder to stop. But now he was yetagain doing the unexpected, funneling an armythrough a narrow opening in the Black Forest andsending it straight at Mack. Even if this move werejust a feint, Mack had to defend his position, so hesent part of his army west into the Black Forest to

stem the French advance long enough for theRussians to come to his aid.

A few days later, Mack began to feel horriblyconfused. The French were proceeding through theBlack Forest, and some of their cavalry had comequite far. At the same time, though, word reachedMack of a large French army somewhere to the northof his position. The reports were contradictory: somesaid this army was at Stuttgart, sixty miles northwestof Ulm; others had it more to the east or even fartherto the north or--quite close, near the Danube. Mackcould get no hard information, since the Frenchcavalry that had come through the Black Forestblocked access to the north for reconnaissance. TheAustrian general now faced what he feared most--uncertainty--and it was clouding his ability to thinkstraight. Finally he ordered all of his troops back toUlm, where he would concentrate his forces. PerhapsNapoleon intended to do battle at Ulm. At least Mackwould have equal numbers.

In early October, Austrian scouts were at last ableto find out what was really going on, and it was anightmare. A French army had crossed the Danube tothe east of Ulm, blocking Mack's way back to Austriaand cutting off the Russians. Another army lay to thesouth, blocking his route to Italy. How could 70,000French soldiers appear in so many places at once?And move so fast? Gripped by panic, Mack sentprobes in every direction. On October 11 his mendiscovered a weak point: only a small French forcebarred the way north and east. There he could push

through and escape the French encirclement. Hebegan to prepare for the march. But two days later,when he was on the point of ordering the retreat, hisscouts reported that a large French force hadappeared overnight, blocking the northeastern routeas well.

On October 20, finding out that the Russians haddecided not to come to his rescue, Macksurrendered. Over 60,000 Austrian soldiers weretaken prisoner with hardly a shot fired. It was one ofthe most splendidly bloodless victories in history.

In the next few months, Napoleon's army turnedeast to deal with the Russians and remainingAustrians, culminating in his spectacular victory atAusterlitz. Meanwhile Mack languished in an Austrianprison, sentenced to two years for his role in thishumiliating defeat. There he racked his brains (losinghis sanity in the process, some said): Where had hisplan gone wrong? How had an army appeared out ofnowhere to his east, so easily swallowing him up? Hehad never seen anything like it, and he was trying tofigure it out to the end of his days.

The fact that, historically speaking, thosearmies have been most successful which didnot turn their troops into automatons, did notattempt to control everything from the top, andallowed subordinate commanders considerablelatitude has been abundantly demonstrated.The Roman centurions and military tribunes;Napoleon's marshals; Moltke's army

commanders; Ludendorff's stormdetachments...--all these are examples, eachwithin its own stage of technologicaldevelopment, of the way things were done insome of the most successful military forcesever.COMMAND IN WAR, MARTIN VAN CREVELD,

1985

InterpretationHistory should not judge General Mack too harshly, forthe French armies he faced in the fall of 1805represented one of the greatest revolutions in militaryhistory. For thousands of years, war had been foughtin essentially the same way: the commander led hislarge and unified army into battle against an opponentof roughly equal size. He would never break up hisarmy into smaller units, for that would violate themilitary principle of keeping one's forcesconcentrated; furthermore, scattering his forces wouldmake them harder to monitor, and he would losecontrol over the battle.

Suddenly Napoleon changed all that. In the years ofpeace between 1800 and 1805, he reorganized theFrench military, bringing different forces together toform the Grande Armee, 210,000 men strong. Hedivided this army into several corps, each with its owncavalry, infantry, artillery, and general staff. Each wasled by a marshal general, usually a young officer ofproven strength in previous campaigns. Varying insize from 15,000 to 30,000 men, each corps was a

miniature army headed by a miniature Napoleon.

Patton's philosophy of command was: "Nevertell people how to do things. Tell them what todo and they will surprise you with theiringenuity."

PATTON: A GENIUS FOR WAR, CARLOD'ESTE, 1995

The key to the system was the speed with which thecorps could move. Napoleon would give the marshalstheir mission, then let them accomplish it on their own.Little time was wasted with the passing of ordersback and forth, and smaller armies, needing lessbaggage, could march with greater speed. Instead ofa single army moving in a straight line, Napoleoncould disperse and concentrate his corps in limitlesspatterns, which to the enemy seemed chaotic andunreadable.

This was the monster that Napoleon unleashed onEurope in September 1805. While a few corps weredispatched to northern Italy as a holding force againstAustria's planned invasion there, seven corps movedeast into Germany in a scattered array. A reserveforce with much cavalry was sent through the BlackForest, drawing Mack to the west--and so making itharder for him to understand what was happening tothe north and easier to entrap. (Napoleon understoodMack's simple psychology and how the appearanceof disorder would paralyze him.) Meanwhile, withStuttgart as a pivot, the seven corps wheeled south to

the Danube and cut off Mack's various escape routes.One corps marshal, hearing that the northeasternroute was weakly held, did not wait for Napoleon tosend orders but simply sped and covered it on hisown. Wherever Mack went, he would hit a corps largeenough to hold him until the rest of the French armycould tighten the circle. It was like a pack of coyotesagainst a rabbit.

Agamemnon smiled and moved on, Comingnext to the two captains Who shared the nameAjax As they were strapping on their helmets.Behind them a cloud of infantryloomed...Agamemnon Was glad to see them,and his words flew out: "Ajax, both of you,Achaean commanders, I would be out of line if Iissued you orders. You push your men to fighthard on your own. By Father Zeus, by Athenaand Apollo, If all of my men had your kind ofheart, King Priam's city would soon bow herhead, Taken and ravaged under our hands."

THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURYB.C.

Understand: the future belongs to groups that arefluid, fast, and nonlinear. Your natural tendency as aleader may be to want to control the group, tocoordinate its every movement, but that will just tie youto the past and to the slow-moving armies of history. Ittakes strength of character to allow for a margin ofchaos and uncertainty--to let go a little--but by

decentralizing your army and segmenting it intoteams, you will gain in mobility what you lose incomplete control. And mobility is the greatest forcemultiplier of them all. It allows you to both disperseand concentrate your army, throwing it into patternsinstead of advancing in straight lines. These patternswill confuse and paralyze your opponents. Give yourdifferent corps clear missions that fit your strategicgoals, then let them accomplish them as they see fit.Smaller teams are faster, more creative, moreadaptable; their officers and soldiers are moreengaged, more motivated. In the end, fluidity will bringyou far more power and control than petty domination.

Separate to live, unite to fight.--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

KEYS TO WARFAREThe world is full of people looking for a secret formulafor success and power. They do not want to think ontheir own; they just want a recipe to follow. They areattracted to the idea of strategy for that very reason. Intheir minds strategy is a series of steps to be followedtoward a goal. They want these steps spelled out forthem by an expert or a guru. Believing in the power ofimitation, they want to know exactly what some greatperson has done before. Their maneuvers in life areas mechanical as their thinking.

To separate yourself from such a crowd, you needto get rid of a common misconception: the essence ofstrategy is not to carry out a brilliant plan that

proceeds in steps; it is to put yourself in situationswhere you have more options than the enemy does.Instead of grasping at Option A as the single rightanswer, true strategy is positioning yourself to be ableto do A, B, or C depending on the circumstances.That is strategic depth of thinking, as opposed toformulaic thinking.

Sun-tzu expressed this idea differently: what youaim for in strategy, he said, is shih, a position ofpotential force--the position of a boulder perchedprecariously on a hilltop, say, or of a bowstringstretched taut. A tap on the boulder, the release of thebowstring, and potential force is violently unleashed.The boulder or arrow can go in any direction; it isgeared to the actions of the enemy. What matters isnot following pre-ordained steps but placing yourselfin shih and giving yourself options.

Napoleon was probably unaware of Sun-tzu'sconcept of shih, yet he had perhaps history's greatestunderstanding of it. Once he had positioned his sevencorps in their seemingly chaotic pattern along theRhine and his reserve forces in the Black Forest, hewas in shih. Wherever Mack turned, whatever he did,the Austrians were doomed. Napoleon had endlessoptions while Mack had only a few, and all of thembad.

It was during this period of post-warintrospection and evaluation that one of thefundamental military concepts of Scharnhorstand Gneisenau coalesced into a clearly defined

doctrine understandable to and understood byall officers in the Army. This was the concept ofAuftragstaktik , or mission tactics. Moltkehimself inserted in the draft of a new tacticalmanual for senior commanders the followinglines: "A favorable situation will never beexploited if commanders wait for orders. Thehighest commander and the youngest soldiermust always be conscious of the fact thatomission and inactivity are worse than resortingto the wrong expedient."...Nothing epitomizedthe outlook and performance of the GermanGeneral Staff, and of the German Army which itcoordinated, more than this concept of missiontactics: the responsibility of each German officerand noncommissioned officer...to do withoutquestion or doubt whatever the situationrequired, as he saw it. This meant that heshould act without awaiting orders, if actionseemed necessary. It also meant that he shouldact contrary to orders, if these did not seem tobe consistent with the situation. To makeperfectly clear that action contrary to orders wasnot considered either as disobedience or lack ofdiscipline, German commanders began torepeat one of Moltke's favorite stories, of anincident observed while visiting theheadquarters of Prince Frederick Charles. Amajor, receiving a tongue-lashing from the

Prince for a tactical blunder, offered the excusethat he had been obeying orders, and remindedthe Prince that a Prussian officer was taught thatan order from a superior was tantamount to anorder from the King. Frederick Charles promptlyresponded: "His Majesty made you a majorbecause he believed you would know when notto obey his orders." This simple story becameguidance for all following generations ofGerman officers.

A GENIUS FOR WAR: THE GERMAN ARMYAND GENERAL STAFF, 1807-1945,

COLONEL T.N. DUPUY, 1977

Napoleon had always aimed at his version of shih,and he perfected it in the 1805 campaign. Obsessedwith structure and organization, he developed thecorps system, building flexibility into the very skeletonof his army. The lesson is simple: a rigid, centralizedorganization locks you into linear strategies; a fluid,segmented army gives you options, endlesspossibilities for reaching shih. Structure is strategy--perhaps the most important strategic choice you willmake. Should you inherit a group, analyze its structureand alter it to suit your purposes. Pour your creativeenergy into its organization, making fluidity your goal.In doing so you will be following in the footsteps notonly of Napoleon but of perhaps the greatest warmachine in modern times, the Prussian (and laterGerman) army.

Shortly after Napoleon's devastating defeat of thePrussians at the Battle of Jena in 1806 (see chapter2), the Prussian leaders did some soul-searching.They saw they were stuck in the past; their way ofdoing things was too rigid. Suddenly the militaryreformers, including Carl von Clausewitz, were takenseriously and given power. And what they decided todo was unprecedented in history: they wouldinstitutionalize success by designing a superior armystructure.

At the core of this revolution was the creation of ageneral staff, a cadre of officers specially trained andeducated in strategy, tactics, and leadership. A king,a prime minister, or even a general might beincompetent at war, but a group of brilliant and well-trained officers on the army's staff could compensatefor his failures. The structure of this body was unfixed:each new chief of staff could alter its size and functionto suit his needs and the times. After each campaignor training exercise, the staff would rigorouslyexamine itself and its performance. A whole sectionwas created for the purpose of these examinationsand for the study of military history. The general staffwould learn from its mistakes and those of others. Itwas to be a work permanently in progress.

The most important reform was the development oft h e Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented commandsystem). In German there are two words for"command": Auftrag and Befehl. A Befehl is an orderto be obeyed to the letter. An Auftrag is much moregeneral: it is a statement of overall mission, a

directive to be followed in its spirit, not its letter. TheAuftragstaktik--inspired by Prussia's archenemyNapoleon and the leeway he gave his marshals--permeated the general staff. Officers were firstinculcated with the philosophy of German warfare:speed, the need to take the offensive, and so on.Then they were put through exercises to help themdevelop their ability to think on their own, to makedecisions that met the overall philosophy butresponded to the circumstances of the moment.Leading the equivalent of a corps in battle, officerswere given missions to accomplish and then were letloose. They were judged by the results of theiractions, not on how those results were achieved.

The general staff (with a few interruptions) was inplace from 1808 to the end of World War II. Duringthat period the Germans consistently outfought otherarmies in the field-including the Allies in World War I,despite the severe limitations of trench warfare. Theirsuccess culminated in the most devastating militaryvictory in modern history: the 1940 blitzkrieg invasionof France and the Low Countries, when the Germanarmy ran rings around the rigid defenses of theFrench. It was the structure of their army, and their useof the Auftragstaktik, that gave them more optionsand greater potential force.

The German general staff should serve as theorganizational model for any group that aims atmobility and strategic depth. First, the staff's structurewas fluid, allowing its leaders to adapt it to their ownneeds. Second, it examined itself constantly and

modified itself according to what it had learned. Third,it replicated its structure through the rest of the army:its officers trained the officers below them, and so ondown the line. The smallest team was inculcated withthe overall philosophy of the group. Finally, rather thanissuing rigid orders, the staff embraced the missioncommand, the Auftragstaktik. By making officers andsoldiers feel more creatively engaged, this tacticimproved their performance and sped up thedecision-making process. Mobility was written intothe system.

The key to the Auftragstaktik is an overall groupphilosophy. This can be built around the cause youare fighting for or a belief in the evil of the enemy youface. It can also include the style of warfare--defensive, mobile, ruthlessly aggressive--that bestsuits it. You must bring the group together around thisbelief. Then, through training and creative exercises,you must deepen its hold on them, infuse it into theirblood. Now, when you unleash your corps on theirmissions, you can trust their decisions and feelconfident in your power to coordinate them.

The Mongol hordes led by Genghis Khan in the firsthalf of the thirteenth century were perhaps the closestprecursors to Napoleon's corps. Genghis, whopreached a philosophy of Mongol superiority, was amaster of mobility in warfare. His segmented forcescould disperse and concentrate in complicatedpatterns; the armies that faced them were shocked athow chaotic they seemed, so impossible to figure out,yet they maneuvered with amazing coordination.

Mongol soldiers knew what to do, and when, withoutbeing told. For their victims the only explanation wasthat they were possessed by the devil.

The sinister coordination of the Mongols, however,was actually the result of rigorous training. Everywinter in peacetime, Genghis would run the GreatHunt, a three-month-long operation in which he wouldscatter the entire Mongol army along an eighty-mileline in the steppes of Central Asia and what is nowMongolia. A flag in the ground hundreds of milesaway marked the hunt's endpoint. The line wouldadvance, driving before it all the animals in its path.Slowly, in an intricately choreographed maneuver, theends of the line would curve to form a circle, trappingthe animals within. (The hunt's endpoint would formthe center of the circle.) As the circle tightened, theanimals were killed; the most dangerous of them, thetigers, were left till last. The Great Hunt exercised theMongols' ability to communicate through signals at adistance, coordinate their movements with precision,know what to do in different circumstances, and actwithout waiting for orders. Even bravery became anexercise, when individual soldiers would have to takeon a tiger. Through hunting and a form of play,Genghis could instill his philosophy, develop cohesionand trust among his men, and tighten his army'sdiscipline.

[Tom] Yawkey was thirty years old when hebought the Red Sox, a hopelessly bankruptteam that had won only forty-three games the

previous season and averaged only 2,365paying customers. The ball club became histoy. Because he loved his players, he spoiledthem rotten. And because he spoiled themrotten, they praised him to the skies.... There isa well-publicized exchange in which BobbyDoerr asks Tommy Henrich why the Red Soxweren't able to beat the Yankees in big games."Weren't we good enough?" Doerr asks. It wasn'tthat they weren't good enough, Henrichanswers. "Your owner was too good to you. TheRed Sox didn't have to get into the World Seriesto drive Cadillacs. The Yankees did."... [TheRed Sox organization] was an amateuroperation...pitted against the toughest, mostprofessional operation of all time.

HITTER: THE LIFE AND TURMOILS OF TEDWILLIAMS, ED LINN, 1993

In unifying your own hordes, find exercises toincrease your troops' knowledge of and trust in eachother. This will develop implicit communication skillsbetween them and their intuitive sense of what to donext. Time will not then be wasted in the endlesstransmission of messages and orders or in constantlymonitoring your troops in the field. If you can disguisethese exercises as play, as in the Great Hunt, somuch the better.

Throughout the 1940s and '50s, two great baseballorganizations did battle: the Boston Red Sox, built

around Ted Williams, and the New York Yankees, withtheir great hitter Joe DiMaggio. The owner of the RedSox, Tom Yawkey, believed in pampering his players,creating a pleasant environment for them, developingfriendships with them. A happy team would play well,he thought. For this purpose he went drinking with hismen, played cards with them, checked them in to nicehotels on tour. He also meddled in managerialdecisions, always with an eye toward making thingsbetter for his players and keeping them happy.

The Yankees' philosophy was very different,emphasizing discipline and victory at all costs. Theorganization's separate parts stayed out of oneanother's business--they understood the team ethosand knew they would be judged on results. Themanager was left to make his own decisions. Yankeeplayers felt an intense need to live up to the team'swinning traditions; they were afraid of losing.

In those two decades, the Red Sox players foughtamong themselves, fell into factions, whined andcomplained at any perceived slight, and won just onepennant. The Yankees were cohesive and spirited;they won thirteen pennants and ten World Series. Thelesson is simple: do not confuse a chummy, clublikeatmosphere with team spirit and cohesion. Coddlingyour soldiers and acting as if everyone were equal willruin discipline and promote the creation of factions.Victory will forge stronger bonds than superficialfriendliness, and victory comes from discipline,training, and ruthlessly high standards.

Finally, you need to structure your group according

to your soldiers' strengths and weaknesses, to theirsocial circumstances. To do that you must be attunedto the human side of your troops; you must understandthem, and the spirit of the times, inside and out.

In a real sense, maximum disorder was ourequilibrium.

T. E. LAWRENCE, 1885-1935

During the American Civil War, the Union generalsstruggled with the ragtag nature of their army. Unlikethe disciplined, well-trained troops of theConfederacy, many Northern soldiers had beenforcibly conscripted at the last minute; they werepioneers, rugged frontiersmen, and they were fiercelyindependent. Some generals tried desperately toinstill discipline, and mostly they failed. Others justpaid attention to map strategy, while their armiescontinued to perform badly.

General William Tecumseh Sherman had adifferent solution: he changed his organization to suitthe personalities of his men. He created a moredemocratic army, encouraged initiative in his officers,let them dress as they saw fit; he loosened outwarddiscipline to foster morale and group spirit. Likefrontiersmen generally, his soldiers were restless andnomadic, so he exploited their mobility and kept hisarmy in perpetual motion, always marching faster thanhis enemies could. Of all the Union armies,Sherman's were the most feared and performed thebest.

Like Sherman, do not struggle with your soldiers'idiosyncrasies, but rather turn them into a virtue, away to increase your potential force. Be creative withthe group's structure, keeping your mind as fluid andadaptable as the army you lead.

Authority: Thus the army...moves foradvantage, and changes throughsegmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed islike the wind, its slowness like the forest; itsinvasion and plundering like a fire.... It is asdifficult to know as the darkness; inmovement it is like thunder.

--The Art of War, Sun-tzu, (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALSince the structure of your army has to be suited tothe people who compose it, the rule ofdecentralization is flexible: some people respondbetter to rigid authority. Even if you run a looser

organization, there may be times when you will haveto tighten it and give your officers less freedom. Wisegenerals set nothing in stone, always retaining theability to reorganize their army to fit the times andtheir changing needs.

TRANSFORM YOUR WAR INTO ACRUSADE

MORALE STRATEGIES

The secret to motivating people and maintainingtheir morale is to get them to think less aboutthemselves and more about the group. Involve themin a cause, a crusade against a hated enemy. Makethem see their survival as tied to the success of thearmy as a whole. In a group in which people havetruly bonded, moods and emotions are socontagious that it becomes easy to infect your troopswith enthusiasm. Lead from the front: let yoursoldiers see you in the trenches, making sacrificesfor the cause. That will fill them with the desire toemulate and please you. Make both rewards andpunishments rare but meaningful. Remember: amotivated army can work wonders, making up forany lack of material resources.

THE ART OF MAN MANAGEMENTWe humans are selfish by nature. Our first thoughts inany situation revolve around our own interests: Howwill this affect me? How will it help me? At the sametime, by necessity, we try to disguise our selfishness,making our motives look altruistic or disinterested.Our inveterate selfishness and our ability to disguise it

are problems for you as a leader. You may think thatthe people working for you are genuinely enthusiasticand concerned--that is what they say, that is what theiractions suggest. Then slowly you see signs that thisperson or that is using his or her position in the groupto advance purely personal interests. One day youwake up to find yourself leading an army of selfish,conniving individuals.

You can do nothing with an army that is anamalgam of a hundred people here, a hundredpeople there, and so on. What can be achievedwith four thousand men, united and standingshoulder to shoulder, you cannot do with forty oreven four hundred thousand men who aredivided and pulled this way and that by internalconflicts....

RULES OF WAR AND BRAVERY,MUBARAKSHAH, PERSIA, THIRTEENTH

CENTURY

That is when you start thinking about morale--aboutfinding a way to motivate your troops and forge theminto a group. Perhaps you try artfully to praise people,to offer them the possibility of reward--only to find youhave spoiled them, strengthening their selfishness.Perhaps you try punishments and discipline--only tomake them resentful and defensive. Perhaps you tryto fire them up with speeches and group activities--but people are cynical nowadays; they will see rightthrough you.

The problem is not what you are doing but the factthat it comes late. You have begun to think aboutmorale only after it has become an issue, not before.That is your mistake. Learn from history's greatmotivators and military leaders: the way to getsoldiers to work together and maintain morale is tomake them feel part of a group that is fighting for aworthy cause. That distracts them from their owninterests and satisfies their human need to feel part ofsomething bigger than they are. The more they thinkof the group, the less they think of themselves. Theysoon begin to link their own success to the group's;their own interests and the larger interests coincide. Inthis kind of army, people know that selfish behaviorwill disgrace them in the eyes of their companions.They become attuned to a kind of group conscience.

Morale is contagious: put people in a cohesive,animated group and they naturally catch that spirit. Ifthey rebel or revert to selfish behavior, they are easilyisolated. You must establish this dynamic the minuteyou become the group's leader; it can only come fromthe top--that is, from you.

The ability to create the right group dynamic, tomaintain the collective spirit, is known in militarylanguage as "man management." History's greatgenerals--Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Napoleon--were all masters of the art, which for military men ismore than simply important: in battle it can be thedeciding issue, a matter of life and death. In war,Napoleon once said, "The moral is to the physical asthree to one." He meant that his troops' fighting spirit

was crucial in the outcome of the battle: withmotivated soldiers he could beat an army three timesthe size of his own.

To create the best group dynamic and preventdestructive morale problems, follow these eightcrucial steps culled from the writings and experiencesof the masters of the art. It is important to follow asmany of the steps as possible; none is less importantthan any other.

Step 1: Unite your troops around a cause. Makethem fight for an idea. Now more than ever, peoplehave a hunger to believe in something. They feel anemptiness, which, left alone, they might try to fill withdrugs or spiritual fads, but you can take advantage ofit by channeling it into a cause you can convince themis worth fighting for. Bring people together around acause and you create a motivated force.

What stronger breast-plate than a heartuntainted! Thrice is he arm'd that hath hisquarrel just, And he but naked, though lock'd upin steel, Whose conscience with injustice iscorrupted.

KING HENRY V, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,1564-1616

There are always moments when thecommander's place is not back with his staff butup with the troops. It is sheer nonsense to saythat maintenance of the men's morale is the job

of the battalion commander alone. The higherthe rank, the greater the effect of the example.The men tend to feel no kind of contact with acommander who, they know, is sittingsomewhere in headquarters. What they want iswhat might be termed a physical contact withhim. In moments of panic, fatigue, ordisorganization, or when something out of theordinary has to be demanded from them, thepersonal example of the commander workswonders, especially if has had the wit to createsome sort of legend around himself.

FIELD MARSHAL ERWIN ROMMEL, 1891-1944

The cause can be anything you wish, but you shouldrepresent it as progressive: it fits the times, it is on theside of the future, so it is destined to succeed. Ifnecessary, you can give it a veneer of spirituality. It isbest to have some kind of enemy to hate--an enemycan help a group to define itself in opposition. Ignorethis step and you are left with an army of mercenaries.You will deserve the fate that usually awaits sucharmies.

Step 2: Keep their bellies full. People cannot staymotivated if their material needs go unmet. If they feelexploited in any way, their natural selfishness willcome to the surface and they will begin to peel offfrom the group. Use a cause--something abstract orspiritual--to bring them together, but meet their

material needs. You do not have to spoil them byoverpaying them; a paternalistic feeling that they arebeing taken care of, that you are thinking of theircomfort, is more important. Attending to their physicalneeds will make it easier to ask more of them whenthe time comes.

Step 3: Lead from the front. The enthusiasm withwhich people join a cause inevitably wanes. One thingthat speeds up its loss, and that produces discontent,is the feeling that the leaders do not practice whatthey preach. Right from the beginning, your troopsmust see you leading from the front, sharing theirdangers and sacrifices--taking the cause as seriouslyas they do. Instead of trying to push them from behind,make them run to keep up with you.

Step 4: Concentrate their ch'i. There is a Chinesebelief in an energy called ch'i, which dwells in all livingthings. All groups have their own level of ch'i, physicaland psychological. A leader must understand thisenergy and know how to manipulate it.

Idleness has a terrible effect on ch'i. When soldiersare not working, their spirits lower. Doubts creep in,and selfish interests take over. Similarly, being on thedefensive, always waiting and reacting to what theenemy dishes out, will also lower ch'i. So keep yoursoldiers busy, acting for a purpose, moving in adirection. Do not make them wait for the next attack;propelling them forward will excite them and makethem hungry for battle. Aggressive actionconcentrates ch'i, and concentrated ch'i is full of latent

force.

During the Spring and Autumn era, the state ofQi was invaded by the states of Jin and Yan. Atfirst the invaders overcame the military forces ofQi. One of the eminent nobles of the court of Qirecommended the martialist Tian Rangju to thelord of Qi. To this man, later called SimaRangju, is attributed the famous militaryhandbook "Sima's Art of War."...The lord of Qithen summoned Rangju to discuss militarymatters with him. The lord was very pleased withwhat Rangju had to say, and he made him ageneral, appointing him to lead an army toresist the aggression of the forces of Yan andJin. Rangju said, "I am lowly in social status, yetthe lord has promoted me from the ranks andplaced me above even the grandees. Thesoldiers are not yet loyal to me, and thecommon people are not familiar with me; as aman of little account, my authority is slight. Irequest one of your favorite ministers, someonehonored by the state, to be overseer of thearmy." The lord acceded to this request andappointed a nobleman to be the overseer.Rangju took his leave, arranging to meet thenobleman at the military headquarters at noonthe following day. Then Rangju hastened backto set up a sundial and a water-clock to await thenew overseer. Now this new overseer was a

proud and haughty aristocrat, and he imaginedthat as overseer he was leading his own army.Because of his pride and arrogance, he did notsee any need to hurry, in spite of his promisewith Rangju the martial master. His relativesand close associates gave him a farewell party,and he stayed to drink with them. At noon thenext day, the new overseer had not arrived atheadquarters. Rangju took down the sundialand emptied the water-clock. He assembled thetroops and informed them of the agreement withthe new overseer. That evening the noblemanfinally arrived. Rangju said to him, "Why areyou late?" He said, "My relatives, who aregrandees, gave me a farewell party, so I stayedfor that." Rangju said, "On the day a militaryleader receives his orders, he forgets about hishome; when a promise is made in the face ofbattle, one forgets his family; when the wardrums sound, one forgets his own body. Nowhostile states have invaded our territory; thestate is in an uproar; the soldiers are exposed atthe borders; the lord cannot rest or enjoy hisfood; the lives of the common people alldepend on you--how can you talk about farewellparties?" Rangju then summoned the officer incharge of military discipline and asked him,"According to military law, what happens tosomeone who arrives later than an appointed

time?" The officer replied, "He is supposed tobe decapitated." Terrified, the aristocrat had amessenger rush back to report this to the lordand beseech him for help. But the haughtynobleman was executed before the messengereven returned, and his execution wasannounced to the army. The soldiers all shookwith fear. Eventually the lord sent an emissarywith a letter pardoning the nobleman, who was,after all, the new overseer of the army. Theemissary galloped right into camp onhorseback with the lord's message. Rangjusaid, "When a general is in the field, there areorders he doesn't take from the ruler." He alsosaid to the disciplinary officer, "It is a rule thatthere shall be no galloping through camp, yetnow the emissary has done just that. Whatshould be done with him?" The officer said, "Heshould be executed." The emissary waspetrified, but Rangju said, "It is not proper to killan emissary of the lord," and had two of theemissary's attendants executed in his stead.This too was announced to the army. Rangjusent the emissary back to report to the lord, andthen he set out with the army. When the soldiersmade camp, Rangju personally oversaw thedigging of wells, construction of stoves,preparation of food and drink, and care of thesick. He shared all of the supplies of the

leadership with the soldiers, personally eatingthe same rations as they. He was especiallykind to the weary and weakened. After threedays, Rangju called the troops to order. Eventhose who were ill wanted to go along, eager togo into battle for Rangju. When the armies ofJin and Yan heard about this, they withdrewfrom the state of Qi. Now Rangju led his troopsto chase them down and strike them. Eventuallyhe recovered lost territory and returned with thearmy victorious.

MASTERING THE ART OF WAR: ZHUGELIANG'S AND LIU JI'S COMMENTARIES ONTHE CLASSIC BY SUN-TZU, TRANSLATED

BY THOMAS CLEARY, 1989

Step 5: Play to their emotions. The best way tomotivate people is not through reason but throughemotion. Humans, however, are naturally defensive,and if you begin with an appeal to their emotions--some histrionic harangue--they will see you asmanipulative and will recoil. An emotional appealneeds a setup: lower their defenses, and make thembond as a group, by putting on a show, entertainingthem, telling a story. Now they have less control overtheir emotions and you can approach them moredirectly, moving them easily from laughter to anger orhatred. Masters of man management have a sense ofdrama: they know when and how to hit their soldiers inthe gut.

Step 6: Mix harshness and kindness. The key toman management is a balance of punishment andreward. Too many rewards will spoil your soldiers andmake them take you for granted; too muchpunishment will destroy their morale. You need to hitthe right balance. Make your kindness rare and evenan occasional warm comment or generous act will bepowerfully meaningful. Anger and punishment shouldbe equally rare; instead your harshness should takethe form of setting very high standards that few canreach. Make your soldiers compete to please you.Make them struggle to see less harshness and morekindness.

Step 7: Build the group myth. The armies with thehighest morale are armies that have been tested inbattle. Soldiers who have fought alongside oneanother through many campaigns forge a kind ofgroup myth based on their past victories. Living up tothe tradition and reputation of the group becomes amatter of pride; anyone who lets it down feelsashamed. To generate this myth, you must lead yourtroops into as many campaigns as you can. It is wiseto start out with easy battles that they can win, buildingup their confidence. Success alone will help bring thegroup together. Create symbols and slogans that fitthe myth. Your soldiers will want to belong.

Step 8: Be ruthless with grumblers. Allowgrumblers and the chronically disaffected any leewayat all and they will spread disquiet and even panicthroughout the group. As fast as you can, you must

isolate them and get rid of them. All groups contain acore of people who are more motivated anddisciplined than the rest--your best soldiers.Recognize them, cultivate their goodwill, and set themup as examples. These people will serve as naturalballasts against those who are disaffected andpanicky.

You know, I am sure, that not numbers orstrength brings victory in war; but whicheverarmy goes into battle stronger in soul, theirenemies generally cannot withstand them.

--Xenophon (430?-355? B.C.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES1. In the early 1630s, Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), aprovincial gentleman farmer in Cambridgeshire,England, fell victim to a depression and to constantthoughts of death. Deep in crisis, he converted to thePuritan religion, and suddenly his life took a new turn:he felt he had experienced a direct communion withGod. Now he believed in providence, the idea thateverything happens for a reason and according toGod's will. Whereas before he had been despondentand indecisive, now he was filled with purpose: hethought himself among God's elect.

Eventually Cromwell became a member ofParliament and a vocal defender of the commonpeople in their grievances against the aristocracy. Yethe felt marked by providence for something largerthan politics: he had visions of a great crusade. In

1642, Parliament, in a bitter struggle with Charles I,voted to cut off the king's funds until he agreed tolimits on royal power. When Charles refused, civil warbroke out between the Cavaliers (supporters of theking, who wore their hair long) and the Roundheads(the rebels, so called since they cropped their hairshort). Parliament's most fervent supporters werePuritans like Cromwell, who saw the war against theking as his chance--more than his chance, his calling.

Although Cromwell had no military background, hehurriedly formed a troop of sixty horsemen from hisnative Cambridgeshire. His aim was to incorporatethem in a larger regiment, gain military experience byfighting under another commander, and slowly provehis worth. He was confident of ultimate victory, for hesaw his side as unbeatable: after all, God was ontheir side, and all his men were believers in the causeof creating a more pious England.

Despite his lack of experience, Cromwell wassomething of a military visionary: he imagined a newkind of warfare spearheaded by a faster, more mobilecavalry, and in the war's first few months he proved abrave and effective leader. He was given more troopsto command but soon realized that he had grosslyoverestimated the fighting spirit of those on his side:time and again he led cavalry charges that piercedenemy lines, only to watch in disgust as his soldiersbroke order to plunder the enemy camp. Sometimeshe tried to hold part of his force in reserve to act asreinforcements later in the battle, but the onlycommand they listened to was to advance, and in

retreat they were hopelessly disordered.Representing themselves as crusaders, Cromwell'smen were revealed by battle as mercenaries, fightingfor pay and adventure. They were useless.

In 1643, when Cromwell was made a colonel at thehead of his own regiment, he decided to break withthe past. From now on, he would recruit only soldiersof a certain kind: men who, like himself, hadexperienced religious visions and revelations. Hesounded out the aspirants, tested them for the depthof their faith. Departing from a long tradition, heappointed commoners, not aristocrats, as officers; ashe wrote to a friend, "I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for, andloves what he knows, than that which you call agentleman and is nothing else." Cromwell made hisrecruits sing psalms and pray together. In a sterncheck on bad discipline, he taught them to see alltheir actions as part of God's plan. And he lookedafter them in an unusual way for the times, makingsure they were well fed, well clothed, and promptlypaid.

When Cromwell's army went into battle, it was nowa force to reckon with. The men rode in tightformation, loudly singing psalms. As they neared theking's forces, they would break into a "pretty roundtrot," not the headlong and disorderly charge of othertroops. Even in contact with the enemy, they kept theirorder, and they retreated with as much discipline aswhen they advanced. Since they believed that Godwas with them, they had no fear of death: they could

march straight up a hill into enemy fire withoutbreaking step. Having gained control over his cavalry,Cromwell could maneuver them with infinite flexibility.His troops won battle after battle.

In 1645, Cromwell was named lieutenant general ofthe cavalry in the New Model Army. That year, at theBattle of Naseby, his disciplined regiment was crucialin the Roundheads' victory. A few days later, hiscavalry finished off the Royalist forces at Langport,effectively putting an end to the first stage of the CivilWar.

InterpretationThat Cromwell is generally considered one of history'sgreat military leaders is all the more remarkable giventhat he learned soldiery on the job. During the secondstage of the Civil War, he became head of theRoundhead armies, and later, after defeating KingCharles and having him executed, he became LordProtector of England. Although he was ahead of histimes with his visions of mobile warfare, Cromwellwas not a brilliant strategist or field tactician; hissuccess lay in the morale and discipline of his cavalry,and the secret to those was the quality of the men herecruited--true believers in his cause. Such men werenaturally open to his influence and accepting of hisdiscipline. With each new victory, they grew morecommitted to him and more cohesive. He could askthe most of them.

Above all else, then, pay attention to your staff, tothose you recruit to your cause. Many will pretend to

share your beliefs, but your first battle will show that allthey wanted was a job. Soldiers like these aremercenaries and will get you nowhere. True believersare what you want; expertise and impressive resumesmatter less than character and the capacity forsacrifice. Recruits of character will give you a staffalready open to your influence, making morale anddiscipline infinitely easier to attain. This corepersonnel will spread the gospel for you, keeping therest of the army in line. As far as possible in thissecular world, make battle a religious experience, anecstatic involvement in something transcending thepresent.

2. In 1931 the twenty-three-year-old Lyndon BainesJohnson was offered the kind of job he had beendreaming of: secretary to Richard Kleberg, newlyelected congressman from Texas's FourteenthCongressional District. Johnson was a high-schooldebating teacher at the time, but he had worked onseveral political campaigns and was clearly a youngman of ambition. His students at Sam Houston High--in Houston, Texas--assumed that he would quicklyforget about them, but, to the surprise of two of hisbest debaters, L. E. Jones and Gene Latimer, he notonly kept in touch, he wrote to them regularly fromWashington. Six months later came a bigger surprisestill: Johnson invited Jones and Latimer toWashington to work as his assistants. With theDepression at its height, jobs were scarce--particularly jobs with this kind of potential. The two

teenagers grabbed the opportunity. Little did theyknow what they were in for.

The pay was ridiculously low, and it soon becameclear that Johnson intended to work the two men totheir human limit. They put in eighteen-or twenty-hourdays, mostly answering constituents' mail. "The chiefhas a knack, or, better said, a genius for getting themost out of those around him," Latimer later wrote."He'd say, 'Gene, it seems L.E.'s a little faster thanyou today.' And I'd work faster. 'L.E., he's catching upwith you.' And pretty soon, we'd both be pounding [thetypewriter] for hours without stopping, just as fast aswe could."

Jones didn't usually take orders too well, but hefound himself working harder and harder for Johnson.His boss seemed destined for something great: thatJohnson would scale the heights of power was writtenall over his face--and he would bring the ambitiousJones along with him. Johnson could also turneverything into a cause, making even the most trivialissue a crusade for Kleberg's constituents, and Jonesfelt part of that crusade--part of history.

The most important reason for both Jones's andLatimer's willingness to work so hard, though, wasthat Johnson worked still harder. When Jones trudgedinto the office at five in the morning, the lights wouldalready be on, and Johnson would be hard at work.He was also the last to leave. He never asked hisemployees to do anything he wouldn't do himself. Hisenergy was intense, boundless, and contagious. Howcould you let such a man down by working less hard

than he did?

THE WOLVES AND THE DOGS AT WAROne day, enmity broke out between the dogsand the wolves. The dogs elected a Greek to betheir general. But he was in no hurry to engagein battle, despite the violent intimidation of thewolves. "Understand," he said to them, "why Ideliberately put off engagement. It is becauseone must always take counsel before acting.The wolves, on the one hand, are all of thesame race, all of the same color. But oursoldiers have very varied habits, and each oneis proud of his own country. Even their colorsare not uniform: some are black, some russet,and others white or ash-grey. How can I leadinto battle those who are not in harmony andwho are all dissimilar?' In all armies it is unity ofwill and purpose which assures victory over theenemy.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

Not only was Johnson relentlessly demanding, buthis criticisms were often cruel. Occasionally, though,he would do Jones and Latimer some unexpectedfavor or praise them for something they hadn'trealized he had noticed. At moments like this, the twoyoung men quickly forgot the many bitter moments intheir work. For Johnson, they felt, they would go to theends of the earth.

And indeed Johnson rose through the ranks, first

And indeed Johnson rose through the ranks, firstwinning influence within Kleberg's office, then gainingthe attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelthimself. In 1935, Roosevelt named Johnson Texasstate director for the recently built National YouthAdministration. Now Johnson began to build a largerteam around the core of his two devoted assistants;he also built loyalties in a scattering of others forwhom he found jobs in Washington. The dynamic hehad created with Jones and Latimer now repeateditself on a larger scale: assistants competed for hisattention, tried to please him, to meet his standards,to be worthy of him and of his causes.

In 1937, when Congressman James Buchanansuddenly died, the seat for Texas's Tenth Districtunexpectedly fell empty. Despite the incredible oddsagainst him--he was still relatively unknown and waytoo young--Johnson decided to run and called in hischips: his carefully cultivated acolytes poured intoTexas, becoming chauffeurs, canvassers,speechwriters, barbecue cooks, crowd entertainers,nurses--whatever the campaign needed. In the sixshort weeks of the race, Johnson's foot soldierscovered the length and breadth of the Tenth District.And in front of them at every step was Johnsonhimself, campaigning as if his life depended on it.One by one, he and his team won over voters in everycorner of the district, and finally, in one of the greatestupsets in any American political race, Johnson wonthe election. His later career, first as a senator, thenas U.S. president, obscured the foundation of his firstgreat success: the army of devoted and tireless

followers that he had carefully built up over theprevious five years.

InterpretationLyndon Johnson was an intensely ambitious youngman. He had neither money nor connections but hadsomething more valuable: an understanding of humanpsychology. To command influence in the world, youneed a power base, and here human beings--adevoted army of followers--are more valuable thanmoney. They will do things for you that money cannotbuy.

That army is tricky to build. People arecontradictory and defensive: push them too hard andthey resent you; treat them well and they take you forgranted. Johnson avoided those traps by making hisstaff want his approval. To do that he led from thefront. He worked harder than any of his staff, and hismen saw him do it; failing to match him would havemade them feel guilty and selfish. A leader who worksthat hard stirs competitive instincts in his men, who doall they can to prove themselves worthier than theirteammates. By showing how much of his own timeand effort he was willing to sacrifice, Johnson earnedtheir respect. Once he had that respect, criticism,even when harsh, became an effective motivator,making his followers feel they were disappointing him.At the same time, some kind act out of the blue wouldbreak down any ability to resist him.

Hannibal was the greatest general of antiquity

by reason of his admirable comprehension ofthe morale of combat, of the morale of thesoldier, whether his own or the enemy's. Heshows his greatness in this respect in all thedifferent incidents of war, of campaign, of action.His men were not better than the Romansoldiers. They were not as well-armed, one-halfless in number. Yet he was always theconqueror. He understood the value of morale.He had the absolute confidence of his people.In addition, he had the art, in commanding anarmy, of always securing the advantage ofmorale.

COLONEL CHARLES ARDANT DU PICQ,1821-70

Understand: morale is contagious, and you, asleader, set the tone. Ask for sacrifices you won't makeyourself (doing everything through assistants) andyour troops grow lethargic and resentful; act too nice,show too much concern for their well-being, and youdrain the tension from their souls and create spoiledchildren who whine at the slightest pressure orrequest for more work. Personal example is the bestway to set the proper tone and build morale. Whenyour people see your devotion to the cause, theyingest your spirit of energy and self-sacrifice. A fewtimely criticisms here and there and they will only tryharder to please you, to live up to your high standards.Instead of having to push and pull your army, you will

find them chasing after you.

3. In May of 218 B.C., the great general Hannibal, ofCarthage in modern Tunisia, embarked on a boldplan: he would lead an army through Spain, Gaul, andacross the Alps into northern Italy. His goal was todefeat Rome's legions on their own soil, finally puttingan end to Rome's expansionist policies.

The Alps were a tremendous obstacle to militaryadvance--in fact, the march of an army across thehigh mountains was unprecedented. Yet in Decemberof that year, after much hardship, Hannibal reachednorthern Italy, catching the Romans completely offguard and the region undefended. There was a priceto pay, however: of Hannibal's original 102,000soldiers, a mere 26,000 survived, and they wereexhausted, hungry, and demoralized. Worse, therewas no time to rest: a Roman army was on its wayand had already crossed the Po River, only a fewmiles from the Carthaginian camp.

On the eve of his army's first battle with thefearsome Roman legions, Hannibal somehow had tobring his worn-out men alive. He decided to put on ashow: gathering his army together, he brought in agroup of prisoners and told them that if they foughtone another to the death in a gladiatorial contest, thevictors would win freedom and a place in theCarthaginian army. The prisoners agreed, andHannibal's soldiers were treated to hours of bloodyentertainment, a great distraction from their troubles.

When the fighting was over, Hannibal addressed

his men. The contest had been so enjoyable, he said,because the prisoners had fought so intensely. Thatwas partly because the weakest man grows fiercewhen losing means death, but there was anotherreason as well: they had the chance to join theCarthaginian army, to go from being abject prisonersto free soldiers fighting for a great cause, the defeatof the hated Romans. You soldiers, said Hannibal, arein exactly the same position. You face a muchstronger enemy. You are many miles from home, onhostile territory, and you have nowhere to go--in a wayyou are prisoners, too. It is either freedom or slavery,victory or death. But fight as these men fought todayand you will prevail.

Four brave men who do not know each other willnot dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, butknowing each other well, sure of their reliabilityand consequently of mutual aid, will attackresolutely. There is the science of theorganization of armies in a nutshell.

COLONEL CHARLES ARDANT DU PICQ,1821-70

The contest and speech got hold of Hannibal'ssoldiers, and the next day they fought with deadlyferocity and defeated the Romans. A series ofvictories against much larger Roman legionsfollowed.

Nearly two years later, the two sides met atCannae. Before the battle, with the armies arrayed

within sight of each other, the Carthaginians couldsee that they were hopelessly outnumbered, and fearpassed through the ranks. Everyone went quiet. ACarthaginian officer called Gisgo rode out in front ofthe men, taking in the Roman lines; stopping beforeHannibal, he remarked, with a quaver in his voice, onthe disparity in numbers. "There is one thing, Gisgo,that you have not noticed," Hannibal replied: "In all thatgreat number of men opposite, there is not a singleone whose name is Gisgo."

The Greeks met the Trojans without a tremor.Agamemnon ranged among them,commanding: "Be men, my friends. Fight withvalor And with a sense of shame before yourcomrades. You're less likely to be killed with asense of shame. Running away never won gloryor a fight."

THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURYB.C.

Gisgo burst out laughing, so did those withinhearing, and the joke passed through the ranks,breaking the tension. No, the Romans had no Gisgo.Only the Carthaginians had Gisgo, and only theCarthaginians had Hannibal. A leader who could jokeat a moment like this had to feel supremely confident--and if the leader were Hannibal, that feeling wasprobably justified.

Just as the troops had been swept with anxiety,now they were infected with self-assurance. At

Cannae that day, in one of the most devastatingvictories in history, the Carthaginians crushed theRoman army.

InterpretationHannibal was a master motivator of a rare kind.Where others would harangue their soldiers withspeeches, he knew that to depend on words was tobe in a sorry state: words only hit the surface of asoldier, and a leader must grab his men's hearts,make their blood boil, get into their minds, alter theirmoods. Hannibal reached his soldiers' emotionsindirectly, by relaxing them, calming them, taking themoutside their problems and getting them to bond. Onlythen did he hit them with a speech that brought hometheir precarious reality and swayed their emotions.

At Cannae a one-line joke had the same effect:instead of trying to persuade the troops of hisconfidence, Hannibal showed it to them. Even as theylaughed at the joke about Gisgo, they bonded over itand understood its inner meaning. No need for aspeech. Hannibal knew that subtle changes in hismen's mood could spell the difference betweenvictory and defeat.

Like Hannibal, you must aim indirectly at people'semotions: get them to laugh or cry over somethingthat seems unrelated to you or to the issue at hand.Emotions are contagious--they bring people togetherand make them bond. Then you can play them like apiano, moving them from one emotion to the other.Oratory and eloquent pleas only irritate and insult us;

we see right through them. Motivation is subtler thanthat. By advancing indirectly, setting up youremotional appeal, you will get inside instead of justscratching the surface.

4. In the 1930s and '40s, the Green Bay Packerswere one of the most successful teams inprofessional football, but by the late '50s they were theworst. What went wrong? The team had manytalented players, like the former All-American PaulHornung. The owners cared about it deeply and kepthiring new coaches, new players--but nothing couldslow the fall. The players tried; they hated losing. And,really, they weren't that bad--they came close towinning many of the games they lost. So what couldthey do about it?

He suddenly lost concern for himself, and forgotto look at a menacing fate. He became not aman but a member. He felt that something ofwhich he was a part--a regiment, an army, acause, or a country--was in a crisis. He waswelded into a common personality which wasdominated by a single desire. For somemoments he could not flee, no more than a littlefinger can commit a revolution from a hand....There was a consciousness always of thepresence of his comrades about him. He felt thesubtle battle brotherhood more potent eventhan the cause for which they were fighting. Itwas a mysterious fraternity born of the smoke

and danger of death.THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE, STEPHEN

CRANE, 1871-1900

The Packers hit bottom in 1958. For the 1959season, they tried the usual trick, bringing in a newcoach and general manager: Vince Lombardi. Theplayers mostly didn't know much about the man,except that he had been an assistant coach for theNew York Giants.

As the players convened to meet the new coach,they expected the typical speech: this is the year toturn things around; I'm going to get tough with you; nomore business as usual. Lombardi did not disappointthem: in a quiet, forceful tone, he explained a new setof rules and code of conduct. But a few playersnoticed something different about Lombardi: heoozed confidence--no shouts, no demands. His toneand manner suggested that the Packers were alreadya winning team; they just had to live up to it. Was hean idiot or some kind of visionary?

Then came the practices, and once again thedifference was not so much how they were conductedas the spirit behind them--they felt different. Theywere shorter but more physically demanding, almostto the point of torture. And they were intense, with thesame simple plays endlessly repeated. Unlike othercoaches, Lombardi explained what he was doing:installing a simpler system, based not on novelty andsurprise but on efficient execution. The players had toconcentrate intensely--the slightest mistake and they

were doing extra laps or making the whole team doextra laps. And Lombardi changed the drillsconstantly: the players were never bored and couldnever relax their mental focus.

Earlier coaches had always treated a few playersdifferently: the stars. They had a bit of an attitude, andthey took off early and stayed up late. The other menhad come to accept this as part of the pecking order,but deep down they resented it. Lombardi, though,had no favorites; for him there were no stars. "CoachLombardi is very fair," said defensive tackle HenryJordan. "He treats us all the same--like dogs." Theplayers liked that. They enjoyed seeing Hornungyelled at and disciplined just as much as the others.

Lombardi's criticisms were relentless and gotunder his players' skins. He seemed to know theirweak points, their insecurities. How did he know, forinstance, that Jordan hated to be criticized in front ofthe others? Lombardi exploited his fear of publiclashings to make him try harder. "We were alwaystrying to show [Lombardi] he was wrong," commentedone player. "That was his psych."

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, oncemore; Or close the wall up with our Englishdead. In peace there's nothing so becomes aman As modest stillness and humility: But whenthe blast of war blows in our ears, Then imitatethe action of the tiger; Stiffen the sinews,summon up the blood, Disguise fair nature withhard-favour'd rage; Then lend the eye a terrible

aspect; Let it pry through the portage of thehead Like the brass cannon; let the browo'erwhelm it As fearfully as doth a galled rockO'erhang and jutty his confounded base, Swill'dwith the wild and wasteful ocean. Now set theteeth and stretch the nostril wide, Hold hard tothe breath and bend up every spirit To his fullheight. On, on, you noblest English, Whoseblood is fet from fathers of war-proof! Fathersthat, like so many Alexanders, Have in theseparts from morn till even fought And sheathedtheir swords for lack of argument: Dishonour notyour mothers; now attest That those whom youcall'd fathers did beget you. Be copy now tomen of grosser blood, And teach them how towar. And you, good yeomen, Whose limbs weremade in England, show us here The mettle ofyour pasture; let us swear That you are worthyour breeding; which I doubt not; For there isnone of you so mean and base, That hath notnoble lustre in your eyes. I see you stand likegreyhounds in the slips, Straining upon thestart. The game's afoot: Follow your spirit, andupon this charge Cry "God for Harry, England,and Saint George!"

KING HENRY V, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,1564-1616

The practices grew more intense still; the playershad never worked this hard in their lives. Yet they

found themselves showing up earlier and stayinglater. By the season's first game, Lombardi hadprepared them for every contingency. Sick of training,they were grateful to be playing in a real game at last--and, to their surprise, all that work made the game alot easier. They were more prepared than the otherteam and less tired in the fourth quarter. They wontheir first three games. With this sudden success,their morale and confidence soared.

The Packers finished the year with a 7-5 record, aremarkable turnaround from 1958's 1-10-1. After oneseason under Lombardi, they had become the mosttight-knit team in professional sports. No one wantedto leave the Packers. In 1960 they reached thechampionship game, and in 1961 they won it, withmany more to follow. Over the years various ofLombardi's Packers would try to explain how he hadtransformed them, but none of them could really sayhow he had pulled it off.

InterpretationWhen Vince Lombardi took over the Packers, herecognized the problem right away: the team wasinfected with adolescent defeatism. Teenagers willoften strike a pose that is simultaneously rebelliousand lackadaisical. It's a way of staying in place: tryingharder brings more risk of failure, which they cannothandle, so they lower their expectations, findingnobility in slacking off and mediocrity. Losing hurtsless when they embrace it.

Groups can get infected with this spirit without

realizing it. All they need is a few setbacks, a fewadolescent-minded individuals, and slowlyexpectations lower and defeatism sets in. The leaderwho tries to change the group's spirit directly--yelling,demanding, disciplining--actually plays into theteenage dynamic and reinforces the desire to rebel.

Lombardi was a motivational genius who saweverything in psychological terms. To him the NationalFootball League teams were virtually equal in talent.The differences lay in attitude and morale: reversingthe Packers' defeatism would translate into wins,which would lift their morale, which in turn would bringmore wins. Lombardi knew he had to approach hisplayers indirectly--had to trick them into changing. Hebegan with a show of confidence, talking as if heassumed they were winners who had fallen on badtimes. That got under their skins, far more than theyrealized. Then, in his practices, Lombardi didn't makedemands--a defensive, whiny approach that betraysinsecurity. Instead he changed the practices' spirit,making them quiet, intense, focused, workmanlike.He knew that willpower is tied to what you believepossible; expand that belief and you try harder.Lombardi created a better team--which won its firstgame--by making its players see possibilities. Defeatwas no longer comfortable.

Understand: a group has a collective personalitythat hardens over time, and sometimes thatpersonality is dysfunctional or adolescent. Changing itis difficult; people prefer what they know, even if itdoesn't work. If you lead this kind of group, do not play

into its negative dynamic. Announcing intentions andmaking demands will leave people defensive andfeeling like children. Like Lombardi, play the wilyparent. Ask more of them. Expect them to work likeadults. Quietly alter the spirit with which things aredone. Emphasize efficiency: anybody can be efficient(it isn't a question of talent), efficiency breedssuccess, and success raises morale. Once the spiritand personality of the group start to shift, everythingelse will fall into place.

5. In April 1796 the twenty-six-year-old NapoleonBonaparte was named commander of the Frenchforces fighting the Austrians in Italy. For many officershis appointment was something of a joke: they sawtheir new leader as too short, too young, tooinexperienced, and even too badly groomed to playthe part of "general." His soldiers, too, wereunderpaid, underfed, and increasingly disillusionedwith the cause they were fighting for, the FrenchRevolution. In the first few weeks of the campaign,Napoleon did what he could to make them fightharder, but they were largely resistant to him.

On May 10, Napoleon and his weary forces cameto the Bridge of Lodi, over the river Adda. Despite hisuphill struggle with his troops, he had the Austrians inretreat, but the bridge was a natural place to take astand, and they had manned it with soldiers on eitherside and with well-placed artillery. Taking the bridgewould be costly--but suddenly the French soldiers sawNapoleon riding up in front of them, in a position of

extreme personal risk, directing the attack. Hedelivered a stirring speech, then launched hisgrenadiers at the Austrian lines to cries of "Vive laRepublique!" Caught up in the spirit, his seniorofficers led the charge.

The French took the bridge, and now, after thisrelatively minor operation, Napoleon's troopssuddenly saw him as a different man. In fondrecognition of his courage, they gave him a nickname:"Le Petit Caporal." The story of Napoleon facing theenemy at the Bridge of Lodi passed through theranks. As the campaign wore on, and Napoleon wonvictory after victory, a bond developed between thesoldiers and their general that went beyond mereaffection.

Between battles Napoleon would sometimeswander among the soldiers' campfires, mingling withthem. He himself had risen through the ranks--he hadonce been an ordinary gunner--and he could talk tothe men as no other general could. He knew theirnames, their histories, even in what battles they'dbeen wounded. With some men he would pinch anearlobe between his finger and thumb and give it afriendly tweak.

Mercenary and auxiliary arms are useless anddangerous; and if one keeps his state foundedon mercenary arms, one will never be firm orsecure; for they are disunited, ambitious, withoutdiscipline, unfaithful; bold among friends,among enemies cowardly; no fear of God, no

faith with men; ruin is postponed only as long asattack is postponed; and in peace you aredespoiled by them, in war by the enemy. Thecause of this is that they have no love nor causeto keep them in the field other than a smallstipend, which is not sufficient to make themwant to die for you.THE PRINCE, NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, 1513

Napoleon's soldiers did not see him often, but whenthey did, it was as if an electrical charge passedthrough them. It was not just his personal presence; heknew exactly when to show up--before a big battle orwhen morale had slipped for some reason. At thesemoments he would tell them they were making historytogether. If a squad were about to lead a charge orseemed in trouble, he would ride over and yell, "Thirty-eighth: I know you! Take me that village--at thecharge!" His soldiers felt they weren't just obeyingorders, they were living out a great drama.

Napoleon rarely showed anger, but when he did,his men felt worse than just guilty or upset. Late in thefirst Italian campaign, Austrian troops had forcedsome of his troops into a humiliating retreat for whichthere was no excuse. Napoleon visited their camppersonally. "Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you," hetold them, his large gray eyes seemingly on fire. "Youhave shown neither bravery, discipline, norperseverance.... You have allowed yourselves to bedriven from positions where a handful of men couldhave stopped an army. Soldiers of the Thirty-ninth and

Eighty-fifth, you are not French soldiers. General,chief of staff, let it be inscribed on their colors: 'Theyno longer form part of the Army of Italy!'" The soldierswere astounded. Some cried; others begged foranother chance. They repented their weakness andturned completely around: the Thirty-ninth and Eighty-fifth would go on to distinguish themselves forstrengths they had never shown previously.

Some years later, during a difficult campaignagainst the Austrians in Bavaria, the French won ahard-fought victory. The next morning Napoleonreviewed the Thirteenth Regiment of Light Infantry,which had played a key role in the battle, and askedthe colonel to name its bravest man. The colonelthought for a moment: "Sir, it is the drum major."Napoleon immediately asked to see the youngbandsman, who appeared, quaking in his boots. ThenNapoleon announced loudly for everyone to hear,"They say that you are the bravest man in thisregiment. I appoint you a knight of the Legion ofHonor, baron of the Empire, and award you a pensionof four thousand francs." The soldiers gasped.Napoleon was famous for his well-timed promotionsand for promoting soldiers on merit, making even thelowliest private feel that if he proved himself, he couldsomeday be a marshal. But a drum major becoming abaron overnight? That was entirely beyond theirexperience. Word of it spread rapidly through thetroops and had an electrifying effect--particularly onthe newest conscripts, the ones who were mosthomesick and depressed.

Throughout his long, very bloody campaigns andeven his heart-wrenching defeats--the bitter winter inRussia, the eventual exile to Elba, the final act atWaterloo--Napoleon's men would go to the ends ofthe earth for Le Petit Caporal and for no one else.

InterpretationNapoleon was the greatest man manager in history:he took millions of unruly, undisciplined, unsoldierlyyoung men, recently liberated by the FrenchRevolution, and molded them into one of the mostsuccessful fighting forces ever known. Their highmorale was all the more remarkable for the ordealshe put them through. Napoleon used every trick in thebook to build his army. He united them around acause, spreading first the ideas of the FrenchRevolution, later the glory of France as a growingempire. He treated them well but never spoiled them.He appealed not to their greed but to their thirst forglory and recognition. He led from the front, provinghis bravery again and again. He kept his men moving--there was always a new campaign for glory. Havingbonded with them, he skillfully played on theiremotions. More than soldiers fighting in an army, hismen felt themselves part of a myth, united under theemperor's legendary eagle standards.

If you wish to be loved by your soldiers,husband their blood and do not lead them toslaughter.

FREDERICK THE GREAT, 1712-86

Of all Napoleon's techniques, none was moreeffective than his use of punishments and rewards, allstaged for the greatest dramatic impact. His personalrebukes were rare, but when he was angry, when hepunished, the effect was devastating: the target feltdisowned, outcast. As if exiled from the warmth of hisfamily, he would struggle to win back the general'sfavor and then never to give him a reason to be angryagain. Promotions, rewards, and public praise wereequally rare, and when they came, they were alwaysfor merit, never for some political calculation. Caughtbetween the poles of wanting never to displeaseNapoleon and yearning for his recognition, his menwere pulled into his sway, following him devotedly butnever quite catching up.

Learn from the master: the way to manage peopleis to keep them in suspense. First create a bondbetween your soldiers and yourself. They respect you,admire you, even fear you a little. To make the bondstronger, hold yourself back, create a little spacearound yourself; you are warm yet with a touch ofdistance. Once the bond is forged, appear less often.Make both your punishments and your praises rareand unexpected, whether for mistakes or forsuccesses that may seem minor at the time but havesymbolic meaning. Understand: once people knowwhat pleases you and what angers you, they turn intotrained poodles, working to charm you with apparentgood behavior. Keep them in suspense: make themthink of you constantly and want to please you butnever know just how to do it. Once they are in the trap,

you will have a magnetic pull over them. Motivation willbecome automatic.

Authority: The Way means inducing thepeople to have the same aim as theleadership, so that they will share death andshare life, without fear of danger.

--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALIf morale is contagious, so is its opposite: fear anddiscontent can spread through your troops likewildfire. The only way to deal with them is to cut themoff before they turn into panic and rebellion.

In 58 B.C., when Rome was fighting the Gallic War,Julius Caesar was preparing for battle against theGermanic leader Ariovistus. Rumors about theferocity and size of the German forces were flying,and his army was panicky and mutinous. Caesaracted fast: first he had the rumormongers arrested.Next he addressed his soldiers personally, remindingthem of their brave ancestors who had fought and

defeated the Germans. He would not lead theirweaker descendants into battle; since the TenthLegion alone seemed immune to the growing panic,he would take them alone. As Caesar prepared tomarch with the valiant Tenth Legion, the rest of thearmy, ashamed, begged him to forgive them and letthem fight. With a show of reluctance, he did so, andthese once frightened men fought fiercely.

In such cases you must act like Caesar, turningback the tide of panic. Waste no time, and deal withthe whole group. People who spread panic or mutinyexperience a kind of madness in which they graduallylose contact with reality. Appeal to their pride anddignity, make them feel ashamed of their moment ofweakness and madness. Remind them of what theyhave accomplished in the past, and show them howthey are falling short of the ideal. This social shamingwill wake them up and reverse the dynamic.

PART III

DEFENSIVE WARFARE

To fight in a defensive manner is not a sign ofweakness; it is the height of strategic wisdom, apowerful style of waging war. Its requirements aresimple: First, you must make the most of yourresources, fighting with perfect economy andengaging only in battles that are necessary. Second,you must know how and when to retreat, luring anaggressive enemy into an imprudent attack. Then,waiting patiently for his moment of exhaustion, launcha vicious counterattack.

In a world that frowns on displays of overtaggression, the ability to fight defensively--to letothers make the first move and then wait for their ownmistakes to destroy them--will bring you untold power.Because you waste neither energy nor time, you arealways ready for the next inevitable battle. Your careerwill be long and fruitful.

To fight this way, you must master the arts ofdeception. By seeming weaker than you are, you candraw the enemy into an ill-advised attack; by seemingstronger than you are--perhaps through an occasionalact that is reckless and bold--you can deter the enemyfrom attacking you. In defensive warfare you areessentially leveraging your weaknesses andlimitations into power and victory.

The following four chapters will instruct you in the

basic arts of defensive warfare: economy of means,counterattack, intimidation and deterrence, and howto retreat skillfully and lie low when under aggressiveattack.

PICK YOUR BATTLES CAREFULLYTHE PERFECT-ECONOMY STRATEGY

We all have limitations--our energies and skills willtake us only so far. Danger comes from trying tosurpass our limits. Seduced by some glittering prizeinto overextending ourselves, we end up exhaustedand vulnerable. You must know your limits and pickyour battles carefully. Consider the hidden costs of awar: time lost, political goodwill squandered, anembittered enemy bent on revenge. Sometimes it isbetter to wait, to undermine your enemies covertlyrather than hitting them straight on. If battle cannotbe avoided, get them to fight on your terms. Aim attheir weaknesses; make the war expensive for themand cheap for you. Fighting with perfect economy,you can outlast even the most powerful foe.

THE SPIRAL EFFECTIn 281 B.C. war broke out between Rome and the cityof Tarentum, on Italy's east coast. Tarentum hadbegun as a colony of the Greek city of Sparta; itscitizens still spoke Greek, considered themselvescultured Spartans, and thought other Italian citiesbarbaric. Rome meanwhile was an emerging power,locked in a series of wars with neighboring cities.

In the utilization of a theater of war, as in

everything else, strategy calls for economy ofstrength. The less one can manage with, thebetter; but manage one must, and here, as incommerce, there is more to it than merestinginess.

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

The prudent Romans were reluctant to take onTarentum. It was Italy's wealthiest city at the time, richenough to finance its allies in a war against Rome; itwas also too far away, off in the southeast, to pose animmediate threat. But the Tarentines had sunk someRoman ships that had wandered into their harbor,killing the fleet's admiral, and when Rome had tried tonegotiate a settlement, its ambassadors had beeninsulted. Roman honor was at stake, and it readieditself for war.

Tarentum had a problem: it was wealthy but had noreal army. Its citizens had gotten used to easy living.The solution was to call in a Greek army to fight on itsbehalf. The Spartans were otherwise occupied, so theTarentines called on King Pyrrhus of Epirus (319-272B.C.), the greatest Greek warrior king sinceAlexander the Great.

Epirus was a small kingdom in west-centralGreece. It was a poor land, sparsely populated, withmeager resources, but Pyrrhus--raised on stories ofAchilles, from whom his family claimed to bedescended, and of Alexander the Great, a distantcousin--was determined to follow in the footsteps ofhis illustrious ancestors and relatives, expanding

Epirus and carving out his own empire. As a youngman, he had served in the armies of other greatmilitary men, including Ptolemy, a general ofAlexander's who now ruled Egypt. Pyrrhus had quicklyproved his value as a warrior and leader. In battle hehad become known for leading dangerous charges,earning himself the nickname "The Eagle." Back inEpirus he had built up his small army and trained itwell, even managing to defeat the much largerMacedonian army in several battles.

Pyrrhus's reputation was on the rise, but it was hardfor a small country like his to gain ascendancy overmore powerful Greek neighbors like theMacedonians, the Spartans, and the Athenians. Andthe Tarentines' offer was tempting: First, theypromised him money and a large army raised fromallied states. Second, by defeating the Romans, hecould make himself master of Italy, and from Italy hecould take first Sicily, then Carthage in North Africa.Alexander had moved east to create his empire;Pyrrhus could move west and dominate theMediterranean. He accepted the offer.

In the spring of 280 B.C., Pyrrhus set sail with thelargest Greek army ever to cross into Italy: 20,000foot soldiers, 3,000 horsemen, 2,000 bowmen, andtwenty elephants. Once in Tarentum, though, herealized he had been tricked: not only did theTarentines have no army, they had made no effort toassemble one, leaving Pyrrhus to do it himself.Pyrrhus wasted no time: he declared a militarydictatorship in the city and began to build and train an

army from among the Tarentines as fast as possible.Pyrrhus's arrival in Tarentum worried the Romans,

who knew his reputation as a strategist and fighter.Deciding to give him no time to prepare, they quicklysent out an army, forcing Pyrrhus to make do withwhat he had and he set off to face them. The twoarmies met near the town of Heraclea. Pyrrhus andhis troops were outnumbered and at one point wereon the verge of defeat, when he unleashed his secretweapon: his elephants, with their massive weight,loud, fearsome trumpeting, and soldiers on top, firingarrows down at will. The Romans had never facedelephants in battle before, and panic spread amongthem, turning the tide of the fight. Soon the disciplinedRoman legions were in headlong retreat.

"The Eagle" had won a great victory. His famespread across the Italian peninsula; he was indeedthe reincarnation of Alexander the Great. Now othercities sent him reinforcements, more than making upfor his losses at Heraclea. But Pyrrhus was worried.He had lost many veterans in the battle, including keygenerals. More important, the strength and disciplineof the Roman legions had impressed him--they werelike no other troops he had faced. He decided to try tonegotiate a peaceful settlement with the Romans,offering to share the peninsula with them. At the sametime, though, he marched on Rome, to give thenegotiations urgency and to make it clear that unlessthe Romans sued for peace, they would face himagain.

Meanwhile the defeat at Heraclea had had a

powerful effect on the Romans, who were not easilyintimidated and did not take defeat lightly.Immediately after the battle, a call went out forrecruits, and young men responded in droves. TheRomans proudly rejected the offer of a settlement;they would never share Italy.

The two armies met again near the town ofAsculum, not far from Rome, in the spring of 279 B.C.This time their numbers were about equal. The firstday of battle was fierce, and once again the Romansseemed to have the edge, but on the second dayPyrrhus, a strategic master, managed to lure theRoman legions onto terrain better suited to his ownstyle of maneuvering, and he gained the advantage.As was his wont, near the end of the day hepersonally led a violent charge at the heart of theRoman legions, elephants in front. The Romansscattered, and Pyrrhus was once again victorious.

King Pyrrhus had now scaled the heights, yet he feltonly gloom and foreboding. His losses had beenterrible; the ranks of the generals he depended onwere decimated, and he himself had been badlywounded. At the same time, the Romans seemedinexhaustible, undaunted by their defeat. Whencongratulated on his victory at Asculum, he replied, "Ifwe defeat the Romans in one more such battle, weshall be totally ruined."

Pyrrhus, however, was already ruined. His losses atAsculum were too large to be quickly replaced, andhis remaining forces were too few to fight the Romansagain. His Italian campaign was over.

InterpretationFrom the story of King Pyrrhus and his famous lamentafter the Battle of Asculum comes the expression"Pyrrhic victory," signifying a triumph that is as goodas a defeat, for it comes at too great a cost. Thevictor is too exhausted to exploit his win, toovulnerable to face the next battle. And indeed, afterthe "victory" at Asculum, Pyrrhus staggered from onedisaster to the next, his army never quite strongenough to defeat his growing hosts of enemies. Thisculminated in his untimely death in battle, endingEpirus's hopes to become a power in Greece.

Pyrrhus could have avoided this downward spiral.Advance intelligence would have told him about boththe disciplined ferocity of the Romans and thedecadence and treachery of the Tarentines, and,knowing this, he could have taken more time to buildan army or canceled the expedition altogether. Oncehe saw that he had been tricked, he could have turnedback; after Heraclea there was still time to retrench,consolidate, quit while he was ahead. Had he doneany of this, his story might have had a differentending. But Pyrrhus could not stop himself--the dreamwas too alluring. Why worry about the costs? He couldrecover later. One more battle, one more victory,would seal the deal.

Pyrrhic victories are much more common than youmight think. Excitement about a venture's prospects isnatural before it begins, and if the goal is enticing, weunconsciously see what we want to see--more of the

possible gains, fewer of the possible difficulties. Thefurther we go, the harder it becomes to pull back andrationally reassess the situation. In suchcircumstances the costs tend not just to mount--theyspiral out of control. If things go badly, we getexhausted, which leads us to make mistakes, whichlead to new, unforeseen problems, which in turn leadto new costs. Any victories we might have along theway are meaningless.

Understand: the more you want the prize, the moreyou must compensate by examining what getting it willtake. Look beyond the obvious costs and think aboutthe intangible ones: the goodwill you may squander bywaging war, the fury of the loser if you win, the timethat winning may take, your debt to your allies. Youcan always wait for a better time; you can always trysomething more in line with your resources.Remember: history is littered with the corpses ofpeople who ignored the costs. Save yourselfunnecessary battles and live to fight another day.

When the weapons have grown dull and spiritsdepressed, when our strength has been

expended and resources consumed, thenothers will take advantage of our exhaustion toarise. Then even if you have wise generals you

cannot make things turn out well in the end.--The Art of War, Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSESWhen Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) ascended the

throne of England in 1558, she inherited a second-rate power: the country had been racked by civil war,and its finances were in a mess. Elizabeth dreamedof creating a long period of peace in which she couldslowly rebuild England's foundations and particularlyits economy: a government with money was agovernment with options. England, a small island withlimited resources, could not hope to compete in warwith France and Spain, the great powers of Europe.Instead it would gain strength through trade andeconomic stability.

He whom the ancients called an expert in battlegained victory where victory was easily gained.Thus the battle of the expert is never anexceptional victory, nor does it win himreputation for wisdom or credit for courage. Hisvictories in battle are unerring. Unerring meansthat he acts where victory is certain, andconquers an enemy that has already lost.

THE ART OF WAR, SUN-TZU, FOURTHCENTURY B.C.

Year by year for twenty years, Elizabeth madeprogress. Then, in the late 1570s, her situationsuddenly seemed dire: an imminent war with Spainthreatened to cancel all the gains of the previous twodecades. The Spanish king, Philip II, was a devoutCatholic who considered it his personal mission toreverse the spread of Protestantism. The LowCountries (now Holland and Belgium) were properties

of Spain at the time, but a growing Protestantrebellion was threatening its rule, and Philip went towar with the rebels, determined to crush them.Meanwhile his most cherished dream was to restoreCatholicism to England. His short-term strategy was aplot to have Elizabeth assassinated and then to placeher half sister, the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots, onthe British throne. In case this plan failed, his long-term strategy was to build an immense armada ofships and invade England.

Philip did not keep his intentions well hidden, andElizabeth's ministers saw war as inevitable. Theyadvised her to send an army to the Low Countries,forcing Philip to put his resources there instead of intoan attack on England--but Elizabeth balked at thatidea; she would send small forces there to help theProtestant rebels avert a military disaster, but shewould not commit to anything more. Elizabethdreaded war; maintaining an army was a hugeexpense, and all sorts of other hidden costs were sureto emerge, threatening the stability she had built up. Ifwar with Spain really was inevitable, Elizabeth wantedto fight on her own terms; she wanted a war that wouldruin Spain financially and leave England safe.

Defying her ministers, Elizabeth did what she couldto keep the peace with Spain, refusing to provokePhilip. That bought her time to put aside funds forbuilding up the British navy. Meanwhile she worked insecret to damage the Spanish economy, which shesaw as its only weak spot. Spain's enormous,expanding empire in the New World made it powerful,

but that empire was far away. To maintain it and profitfrom it, Philip was entirely dependent on shipping, avast fleet that he paid for with enormous loans fromItalian bankers. His credit with these banks dependedon the safe passage of his ships bringing gold fromthe New World. The power of Spain rested on a weakfoundation.

And so Queen Elizabeth unleashed her greatestcaptain, Sir Francis Drake, on the Spanish treasureships. He was to appear to be operating on his own,a pirate out for his own profit. No one was to know ofthe connection between him and the queen. Witheach ship that he captured, the interest rate onPhilip's loans crept upward, until eventually the Italianbankers were raising the rate more because of thethreat of Drake than because of any specific loss.Philip had hoped to launch his armada againstEngland by 1582; short of money, he had to delay.Elizabeth had bought herself more time.

Meanwhile, much to the chagrin of Philip's financeministers, the king refused to scale back the size ofthe invading armada. Building it might take longer, buthe would just borrow more money. Seeing his fightwith England as a religious crusade, he would not bedeterred by mere matters of finance.

Achilles now routed the Trojans and pursuedthem towards the city, but his course, too, wasrun. Poseidon and Apollo, pledged to avengethe deaths of Cycnus and Troilus, and to punishcertain insolent boasts that Achilles had uttered

over Hector's corpse, took counsel together.Veiled with cloud and standing by the Scaeangate, Apollo sought out Paris in the thick ofbattle, turned his bow and guided the fatal shaft.It struck the one vulnerable part of Achilles'sbody, the right heel, and he died in agony.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

While working to ruin Philip's credit, Elizabeth putan important part of her meager resources intobuilding up England's spy network--in fact, she madeit the most sophisticated intelligence agency inEurope. With agents throughout Spain, she was keptinformed of Philip's every move. She knew exactlyhow large the armada was to be and when it was tobe launched. That allowed her to postpone calling upher army and reserves until the very last moment,saving the government money.

Finally, in the summer of 1588, the SpanishArmada was ready. It comprised 128 ships, includingtwenty large galleons, and a vast number of sailorsand soldiers. Equal in size to England's entire navy, ithad cost a fortune. The Armada set sail from Lisbonin the second week of July. But Elizabeth's spies hadfully informed her of Spain's plans, and she was ableto send a fleet of smaller, more mobile English shipsto harass the Armada on its way up the French coast,sinking its supply ships and generally creating chaos.As the commander of the English fleet, Lord Howardof Effingham, reported, "Their force is wonderful great

and strong; and yet we pluck their feathers little bylittle."

Finally the Armada came to anchor in the port ofCalais, where it was to link up with the Spanisharmies stationed in the Low Countries. Determined toprevent it from picking up these reinforcements, theEnglish gathered eight large ships, loaded them withflammable substances, and set them on course forthe Spanish fleet, which was anchored in tightformation. As the British ships approached the harborunder full sail, their crews set them on fire andevacuated. The result was havoc, with dozens ofSpanish ships in flames. Others scrambled for safewater, often colliding with one another. In their haste toput to sea, all order broke down.

The loss of ships and supplies at Calaisdevastated Spanish discipline and morale, and theinvasion was called off. To avoid further attacks on thereturn to Spain, the remaining ships headed not southbut north, planning to sail home around Scotland andIreland. The English did not even bother with pursuit;they knew that the rough weather in those waterswould do the damage for them. By the time theshattered Armada returned to Spain, forty-four of itsships had been lost and most of the rest were toodamaged to be seaworthy. Almost two-thirds of itssailors and soldiers had perished at sea. MeanwhileEngland had lost not a single ship, and barely ahundred men had died in action.

It was a great triumph, but Elizabeth wasted no timeon gloating. To save money, she immediately

decommissioned the navy. She also refused to listento advisers who urged her to follow up her victory byattacking the Spanish in the Low Countries. Her goalswere limited: to exhaust Philip's resources andfinances, forcing him to abandon his dreams ofCatholic dominance and instituting a delicate balanceof power in Europe. And this, indeed, was ultimatelyher greatest triumph, for Spain never recoveredfinancially from the disaster of the Armada and soongave up its designs on England altogether.

Limitations are troublesome, but they areeffective. If we live economically in normaltimes, we are prepared for times of want. To besparing saves us from humiliation. Limitationsare also indispensable in the regulation of worldconditions. In nature there are fixed limits forsummer and winter, day and night, and theselimits give the year its meaning. In the sameway, economy, by setting fixed limits uponexpenditures, acts to preserve property andprevent injury to the people.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

InterpretationThe defeat of the Spanish Armada has to beconsidered one of the most cost-effective in militaryhistory: a second-rate power that barely maintained astanding army was able to face down the greatestempire of its time. What made the victory possible

was the application of a basic military axiom: attacktheir weaknesses with your strengths. England'sstrengths were its small, mobile navy and itselaborate intelligence network; its weaknesses wereits limited resources in men, weaponry, and money.Spain's strengths were its vast wealth and its hugearmy and fleet; its weaknesses were the precariousstructure of its finances, despite their magnitude, andthe lumbering size and slowness of its ships.

Elizabeth refused to fight on Spain's terms, keepingher army out of the fray. Instead she attacked Spain'sweaknesses with her strengths: plaguing the Spanishgalleons with her smaller ships, wreaking havoc onthe country's finances, using special ops to grind itswar machine to a halt. She was able to control thesituation by keeping England's costs down whilemaking the war effort more and more expensive forSpain. Eventually a time came when Philip could onlyfail: if the Armada sank, he would be ruined for yearsto come, and even if the Armada triumphed, victorywould come so dear that he would ruin himself tryingto exploit it on English soil.

Understand: no person or group is completelyeither weak or strong. Every army, no matter howinvincible it seems, has a weak point, a place leftunprotected or undeveloped. Size itself can be aweakness in the end. Meanwhile even the weakestgroup has something it can build on, some hiddenstrength. Your goal in war is not simply to amass astockpile of weapons, to increase your firepower soyou can blast your enemy away. That is wasteful,

expensive to build up, and leaves you vulnerable toguerrilla-style attacks. Going at your enemies blow byblow, strength against strength, is equally unstrategic.Instead you must first assess their weak points:internal political problems, low morale, shakyfinances, overly centralized control, their leader'smegalomania. While carefully keeping your ownweaknesses out of the fray and preserving yourstrength for the long haul, hit their Achilles' heel againand again. Having their weaknesses exposed andpreyed upon will demoralize them, and, as they tire,new weaknesses will open up. By carefully calibratingstrengths and weaknesses, you can bring down yourGoliath with a slingshot.

Abundance makes me poor.--Ovid (43 B.C.-A.D. 17)

In all this--in selection of nutriment, of place andclimate, of recreation--there commands aninstinct of self-preservation which manifestsitself most unambiguously as an instinct forself-defense. Not to see many things, not tohear them, not to let them approach one--firstpiece of ingenuity, first proof that one is noaccident but a necessity. The customary wordfor this self-defensive instinct is taste. Itsimperative commands, not only to say No whenYes would be a piece of "selflessness," but alsoto say No as little as possible. To separateoneself, to depart from that to which No would

be required again and again. The rationale isthat defensive expenditures, be they never sosmall, become a rule, a habit, lead to anextraordinary and perfectly superfluousimpoverishment. Our largest expenditures areour most frequent small ones. Warding off, notletting come close, is an expenditure--oneshould not deceive oneself over this--a strengthsquandered on negative objectives. One canmerely through the constant need to ward offbecome too weak any longer to defendoneself.... Another form of sagacity and self-defense consists in reacting as seldom aspossible and withdrawing from situations andrelationships in which one would be condemnedas it were to suspend one's freedom, one'sinitiative, and become a mere reagent.

ECCE HOMO, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1888

KEYS TO WARFAREReality can be defined by a sharp series of limitationson every living thing, the final boundary being death.We have only so much energy to expend before wetire; only so much in the way of food and resources isavailable to us; our skills and capacities can go onlyso far. An animal lives within those limits: it does nottry to fly higher or run faster or expend endless energyamassing a pile of food, for that would exhaust it andleave it vulnerable to attack. It simply tries to make themost of what it has. A cat, for instance, instinctively

practices an economy of motion and gesture, neverwasting effort. People who live in poverty, similarly,are acutely aware of their limits: forced to make themost of what they have, they are endlessly inventive.Necessity has a powerful effect on their creativity.

The problem faced by those of us who live insocieties of abundance is that we lose a sense oflimit. We are carefully shielded from death and canpass months, even years, without contemplating it.We imagine endless time at our disposal and slowlydrift further from reality; we imagine endless energy todraw on, thinking we can get what we want simply bytrying harder. We start to see everything as limitless--the goodwill of friends, the possibility of wealth andfame. A few more classes and books and we canextend our talents and skills to the point where webecome different people. Technology can makeanything achievable.

Abundance makes us rich in dreams, for in dreamsthere are no limits. But it makes us poor in reality. Itmakes us soft and decadent, bored with what wehave and in need of constant shocks to remind us thatwe are alive. In life you must be a warrior, and warrequires realism. While others may find beauty inendless dreams, warriors find it in reality, inawareness of limits, in making the most of what theyhave. Like the cat, they look for the perfect economyof motion and gesture--the way to give their blows thegreatest force with the least expenditure of effort.Their awareness that their days are numbered--thatthey could die at any time--grounds them in reality.

There are things they can never do, talents they willnever have, lofty goals they will never reach; thathardly bothers them. Warriors focus on what they dohave, the strengths that they do possess and that theymust use creatively. Knowing when to slow down, torenew, to retrench, they outlast their opponents. Theyplay for the long term.

Through the final years of French colonial rule inVietnam and on through the Vietnam War, the militaryleader of the Vietnamese insurgents was General VoNguyen Giap. In first the French and then theAmericans, he faced an enemy with vastly superiorresources, firepower, and training. His own army wasa ragtag collection of peasants; they had morale, adeep sense of purpose, but little else. Giap had notrucks to carry supplies, and his communicationswere nineteenth century. Another general would havetried to catch up, and Giap had the opportunity--hehad the offer of trucks, radios, weapons, and trainingfrom China--but he saw them as a trap. It wasn't onlythat he didn't want to spend his limited funds on suchthings; in the long run, he believed, all they would dowas turn the North Vietnamese into a weaker versionof their enemy. Instead he chose to make the most ofwhat he had, turning his army's weaknesses intovirtues.

Trucks could be spotted from the air, and theAmericans could bomb them. But the Americanscould not bomb supply lines they could not see.Exploiting his resources, then, Giap used a vastnetwork of peasant coolies to carry supplies on their

backs. When they came to a river, they would cross iton rope bridges hung just below the surface of thewater. Right up to the end of the war, the Americanswere still trying to figure out how North Vietnamsupplied its armies in the field.

Meanwhile Giap developed hit-and-run guerrillatactics that gave him enormous potential to disruptAmerican supply lines. To fight, move troops, andferry supplies, the Americans used helicopters, whichgave them tremendous mobility. But the war ultimatelyhad to be fought on the ground, and Giap wasendlessly inventive in using the jungle to neutralizeAmerican air power, disorient American foot soldiers,and camouflage his own troops. He could not hope towin a pitched battle against superior U.S. weaponry,so he put his effort into spectacular, symbolic,demoralizing attacks that would drive home the futilityof the war when they appeared on American TV. Withthe minimum that he had, he created the maximumeffect.

Armies that seem to have the edge in money,resources, and firepower tend to be predictable.Relying on their equipment instead of on knowledgeand strategy, they grow mentally lazy. When problemsarise, their solution is to amass more of what theyalready have. But it's not what you have that bringsyou victory, it's how you use it. When you have less,you are naturally more inventive. Creativity gives youan edge over enemies dependent on technology; youwill learn more, be more adaptable, and you willoutsmart them. Unable to waste your limited

resources, you will use them well. Time will be yourally.

If you have less than your enemy, do not despair.You can always turn the situation around by practicingperfect economy. If you and your enemy are equals,getting hold of more weaponry matters less thanmaking better use of what you have. If you have morethan your enemy, fighting economically is as importantas ever. As Pablo Picasso said, Even if you arewealthy, act poor. The poor are more inventive, andoften have more fun, because they value what theyhave and know their limits. Sometimes in strategy youhave to ignore your greater strength and force yourselfto get the maximum out of the minimum. Even if youhave the technology, fight the peasant's war.

This does not mean that you disarm or fail to exploitwhat advantages you may have in materiel. InOperation Desert Storm, the U.S. campaign againstIraq in 1991, American military strategists made fulluse of their superior technology, particularly in the air,but they did not depend on this for victory. They hadlearned the lesson of their debacle twenty yearsearlier in Vietnam, and their maneuvers showed thekind of deceptive feints and use of mobilityassociated with smaller, guerrilla-like forces. Thiscombination of advanced technology and creative flairproved devastating.

War is a balance of ends and means: a generalmight have the best plan to achieve a certain end, butunless he has the means to accomplish it, his plan isworthless. Wise generals through the ages, then, have

learned to begin by examining the means they have athand and then to develop their strategy out of thosetools. That is what made Hannibal a brilliant strategist:he would always think first of the givens--the makeupof his own army and of the enemy's, their respectiveproportions of cavalry and infantry, the terrain, histroops' morale, the weather. That would give him thefoundation not only for his plan of attack but for theends he wanted to achieve in this particularencounter. Instead of being locked in to a way offighting, like so many generals, he constantly adjustedhis ends to his means. That was the strategicadvantage he used again and again.

The next time you launch a campaign, try anexperiment: do not think about either your solid goalsor your wishful dreams, and do not plan out yourstrategy on paper. Instead think deeply about whatyou have--the tools and materials you will be workingwith. Ground yourself not in dreams and plans but inreality: think of your own skills, any political advantageyou might have, the morale of your troops, howcreatively you can use the means at your disposal.Then, out of that process, let your plans and goalsblossom. Not only will your strategies be morerealistic, they will be more inventive and forceful.Dreaming first of what you want and then trying to findthe means to reach it is a recipe for exhaustion,waste, and defeat.

Do not mistake cheapness for perfect economy--armies have failed by spending too little as often asby spending too much. When the British attacked

Turkey during World War I, hoping to knock it out ofthe war and then attack Germany from the east, theybegan by sending a fleet to break through theDardanelles Strait and head for the Turkish capital ofConstantinople. The fleet made good progress, buteven so, after several weeks some ships had beensunk, more lives than expected had been lost, and theventure in general was proving costly. So the Britishcalled off the naval campaign, deciding instead toland an army on the peninsula of Gallipoli and fightthrough by land. That route seemed safer andcheaper--but it turned into a months-long fiasco thatcost thousands of lives and in the end led nowhere,for the Allies eventually gave up and pulled out theirtroops. Years later, Turkish documents wereuncovered that revealed that the British fleet had beenon the verge of success: in another day or two, itwould have broken through and Constantinople wouldprobably have fallen. The whole course of the warmight have been changed. But the British hadovereconomized; at the last moment, they had pulledtheir punches, worrying about cost. In the end the costof trying to win on the cheap wound up punitivelyexpensive.

Every limitation has its value, but a limitationthat requires persistent effort entails a cost oftoo much energy. When, however, the limitationis a natural one (as, for example, the limitationby which water flows only downhill), itnecessarily leads to success, for then it means

a saving of energy. The energy that otherwisewould be consumed in a vain struggle with theobject is applied wholly to the benefit of thematter in hand, and success is assured.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

Perfect economy, then, does not mean hoardingyour resources. That is not economy but stinginess--deadly in war. Perfect economy means finding agolden mean, a level at which your blows count but donot wear you out. Overeconomizing will wear you outmore, for the war will drag on, its costs growing,without your ever being able to deliver a knockoutpunch.

Several tactics lend themselves to economy infighting. First is the use of deception, which costsrelatively little but can yield powerful results. DuringWorld War II the Allies used a complicated series ofdeceptions to make the Germans expect an attackfrom many different directions, forcing them to spreadthemselves thin. Hitler's Russian campaign was muchweakened by the need to keep troops in France andthe Balkans, to defend from attacks there--attacksthat never came. Deception can be a great equalizerfor the weaker side. Its arts include the gathering ofintelligence, the spreading of misinformation, and theuse of propaganda to make the war more unpopularwithin the enemy camp.

Second, look for opponents you can beat. Avoidenemies who have nothing to lose--they will work to

bring you down whatever it costs. In the nineteenthcentury, Otto von Bismarck built up Prussia's militarypower on the backs of weaker opponents such as theDanes. Easy victories enhance morale, develop yourreputation, give you momentum, and, most important,do not cost you much.

There will be times when your calculations misfire;what had seemed to be an easy campaign turns outhard. Not everything can be foreseen. Not only is itimportant to pick your battles carefully, then, but youmust also know when to accept your losses and quit.In 1971 the boxers Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier,both at the heights of their careers, met for the worldheavyweight championship. It was a grueling match,one of the most exciting in history; Frazier won by adecision after nearly knocking out Ali in the fifteenthround. But both men suffered horribly in the fight; boththrew a lot of good punches. Wanting revenge, Aligained a rematch in 1974--another grueling fifteen-round affair--and won by a decision. Neither boxerwas happy, both wanted a more conclusive result, sothey met again in 1975, in the famous "Thrilla inManila." This time Ali won in the fourteenth round, butneither man was ever the same again: these threefights had taken too much out of them, shortening theircareers. Pride and anger had overtaken their powersof reason. Do not fall into such a trap; know when tostop. Do not soldier on out of frustration or pride. Toomuch is at stake.

Finally, nothing in human affairs stays the same.Over time either your efforts will tend to slow down--a

kind of friction will build up, whether from unexpectedexterior events or from your own actions--ormomentum will help to move you forward. Wastingwhat you have will create friction, lowering your energyand morale. You are essentially slowing yourselfdown. Fighting economically, on the other hand, willbuild momentum. Think of it as finding your level--aperfect balance between what you are capable of andthe task at hand. When the job you are doing isneither above nor below your talents but at your level,you are neither exhausted nor bored and depressed.You suddenly have new energy and creativity. Fightingwith perfect economy is like hitting that level--lessresistance in your path, greater energy unleashed.Oddly enough, knowing your limits will expand yourlimits; getting the most out of what you have will let youhave more.

Authority: The value of a thing sometimeslies not in what one attains with it but inwhat one pays for it--what it costs us.

--Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

REVERSALThere can never be any value in fighting

uneconomically, but it is always a wise course tomake your opponent waste as much of his resourcesas possible. This can be done through hit-and-runtactics, forcing him to expend energy chasing afteryou. Lure him into thinking that one big offensive willruin you; then bog that offensive down in a protractedwar in which he loses valuable time and resources. Afrustrated opponent exhausting energy on punches hecannot land will soon make mistakes and openhimself up to a vicious counterattack.

TURN THE TABLESTHE COUNTERATTACK STRATEGY

Moving first--initiating the attack--will often put you ata disadvantage: you are exposing your strategy andlimiting your options. Instead discover the power ofholding back and letting the other side move first,giving you the flexibility to counterattack from anyangle. If your opponents are aggressive, bait theminto a rash attack that will leave them in a weakposition. Learn to use their impatience, theireagerness to get at you, as a way to throw them offbalance and bring them down. In difficult momentsdo not despair or retreat: any situation can be turnedaround. If you learn how to hold back, waiting for theright moment to launch an unexpectedcounterattack, weakness can become strength.

The technique of "according with" the enemy'sexpectations and desires requires firstdetermining what they believe and want, thenapparently conforming to them until thesituation can be exploited: Definition: When theenemy wants to take something and you yield it,it is termed "according with."...In general, whengoing contrary to something merely solidifies it,it is better to accord with it in order to lead them

to flaws. If the enemy wants to advance, becompletely flexible and display weakness inorder to induce an advance. If the enemy wantsto withdraw, disperse and open an escape routefor their retreat. If the enemy is relying upon astrong front, establish your own front lines far off,solidly assuming a defensive posture in order toobserve their arrogance. If the enemy reliesupon their awesomeness, be emptily respectfulbut substantially plan while awaiting theirlaxness. Draw them forward and cover them,release and capture them. Exploit theirarrogance, capitalize on their laxity.

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY MING DYNASTYTEXT, QUOTED IN THE TAO OF SPYCRAFT,

RALPH D. SAWYER

DISGUISED AGGRESSIONIn September 1805, Napoleon Bonaparte faced thegreatest crisis until that moment in his career: Austriaand Russia had joined in an alliance against him. Tothe south, Austrian troops were attacking the Frenchsoldiers occupying northern Italy; to the east, theAustrian general Karl Mack was leading a large forceinto Bavaria. A sizable Russian army under GeneralMikhail Kutusov was on its way to join Mack's army,and this allied force, once merged and expanded,would head for France. East of Vienna, more Russianand Austrian troops were waiting to be deployedwherever needed. Napoleon's armies were

outnumbered two to one.Napoleon's plan was to try to defeat each of the

alliance's armies one by one, using his smaller butmore mobile corps to fight them before they could joinforces. While committing enough troops to produce astalemate in Italy, he moved into Bavaria beforeKutusov could reach it and forced Mack's ignominioussurrender at Ulm, with hardly a shot being fired (seechapter 6). This bloodless victory was a masterpiece,but to exploit it to its fullest, Napoleon needed to catchKutusov before the Russian general could himself bereinforced by more Russian or Austrian troops. Tothat end, Napoleon sent the bulk of his army east,toward Vienna, hoping to trap the retreating Russianforces. But the pursuit bogged down: the weather wasbad, the French troops were tired, their marshalsmade mistakes, and, most important, the wily Kutusovwas cleverer in retreat than in attack. Managing toelude the French, he reached the town of Olmutz,northeast of Vienna, where the remaining Austro-Russian forces were stationed.

Now the situation reversed: suddenly it wasNapoleon who was in grave danger. The strength ofhis corps was their mobility; relatively small, they werevulnerable individually and worked best whenoperating close enough to one another to come fastto one another's support. Now they were dispersed ina long line from Munich to Vienna, which Napoleonhad taken after his victory over Mack at Ulm. The menwere hungry, tired, and short of supplies. TheAustrians fighting the French in northern Italy had

given up the battle there and were in retreat--but thatput them heading northeast, posing a threat toNapoleon's southern flank. To the north, thePrussians, seeing that Napoleon was in trouble, wereconsidering joining the alliance. If that happened, theycould wreak havoc on Napoleon's extended lines ofcommunication and supply--and the two armiesmoving in from north and south could squeeze him todeath.

Napoleon's options were abysmal. To continue thepursuit of Kutusov would further extend his lines.Besides, the Russians and Austrians were now90,000 strong and in an excellent position at Olmutz.To stay put, on the other hand, was to risk beingslowly swallowed by armies on all sides. Retreatseemed the only solution, and it was what hisgenerals advised, but with the weather deteriorating(it was mid-November) and the enemy sure to harasshim, that would be costly, too. And retreat would meanthat his victory at Ulm had been wasted--atremendous blow to the morale of his men. That wouldvirtually invite the Prussians to join the war, and hisenemies the English, seeing him vulnerable, might goso far as to invade France. Whatever path he choseseemed to lead to disaster. For several days he wentinto deep thought, ignoring his advisers and poringover maps.

A rapid, powerful transition to the attack--theglinting sword of vengeance--is the mostbrilliant moment of the defense.

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

Meanwhile, at Olmutz, the Austrian and Russianleaders--among them the Austrian Emperor Francis Iand the young czar Alexander I--watched Napoleon'smoves with intense curiosity and excitement. Theyhad him where they wanted him; surely they would beable to recoup the disaster at Ulm and then some.

On November 25, alliance scouts reported thatNapoleon had moved a large part of his army toAusterlitz, halfway between Vienna and Olmutz. Thereit looked as if his forces were occupying the PratzenHeights, a position that would indicate preparation forbattle. But Napoleon had only some 50,000 men withhim; he was outnumbered nearly two to one. Howcould he hope to face the allies? Even so, onNovember 27, Francis I offered him an armistice.Napoleon was formidable, and even at those odds,fighting him was a risk. In truth, Francis was alsotrying to buy enough time to envelop the French armycompletely, but none of the alliance generals thoughtNapoleon would fall for that trick.

To their surprise, however, Napoleon seemedeager to come to terms. Suddenly the czar and hisgenerals had a new thought: he was panicking,grasping at straws. That suspicion seemed borne outalmost immediately, when, on November 29,Napoleon abandoned the Pratzen Heights almost assoon as he had taken them, assuming a position totheir west and repeatedly repositioning his cavalry.He appeared utterly confused. The next day he asked

for a meeting with the czar himself. Instead the czarsent an emissary, who reported back that Napoleonhad been unable to disguise his fear and doubt. Hehad seemed on edge, emotional, even distraught.The emissary's conditions for armistice had beenharsh, and although Napoleon had not agreed tothem, he had listened quietly, seeming chastened,even intimidated. This was music to the ears of theyoung czar, who was burning for his first engagementwith Napoleon. He was tired of waiting.

By abandoning the Pratzen Heights, Napoleonseemed to have put himself in a vulnerable position:his southern lines were weak, and his route of retreat,southwest toward Vienna, was exposed. An alliedarmy could take the Pratzen Heights, pivot south tobreak through that weak point in his lines and cut offhis retreat, then move back north to surround his armyand destroy him. Why wait? A better chance wouldnever come. Czar Alexander and his youngergenerals prevailed over the hesitant Austrian emperorand launched the attack.

A sudden inspiration then came to William [atthe Battle of Hastings, A.D. 1066] , suggestedby the disaster which had befallen the Englishright in the first conflict. He determined to try theexpedient of a feigned flight, a stratagem notunknown to Bretons and Normans of earlierages. By his orders a considerable portion ofthe assailants suddenly wheeled about andretired in seeming disorder. The English

thought, with more excuse on this occasion thanon the last, that the enemy was indeed routed,and for the second time a great body of thembroke the line and rushed after the retreatingsquadrons. When they were well on their waydown the slope, William repeated his formerprocedure. The intact portion of his host fellupon the flanks of the pursuers, while those whohad simulated flight faced about and attackedthem in front. The result was again a foregoneconclusion: the disordered men of the fyrd werehewn to pieces, and few or none of themescaped back to their comrades on the height.

HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR IN THEMIDDLE AGES, SIR CHARLES OMAN, 1898

It began early on the morning of December 2. Whiletwo smaller divisions faced off against the Frenchfrom the north, pinning them down, a stream ofRussian and Austrian soldiers moved toward thePratzen Heights, took them, then wheeled to thesouth, aiming at the French weak point. Although theymet resistance from the outnumbered enemy, theyquickly broke through and were soon able to take thekey positions that would allow them to turn north andsurround Napoleon. But at 9:00 A.M., as the lastalliance troops (some 60,000 men in all) made theirway to the heights and headed south, word reachedthe allied commanders that something unexpectedwas afoot: a large French force, invisible to them

beyond the Pratzen Heights, was suddenly headingdue east, straight for the town of Pratzen itself and thecenter of the allied lines.

Kutusov saw the danger: the allies had advancedso many men into the gap in the French lines that theyhad left their own center exposed. He tried to turnback the last troops heading south, but it was too late.By 11:00 A.M. the French had retaken the heights.Worse, French troops had come up from thesouthwest to reinforce the southern position andprevent the allies from surrounding the French.Everything had turned around. Through the town ofPratzen, the French were now pouring through theallied center and were swiftly moving to cut off theretreat of the allied troops to their south.

Each part of the allied army--north, center, andsouth--was now effectively isolated from the others.The Russians in the southernmost position tried toretreat farther to the south, but thousands of them losttheir lives in the frozen lakes and marshes in theirpath. By 5:00 P.M. the rout was complete, and a trucewas called. The Austro-Russian army had sufferedterrible casualties, far more than the French. Thedefeat was so great that the alliance collapsed; thecampaign was over. Somehow Napoleon hadsnatched victory from defeat. Austerlitz was thegreatest triumph of his career.

InterpretationIn the crisis leading up to the Battle of Austerlitz,Napoleon's advisers and marshals had thought only of

retreat. Sometimes it is better, they believed, toaccept a setback willingly and go on the defensive.On the other side stood the czar and his allies, whohad Napoleon weak. Whether they waited to envelophim or attacked right away, they were on theoffensive.

In the middle was Napoleon, who, as a strategist,stood far above both his own advisers and marshals,on the one hand, and the czar and alliance generalson the other. His superiority lay in the fluidity of histhinking: he did not conceive war in mutually exclusiveterms of defense and offense. In his mind they wereinextricably linked: a defensive position was theperfect way to disguise an offensive maneuver, acounterattack; an offensive maneuver was often thebest way to defend a weak position. What Napoleonorchestrated at Austerlitz was neither retreat norattack but something far more subtle and creative: hefused defense and offense to set up the perfect trap.

When the enemy finds itself in a predicamentand wants to engage us in a decisive battle,wait; when it is advantageous for the enemy butnot for us to fight, wait; when it is expedient toremain still and whoever moves first will fall intodanger, wait; when two enemies are engaged ina fight that will result in defeat or injury, wait;when the enemy forces, though numerous,suffer from mistrust and tend to plot against oneanother, wait; when the enemy commander,though wise, is handicapped by some of his

cohorts, wait.THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARY

STRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

First, having taken Vienna, Napoleon advanced toAusterlitz, apparently taking the offensive. Thatstartled the Austrians and Russians, even though theystill heavily outnumbered him. Next he backed off andtook a defensive position; then he seemed to switchbetween offense and defense, giving everyappearance of confusion. In his meeting with theczar's emissary, he seemed confused personally aswell as strategically. It was all high drama, staged byNapoleon to make him look weak and vulnerable,inviting attack.

These maneuvers fooled the allies into giving upprudence, striking out at Napoleon with total abandonand exposing themselves in the process. Theirdefensive position at Olmutz was so strong anddominant that only leaving it would ruin it, and that wasprecisely what Napoleon lured them into doing. Then,instead of defending himself against their rash attack,he suddenly switched to the offensive himself, thecounterattack. In doing so he altered the dynamic ofthe battle not only physically but psychologically: whenan attacking army suddenly has to go on thedefensive, its spirit crumbles. And indeed the alliancetroops panicked, retreating to the frozen lakes thatNapoleon had intended as their graveyard all along.

Most of us only know how to play either offensively

or defensively. Either we go into attack mode,charging our targets in a desperate push to get whatwe want, or we try frantically to avoid conflict and, if itis forced on us, to ward off our enemies as best wecan. Neither approach works when it excludes theother. Making offense our rule, we create enemiesand risk acting rashly and losing control of our ownbehavior, but constant defensiveness backs us into acorner, becomes a bad habit. In either case we arepredictable.

Instead consider a third option, the Napoleonicway. At times you seem vulnerable and defensive,getting your opponents to disregard you as a threat,to lower their guard. When the moment is right andyou sense an opening, you switch to the attack. Makeyour aggression controlled and your weakness a ployto disguise your intentions. In a dangerous moment,when those around you see only doom and the needto retreat, that is when you smell an opportunity. Byplaying weak you can seduce your aggressiveenemies to come at you full throttle. Then catch themoff guard by switching to the offense when they leastexpect it. Mixing offense and defense in this fluidfashion, you will stay one step ahead of your inflexibleopponents. The best blows are the ones they neversee coming.

These two main principles of application arespecifically related to the tactical valueassigned to the personality of the opponent incombat. According to the unilateral principle of

application, the personality of the opponent wasconsidered the primary target of an attack orcounterattack, for the purpose of either total orpartial subjugation. According to the bilateralprinciple of application, on the other hand, theopponent's personality was viewed not merelyas a target, but also (and by certain bujutsumasters, primarily) as an instrument--that is, asthe unwilling but nevertheless useful vector ofhis own subjugation....... It is the principle ofbilateral application which seems to represent atactical differentiation between Japanesebujutsu and the martial arts of the West.Lafcadio Hearn, for example, considered thisprinciple "a uniquely Oriental idea," asking,"What Western brain could have elaborated thisstrange teaching: never to oppose force toforce, but only to direct and utilize the power ofattack; to overthrow the enemy solely by his ownstrength--to vanquish him solely by his ownefforts?" (Smith, 128)...Takuan, writing about theart of swordsmanship in particular, refers to thestrategic value of the bilateral principle in thestrategy of counterattack against an opponent,when he advised his pupil to "make use of hisattack by turning it on to himself. Then, hissword meant to kill you becomes your own andthe weapon will fall on the opponent himself. InZen this is known as 'seizing the enemy's spear

and using it as the weapon to kill him'" (Suzuki,96) The ancient schools of jujutsu were veryempathetic on this subject.... Ju-Jutsu (literally"soft art"), as its name implies, is based uponthe principle of opposing softness or elasticity tohardness or stiffness. Its secret lies in keepingone's body full of ki, with elasticity in one'slimbs, and in being ever on the alert to turn thestrength of one's foe to one's own advantagewith the minimum employment of one's ownmuscular force.SECRETS OF THE SAMURAI, OSCAR RATTI

AND ADELE WESTBROOK, 1973

However desperate the situation andcircumstances, don't despair. When there is

everything to fear, be unafraid. Whensurrounded by dangers, fear none of them.

When without resources, depend onresourcefulness. When surprised, take the

enemy itself by surprise.--Sun-tzu, The Art of War (fourth century B.C.)

JUJITSUIn 1920 the Democratic Party nominated Ohiogovernor James Cox as its candidate to succeed theretiring President Woodrow Wilson. At the same time,it named thirty-eight-year-old Franklin DelanoRoosevelt as its vice presidential nominee. Roosevelthad served as the assistant secretary of the navy

under Wilson; more important, he was the cousin ofTheodore Roosevelt, still very popular after hispresidency in the first decade of the century.

The Republican nominee was Warren G. Harding,and the campaign was a grueling affair. TheRepublicans had a lot of money; they avoided talkingabout the issues and played up Harding's folksyimage. Cox and Roosevelt responded to theRepublicans by going on a vigorous offensive, basingtheir campaign on a single issue of Wilson's:American participation in the League of Nations,which they hoped would bring peace and prosperity.Roosevelt campaigned all over the country, deliveringspeech after speech--the idea was to counter theRepublicans' money with sheer effort. But the racewas a disaster: Harding won the presidency in one ofthe biggest landslides in American electoral history.

The following year, Roosevelt was stricken withpolio and lost the use of his legs. Coming just after thedisastrous 1920 campaign, his illness marked aturning point in his life: suddenly made aware of hisphysical fragility and mortality, he retreated intohimself and reassessed. The world of politics wasvicious and violent. To win an election, people woulddo anything, stooping to all kinds of personal attacks.The public official moving in this world was underpressure to be as unscrupulous as everyone else andsurvive as best he could--but that approach did notsuit Roosevelt personally and took too much out ofhim physically. He decided to craft a different politicalstyle, one that would separate him from the crowd and

give him a constant advantage.In 1932, after a stint as governor of New York,

Roosevelt ran as the Democratic presidentialnominee against the Republican incumbent, HerbertHoover. The country was in the midst of theDepression, and Hoover seemed incapable ofdealing with it. Given the weakness of his record, adefensive hand was a difficult one for him to play, and,like the Democrats in 1920, he went vigorously on theoffensive, attacking Roosevelt as a socialist.Roosevelt in turn traveled the country, speaking on hisideas for getting America out of the Depression. Hedidn't give many specifics, nor did he respond toHoover's attacks directly--but he radiated confidenceand ability. Hoover meanwhile seemed shrill andaggressive. The Depression would probably havedoomed him to defeat whatever he did, but he lost farbigger than expected: the size of Roosevelt's victory--nearly an electoral sweep--surprised one and all.

In the weeks following the election, Rooseveltessentially hid from public view. Slowly his enemieson the right began to use his absence to attack him,circulating speculation that he was unprepared for thechallenge of the job. The criticisms became pointedand aggressive. At his inauguration, however,Roosevelt gave a rousing speech, and in his firstmonths in office, now known as the "Hundred Days,"he switched from the appearance of inactivity to apowerful offensive, hurrying through legislation thatmade the country feel as if something were finallybeing done. The sniping died.

Over the next few years, this pattern repeatedlyrecurred. Roosevelt would face resistance: TheSupreme Court, say, would overturn his programs,and enemies on all sides (Senator Huey Long andlabor leader John L. Lewis on the left, Father CharlesCoughlin and wealthy businessmen on the right)would launch hostile campaigns in the press.Roosevelt would retreat, ceding the spotlight. In hisabsence the attacks would seem to pick up steam,and his advisers would panic--but Roosevelt was justbiding his time. Eventually, he knew, people would tireof these endless attacks and accusations, particularlybecause, by refusing to reply to them, he made theminevitably one-sided. Then--usually a month or twobefore election time--he would go on the offensive,defending his record and attacking his opponentssuddenly and vigorously enough to catch them all offguard. The timing would also jolt the public, winninghim their attention.

In the periods when Roosevelt was silent, hisopponents' attacks would grow, and grow more shrill--but that only gave him material he could use later,taking advantage of their hysteria to make themridiculous. The most famous example of this came in1944, when that year's Republican presidentialnominee, Thomas Dewey, launched a series ofpersonal attacks on Roosevelt, questioning theactivities of his wife, his sons, and even his dog, theScotch terrier Fala, whom Dewey accused of beingpampered at the taxpayers' expense. Rooseveltcountered in a campaign speech,

The Republican leaders have not been content tomake personal attacks upon me--or my sons--they now include my little dog, Fala. Unlike themembers of my family, Fala resents this. Whenhe learned that the Republican fiction writers hadconcocted a story that I left him behind on anAleutian island and had sent a destroyer back tofind him--at a cost to the taxpayer of 2 or 3, or 8or 20 million dollars--his Scotch soul was furious.He has not been the same dog since. I amaccustomed to hearing malicious falsehoodsabout myself, but I think I have the right to objectto libelous statements about my dog.

To undertake the military operations, the armymust prefer stillness to movement. It reveals noshape when still but exposes its shape inmovement. When a rash movement leads toexposure of the shape of the army, it will fallvictim to the enemy. But for movement, the tigerand leopard will not fall into trap, the deer willnot run into snare, the birds will not be stuck bynet, and the fish and turtles will not be caught byhooks. All these animals become prey to manbecause of their movement. Therefore the wiseman treasures stillness. By keeping still, he candispel temerity and cope with the temerariousenemy. When the enemy exposes a vulnerableshape, seize the chance to subdue it. The Bookof Master Weiliao observes, "The army

achieves victory by stillness." Indeed, the armyshould not move without careful thought, muchless take reckless action.

THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARYSTRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

Devastatingly funny, the speech was also ruthlesslyeffective. And how could his opponents reply to itwhen it quoted their own words right back at them?Year after year Roosevelt's opponents exhaustedthemselves attacking him, scoring points at momentswhen it didn't matter and losing one landslide electionafter another to him.

InterpretationRoosevelt could not bear to feel cornered, to have nooptions. This was partly because of his flexible nature;he preferred to bend to circumstances, changingdirection effortlessly as needed. It also came out ofhis physical limitations--he hated to feel hemmed inand helpless. Early on, when Roosevelt campaignedin the usual aggressive way of American politics,arguing his case and attacking his opponents, he felthopelessly constricted. Through experiment helearned the power of holding back. Now he let hisopponents make the first move: whether by attackinghim or by detailing their own positions, they wouldexpose themselves, giving him openings to use theirown words against them later on. By staying silentunder their attacks, he would goad them into going

too far (nothing is more infuriating than engaging withsomeone and getting no response) and ending upshrill and irrational, which played badly with the public.Once their own aggression had made themvulnerable, Roosevelt would come in for the kill.

Roosevelt's style can be likened to jujitsu, theJapanese art of self-defense. In jujitsu a fighter baitsopponents by staying calm and patient, getting themto make the first aggressive move. As they come atthe fighter and either strike at him or grab hold of him--either push or pull--the fighter moves with them, usingtheir strength against them. As he deftly steps forwardor back at the right moment, the force of their ownmomentum throws them off balance: often theyactually fall, and even if they don't, they leavethemselves vulnerable to a counterblow. Theiraggression becomes their weakness, for it commitsthem to an obvious attack, exposing their strategy andmaking it hard for them to stop.

In politics, jujitsu style yields endless benefits. Itgives you the ability to fight without seemingaggressive. It saves energy, for your opponents tirewhile you stay above the fray. And it widens youroptions, allowing you to build on what they give you.

Aggression is deceptive: it inherently hidesweakness. Aggressors cannot control their emotions.They cannot wait for the right moment, cannot trydifferent approaches, cannot stop to think about howto take their enemies by surprise. In that first wave ofaggression, they seem strong, but the longer theirattack goes on, the clearer their underlying weakness

and insecurity become. It is easy to give in toimpatience and make the first move, but there is morestrength in holding back, patiently letting the otherperson make the play. That inner strength will almostalways prevail over outward aggression.

Time is on your side. Make your counterattacksswift and sudden--like the cat who creeps on paddedpaws to suddenly pounce on its prey. Make jujitsuyour style in almost everything you do: it is your way ofresponding to aggression in everyday life, your way offacing circumstances. Let events come to you, savingvaluable time and energy for those brief momentswhen you blaze with the counterattack.

The soundest strategy in war is to postponeoperations until the moral disintegration of theenemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow

both possible and easy.--Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924)

KEYS TO WARFAREThousands of years ago, at the dawn of militaryhistory, various strategists in different cultures noticeda peculiar phenomenon: in battle, the side that was onthe defensive often won in the end. There seemed tobe several reasons for this. First, once the aggressorwent on the attack, he had no more surprises in store--the defender could clearly see his strategy and takeprotective action. Second, if the defender couldsomehow turn back this initial attack, the aggressorwould be left in a weak position; his army was

disorganized and exhausted. (It requires more energyto take land than to hold it.) If the defenders could takeadvantage of this weakness to deliver a counterblow,they could often force the aggressor to retreat.

Based on these observations, the art of thecounterattack was developed. Its basic tenets were tolet the enemy make the first move, actively baiting himinto an aggressive attack that would expend hisenergy and unbalance his lines, then takingadvantage of his weakness and disorganization. Thisart was refined by theorists such as Sun-tzu andpracticed to perfection by leaders like Philip ofMacedon.

The counterattack is, in fact, the origin of modernstrategy. The first real example of an indirectapproach to war, it represents a major breakthroughin thinking: instead of being brutal and direct, thecounterattack is subtle and deceptive, using theenemy's energy and aggression to bring about hisdownfall. Although it is one of the oldest and mostbasic strategies in warfare, it remains in many waysthe most effective and has proven highly adaptable tomodern conditions. It was the strategy of choice ofNapoleon Bonaparte, T. E. Lawrence, Erwin Rommel,and Mao Tse-tung.

The counterattack principle is infinitely applicable toany competitive environment or form of conflict, sinceit is based on certain truths of human nature. We areinherently impatient creatures. We find it hard to wait;we want our desires to be satisfied as quickly aspossible. This is a tremendous weakness, for it

means that in any given situation we often commitourselves without enough thought. In charging aheadwe limit our options and get ourselves into trouble.Patience, on the other hand, particularly in war, paysunlimited dividends: it allows us to sniff outopportunities, to time a counterblow that will catch theenemy by surprise. A person who can lie back andwait for the right moment to take action will almostalways have an advantage over those who give in totheir natural impatience.

THE HEFFALUMP TRAPPiglet and Pooh have fallen into a Hole in theFloor of the Forest. They have Agreed that it isReally a Heffalump Trap, which makes PigletNervous. He imagines that a Heffalump hasLanded Close By: Heffalump (gloatingly): "Ho-h o !" Piglet ( carelessly): "Tra-la-la, tra-la-la."Heffalump (surprised, and not quite so sure ofhimself): "Ho-ho!" Piglet (more carelessly still):"Tiddle-um-tum, tiddle-um-tum." Heffalump(beginning to say Ho-ho and turning itawkwardly into a cough): "H'r'm! What's all this?"Piglet (surprised): "Hullo! This is a trap I'vemade, and I'm waiting for a Heffalump to fall intoit." Heffalump (greatly disappointed): "Oh!"(after a long silence): "Are you sure?" Piglet:"Yes." Heffalump: "Oh!" (nervously): "I--Ithought it was a trap I'd made to catch Piglets."Piglet (surprised): "Oh, no!" Heffalump: "Oh!"

(apologetically): "I--I must have got it wrong,then." Piglet: "I'm afraid so." (politely): "I'msorry." (he goes on humming.) Heffalump:"Well--well--I--well. I suppose I'd better begetting back?" Piglet (looking up carelessly):"Must you? Well, if you see Christopher Robinanywhere, you might tell him I want him."Heffalump (eager to please): "Certainly!Certainly!" (he hurries off.) Pooh (who wasn'tgoing to be there, but we find we can't do withouthim): "Oh Piglet, how brave and clever you are!"Piglet (modestly): "Not at all, Pooh." (And then,when Christopher Robin comes, Pooh can tellhim all about it.)

THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER, A.A.MILNE, 1928

The notion of "catching" (utsuraseru) applies tomany things: yawning and sleepiness, forexample. Time can also be "catching." In alarge-scale battle, when the enemy is restlessand trying to bring a quick conclusion to thebattle, pay no attention. Instead, try to pretendthat you are calm and quiet with no urgent needto end the battle. The enemy will then beaffected by your calm and easy attitude andbecome less alert. When this "catching" occurs,quickly execute a strong attack to defeat theenemy.... There is also a concept called"making one drunk," which is similar to the

"making one drunk," which is similar to thenotion of "catching." You can make youropponent feel bored, carefree, or feeble spirited.You should study these matters well.

THE BOOK OF FIVE RINGS, MIYAMOTOMUSASHI, 1584-1645

The first step in mastering the counterattack is tomaster yourself, and particularly the tendency to growemotional in conflict. When the great baseball playerTed Williams made the major leagues with the BostonRed Sox, he took a look around. He was now amember of an elite--the best hitters in the country.They all had sharp vision, quick reflexes, and strongarms, but relatively few of them could control theirimpatience at the plate--and pitchers preyed on thatweakness, getting them to swing on losing pitches.Williams separated himself out, and made himselfperhaps the greatest pure hitter in baseball history, bydeveloping his patience and a kind of hitter'scounterattack: he would wait, and keep waiting, forthe best pitch to swing at. Good pitchers are mastersat making a hitter feel frustrated and emotional, butWilliams would not be baited: whatever they did, hewould wait for the pitch that was right for him. In fact,he turned the situation around: given his ability to wait,it was the pitcher, not Williams, who would end upimpatient and throwing the wrong pitch as a result.

Once you learn patience, your options suddenlyexpand. Instead of wearing yourself out in little wars,you can save your energy for the right moment, takeadvantage of other people's mistakes, and think

clearly in difficult situations. You will see opportunitiesfor counterattack where others see only surrender orretreat.

The key to the successful counterattack is stayingcalm while your opponent gets frustrated and irritable.In sixteenth-century Japan, there emerged a novelway of fighting called Shinkage: the swordsman wouldbegin the fight by mirroring his opponent's everymove, copying his every footstep, every blink, everygesture, every twitch. This would drive the enemycrazy, for he would be unable to read the Shinkagesamurai's moves or get any sense of what he was upto. At some point he would lose patience and strikeout, lowering his guard. The Shinkage samurai wouldinevitably parry this attack and follow up with a fatalcounterblow.

Shinkage samurai believed that the advantage in alife-and-death swordfight lay not in aggression but inpassivity. By mirroring their enemy's moves, theycould understand his strategy and thinking. By beingcalm and observant--patient--they could detect whentheir opponent had decided to attack; the momentwould register in his eyes or in a slight movement ofhis hands. The more irritated he became and theharder he tried to hit the Shinkage fighter, the greaterhis imbalance and vulnerability. Shinkage samuraiwere virtually unbeatable.

Mirroring people--giving back to them just what theygive you--is a powerful method of counterattack. Indaily life, mirroring and passivity can charm people,flattering them into lowering their defenses and

opening themselves to attack. It can also irritate anddiscomfit them. Their thoughts become yours; you arefeeding off them like a vampire, your passive frontdisguising the control you are exercising over theirminds. Meanwhile you are giving them nothing ofyourself; they cannot see through you. Yourcounterattack will come as a complete surprise tothem.

The counterattack is a particularly effective strategyagainst what might be called "the barbarian"--the manor woman who is especially aggressive by nature. Donot be intimidated by these types; they are in factweak and are easily swayed and deceived. The trickis to goad them by playing weak or stupid whiledangling in front of them the prospect of easy gains.

During the era of the Warring States in ancientChina, the state of Qi found itself threatened by thepowerful armies of the state of Wei. The Qi generalconsulted the famous strategist Sun Pin (adescendant of Suntzu himself), who told him that theWei general looked down on the armies of Qi,believing that their soldiers were cowards. That, saidSun Pin, was the key to victory. He proposed a plan:Enter Wei territory with a large army and makethousands of campfires. The next day make half thatnumber of campfires, and the day after that, half thatnumber again. Putting his trust in Sun Pin, the Qigeneral did as he was told.

The Wei general, of course, was carefullymonitoring the invasion, and he noted the dwindlingcampfires. Given his predisposition to see the Qi

soldiers as cowards, what could this mean but thatthey were defecting? He would advance with hiscavalry and crush this weak army; his infantry wouldfollow, and they would march into Qi itself. Sun Pin,hearing of the approaching Wei cavalry andcalculating how fast they were moving, retreated andstationed the Qi army in a narrow pass in themountains. He had a large tree cut down and strippedof its bark, then wrote on the bare log, "The general ofWei will die at this tree." He set the log in the path ofthe pursuing Wei army, then hid archers on both sidesof the pass. In the middle of the night, the Weigeneral, at the head of his cavalry, reached the placewhere the log blocked the road. Something waswritten on it; he ordered a torch lit to read it. Thetorchlight was the signal and the lure: the Qi archersrained arrows on the trapped Wei horsemen. The Weigeneral, realizing he had been tricked, killed himself.

Sun Pin based his baiting of the Wei general on hisknowledge of the man's personality, which wasarrogant and violent. By turning these qualities to hisadvantage, encouraging his enemy's greed andaggression, Sun Pin could control the man's mind.You, too, should look for the emotion that yourenemies are least able to manage, then bring it to thesurface. With a little work on your part, they will laythemselves open to your counterattack.

The other improvement was his father'sinspiration. Lyndon Johnson was very dejectedas he sat, on the day the Express poll

appeared, in his parents' home in Johnson Cityafter hours of campaigning, talking to hisparents, his brother, his Uncle Tom, his cousinAva Johnson Cox, and Ava's eight-year-oldson, William, known as "Corky." The leaderswere almost all against him, he said; he hadseveral large rallies scheduled, and he had notbeen able to persuade a single prominentindividual to introduce him. So, Ava recalls--in arecollection echoed by Lyndon's brother--"hisDaddy said, 'If you can't use that route, whydon't you go the other route?'" "What otherroute?" Lyndon asked--and his Daddy mappedit out for him. There was a tactic, Sam Johnsonsaid, that could make the leaders' oppositionwork for him, instead of against him. The sametactic, Sam said, could make the adversenewspaper polls work for him, instead of againsthim. It could even make the youth issue work forhim. If the leaders were against him, he told hisson, stop trying to conceal that fact; emphasizeit--in a dramatic fashion. If he was behind in therace, emphasize that--in a dramatic fashion. Ifhe was younger than the other candidates,emphasize that. Lyndon asked his father whathe meant, and his father told him. If no leaderwould introduce Lyndon, Sam said, he shouldstop searching for mediocre adults assubstitutes, but instead should be introduced by

an outstanding young child. And the childshould introduce him not as an adult wouldintroduce him, but with a poem, a very specialpoem.... And when Lyndon asked who the childshould be, Sam smiled, and pointed to Ava'sson. In an area in which horsemanship was oneof the most esteemed talents, Corky Cox was, atthe age of eight, already well known for the featsof riding and calf-roping with which he had sweptthe children's events in recent rodeos; the bestyoung cowboy in the Hill Country, people werecalling him. "Corky can do it," Sam said. All thenext day, Sam trained him. "He wanted Corky toreally shout out 'thousands,'" Ava recalls. "Hewanted him to smack down his hand every timehe said that word. I can still see Uncle Samsmacking down his hand on the kitchen table toshow Corky how." And that night, at a rally inHenly, in Hays County, Lyndon Johnson toldthe audience, "They say I'm a young candidate.Well, I've got a young campaign manager, too,"and he called Corky to the podium, and Corky,smacking down his hand, recited a stanza ofEdgar A. Guest's "It Couldn't Be Done": Thereare thousands to tell you it cannot be done, Thereare thousands to prophesy failure; There arethousands to point out to you one by one, Thedangers that wait to assail you. But just buckle inwith a bit of a grin, Just take off your coat and goto it; Just start in to sing as you tackle the thing

That "cannot be done," and you'll do it.THE PATH TO POWER: THE YEARS OFLYNDON JOHNSON, VOL. 1, ROBERT A.

CARO, 1990

In our own time, the family therapist Jay Haley hasobserved that for many difficult people acting out is astrategy--a method of control. They give themselvesthe license to be impossible and neurotic. If you reactby getting angry and trying to make them stop, youare doing just what they want: they are engaging youremotions and dominating your attention. If, on theother hand, you simply let them run amok, you putthem still more in control. But Haley discovered that ifyou encourage their difficult behavior, agree with theirparanoid ideas, and push them to go further, you turnthe dynamic around. This is not what they want orexpect; now they're doing what you want, which takesthe fun out of it. It is the jujitsu strategy: you are usingtheir energy against them. In general, encouragingpeople to follow their natural direction, to give in totheir greed or neuroses, will give you more controlover them than active resistance will. Either they getthemselves into terrible trouble or they becomehopelessly confused, all of which plays into yourhands.

Whenever you find yourself on the defensive and introuble, the greatest danger is the impulse tooverreact. You will often exaggerate your enemy'sstrength, seeing yourself as weaker than is actuallythe case. A key principle of counterattack is never to

see a situation as hopeless. No matter how strongyour enemies seem, they have vulnerabilities you canprey upon and use to develop a counterattack. Yourown weakness can become a strength if you play itright; with a little clever manipulation, you can alwaysturn things around. That is how you must look at everyapparent problem and difficulty.

An enemy seems powerful because he has aparticular strength or advantage. Maybe it's moneyand resources; maybe it's the size of his army or ofhis territory; maybe, more subtly, it's his moralstanding and reputation. Whatever his strength mightbe, it is actually a potential weakness, simplybecause he relies on it: neutralize it and he isvulnerable. Your task is to put him in a situation inwhich he cannot use his advantage.

In 480 B.C., when the Persian king Xerxes invadedGreece, he had a huge advantage in the size of hisarmy and particularly his navy. But the Atheniangeneral Themistocles was able to turn that strengthinto weakness: he lured the Persian fleet into thenarrow straits off the island of Salamis. In thesechoppy, difficult waters, the very size of the fleet, itsapparent strength, became a nightmare: it wascompletely unable to maneuver. The Greekscounterattacked and destroyed it, ending theinvasion.

If your opponent's advantage comes from asuperior style of fighting, the best way to neutralize itis to learn from it, adapting it to your own purposes. Inthe nineteenth century, the Apaches of the American

Southwest were for many years able to torment U.S.troops through guerrilla-style tactics that wereperfectly suited to the terrain. Nothing seemed to workuntil General George Crook hired disaffectedApaches to teach him their way of fighting and serveas scouts. Adapting their style of warfare, Crookneutralized the Apaches' strengths and finallydefeated them.

As you neutralize your enemy's strengths, you mustsimilarly reverse your own weaknesses. If your forcesare small, for example, they are also mobile; use thatmobility to counterattack. Perhaps your reputation islower than your opponent's; that just means you haveless to lose. Sling mud--some of it will stick, andgradually your enemy will sink to your level. Alwaysfind ways to turn your weakness to advantage.

Difficulties with other people are inevitable; youmust be willing to defend yourself and sometimes totake the offensive. The modern dilemma is that takingthe offensive is unacceptable today--attack and yourreputation will suffer, you will find yourself politicallyisolated, and you will create enemies and resistance.The counterattack is the answer. Let your enemymake the first move, then play the victim. Withoutovert manipulation on your part, you can control youropponents' minds. Bait them into a rash attack; whenit ends up in disaster, they will have only themselvesto blame, and everyone around them will blame them,too. You win both the battle of appearances and thebattle on the field. Very few strategies offer suchflexibility and power.

Authority: The whole art of war consists in awell-reasoned and extremely circumspectdefensive, followed by a rapid andaudacious attack.

--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

REVERSALThe counterattack strategy cannot be applied in everysituation: there will always be times when it is better toinitiate the attack yourself, gaining control by puttingyour opponents on the defensive before they havetime to think. Look at the details of the situation. If theenemy is too smart to lose patience and attack you,or if you have too much to lose by waiting, go on theoffensive. It is also usually best to vary your methods,always having more than one strategy to draw on. Ifyour enemies think you always wait to counterattack,you have the perfect setup for moving first andsurprising them. So mix things up. Watch the situationand make it impossible for your opponents to predictwhat you will do.

Conditions are such that the hostile forces

favored by the time are advancing. In this caseretreat is the right course, and it is throughretreat that success is achieved. But successconsists in being able to carry out the retreatcorrectly. Retreat is not to be confused withflight. Flight means saving oneself under anycircumstances, whereas retreat is a sign ofstrength. We must be careful not to miss theright moment while we are in full possession ofpower and position. Then we shall be able tointerpret the signs of the time before it is too lateand to prepare for provisional retreat instead ofbeing drawn into a desperate life-and-deathstruggle. Thus we do not simply abandon thefield to the opponent; we make it difficult for himto advance by showing perseverance in singleacts of resistance. In this way we prepare, whileretreating, for the counter-movement.Understanding the laws of a constructive retreatof this sort is not easy. The meaning that lieshidden in such a time is important.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

CREATE A THREATENINGPRESENCE

DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

The best way to fight off aggressors is to keep themfrom attacking you in the first place. To accomplishthis you must create the impression of being morepowerful than you are. Build up a reputation: You'rea little crazy. Fighting you is not worth it. You takeyour enemies with you when you lose. Create thisreputation and make it credible with a fewimpressive--impressively violent--acts. Uncertaintyis sometimes better than overt threat: if youropponents are never sure what messing with you willcost, they will not want to find out. Play on people'snatural fears and anxieties to make them think twice.

If your organization is small in numbers, then dowhat Gideon did: conceal the members in thedark but raise a din and clamor that will makethe listener believe that your organizationnumbers many more than it does.... Alwaysremember the first rule of power tactics: Poweris not only what you have but what the enemythinks you have.

RULES FOR RADICALS, SAUL D. ALINSKY,1972

REVERSE INTIMIDATIONInevitably in life you will find yourself facing peoplewho are more aggressive than you are--crafty,ruthless people who are determined to get what theywant. Fighting them head-on is generally foolish;fighting is what they are good at, and they areunscrupulous to boot. You will probably lose. Trying tofend them off by giving them part of what they areafter, or otherwise pleasing or appeasing them, is arecipe for disaster: you are only showing yourweakness, inviting more threats and attacks. Butgiving in completely, surrendering without a fight,hands them the easy victory they crave and makesyou resentful and bitter. It can also become a badhabit, the path of least resistance in dealing withdifficult situations.

Instead of trying to avoid conflict or whining aboutthe injustice of it all, consider an option developedover the centuries by military leaders and strategiststo deal with violent and acquisitive neighbors: reverseintimidation. This art of deterrence rests on threebasic facts about war and human nature: First, peopleare more likely to attack you if they see you as weakor vulnerable. Second, they cannot know for sure thatyou're weak; they depend on the signs you give out,through your behavior both present and past. Third,they are after easy victories, quick and bloodless.That is why they prey on the vulnerable and weak.

Deterrence is simply a matter of turning thisdynamic around, altering any perception of yourself as

weak and naive and sending the message that battlewith you will not be as easy as they had thought. Thisis generally done by taking some visible action thatwill confuse aggressors and make them think theyhave misread you: you may indeed be vulnerable, butthey are not sure. You're disguising your weaknessand distracting them. Action has much morecredibility than mere threatening or fiery words; hittingback, for instance, even in some small, symbolic way,will show that you mean what you say. With so manyother people around who are timid and easy prey, theaggressor will most likely back off and move on tosomeone else.

This form of defensive warfare is infinitelyapplicable to the battles of daily life. Appeasingpeople can be as debilitating as fighting them;deterring them, scaring them out of attacking you orgetting in your way, will save you valuable energy andresources. To deter aggressors you must becomeadept at deception, manipulating appearances andtheir perceptions of you--valuable skills that can beapplied to all aspects of daily warfare. And finally, bypracticing the art as needed, you will build for yourselfa reputation as someone tough, someone worthy ofrespect and a little fear. The passive-aggressiveobstructionists who try to undermine you covertly willalso think twice about taking you on.

The following are five basic methods of deterrenceand reverse intimidation. You can use them all inoffensive warfare, but they are particularly effective indefense, for moments when you find yourself

vulnerable and under attack. They are culled from theexperiences and writings of the greatest masters ofthe art.

Surprise with a bold maneuver. The best way tohide your weakness and to bluff your enemies intogiving up their attack is to take some unexpected,bold, risky action. Perhaps they had thought you werevulnerable, and now you are acting as someone whois fearless and confident. This will have two positiveeffects: First, they will tend to think your move isbacked up by something real--they will not imagineyou could be foolish enough to do somethingaudacious just for effect. Second, they will start to seestrengths and threats in you that they had notimagined.

A certain person said the following. There aretwo kinds of dispositions, inward and outward,and a person who is lacking in one or the otheris worthless. It is, for example, like the blade of asword, which one should sharpen well and thenput in its scabbard, periodically taking it out andknitting one's eyebrows as in an attack, wipingoff the blade, and then placing it in its scabbardagain. If a person has his sword out all the time,he is habitually swinging a naked blade; peoplewill not approach him and he will have no allies.If a sword is always sheathed, it will becomerusty, the blade will dull, and people will think asmuch of its owner.

HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI,YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, 1659-1720

Reverse the threat. If your enemies see you assomeone to be pushed around, turn the tables with asudden move, however small, designed to scarethem. Threaten something they value. Hit them whereyou sense they may be vulnerable, and make it hurt. Ifthat infuriates them and makes them attack you, backoff a moment and then hit them again when they're notexpecting it. Show them you are not afraid of themand that you are capable of a ruthlessness they hadnot seen in you. You needn't go too far; just inflict alittle pain. Send a short, threatening message toindicate that you are capable of a lot worse.

Seem unpredictable and irrational. In this instanceyou do something suggesting a slightly suicidalstreak, as if you felt you had nothing to lose. You showthat you are ready to take your enemies down withyou, destroying their reputations in the process. (Thisis particularly effective with people who have a lot tolose themselves--powerful people with sterlingreputations.) To defeat you will be costly and perhapsself-destructive. This will make fighting you veryunattractive. You are not acting out emotionally; that isa sign of weakness. You are simply hinting that youare a little irrational and that your next move could bealmost anything. Crazy opponents are terrifying--noone likes fighting people who are unpredictable andhave nothing to lose.

Play on people's natural paranoia. Instead ofthreatening your opponents openly, you take actionthat is indirect and designed to make them think. Thismight mean using a go-between to send them amessage--to tell some disturbing story about what youare capable of. Or maybe you "inadvertently" let themspy on you, only to hear something that should givethem cause for concern. Making your enemies thinkthey have found out you are plotting a countermove ismore effective than telling them so yourself; make athreat and you may have to live up to it, but makingthem think you are working treacherously againstthem is another story. The more veiled menace anduncertainty you generate, the more their imaginationswill run away with them and the more dangerous anattack on you will seem.

Establish a frightening reputation. This reputationcan be for any number of things: being difficult,stubborn, violent, ruthlessly efficient. Build up thatimage over the years and people will back off fromyou, treating you with respect and a little fear. Whyobstruct or pick an argument with someone who hasshown he will fight to the bitter end? Someonestrategic yet ruthless? To create this image, you mayevery now and then have to play a bit rough, buteventually it will become enough of a deterrent tomake those occasions rare. It will be an offensiveweapon, scaring people into submission before theyeven meet you. In any event, you must build yourreputation carefully, allowing no inconsistencies. Any

holes in this kind of image will make it worthless.

Brinkmanship is...the deliberate creation of arecognizable risk, a risk that one does notcompletely control. It is the tactic of deliberatelyletting the situation get somewhat out of hand,just because its being out of hand may beintolerable to the other party and force hisaccommodation. It means harassing andintimidating an adversary by exposing him to ashared risk, or deterring him by showing that ifhe makes a contrary move he may disturb usso that we slip over the brink whether we want toor not, carrying him with us.

THINKING STRATEGICALLY, AVINASH K.DIXIT AND BARRY J. NALEBUFF, 1991

Injuring all of a man's ten fingers is not aseffective as chopping off one.--Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976)

DETERRENCE AND REVERSE INTIMIDATION INPRACTICE1. In March 1862, less than a year after the start of theAmerican Civil War, the Confederates' situationlooked bleak: they had lost a series of importantbattles, their generals were squabbling, morale waslow, and recruits were hard to find. Sensing theSouth's great weakness, a large Union army underMajor General George B. McClellan headed towardthe Virginia coast, planning to march from there west

the Virginia coast, planning to march from there westto Richmond, the capital of the South. There wereenough Confederate troops in the area to hold offMcClellan's army for a month or two, but Southernspies reported that Union troops stationed nearWashington were about to be transferred to the marchon Richmond. If these troops reached McClellan--andthey were promised by Abraham Lincoln himself--Richmond would be doomed; and if Richmond fell, theSouth would have to surrender.

The Confederate general Stonewall Jackson wasbased in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley at the head of3,600 men, a ragtag group of rebels he had recruitedand trained. His job was merely to defend the fertilevalley against a Union army in the area, but as hepondered the developing campaign againstRichmond, he saw the possibility of something muchgreater. Jackson had been a classmate ofMcClellan's at West Point and knew that underneathhis brash, talkative exterior he was basically timid,overly anxious about his career and making anymistakes. McClellan had 90,000 men ready for themarch on Richmond, almost double the availableConfederate forces, but Jackson knew that thiscautious man would wait to fight until his army wasoverwhelming; he wanted the extra troops that Lincolnhad promised him. Lincoln, however, would notrelease those forces if he saw danger elsewhere. TheShenandoah Valley was to the southwest ofWashington. If Jackson could possibly create enoughconfusion as to what was happening there, he coulddisrupt the Union plans and perhaps save the South

from disaster.On March 22, Jackson's spies reported that two-

thirds of the Union army stationed in the ShenandoahValley, under General Nathaniel Banks, was headingeast to join McClellan. Soon an army nearWashington, led by General Irvin McDowell, wouldmove toward Richmond as well. Jackson wasted notime: he marched his men fast to the north to attackthe Union soldiers still in the valley, near Kernstown.The battle was fierce, and at the end of the dayJackson's soldiers were forced to retreat. To them theengagement seemed to have been a defeat, even adisaster: outnumbered nearly two to one, they hadsuffered terrible casualties. But Jackson, always ahard man to figure out, seemed oddly satisfied.

One classic response to a particularly viciousbeanball was exemplified by a play JackieRobinson made in the summer of 1953. SalMaglie of the New York Giants was "Sal theBarber," mostly because his high inside fastballs "shaved" hitters' chins. Maglie was candidand friendly when he wasn't pitching. "You haveto make the batter afraid of the ball or, anyway,aware that he can get hurt," Maglie told mematter-of-factly one afternoon over drinks at hisapartment in Riverdale. "A lot of pitchers thinkthey do that by throwing at a hitter when thecount is two strikes and no balls. The troublethere is that the knockdown is expected. You

don't scare a guy by knocking him down whenhe knows he's going to be knocked down.""Then when, Sal?" I asked. "A good time iswhen the count is two and two. He's looking toswing. You knock him down then and he gets upshaking. Now curve him and you have your out.Of course, to do that you have to be able to getyour curve over the plate on a three-and-twocount. Not every pitcher can." Maglie couldbreak three different curves over the plate, threeand two. He had particular success againstsuch free-swinging sluggers as RoyCampanella and Gil Hodges. But it is simplisticto say Maglie intimidated Campanella andHodges. Rather, his unpredictable patternsdisrupted their timing and concentration. Hehad less success with Pee Wee Reese andJackie Robinson, and one day in Ebbets Field,by throwing a shoulder-high fast ball behindRobinson, Maglie brought matters todetonation. The knockdowns thrown at [Cookie]Lavagetto, the fatal pitch thrown at RayChapman, roared toward the temple. A battergets away from that pitch by ducking backward.(Chapman's freeze reaction, though notunknown, is rare.) Angered or frustrated byRobinson that afternoon in Brooklyn, Magliethrew his best fast ball behind the hitter,shoulder high. That was and is dangerous and

inexcusable. As a batter strides forward, heloses height. Reflex makes him duck backward.A batter's head moves directly into the path ofthe fast ball thrown behind him shoulder high.Robinson started to duck into Maglie's pitchand then his phenomenal reflexes enabled himto stop, as it were, in mid-duck. The ball sailedjust behind the back of Robinson's neck.Robinson glared but did not lose his poise.Maglie threw an outside curve, and Robinsonbunted toward Whitey Lockman, the Giant's firstbaseman. By making Lockman field the bunt,Robinson was forcing Maglie to leave thepitcher's mound and cover first. There he wouldbe in Robinson's path, and Jack, going at fulland full-muscled tilt, intended to run overMaglie, signing his name in spikes on thepitcher's spine. Saturnine, Faustian, broodingSal Maglie refused to leave the mound. At acritical moment, the Barber lost his nerve.Davey Williams, the Giants' second baseman,rushed over, and as he was reaching forLockman's throw, Robinson crashed into him, aknee catching Williams in the lower back.Robinson's knee was so swollen a day later thathe could not play. Williams never reallyrecovered. He dropped out of the major leaguestwo seasons later, at twenty-eight.... "Actually,"Robinson himself said a few days later, "I'm

sorry that Williams got hurt. But when Magliethrew behind me, he was starting a reallydangerous business, and I was going to put astop to it before he hit Gil or Campy or Pee Weein the head...." After that I saw Maglie start eightgames against the Dodgers, but I never sawhim throw another fast ball behind a hitter. Thegrim, intimidating beanballer had beenintimidated himself, and by a bunt.

THE HEAD GAME, ROGER KAHN, 2000

A few days later, Jackson received the news hehad been waiting for: Lincoln had ordered Banks'sarmy to return to the valley and McDowell's army tostay where it was. The battle at Kernstown had gottenhis attention and made him worry--only a little, butenough. Lincoln did not know what Jackson was up toor how large his army was, but he wanted theShenandoah Valley pacified no matter what. Only thenwould he release Banks and McDowell. McClellanwas forced to agree with that logic, and although hehad the men to march on Richmond right away, hewanted to wait for the reinforcements who wouldmake the attack a sure thing.

After Kernstown, Jackson retreated south, awayfrom Banks, and lay low for a few weeks. In early May,thinking that the Shenandoah Valley had beensecured, Lincoln sent McDowell toward Richmond,and Banks prepared to join him. Again Jackson wasready: he marched his army in a completely bizarre

fashion, first to the east, toward McDowell, then backwest into the Valley. Not even his own soldiers knewwhat he was doing. Mystified by these strangemaneuvers, Lincoln imagined--but wasn't sure--thatJackson was marching to fight McDowell. Once againhe halted McDowell's march south, kept half ofBanks's army in the valley, and sent the other half tohelp McDowell defend himself against Jackson.

Suddenly the Union's plans, which had seemed soperfect, were in disarray, its troops too scattered tosupport each other. Now Jackson went in for the kill:he linked up with other Confederate divisions in thearea and, on May 24, marched on the Union army--now divided and dangerously diminished--thatremained in the valley. Jackson maneuvered onto itsflank and sent it in headlong retreat north to thePotomac River. His pursuit of this army sent a wave ofpanic through Washington: this now dreaded general,commanding forces that seemed to have doubled insize overnight, was heading straight for the capital.

Secretary of War Edwin Stanton telegraphedNorthern governors to alert them to the threat and tomuster troops for the city's defense. Reinforcementsquickly arrived to halt the Confederate advance.Meanwhile Lincoln, determined to eliminate Jacksononce and for all, ordered half of McDowell's army westto join in the fight to destroy this pest and the otherhalf to return to Washington to secure the capital.McClellan could only agree.

Once again Jackson retreated, but by now his planhad worked to perfection. In three months, with only

3,600 men, he had diverted well over 60,000 Northerntroops, bought the South enough time to coordinatethe defense of Richmond, and completely altered thecourse of the war.

InterpretationThe story of Stonewall Jackson in the ShenandoahValley illustrates a simple truth: what matters in war,as in life generally, is not necessarily how many menyou have or how well supplied you are but how yourenemies see you. If they think you are weak andvulnerable, they act aggressively, which in and of itselfcan put you in trouble. If they suddenly think you arestrong, or unpredictable, or have hidden resources,they back off and reassess. Getting them to changetheir plans and treat you more carefully can by itselfalter the war. In any struggle, some things will beoutside your control; you may not be able to puttogether a large army or defend all your weak points,but you can always affect people's perceptions of you.

Jackson altered Union perceptions first by his boldattack on Kernstown, which made Lincoln andMcClellan think he had more troops than he did--theycould not imagine that anyone would be so stupid asto send only 3,600 men against a Union stronghold. IfJackson was stronger than they had imagined, thatmeant they needed more men in the ShenandoahValley, which cut into the troops available for themarch on Richmond. Next Jackson began behavingunpredictably, creating the impression of having notonly a large army but also some strange and worrying

plan. Lincoln's and McClellan's inability to figure outthis plan stopped them in their tracks, making themdivide their forces to take care of the possibledangers. Finally Jackson attacked boldly one moretime. He did not have nearly enough men to threatenWashington, but Lincoln could not be sure of that. Likea conjuror, Jackson created a bogeyman out of anarmy that in essence was laughably small.

You must take control over people's perceptions ofyou by playing with appearances, mystifying andmisleading them. Like Jackson, it is best to mixaudacity with unpredictability and unorthodoxy and actboldly in moments of weakness or danger. That willdistract people from any holes in your armor, andthey'll be afraid there may be more to you than meetsthe eye. Then, if you make your behavior hard to read,you'll only seem more powerful, since actions thatelude interpretation attract attention, worry, and a bitof awe. In this way you will throw people off balanceand onto their heels. Kept at a distance, they will beunable to tell how far you are bluffing them.Aggressors will back off. Appearance andperception--you are not someone to mess with--willbecome reality.

2. King Edward I of England was a fierce thirteenth-century warrior-king who was determined to conquerall of the British Isles. First he battered the Welsh intosubmission; then he set his sights on Scotland, layingsiege to towns and castles and razing to the groundthe communities that dared to resist him. He was

even more brutal with the Scots who fought back,including the famous Sir William Wallace: he huntedthem down and had them publicly tortured andexecuted.

Only one Scottish lord eluded Edward: Robert theBruce, Earl of Carrick (1274-1329), who hadsomehow escaped to the remote fastness of northernScotland. So Edward captured the rebel's family andfriends, killing the men and imprisoning the women incages. Bruce remained defiant. In 1306 he hadhimself crowned Scotland's king; whatever it took, hevowed to revenge himself on Edward and throw theEnglish out of Scotland. Hearing this, Edwardbecame even more determined to capture this finalpiece in his Scottish wars, but in 1307 he died, beforethe job was done.

Edward's son, now Edward II, did not share hisfather's lust for war. Edward I had left the islandsecure. The new king did not have to worry aboutScotland; England was far wealthier, and its armieswere well equipped, well fed, well paid, andexperienced. In fact, their recent wars had made themthe most-feared fighters in Europe. At any momentEdward II could field a great army against the Scots,whose weapons and armor were primitive. He feltconfident that he could handle Robert the Bruce.

A few months into the reign of Edward II, Brucemanaged to take some Scottish castles held by theEnglish and burn them to the ground. When Edwardsent forces against him, Bruce refused to fight andfled with his small army into the forest. Edward sent

more men to secure his remaining strongholds inScotland and exact revenge on Bruce, but now Scotssoldiers suddenly began to raid England. Highlymobile, these pirates on horseback devastated thenorthern English countryside, destroying crops andlivestock. The English campaign in Scotland hadbecome too costly, so it was called off--but a fewyears later Edward tried again.

This time an English army penetrated farther intoScotland, but again, in response, Scottish raidersrode south into England, wreaking still more havoc onfarms and property. And in Scotland itself Bruce'sarmy burned their own countrymen's crops, leavingthe English invaders nothing to eat. As before, theEnglish wore themselves out chasing Bruce, but to noavail--the Scots refused battle. Bivouacked in theircamps, the English soldiers would hear bagpipes andhorns out in the dark at night, making it impossible tosleep. Hungry, tired, and irritated to no end, they soonretreated back to northern England, only to find theirown land barren of crops and cattle. Morale sank. Noone wanted to fight in Scotland anymore. Slowly onecastle after another fell back into Scottish hands.

In 1314 the Scots finally engaged in direct combatwith the English, at the Battle of Bannockburn, anddefeated them. It was a most humiliating loss forEdward II, who swore to avenge it. In 1322 hedecided to finish Bruce off once and for good with avigorous campaign worthy of his father. Organizingand personally leading the largest army yet to fight therebellious Scots, Edward got as far as Edinburgh

Castle. At one point he sent foragers out to look forfood in the countryside; they returned with a singledecrepit bull and an empty wagon. Dysentery sweptthe English troops. Edward was forced to retreat, andwhen he reached northern England, he saw that theScots had once again razed the fields there, andmore thoroughly than ever. Hunger and diseasefinished off the remnants of his army. The campaignwas such a disaster that a rebellion broke out amongEdward's lords: he fled but in 1327 was captured andkilled.

Another anecdote explaining iwao-no-miconcerns an accomplished warrior who hadreached the highest stage of the art of swordfighting. Having been enlightened as to the truemeaning of the art of sword fighting, whichshould be based on the promotion of well-beingof people rather than the destruction or killing ofothers, this great master was not interested infighting any longer. His ability in the art of swordfighting was absolutely unquestionable; he wasrespected and feared by everyone. He walkedthe streets with a cane like a bored old man andyet wherever he went people looked at him withintense fear and respect. People were carefulnot to anger him and the old man wasnonchalant. This is akin to having a huge rockhanging above a mountain path. People areafraid of the rock, which they believe may come

down at any moment, and so they walk quietlyand carefully under the rock. But the rock isactually very stable, being planted in the groundso deeply that it will never fall down. But peopledo not know it, and they continue to fear that itwill fall down if they make any kind of loud noiseas they walk under it. The rock just sits therecompletely indifferent to its surroundings andpeople's fear and awe.

A WAY TO VICTORY: THE ANNOTATEDBOOK OF FIVE RINGS, TRANSLATED AND

COMMENTARY BY HIDY OCHIAI, 2001

The following year Edward's son, Edward III,negotiated a peace with the Scots, granting Scotlandits independence and recognizing Robert the Bruceas its rightful king.

InterpretationThe English thought they could move on Scotland withimpunity anytime they wanted. The Scots were poorlyequipped, and their leadership was bitterly divided:seeing such weakness, what could prevent Englishconquest? Trying to stop what seemed inevitable,Robert the Bruce evolved a novel strategy. When theEnglish attacked, he did not take them on directly; hewould have lost. Instead he hit them indirectly butwhere it hurt, doing exactly to the English what theywere doing to him: ruining his country. He continued toplay tit for tat until the English understood that everytime they attacked Scotland, they would get a bloody

nose in exchange: they would lose valuable farmland,be harassed, fight in abysmal conditions. They slowlylost their hunger for the fight, then finally gave up.

The essence of this deterrence strategy is thefollowing: when someone attacks you or threatensyou, you make it clear that he will suffer in return. He--or she--may be stronger, he may be able to winbattles, but you will make him pay for each victory.Instead of taking him on directly, you hurt somethinghe values, something close to home. You make himunderstand that every time he bothers you he canexpect damage, even if on a smaller scale. The onlyway to make you stop attacking him in your irritatingfashion is for him to stop attacking you. You are like awasp on his skin: most people leave wasps alone.

3. One morning in 1474, King Louis XI (1423-83)--France's infamous "Spider King," so named becausehe always wove the most intricate and well-conceivedplots against his enemies--went into a vehement rantagainst the Duke of Milan. The courtiers present thatJanuary day listened in amazement as the normallycomposed and careful king spun out his suspicions:although the duke's father had been a friend, the soncould not be trusted; he was working against France,breaking the treaty between the two countries. On andon the king went: perhaps he would have to takeaction against the duke. Suddenly, to the courtiers'dismay, a man slipped quietly out of the room. It wasChristopher da Bollate, the Milanese ambassador toFrance. Bollate had been received graciously by the

king earlier that morning but then had retreated intothe background; Louis must have forgotten he wasthere. The king's diatribe could cause quite adiplomatic mess.

Once, when a group of five or six pages weretraveling to the capital together in the sameboat, it happened that their boat struck a regularship late at night. Five or six seamen from theship leapt aboard and loudly demanded that thepages give up their boat's anchor, in accord withthe seaman's code. Hearing this, the pages ranforward yelling, "The seaman's code issomething for people like you! Do you think thatwe samurai are going to let you take equipmentfrom a boat carrying warriors? We will cut youdown and throw you into the sea to the lastman!" With that, all the seamen fled back totheir own ship. At such a time, one must act likea samurai. For trifling occasions it is better toaccomplish things simply by yelling. By makingsomething more significant than it really is andmissing one's chance, an affair will not bebrought to a close and there will be noaccomplishment at all.HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI,

YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, 1659-1720

Later that day Louis invited Bollate to his privaterooms and, lounging on his bed, began an apparently

casual conversation. Drifting into politics, hedescribed himself as a supporter of the Duke ofMilan's: he would do anything, he said, to help theduke expand his power. Then he asked, "Tell me,Christopher, has it been reported to you what I saidthis morning in council? Tell me the truth--was it notsome courtier who told you?" Bollate confessed thathe had actually been in the room during the king'stirade and had heard the king's words himself. Healso protested that the Duke of Milan was a loyalfriend of France. Louis replied that he had his doubtsabout the duke and had cause to be angry--but thenhe immediately changed the subject to somethingpleasant, and Bollate eventually left.

The next day the king sent three councilors to visitBollate. Was he comfortable in his lodgings? Was hehappy with his treatment from the king? Was thereanything they could do to improve his stay at theFrench court? They also wanted to know if he wasgoing to pass on the king's words to the duke. Theking, they said, considered Bollate a friend, aconfidant; he had merely been venting his emotions. Itmeant nothing. Bollate should forget the whole thing.

Of course, none of these men--the councilors, thecourtiers, Bollate--knew that the king had done all thisdeliberately. Louis was certain that the perfidiousambassador--whom he hardly considered a friend, letalone a confidant--would report what he had said indetail to the duke. He knew that the duke wastreacherous, and this was precisely how Louis wantedto send him a warning. And it seemed the message

got through: for the next several years, the duke wasan obedient ally.

InterpretationThe Spider King was a man who always plottedseveral moves in advance. In this case he knew that ifhe spoke politely and diplomatically to theambassador of his worries about the duke, his wordswould carry no weight--they would seem like whining.If he vented his anger directly to the ambassador, onthe other hand, he would look out of control. A directthrust is also easily parried: the duke would just mouthreassurances, and the treachery would go on. Bytransmitting his threat indirectly, however, Louis madeit stick. That the duke was not meant to know he wasangry made his anger truly ominous: it meant he wasplanning something and wanted to keep the dukefrom suspecting it and knowing his true feelings. Hedelivered his threat insidiously to make the dukeponder his intentions and to instill an uneasy fear.

It was thus that, during the 1930s, the diplomacyof Mussolini's Italy was greatly enhanced by astance of restless bellicosity and by a mirage ofgreat military strength: an army of "eight millionbayonets," whose parades were dashing affairsof bersaglieri on the run and roaring motorizedcolumns; and an air force greatly respected, notleast for its spectacular long-range flights to theNorth Pole and South America; and a navy thatcould acquire many impressive ships because

so little of its funding was wasted on gunnerytrials and navigation. By a military policy inwhich stage management dominated over thesordid needs of war preparation, Mussolinisacrificed real strength for the sake of hugelymagnified images of what little strength therewas--but the results of suasion that thoseimages evoked were very real: Britain andFrance were both successfully dissuaded frominterfering with Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, itsintervention in Spain, and the subjection ofAlbania; and none dared oppose Italy's claim tobe accepted as a Great Power, whose interestshad to be accommodated sometimes intangible ways such as the licenses obtained byItalian banks in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania,and Yugoslavia). Only Mussolini's last-minutedecision to enter the war in June 1940--when hisown considerable prudence was overcome bythe irresistible temptation of sharing in thespoils of the French collapse--brought years ofsuccessful deception (and self-deception) to anend.

STRATEGY: THE LOGIC OF WAR ANDPEACE, EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, 1987

When we are under attack, the temptation is to getemotional, to tell the aggressors to stop, to makethreats as to what we'll do if they keep going. Thatputs us in a weak position: we've revealed both our

fears and our plans, and words rarely deteraggressors. Sending them a message through a thirdparty or revealing it indirectly through action is muchmore effective. That way you signal that you arealready maneuvering against them. Keep the threatveiled: if they can only glimpse what you are up to,they will have to imagine the rest. Making them seeyou as calculating and strategic will have a chillingeffect on their desires to harm or attack you. It is notworth the risk to find out what you may be up to.

4. In the early 1950s, John Boyd (1927-97) servedwith distinction as a fighter pilot in the Korean War. Bythe middle of that decade, he was the most respectedflight instructor at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada; hewas virtually unbeatable in practice dogfights, sogood that he was asked to rewrite the manual onfighter-pilot tactics. He had developed a style thatwould demoralize and terrorize, get inside theopponent's head, disrupt his ability to react. Boyd wasclever and fearless. But none of his training and skill,none of his brushes with death as a pilot, preparedhim for the bloodless backstabbing, politicalmaneuvering, and indirect warfare of the Pentagon,where he was assigned in 1966 to help designlightweight jet fighters.

As Major Boyd quickly discovered, Pentagonbureaucrats were more concerned with their careersthan with national defense. They were less interestedin developing the best new fighter than in satisfyingcontractors, often buying their new technological gear

regardless of its suitability. Boyd, as a pilot, hadtrained himself to see every situation as a kind ofstrategic combat, and in this instance he decided totransfer his skills and style of warfare to the jungles ofthe Pentagon. He would intimidate, discourage, andoutsmart his opponents.

Boyd believed that a streamlined jet fighter of thekind he was designing could outperform any plane inthe world. But contractors hated his design, becauseit was inexpensive--it did not highlight the technologythey were trying to peddle. Meanwhile Boyd'scolleagues in the Pentagon had their own petprojects. Competing for the same pot of money, theydid everything they could to sabotage or transform hisdesign.

Boyd developed a defense: Outwardly he looked alittle dumb. He wore shabby suits, smoked a nastycigar, kept a wild look in his eye. He seemed to bejust another emotional fighter pilot, promoted too fastand too soon. But behind the scenes he masteredevery detail. He made sure he knew more than hisopponents: he could quote statistics, studies, andengineering theories to support his own project andpoke holes through theirs. Contractors would show upin meetings with glossy presentations delivered bytheir top engineers; they would make fantastic claimsto dazzle the generals. Boyd would listen politely,seem impressed, and then suddenly, without warning,he would go on the offensive--deflating their optimisticclaims, showing in detail that the numbers did not addup, revealing the hype and the fakery. The more they

protested, the more vicious Boyd got, bit by bittearing their project to shreds.

Blindsided by a man they had grosslyunderestimated, time and again the contractors wouldleave these meetings vowing revenge. But what couldthey do? He had already shot down their numbers andturned their proposals to mush. Caught in the act ofoversell, they had lost all credibility. They would haveto accept their defeat. Soon they learned to avoidBoyd: instead of trying to sabotage him, they hopedhe would fail on his own.

In 1974, Boyd and his team had finished the designof a jet they had been working on, and it seemedcertain to be approved. But part of Boyd's strategyhad been to build up a network of allies in differentparts of the Pentagon, and these men told him thatthere was a group of three-star generals who hatedthe project and were planning his defeat. They wouldlet him brief the various officials in the chain ofcommand, all of whom would give him their go-ahead;then there would be a final meeting with the generals,who would scuttle the project as they had planned toall along. Having gotten that far, though, the projectwould look as if it had been given a fair hearing.

In addition to his network of allies, Boyd alwaystried to make sure he had at least one powerfulsupporter. This was usually easy to find: in a politicalenvironment like the Pentagon, there was alwayssome general or other powerful official who wasdisgusted with the system and was happy to beBoyd's secret protector. Now Boyd called on his most

powerful ally, Secretary of Defense JamesSchlesinger, and won Schlesinger's personalapproval for the project. Then, at the meeting with thegenerals, whom he could tell were inwardly gloatingthat they finally had him, Boyd announced,"Gentlemen, I am authorized by the secretary ofdefense to inform you that this is not a decision brief.This briefing is for information purposes only." Theproject, he said, had already been approved. He wenton to deliver his presentation, making it as long aspossible--twisting the knife in their backs. He wantedthem to feel humiliated and wary of messing with himagain.

As a fighter pilot, Boyd had trained himself to thinkseveral moves ahead of his opponents, alwaysaiming to surprise them with some terrifyingmaneuver. He incorporated this strategy into hisbureaucratic battles. When a general gave him someorder that was clearly designed to ruin the plans forhis lightweight jet, he would smile, nod, and say, "Sir,I'll be happy to follow that order. But I want you to put itin writing." Generals liked to issue commands verballyrather than putting them on paper as a way to coverthemselves in case things went bad. Caught offguard, the general would either have to drop the orderor deny the request to put it in writing--which, ifpublicized, would make him look terrible. Either wayhe was trapped.

After several years of dealing with Boyd, generalsand their minions learned to avoid him--and his foulcigars, his verbal abuse, his knife-twisting tactics--like

the plague. Given this wide berth, he was able to pushhis designs for the F-15 and F-16 through thePentagon's almost impossible process, leaving anenduring imprint on the air force by creating two of itsmost famous and effective jet fighters.

InterpretationBoyd realized early on that his project was unpopularat the Pentagon and that he would meet oppositionand obstruction up and down the line. If he tried tofight everyone, to take on every contractor andgeneral, he would exhaust himself and go down inflames. Boyd was a strategist of the highest order--histhinking would later have a major influence onOperation Desert Storm--and a strategist never hitsstrength against strength; instead he probes theenemy's weaknesses. And a bureaucracy like thePentagon inevitably has weaknesses, which Boydknew how to locate.

The people in Boyd's Pentagon wanted to fit in andbe liked. They were political people, careful abouttheir reputations; they were also very busy and hadlittle time to waste. Boyd's strategy was simple: overthe years he would establish a reputation for beingdifficult, even nasty. To get involved with Boyd couldmean an ugly public fight that would sully yourreputation, waste your time, and hurt you politically. Inessence Boyd transformed himself into a kind ofporcupine. No animal wants to take on a creature thatcan do so much damage, no matter how small it is;even tigers will leave it alone. And being left alone

gave Boyd staying power, allowing him to survive longenough to shepherd the F-15 and F-16 through.

Reputation, Boyd knew, is key. Your own reputationmay not be intimidating; after all, we all have to fit in,play politics, seem nice and accommodating. Mostoften this works fine, but in moments of danger anddifficulty being seen as so nice will work against you:it says that you can be pushed around, discouraged,and obstructed. If you have never been willing to fightback before, no threatening gesture you make will becredible. Understand: there is great value in lettingpeople know that when necessary you can let go ofyour niceness and be downright difficult and nasty. Afew clear, violent demonstrations will suffice. Oncepeople see you as a fighter, they will approach youwith a little fear in their hearts. And as Machiavellisaid, it is more useful to be feared than to be loved.

Authority: When opponents are unwilling tofight with you, it is because they think it iscontrary to their interests, or because you

have misled them into thinking so.--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALThe purpose of strategies of deterrence is todiscourage attack, and a threatening presence oraction will usually do the job. In some situations,though, you can more safely achieve the same thingby doing the opposite: play dumb and unassuming.Seem inoffensive, or already defeated, and peoplemay leave you alone. A harmless front can buy youtime: that is how Claudius survived the violent,treacherous world of Roman politics on his way tobecoming emperor--he seemed too innocuous tobother with. This strategy needs patience, though, andis not without risk: you are deliberately makingyourself the lamb among the wolves.

In general, you have to keep your attempts atintimidation under control. Be careful not to becomeintoxicated by the power fear brings: use it as adefense in times of danger, not as your offense ofchoice. In the long run, frightening people createsenemies, and if you fail to back up your toughreputation with victories, you will lose credibility. If youropponent gets angry enough to decide to play thesame game back at you, you may also escalate asquabble into a retaliatory war. Use this strategy withcaution.

TRADE SPACE FOR TIMETHE NONENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

Retreat in the face of a strong enemy is a sign not ofweakness but of strength. By resisting the temptationto respond to an aggressor, you buy yourselfvaluable time--time to recover, to think, to gainperspective. Let your enemies advance; time ismore important than space. By refusing to fight, youinfuriate them and feed their arrogance. They willsoon overextend themselves and start makingmistakes. Time will reveal them as rash and you aswise. Sometimes you can accomplish most by doingnothing.

RETREAT TO ADVANCEIn the early 1930s, Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976) was arising star in the Chinese Communist Party. A civilwar had broken out between the Communists and theNationalists; Mao led campaigns against theNationalists, using guerrilla tactics to beat them timeand again, despite being greatly outnumbered. Healso served as the chairman of the fledgling ChineseCommunist government, and his provocative essayson strategy and philosophy were widely read.

Then a power struggle broke out among theCommunists: a group of Soviet-educated intellectualsknown as the 28 Bolsheviks tried to gain control of the

party. They despised Mao, seeing his taste forguerrilla warfare as a sign of timidity and weaknessand his advocacy of a peasant revolution backward.Instead they advocated frontal warfare, fighting theNationalists directly for control of key cities andregions, as the Communists had done in Russia.Slowly the 28B isolated Mao and stripped him of bothpolitical and military power. In 1934 they put himunder virtual house arrest on a farm in Hunan.

Mao's friends and comrades felt he had suffered adizzying fall from grace. But more troubling than thefall itself was his apparent acceptance of it: he did notrally supporters to fight back, he stopped publishing,he effectively disappeared. Perhaps the 28B hadbeen right: Mao was a coward.

That same year the Nationalists--led by GeneralChiang Kai-shek--launched a new campaign todestroy the Communists. Their plan was to encirclethe Red Army in its strongholds and kill every lastsoldier, and this time they seemed likely to succeed.The 28B fought back bravely, battling to hold on to thefew cities and regions under Communist control, butthe Nationalists outnumbered them, were betterequipped, and had German military advisers to helpthem. The Nationalists took city after city and slowlysurrounded the Communists.

Thousands deserted the Red Army, but finally itsremaining soldiers--around 100,000 of them--managed to break out of the Nationalist encirclementand head northwest. Mao joined them in their flight.Only now did he begin to speak up and question the

28B strategy. They were retreating in a straight line,he complained, making it easier for the Nationalists tochase them, and they were moving too slowly,carrying too many documents, file cabinets, and othertrappings from their old offices. They were acting as ifthe whole army were merely moving camp andplanning to keep fighting the Nationalists in the sameway, fighting over cities and land. Mao argued thatthis new march should not be a momentary retreat tosafer ground, but something larger. The wholeconcept of the party needed rethinking: instead ofcopying the Bolsheviks, they should create a distinctlyChinese revolution based on the peasantry, China'ssingle largest population group. To accomplish thisthey needed time and freedom from attack. Theyshould head southwest, to the farthest reaches ofChina, where the enemy could not reach them.

Red Army officers began to listen to Mao: hisguerrilla tactics had been successful before, and the28B strategy was clearly failing. They slowly adoptedhis ideas. They traveled more lightly; they moved onlyat night; they feinted this way and that to throw theNationalists off their scent; wherever they went, theyconducted rallies to recruit peasants to their cause.Somehow Mao had become the army's de factoleader. Although outnumbered a hundred to one,under his leadership the Red Army managed toescape the Nationalists and, in October 1935, toarrive at the remote reaches of Shan-hsi Province,where it would finally be safe.

Six in the fourth place means: The armyretreats. No blame. In face of a superior enemy,with whom it would be hopeless to engage inbattle, an orderly retreat is the only correctprocedure, because it will save the army fromdefeat and disintegration. It is by no means asign of courage or strength to insist uponengaging in a hopeless struggle regardless ofcircumstances.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

After crossing twenty-four rivers and eighteenmountain ranges and having many near misses withdisaster, the army came to the end of its "LongMarch." It was radically reduced--it now numberedonly 6,000--but a new kind of party had been forged,the kind Mao had wanted all along: a hard-core groupof devoted followers who believed in a peasantrevolution and embraced guerrilla warfare. Safe fromattack in Shan-hsi, this purified party was slowly ablefirst to recover, then to spread its gospel. In 1949 theCommunists finally defeated the Nationalists for goodand exiled them from mainland China.

InterpretationMao was born and raised on a farm, and Chinesefarm life could be harsh. A farmer had to be patient,bending with the seasons and the capricious climate.Thousands of years earlier, the Taoist religion hademerged from this hard life. A key concept in Taoism

is that of wei wu--the idea of action through inaction, ofcontrolling a situation by not trying to control it, ofruling by abdicating rule. Wei wu involves the beliefthat by reacting and fighting against circumstances,by constantly struggling in life, you actually movebackward, creating more turbulence in your path anddifficulties for yourself. Sometimes it is best to lie low,to do nothing but let the winter pass. In such momentsyou can collect yourself and strengthen your identity.

Growing up on a farm, Mao had internalized theseideas and applied them constantly in politics and war.In moments of danger, when his enemies werestronger, he was not afraid to retreat, although heknew that many would see this as a sign of weakness.Time, he knew, would show up the holes in hisenemies' strategy, and he would use that time toreflect on himself and gain perspective on the wholesituation. He made his period of retreat in Hunan nota negative humiliation but a positive strategy.Similarly, he used the Long March to forge a newidentity for the Communist Party, creating a new kindof believer. Once his winter had passed, hereemerged--his enemies succumbing to their ownweaknesses, himself strengthened by a period ofretreat.

War is deceptive: you may think that you are strongand that you are making advances against an enemy,but time may show that you were actually marchinginto great danger. You can never really know, sinceour immersion in the present deprives us of trueperspective. The best you can do is to rid yourself of

lazy, conventional patterns of thinking. Advancing isnot always good; retreating is not always weak. Infact, in moments of danger or trouble, refusing to fightis often the best strategy: by disengaging from theenemy, you lose nothing that is valuable in the long runand gain time to turn inward, rethink your ideas,separate the true believers from the hangers-on. Timebecomes your ally. By doing nothing outwardly, yougain inner strength, which will translate intotremendous power later, when it is time to act.

Space I can recover. Time, never.--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

KEYS TO WARFAREThe problem we all face in strategy, and in life, is thateach of us is unique and has a unique personality.Our circumstances are also unique; no situation everreally repeats itself. But most often we are barelyaware of what makes us different--in other words, ofwho we really are. Our ideas come from books,teachers, all kinds of unseen influences. We respondto events routinely and mechanically instead of tryingto understand their differences. In our dealings withother people, too, we are easily infected by theirtempo and mood. All this creates a kind of fog. Wefail to see events for what they are; we do not knowourselves.

Your task as a strategist is simple: to see thedifferences between yourself and other people, tounderstand yourself, your side, and the enemy as well

as you can, to get more perspective on events, toknow things for what they are. In the hubbub of dailylife, this is not easy--in fact, the power to do it cancome only from knowing when and how to retreat. Ifyou are always advancing, always attacking, alwaysresponding to people emotionally, you have no time togain perspective. Your strategies will be weak andmechanical, based on things that happened in thepast or to someone else. Like a monkey, you willimitate instead of create. Retreating is something youmust do every now and then, to find yourself anddetach yourself from infecting influences. And the besttime to do this is in moments of difficulty and danger.

Symbolically the retreat is religious, ormythological. It was only by escaping into the desertthat Moses and the Jews were able to solidify theiridentity and reemerge as a social and political force.Jesus spent his forty days in the wilderness, andMohammed, too, fled Mecca at a time of great perilfor a period of retreat. He and just a handful of hismost devoted supporters used this period to deepentheir bonds, to understand who they were and whatthey stood for, to let time work its good. Then this littleband of believers reemerged to conquer Mecca andthe Arabian Peninsula and later, after Mohammed'sdeath, to defeat the Byzantines and the Persianempire, spreading Islam over vast territories. Aroundthe world every mythology has a hero who retreats,even to Hades itself in the case of Odysseus, to findhimself.

Opportunities are changing ceaselessly. Thosewho get there too early have gone too far, whilethose who get there too late cannot catch up. Asthe sun and moon go through their courses,time does not go along with people. Therefore,sages do not value huge jewels as much asthey value a little time. Time is hard to find andeasy to lose.HUAINANZI, CHINA, SECOND CENTURY B.C.

If Moses had stayed and fought in Egypt, the Jewswould be a footnote in history. If Mohammed hadtaken on his enemies in Mecca, he would have beencrushed and forgotten. When you fight someone morepowerful than you are, you lose more than yourpossessions and position; you lose your ability tothink straight, to keep yourself separate and distinct.You become infected with the emotions and violenceof the aggressor in ways you cannot imagine. Betterto flee and use the time your flight buys to turn inward.Let the enemy take land and advance; you will recoverand turn the tables when the time comes. Thedecision to retreat shows not weakness but strength.It is the height of strategic wisdom.

The essence of retreat is the refusal to engage theenemy in any way, whether psychologically orphysically. You may do this defensively, to protectyourself, but it can also be a positive strategy: byrefusing to fight aggressive enemies, you caneffectively infuriate and unbalance them.

During World War I, England and Germany fought a

During World War I, England and Germany fought aside war in East Africa, where each of them had acolony. In 1915 the English commander, LieutenantGeneral Jan Smuts, moved against the much smallerGerman army in German East Africa, led by ColonelPaul von Lettow-Vorbeck. Smuts was hoping for aquick win; as soon as he had finished off theGermans, his troops could move to more importanttheaters of war. But von Lettow-Vorbeck refused toengage him and retreated south. Smuts marched inpursuit.

Time and again Smuts thought he had von Lettow-Vorbeck cornered, only to find that the German officerhad moved on just hours earlier. As if a drawn by amagnet, Smuts followed von Lettow-Vorbeck acrossrivers, mountains, and forests. Their supply linesextended over hundreds of miles, his soldiers werenow vulnerable to small, harassing actions from theGermans, which destroyed their morale. Boggeddown in pestilential jungles, as time went by, Smuts'sarmy was decimated by hunger and disease, allwithout ever fighting a real battle. By the end of thewar, von Lettow-Vorbeck had managed to lead hisenemy on a four-year cat-and-mouse chase that hadcompletely tied up valuable English forces andyielded them nothing in return.

Smuts was a persistent, thorough, aggressiveleader who liked to defeat his opponents throughmaneuver in the field. Von Lettow-Vorbeck played onthis taste: he refused to engage Smuts in frontal battlebut stayed enticingly close, just beyond reach, holdingout the possibility of engagement so as to keep the

Englishmen pushing forward into the wilderness.Infuriated to no end, Smuts continued the chase. VonLettow-Vorbeck used Africa's vast spaces andinhospitable climate to destroy the English.

Most people respond to aggression by in someway getting involved with it. It is almost impossible tohold back. By disengaging completely and retreating,you show great power and restraint. Your enemiesare desperate for you to react; retreat infuriates andprovokes them into further attack. So keep retreating,exchanging space for time. Stay calm and balanced.Let them take the land they want; like the Germans,lure them into a void of nonaction. They will start tooverextend themselves and make mistakes. Time ison your side, for you are not wasting any of it inuseless battles.

War is notoriously full of surprises, of unforeseenevents that can slow down and ruin even the best-laidplan. Carl von Clausewitz called this "friction." War isa constant illustration of Murphy's Law: if anything cango wrong, it will. But when you retreat, when youexchange space for time, you are making Murphy'sLaw work for you. So it was with von Lettow-Vorbeck:he set up Smuts as the victim of Murphy's Law, givinghim enough time to make the worst come to pass.

During the Seven Years' War (1756-63), Frederickthe Great of Prussia was faced with Austrian, French,and Russian armies on every side, all determined tocarve him up. A strategist who usually favoredaggressive attack, Frederick this time went on thedefensive, crafting his maneuvers to buy himself time

and slip the net his enemies were trying to catch himin. Year after year he managed to avoid disaster,though barely. Then, suddenly, Czarina Elizabeth ofRussia died. She had hated Frederick bitterly, but hernephew and successor to the throne, Czar Peter III,was a perverse young boy who had not liked his auntand who greatly admired Frederick the Great. He notonly pulled Russia out of the war, he allied himself withthe Prussians. The Seven Years' War was over; themiracle Frederick needed had come to pass. Had hesurrendered at his worst point or tried to fight his wayout, he would have lost everything. Instead hemaneuvered to create time for Murphy's Law to do itswork on his enemies.

War is a physical affair, which takes placesomewhere specific: generals depend on maps andplan strategies to be realized in particular locations.But time is just as important as space in strategicthought, and knowing how to use time will make you asuperior strategist, giving an added dimension to yourattacks and defense. To do this you must stopthinking of time as an abstraction: in reality, beginningthe minute you are born, time is all you have. It is youronly true commodity. People can take away yourpossessions, but--short of murder--not even the mostpowerful aggressors can take time away from youunless you let them. Even in prison your time is yourown, if you use it for your own purposes. To wasteyour time in battles not of your choosing is more thanjust a mistake, it is stupidity of the highest order. Timelost can never be regained.

Authority: To remain disciplined and calmwhile waiting for disorder to appearamongst the enemy is the art of self-possession.

--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALWhen enemies attack you in overwhelming force,instead of retreating you may sometimes decide toengage them directly. You are inviting martyrdom,perhaps even hoping for it, but martyrdom, too, is astrategy, and one of ancient standing: martyrdommakes you a symbol, a rallying point for the future.The strategy will succeed if you are important enough--if your defeat has symbolic meaning--but thecircumstances must work to highlight the rightness of

your cause and the ugliness of the enemy's. Yoursacrifice must also be unique; too many martyrs,spread over too much time, will spoil the effect. Incases of extreme weakness, when facing animpossibly large enemy, martyrdom can be used toshow that your side's fighting spirit has not beenextinguished, a useful way to keep up morale. But, ingeneral, martyrdom is a dangerous weapon and canbackfire, for you may no longer be there to see itthrough, and its effects are too strong to be controlled.It can also take centuries to work. Even when it mayprove symbolically successful, a good strategistavoids it. Retreat is always the better strategy.

Retreat must never be an end in itself; at somepoint you have to turn around and fight. If you don't,retreat is more accurately called surrender: the enemywins. Combat is in the long run unavoidable. Retreatcan only be temporary.

PART IV

OFFENSIVE WARFARE

The greatest dangers in war, and in life, come fromthe unexpected: people do not respond the way youhad thought they would, events mess up your plansand produce confusion, circumstances areoverwhelming. In strategy this discrepancy betweenwhat you want to happen and what does happen iscalled "friction." The idea behind conventionaloffensive warfare is simple: by attacking the otherside first, hitting its points of vulnerability, and seizingthe initiative and never letting it go, you create yourown circumstances. Before any friction can creep inand undermine your plans, you move to the offensive,and your relentless maneuvers force so much frictionon the enemy that he collapses.

This is the form of warfare practiced by the mostsuccessful captains in history, and the secret to theirsuccess is a perfect blend of strategic cleverness andaudacity. The strategic element comes in theplanning: setting an overall goal, crafting ways toreach it, and thinking the whole plan through in intensedetail. This means thinking in terms of a campaign,not individual battles. It also means knowing thestrengths and weaknesses of the other side, so thatyou can calibrate your strikes to its vulnerabilities. Themore detailed your planning, the more confident youwill feel as you go into battle, and the easier it will be

to stay on course once the inevitable problems arise.In the attack itself, though, you must strike with suchspirit and audacity that you put your enemies on theirheels, giving irresistible momentum to your offensive.

The following eleven chapters will initiate you intothis supreme form of warfare. They will help you to putyour desires and goals into a larger framework knownas "grand strategy." They will show you how to look atyour enemies and uncover their secrets. They willdescribe how a solid base of planning will give youfluid options for attack and how specific maneuvers(the flanking maneuver, the envelopment) and stylesof attack (hitting centers of gravity, forcing the enemyinto positions of great weakness) that work brilliantlyin war can be applied in life. Finally, they will show youhow to finish off your campaign. Without a vigorousconclusion that meets your overall goals, everythingyou have done will be worthless. Mastering thevarious components of offensive warfare will give allof your attacks in life much greater force.

LOSE BATTLES BUT WIN THE WARGRAND STRATEGY

Everyone around you is a strategist angling forpower, all trying to promote their own interests, oftenat your expense. Your daily battles with them makeyou lose sight of the only thing that really matters:victory in the end, the achievement of greater goals,lasting power. Grand strategy is the art of lookingbeyond the battle and calculating ahead. It requiresthat you focus on your ultimate goal and plot toreach it. In grand strategy you consider the politicalramifications and long-term consequences of whatyou do. Instead of reacting emotionally to people,you take control, and make your actions moredimensional, subtle, and effective. Let others getcaught up in the twists and turns of the battle,relishing their little victories. Grand strategy will bringyou the ultimate reward: the last laugh.

Readiness is everything. Resolution isindissolubly bound up with caution. If anindividual is careful and keeps his wits abouthim, he need not become excited or alarmed. Ifhe is watchful at all times, even before danger ispresent, he is armed when danger approachesand need not be afraid. The superior man is on

his guard against what is not yet in sight and onthe alert for what is not yet within hearing;therefore he dwells in the midst of difficulties asthough they did not exist.... If reason triumphs,the passions withdraw of themselves.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

THE GREAT CAMPAIGNGrowing up at the Macedonian court, Alexander (356-322 B.C.) was considered a rather strange youngman. He enjoyed the usual boyish pursuits, such ashorses and warfare; having fought alongside hisfather, King Philip II, in several battles, he had provedhis bravery. But he also loved philosophy andliterature. His tutor was the great thinker Aristotle,under whose influence he loved to argue aboutpolitics and science, looking at the world asdispassionately as possible. Then there was hismother, Olympias: a mystical, superstitious woman,she had had visions at Alexander's birth that he wouldone day rule the known world. She told him aboutthem and filled him with stories of Achilles, from whomher family claimed descent. Alexander adored hismother (while hating his father) and took herprophecies most seriously. From early on in life, hecarried himself as if he were more than the son of aking.

Alexander was raised to be Philip's successor, andthe state he was to inherit had grown considerablyduring his father's reign. Over the years the king had

managed to build up the Macedonian army into thesupreme force in all Greece. He had defeatedThebes and Athens and had united all the Greek city-states (except Sparta) into a Hellenic league underhis leadership. He was a crafty, intimidating ruler.Then, in 336 B.C., a disgruntled noblemanassassinated him. Suddenly seeing Macedonia asvulnerable, Athens declared its independence fromthe league. The other city-states followed suit. Tribesfrom the north now threatened to invade. Almostovernight Philip's small empire was unraveling.

When Alexander came to the throne, he was onlytwenty, and many considered him unready. It was abad time for learning on the job; the Macedoniangenerals and political leaders would have to take himunder their wing. They advised him to go slowly, toconsolidate his position in both the army andMacedonia and then gradually reform the leaguethrough force and guile. That was what Philip wouldhave done. But Alexander would not listen; he hadanother plan, or so it seemed. Without giving hisenemies in and beyond Macedonia time to organizeagainst him, he led the army south and reconqueredThebes in a series of lightning maneuvers. Next hemarched on the Athenians, who, fearing hisretribution, begged forgiveness and pleaded to bereadmitted to the league. Alexander granted theirwish.

The eccentric young prince had shown himself tobe a bold and unpredictable king--attacking when hewas not meant to, yet showing Athens unexpected

mercy. He was hard to read, but his first maneuversas king had won him many admirers. His next move,however, was still stranger and more audacious:instead of working to consolidate his gains andstrengthen the fragile league, he proposed to launch acrusade against the Persian Empire, the Greeks'great enemy. Some 150 years earlier, the Persianshad tried to invade Greece. They had almostsucceeded, and it remained their dream to try it againand get it right. With Persia a constant threat, theGreeks could never rest easy, and their maritimetrade was cramped by the power of the Persian navy.

THE FOX AND THE MONKEY ELECTED KINGThe monkey, having danced in an assembly ofthe animals and earned their approval, waselected by them to be king. The fox was jealous.So, seeing a piece of meat one day in a snare,he led the monkey to it, saying that he hadfound a treasure. But rather than take it forhimself, he had kept guard over it, as itspossession was surely a prerogative of royalty.The fox then urged him to take it.

The monkey approached it, taking no care, andwas caught in the trap. When he accused thefox of luring him into a trap, the fox replied:"Monkey, you want to reign over all the animals,but look what a fool you are!" It is thus that thosewho throw themselves into an enterprise withoutsufficient thought not only fail, but even become

a laughing stock.FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

In 334 B.C., Alexander led a united army of 35,000Greeks across the Dardanelle Straits and into AsiaMinor, the westernmost part of the Persian Empire. Intheir first encounter with the enemy, at the Battle of theGranicus, the Greeks routed the Persians.Alexander's generals could only admire his boldness:he seemed poised to conquer Persia, fulfilling hismother's prophecy in record time. He succeededthrough speed and by seizing the initiative. Nowsoldiers and generals alike expected him to headstraight east into Persia to finish off the enemy army,which seemed surprisingly weak.

Once again Alexander confounded expectations,suddenly deciding to do what he had never donebefore: take his time. That would have seemed wisewhen he first came to power, but now it seemed likelyto give the Persians the one thing they needed: timeto recover and replenish. Yet Alexander led his armynot east but south, down the coast of Asia Minor,freeing local towns from Persian rule. Next hezigzagged east and then south again, throughPhoenicia and into Egypt, quickly defeating the weakPersian garrison there. The Egyptians hated theirPersian rulers and welcomed Alexander as theirliberator. Now Alexander could use Egypt's vaststores of grain to feed the Greek army and help keepthe Greek economy stable, while depriving Persia ofvaluable resources.

As the Greeks advanced farther from home, thePersian navy, which could land an army almostanywhere in the Mediterranean to attack them fromthe rear or flank, was a worrying threat. BeforeAlexander set out on his expedition, many hadadvised him to build up the Greek navy and take thebattle to the Persians by sea as well as land.Alexander had ignored them. Instead, as he passedthrough Asia Minor and then along the coast ofPhoenicia, he simply captured Persia's principalports, rendering their navy useless.

These small victories, then, had a greater strategicpurpose. Even so, they would have meant little hadthe Greeks been unable to defeat the Persians inbattle--and Alexander seemed to be making thatvictory more difficult. The Persian king, Darius, wasconcentrating his forces east of the Tigris River; hehad numbers and his choice of location and couldwait in ease for Alexander to cross the river. HadAlexander lost his taste for battle? Had Persian andEgyptian culture softened him? It seemed so: he hadbegun to wear Persian clothes and to adopt Persiancustoms. He was even seen worshipping Persiangods.

As the Persian army retreated east of the Tigris,large areas of the Persian empire had come underGreek control. Now Alexander spent much of his timenot on warfare but on politics, trying to see how bestto govern these regions. He decided to build on thePersian system already in place, keeping the sametitles for jobs in the governmental bureaucracy,

collecting the same tribute that Darius had done. Hechanged only the harsh, unpopular aspects of Persianrule. Word quickly spread of his generosity andgentleness toward his new subjects. Town after townsurrendered to the Greeks without a fight, only tooglad to be part of Alexander's growing empire, whichtranscended Greece and Persia. He was the unifyingfactor, the benevolent overseeing god.

Epistemologically speaking, the source of allerroneous views on war lies in idealist andmechanistic tendencies.... People with suchtendencies are subjective and one-sided intheir approach to problems. They indulge ingroundless and purely subjective talk, basingthemselves upon a single aspect or temporarymanifestation [and] magnify it with similarsubjectivity into the whole of the problem.... Onlyby opposing idealistic and mechanistictendencies and taking an objective all-sidedview in making a study of war can we drawcorrect conclusions on the question of war.SELECTED MILITARY WRITINGS, MAO TSE-

TUNG, 1893-1976

Finally, in 331 B.C., Alexander marched on themain Persian force at Arbela. What his generals hadnot understood was that, deprived of the use of itsnavy, its rich lands in Egypt, and the support andtribute of almost all of its subjects, the Persian Empirehad already crumbled. Alexander's victory at Arbela

merely confirmed militarily what he had alreadyachieved months earlier: he was now the ruler of theonce mighty Persian Empire. Fulfilling his mother'sprophecy, he controlled almost all of the known world.

InterpretationAlexander the Great's maneuvers bewildered hisstaff: they seemed to have no logic, no consistency.Only later could the Greeks look back and really seehis magnificent achievement. The reason they couldnot understand him was that Alexander had inventeda whole new way of thinking and acting in the world:the art of grand strategy.

In grand strategy you look beyond the moment,beyond your immediate battles and concerns. Youconcentrate instead on what you want to achievedown the line. Controlling the temptation to react toevents as they happen, you determine each of youractions according to your ultimate goals. You think interms not of individual battles but of a campaign.

Alexander owed his novel style of strategizing to hismother and to Aristotle. His mother had given him asense of destiny and a goal: to rule the known world.From the age of three, he could see in his mind's eyethe role he would play when he was thirty. FromAristotle he learned the power of controlling hisemotions, seeing things dispassionately, thinkingahead to the consequences of his actions.

Trace the zigzags of Alexander's maneuvers andyou will see their grand-strategic consistency. Hisquick actions against first Thebes, then Persia,

worked psychically on his soldiers and on his critics.Nothing quiets an army faster than battle; Alexander'ssudden crusade against the hated Persians was theperfect way to unite the Greeks. Once he was inPersia, though, speed was the wrong tactic. HadAlexander advanced, he would have found himselfcontrolling too much land too quickly; running it wouldhave exhausted his resources, and in the ensuingpower vacuum, enemies would have sprung upeverywhere. Better to proceed slowly, to build on whatwas there, to win hearts and minds. Instead of wastingmoney on building a navy, better simply to make thePersian navy unusable. To pay for the kind ofextended campaign that would bring long-termsuccess, first seize the rich lands of Egypt. None ofAlexander's actions were wasted. Those who saw hisplans bear fruit, in ways they themselves had beenentirely unable to predict, thought him a kind of god--and certainly his control over events deep in the futureseemed more godlike than human.

There is, however, much difference between theEast and the West in cultural heritages, invalues, and in ways of thinking. In the Easternway of thinking, one starts with the whole, takeseverything as a whole and proceeds with acomprehensive and intuitive synthesization[combinaton] . In the Western way of thinking,however, one starts with the parts, takes[divides] a complex matter into componentparts and then deals with them one by one, with

an emphasis on logical analysis. Accordingly,Western traditional military thought advocates adirect military approach with a stress on the useof armed forces.

THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: SUN ZI &WESTERN APPROACHES TO WAR, CAO

SHAN, ED., 1997

To become a grand strategist in life, you mustfollow the path of Alexander. First, clarify your life--decipher your own personal riddle--by determiningwhat it is you are destined to achieve, the direction inwhich your skills and talents seem to push you.Visualize yourself fulfilling this destiny in gloriousdetail. As Aristotle advised, work to master youremotions and train yourself to think ahead: "Thisaction will advance me toward my goal, this one willlead me nowhere." Guided by these standards, youwill be able to stay on course.

Ignore the conventional wisdom about what youshould or should not be doing. It may make sense forsome, but that does not mean it bears any relation toyour own goals and destiny. You need to be patientenough to plot several steps ahead--to wage acampaign instead of fighting battles. The path to yourgoal may be indirect, your actions may be strange toother people, but so much the better: the less theyunderstand you, the easier they are to deceive,manipulate, and seduce. Following this path, you willgain the calm, Olympian perspective that will separateyou from other mortals, whether dreamers who get

nothing done or prosaic, practical people whoaccomplish only small things.

What I particularly admire in Alexander is, notso much his campaigns...but his political sense.He possessed the art of winning the affection of

the people.--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

TOTAL WARFAREIn 1967 the leaders of the American war effort inVietnam thought they were finally making progress.They had launched a series of operations to searchout and destroy the Vietcong--North Vietnamesesoldiers who had infiltrated South Vietnam and hadcome to control much of its countryside. Theseguerrilla fighters were elusive, but the Americans hadinflicted heavy losses on them in the few battles theyhad managed to force on them that year. The newSouth Vietnamese government, supported by theAmericans, seemed relatively stable, which couldhelp to win it approval among the Vietnamese people.To the north, bombing raids had knocked out many ofNorth Vietnam's airfields and heavily damaged its airforce. Although massive antiwar demonstrations hadbroken out in the United States, polls showed thatmost Americans supported the war and believed thatthe end was in sight.

Since the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese armyhad proved rather ineffective in head-to-head battleagainst the might of American firepower and

technology, the strategy was to somehow lure theminto a major engagement. That would be the turningpoint of the war. And by the end of 1967, intelligenceindicated that the North Vietnamese were about to fallinto just such a trap: their commander, General VoNguyen Giap, was planning a major offensive againstthe U.S. marine outpost at Khe Sanh. Apparently hewanted to repeat his greatest success, the battle atDien Bien Phu in 1954, in which he had defeated theFrench army, driving the French out of Vietnam forgood.

Khe Sanh was a key strategic outpost. It waslocated a mere fourteen miles from the demilitarizedzone that separated North from South Vietnam. It wasalso six miles from the border of Laos, site of astretch of the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, the NorthVietnamese supply route to the Vietcong in the South.General William C. Westmoreland, the overall U.S.commander, was using Khe Sanh to monitor enemyactivity to the north and west. Dien Bien Phu hadserved a similar role for the French, and Giap hadbeen able to isolate and destroy it. Westmorelandwould not allow Giap to repeat that feat. He built well-protected airstrips around Khe Sanh, ensuring full useof his helicopters and control of the air. He called upsubstantial numbers of troops from the south to theKhe Sanh area, just in case he needed them. He alsoordered 6,000 additional marines to reinforce theoutpost. But a major attack on Khe Sanh was nothinghe wanted to discourage: in frontal battle the enemywould finally expose itself to severe defeat.

In the first few weeks of 1968, all eyes were on KheSanh. The White House and the U.S. media werecertain that the decisive battle of the war was about tobegin. Finally, at dawn on January 21, 1968, the NorthVietnamese army launched a vicious assault. As bothsides dug in, the battle turned into a siege.

Soon after the engagement began, the Vietnamesewere to celebrate their lunar New Year, the holidaycalled Tet. It was a period of revelry, and in time ofwar it was also a traditional moment to declare atruce. This year was no different; both sides agreed tohalt the fighting during Tet. Early on the morning ofJanuary 31, however, the first day of the New Year,reports began to trickle in from all over SouthVietnam: virtually every major town and city, as well asthe most important American bases, had come underVietcong attack. An army general, tracking the assaultpattern on a map, said it "resembled a pinballmachine, lighting up with each raid."

Parts of Saigon itself had been overrun by enemysoldiers, some of whom had managed to blow theirway through the wall of the U.S. embassy, the verysymbol of the American presence in Vietnam.Marines regained control of the embassy in a bloodyfight, which was widely seen on American television.The Vietcong also attacked the city's radio station,the presidential palace, and Westmoreland's owncompound at the Tan Son Nhut air base. The cityquickly descended into street fighting and chaos.

Outside Saigon, provincial cities, too, came undersiege. Most prominent was the North Vietnamese

capture of Hue, the ancient Vietnamese capital and acity revered by Buddhists. Insurgents managed totake control of virtually the whole city.

Meanwhile the attacks on Khe Sanh continued inwaves. It was hard for Westmoreland to tell what themain target was: were the battles to the south merelya means of drawing forces away from Khe Sanh, orwas it the other way around? Within a few weeks, inall parts of South Vietnam, the Americans regainedthe upper hand, retaking control of Saigon andsecuring their air bases. The sieges at Hue and KheSanh took longer, but massive artillery and airbombardments eventually doomed the insurgents, aswell as leveling entire sections of Hue.

When dark inertia increases, obscurity andinactivity, negligence and delusion, arise. Whenlucidity prevails, the self whose body dies entersthe untainted worlds of those who know reality.When he dies in passion, he is born amonglovers of action; so when he dies in dark inertia,he is born into wombs of folly. The fruit of goodconduct is pure and untainted, they say, butsuffering is the fruit of passion, ignorance thefruit of dark inertia. From lucidity knowledge isborn; from passion comes greed; from darkinertia come negligence, delusion, andignorance. Men who are lucid go upward; menof passion stay in between; men of dark inertia,caught in vile ways, sink low.

THE BHAGAVAD GITA: KRISHNA'SCOUNSEL IN TIME OF WAR, CIRCA FIRST

CENTURY A.D.

After what later became known as the Tet Offensivewas over, Westmoreland likened it to the Battle of theBulge, near the end of World War II. There theGermans had managed to surprise the Allies bystaging a bold incursion into eastern France. In thefirst few days, they had advanced rapidly, creatingpanic, but once the Allies recovered, they hadmanaged to push the Germans back--and eventually itbecame apparent that the battle was the Germanmilitary's death knell, their last shot. So it was,Westmoreland argued, with the North Vietnamesearmy at Khe Sanh and the Vietcong throughout theSouth: they had suffered terrible casualties, far morethan the Americans had--in fact, the entire Vietconginfrastructure had been wiped out. They would neverrecover; at long last the enemy had revealed itself andhad been badly mauled.

The Americans thought Tet had been a tacticaldisaster for the North. But another viewpoint began totrickle in from home: the drama at the U.S. embassy,the siege of Hue, and the attacks on air bases hadkept millions of Americans glued to their televisionsets. Until then the Vietcong had operated mostly inthe countryside, barely visible to the American public.Now, for the first time, they were apparent in majorcities, wreaking havoc and destruction. Americanshad been told the war was winding down and

winnable; these images said otherwise. Suddenly thewar's purpose seemed less clear. How could SouthVietnam remain stable in the face of this ubiquitousenemy? How could the Americans ever claim a clearvictory? There was really no end in sight.

American opinion polls tracked a sharp turn againstthe war. Antiwar demonstrations broke out all over thecountry. President Lyndon Johnson's militaryadvisers, who had been telling him that SouthVietnam was coming under control, now confessedthat they were no longer so optimistic. In the NewHampshire Democratic primary that March, Johnsonwas stunned by his defeat by Senator EugeneMcCarthy, who had galvanized the growing antiwarsentiment. Shortly thereafter Johnson announced thathe would not run for reelection in the upcomingpresidential race and that he would slowly disengageAmerican forces from Vietnam.

The Tet Offensive was indeed the turning point inthe Vietnam War, but not in the direction thatWestmoreland and his staff had foreseen.

At this the grey-eyed goddess Athena smiled,and gave him a caress, her looks beingchanged now, so she seemed a woman, tall andbeautiful and no doubt skilled at weavingsplendid things. She answered briskly:"Whoever gets around you [Odysseus] must besharp and guileful as a snake; even a godmight bow to you in ways of dissimulation. You!You chameleon! Bottomless bag of tricks! Here

in your own country would you not give yourstratagems a rest or stop spellbinding for aninstant?...Two of a kind, we are, contrivers, both.Of all men now alive you are the best in plotsand story telling. My own fame is for wisdomamong the gods--deceptions, too.

THE ODYSSEY, HOMER, CIRCA NINTHCENTURY B.C.

InterpretationFor the American strategists, the success of the wardepended mostly on the military. By using their armyand superior weaponry to kill as many Vietcong aspossible and gain control of the countryside, theywould ensure the stability of the South Vietnamesegovernment. Once the South was strong enough,North Vietnam would give up the fight.

The North Vietnamese saw the war very differently.By nature and practice, they viewed conflict in muchbroader terms. They looked at the political situation inthe South, where American search-and-destroymissions were alienating South Vietnamesepeasants. The North Vietnamese, meanwhile, dideverything they could to win the peasants over andearned for themselves an army of millions of silentsympathizers. How could the South be secure whenthe Americans had failed to capture the hearts andminds of the Vietnamese farmers? The NorthVietnamese also looked to the American politicalscene, where, in 1968, there was to be a presidentialelection. And they looked at American culture, where

support for the war was wide but not deep. TheVietnam War was the first televised war in history; themilitary was trying to control information about thewar, but the images on television spoke forthemselves.

On and on the North Vietnamese went, continuallybroadening their outlook and analyzing the war'sglobal context. And out of this study they crafted theirmost brilliant strategy: the Tet Offensive. Using theirarmy of peasant sympathizers in the South, they wereable to infiltrate every part of the country, smuggling inarms and supplies under the cover of the Tet holiday.The targets they hit were not only military buttelevisual: their attacks in Saigon, base of most of theAmerican media (including the CBS newsman WalterCronkite, visiting at the time) were spectacular; Hueand Khe Sanh were also places heavily covered byAmerican reporters. They also struck symboliclocations--embassies, palaces, air bases--that wouldsuck in media attention. On television all this wouldcreate the dramatic (and deceptive) impression thatthe Vietcong were everywhere while Americanbombing raids and pacification programs had gottennowhere. In effect, the goal of the Tet Offensive wasnot a military target but the American public in front ofits televisions. Once Americans lost faith--and in anelection year--the war was doomed. The NorthVietnamese did not have to win a single pitchedbattle on the field, and in fact they never did. But byextending their vision beyond the battlefield to politicsand culture, they won the war.

We always tend to look at what is most immediateto us, taking the most direct route toward our goalsand trying to win the war by winning as many battlesas we can. We think in small, microlevel terms andreact to present events--but this is petty strategy.Nothing in life happens in isolation; everything isrelated to everything else and has a broader context.That context includes people outside your immediatecircle whom your actions affect, the public at large, thewhole world; it includes politics, for every choice inmodern life has political ramifications; it includesculture, the media, the way the public sees you. Yourtask as a grand strategist is to extend your vision in alldirections--not only looking further into the future butalso seeing more of the world around you, more thanyour enemy does. Your strategies will becomeinsidious and impossible to thwart. You will be able toharness the relationships between events, one battlesetting up the next, a cultural coup setting up apolitical coup. You will bring the war to arenas yourenemies have ignored, catching them by surprise.Only grand strategy can yield grand results.

War is the continuation of politics by othermeans.

--Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)

KEYS TO WARFAREThousands of years ago, we humans elevatedourselves above the animal world and never lookedback. Figuratively speaking, the key to this

evolutionary advance was our powers of vision:language, and the ability to reason that it gave us, letus see more of the world around us. To protect itselffrom a predator, an animal depended on its sensesand instincts; it could not see around the corner or tothe other end of the forest. We humans, on the otherhand, could map the entire forest, study the habits ofdangerous animals and even nature itself, gainingdeeper, wider knowledge of our environment. Wecould see dangers coming before they were here.This expanded vision was abstract: where an animalis locked in the present, we could see into the pastand glimpse as far as our reason would take us intothe future. Our sight expanded further and further intotime and space, and we came to dominate the world.

Somewhere along the line, however, we stoppedevolving as rational creatures. Despite our progressthere is always a part of us that remains animal, andthat animal part can respond only to what is mostimmediate in our environment--it is incapable ofthinking beyond the moment. The dilemma affects usstill: the two sides of our character, rational andanimal, are constantly at war, making almost all of ouractions awkward. We reason and plan to achieve agoal, but in the heat of action we become emotionaland lose perspective. We use cleverness andstrategy to grab for what we want, but we do not stopto think about whether what we want is necessary, orwhat the consequences of getting it will be. Theextended vision that rationality brings us is ofteneclipsed by the reactive, emotional animal within--the

stronger side of our nature.More than we are today, the ancient Greeks were

close to the passage of the human race from animalto rational. To them our dual nature made us tragic,and the source of tragedy was limited vision. Inclassical Greek tragedies such as Oedipus Rex, theprotagonist may think he knows the truth and knowsenough about the world to act in it, but his vision islimited by his emotions and desires. He has only apartial perspective on life and on his own actions andidentity, so he acts imprudently and causes suffering.When Oedipus finally understands his own role in allhis misfortunes, he tears out his eyes--symbols of histragic limitation. He can see out into the world but notinward into himself.

Then he saw Odysseus and asked: "Now tell meabout this one, dear child, Shorter thanAgamemnon by a head But broader in theshoulders and chest. His armor is lying on theground And he's roaming the ranks like a ram,That's it, just like a thick-fleeced ram Stridingthrough a flock of silvery sheep." And Helen,Zeus' child: "That is Laertes' son, The masterstrategist Odysseus, born and bred In the rockyhills of Ithaca. He knows Every trick there is, andhis mind runs deep." Antenor turned to her andobserved astutely: "Your words are not off themark there, madam. Odysseus came here oncebefore, on an embassy For your sake along with

Menelaus. I entertained them courteously in thegreat hall And learned each man's characterand depth of mind. Standing in a crowd ofTrojans, Menelaus, With his wide shoulders,was more prominent, But when both were seatedOdysseus was lordlier. When it came time foreach to speak in public And weave a spell ofwisdom with their words, Menelaus spokefluently enough, to the point And very clearly,but briefly, since he is not A man of manywords. Being older, he spoke first. ThenOdysseus, the master strategist, rose quickly,But just stood there, his eyes fixed on theground. He did not move his staff forward orbackward But held it steady. You would havethought him A dull, surly lout without any wit. Butwhen he Opened his mouth and projected hisvoice The words fell down like snowflakes in ablizzard. No mortal could have vied withOdysseus then, And we no longer held his looksagainst him."

THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURYB.C.

The Greeks, however, also recognized the potentialfor a higher human possibility. Far above the sphereof mortals were the gods on Mount Olympus, who hadperfect vision of the world and of both the past and thefuture; and the human race shared something withthem as well as with animals--we were not only part

animal but part divine. Furthermore, those able to seefurther than others, to control their animal nature andthink before they acted, were humans of the mostdeeply human kind--the ones best able to use thereasoning powers that separate us from animals. Asopposed to human stupidity (limited vision), theGreeks imagined an ideal human prudence. Itssymbol was Odysseus, who always thought before heacted. Having visited Hades, the land of the dead, hewas in touch with ancestral history and the past; andhe was also always curious, eager for knowledge,and able to view human actions, his own and otherpeople's, with a dispassionate eye, considering theirlong-term consequences. In other words, like thegods, if to a lesser extent, he had the skill of lookinginto the future. The consummate realist, the man ofvision, Odysseus was a character in the epic poetry ofHomer, but there were also historical versions of theideal: the political figure and military leaderThemistocles, for example, and Alexander the Great,raised to heights of combined intellect and action byAristotle.

The prudent man might seem cold, his rationalitysucking pleasure out of life. Not so. Like the pleasure-loving gods on Mount Olympus, he has theperspective, the calm detachment, the ability to laugh,that come with true vision, which gives everything hedoes a quality of lightness--these traits comprisingwhat Nietzsche calls the "Apollonian ideal." (Onlypeople who can't see past their noses make thingsheavy.) Alexander, the great strategist and man of

action, was also famous for revelry and festivity.Odysseus loved adventure; no one was better at theexperience of pleasure. He was simply morereasonable, more balanced, less vulnerable to hisown emotions and moods, and he left less tragedyand turmoil in his wake.

This calm, detached, rational, far-seeing creature,called "prudent" by the Greeks, is what we shall callthe "grand strategist."

We are all of us to some extent strategists: wenaturally want control over our lives, and we plot forpower, consciously or unconsciously angling to getwhat we want. We use strategies, in other words, butthey tend to be linear and reactive and are oftenfractured and struck off course by emotionalresponses. Clever strategists can go far, but all but afew make mistakes. If they are successful, they getcarried away and overreach; if they face setbacks--and setbacks are inevitable over a lifetime--they areeasily overwhelmed. What sets grand strategistsapart is the ability to look more deeply into boththemselves and others, to understand and learn fromthe past and to have a clear sense of the future, to theextent that it can be predicted. Simply, they see more,and their extended vision lets them carry out plansover sometimes-long periods of time--so long thatthose around them may not even realize that theyhave a plan in mind. They strike at the roots of aproblem, not at its symptoms, and hit their markcleanly. In moving toward becoming a grandstrategist, you follow in the path of Odysseus and rise

toward the condition of the gods. It is not so much thatyour strategies are more clever or manipulative asthat they exist on a higher plane. You have made aqualitative leap.

In a world where people are increasingly incapableof thinking consequentially, more animal than ever, thepractice of grand strategy will instantly elevate youabove others.

To become a grand strategist does not involveyears of study or a total transformation of yourpersonality. It simply means more effective use ofwhat you have--your mind, your rationality, your vision.Having evolved as a solution to the problems ofwarfare, grand strategy is a military concept. And anexamination of its historical development will revealthe key to making it work for you in daily life.

In the early history of warfare, a ruler or general whounderstood strategy and maneuver could exercisepower. He could win battles, carve out an empire, orat the very least defend his own city or state. Butproblems came with strategy on this level. More thanany other human activity, war plays havoc withemotion, stirs the animal within. In plotting war a kingwould depend on things like his knowledge of theterrain and his understanding of both the enemy'sforces and his own; his success would depend on hisability to see these things clearly. But this vision waslikely to be clouded. He had emotions to respond to,desires to realize; he could not think his goalsthrough. Wanting to win, he would underestimate theenemy's strength or overestimate his own. When

Xerxes of Persia invaded Greece in 480 B.C., hethought he had a perfectly rational plan. There wasmuch he had not taken into account, and disasterfollowed.

Other rulers actually won their battles only to growdrunk on victory and not know when to stop, stirring upimplacable hatred, distrust, and the desire forrevenge all around them, culminating in war onseveral fronts and total defeat--as in the destruction ofthe warlike Assyrian Empire, its capital of Nineveheternally buried in the sand. In cases like that, victoryin battle brought only danger, exposing the conquerorto ruinous cycles of attack and counterattack.

In ancient times, strategists and historians fromSun-tzu to Thucydides became conscious of thisrecurring self-destructive pattern in warfare andbegan to work out more rational ways to fight. The firststep was to think beyond the immediate battle.Supposing you won victory, where would it leave you--better off or worse? To answer that question, thelogical step was to think ahead, to the third and fourthbattles on, which connected like links in a chain. Theresult was the concept of the campaign, in which thestrategist sets a realistic goal and plots several stepsahead to get there. Individual battles matter only in theway they set up the next ones down the line; an armycan even deliberately lose a battle as part of a long-term plan. The victory that matters is that of the overallcampaign, and everything is subordinated to thatgoal.

Forgetting our objectives. --During the journeywe commonly forget its goal. Almost everyprofession is chosen and commenced as ameans to an end but continued as an end initself. Forgetting our objectives is the mostfrequent of all acts of stupidity.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844-1900

This kind of strategy represented a qualitativeadvance. Think of chess, where the grand master,instead of focusing only on the move at hand andmaking it solely in reaction to what the other playerhas just done, must visualize the entire chessboarddeep into the future, crafting an overall strategy, usingthe moves of the pawns now to set up those of themore powerful pieces later on. Thinking in terms ofthe campaign gave strategy a new depth. Thestrategist used more and more of the map.

War on this level required that the strategist thinkdeeply in all directions before launching thecampaign. He had to know the world. The enemy wasjust one part of the picture; the strategist also had toanticipate the reactions of allies and neighboringstates--any missteps with them and the entire plancould unravel. He had to imagine the peace after thewar. He had to know what his army was capable ofover time and ask no more of it than that. He had tobe realistic. His mind had to expand to meet thecomplexities of the task--and all this before a singleblow was exchanged.

Yet strategic thinking on this level yielded limitless

benefits. A victory on the battlefield would not seducethe leader into an unconsidered move that mightultimately set the campaign back, nor would a defeatunnerve him. When something unexpected happened--and the unexpected is to be expected in war--thesolution he improvised to meet it would have to suitgoals far on the horizon. His subordination of hisemotions to strategic thought would give him morecontrol during the course of the campaign. He wouldkeep his perspective in the heat of battle. He wouldnot get caught up in the reactive and self-destructivepattern that had destroyed so many armies andstates.

This principle of campaigning was only relativelyrecently christened "grand strategy," but it has existedin various forms since ancient times. It is clearlyvisible in Alexander's conquest of Persia, in theRoman and Byzantine empires' control of vastterritories with small armies, in the disciplinedcampaigns of the Mongols, in Queen Elizabeth I'sdefeat of the Spanish Armada, in the Duke ofMarlborough's brilliantly conceived campaignsagainst the Hapsburgs. In modern times NorthVietnam's defeat first of the French, then of the UnitedStates--in the latter case without winning a singlemajor battle--must be considered a consummate useof the art.

Military history shows that the key to grand strategy--the thing that separates it from simple, garden-varietystrategy--is its particular quality of forethought. Grandstrategists think and plan further into the future before

taking action. Nor is their planning simply a matter ofaccumulating knowledge and information; it involveslooking at the world with a dispassionate eye, thinkingin terms of the campaign, planning indirect, subtlesteps along the way whose purpose may onlygradually become visible to others. Not only does thiskind of planning fool and disorient the enemy; for thestrategist it has the psychological effects of calm, asense of perspective, flexibility to change in themoment while keeping the ultimate goal in mind.Emotions are easier to control; vision is far-seeingand clear. Grand strategy is the apex of rationality.

Plot against the difficult while it remains easy,Act against the great while it is still minute.Difficult affairs throughout the realm invariablycommence with the easy, Great affairsthroughout the realm inevitably commence withthe small. For this reason the Sage never actsagainst the great and is thus able to completegreatness. What is tranquil remains easilygrasped, What has not yet betrayed signs iseasy to plot against. The brittle is easily split,The minute is easily scattered. Act upon thembefore they attain being, Control them beforethey become chaotic. Trees that require botharms to embrace Are born from insignificantsaplings. A nine-story tower commences with alittle accumulated earth, A journey of athousand kilometers begins beneath one's feet.

TAO TE CHING, LAO-TZU, CIRCA 551-479B.C.

Grand strategy has four main principles, distilledbelow from case histories of the most successfulpractitioners of the art. The more you can incorporatethese principles into your plans, the better the results.

Focus on your greater goal, your destiny. Thefirst step toward becoming a grand strategist--thestep that will make everything else fall into place--is tobegin with a clear, detailed, purposeful goal in mind,one rooted in reality. We often imagine that wegenerally operate by some kind of plan, that we havegoals we are trying to reach. But we're usually foolingourselves; what we have are not goals but wishes.Our emotions infect us with hazy desire: we wantfame, success, security--something large andabstract. This haziness unbalances our plans from thebeginning and sets them on a chaotic course. Whathave distinguished all history's grand strategists andcan distinguish you, too, are specific, detailed,focused goals. Contemplate them day in and day out,and imagine how it will feel to reach them and whatreaching them will look like. By a psychological lawpeculiar to humans, clearly visualizing them this waywill turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Having clear objectives was crucial to Napoleon.He visualized his goals in intense detail--at thebeginning of a campaign, he could see its last battleclearly in his mind. Examining a map with his aides,he would point to the exact spot where it would end--a

ridiculous prediction, it might seem, since not only iswar in any period subject to chance and to whateverthe enemy comes up with to surprise you, but themaps of Napoleon's era were notoriously unreliable.Yet time and again his predictions would proveuncannily correct. He would also visualize thecampaign's aftermath: the signing of the treaty, itsconditions, how the defeated Russian czar or Austrianemperor would look, and exactly how the achievementof this particular goal would position Napoleon for hisnext campaign.

As a young man, Lyndon B. Johnson, despite hislimited education, was determined to becomepresident one day. Dream turned into obsession: hecould picture himself as president, strutting the world'sstage. As he advanced in his career, he never didanything without one eye on this ultimate objective. In1957, Johnson, by that time a Texas senator,supported a civil rights bill. That damaged him inTexas but elevated him nationally: apparently asenator from the South had stuck his neck out, riskinghis job. Johnson's vote caught the attention of John F.Kennedy, who, in the campaign of 1960, nominatedhim for vice president--the job that was ultimatelyJohnson's stepping-stone to the presidency.

Clear long-term objectives give direction to all ofyour actions, large and small. Important decisionsbecome easier to make. If some glittering prospectthreatens to seduce you from your goal, you will knowto resist it. You can tell when to sacrifice a pawn, evenlose a battle, if it serves your eventual purpose. Your

eyes are focused on winning the campaign andnothing else.

Your goals must be rooted in reality. If they aresimply beyond your means, essentially impossible foryou to realize, you will grow discouraged, anddiscouragement can quickly escalate into a defeatistattitude. On the other hand, if your goals lack a certaindimension and grandeur, it can be hard to staymotivated. Do not be afraid to be bold. In the largesense, you are working out for yourself whatAlexander experienced as his destiny and whatFriedrich Nietzsche called your "life's task"--the thingtoward which your natural leanings and aptitudes,talents and desires, seem to point you. Assigningyourself a life task will inspire and guide you.

The goal's nature is critical: some objectives, ifrealized, will hurt you in the long run. The objectives ofgrand strategy in the true sense are to build a solidfoundation for future expansion, to make you moresecure, to increase your power. When Israel seizedthe Sinai Desert during the Six-Day War in 1967,what seemed to make sense was creating a kind ofbuffer zone between itself and Egypt. In fact, this justmeant more territory to patrol and control, and itcreated a cause to motivate enduring hostility in theEgyptian populace. The Sinai was also vulnerable tosurprise attack, which is what ended up happening inthe Yom Kippur War of 1973. Since holding on to thedesert, though seductive, ultimately disserved theneeds of security, in the terms of grand strategy it wasprobably a mistake. It is sometimes hard to know

what the long-term effects of achieving a goal will be,but the more seriously and realistically you examinethe possibilities downwind, the less likely you are tomiscalculate.

Widen your perspective. Grand strategy is afunction of vision, of seeing further in time and spacethan the enemy does. The process of foresight isunnatural: we can only ever live in the present, whichis the ground for our consciousness, and oursubjective experiences and desires narrow the scopeof our vision--they are like a prison we inhabit. Yourtask as a grand strategist is to force yourself to widenyour view, to take in more of the world around you, tosee things for what they are and for how they may playout in the future, not for how you wish them to be.Every event has a reason, a causal chain ofrelationships that made it happen; you have to digdeep into that reality, instead of seeing only thesurfaces of things. The closer you get to objectivity,the better your strategies and the easier the path toyour goals.

THE WILD BOAR AND THE FOXA wild boar was sharpening his tusks on a treetrunk one day. A fox asked him why he did thiswhen there was neither huntsman nor dangerthreatening him. "I do so for a good reason," hereplied. "For if I am suddenly surprised bydanger I wouldn't have the time to sharpen mytusks. But now I will find them ready to do their

duty."

The fable shows that it is no good waiting untildanger comes to be ready.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

You can take a step in this direction by alwaystrying to look at the world through the eyes of otherpeople--including, most definitely, your enemy--beforeengaging in war. Your own cultural preconceptionsare a major hindrance to seeing the world objectively.Looking through other people's eyes is not a questionof political correctness or of some soft, hazysensitivity; it makes your strategies more effective.During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnameseintensely studied the American cultural scene. Theylooked for shifts in public opinion and strained tounderstand the U.S. political system and the socialeffects of television. American strategists, on theother hand, revealed an absolutely minimalunderstanding of the alien cultures of Vietnam--whether the South Vietnamese culture they weresupporting or the North Vietnamese culture they weretrying to fight. Blinded by their obsession withstopping the spread of communism, they failed tonote the far deeper influences of culture and religionon the North Vietnamese way of fighting. Theirs was agrand-strategic blunder of the highest order.

Grand strategists keep sensitive antennae attunedto the politics of any situation. Politics is the art ofpromoting and protecting your own interests. You

might think it was largely a question of parties andfactions, but every individual is, among other things, apolitical creature seeking to secure his or her ownposition. Your behavior in the world always haspolitical consequences, in that the people around youwill analyze it in terms of whether it helps or harmsthem. To win the battle at the cost of alienatingpotential allies or creating intractable enemies isnever wise.

Taking politics into account, you must figure outyour grand strategy with a mind to gaining supportfrom other people--to creating and strengthening abase. In the Roman Civil War in 49 B.C., JuliusCaesar faced off against Pompey, who was then themore experienced military man. Caesar gained theedge by planning his maneuvers with an eye to theireffect on public opinion in Rome. Lacking support inthe Senate, he built support among the general public.Caesar was a brilliant political animal, and whatmade him so was his grasp of the public psyche: heunderstood their self-interest and shaped hisstrategies accordingly. Being political meansunderstanding people--seeing through their eyes.

Sever the roots. In a society dominated byappearances, the real source of a problem issometimes hard to grasp. To work out a grandstrategy against an enemy, you have to know whatmotivates him or is the source of his power. Too manywars and battles drag on because neither side knowshow to strike at the other's roots. As a grand

strategist, you must expand your vision not only farand wide but under. Think hard, dig deep, do not takeappearances for reality. Uncover the roots of thetrouble and you can strategize to sever them, endingthe war or problem with finality.

When the Carthaginian general Hannibal invadedItaly in 218 B.C., various Roman generals strained todefeat him, but none was effective. The Romangeneral later called Scipio Africanus looked at thesituation differently: the problem wasn't Hannibalhimself, or his base in Spain, or his ability to restockhis supplies by sea from Carthage; the problem wasCarthage itself. This was a country with an intractablehatred of Rome, and a long power struggle hadendured between the two. Instead of taking onHannibal, a brilliant military man, in Italy, then, Scipioinvaded Carthage, forcing Hannibal to leave Italy todefend his homeland. The attack on Carthage wasmore than a mere feint to draw Hannibal away; it wasa sizable invasion. Scipio's grand strategy worked toperfection: not only did he defeat Hannibal in battle,he destroyed Carthage as a rival power, permanentlyending its ability to stand up to Rome.

This is as it should be. No major proposalrequired for war can be worked out in ignoranceof political factors; and when people talk, asthey often do, about harmful political influenceon the management of war, they are not reallysaying what they mean. Their quarrel should bewith the policy itself, not with its influence. If the

policy is right--that is, successful--anyintentional effect it has on the conduct of warcan only be to the good. If it has the oppositeeffect the policy itself is wrong. Only ifstatesmen look to certain military moves andactions to produce effects that are foreign totheir nature do political decisions influenceoperations for the worse. In the same way as aman who has not fully mastered a foreignlanguage sometimes fails to express himselfcorrectly, so statesmen often issue orders thatdefeat the purpose they are meant to serve.Time and again that has happened, whichdemonstrates that a certain grasp of militaryaffairs is vital for those in charge of generalpolicy. Before continuing, we must guardagainst a likely misinterpretation. We are farfrom believing that a minister of war immersedin his files, an erudite engineer or even anexperienced soldier would, simply on the basisof their particular experience, make the bestdirector of policy--always assuming that theprince himself is not in control. Far from it. Whatis needed in the post is distinguished intellectand strength of character. He can always get thenecessary military information somehow orother. The military and political affairs of Francewere never in worse hands than when thebrothers Belle-Isle and the Duc de Choiseul

were responsible--good soldiers though they allwere.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

A part of grand strategy related to severing theroots is seeing dangers as they start to sprout, thencutting them down before they get too big to handle. Agrand strategist knows the value of preemptive action.

Take the indirect route to your goal. The greatestdanger you face in strategy is losing the initiative andfinding yourself constantly reacting to what the otherside does. The solution, of course, is to plan aheadbut also to plan subtly--to take the indirect route.Preventing your opponent from seeing the purpose ofyour actions gives you an enormous advantage.

So make your first move merely a setup, designedto extract a response from your opponent that openshim up to what comes next. Hit him directly and hereacts, taking a defensive pose that may allow him toparry your next blow; but if he can't see the point ofyour strike, or if it misleads him as to where the nextone will come from, he is defenseless and blind. Thekey is to maintain control of your emotions and plotyour moves in advance, seeing the entirechessboard.

The film director Alfred Hitchcock made thisstrategy a life principle. His every action a setupdesigned to yield results down the road, he calmlythought ahead and moved step by step. His goal was

to make a film that matched his original vision,uncorrupted by the influence of the actors, producers,and other staff who necessarily came along later. Bycontrolling every detail of the film's screenplay, hemade it almost impossible for the producer tointerfere. Should the producer try to meddle during theactual shooting, Hitchcock would have a cameraready on set with no film in it. He could pretend to takethe extra shots that the producer wanted, letting theproducer feel powerful without risk to the end result.Hitchcock did the same with actors: instead of tellingthem directly what to do, he would infect them with theemotion he wanted--fear, anger, desire--by the wayhe treated them on set. Every step on the campaigntrail fit perfectly into the next one.

In working on the level not of the battle but of thecampaign, your first step is crucial. It should usually bedeceptively soft and indirect, making it harder to read.The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor during WorldWar II was a devastating surprise, but as the firstmove of a campaign it was a disaster. The Japaneseshowed their hand too quickly; rallying Americanpublic opinion to an intense level of anger, theyensured that the Americans would prosecute the warto the bitter end--and it was the Americans who hadthe greater military resources. Always pay attention tothe first step of the campaign. It sets the tempo,determines the enemy's mind-set, and launches youin a direction that had better be the right one.

The Prussian military theoretician Carl von Clausewitz

famously argued that war is the continuation of politicsby other means. He meant that every nation hasgoals--security, well-being, prosperity--that it ordinarilypursues through politics, but when another nation orinternal force thwarts their achievement throughpolitics, war is the natural result. War is never merelyabout victory on the battlefield or the simple conquestof land; it is about the pursuit of a policy that cannotbe realized in any other way than through force.

When a war is lost, however, all fingers usually pointat the military. We may sometimes go over thegenerals' heads, to the politicians who declared warin the first place; during and after the Vietnam War, forexample, some blamed the loss on the government'sfailure to commit to the war with full effort. More often,though, the postgame analysis is military--we poreover the war's battles, critiquing the officers' moves.And of course it is the military that has planned andfought the war, but even so, the real problem is aproblem of grand strategy. According to vonClausewitz, failure in war is a failure of policy. Thegoals of the war, and the policies that drove it, wereunrealistic, inappropriate, blind to other factors.

This idea is the philosophy of the grand strategist.Whenever anything goes wrong, it is human nature toblame this person or that. Let other people engage insuch stupidity, led around by their noses, seeing onlywhat is immediately visible to the eye. You see thingsdifferently. When an action goes wrong--in business,in politics, in life--trace it back to the policy thatinspired it in the first place. The goal was misguided.

This means that you yourself are largely the agentof anything bad that happens to you. With moreprudence, wiser policies, and greater vision, youcould have avoided the danger. So when somethinggoes wrong, look deep into yourself--not in anemotional way, to blame yourself or indulge yourfeelings of guilt, but to make sure that you start yournext campaign with a firmer step and greater vision.

Authority: It is a common mistake in going towar to begin at the wrong end, to act firstand to wait for disaster to discuss thematter.

--Thucydides (between 460 and 455 B.C.-circa400 B.C.)

REVERSALGrand strategy involves two dangers that you must

consider and combat. First, the successes it bringsyou in your first campaigns may have the same effecton you that easy victory on the battlefield gives ageneral: drunk on triumph, you may lose the sense ofrealism and proportion on which your future movesdepend. Even such supreme grand strategists asJulius Caesar and Napoleon eventually fell victim tothis dynamic: losing their sense of reality, they beganto believe that their instincts were infallible. Thegreater the victory, the greater the danger. As you getolder, as you move to your next campaign, you mustretrench, strain doubly hard to rein in your emotions,and maintain a sense of realism.

Second, the detachment necessary to grandstrategy can bring you to a point where you find it hardto act. Understanding the world too well, you see toomany options and become as indecisive as Hamlet.No matter how far we progress, we remain partanimal, and it is the animal in us that fires ourstrategies, gives them life, animates us to fight.Without the desire to fight, without a capacity for theviolence war churns up, we cannot deal with danger.

The prudent Odysseus types are comfortable withboth sides of their nature. They plan ahead as bestthey can, see far and wide, but when it comes time tomove ahead, they move. Knowing how to control youremotions means not repressing them completely butusing them to their best effect.

KNOW YOUR ENEMYTHE INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY

The target of your strategies should be less the armyyou face than the mind of the man or woman whoruns it. If you understand how that mind works, youhave the key to deceiving and controlling it. Trainyourself to read people, picking up the signals theyunconsciously send about their innermost thoughtsand intentions. A friendly front will let you watch themclosely and mine them for information. Beware ofprojecting your own emotions and mental habitsonto them; try to think as they think. By finding youropponents' psychological weaknesses, you can workto unhinge their minds.

THE MIRRORED ENEMYIn June 1838, Lord Auckland, the British governor-general of India, called a meeting of his top officials todiscuss a proposed invasion of Afghanistan.Auckland and other British ministers had becomeincreasingly concerned at Russia's growing influencein the area. The Russians had already made an ally ofPersia; they were now trying to do the same withAfghanistan, and if they were successful, the British inIndia would find themselves potentially cut off by landto the west and vulnerable to more incursions by theRussians. Instead of trying to outdo the Russians and

negotiate an alliance with the Afghan ruler, DostMahomed, Auckland proposed what he thought was asurer solution: invade Afghanistan and install a newruler--Shah Soojah, a former Afghan leader forced outof power twenty-five years earlier--who would then beindebted to the English.

He who knows the enemy and himself Willnever in a hundred battles be at risk.

SUN-TZU, FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

[As to the second case] , that of being drawn intoone [a trap or ambush] ...you must be shrewdabout not believing easily things not in accordwith reason. For example, if the enemy putssome booty before you, you ought to believethat within it there is a hook and that it concealssome trick. If many of the enemy are put to flightby your few, if a few of the enemy assail yourmany, if the enemy turn in sudden flight,...youought to fear a trick. And you should neverbelieve that the enemy does not know how tocarry on his affairs; rather, if you hope to be lessdeceived...and...run less risk, in proportion asyour enemy is weaker, in proportion as he isless cautious, you should the more respect him.THE ART OF WAR, NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI,

1521

Among the men listening to Auckland that day wasWilliam Macnaghten, the forty-five-year-old chief

secretary of the Calcutta government. Macnaghtenthought the invasion a brilliant idea: a friendlyAfghanistan would secure British interests in the areaand even help to spread British influence. And theinvasion could hardly fail. The British army would haveno trouble sweeping away the primitive Afghantribesmen; they would present themselves asliberators, freeing the Afghans from Russian tyrannyand bringing to the country the support and civilizinginfluence of England. As soon as Shah Soojah was inpower, the army would leave, so that British influenceover the grateful shah, although powerful, would beinvisible to the Afghan public. When it came time forMacnaghten to give his opinion on the proposedinvasion, his support of it was so sound andenthusiastic that Lord Auckland not only decided togo ahead, he named Macnaghten the queen's envoyto Kabul, the Afghan capital--the top Britishrepresentative in Afghanistan.

Meeting little resistance along the way, in August1839 the British army reached Kabul. Dost Mahomedfled to the mountains, and the shah reentered the city.To the local inhabitants, this was a strange sight:Shah Soojah, whom many could barely remember,looked old and submissive alongside Macnaghten,who rode into Kabul wearing a bright-colored uniformtopped by a cocked hat fringed with ostrich feathers.Why had these people come? What were they doinghere?

With the shah back in power, Macnaghten had toreassess the situation. Reports came in informing him

that Dost Mahomed was building an army in themountains to the north. Meanwhile, to the south, itseemed that in invading the country the British hadinsulted some local chieftains by plundering theirlands for food. These chiefs were now stirring uptrouble. It was also clear that the shah was unpopularwith his former subjects, so unpopular thatMacnaghten could not leave him and other Britishinterests in the country unprotected. ReluctantlyMacnaghten ordered most of the British army toremain in Afghanistan until the situation wasstabilized.

Time went by, and eventually Macnaghten decidedto allow the officers and soldiers of this increasinglylong-standing occupying force to send for theirfamilies, so that life would be less harsh for them.Soon the wives and children came, along with theirIndian servants. But where Macnaghten had imaginedthat the arrival of the soldiers' families would have ahumanizing, civilizing effect, it only alarmed theAfghans. Were the British planning a permanentoccupation? Everywhere the local people looked,there were representatives of British interests, talkingloudly in the streets, drinking wine, attending theatersand horse races--strange imported pleasures thatthey had introduced to the country. Now their familieswere making themselves at home. A hatred ofeverything English began to take root.

THE AGING LION AND THE FOXA lion who was getting old and could no longer

obtain his food by force decided that he mustresort to trickery instead. So he retired to a caveand lay down pretending to be ill. Thus,whenever any animals came to his cave to visithim, he ate them all as they appeared. Whenmany animals had disappeared, a fox figuredout what was happening. He went to see the lionbut stood at a safe distance outside the caveand asked him how he was. "Oh, not very well,"said the lion. "But why don't you come in?" Butthe fox said: "I would come inside if I hadn'tseen that a lot of footprints are pointing inwardstowards your cave but none are pointing out."Wise men note the indications of dangers andthus avoid them.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

There were those who warned Macnaghten aboutthis, and to all of them he had the same answer:everything would be forgotten and forgiven when thearmy left Afghanistan. The Afghans were childlike,emotional people; once they felt the benefits ofEnglish civilization, they would be more than grateful.One matter, however, did worry the envoy: the Britishgovernment was unhappy about the increasingexpense of the occupation. Macnaghten would haveto do something to cut costs, and he knew just whereto begin.

Most of the mountain passes through whichAfghanistan's main trade routes ran were held by the

Ghilzye tribes, who for many years, over the lives ofmany different rulers of the country, had been paid astipend to keep the passes open. Macnaghtendecided to halve this stipend. The Ghilzyesresponded by blocking the passes, and elsewhere inthe country tribes sympathetic to the Ghilzyesrebelled. Macnaghten, caught off guard, tried to putthese rebellions down, but he did not take them tooseriously, and worried officers who told him torespond more vigorously were rebuked foroverreacting. Now the British army would have to stayindefinitely.

The situation deteriorated quickly. In October 1841a mob attacked the home of a British official andkilled him. In Kabul local chiefs began to conspire toexpel their British overlords. Shah Soojah panicked.For months he had begged Macnaghten to let himcapture and kill his main rivals, an Afghan ruler'straditional method of securing his position.Macnaghten had told him that a civilized country didnot use murder to solve its political problems. Theshah knew that the Afghans respected strength andauthority, not "civilized" values; to them his failure todeal with his enemies made him look weak andunrulerlike and left him surrounded by enemies.Macnaghten would not listen.

The rebellion spread, and Macnaghten now had toconfront the fact that he did not have the manpower toput down a general uprising. But why should hepanic? The Afghans and their leaders were naive; hewould regain the upper hand through intrigue and

cleverness. To that end, Macnaghten publiclynegotiated an agreement whereby British troops andcitizens would leave Afghanistan, in exchange forwhich the Afghans would supply the retreating Britishwith food. Privately, though, Macnaghten made itknown to a few key chiefs that he was willing to makeone of them the country's vizier--and load with himmoney--in exchange for putting down the rebellion andallowing the English to stay.

Bait.--"Everyone has his price"--this is not true.But there surely exists for everyone a bait hecannot help taking. Thus to win many peopleover to a cause one needs only to put on it agloss of philanthropy, nobility, charitableness,self-sacrifice--and on to what cause can one notput it?--: these are the sweetmeats and daintiesfor their soul; others have others.

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE, 1886

The chief of the eastern Ghilzyes, Akbar Khan,responded to this offer, and on December 23, 1841,Macnaghten rode out for a private meeting with him toseal the bargain. After exchanging greetings Akbarasked Macnaghten if he wanted to go ahead with thetreachery they were planning. Thrilled to have turnedthe situation around, Macnaghten cheerily answeredthat he did. Without a word of explanation, Akbarsignaled his men to grab Macnaghten and throw himin prison--he had no intention of betraying the other

chiefs. Along the way a mob developed, caught holdof the unfortunate envoy, and with a fury built up overyears of humiliation literally tore him to pieces. Hislimbs and head were paraded through the streets ofKabul, and his torso was hung from a meat hook inthe bazaar.

In a matter of days, everything unraveled. Theremaining British troops--some 4,500 of them, alongwith 12,000 camp followers--were forced to agree toan immediate retreat from Afghanistan, despite thebitter winter weather. The Afghans were to keep theretreating army supplied but did not do so. Certainthat the British would never leave unless forced to,they harassed them relentlessly in their retreat.Civilians and soldiers alike quickly perished in thesnow.

On January 13, British forces at the fort inJalalabad saw a single horse struggling toward thegates. Its half-dead rider, Dr. William Brydon, was thesole survivor of the British army's doomed invasion ofAfghanistan.

InterpretationThe knowledge that would have averted thecatastrophe was at Macnaghten's fingertips longbefore he launched the expedition. Englishmen andIndians who had lived in Afghanistan could have toldhim that the Afghan people were among the proudestand most independent on the planet. To them theimage of foreign troops marching into Kabul wouldconstitute an unforgivable humiliation. On top of that,

they were not a people yearning for peace, prosperity,and reconciliation. In fact, they saw strife andconfrontation as a healthy way of life.

Macnaghten had the information but refused to seeit. Instead he projected onto the Afghans the values ofan Englishman, which he mistakenly assumed wereuniversal. Blinded by narcissism, he misread everysignal along the way. As a result his strategic moves--leaving the British army occupying Kabul, halving theGhilzyes' stipend, trying not to overplay his hand inputting down the rebellions--were exactly the oppositeof what was needed. And on that fateful day when heliterally lost his head, he made the ultimatemiscalculation, imagining that money and an appealto self-interest would buy loyalty among the verypeople he had so humiliated.

Blindness and narcissism like this are not so rare;we find them every day. Our natural tendency is to seeother people as mere reflections of our own desiresand values. Failing to understand the ways they arenot like us, we are surprised when they do notrespond as we had imagined. We unintentionallyoffend and alienate people, then blame them, not ourinability to understand them, for the damage done.

Understand: if you let narcissism act as a screenbetween you and other people, you will misread themand your strategies will misfire. You must be aware ofthis and struggle to see others dispassionately. Everyindividual is like an alien culture. You must get insidehis or her way of thinking, not as an exercise insensitivity but out of strategic necessity. Only by

knowing your enemies can you ever hope to vanquishthem.

Be submissive so that he will trust you and youwill thereby learn about his true situation.

Accept his ideas and respond to his affairs as ifyou were twins. Once you have learned

everything, subtly gather in his power. Thuswhen the ultimate day arrives, it will seem as if

Heaven itself destroyed him.--Tai Kung, Six Secret Teachings (circa fourth

century B.C.)

THE CLOSE EMBRACEIn 1805, Napoleon Bonaparte humiliated theAustrians in the battles of Ulm and Austerlitz. In thesubsequent treaty, he carved up the Austrian Empire,taking over its lands in Italy and Germany. ForNapoleon all this was one part of a chess game. Hisultimate goal was to make Austria an ally--a weak andsubordinate ally, but one that would lend him weight inthe courts of Europe, since Austria had been a centralforce in European politics. As part of this overallstrategy, Napoleon requested a new Austrianambassador to France: Prince Klemens vonMetternich, at the time the Austrian ambassador tothe Prussian court in Berlin.

Confucius's evaluation of Yang Hu, a man whohad been forced to flee from one state toanother because he proved greedy and disloyal

each time he acquired power, provides a simpleexample of projecting behavior on the basis ofconstancy. Based upon this repeatedbehavioral pattern, Confucius accuratelypredicted that Yang Hu would certainly suffer anignominious end. More generally, Menciussubsequently stated: "A man who ceases hisefforts where he should not will abandon themanywhere. A man who is parsimonious withthose with whom he should be generous will beparsimonious everywhere." Granting thatpeople generally acquire fixed habits early inlife, a man's end may therefore be foreseen bymidlife: "Someone who is still disliked at fortyyears of age will end by being so."

RALPH D. SAWYER, THE TAO OFSPYCRAFT, 1998

Metternich, then thirty-two, came from one ofEurope's most illustrious families. A speaker ofimpeccable French, a staunch conservative inpolitics, he was a paragon of breeding and eleganceand an inveterate ladies' man. The presence of thispolished aristocrat would add a sheen to the imperialcourt that Napoleon was creating. More important,winning over a man of such power--and Napoleoncould be quite seductive in private meetings--wouldhelp in his grand strategy of making Austria a weaksatellite. And Metternich's weakness for women wouldgive Napoleon a way in.

The two men met for the first time in August 1806,when Metternich presented his credentials. Napoleonacted coolly. He dressed well for the occasion butkept his hat on, which in the mores of the time wasrather rude. After Metternich's speech--short andceremonious--Napoleon began to pace the room andtalk politics in a way that made it clear he was incommand. (He liked to stand up to talk to peoplewhile they remained seated.) He made a show ofspeaking pointedly and concisely; he was not someCorsican rube for the sophisticated Metternich to playwith. In the end he was sure he had made theimpression he wanted.

Coordination is less of a problem when politicalleaders themselves play an active part in theintelligence effort. When he was Senatemajority leader, Lyndon Johnson cultivated anextensive intelligence system with sources allover Washington. At one point in the 1950s,Johnson complained to a reporter that he wasfocusing on internal Democratic problems whilefailing to cover divisions in the Senate GOP. Tomake his point, he pulled out a memorandumon a recent private meeting at which the reporterand several of his colleagues had gotten abriefing on GOP factionalism from SenatorThurston Morton (R-KY). Rowland Evans andRobert Novak recalled: "The IntelligenceSystem was a marvel of efficiency. It was also

rather frightening." Even in the White House,Johnson believed in firsthand politicalintelligence. According to his aide HarryMcPherson, "I guess he called a lot of people,but I could usually count on it in the lateafternoon, as he woke up from his nap, that Iwould get a call which would usually say, 'Whatdo you know?'" McPherson would then passalong the latest news that he picked up fromreporters and political figures.THE ART OF POLITICAL WARFARE, JOHN J.

PITNEY, JR., 2000

Over the months to come, Napoleon and Metternichhad many more such meetings. It was the emperor'splan to charm the prince, but the charm raninescapably the other way: Metternich had a way oflistening attentively, making apt comments, evencomplimenting Napoleon on his strategic insights. Atthose moments Napoleon would beam inside: herewas a man who could truly appreciate his genius. Hebegan to crave Metternich's presence, and theirdiscussions of European politics became more andmore frank. The two became friends of sorts.

Hoping to take advantage of Metternich'sweakness for women, Napoleon set up his sister,Caroline Murat, to have an affair with the prince. Helearned from her a few pieces of diplomatic gossip,and she told him that Metternich had come to respecthim. In turn she also told Metternich that Napoleon

was unhappy with his wife, Empress Josephine, whocould not bear children; he was considering divorce.Napoleon did not seem upset that Metternich knewsuch things about his personal life.

In 1809, seeking revenge for its ignominious defeatat Austerlitz, Austria declared war on France.Napoleon only welcomed this event, which gave him achance to beat the Austrians still more soundly thanbefore. The war was hard fought, but the Frenchprevailed, and Napoleon imposed a humiliatingsettlement, annexing whole sections of the AustrianEmpire. Austria's military was dismantled, itsgovernment was overhauled, and Napoleon's friendMetternich was named foreign minister--exactly whereNapoleon wanted him.

Several months later something happened thatcaught Napoleon slightly off guard but delighted him:the Austrian emperor offered him his eldest daughter,the Archduchess Marie Louise, in marriage.Napoleon knew that the Austrian aristocracy hatedhim; this had to be Metternich's work. Alliance bymarriage with Austria would be a strategic tour deforce, and Napoleon happily accepted the offer, firstdivorcing Josephine, then marrying Marie Louise in1810.

Metternich accompanied the archduchess to Parisfor the wedding, and now his relationship withNapoleon grew still warmer. Napoleon's marriagemade him a member of one of Europe's greatestfamilies, and to a Corsican, family was everything; hehad won a dynastic legitimacy he had long craved. In

conversation with the prince, he opened up evenmore than before. He was also delighted with his newempress, who revealed a keen political mind. He lether in on his plans for empire in Europe.

In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia. Now Metternichcame to him with a request: the formation of an armyof 30,000 Austrian soldiers at Napoleon's disposal. Inreturn Napoleon would let Austria rebuild its military.Napoleon saw no harm in this step; he was allied withAustria by marriage, and rearmament there wouldhelp him in the end.

Months later the Russian invasion had turned into adisaster, and Napoleon was forced to retreat, hisarmy decimated. Now Metternich offered his servicesas a mediator between France and the otherEuropean powers. Centrally placed as it is, Austriahad performed that task in the past, and anywayNapoleon had little choice: he needed time to recoup.Even if Austria's role as a mediator allowed it toreassert its independence, he had little to fear fromhis in-laws.

In all the martial arts, in all the performing artsand still more in all the forms of humanbehavior, a man's postures or moves are basedon the movements of his [invisible] mind.... Inthe Kage Style of swordsmanship a swordsmanreads his opponent's mind through his posturesor moves.... What mind can penetrate hisopponent's mind? It is a mind that has beentrained and cultivated to the point of

detachment with perfect freedom. It is as clearas a mirror that can reflect the motions within hisopponent's mind.... When one stands face toface with his opponents, his mind must not berevealed in the form of moves. Instead his mindshould reflect his opponent's mind like waterreflecting the moon.LIVES OF MASTER SWORDSMEN, MAKOTO

SUGAWARA, 1988

By the spring of 1813, negotiations had brokendown and a new war was about to break out betweenthe badly damaged France and a powerful alliance ofRussia, Prussia, England, and Sweden. By this timethe Austrian army had grown considerably; somehowNapoleon had to get his hands on it--but his spiesreported that Metternich had entered into secretagreement with the Allies. Surely this had to be somesort of ploy: how could the Austrian emperor fight hisson-in-law? Yet in a few weeks, it became official:unless France negotiated a peace, Austria woulddrop its mediating position and join the Allies.

Napoleon could not believe what he was hearing.He traveled to Dresden for a meeting with Metternich,which took place on June 26. The moment he saw theprince, he felt a shock: the friendly, nonchalant air wasgone. In a rather cold tone, Metternich informed himthat France must accept a settlement that wouldreduce it to its natural boundaries. Austria wasobligated to defend its interests and the stability ofEurope. Suddenly it occurred to the emperor:

Metternich had been playing him all along, the familyties merely a ploy to blind him to Austrian rearmamentand independence. "So I have perpetrated a verystupid piece of folly in marrying an archduchess ofAustria?" Napoleon blurted out. "Since Your Majestydesires to know my opinion," Metternich replied, "I willcandidly say that Napoleon, the conqueror, has madea mistake."

Napoleon refused to accept Metternich's dictatedpeace. In return Austria dropped its neutrality andjoined the Allies, becoming their de facto militaryleader. And with Austria leading the way, they finallydefeated Napoleon in April 1814 and exiled him tothe Mediterranean island of Elba.

InterpretationNapoleon prided himself on his ability to gaugepeople's psychology and use it against them, but inthis case he was outwitted by a man far superior atsuch a game. Metternich's modus operandi was thefollowing: he would quietly study his enemies frombehind his smiling, elegant exterior, his own apparentrelaxation inviting them to open up. In his very firstmeeting with Napoleon, he saw a man straining toimpress: he noticed that the bantam Napoleon walkedon his toes, to look taller, and struggled to suppresshis Corsican accent. Later meetings only confirmedMetternich's impression of a man who cravedacceptance as the social equal of Europe'saristocracy. The emperor was insecure.

This insight won, Metternich used it to craft the

perfect counter-strategy: the offer of marriage into theAustrian dynasty. To a Corsican, that would meaneverything, and it would blind Napoleon to a simplereality: for aristocrats like Metternich and the Austrianemperor, family ties meant nothing compared to thesurvival of the dynasty itself.

When Munenori was granted an audience withthe shogun, he sat down, put his hands on thetatami floor, as retainers always did to show theirrespect to their master. Suddenly, Iemitsu thrusta spear at the "unsuspecting" Munenori--andwas surprised to find himself lying flat on hisback! Munenori had sensed the shogun'sintention before a move had been made, andswept Iemitsu's legs out from under him at theinstant of the thrust.LIVES OF MASTER SWORDSMEN, MAKOTO

SUGAWARA, 1988

Metternich's genius was to recognize theappropriate target for his strategy: not Napoleon'sarmies, which Austria could not hope to defeat--Napoleon was a general for the ages--but Napoleon'smind. The prince understood that even the mostpowerful of men remains human and has humanweaknesses. By entering Napoleon's private life,being deferential and subordinate, Metternich couldfind his weaknesses and hurt him as no army could.By getting closer to him emotionally--through theemperor's sister Caroline, through the Archduchess

Marie Louise, through their convivial meetings--hecould choke him in a friendly embrace.

Understand: your real enemy is your opponent'smind. His armies, his resources, his intelligence, canall be overcome if you can fathom his weakness, theemotional blind spot through which you can deceive,distract, and manipulate him. The most powerful armyin the world can be beaten by unhinging the mind ofits leader.

And the best way to find the leader's weaknessesis not through spies but through the close embrace.Behind a friendly, even subservient front, you canobserve your enemies, get them to open up andreveal themselves. Get inside their skin; think as theythink. Once you discover their vulnerability--anuncontrollable temper, a weakness for the oppositesex, a gnawing insecurity--you have the material todestroy them.

War is not an act of the will aimed at inanimatematter, as it is in the mechanical arts.... Rather,

[it] is an act of the will aimed at a living entitythat reacts.

--Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)

KEYS TO WARFAREThe greatest power you could have in life would comeneither from limitless resources nor evenconsummate skill in strategy. It would come from clearknowledge of those around you--the ability to readpeople like a book. Given that knowledge, you could

distinguish friend from foe, smoking out snakes in thegrass. You could anticipate your enemies' malice,pierce their strategies, and take defensive action.Their transparency would reveal to you the emotionsthey could least control. Armed with that knowledge,you could make them tumble into traps and destroythem.

This kind of knowledge has been a military goalsince the dawn of history. That is why the arts ofintelligence gathering and spying were invented. Butspies are unreliable; they filter information throughtheir own preconceptions and prejudices, and sincetheir trade places them precisely between one sideand the other and forces them to be independentoperators, they are notoriously hard to control and canturn against you. Then, too, the nuances that givepeople away--the tone in a speaker's voice, the lookin his or her eyes--are inevitably missing from theirreports. In the end the spy's information meansnothing unless you are adept at interpreting humanbehavior and psychology. Without that skill you willsee in it what you want to see, confirming your ownprejudices.

The leaders who have made best use ofintelligence--Hannibal, Julius Caesar, PrinceMetternich, Winston Churchill, Lyndon Johnson duringhis career in the U.S. Senate--were all first andforemost great students of human nature and superiorreaders of men. They honed their skills throughpersonal observation of people. Only with thatfoundation could the use of spies extend their powers

of vision.

In my opinion, there are two kinds of eyes: onekind simply looks at things and the other seesthrough things to perceive their inner nature.The former should not be tense [so as toobserve as much as possible] ; the latter shouldbe strong [so as to discern the workings of theopponent's mind clearly] . Sometimes a mancan read another's mind with his eyes. Infencing, it is all right to allow your own eyes toexpress your will but never let them reveal yourmind. This matter should be consideredcarefully and studied diligently.

MIYAMOTO MUSASHI, 1584-1645

The first step in the process is to get over the ideathat people are impenetrable mysteries and that onlysome trick will let you peek into their souls. If theyseem mysterious, it is because almost all of us learnto disguise our true feelings and intentions from anearly age. If we went around showing just how we feltand telling people what we planned to do, we wouldmake ourselves vulnerable to malice, and if wealways spoke our minds, we would offend a lot ofpeople unnecessarily. So as we grow up, concealingmuch of what we are thinking becomes secondnature.

This deliberate opacity makes the intelligencegame difficult but not impossible. For even as peopleconsciously struggle to conceal what is going on in

their minds, they unconsciously want to revealthemselves. Hiding how we feel in social situations isexhausting; being able to show ourselves is a relief.We secretly want people to know us, even includingour dark side. Even while we consciously struggle tocontrol this hidden yearning, unconsciously we arealways sending out signals that reveal a part of whatis going on inside--slips of the tongue, tones of voice,styles of dress, nervous twitches, sudden irrationalactions, a look in the eye that contradicts our words,the things we say after a drink.

Anger as spy. --Anger empties out the soul andbrings even its dregs to light. That is why, if weknow no other way of discovering the truth of thematter, we must know how to put ouracquaintances, our adherents and opponents,into a rage, so as to learn all that is really beingthought and undertaken against us.

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE, 1886

Understand: day in and day out, people emitsignals that reveal their intentions and deepestdesires. If we do not pick them up, it is because weare not paying attention. The reason for this is simple:we are usually locked up in our own worlds, listeningto our internal monologues, obsessed with ourselvesand with satisfying our own egos. Like WilliamMacnaghten, we tend to see other people merely asreflections of ourselves. To the extent that you can

drop your self-interest and see people for who theyare, divorced from your desires, you will becomemore sensitive to their signals.

The ability to read people was a critical survival skillfor Japanese samurai and was particularlyemphasized by the Shinkage school ofswordsmanship. One of the school's earliest masterswas the seventeenth-century samurai YagyuMunenori. One spring afternoon in his later years,Munenori was taking a peaceful walk through hisgardens, admiring the cherry blossoms. He wasaccompanied by a page/protector, who walkedbehind him, sword raised, as was the custom.Suddenly Munenori stopped in his tracks. He had afeeling of danger. Looking around, he saw nothing towarrant this feeling, but even so he was so troubledthat he returned to his house and sat with his backagainst a post to prevent a surprise attack.

Then David fled from Nai'oth in Ramah, andcame and said before Jonathan, "What have Idone? What is my guilt? And what is my sinbefore your father, that he seeks my life?" Andhe said to him, "Far from it! You shall not die.Behold, my father does nothing either great orsmall without disclosing it to me; and whyshould my father hide this from me? It is notso." But David replied, "Your father knows wellthat I have found favor in your eyes; and hethinks, 'Let not Jonathan know this, lest he begrieved.' But truly, as the Lord lives and as your

soul lives, there is but a step between me anddeath." Then said Jonathan to David,"Whatever you say, I will do for you." David saidto Jonathan, "Behold, tomorrow is the newmoon, and I should not fail to sit at table with theking; but let me go, that I may hide myself in thefield till the third day at evening. If your fathermisses me at all, then say, 'David earnestlyasked leave of me to run to Bethlehem his city;for there is a yearly sacrifice there for all thefamily.' If he says, 'Good!' it will be well with yourservant; but if he is angry, then know that evil isdetermined by him."...And Jonathan said toDavid, "Come, let us go out into the field." Sothey both went out into the field.... So David hidhimself in the field; and when the new mooncame, the king sat down to eat food. The kingsat upon his seat, as at other times, upon theseat by the wall; Jonathan sat opposite, andAbner sat by Saul's side, but David's place wasempty. Yet Saul did not say anything that day;for he thought, "Something has befallen him; heis not clean, surely he is not clean." But on thesecond day, the morrow after the new moon,David's place was empty. And Saul said toJonathan his son, "Why has not the son ofJesse come to the meal, either yesterday ortoday?" Jonathan answered Saul, "Davidearnestly asked leave of me to go to

Bethlehem; he said, 'Let me go; for our familyholds a sacrifice in the city, and my brother hascommanded me to be there. So now, if I havefound favor in your eyes, let me get away, andsee my brothers.' For this reason he has notcome to the king's table." Then Saul's angerwas kindled against Jonathan, and he said tohim, "You son of a perverse, rebellious woman,do I not know that you have chosen the son ofJesse to your own shame, and to the shame ofyour mother's nakedness? For as long as theson of Jesse lives upon the earth, neither younor your kingdom shall be established.Therefore send and fetch him to me, for he shallsurely die." Then Jonathan answered Saul hisfather, "Why should he be put to death? Whathas he done?" But Saul cast his spear at him tosmite him; so Jonathan knew that his father wasdetermined to put David to death. And Jonathanrose from the table in fierce anger and ate nofood the second day of the month, for he wasgrieved for David, because his father haddisgraced him.

1 SAMUEL 20:1-11, 24-34

After Munenori had sat there for a while, his pageasked him what was the matter. The samuraiconfessed that while looking at the cherry blossomshe had had an intimation of imminent danger, of anenemy on the attack. What troubled him now was that

the danger had apparently been imaginary--he musthave hallucinated it. A samurai depended on his keeninstincts to anticipate attack. If Munenori had lost thatpower, his life as a warrior was over.

Suddenly the page threw himself to the ground andconfessed: as Munenori walked in the garden, thethought had come to the page that if he were to strikeat his master while the samurai was lost in admirationof the cherry blossoms, not even this giftedswordsman could have parried his attack. Munenorihad not lost his skill at all; quite the contrary--hisincomparable sensitivity to other people's emotionsand thoughts had allowed him to pick up sensationsfrom someone behind his back, rather as a horsesenses the energy of its rider or a dog the movementsof its owner. An animal has that sensitivity because itpays complete attention. Similarly, the Shinkageschool taught warriors to empty their minds, centeringthemselves in the moment as animals did andkeeping themselves from getting derailed by anyparticular thought. This would allow the Shinkagewarrior to read in his opponent's elbow or hand theslight tension that signaled an attack; he could lookthrough his opponent's eyes and sense the comingblow or notice the nervous shuffle of the feet thatindicated fear or confusion. A master like Munenoricould virtually read someone's thoughts when theother person wasn't even visible.

The power taught by the Shinkage school--thesame power possessed by Prince Metternich--wasthe ability to let go of one's ego, to submerge oneself

temporarily in the other person's mind. You will beamazed at how much you can pick up about people ifyou can shut off your incessant interior monologue,empty your thoughts, and anchor yourself in themoment. The details you now see give you unfilteredinformation from which you can put together anaccurate picture of people's weaknesses anddesires. Be particularly attentive to their eyes: it takesa lot of effort to hide the eyes' message about aperson's state of mind.

According to the baseball pitcher Bob Lemon, thegreat player Ted Williams "was the only hitter who youfelt saw through you." In the struggle between pitcherand batter, the pitcher has the advantage of knowingwhat pitch he will throw. The hitter can only guess atthat, which is why even the best of them usuallyconnect only one out of every three or four times.Somehow Williams changed those odds.

Williams's method wasn't magic, or even intuition; itwas simple enough. He made baseball pitchers hisstudy, watching their patterns over the course of agame, a season, a career. He would ask the pitcherson his own team endless questions about theirprocess, trying to get a feel for how they thought. Atthe plate he would empty his mind of everything butthe pitcher, noticing the slightest hitch in his windup orchange in his grip--anything that would signal hisintentions. The end result seemed uncanny: at bat,Williams was able to think himself into the pitcher'smind and anticipate the pitch that was coming.Sometimes he would even see himself as another

person--a pitcher trying to outwit the great hitter TedWilliams. As Williams demonstrates, the ability tomimic and get inside your enemies' thought patternsdepends on collecting as much information on themas you can, analyzing their past behavior for itshabitual patterns, and being alert to the signs theygive off in the present.

It is of course critical that people be unaware youare watching them so closely. A friendly front, likePrince Metternich's to Napoleon, will help disguisewhat you're doing. Do not ask too many questions; thetrick is to get people to relax and open up withoutprodding, shadowing them so quietly that they neverguess what you're really up to.

Information is useless unless you know how tointerpret it, how to use it to tell appearance fromreality. You must learn how to recognize a range ofpsychological types. Be alert, for instance, to thephenomenon of the masked opposite: when someonestrikingly manifests a particular personality trait, thattrait may well be a cover-up. The oily character who isingratiatingly effusive with flattery may be hidinghostility and ill will; the aggressive bully may be hidinginsecurity; the moralizer may be making a show ofpurity to hide nefarious desires. Whether they'rethrowing dust in your eyes or their own--they may betrying to convince themselves that they're not whatthey're afraid they are--the opposite trait lurks belowthe surface.

In general, it is easier to observe people in action,particularly in moments of crisis. Those are the times

when they either reveal their weakness or struggle sohard to disguise it that you can see through the mask.You can actively probe them by doing things thatseem harmless but get a response--maybe saysomething bold or provocative, then see how theyreact. Making people emotional, pushing theirbuttons, will touch some deep part of their nature.Either they will let slip some truth about themselves orthey will put on a mask that you, in the laboratorysituation you have created, will be able to peerbehind.

A critical part of understanding people is gaugingtheir powers of resistance. Without that knowledgeyou will either over-or underestimate them, dependingon your own levels of fear and confidence. You needto know how much fight people have in them.Someone hiding his cowardice and lack of resolvecan be made to surrender with a single violent push;someone desperate who has little to lose will fight tothe bitter end. The Mongols used to begin theircampaigns with a battle whose only purpose was totest their opponent's strength and resolve. They wouldnever deal with an enemy until they had gauged hismorale. This set-up battle also had the benefit ofrevealing something of his strategy and thought.

The quality of the information you gather on yourenemies is more important than the quantity. A singlebut crucial nugget can be the key to their destruction.When the Carthaginian general Hannibal saw that theRoman general he was facing was arrogant and hot-tempered, he would deliberately play weak, luring the

man into a rash attack. Once Churchill saw that Hitlerhad a paranoid streak, becoming irrational at themerest hint of vulnerability, the British prime ministerknew how to unhinge the German fuhrer: by feigningto attack some marginal area like the Balkans, hecould make him see threats on all sides and spreadout his defenses, a critical military mistake.

In 1988, Lee Atwater was a political strategist onthe team of the senior George Bush, who was then inthe race to become that year's Republicanpresidential nominee. Discovering that Bush's mainrival, Senator Robert Dole, had a terrible temper thathis aides had to struggle to control, Atwater devisedendless stratagems to push Dole's buttons. Not onlydid an upset Dole look unpresidential to the Americanpublic, but an emotional and angry man rarely thinksstraight. A disturbed mind is one you can control andunbalance at will.

There are, of course, limits to how muchintelligence gathering you can achieve by firsthandobservation. A network of spies will extend yourvision, particularly as you learn to interpret theinformation they bring you. An informal network is thebest--a group of allies recruited over time to be youreyes and ears. Try to make friends with people at ornear the source of information on your rival; one well-placed friend will yield far more than will a handful ofpaid spies. In Napoleon's time his intelligencenetwork was second to none, but his best informationcame from friends whom he had carefully positionedin diplomatic circles around Europe.

Always look for internal spies, people in the enemycamp who are dissatisfied and have an ax to grind.Turn them to your purposes and they will give youbetter information than any infiltrator you sneak in fromoutside. Hire people the enemy has fired--they will tellyou how the enemy thinks. President Bill Clinton gothis best intelligence on the Republicans from hisadviser Dick Morris, who had worked for them foryears and knew their weaknesses, both personal andorganizational. A warning: never rely on one spy, onesource of information, no matter how good. You riskbeing played or getting slanted, one-sidedinformation.

Many people leave a paper trail of writings,interviews, and so on that is as revealing as anythingyou can learn from a spy. Well before World War II,Adolf Hitler's book Mein Kampf supplied a blueprintof his thinking and intentions, not to mention endlessclues to his psychology. His generals Erwin Rommeland Heinz Guderian also wrote about the new kind ofblitzkrieg warfare they were preparing. People reveala lot about themselves in their writing, partlyintentionally--they are out to explain themselves, afterall--and partly helplessly to the skilled reader-between-the-lines.

Motive of attack. --One attacks someone notonly so as to harm him or to overpower him butperhaps only so as to learn how strong he is.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844-1900

Last year at a great conference there was acertain man who explained his dissentingopinion and said he was resolved to kill theconference leader if it was not accepted. Hismotion was passed. After the procedures wereover, the man said, "Their assent came quickly.I think that they are too weak and unreliable tobe counselors to the master."HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI,

YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, 1659-1720

Finally, the enemy you are dealing with is not aninanimate object that will simply respond in anexpected manner to your strategies. Your enemiesare constantly changing and adapting to what you aredoing. Innovating and inventing on their own, they tryto learn from their mistakes and from your successes.So your knowledge of the enemy cannot be static.Keep your intelligence up to date, and do not rely onthe enemy's responding the same way twice. Defeatis a stern teacher, and your beaten opponent todaymay be wiser tomorrow. Your strategies must takethis possibility into account; your knowledge of theenemy must be not just deep but timely.

Colonel John Cremony commented on theiradeptness at seeming to "disappear" when hewrote "an Apache can conceal his swart bodyamidst the green grass, behind brown shrubs, orgray rocks, with so much address andjudgement that any but the experienced would

pass him by without detection at the distance ofthree or four yard" and noted that "they willwatch for days, scanning your every movement,observing your every act; taking exact note ofyour party and all its belongings. Let no onesuppose that these assaults are made upon thespur of the moment by bands accidentallyencountered. Far from it; they are almostinvariably the results of long watching--patientwaiting--careful and rigorous observation, andanxious counsel."

WARRIORS: WARFARE AND THE NATIVEAMERICAN INDIAN, NORMAN BANCROFT-

HUNT, 1995

Image: The Shadow. Everyone has ashadow, a secret self, a dark side. Thisshadow comprises everything people try tohide from the world--their weaknesses,secret desires, selfish intentions. Thisshadow is invisible from a distance; to see ityou must get up close, physically and mostof all psychologically. Then it will come intorelief. Follow close in your target's footstepsand he will not notice how much of hisshadow he has revealed.

REVERSALEven as you work to know your enemies, you mustmake yourself as formless and difficult to read aspossible. Since people really only have appearancesto go on, they can be readily deceived. Actunpredictably now and then. Throw them some goldennugget of your inner self--something fabricated thathas nothing to do with who you really are. Be awarethat they are scrutinizing you, and either give themnothing or feed them misinformation. Keepingyourself formless and inscrutable will make itimpossible for people to defend themselves againstyou and render the intelligence they gather on youuseless.

In principle, I should lay it down that theexistence of secret agents should not betolerated, as tending to augment the positivedangers of the evil against which they are used.That the spy will fabricate his information is acommonplace. But in the sphere of political andrevolutionary action, relying partly on violence,

the professional spy has every facility tofabricate the very facts themselves, and willspread the double evil of emulation in onedirection, and of panic, hasty legislation,unreflecting hate, on the other.

THE SECRET AGENT, JOSEPH CONRAD,1857-1924

OVERWHELM RESISTANCE WITHSPEED AND SUDDENNESS

THE BLITZKRIEG STRATEGY

In a world in which many people are indecisive andoverly cautious, the use of speed will bring youuntold power. Striking first, before your opponentshave time to think or prepare, will make thememotional, unbalanced, and prone to error. Whenyou follow with another swift and sudden maneuver,you will induce further panic and confusion. Thisstrategy works best with a setup, a lull--yourunexpected action catches your enemy off guard.When you strike, hit with unrelenting force. Actingwith speed and decisiveness will garner you respect,awe, and irresistible momentum.

War is such that the supreme consideration isspeed. This is to take advantage of what isbeyond the reach of the enemy, to go by way ofroutes where he least expects you, and to attackwhere he has made no preparations.

SUN-TZU, FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

SLOW-SLOW-QUICK-QUICKIn 1218, Muhammad II, the shah of Khwarizm,received a visit from three ambassadors on behalf of

Genghis Khan, the leader of the Mongol Empire to theeast. The visitors bore magnificent gifts and, moreimportant, the offer of a treaty between the twopowers that would allow the reopening of the lucrativeSilk Road connecting China and Europe. The shah'sempire was immense, incorporating present-day Iranand much of Afghanistan. His capital, Samarkand,was fabulously wealthy, a symbol of his power, andincreased trade along the route would only add tothese riches. Since the Mongols made it clear theyconsidered him the superior partner in the deal, theshah decided to sign the treaty.

A few months later, a Mongol caravan arrived in thecity of Otrar, in the northeastern corner of the shah'sempire, with the mission to buy luxury items for theMongol court. The governor of Otrar suspected themen in the caravan of being spies. He had themkilled, and he seized the goods they had brought tobarter. Hearing of this outrage, Genghis Khandispatched an ambassador, escorted by two soldiers,to the shah, calling for an apology. The demand--which presumed to put the two empires on equalfooting--incensed the shah. He had the ambassador'shead cut off and sent back to Genghis Khan. This, ofcourse, meant war.

The shah was not afraid: his army, anchored by itswell-trained Turkish cavalry, numbered over 400,000,at least twice the enemy's size. By defeating theMongols in battle, the shah could finally take over theirland. He assumed the Mongols would attackTransoxiana, the easternmost part of the shah's

empire. Bordered to the east by the five-hundred-mile-long Syr Dar'ya River, to the north by the KizilKum Desert, and to the west by the Amu Dar'ya River,Transoxiana's interior was also home to two of themost important cities of the empire, Samarkand andBukhara. The shah decided to establish a cordon ofsoldiers along the Syr Dar'ya, which the Mongolswould have to cross to enter his empire. They couldnot cross from the north--the desert was impassable--and to go to the south would be too great a detour.Keeping the bulk of his army in the interior ofTransoxiana, he would be able to placereinforcements where needed. He had animpregnable defensive position and superiority innumbers. Let the Mongols come. He would crushthem.

In the summer of 1219, scouts reported that theMongols were approaching the southern end of theSyr Dar'ya, through the Fergana Valley. The shah senta large force, under the leadership of his son Jalal ad-Din, to destroy the enemy. After a fierce battle, theMongols retreated. Jalal ad-Din reported back to hisfather that the Mongol army was not nearly asfearsome as their reputation. The men lookedhaggard, their horses emaciated, and they seemednone too eager to sustain a fight. The shah, believingthe Mongols no match for his army, put more troops atthe southern end of the cordon and waited.

A few months later, a Mongol battalion appearedwithout warning in the north, attacking the city of Otrarand capturing its governor--the same man

responsible for the outrage against the Mongoltraders. The Mongols killed him by pouring moltensilver into his eyes and ears. Stunned by how quicklythey had managed to reach Otrar, and from anunexpected direction, the shah decided to shift moretroops to the north. These barbarians might moveswiftly, he reasoned, but they could not overcome anentrenched army with such great numbers.

Next, however, two Mongol armies swept southfrom Otrar, running parallel to the Syr Dar'ya. One,under General Jochi, began to attack key towns alongthe river, while the other, under General Jebe,disappeared to the south. Like locusts, Jochi's armyswarmed through the hills and lowlands near the river.The shah moved a good portion of his army to theriver, keeping some reserves in Samarkand. Jochi'sforce was relatively small, 20,000 at most; thesemobile units hit one position after another, withoutwarning, burning forts and wreaking havoc.

Reports from the front lines began to give the shaha picture of these strange warriors from the east.Their army was all cavalry. Each Mongol not only rodea horse but was trailed by several more riderlesshorses, all mares, and when his own horse tired, hewould mount a fresh one. These horses were light andfast. The Mongols were unencumbered by supplywagons; they carried their food with them, drank themares' milk and blood, and killed and ate the horsesthat had become weak. They could travel twice as fastas their enemy. Their marksmanship wasextraordinary--facing forward or in retreat, they could

fire arrows with remarkable dexterity, making theirattacks far deadlier than anything the shah's army hadever seen. Their divisions communicated over greatdistances with flags and torches; their maneuverswere precisely coordinated and nearly impossible toanticipate.

Dealing with this constant harassment exhaustedthe shah's forces. Now, suddenly, the army underGeneral Jebe that had disappeared to the southreappeared heading northwest into Transoxiana atremarkable speed. The shah hurriedly sent south hislast reserves, an army of 50,000, to do battle withJebe. He still was not worried--his men had provedtheir superiority in direct combat, at the battle in theFergana Valley.

This time, however, it was different. The Mongolsunleashed strange weapons: their arrows weredipped in burning tar, which created smoke screensbehind which their lightning-quick horsemenadvanced, opening breaches in the lines of the shah'sarmy through which more heavily armed cavalry wouldadvance. Chariots darted back and forth behind theMongol lines, bringing up constant supplies. TheMongols filled the sky with arrows, creating relentlesspressure. They wore shirts of heavy silk. An arrow thatmanaged to pierce the shirt would rarely reach theflesh and could be extracted easily by pulling at theshirt, all of this done while moving at great speed.Jebe's army annihilated the shah's forces.

The shah had one option left: retreat to the west,retrench, and slowly rebuild his army. As he began

preparations, however, something beyond beliefoccurred: an army under Genghis Khan himselfsuddenly stood outside the gates of the city ofBukhara, to the west of Samarkand. Where had theycome from? They could not have crossed the KizilKum Desert to the north. Their appearance seemedall but impossible, as if the devil himself had conjuredthem up. Bukhara soon fell, and within daysSamarkand followed. Soldiers deserted, generalspanicked. The shah, fearing for his life, fled with ahandful of soldiers. The Mongols pursued himrelentlessly. Months later, on a small island in theCaspian Sea, abandoned by one and all, wearingrags and begging for food, the former ruler of thewealthiest empire in the East finally died of hunger.

InterpretationWhen Genghis Khan became the leader of theMongol nation, he inherited perhaps the fastest armyon the planet, but their swiftness had translated intolimited military success. The Mongols might haveperfected the art of fighting on horseback, but theywere too undisciplined to exploit any advantage theygained this way or to coordinate for a large-scaleattack. The genius of Genghis Khan was to transformthe chaotic Mongol speed into something organized,disciplined, and strategic. He achieved this byadapting the ancient Chinese strategy of slow-slow-quick-quick.

The first step, a "slow," was to meticulously preparebefore any campaign, which the Mongols always did

to the highest degree. (In planning for the attack onthe shah, the Mongols learned of a guide who knew ofa chain of oases across the Kizil Kum Desert. Thisman was captured and later led Genghis Khan's armyacross the forbidding territory.) The second "slow"was a setup, which involved getting the enemy tolower its guard, lulling it into complacency. TheMongols, for example, deliberately lost the first battlein the Fergana Valley to feed the shah's arrogance.Then came the first "quick": fixing the enemy'sattention forward with a swift frontal attack (Jebe'sraids along the river). The final "quick" was a doublyswift blow from an unexpected direction. (Genghis'ssudden appearance before the gates of Bukhara isconsidered by many the greatest military surprise inhistory.) A master of psychological warfare, GenghisKhan understood that men are most terrified by theunknown and unpredictable. The suddenness of hisattacks made the speed of them doubly effective,leading to confusion and panic.

We live in a world in which speed is prized abovealmost all else, and acting faster than the other sidehas itself become the primary goal. But most oftenpeople are merely in a hurry, acting and reactingfrantically to events, all of which makes them prone toerror and wasting time in the long run. In order toseparate yourself from the pack, to harness a speedthat has devastating force, you must be organizedand strategic. First, you prepare yourself before anyaction, scanning your enemy for weaknesses. Thenyou find a way to get your opponents to underestimate

you, to lower their guard. When you strikeunexpectedly, they will freeze up. When you hit again,it is from the side and out of nowhere. It is theunanticipated blow that makes the biggest impact.

The less a thing is foreseen, the more...frightdoes it cause. This is nowhere seen better thanin war, where every surprise strikes terror even

to those who are much the stronger.--Xenophon (430?-355? B.C.)

CHEN/THE AROUSING (SHOCK, THUNDER)The hexagram Chen represents the eldest son,who seizes rule with energy and power. A yangline develops below two yin lines and pressesupward forcibly. This movement is so violentthat it arouses terror. It is symbolized bythunder, which bursts forth from the earth and byits shock causes fear and trembling.

THE JUDGEMENT SHOCK brings success.Shock comes--oh, oh! Laughing words--ha, ha!The shock terrifies for a hundred miles....

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

KEYS TO WARFAREIn May 1940 the German army invaded France andthe Low Countries using a new form of warfare: theblitzkrieg. Advancing with incredible speed, theGermans coordinated tanks and airplanes in an

attack that culminated in one of the quickest and mostdevastating victories in military history. The successof the blitzkrieg was largely due to the Allies' static,rigid defense--similar to the shah's defense againstthe Mongols. When the Germans breached thisdefense, the Allies could not adjust or react in time.The Germans advanced faster than their enemy couldprocess what was happening. By the time the Alliesdecided upon a counterstrategy it was too late--conditions had changed. They were always a stepbehind.

Now more than ever, we find ourselves dealing withpeople who are defensive and cautious, who beginany action from a static position. The reason issimple: the pace of modern life is increasinglygrowing faster, full of distractions, annoyances, andinterruptions. The natural response for many is toretreat inward, to erect psychological walls againstthe harsh realities of modern life. People hate thefeeling of being rushed and are terrified of making amistake. They unconsciously try to slow things down--by taking longer to make decisions, beingnoncommittal, defensive, and cautious.

Blitzkrieg warfare, adapted for daily combat, is theperfect strategy for these times. While those aroundyou remain defensive and immobile, you surprisethem with sudden and decisive action, forcing them toact before they are ready. They cannot respond, asthey usually do, by being elusive or cautious. They willmost likely become emotional and react imprudently.You have breached their defenses, and if you keep up

the pressure and hit them again with somethingunexpected, you will send them into a kind ofdownward psychological spiral--pushing them intomistakes, which further deepens their confusion, andso the cycle goes on.

Many of those who practiced a form of blitzkriegwarfare on the battlefield used it to great effect in dailylife. Julius Caesar--master of speed and surprise--was a great example of this. From out of the blue, hemight form an alliance with a senator's bitterestenemy, forcing the senator either to change hisopposition to Caesar or to risk a dangerousconfrontation. Equally, he might unexpectedly pardona man who had fought against him. Caught off guard,the man would become a loyal ally. Caesar'sreputation for doing the unpredictable made peopleall the more cautious in his presence, furtherenhancing his ability to catch those around himunawares.

But the genius in Ali takes his limitations andmakes them virtues. Let us go step by step. Ican't think of a past heavyweight championwhose punching power wasn't superior to Ali's.Yet in his first twenty fights, Ali, then CassiusClay, won every one of them, scoring seventeenknockouts.... So what is Ali's mystery? Whydoes a man who every expert agrees has nopunching power knock most of his opponentsout, including a one-punch K.O. over SonnyListon on Ali's first defense of his title? The

answer is in speed and timing. Clay then, andAli now, has the ability to let punches go withextreme quickness, but most important, at theright moment, just before the man in front of himis able to put his boxer's sense of anticipation towork. When that happens, the man getting hitdoesn't see the punch. As a result, this man'sbrain can't prepare him to receive the impact ofthe blow. The eyes couldn't send the messageback to the part of the body which would take theshock. So we arrive at one knockout of aconclusion: the punch that puts you to sleep isnot so much the hard punch as the punch thatyou don't see coming.

STING LIKE A BEE, JOSE TORRES ANDBERT RANDOLPH SUGAR, 1971

This strategy works wonders on those who areparticularly hesitant and afraid of making any kind ofmistake. In similar fashion, if you are facing an enemythat has divided leadership or internal cracks, asudden and swift attack will make the cracks largerand cause internal collapse. Half of the success ofNapoleon Bonaparte's form of blitzkrieg warfare wasthat he used it against armies of allies in whichseveral bickering generals were in charge of strategy.Once his army broke through these armies' defenses,dissension would break out and they would fall apartfrom within.

The blitzkrieg strategy can be effective in

diplomacy, too, as Henry Kissinger demonstrated.The former U.S. secretary of state would often takehis time when beginning diplomatic negotiations,lulling the other side with bland banter. Then, with thedeadline for the end of the talks approaching, hewould suddenly hit them with a list of demands.Without enough time to process what was happening,they became prone to giving in or to becomingemotional and making mistakes. This was Kissinger'sversion of slow-slow-quick-quick.

For their initial thrust into France during World WarII, the Germans chose to attack through the ArdennesForest in southern Belgium. The forest, consideredimpenetrable by tank, was lightly guarded. Pushingthrough this weak point, the Germans were able tobuild up speed and momentum. In launching ablitzkrieg, you must begin by finding your enemy'sweak point. Initiating the action where there will beless resistance will allow you to develop crucialmomentum.

The success of this strategy depends on threethings: a group that is mobile (often, the smaller thebetter), superior coordination between the parts, andthe ability to send orders quickly up and down thechain of command. Do not depend on technology toaccomplish this. During the Vietnam War, the U.S.military might in fact have been hindered by itssuperior communications--too much information to beprocessed made for slower response times. TheNorth Vietnamese, who depended on a well-coordinated network of spies and informers, not

gadgetry, made decisions more quickly and as aresult were more nimble on the ground.

Shortly after being elected president in 1932,Franklin D. Roosevelt seemed to disappear from thepublic stage. The Depression was at its height, andfor many Americans this was not very reassuring.Then, with his inauguration, Roosevelt changedtempo, giving a rousing speech that showed he had infact been meditating deeply on the issues facing thecountry. In the weeks that followed, he came atCongress fast and furiously, with a series of boldlegislative proposals. The intensity of this newdirection was felt all the more because of the slowsetup. More than mere drama, the momentum built bythis strategy helped Roosevelt to convince the publicthat he meant business and was leading the country inthe right direction. This momentum translated intosupport for his policies, which in turn helped spurconfidence and turn the economy around.

Veni, vidi, vici (I came, I saw, I conquered).JULIUS CAESAR, 100-44 B.C.

Speed, then, is not only a powerful tool to useagainst an enemy, but it can also have a bracing,positive influence on those on your side. Frederick theGreat noted that an army that moves quickly hashigher morale. Velocity creates a sense of vitality.Moving with speed means there is less time for youand your army to make mistakes. It also creates abandwagon effect: more and more people admiring

your boldness, will decide to join forces with you. LikeRoosevelt, make such decisive action as dramatic aspossible: a moment of quiet and suspense on thestage before you make your startling entrance.

Image: The Storm. The sky becomes stilland calm, and a lull sets in, peaceful andsoothing. Then, out of nowhere, lightningstrikes, the wind picks up...and the skyexplodes. It is the suddenness of the stormthat is so terrifying.

Authority: You must be slow in deliberationand swift in execution.

--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

REVERSALSlowness can have great value, particularly as asetup. To appear slow and deliberate, even a littlefoolish, will lull your enemies, infecting them with asleepy attitude. Once their guard is down, anunexpected blow from the side will knock them out.Your use of slowness and speed, then, should bedeliberate and controlled, never a natural tempo thatyou fall into.

In general, when facing a fast enemy, the only truedefense is to be as fast or faster. Only speed canneutralize speed. Setting up a rigid defense, as theshah did against the Mongols, only plays into thehands of the swift and mobile.

CONTROL THE DYNAMICFORCING STRATEGIES

People are constantly struggling to control you--getting you to act in their interests, keeping thedynamic on their terms. The only way to get theupper hand is to make your play for control moreintelligent and insidious. Instead of trying todominate the other side's every move, work to definethe nature of the relationship itself. Shift the conflictto terrain of your choice, altering the pace andstakes to suit you. Maneuver to control youropponents' minds, pushing their emotional buttons,and compelling them to make mistakes. Ifnecessary, let them feel they are in control in orderto get them to lower their guard. If you control theoverall direction and framing of the battle, anythingthey do will play into your hands.

"Pressing down the pillow" refers to one's effortsnot to let the head of one's opponent rise. Inbattles based on martial strategy, it is taboo tolet your opponent take the initiative, thus puttingyourself on the defensive. You must try at allcosts to lead your opponent by taking completecontrol of him. During combat, your opponentintends to dominate you as much as you want to

dominate him, so it is vital that you pick up onyour opponent's intentions and tactics so as tocontrol him.... According to the principle ofmartial strategy, you must be able to controlyour opponent(s) at all times. Study this pointwell.

THE BOOK OF FIVE RINGS, MIYAMOTOMUSASHI, 1584-1645

THE ART OF ULTIMATE CONTROLControl is an issue in all relationships. It is humannature to abhor feelings of helplessness and to strivefor power. Whenever two people or groups interact,there is a constant maneuvering between them todefine the relationship, to determine who has controlover this and that. This battle of wills is inevitable.Your task as a strategist is twofold: First, recognizethe struggle for control in all aspects of life, and neverbe taken in by those who claim they are not interestedin control. Such types are often the most manipulativeof all. Second, you must master the art of moving theother side like pieces on a chessboard, with purposeand direction. This art was cultivated by the mostcreative generals and military strategists throughoutthe ages.

War is above all else a struggle over who cancontrol the actions of the other side to a greaterextent. Military geniuses such as Hannibal, Napoleon,and Erwin Rommel discovered that the best way toattain control is to determine the overall pace,direction, and shape of the war itself. This means

getting enemies to fight according to your tempo,luring them onto terrain that is unfamiliar to them andsuited to you, playing to your strengths. And, mostimportant of all, it means gaining influence over theframe of mind of your opponents, adapting yourmaneuvers to their psychological weaknesses.

The superior strategist understands that it isimpossible to control exactly how an enemy willrespond to this move or that. To attempt to do so willonly lead to frustration and exhaustion. There is toomuch in war and in life that is unpredictable. But if thestrategist can control the mood and mind-set of hisenemies, it does not matter exactly how they respondto his maneuvers. If he can make them frightened,panicky, overly aggressive, and angry, he controls thewider scope of their actions and can trap themmentally before cornering them physically.

Control can be aggressive or passive. It can be animmediate push on the enemy, making him back upand lose the initiative. It can be playing possum,getting the enemy to lower his guard, or baiting himinto a rash attack. The artist of control weaves both ofthese into a devastating pattern--hitting, backing off,baiting, overwhelming.

This art is infinitely applicable to the battles ofeveryday life. Many people tend to play unconsciousgames of domination or get caught up in trying tocontrol someone else's every move. In trying tomanage and determine too much, they exhaustthemselves, make mistakes, push people away, andin the end lose control of the situation. If you

understand and master the art, you will instantlybecome more creative in your approach to influencingand controlling the other side. By determiningpeople's moods, the pace at which they must move,the stakes involved, you will find that almost anythingpeople do in response to your maneuvers will fit intothe overall dynamic you have shaped. They may knowthey are being controlled but be helpless to fight it, orthey may move in the direction you desire withoutrealizing it. That is ultimate control.

In short, I think like Frederick [the Great] , oneshould always be the first to attack.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, 1769-1821

The following are the four basic principles of the art.

Keep them on their heels. Before the enemy makesa move, before the element of chance or theunexpected actions of your opponents can ruin yourplans, you make an aggressive move to seize theinitiative. You then keep up a relentless pressure,exploiting this momentary advantage to the fullest.You do not wait for opportunities to open up; youmake them yourself. If you are the weaker side, thiswill often more than level the playing field. Keepingyour enemies on the defensive and in react mode willhave a demoralizing effect on them.

Shift the battlefield. An enemy naturally wants tofight you on familiar terrain. Terrain in this sensemeans all of the details of the battle--the time and

place, exactly what is being fought over, who isinvolved in the struggle, and so on. By subtly shiftingyour enemies into places and situations that are notfamiliar to them, you control the dynamic. Withoutrealizing what is happening, your opponents findthemselves fighting on your terms.

Compel mistakes. Your enemies depend onexecuting a strategy that plays to their advantages,that has worked in the past. Your task is twofold: tofight the battle in such a way that they cannot bringtheir strength or strategy into play and to create sucha level of frustration that they make mistakes in theprocess. You do not give them enough time to doanything; you play to their emotional weaknesses,making them as irritable as possible; you bait theminto deadly traps. It is less your action than theirmissteps that give you control.

Assume passive control. The ultimate form ofdomination is to make those on the other side thinkthey are the ones in control. Believing they are incommand, they are less likely to resist you or becomedefensive. You create this impression by moving withthe energy of the other side, giving ground but slowlyand subtly diverting them in the direction you desire. Itis often the best way to control the overly aggressiveand the passive-aggressive.

One who excels at warfare compels men and isnot compelled by others.

--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES1. By the end of 1940, British forces in the MiddleEast had been able to secure their position in Egyptand take back a good part of Libya that the Italians(an ally of Germany) had seized early in World War II.Having captured the important port town of Benghazi,the British were poised to advance farther west, allthe way to Tripoli, allowing them to push the Italiansout of the country for good. Then, unexpectedly, a haltwas called in their advance. General ArchibaldWavell, commander in chief of British forces in theMiddle East, was waging battle on too many fronts.Since the Italians had proved themselves to be ratherinept in desert warfare, the British felt they couldafford to create a defensive line in Libya, build uptheir forces in Egypt, and launch a major offensiveagainst the Italians by April of the following year.

News that a German armored brigade under theleadership of General Erwin Rommel had arrived inTripoli in February 1941 did not alter the British plans.Rommel had been a superb commander during theblitzkrieg in France the previous year. But here hewas under Italian command, dependent on theincompetent Italians for supplies, and his force wastoo small to make the British nervous. In addition,intelligence reports revealed that Hitler had sent himthere with orders to do no more than block the Britishfrom advancing to Tripoli.

Then, without warning, at the end of March 1941,Rommel's tanks swept eastward. Rommel had

broken up his small force into columns, and he hurledthem in so many directions against the Britishdefensive line that it was hard to fathom his intentions.These mechanized columns moved with incrediblespeed; advancing at night with lights dimmed, timeand again they caught their enemy by surprise,suddenly appearing to their flank or rear. As their linewas breached in multiple places, the British werecompelled to retreat farther and farther east. ToWavell, who was following these events from Cairo,this was downright shocking and humiliating: Rommelwas causing chaos with a disproportionately smallnumber of tanks and severe supply limitations. Withina few weeks, the Germans had advanced to theborder of Egypt.

What was most devastating about this offensivewas the novel way in which Rommel fought. He usedthe desert as if it were an ocean. Despite supplyproblems and the difficult terrain, he kept his tanks inperpetual motion. The British could not let up theirguard for a moment, and this mentally exhaustedthem. But his movements, though seemingly random,were always for a purpose. If he wanted to take aparticular city, he would head in the oppositedirection, then circle and attack from an unexpectedside. He brought along an armada of trucks to kick upenough dust so that the British could not see where hewas headed and to give the impression of a muchlarger force than was actually on the attack.

Rommel would ride with the front line, risking deathso that he could make rapid judgments on the move,

sending his columns here and there before the Britishhad time to figure out the game. And he used histanks in the opposite way of the British, to deadlyeffect. Instead of pushing them forward to punch holesin the enemy lines, he would send out his weakesttanks, then have them retreat at first contact; theBritish tanks would invariably swallow the bait and goin pursuit, kicking up so much of their own dust in theprocess that they would not see they were runningstraight into a line of German antitank guns. Once asufficient number of British tanks had been taken out,Rommel would advance again, wreaking havocbehind the British lines.

Given the same amount of intelligence, timiditywill do a thousand times more damage in warthan audacity.

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

Kept constantly on their heels, forced to come torapid decisions in response to Rommel's moves, theBritish made endless mistakes. Not knowing wherehe might show up next, or from what direction, theyspread their forces over dangerously vast areas.Before long, at the mere mention that a Germancolumn was approaching, Rommel at its head, theBritish would abandon their positions, even thoughthey greatly outnumbered him. In the end the only thingthat stopped him was Hitler's obsession with Russia,which bled Rommel of the supplies andreinforcements he needed to conquer Egypt.

InterpretationThis is how Rommel analyzed the situation firstconfronting him: The enemy had a strong position tothe east, which would only get stronger as moresupplies and men came from Egypt. Rommel had amuch smaller force, and the longer he waited, themore useless it would become. And so he decided todisobey Hitler's orders, risking his career on a truth hehad learned in the blitzkrieg in France: making thefirst hit against the enemy completely alters thedynamic. If the enemy is the stronger side, it isupsetting and discouraging to be suddenly put on thedefensive. Being larger and unprepared makes itharder to organize an orderly retreat.

To get his strategy to work, Rommel had to createmaximum disorder in the enemy. In the ensuingconfusion, the Germans would seem more formidablethan they were. Speed, mobility, and surprise--asagents of such chaos--became ends in themselves.Once the enemy was on its heels, a deceptivemaneuver--heading one way, then attacking fromanother--had double the effect. An enemy that is inretreat and without time to think will make endlessmistakes if you keep up the pressure. Ultimately, thekey to Rommel's success was to seize the initiativewith one bold maneuver, then exploit this momentaryadvantage to the fullest.

Everything in this world conspires to put you on thedefensive. At work, your superiors may want the gloryfor themselves and will discourage you from takingthe initiative. People are constantly pushing and

attacking you, keeping you in react mode. You arecontinually reminded of your limitations and what youcannot hope to accomplish. You are made to feelguilty for this and that. Such defensiveness on yourpart can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Beforeanything, you need to liberate yourself from thisfeeling. By acting boldly, before others are ready, bymoving to seize the initiative, you create your owncircumstances rather than simply waiting for what lifebrings you. Your initial push alters the situation, onyour terms. People are made to react to you, makingyou seem larger and more powerful than may be thecase. The respect and fear you inspire will translateinto offensive power, a reputation that precedes you.Like Rommel, you must also have a touch ofmadness: ready to disorient and confuse for its ownsake, to keep advancing no matter the circumstance.It is up to you--be constantly defensive or make othersfeel it instead.

When they came to the ford of Xanthus, Theeddying river that Zeus begot, Achilles split theTrojans. Half he chased Toward the city, acrossthe plain where yesterday The Greeks had fledfrom Hector's shining rage. Hera, to slow thisstampede of Trojans, Spread a curtain of fogbetween them.

The others swerved--And found themselvesherded into the river. They crashed down intothe deep, silver water As it tumbled and roared

through its banks. You could hear their screamsas they floundered And were whirled around inthe eddies.

Fire will sometimes cause a swarm of locusts Torise in the air and fly to a river. The fire Keepscoming, burning them instantly,

And the insects shrink down into the water.

Just so Achilles. And Xanthus' noisy channelWas clogged with chariots, horses, and men.Achilles wasted no time. Leaving his spearPropped against a tamarisk And holding onlyhis sword, he leapt from the bank Like a spiritfrom hell bent on slaughter. He struck over andover, in a widening spiral.

2. In 1932, Paramount Pictures, following a craze forgangster films, began production on Night AfterNight. The film was to star George Raft, who hadrecently made a name for himself in Scarface. Raftwas cast to type as a typical gangster. But Night AfterNight, in a twist, was to have a comic edge to it. Theproducer, William Le Baron, was afraid that there wasno one in the cast who had a light enough touch to pullthis off. Raft, hearing of his concern, suggested hehire Mae West.

West was a celebrity in vaudeville and onBroadway, starring in plays she had written. She hadmade her reputation as a saucy, aggressive blonde

with a devastating wit. Hollywood producers hadthought of her before, but she was too bawdy for film.And by 1932 she was thirty-nine years old, on theplump side, and considered too old to be making afilm debut. Nevertheless, Le Baron was willing to takea risk to liven up the picture. She would create asplash, provide an angle for promotion, then be sentback to Broadway, where she belonged. Paramountoffered her a two-month contract at five thousanddollars a week, a generous deal for the times. Westhappily accepted.

At first West was a little difficult. She had been toldto lose some weight, but she hated dieting andquickly gave up. Instead she had her hair dyed arather indecent platinum blond. She hated the script--the dialog was flat and her character unimportant. Thepart needed to be rewritten, and West offered herservices as a writer. Hollywood people were used todealing with difficult actresses and had a panoply oftactics for taming them, particularly those who wantedtheir parts rewritten. What was unusual was anactress who offered to rewrite her own lines. Baffledby the request, even from someone who had writtenfor Broadway, the studio executives came back with afirm refusal. Giving her that privilege would set aterrible precedent. West countered by refusing tocontinue with the film until they let her rewrite thedialog.

Paramount boss Adolph Zukor had seen West'sscreen test and liked her look and manner. Thepicture needed her. Zukor had a studio executive take

her out to dinner on her birthday to try to cajole her;the goal was to calm her down enough so that theycould begin shooting. Once cameras were rolling, hethought, they would find a way to get West to behave.But that night at dinner, West pulled out a check fromher handbag and handed it to the executive. It was fortwenty thousand dollars, the amount she had earnedto that point. She was giving the money back to thestudio and, thanking Paramount for the opportunity,told the executive she was leaving for New York thenext morning.

Zukor, immediately apprised of this news, wascaught completely off balance. West seemed willingto lose substantial money, risk a lawsuit for breach ofcontract, and guarantee that she would never work inHollywood again. Zukor took another look at thescript--perhaps she was right and the dialog waslousy. She would rather give up money and a careerthan be in an inferior picture! He decided to offer hera compromise: she could write her own dialog, andthey would shoot two versions of the movie, one hers,one the studio's. That would cost a little more, but theywould get West on film. If her version was better,which Zukor thought unlikely, that would only improvethe picture; if not, they would go with the originalversion. Paramount couldn't lose.

West accepted the compromise and shootingbegan. One person, however, was not amused: thedirector, Archie L. Mayo, a man with an extensiveresume. Not only had West changed the script to suither wise-cracking style, she insisted on altering the

blocking and camera setups to make the most of herlines. They fought and fought, until one day Westrefused to go on. She had demanded a shot of herdisappearing up some stairs after delivering one ofher patented wisecracks. This would give theaudience time to laugh. Mayo thought it unnecessaryand refused to shoot it. West walked off the set, andproduction came to a halt. Studio executives agreedthat West's lines had lightened up the picture; let herhave her way with the direction and shoot the shot,they told Mayo. They would edit it out later.

Production resumed. The other actress in herscenes, Alison Skipworth, had the distinct impressionthat West was determining the pace of the lines,getting the camera to focus on her, stealing thescene. Protesting that West was taking over thedirection of the movie, Skipworth, too, was told not toworry--it would all be fixed in the editing.

When it came time to cut the film, however, Westhad so altered the mood and pace of her scenes thatno editing could bring them back to the original; moreimportant, her sense of timing and direction weresolid. She had indeed improved the entire picture.

The film debuted in October 1932. The reviewswere mixed, but almost all agreed that a new star wasborn. West's aggressive sexual style and witfascinated the men in the audience. Though sheappeared in just a few scenes, she was the only partof the film anyone seemed to remember. Lines shehad written--"I'm a girl who lost her reputation andnever missed it"--were quoted endlessly. As Raft later

admitted, "Mae West stole everything but thecameras."

Audiences were soon clamoring for more MaeWest--and Paramount, in financial trouble at the time,could not ignore them. At the age of forty, as plump asever, West was signed to a long-term contract at thehighest salary of any star in the studio. For her nextfilm, Diamond Lil, she would have complete creativecontrol. No other actress--or actor, for that matter--hadever pulled off such a coup and in so short a time.

Hideous groans rose from the wounded, Andthe river water turned crimson with blood.

Fish fleeing a dolphin's huge maw Hide by thehundreds in the harbor's crannies, But the dolphindevours whatever it catches.

Likewise the Trojans beneath the riverbanks.THE ILIAD, HOMER, CIRCA NINTH CENTURY

B.C.

InterpretationWhen Mae West set foot in Hollywood, everythingwas stacked against her. She was old and passe.The director and an army of studio executives had justone goal: to use her in a scene or two to animate adull picture, then ship her back to New York. She hadno real power, and if she had chosen to fight on theirbattlefield--one in which actresses were a dime adozen and exploited to the fullest--she would havegotten nowhere. West's genius, her form of warfare,

was slowly but surely to shift the battlefield to terrain ofher choice.

She began her war by playing the part of the blondbombshell, charming and seducing the Paramountmen. Her screen test hooked them--she was difficult,but what actress wasn't? Next she asked to rewriteher lines and, receiving the expected refusal,ratcheted up the stakes by not budging. Returning themoney she had been paid was her campaign's keymoment: it subtly shifted the focus from a battle withan actress to the script itself. By showing herselfready to give up so much, she made Zukor begin towonder more about the dialog than about her. Afterhis compromise, West made her next maneuver,fighting over the blocking, the camera angles, thepacing of the shots. Her writing had become anaccepted part of the scenery; the battle now was overher directing. Another compromise, which translatedinto another victory. Instead of fighting the studioexecutives on their terms, West had subtly shifted thebattle to a field unfamiliar to them--fighting with anactress over the writing and directing of a film. Onsuch terrain, against a smart and seductive woman,the army of Paramount men was lost and helpless.

Your enemies will naturally choose to fight on terrainthat is to their liking, that allows them to use theirpower to best advantage. Cede them such power andyou end up fighting on their terms. Your goal is tosubtly shift the conflict to terrain of your choice. Youaccept the battle but alter its nature. If it is aboutmoney, shift it to something moral. If your opponents

want to fight over a particular issue, reframe the battleto encompass something larger and more difficult forthem to handle. If they like a slow pace, find a way toquicken it. You are not allowing your enemies to getcomfortable or fight in their usual way. And an enemywho is lured onto unfamiliar terrain is one who has lostcontrol of the dynamic. Once such control slips fromhis hands, he will compromise, retreat, makemistakes, and effect his own destruction.

3. By early 1864 the American Civil War had settledinto a stalemate. Robert E. Lee's Army of NorthernVirginia had managed to keep the Union forces awayfrom Richmond, capital of the Confederacy. To thewest the Confederates had established animpregnable defensive position at the town of Dalton,Georgia, blocking any Union advance on Atlanta, thekey industrial city of the South. President AbrahamLincoln, facing reelection that year and gravelyworried about his chances if the stalemate continued,decided to name Ulysses S. Grant overallcommander of the Union forces. Here was a man whowould go on the offensive.

Let us admit that boldness in war even has itsown prerogatives. It must be granted a certainpower over and above successful calculationsinvolving space, time, and magnitude of forces,for wherever it is superior, it will take advantageof its opponent's weakness. In other words, it is agenuinely creative force. This fact is not difficult

to prove even scientifically. Whenever boldnessencounters timidity, it is likely to be the winner,because timidity in itself implies a loss ofequilibrium. Boldness will be at a disadvantageonly in an encounter with deliberate caution,which may be considered bold in its own right,and is certainly just as powerful and effective;but such cases are rare. Timidity is the root ofprudence in the majority of men.... The higherup the chain of command, the greater is theneed for boldness to be supported by areflective mind, so that boldness does notdegenerate into purposeless bursts of blindpassion.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

Grant's first move was to appoint his chieflieutenant, General William Tecumseh Sherman, tocommand the Union forces in Georgia. WhenSherman arrived on the scene, he realized that anyattempt to take Dalton was doomed from the start.The Confederate commander, General JohnJohnston, was a master at defensive warfare. Withmountains to his rear and a solid position to his front,Johnston could simply stay put. A siege would taketoo long, and a frontal attack would be too costly. Thesituation seemed hopeless.

Sherman decided, then, that if he could not seizeDalton, he would take hold of Johnston's mind,

striking fear in a man notorious for being conservativeand cautious. In May 1864, Sherman sent three-fourths of his army into a direct attack on Dalton. WithJohnston's attention held by this attack, Sherman thensneaked the Army of the Tennessee around themountains to the town of Resaca, fifteen miles to thesouth of Dalton, blocking Johnston's only real route ofretreat and only supply line. Terrified to find himselfsuddenly surrounded, Johnston had no choice but togive up his position at Dalton. He would not, however,play into Sherman's hands: he simply retreated toanother defensive position that gave him maximumsecurity, again inviting Sherman to attack him straighton. This quickly turned into a dance: Sherman wouldfeint going one way, then would somehow divert apart of his army to the south of Johnston, who keptbacking up...all the way to Atlanta.

The Confederate president, Jefferson Davis,disgusted by Johnston's refusal to fight, replaced himwith General John Hood. Sherman knew that Hoodwas an aggressive commander, often even reckless.He also knew that neither the time nor the men wereavailable to lay siege to Atlanta--Lincoln needed aquick victory. His solution was to send detachments tothreaten Atlanta's defenses, but he made these forcestemptingly small and weak. Hood could not resist thetemptation to leave his stronghold in the city andmove to the attack, only to find himself rushing into anambush. This happened several times, and with eachdefeat, Hood's army became smaller and the moraleof his men quickly deteriorated.

Now, with Hood's army tired and expectingdisaster, Sherman played yet another trick. At the endof August, he marched his army southeast, pastAtlanta, abandoning his supply lines. To Hood thiscould only mean that Sherman had given up the fightfor Atlanta. Wild celebration broke out throughout thecity. But Sherman had cunningly timed this march tocoincide with the ripening of the corn, and with hismen well fed and Hood unsuspecting, he cut off thefinal railway line still open to Atlanta and wheeledback to attack the unguarded city. Hood was forced toabandon Atlanta. This was the great victory that wouldensure Lincoln's reelection.

Next came Sherman's strangest maneuver of all.He divided his army into four columns and, completelycutting himself loose from his supply lines, began amarch east from Atlanta to Savannah and the sea. Hismen lived off the land, destroying everything in theirpath. Unencumbered by supply wagons, they movedwith incredible speed. The four parallel columns werefar enough apart that the southern forces could not tellwhere they were headed. The southern columnseemed headed for Macon, the northern for Augusta.Confederate forces scrambled to cover both places,leaving the center open--which was exactly whereSherman planned to advance. Keeping the South onwhat he called "the horns of a dilemma," off balanceand mystified as to his intentions, Sherman marchedall the way to Savannah with hardly a battle.

The Olympians could now join battle with the

giants. Heracles let loose his first arrow againstAlcyoneus, the enemy's leader. He fell to theground, but sprang up again revived, becausethis was his native soil of Phlegra. "Quick, nobleHeracles!" cried Athene. "Drag him away toanother country!" Heracles caught Alcyoneusup on his shoulders, and dragged him over theThracian border, where he despatched him witha club.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 1, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

The effect of this march was devastating. For theConfederate soldiers still fighting in Virginia, the ruinof Georgia--where many had left behind homes--wasa terrible blow to their morale. Sherman's march casta mood of deep gloom over the entire South. Slowlybut surely it was losing its will to keep up the fight,Sherman's goal all along.

InterpretationIn any conflict it is often the weaker side that in factcontrols the dynamic. In this case the South was incontrol in both the strategic and the grand-strategicsense. In their immediate, local strategy, theConfederates had entrenched themselves in powerfuldefensive positions in Georgia and Virginia. Thetemptation for the North was to fight on the enemy'sterms, to hurl division after division against thesepositions, at tremendous loss of life and with littlechance of advancing. In the South's grand strategy,

the longer this stalemate prevailed, the more likelyLincoln was to be thrown out of office. Then the warwould end through negotiation. The South set thetempo for the battle (slow and grinding) and controlledthe stakes.

As Sherman saw it, his goal was not to capture acity or to defeat the Confederates in battle. In his viewthe only way to win the war was to regain control of thedynamic. Instead of brutal, frontal attacks againstDalton or Atlanta, which would play into the South'shands, he operated indirectly. He frightened the timidJohnston into abandoning his stronghold and goadedthe rash Hood into senseless attacks, in bothinstances playing upon the psychology of theopponent to force the issue. By constantly putting hisenemy on the horns of a dilemma, where both stayingput and moving were equally dangerous, he tookcontrol of the situation without having to waste men inbattle. Most important, by demonstrating to the Southwith his destructive march that the longer the wardragged on, the worse it would be for them, heregained grand-strategic control of the war. For theConfederates, to keep fighting was slow suicide.

The worst dynamic in war, and in life, is thestalemate. It seems that whatever you do only feedsthe stagnation. Once this happens, a kind of mentalparalysis overcomes you. You lose the ability to thinkor respond in different ways. At such a point, all islost. If you find yourself falling into such a dynamic--dealing with a defensive, entrenched opponent ortrapped in a reactive relationship--you must become

as creative as General Sherman. Deliberately shakeup the pace of the slow waltz by doing somethingseemingly irrational. Operate outside the experienceof the enemy, as Sherman did when he cut himselfloose from his supplies. Move fast here and slowthere. One major jolt given to the stale dynamic willshake it up, force the enemy to do somethingdifferent. With the slightest change, you have room forgreater change and taking control. Injecting noveltyand mobility is often enough to unbalance the mindsof your rigid and defensive opponents.

4. In 1833, Mr. Thomas Auld, the slaveholding ownerof a plantation on Maryland's Eastern Shore,summoned back his slave Frederick Douglass, fifteenyears old at the time, from Baltimore, where Douglasshad just spent seven years serving Auld's brother.Now he was needed to work the fields of theplantation. But life in the city had changed Douglass inmany ways, and to his chagrin he found it quite hardto disguise this from Auld. In Baltimore he hadsecretly managed to teach himself how to read andwrite, something no slave was allowed to do, for thatwould stimulate dangerous thoughts. On the plantationDouglass tried to teach as many slaves as possibleto read; these efforts were quickly squashed. But whatwas worse for him was that he had developed arather defiant attitude, what the slaveholder calledimpudence. He talked back to Auld, questioned someof his orders, and played all kinds of tricks to getmore food. (Auld was notorious for keeping his slaves

near starvation.)One day Auld informed Douglass that he was hiring

him out for a year to Mr. Edward Covey, a nearbyfarm renter who had earned a reputation as aconsummate "breaker of young Negroes."Slaveholders would send him their most difficultslaves, and in exchange for their free labor Coveywould beat every last ounce of rebellion out of them.Covey worked Douglass especially hard, and after afew months he was broken in body and spirit. He nolonger desired to read books or engage indiscussions with his fellow slaves. On his days off, hewould crawl under the shade of a tree and sleep offhis exhaustion and despair.

One especially hot day in August 1834, Douglassbecame ill and fainted. The next thing he knew, Coveywas hovering over him, hickory slab in hand, orderinghim back to work. But Douglass was too weak. Coveyhit him on the head, opening a deep wound. Hekicked him a few times, but Douglass could not move.Covey finally left, intending to deal with him later.

Well, my dear reader, this battle with Mr.Covey,--undignified as it was, and as I fear mynarration of it is--was the turning point in my "lifeas a slave." It rekindled in my breast thesmouldering embers of liberty; it brought up myBaltimore dreams, and revived a sense of myown manhood. I was a changed being after thatfight. I was nothing before; I WAS A MAN NOW.It recalled to life my crushed self-respect and

my self-confidence, and inspired me with arenewed determination to be A FREEMAN. Aman, without force, is without the essentialdignity of humanity. Human nature is soconstituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man,although it can pity him; and even this it cannotdo long, if the signs of power do not arise. Heonly can understand the effect of this combat onmy spirit, who has himself incurred something,hazarded something, in repelling the unjust andcruel aggressions of a tyrant. Covey was atyrant, and a cowardly one, withal. After resistinghim, I felt as I had never felt before. It was aresurrection from the dark and pestiferous tombof slavery, to the heaven of comparativefreedom. I was no longer a servile coward,trembling under the frown of a brother worm ofthe dust, but, my long-cowed spirit was roused toan attitude of manly independence. I hadreached a point, at which I was not afraid to die .This spirit made me a freeman in fact , while Iremained a slave in form . When a slave cannotbe flogged he is more than half free. He has adomain as broad as his own manly heart todefend, and he is really "a power on earth."While slaves prefer their lives, with flogging, toinstant death, they will always find christiansenough, like unto Covey, to accommodate thatpreference. From this time, until that of my

escape from slavery, I was never fairly whipped.Several attempts were made to whip me, butthey were always unsuccessful. Bruises I didget, as I shall hereafter inform the reader; butthe case I have been describing, was the end ofthe brutification to which slavery had subjectedme.

MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM,FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 1818-1895

Douglass managed to get to his feet, staggered tothe woods, and somehow made his way back toAuld's plantation. There he begged with Master Auldto keep him there, explaining Covey's cruelty. Auldwas unmoved. Douglass could spend the night butthen must return to Covey's farm.

Making his way back to the farm, Douglass fearedthe worst. He told himself that he would do his best toobey Covey and somehow survive the weeks ahead.Arriving at the stables where he was supposed towork that day, he began his chores, when out ofnowhere, like a snake, Covey slithered in, rope inhand. He lunged at Douglass, trying to get a slipknoton his leg and tie him up. He was clearly intending thethrashing to end all thrashings.

Risking an even more intense beating, Douglasspushed Covey away and, without hitting him, kept himfrom getting the rope around his leg. At that momentsomething clicked in Douglass's head. Every defiantthought that had been suffocated by his months ofbrutal labor came back to him. He was not afraid.

Covey could kill him, but it was better to go downfighting for his life.

Suddenly a cousin came to Covey's aid, and,finding himself surrounded, Douglass did theunthinkable: he swung hard at the man and knockedhim to the ground. Hitting a white man would mostlikely lead to his hanging. A "fighting madness" cameover Douglass. He returned Covey's blows. Thestruggle went on for two hours until, bloodied,exhausted, and gasping for breath, Covey gave upand slowly staggered back to his house.

Douglass could only assume that Covey would nowcome after him with a gun or find some other way tokill him. It never happened. Slowly it dawned onDouglass: to kill him, or punish him in some powerfulway, posed too great a risk. Word would get out thatCovey had failed to break a Negro this one time, hadhad to resort to a gun when his terror tactics did notwork. The mere hint of that would ruin his reputationfar and wide, and his job depended on his perfectreputation. Better to leave the wild sixteen-year-oldslave alone than risk the kind of crazy orunpredictable response Douglass had showedhimself capable of. Better to let him calm down andgo quietly away when his time of service there wasover.

For the rest of Douglass's stay with Covey, thewhite man did not lay a hand on him. Douglass hadnoticed that slaveholders often "prefer to whip thosewho are most easily whipped." Now he had learnedthe lesson for himself: never again would he be

submissive. Such weakness only encouraged thetyrants to go further. He would rather risk death,returning blow for blow with his fists or his wits.

InterpretationReflecting on this moment years later in his book MyBondage and My Freedom, after he had escaped tothe North and become a leading advocate of theabolitionist movement, Douglass wrote, "This battlewith Mr. Covey...was the turning point in my ' life as aslave.'...I was a changed being after that fight.... I hadreached the point at which I was not afraid to die. Thisspirit made me a freeman in fact, while I remained aslave in form." For the rest of his life, he adopted thisfighting stance: by being unafraid of theconsequences, Douglass gained a degree of controlof his situation both physically and psychologically.Once he had rooted fear out of himself, he opened uppossibilities for action--sometimes fighting backovertly, sometimes being clever and deceitful. From aslave with no control, he became a man with someoptions and some power, all of which he leveragedinto real freedom when the time came.

To control the dynamic, you must be able to controlyourself and your emotions. Getting angry and lashingout will only limit your options. And in conflict, fear isthe most debilitating emotion of all. Even beforeanything has happened, your fear puts you on yourheels, cedes the initiative to the enemy. The otherside has endless possibilities for using your fear tohelp control you, keep you on the defensive. Those

who are tyrants and domineering types can smell youranxiety, and it makes them even more tyrannical.Before anything else you must lose your fear--ofdeath, of the consequences of a bold maneuver, ofother people's opinion of you. That single moment willsuddenly open up vistas of possibilities. And in theend whichever side has more possibilities for positiveaction has greater control.

5. Early in his career, the American psychiatrist MiltonH. Erickson (1901-80) noticed that patients hadcountless ways of controlling the relationship betweenpatient and therapist. They might withhold informationfrom him or resist entering into a hypnotic trance(Erickson often used hypnosis in his therapy); theymight question the therapist's abilities, insist he domore of the talking, or emphasize the hopelessnessof their problems and the futility of therapy. Theseattempts at control in fact mirrored whatever theirproblem was in daily life: they resorted to all kinds ofunconscious and passive games of domination whiledenying to themselves and to others they were up tosuch tricks. And so, over the years, Ericksondeveloped what he called his "Utilization Technique"--literally using these patients' passive aggression, theirclever manipulations, as instruments to change them.

Erickson often dealt with patients whom someoneelse--a partner, a parent--had forced to seek his help.Resentful of this, they would get revenge bydeliberately withholding information about their lives.Erickson would begin by telling these patients that it

was natural, even healthy, not to want to revealeverything to the therapist. He would insist theywithhold any sensitive information. The patients wouldthen feel trapped: by keeping secrets they wereobeying the therapist, which was just the opposite ofwhat they wanted to do. Usually by the secondsession, they would open up, rebelling to such anextent that they revealed everything about themselves.

One man, on his first visit to Erickson's office,began anxiously pacing the room. By refusing to sitdown and relax, he was making it impossible forErickson to hypnotize him or work with him at all.Erickson began by asking him, "Are you willing tocooperate with me by continuing to pace the floor asyou are doing now?" The patient agreed to thisstrange request. Then Erickson asked if he could tellthe patient where to pace and how fast. The patientcould see no problem with this. Minutes later Ericksonbegan to hesitate in giving his directions; the patientwaited to hear what he was to do next with his pacing.After this happened a few times, Erickson finally toldhim to sit in a chair, where the man promptly fell into atrance.

It is not the same when a fighter moves becausehe wants to move, and another when he movesbecause he has to.

JOE FRAZIER, 1944

With those who were patently cynical about therapy,Erickson would deliberately try a method of hypnosis

that would fail, and then he would apologize for usingthat technique. He would talk about his owninadequacies and the many times he had failed.Erickson knew that these types needed to one-up thetherapist, and that once they felt they had gained theadvantage, they would unconsciously openthemselves up to him and fall easily into a trance.

A woman once came to Erickson complaining thather husband used his supposedly weak heart to keepher on constant alert and dominate her in every way.The doctors had found nothing wrong with him, yet hegenuinely seemed weak and always believed that aheart attack was imminent. The woman feltconcerned, angry, and guilty all at the same time.Erickson advised her to continue being sympatheticto his condition, but the next time he talked about aheart attack, she was to tell him politely she needed totidy the house. She was then to place brochures shehad collected from morticians all around the house. Ifhe did it again, she was to go to the desk in the livingroom and begin adding up the figures in his life-insurance policies. At first the husband was furious,but soon he came to fear seeing those brochures andhearing the sound of the adding machine. He stoppedtalking about his heart and was forced to deal with hiswife in a more direct manner.

InterpretationIn some relationships you may have a gnawing feelingthat the other person has gained control of thedynamic, yet you find it hard to pinpoint how or when

this occurred. All that can be said for certain is thatyou feel unable to move the other person, to influencethe course of the relationship. Everything you do onlyseems to feed the power of the controller. The reasonfor this is that the other person has adopted subtle,insidious forms of control that are easily disguisedand yet all the more effective for being unconsciousand passive. Such types exert control by beingdepressed, overly anxious, overburdened with work--they are the victims of constant injustice. They cannothelp their situation. They demand attention, and if youfail to provide it, they make you feel guilty. They areelusive and impossible to fight because they make itappear at each turn that they are not at all looking forcontrol. They are more willful than you, but better atdisguising it. In truth, you are the one who feelshelpless and confused by their guerrilla-like tactics.

To alter the dynamic, you must first recognize thatthere is far less helplessness in their behavior thanthey let on. Second, these people need to feel thateverything takes place on their terms; threaten thatdesire and they fight back in underhanded ways. Youmust never inadvertently feed their rebelliousness byarguing, complaining, trying to push them in adirection. This makes them feel more under attack,more like a victim, and encourages passive revenge.Instead move within their system of control, applyingErickson's Utilization Technique. Be sympathetic totheir plight, but make it seem that whatever they do,they are actually cooperating with your own desires.That will put them off balance; if they rebel now, they

are playing into your hands. The dynamic will subtlyshift, and you will have room to insinuate change.Similarly, if the other person wields a fundamentalweakness as a weapon (the heart-attack tactic),make that threat impossible to use against you bytaking it further, to the point of parody or painfulness.The only way to beat passive opponents is to outdothem in subtle control.

Authority: In order to have rest oneself it isnecessary to keep the enemy occupied. Thisthrows them back on the defensive, andonce they are placed that way they cannotrise up again during the entire campaign.

--Frederick the Great (1712-1786)

REVERSALThis strategy has no reversal. Any effort to seem notto control a situation, to refuse to influence a

relationship, is in fact a form of control. By cedingpower to others, you have gained a kind of passiveauthority that you can use later for your own purposes.You are also the one determining who has control byrelinquishing it to the other side. There is no escapefrom the control dynamic. Those who say they aredoing so are playing the most insidious control gameof all.

HIT THEM WHERE IT HURTSTHE CENTER-OF-GRAVITY STRATEGY

Everyone has a source of power on which he or shedepends. When you look at your rivals, search belowthe surface for that source, the center of gravity thatholds the entire structure together. That center canbe their wealth, their popularity, a key position, awinning strategy. Hitting them there will inflictdisproportionate pain. Find what the other side mostcherishes and protects--that is where you muststrike.

Man depends on his throat for fluent breathingand the maintenance of life. When his throat isstrangled, his five sense organs will lose theirsensibility and no longer function normally. Hewill not be able to stretch his limbs, whichbecome numb and paralyzed. The man cantherefore rarely survive. Thus, when the bannersof the enemy come into sight and the beating ofits battle drums can be heard, we must firstascertain the positions of its back and throat.Then we can attack it from the back andstrangle its throat. This is an excellent strategyto crush the enemy.

THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARY

STRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

PILLARS OF COLLAPSEIn 210 B.C. a young Roman general named PubliusScipio the Younger (later called Scipio Africanus) wassent to northeastern Spain with a simple mission: tohold the Ebro River against the powerful Carthaginianarmies that were threatening to cross it and takecontrol of the peninsula. This was Scipio's firstassignment as commander, and as he looked out onthe river and plotted his strategy, he felt a strange mixof emotions.

Eight years earlier the great Carthaginiancommander Hannibal had crossed this river headingnorth. Onward he had gone into Gaul and then,catching the Romans by surprise, had crossed theAlps into Italy. Scipio, only eighteen at the time, hadfought alongside his father, a general, in the firstbattles against Hannibal on Italian soil. He had seenthe North African's battlefield skills with his own eyes:Hannibal had maneuvered his small army brilliantly,made maximum use of his superior cavalry, andthrough inexhaustible creativity had constantlymanaged to surprise the Romans and inflict on thema series of humiliating defeats, culminating in thevirtual annihilation of the Roman legions at the Battleof Cannae in 216 B.C. Matching wits with Hannibal,Scipio knew, was futile. It had seemed back then thatRome itself was doomed.

Scipio also recalled two events after Cannae that

had had an overwhelming effect on him. First, aRoman general named Fabius had finally conceived astrategy to keep Hannibal at bay. Keeping his legionsin the hills and avoiding direct battle, Fabius hadlaunched hit-and-run raids designed to wear down theCarthaginians, who were fighting far from their home,in what is now Tunisia. The campaign had worked asa holding action, but to Scipio it had seemed equallyexhausting for the Romans to fight so long and stillhave the enemy at their doorstep. Also, since the plancould not lead to any real defeat of Hannibal, it wasbasically flawed.

Second, a year into Hannibal's invasion, theRomans had sent Scipio's father to Spain to try toknock out the Carthaginian bases there. Carthagehad had colonies in Spain for many years and earnedwealth from Spanish mines. It used Spain as atraining ground for its soldiers and as the base for itswar on Rome. For six years Scipio's father had foughtthe Carthaginians on the Spanish peninsula, but thecampaign had ended in his defeat and death in 211B.C.

As Scipio studied the reports coming in about thesituation beyond the Ebro, a plan took root in hismind: with one bold maneuver, he could avenge hisfather's death the year before, demonstrate theeffectiveness of a strategy he thought far better thanFabius's, and set in motion the eventual collapse notjust of Hannibal but of Carthage itself. Along the coastto the south of him was the city of New Carthage(present-day Cartagena), the Carthaginians' capital in

Spain. There they stored their vast wealth, their army'ssupplies, and the hostages they had taken fromdifferent Spanish tribes to be held as ransom in caseof rebellion. At this moment the Carthaginian armies--which outnumbered the Romans two to one--werescattered about the country, trying to gain furtherdomination over the Spanish tribes, and were allseveral days' march from New Carthage. Theircommanders, Scipio learned, had been quarrelingamong themselves over power and money.Meanwhile New Carthage was garrisoned with only1,000 men.

The third shogun Iemitsu was fond of swordmatches. Once, when he arranged to see someof his outstanding swordsmen display theirskills, he spotted among the gathering a masterequestrian by the name of Suwa Bunkuro, andimpulsively asked him to take part. Bunkuroresponded by saying that he would be pleasedto if he could fight on horseback, adding that hecould defeat anyone on horseback. Iemitsu wasdelighted to urge the swordsmen to fightBunkuro in the style he preferred. As it turnedout, Bunkuro was right in his boasting.Brandishing a sword on a prancing horse wasn'tsomething many swordsmen were used to, andBunkuro easily defeated everyone who daredface him on horseback. Somewhatexasperated, Iemitsu told Munenori to give it a

try. Though a bystander on this occasion,Munenori at once complied and mounted ahorse. As his horse trotted up to Bunkuro's,Munenori suddenly stopped his horse andslapped the nose of Bunkuro's horse with hiswooden sword. Bunkuro's horse reared, andwhile the famed equestrian was trying to restorehis balance, Munenori struck him off his horse.THE SWORD AND THE MIND, TRANSLATED

BY HIROAKI SATO, 1985

Disobeying his orders to take his stand at the Ebro,Scipio advanced south by ship and led a daring raidon New Carthage. This walled city was consideredimpregnable, but he timed his attack for the ebbing ofthe tide in a lagoon on the city's north side; there hismen were able to scale the walls relatively easily, andNew Carthage was taken. In one move, Scipio hadproduced a dramatic turnaround. Now the Romanscommanded the central position in Spain; they hadthe money and supplies on which the Carthaginians inSpain depended; and they had Carthage's hostages,whom they now could use to stir revolt among theconquered tribes. Over the next few years, Scipioexploited this position and slowly brought Spain underRoman control.

In 205 B.C., Scipio returned to Rome a hero--butHannibal was still a menace in Italy's interior. Scipionow wanted to take the war to Africa, by marching onCarthage itself. That was the only way to get Hannibalout of Italy and finally erase Carthage as a threat. But

out of Italy and finally erase Carthage as a threat. ButFabius was still the commander in charge of Rome'sstrategy, and few saw the point of fighting Hannibal bywaging war so far from him, and from Rome. YetScipio's prestige was high, and the Roman Senatefinally gave him an army--a small, low-quality army--touse for his campaign.

Wasting no time on arguing his case, Scipioproceeded to make an alliance with Masinissa, kingof the Massyles, Carthage's neighbors. Masinissawould supply him with a large and well-trained cavalry.Then, in the spring of 204 B.C., Scipio sailed forAfrica and landed near Utica, not far from Carthage.Initially surprised, the Carthaginians rallied and wereable to pin Scipio's troops on a peninsula outside thetown. The situation looked bleak. If Scipio couldsomehow advance past the enemy troops thatblocked his path, he would enter the heart of theenemy state and gain control of the situation, but thatseemed an impossible task--he could not hope tofight his way past the tight Carthaginian cordon;trapped where he was, his supplies would eventuallyrun out, forcing him to surrender. Scipio bargained forpeace but used the negotiations as a way to spy onthe Carthaginian army.

Scipio's ambassadors told him that the enemy hadtwo camps, one for its own army and the other for itsmain ally, the Numidians, whose camp was ratherdisorganized, a swarm of reed huts. The Carthaginiancamp was more orderly but made of the samecombustible materials. Over the next few weeks,Scipio seemed indecisive, first breaking off

negotiations, then reopening them, confusing theCarthaginians. Then one night he made a sneakattack on the Numidian camp and set it on fire. Theblaze spread quickly, and the African soldierspanicked, scattering in every direction. Awakened bythe hubbub, the Carthaginians opened the gates totheir own camp to come to their allies' rescue--but inthe confusion the Romans were able to steal in andset fire to their camp as well. The enemy lost half theirarmy in this battle by night, the rest managing toretreat to Numidia and Carthage.

Heracles did not return to Mycenae by a directroute. He first traversed Libya, whose KingAntaeus, son of Poseidon and Mother Earth,was in the habit of forcing strangers to wrestlewith him until they were exhausted, whereuponhe killed them; for not only was he a strong andskilful athlete, but whenever he touched theearth, his strength revived. He saved the skullsof his victims to roof a temple of Poseidon. It isnot known whether Heracles, who wasdetermined to end this barbarous practice,challenged Antaeus, or was challenged by him.Antaeus, however, proved no easy victim, beinga giant who lived in a cave beneath a toweringcliff, where he feasted on the flesh of lions, andslept on the bare ground in order to conserveand increase his already colossal strength.Mother Earth, not yet sterile after her birth of the

Giant, had conceived Antaeus in a Libyan cave,and found more reason to boast of him thaneven of her monstrous elder children, Typhon,Tityus, and Briareus. It would have gone ill withthe Olympians if he had fought against them onthe Plains of Phlegra. In preparation for thewrestling match, both combatants cast off theirlion pelts, but while Heracles rubbed himselfwith oil in the Olympian fashion, Antaeuspoured hot sand over his limbs lest contact withthe earth through the soles of his feet aloneshould prove insufficient. Heracles planned topreserve his strength and wear Antaeus down,but after tossing him full length on the ground,he was amazed to see the giant's muscles swelland a healthy flush suffuse his limbs as MotherEarth revived him. The combatants grappledagain, and presently Antaeus flung himselfdown of his own accord, not waiting to be thrown;upon which, Heracles, realizing what he was at,lifted him high into the air, then cracked his ribsand, despite the hollow groans of Mother Earth,held him aloft until he died.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

Suddenly the Carthaginian interior lay open toScipio's army. He proceeded to take town after town,advancing much as Hannibal had in Italy. Then helanded a contingent of troops at the port of Tunis,

within sight of Carthage's walls. Now it was theCarthaginians' turn to panic, and Hannibal, theirgreatest general, was immediately recalled. In 202B.C., after sixteen years of fighting on Rome'sdoorstep, Hannibal was finally compelled to leaveItaly.

Hannibal landed his army to Carthage's south andmade plans to fight Scipio. But the Roman generalretreated west, to the Bagradas Valley--the mostfertile farmlands of Carthage, its economic base.There he went on a rampage, destroying everything insight. Hannibal had wanted to fight near Carthage,where he had shelter and material reinforcements.Instead he was compelled to pursue Scipio beforeCarthage lost its richest territory. But Scipio keptretreating, refusing battle until he had lured Hannibalto the town of Zama, where he secured a solidposition and forced Hannibal to camp in a placewithout water. Now the two armies finally met in battle.Exhausted by their pursuit of Scipio, their cavalryneutralized by Masinissa's, the Carthaginians weredefeated, and with no refuge close enough to retreatto, Hannibal was forced to surrender. Carthagequickly sued for peace, and under the harsh termsimposed by Scipio and the Senate, it was reduced toa client state of Rome. As a Mediterranean powerand a threat to Rome, Carthage was finished forgood.

InterpretationOften what separates a mediocre general from a

superior one is not their strategies or maneuvers buttheir vision--they simply look at the same problemfrom a different angle. Freed from the stranglehold ofconvention, the superior general naturally hits on theright strategy.

The Romans were dazzled by Hannibal's strategicgenius. They came to so fear him that the onlystrategies they could use against him were delay andavoidance. Scipio Africanus simply saw differently. Atevery turn he looked not at the enemy army, nor evenat its leader, but at the pillar of support on which itstood--its critical vulnerability. He understood thatmilitary power was located not in the army itself but inits foundations, the things that supported it and madeit possible: money, supplies, public goodwill, allies.He found those pillars and bit by bit knocked themdown.

Scipio's first step was to see Spain, not Italy, asHannibal's center of gravity. Within Spain the key wasNew Carthage. He did not chase the various Romanarmies but took New Carthage and turned the wararound. Now Hannibal, deprived of his main militarybase and source of supply, would have to lean moreheavily on his other support base: Carthage itself, withits wealth and resources. So Scipio took the war toAfrica. Trapped near Utica, he examined what gavethe enemy its power in this situation, and saw that itwas not the armies themselves but the position theyhad taken: get them to move out of that positionwithout wasting men in a frontal battle and Carthage'ssoft underbelly would be exposed. By burning the

camps, Scipio moved the armies. Then, instead ofmarching on the city of Carthage--a glittering prizethat would have drawn most generals like a magnet--he hit what would hurt the Carthaginian state most: thefertile farming zone that was the source of its wealth.Finally, instead of chasing Hannibal, he madeHannibal come after him, to an area in the middle ofthe country where he would be deprived ofreinforcements and support. Now that Scipio hadunbalanced the Carthaginians so completely, theirdefeat at Zama was definitive.

Power is deceptive. If we imagine the enemy as aboxer, we tend to focus on his punch. But still morethan he depends on his punch, he depends on hislegs; once they go weak, he loses balance, he cannotescape the other fighter, he is subject to gruelingexchanges, and his punches gradually diminish inforce until he is knocked out. When you look at yourrivals, do not be distracted by their punch. To engagein any exchange of punches, in life or in war, is theheight of stupidity and waste. Power depends onbalance and support; so look at what is holding yourenemy up, and remember that what holds him up canalso make him fall. A person, like an army, usuallygets his or her power from three or four simultaneoussources: money, popularity, skillful maneuvering,some particular advantage he has fostered. Knockout one and he will have to depend more on theothers; knock out those and he is lost. Weaken aboxer's legs and he will reel and stagger, and whenhe does, be merciless. No power can stand without

its legs.

When the vanes are removed from an arrow,even though the shaft and tip remain it isdifficult for the arrow to penetrate deeply.--Ming dynasty strategist Chieh Hsuan (early

seventeenth century A.D.)

KEYS TO WARFAREIt is natural in war to focus on the physical aspect ofconflict--bodies, equipment, materiel. Even anenlightened strategist will tend to look first at theenemy's army, firepower, mobility, reserves. War is avisceral, emotional affair, an arena of physicaldanger, and it takes great effort to rise above thislevel and ask different questions: What makes theenemy army move? What gives it impetus andendurance? Who guides its actions? What is theunderlying source of its strength?

The people of Israel cried out to the Lord theirGod, for their courage failed, because all theirenemies had surrounded them and there wasno way of escape from them. The wholeAssyrian army, their infantry, chariots, andcavalry, surrounded them for thirty-four days,until all the vessels of water belonging to everyinhabitant of Bethulia were empty.... Theirchildren lost heart, and the women and youngmen fainted from thirst and fell down in thestreets of the city and in the passages through

the gates; there was no strength left in them anylonger.... When Judith had ceased crying out tothe God of Israel, and had ended all thesewords, she rose from where she lay prostrateand called her maid and went down into thehouse where she lived on sabbaths and on herfeast days; and she removed the sackclothwhich she had been wearing, and took off herwidow's garments, and bathed her body withwater, and anointed herself with preciousointment, and combed her hair and put on atiara, and arrayed herself in her gayest apparel,which she used to wear while her husbandManasseh was living. And she put sandals onher feet, and put on her anklets and braceletsand rings, and her earrings and all herornaments, and made herself very beautiful, toentice the eyes of all men who might seeher....... The women went straight on through thevalley; and an Assyrian patrol met her and tookher into custody, and asked her, "To whatpeople do you belong, and where are yougoing?" She replied, "I am a daughter of theHebrews, but I am fleeing from them, for theyare about to be handed over to you to bedevoured. I am on my way to the presence ofHolofernes the commander of your army, togive him a true report; and I will show him a wayby which he can go and capture all the hill

country without losing one of his men, capturedor slain." When the man heard her words, andobserved her face--she was in their eyesmarvelously beautiful--they said to her "...Go atonce to his tent.... And when you stand beforehim, do not be afraid in your heart, but tell himjust what you have said, and he will treat youwell."...Her words pleased Holofernes and all hisservants, and they marveled at her wisdom andsaid, "There is no such a woman from one endof the earth to the other, either for beauty of faceor wisdom of speech!"...On the fourth dayHolofernes held a banquet for his slaves only,and did not invite any of his officers. And hesaid to Bagoas, the eunuch who had charge ofall his personal affairs, "Go now and persuadethe Hebrew woman who is in your care to join usand eat and drink with us."...So Bagoas went outfrom the presence of Holofernes, andapproached her...And Judith said, "Who am I, torefuse my lord? Surely whatever pleases him Iwill do at once, and it will be a joy to me until theday of my death!" So she got up and arrayedherself in all her woman's finery. Then Judithcame in and lay down, and olofernes' heart wasravished with her and he was moved with greatdesire to possess her; for he had been waitingfor an opportunity to deceive her, ever since theday he first saw her. So Holofernes said to her,

"Drink now, and be merry with us!" Judith said, "Iwill drink now, my lord, because my life meansmore to me today than in all the days since Iwas born."...And Holofernes was greatly pleasedwith her, and drank a great quantity of wine,much more than he had ever drunk in any oneday since he was born. When evening came,his slaves quickly withdrew, and Bagoas closedthe tent from outside and shut out theattendants from his master's presence; and theywent to bed.... So Judith was left alone in thetent, with Holofernes stretched out on his bed,for he was overcome with wine.... [Judith] went tothe post at the end of the bed, aboveHolofernes' head, and took down his sword thathung there. She came close to his bed and tookahold of the hair on his head.... And she struckhis neck twice with all her might and severed hishead from his body. Then she tumbled his bodyoff the bed and pulled the canopy from theposts; after a moment she went out, and gaveHolofernes' head to her maid, who placed it inher food bag.... So Bagoas...went into thebedchamber and found him thrown down on theplatform dead, with his head cut off and missing.And he cried out with a loud voice and wept andgroaned.... Then he went to the tent where Judithhad stayed, and when he did not find her herushed out to the people and shouted, "The

slaves have tricked us! One Hebrew woman hasbrought disgrace upon the house ofNebuchadnezzar! For look, here is Holoferneslying on the ground, and his head is not onhim!" When the leaders of the Assyrian armyheard this, they rent their tunics and weregreatly dismayed, and their loud cries andshouts arose in the midst of the camp.... Whenthe men in the tents heard it, they were amazedat what had happened. Fear and tremblingcame over them, so that they did not wait forone another, but with one impulse all rushed outand fled by every path across the plain andthrough the country.... Then the men of Israel,every one that was a soldier, rushed out uponthem.... And when the Israelites heard it, withone accord they fell upon the enemy, and cutthem down as far as Choba.

JUDITH 7:19-15:7

Most people have the problem of seeing war as aseparate activity unrelated to other realms of humanlife. But in fact war is a form of power--Carl vonClausewitz called it "politics by other means"--and allforms of power share the same essential structures.

The most visible thing about power is its outwardmanifestation, what its witnesses see and feel. Anarmy has its size, its weaponry, its shows ofdiscipline, its aggressive maneuvers; individuals havemany ways of showing their position and influence. It

is the nature of power to present a forceful front, toseem menacing and intimidating, strong anddecisive. But this outward display is oftenexaggerated or even downright deceptive, sincepower does not dare show its weaknesses. Andbeneath the display is the support on which powerrests--its "center of gravity." The phrase is vonClausewitz's, who elaborated it as "the hub of allpower and movement, on which everything depends."This is the part that governs the whole, a kind of nervecenter.

To attack this center of gravity, to neutralize ordestroy it, is the ultimate strategy in war, for without itthe whole structure will collapse. The enemy may havegreat generals and strong armies, like Hannibal andhis invincible army in Italy, but without a center ofgravity those armies cannot move and have no forceor coherence. Hitting the center will have devastatingpsychological effects, throwing the enemy off balanceand inducing a creeping panic. If conventionalgenerals look at the physical aspect of the enemyarmy, focusing on its weaknesses and trying to exploitthem, superior strategists look behind and beyond, tothe support system. The enemy's center of gravity iswhere an injury will hurt him most, his point of greatestvulnerability. Hitting him there is the best way to end aconflict definitively and economically.

The key is analyzing the enemy force to determineits centers of gravity. In looking for those centers, it iscrucial not to be misled by the intimidating or dazzlingexterior, mistaking the outward appearance for what

sets it in motion. You will probably have to takeseveral steps, one by one, to uncover this ultimatepower source, peeling away layer after layer.Remember Scipio, who saw first that Hannibaldepended on Spain, then that Spain depended onCarthage, then that Carthage depended on itsmaterial prosperity, which itself had particularsources. Strike at Carthage's prosperity, as Scipioeventually did, and the whole thing would fall apart.

To find a group's center of gravity, you mustunderstand its structure and the culture within which itoperates. If your enemies are individuals, you mustfathom their psychology, what makes them tick, thestructure of their thinking and priorities.

In crafting a strategy to defeat the United States inthe Vietnam War, General Vo Nguyen Giapdetermined that the real center of gravity in theAmerican democracy was the political support of itscitizens. Given that support--the kind of support themilitary had had during World War II--the country couldprosecute a war with the utmost effectiveness.Without that support, though, the effort was doomed.Through the Tet Offensive of 1968, Giap was able toundermine the American public's support for the war.He had gained an understanding of American culturethat allowed him to aim at the right target.

The more centralized the enemy, the moredevastating becomes a blow at its leader orgoverning body. Hernan Cortes was able to conquerMexico with a handful of soldiers by capturingMoctezuma, the Aztec emperor. Moctezuma was the

center around which everything revolved; without himAztec culture quickly collapsed. When Napoleoninvaded Russia in 1812, he assumed that by takingMoscow, the capital, he could force the Russians tosurrender. But the true center of gravity in thisauthoritarian nation was the czar, who wasdetermined to continue the war. The loss of Moscowonly steeled his resolve.

A more decentralized enemy will have severalseparate centers of gravity. The key here is todisorganize them by cutting off communicationbetween them. That was what General DouglasMacArthur did in his remarkable campaign in thePacific during World War II: he skipped some islandsbut took key ones, keeping the Japanese extendedover a vast area and making it impossible for them tocommunicate with each other. It is almost alwaysstrategically wise to disrupt your enemy's lines ofcommunication; if the parts cannot communicate withthe whole, chaos ensues.

Your enemy's center of gravity can be somethingabstract, like a quality, concept, or aptitude on whichhe depends: his reputation, his capacity to deceive,his unpredictability. But such strengths becomecritical vulnerabilities if you can make themunattractive or unusable. In fighting the Scythians inwhat is now modern-day Iran, a tribe that no one couldfigure out how to defeat, Alexander the Great saw thecenter of gravity as their complete mobility onhorseback and their fluid, almost chaotic style offighting. He simply plotted to neutralize the source of

this power by luring them on to enclosed ground inwhich they could not use their cavalry and pell-melltactics. He defeated them with ease.

To find an enemy's center of gravity, you have toerase your own tendency to think in conventionalterms or to assume that the other side's center is thesame as your own. When Salvador Dali came to theUnited States in 1940, intent on conquering thecountry as an artist and making his fortune, he madea clever calculation. In the European art world, anartist had to win over the critics and make a name as"serious." In America, though, that kind of fame woulddoom an artist to a ghetto, a limited circle. The realcenter of gravity was the American media. By wooingthe newspapers, he would gain access to theAmerican public, and the American public wouldmake him a star.

Again, in the civil war between Communists andNationalists for control of China in the late 1920s andearly '30s, most of the Communists focused on takingcities, as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia. But MaoTse-tung, an outsider within the dogmatic ChineseCommunist Party, was able to look at China in a clearlight and see China's center of gravity as its vastpeasant population. Win them to his side, hebelieved, and the revolution could not fail. That singleinsight proved the key to the Communists' success.Such is the power of identifying the center of gravity.

We often hide our sources of power from view;what most people consider a center of gravity is oftena front. But sometimes an enemy will reveal his center

of gravity by what he protects the most fervently. Inbringing the Civil War into Georgia, General WilliamTecumseh Sherman discovered that the South wasparticularly anxious to protect Atlanta and the areasaround it. That was the South's industrial center ofgravity. Like Sherman, attack what the enemy mosttreasures, or threaten it to make the enemy divertforces to defend itself.

In any group, power and influence will naturallydevolve to a handful of people behind the scenes.That kind of power works best when it is not exposedto the light of day. Once you discover this coterieholding the strings, win it over. As president during theDepression, Franklin Roosevelt faced problems fromso many sides that it was difficult for him to knowwhere his energy should go. In the end he decidedthat the key to enacting his reforms was winning overCongress. Then, within Congress, there wereparticular leaders who held the real power. Heconcentrated on wooing and seducing these leaderswith his great charm. It was one of the secrets to hissuccess.

What ultimately guides a group is the command-and-control center, the operational brain that takes ininformation, then makes the crucial decisions.Disrupting the functioning of that brain will causedislocation throughout the enemy army. Before almostevery battle, Alexander the Great would examine theenemy's organization, pinpointing as best he couldthe location of the command structure, then eitherattacking it or isolating it, making it impossible for the

brain to communicate with the body.Even in a sport as physical as boxing, Muhammad

Ali, in crafting a strategy to defeat his archnemesisJoe Frazier, took aim at Frazier's mind, the ultimatecenter of gravity for any individual. Before every fight,Ali would get under Frazier's skin, riling him up bycalling him an Uncle Tom, a tool of the white man'smedia. He would keep going during the fight itself,taunting Frazier mercilessly in the ring. Frazierbecame obsessed with Ali, could not think about himwithout bursting with anger. Controlling Frazier's mindwas the key to controlling his body.

In any interaction with people, you must trainyourself to focus on their strength, the source of theirpower, whatever it is that gives them their most crucialsupport. That knowledge will afford you manystrategic options, many angles from which to attack,subtly or not so subtly undermining their strengthrather than hitting it head-on. You can create nogreater sense of panic in your enemies than that ofbeing unable to use their strengths.

REVERSALEvery living creature has a center of gravity. Even themost decentralized group has to communicate anddepends on a network that is vulnerable to attack.There is no reversal to this principle.

Image: The Wall. Your opponents standbehind a wall, which protects them fromstrangers and intruders. Do not hit your

head against the wall or lay siege to it; findthe pillars and supports that make it standand give it strength. Dig under the wall,sapping its foundations until it collapses onits own.

DEFEAT THEM IN DETAILTHE DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER STRATEGY

When you look at your enemies, do not beintimidated by their appearance. Instead look at theparts that make up the whole. By separating theparts, sowing dissension and division from within,you can weaken and bring down even the mostformidable foe. In setting up your attack, work ontheir minds to create internal conflict. Look for thejoints and links, the things that connect the people ina group or connect one group to another. Division isweakness, and the joints are the weakest part of anystructure. When you are facing troubles or enemies,turn a large problem into small, eminentlydefeatable parts.

There were, however, many occasions when theFrench were faced not by one but by two or awhole series of enemy armies within supportingdistance of one another. Faced with such adifficult situation, Napoleon often adopted asecond system of maneuver--the "strategy ofthe central position." Very often under thesecircumstances the French found themselvesoperating at a numerical disadvantage againstthe combined strength of their opponents, but

could procure superior numbers against anyone part of their adversaries' forces. It was thissecond factor that the system was designed toexploit to the full. "The art of generalshipconsists in, when actually inferior in numbers tothe enemy (overall), being superior to him onthe battlefield." In brief, Napoleon set himselfthe task of isolating one part of the enemyarmament, concentrating a stronger force toensure its defeat and if possible its destruction,and then turning with his full strength to attackthe second enemy army; that is to say, insteadof a single decisive blow, he planned a series ofsmaller blows against scattered adversariesand set out to destroy them in detail. How couldthis be done? Once again, the sequence of theNapoleonic attack reveals the formula. First ofall the Emperor would accumulate as muchinformation about the forces facing him fromcaptured newspapers, deserters and mostespecially from the indications brought in by hisprobing cavalry patrols. From the data thusprovided, he would carefully plot the knowndispositions of his foes on the map, and thenselect the place where their respective armyboundaries converged. This was the "hinge" or"joint" of the enemy's strategic dispositions, andas such was vulnerable to attack. This pointwould be selected by Napoleon for his initial

blitzkrieg attack, carried out as often as not infull strength. Shielded by the cavalry screen, theFrench army would perform a crashconcentration and fall like a thunderbolt on thehandful of troops defending this central point.Invariably this initial onslaught would besuccessful. Immediately Napoleon had massedhis army at this newly captured point, he wasmaster of the "central position"--that is to say,he had successfully interposed hisconcentrated army between the forces of hisenemies who, ideally, would have staggeredback under the impact of the surprise blow insuch a way as to increase the distance betweentheir respective armies. This would inevitablymean that the foe would have to operate on"exterior lines" (i.e., have greater distances tomarch from one flank to the other) while thebetter-positioned French would have a shorterdistance to travel to reach either enemy.THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON, DAVID G.

CHANDLER, 1966

THE CENTRAL POSITIONOne day in early August of 490 B.C., the citizens ofAthens received word that a massive Persian fleethad just landed some twenty-four miles to the north,along the coastal plains of Marathon. A mood ofdoom quickly spread. Every Athenian knew Persia'sintentions--to capture their city; destroy its young

democracy and restore a former tyrant, Hippias, tothe throne; and sell many of its citizens into slavery.Some eight years earlier, Athens had sent ships tosupport the Greek cities of Asia Minor in a rebellionagainst King Darius, ruler of the Persian Empire. TheAthenians had sailed home after a few battles--theysoon saw that this business was hopeless--but theyhad participated in burning down the city of Sardis, anunforgivable outrage, and Darius wanted revenge.

The Athenians' predicament seemed desperate.The Persian army was enormous, some 80,000 menstrong, transported by hundreds of ships; it hadexcellent cavalry and the best archers in the world.The Athenians, meanwhile, had only infantry, some10,000 strong. They had sent a runner to Spartaurgently requesting reinforcements, but the Spartanswere celebrating their moon festival and it was tabooto fight during such a time. They would send troops assoon as they could, within a week--but that wouldprobably be too late. Meanwhile a group of Persiansympathizers within Athens--mostly from wealthyfamilies--despised the democracy, looked forward toHippias's return, and were doing their best to sowdissension and betray the city from within. Not onlywould the Athenians have to fight the Persians alone,but they were divided into factions amongthemselves.

The leaders of democratic Athens gathered todiscuss the alternatives, all of which seemed bad. Themajority argued for concentrating the Athenian forcesoutside the city in a defensive cordon. There they

could wait to fight the Persians on terrain they knewwell. The Persian army, however, was large enough tosurround the city by both land and sea, choking it offwith a blockade. So one leader, Miltiades, made avery different proposal: to march the entire Athenianarmy immediately toward Marathon, to a place wherethe road to Athens passed through a narrow passalong the coast. That would leave Athens itselfunprotected; in trying to block the Persian advance onland, it would open itself to an attack by sea. ButMiltiades argued that occupying the pass was the onlyway to avoid being surrounded. He had fought thePersians in Asia Minor and was the Athenians' mostexperienced soldier. The leaders voted for his plan.

And so a few days later, the 10,000 Athenianinfantrymen began the march north, slaves carryingtheir heavy body armor, mules and donkeystransporting their food. When they reached the passlooking down on the plains of Marathon, their heartssank: as far as the eye could see, the long strip ofland was filled with tents, horses, and soldiers from allover the Persian Empire. Ships cluttered the coast.

For several days neither side moved. TheAthenians had no choice but to hold their position;without cavalry and hopelessly outnumbered, howcould they do battle at Marathon? If enough time wentby, perhaps the Spartans would arrive asreinforcements. But what were the Persians waitingfor?

Before dawn on August 12, some Greek scoutsostensibly working for the Persians slipped across to

the Athenian side and reported startling news: undercover of darkness, the Persians had just sailed for theBay of Phaleron outside Athens, taking most of theircavalry with them and leaving a holding force of some15,000 soldiers in the plains of Marathon. They wouldtake Athens from the sea, then march north,squeezing the Athenian army at Marathon betweentwo larger forces.

Of the Athenian army's eleven commanders,Miltiades alone seemed calm, even relieved: this wastheir opportunity. As the sun was getting ready to rise,he argued for an immediate attack on the Persians atMarathon. Some of the other commanders resistedthis idea: the enemy still had more men, somecavalry, and plenty of archers. Better to wait for theSpartans, who would surely arrive soon. But Miltiadescountered that the Persians had divided their forces.He had fought them before and knew that the Greekinfantryman was superior in discipline and spirit. ThePersians at Marathon now only slightly outnumberedthe Greeks; they could fight them and win.

Meanwhile, even with a good wind, it would take thePersian ships ten to twelve hours to round the coastand arrive at the Bay of Phaleron. Then they wouldneed more time to disembark the troops and horses.If the Athenians defeated the Persians at Marathonquickly, they would have just enough time to run backto Athens and defend the city the same day. If insteadthey opted to wait, the Spartans might never arrive;the Persians would surround them, and, moreominously, the Persian sympathizers within Athens

would probably betray the city from within and open itswalls to the barbarians. It was now or never. By a voteof six to five, the commanders decided to attack atdawn.

At six in the morning, the Athenians began theircharge. A hail of arrows from the Persian archersrained down on them, but they closed in on the enemyso quickly that the battle now had to be fought hand-to-hand--and, as Miltiades had foreseen, in closecombat the Athenians were superior. They pushed thePersians back into the marshes at the north end of theplain, where thousands drowned. The watersreddened with blood. By nine in the morning, theAthenians had control of the plains, having lost fewerthan two hundred men.

Although emotionally spent by this battle, theAthenians now had only around seven hours to makethe twenty-four miles back to Athens in time to stopthe Persians. There was simply no time to rest; theyran, as fast their feet could take them, loaded down intheir heavy armor, impelled by the thought of theimminent dangers facing their families and fellowcitizens. By four in the afternoon, the fastest amongthem had straggled to a point overlooking the Bay ofPhaleron. The rest soon followed. Within a matter ofminutes after their arrival, the Persian fleet sailed intothe bay to see a most unwelcome sight: thousands ofAthenian soldiers, caked in dust and blood, standingshoulder to shoulder to fight the landing.

The Persians rode at anchor for a few hours, thenheaded out to sea, returning home. Athens was

saved.

InterpretationThe victory at Marathon and race to Athens wereperhaps the most decisive moments in Athenianhistory. Had the soldiers not come in time, thePersians would have taken the city, then certainly allof Greece, and eventually they would have expandedthroughout the Mediterranean, for no other power inexistence at the time could have stopped them.History would have been altered irrevocably.

Miltiades' plan worked by the narrowest of margins,but it was based on sound and timeless principles.When a powerful foe attacks you in strength,threatening your ability to advance and take theinitiative, you must work to make the enemy divide itsforces and then defeat these smaller forces one byone--"in detail," as the military say.

The key to Miltiades' strategy was his intuition totake the battle to Marathon. By placing himself at thepass that led to Athens, he occupied the centralposition in the war instead of the southern periphery.With the entire army holding the pass, the Persianswould have a bloody time forcing their way through, sothey decided to divide their forces before the Spartanreinforcements arrived. Once divided, and with theircavalry diluted, they lost their advantage and thecentral position from which they could dominate thewar.

For the Athenians it was imperative to fight thesmallest force first, the one they faced at Marathon.

That done, and having taken the central position, theyhad the shorter route to Athens, while the invadershad to round the coast. Arriving first at Phaleron, theAthenians allowed no safe place to disembark. ThePersians could have returned to Marathon, but thearrival of the bloodied Athenian soldiers from thenorth must have told them they had already lost thebattle there, and their spirits were broken. Retreatwas the only option.

There will be times in life when you face a powerfulenemy--a destructive opponent seeking your undoing,a slew of seemingly insurmountable problems hittingyou at once. It is natural to feel intimidated in thesesituations, which may paralyze you into inaction ormake you wait in the vain hope that time will bring asolution. But it is a law of war that by allowing thelarger force to come to you, at full strength and unified,you increase the odds against you; a large andpowerful army on the move will gain an irresistiblemomentum if left unchecked. You will find yourselfquickly overwhelmed. The wisest course is to take arisk, meet the enemy before it comes to you, and tryto blunt its momentum by forcing or enticing it todivide. And the best way to make an enemy divide isto occupy the center.

Think of battle or conflict as existing on a kind ofchessboard. The chessboard's center can bephysical--an actual place like Marathon--or moresubtle and psychological: the levers of power within agroup, the support of a critical ally, a troublemaker atthe eye of the storm. Take the center of the

chessboard and the enemy will naturally break intoparts, trying to hit you from more than one side. Thesesmaller parts are now manageable, can be defeatedin detail or forced to divide yet again. And oncesomething large is divided, it is prone to furtherdivision, to being splintered into nothingness.

As your army faces the enemy and the enemyappears powerful, try to attack the enemy in one

particular spot. If you are successful incrumbling that one particular spot, leave that

spot and attack the next, and so on and so forth,as if you were going down a winding road.

--Miyamoto Musashi (1584-1645)

ATTACKING THE JOINTSAs a young man, Samuel Adams (1722-1803) ofcolonial-era Boston developed a dream: theAmerican colonies, he believed, should one day wincomplete independence from England and establisha government based on the writings of the Englishphilosopher John Locke. According to Locke, agovernment should reflect the will of its citizens; agovernment that did not do so had lost its right toexist. Adams had inherited a brewery from his father,but he did not care about business, and while thebrewery veered toward bankruptcy, he spent his timewriting articles on Locke and the need forindependence. He was an excellent writer, goodenough to get his articles published, but few took hisideas seriously: he seemed to rant, to be somewhat

out of touch with the world. He had that obsessive glintin the eye that makes people think you're a crackpot.The problem was that the ties between England andAmerica were strong; the colonists did have theirgrievances, but there was hardly a clamor forindependence. Adams began to have bouts ofdepression; his self-appointed mission seemedhopeless.

The British desperately needed money from thecolonies, and in 1765 they passed a law called theStamp Act: to make any document legal, Americanbusinesses would be required to purchase and affixto it a stamp of the British crown. The colonists weregrowing ticklish about the taxes they paid to England;they saw the Stamp Act as a new kind of tax indisguise, and a few disgruntled voices were raised inurban taverns. Even so, for most the issue seemedminor--but Adams saw the Stamp Act as theopportunity he had been waiting for his whole life. Itgave him something tangible to attack, and heflooded newspapers throughout the colonies witheditorials, all fulminating against the act. Withoutconsulting the colonies, he wrote, England wasimposing a new kind of tax, and this, in a memorablephrase, was taxation without representation, the firststep toward tyranny.

A novice chess player soon learns that it is agood idea to control the center of the board.This recognition will recur, in novel disguises, insituations far from the chessboard. It may help

to seek the equivalent of the center of the boardin any situation, or to see that the role of thecenter has migrated to the flanks, or to realizethat there is no board and no singulartopology....

CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY, TIHA VONGHYZY, BOLKO VON OETINGER,

CHRISTOPHER BASSFORD, EDS., 2001

These editorials were so well written and soaudacious in their criticisms that many began to takea closer look at the Stamp Act, and they did not likewhat they saw. Adams had never previously gonebeyond writing articles, but now that he had lit this fireof discontent, he saw the urgency in stoking it furtherwith action. For many years he had fraternized withworking-class people considered riffraff by politesociety--dockworkers and the like; now he bandedthese men into an organization called the Sons ofLiberty. The group marched through the streets ofBoston shouting a slogan Adams had coined:"Liberty, property, and no stamps!" They burnedeffigies of political figures who had promoted theStamp Act. They distributed pamphlets containingAdams's arguments against the act. They alsoworked to intimidate the future distributors of thestamps, even going so far as to destroy one of theiroffices. The more dramatic the action, the morepublicity Adams would earn, publicity into which hecould insert arguments against the act.

Having gained momentum, the relentless Adams

would not stop. He organized a statewide workstoppage for the day the act was to become law:shops would close, the courts would be empty. Sinceno business would be conducted in Massachusetts,no stamps would be purchased. The boycott wasmassively successful.

Adams's articles, demonstrations, and boycottmade a splash in England, and there were membersof Parliament who sympathized with the colonists andspoke out against the Stamp Act. Finally King GeorgeIII had had enough, and in April 1766 the act wasrepealed. Americans rejoiced at their first show ofpower. The British were smarting from their defeat,however, and the following year they sneaked inanother series of indirect taxes known as theTownshend System.

Clearly they had underestimated their enemy:Adams went to war. As he had with the Stamp Act, hewrote countless articles on the nature of the taxes theEnglish had tried to disguise, once again stirring upanger. He also organized further demonstrations bythe Sons of Liberty, now more menacing and violentthan ever--in fact, the English were forced to sendtroops to Boston to keep the peace. This had beenAdams's goal all along; he had ratcheted up thetension. Belligerent encounters between the Sons ofLiberty and the English troops put the soldiers onedge, and finally a nervous group of them fired into acrowd, killing several Bostonians. Adams called thisthe Boston Massacre and spread fiery word of itthroughout the colonies.

With the people of Boston now bubbling with anger,Adams organized another boycott: no citizen ofMassachusetts, not even a prostitute, would sellanything to British soldiers. No one would rent themlodgings. They were shunned in the streets andtaverns; even eye contact was avoided. All of this hada demoralizing effect on the British soldiers. Feelingisolated and antagonized, many of them began todesert or find ways to be sent home.

Every kingdom divided against itself is laidwaste, and a divided household falls. And ifSatan also is divided against himself, how willhis kingdom stand?

LUKE 11:14

News of the problems in Massachusetts spreadnorth and south; colonists everywhere began to talkabout Britain's actions in Boston, its use of force, itshidden taxes, its patronizing attitude. Then, in 1773,Parliament passed the Tea Act, on the surface arather harmless attempt to solve the economicproblems of the East India Company by giving it avirtual monopoly on the sale of tea in the colonies. Thelaw also levied a nominal tax, but, even so, it wouldhave made tea cheaper in the colonies, because themiddlemen--the colonial importers--were to be cutout. The Tea Act, however, was deceptive in its effect,and confusing, and Adams saw in it a chance to applythe coup de grace: it would ruin many colonial teaimporters, and it did include a hidden tax, yet another

form of taxation without representation. In exchangefor cheaper tea, the English were making a mockeryof democracy. In language more fiery than ever,Adams began to turn out articles opening up the oldwounds from the Stamp Act and the BostonMassacre.

When East India Company ships began to arrive inBoston at the end of that year, Adams helped toorganize a nationwide boycott of their tea. Nodockworker would unload the cargo, no warehousewould store it. Then, one night in mid-December, afterAdams had addressed a town meeting about the TeaAct, a group of members of the Sons of Liberty--disguised as Mohawk Indians, body paint and all--erupted in war whoops, charged to the wharves,boarded the tea ships, and destroyed their cargo,cutting open the cases of tea and pouring them intothe harbor, all of this done with great revelry.

This provocative act, which later became known asthe Boston Tea Party, was the turning point. TheBritish could not tolerate it and quickly closed downBoston harbor and imposed military law onMassachusetts. Now all doubt vanished: pushed intoa corner by Adams, the British were acting just astyrannically as he had prophesied they would. Theheavy military presence in Massachusetts waspredictably unpopular, and it was only a matter ofmonths before violence erupted: in April 1775,English soldiers fired on Massachusetts militiamen inLexington. This "shot heard 'round the world" becamethe spark for the war that Adams had so diligently

worked to kindle out of nothing.

InterpretationBefore 1765, Adams labored under the belief thatwell-reasoned arguments would be enough toconvince the colonists of the rightness of his cause.But as the years of failure piled up, he confronted thereality that the colonists retained a deep emotionalattachment to England, as children do to a parent.Liberty meant less to them than did England'sprovision of protection and a sense of belonging in athreatening environment. When Adams realized this,he reformulated his goals: instead of preachingindependence and the ideas of John Locke, he set towork to sever the colonists' ties with England. Hemade the children distrust the parent, whom theycame to see not as a protector but as a domineeringoverlord exploiting them for its profit. The bond withEngland loosened, Adams's arguments forindependence began to resonate. Now the colonistsbegan to look for their sense of identity not to MotherEngland but to themselves.

With the Stamp Act campaign, then, Adamsdiscovered strategy, the bridge between his ideasand reality. His writings now aimed at stirring upanger. The demonstrations he organized--puretheater--were also designed to create and build angeramong the middle and lower classes, keycomponents of the future revolution. Adams'sinnovative use of boycotts was calibrated to infuriatethe British and bait them into rash action. Their violent

response contrasted brilliantly with the relativelypeaceful methods of the colonists, making them seemas tyrannical as he had said they were. Adams alsoworked to stir dissension among the Englishthemselves, weakening the bond on all sides. TheStamp Act and Tea Act were actually rather trivial, butAdams strategically manipulated them to manufactureoutrage, making them into wedges driven betweenthe two sides.

Understand: rational arguments go in one ear andout the other. No one is changed; you are preachingto the converted. In the war to win people's attentionand influence them, you must first separate them fromwhatever ties them to the past and makes them resistchange. You must realize that these ties are generallynot rational but emotional. By appealing to people'semotions, you can make your targets see the past ina new light, as something tyrannical, boring, ugly,immoral. Now you have room to infiltrate new ideas,shift people's vision, make them respond to a newsense of their self-interest, and sow the seeds for anew cause, a new bond. To make people join you,separate them from their past. When you size up yourtargets, look for what connects them to the past, thesource of their resistance to the new.

A joint is the weakest part of any structure. Break itand you divide people internally, making themvulnerable to suggestion and change. Divide theirminds in order to conquer them.

Make the enemy believe that support is

lacking;...cut off, flank, turn, in a thousand waysmake his men believe themselves isolated.

Isolate in like manner his squadrons, battalions,brigades and divisions; and victory is yours.

--Colonel Ardant du Picq (1821-1870)

KEYS TO WARFAREThousands of years ago, our primitive ancestors wereprone to feelings of great weakness and vulnerability.To survive in the hostile environment of our earlyworld, animals had speed, teeth and claws, furagainst winter cold, and other advantages of powerand protection. Humans had none of this and musthave felt terrifyingly exposed and alone. The only wayto compensate for such weakness was to formgroups.

THE THREE OXEN AND THE LIONThere were three oxen who always grazedtogether. A lion had his designs upon them andwanted to eat them, but he could never get atone of them because they were always together.So he set them against each other withslanderous talk and managed to get themseparated, whereupon they were isolated andhe was able to eat them one after the other.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

The group or tribe offered a defense againstpredators and greater effectiveness in the hunt. In thegroup there were enough people to watch your back.

The larger the group, the more it allowed its membersto refine that great human invention, the division oflabor, and the more different individuals in the groupwere freed from the immediate needs of survival, themore time and energy they could devote to highertasks. These different roles were mutually supportiveand reinforcing, and the result was a net increase inhuman strength.

Over the centuries groups became ever larger andmore complex. By learning to live in towns andsettlements, people found that they could escape thefeeling of imminent danger and need. Living withothers also offered more subtle psychologicalprotections. In time humans began to forget the fearthat had made them form tribes in the first place. Butin one group--the army--that primal terror remained asstrong as ever.

The standard mode of ancient warfare was hand-to-hand combat, a frightening drama in whichindividuals were at all times exposed to death frombehind and to each side. Military leaders learnedearly on to form their soldiers into tight, cohesiveranks. Trusting his fellows on either side of him not toretreat and leave him exposed, a soldier could fightthe man in front of him with more spirit andconfidence. The Romans extended this strategy byplacing the youngest, most impetuous fighters in thefront ranks, the most experienced and best fighters inthe rear, and everyone else in the center. This meantthat the weakest soldiers--the ones most prone topanic--were surrounded by those who were braver

and steadier, giving them a powerful sense ofsecurity. No army went into battle with more cohesionand trust than the Roman legions.

In studying ancient warfare, the great nineteenth-century military writer Colonel Ardant du Picq noticeda peculiar phenomenon: in some of the mostcelebrated battles (Hannibal's victory over theRomans at Cannae and Julius Caesar's over Pompeyat Pharsalus, for example), the losses on each sidewere fantastically disproportionate--a few hundred forthe victors, thousands upon thousands among thevanquished. According to du Picq, what hadhappened in these cases was that through maneuverthe ultimately victorious army had managed tosurprise the enemy and splinter its lines into parts.Seeing their ranks breaking up, losing their sense ofsolidarity and support, and feeling isolated, soldierspanicked, dropped their weapons, and fled--and asoldier who turned his back on the enemy was aneasy soldier to kill. Thousands were slaughtered thisway. These great victories, then, were essentiallypsychological. Hannibal was vastly outnumbered atCannae, but by making the Romans feel vulnerableand isolated, he made them overreact and retreat inconfusion: easy pickings.

Roosevelt...disliked being completelycommitted to any one person. He enjoyedbeing at the center of attention and action, andthe system made him the focus through whichthe main lines of action radiated....... The main

reason for Roosevelt's methods, however,involved a tenacious effort to keep control of theexecutive branch in the face of the centrifugalforces of the American political system. Byestablishing in an agency one power center thatcounteracted another, he made each officialmore dependent on White House support; thePresident in effect became the necessary allyand partner of each. He lessened bureaucratictendencies toward self-aggrandizement; hecurbed any attempt to gang up on him. He was,in effect, adapting the old method of divide andconquer to his own purposes....... His techniquewas curiously like that of Joseph Stalin, whoused the overlapping delegation of function, aclose student of his methods has said, toprevent "any single chain of command frommaking major decisions without confrontingother arms of the state's bureaucracy and thusbringing the issues into the open at a highlevel." Roosevelt, like Stalin, was a politicaladministrator in the sense that his first concernwas power--albeit for very different ends.

ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX,JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, 1956

The phenomenon is timeless: the soldier who feelshe is losing the support of those around him is borneback into an intolerable primitive terror. He fears hewill face death alone. Many great military leaders

have turned this terror into strategy. Genghis Khanwas a master at it: using the mobility of his Mongolcavalry to cut off his enemies' communications, hewould isolate parts of their armies to make them feelalone and unprotected. He worked consciously toinstill terror. The divide-and-isolate strategy was alsoused to great effect by Napoleon and the guerrillaforces of Mao Tse-tung, among many others.

Our nature has not changed. Lurking deep in eventhe most civilized among us is the same basic fear ofbeing alone, unsupported, and exposed to danger.People today are more dispersed and society is lesscohesive than ever before, but that only increases ourneed to belong to a group, to have a strong network ofallies--to feel supported and protected on all sides.Take away this feeling and we are returned to thatprimitive sensation of terror at our own vulnerability.The divide-and-conquer strategy has never beenmore effective than it is today: cut people off fromtheir group--make them feel alienated, alone, andunprotected--and you weaken them enormously. Thatmoment of weakness gives you great power tomaneuver them into a corner, whether to seduce or toinduce panic and retreat.

Throughout the 1960s, one of Mao Tse-tung's mostloyal and trusted followers was his minister ofdefense, Lin Biao. No one praised the Chinese rulermore fulsomely than Lin. And yet by 1970 Mao hadcome to suspect that the flattery was a ruse todisguise his intentions: Lin was plotting to be hissuccessor. And what made Lin particularly dangerous

was that, as minister of defense, he had accumulatedallies in the military.

Mao went to work with great subtlety. In public hewent out of his way to support Lin, as if he, too, sawthe minister as his successor. That soothed thenatural wariness of the plotter. At the same time,however, Mao also attacked and demoted some ofLin's most important supporters in the military. Linwas a bit of a radical, veering left on most issues;Mao urged him to propose some of his more extremeideas for restructuring the military, secretly knowingthat these ideas would prove unpopular. Lin's supportamong the higher branches of the military slowlybegan to thin.

Lin finally realized what Mao was up to, but it wastoo late. He had lost his power base. Frustrated andscared, he resorted to plotting a coup d'etat, adesperate act that played straight into Mao's hands. In1971, Lin died under suspicious circumstances in aplane crash.

As Mao understood, in political environmentspeople depend on their connections even more thanon their talents. In such a world, a person whosecareer seems to be waning is one whom few will wantto know. And people who feel isolated will oftenoverreact and do something desperate--which ofcourse just makes them more isolated. So Maocreated the impression that Lin was losing hisconnections. Had he attacked Lin directly, he wouldhave gotten bogged down in an ugly fight. Dividing theminister from his power base, and in the process

making him appear to be on the decline, was muchmore effective.

Before you launch an outright attack on yourenemies, it is always wise first to weaken them bycreating as much division in their ranks as possible.One good place to drive a wedge is between theleadership and the people, whether soldiers orcitizenry; leaders function poorly when they lose theirsupport among the people. So work to make themlook authoritarian or out of touch. Or steal theirfoundation, as the Republican president RichardNixon did in 1972 by wooing the blue-collar types whohad traditionally voted Democrat: he split theDemocrats' base. (The Republicans have been doingthe same thing ever since.) Remember: once yourenemy begins to splinter in any way, the rupture willtend to gain momentum. Division usually leads tomore division.

In 338 B.C., Rome defeated its greatest enemy atthe time, the Latin League--a confederation of Italiancities that had formed to block Rome's expansion.With this victory, however, the Romans faced a newproblem: how to govern the region. If they crushed theleague's members, they would leave a power vacuum,and down the road another enemy would emerge thatmight prove a still-greater threat. If they simplyswallowed up the cities of the league, they woulddilute the power and prestige of Rome, givingthemselves too large an area to protect and police.

The solution the Romans came up with, which theywould later call divide et impera (divide and rule), was

to become the strategy by which they forged theirempire. Essentially they broke up the league but didnot treat all of its parts equally. Instead they created asystem whereby some of its cities were incorporatedinto Roman territory and their residents given fullprivileges as Roman citizens; others were deprived ofmost of their territory but granted near-totalindependence; and others still were broken up andheavily colonized with Roman citizens. No single citywas left powerful enough to challenge Rome, whichretained the central position. (As the saying goes, allroads led to Rome.)

The key to the system was that if an independentcity proved itself loyal enough to Rome or fought wellenough for Rome, it won the chance of beingincorporated into the empire. The individual citiesnow saw it as more in their interest to gain Rome'sfavor than to ally themselves elsewhere. Rome heldout the prospect of great power, wealth, andprotection, while isolation from Rome was dangerous.And so the once proud members of the Latin Leaguenow competed against one another for Rome'sattention.

Divide and rule is a powerful strategy for governingany group. It is based on a key principle: within anyorganization people naturally form smaller groupsbased on mutual self-interest--the primitive desire tofind strength in numbers. These subgroups formpower bases that, left unchecked, will threaten theorganization as a whole. The formation of parties andfactions can be a leader's greatest threat, for in time

these factions will naturally work to secure their owninterests before those of the greater group. Thesolution is to divide to rule. To do so you must firstestablish yourself as the center of power; individualsmust know they need to compete for your approval.There has to be more to be gained by pleasing theleader than by trying to form a power base within thegroup.

"Do not think that I have come to bring peaceon earth; I have not come to bring peace, but asword. For I have come to set a man against hisfather, and a daughter against her mother, anda daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; anda man's foes will be those of his own household.He who loves father or mother more than me isnot worthy of me; and he who loves son ordaughter more than me is not worthy of me; andhe who does not take his cross and follow me isnot worthy of me."

MATTHEW 10:34

When Elizabeth I became queen, England was anation divided. The remnants of feudalism entailedmany competing power centers, and the court itselfwas full of factions. Elizabeth's solution was toweaken the nobility by deliberately pitting one familyagainst another. At the same time, she occupied thecenter, making herself a symbol of England itself, thehub around which everything revolved. Within thecourt, too, she made sure that no individual--except of

course herself--gained ascendancy. When she sawthat first Robert Dudley and then the Earl of Essexbelieved themselves her favorites, she quickly cutthem loose.

The temptation to maintain a favorite isunderstandable but dangerous. Better to rotate yourstars, occasionally making each one fall. Bring inpeople with different viewpoints and encourage themto fight it out. You can justify this as a healthy form ofdemocracy, but the effect is that while those belowyou fight to be heard, you rule.

The film director Alfred Hitchcock faced enemieson all sides--writers, set designers, actors, producers,marketers--any of them quite capable of putting theiregos before the quality of the film. Writers wanted toshow off their literary skills, actors wanted to look likestars, producers and marketers wanted the movie tobe commercial--the whole crew had competinginterests. Hitchcock's solution, like Queen Elizabeth's,was to take the central position, in a variant of divideand rule. His carefully crafted role as a public celebritywas part of this: his movies' publicity campaignsalways involved him as spokesperson, and he madebit-part appearances in most of his films, becomingan instantly recognizable, endearingly humorousfigure. He put himself in the middle of every aspect ofproduction, from writing the script before the shootbegan to editing the film when the shoot was finished.At the same time, he kept all the filmmakingdepartments, even that of the producer, a little out ofthe loop; information about every detail of the film was

kept in his head, his drawings, and his notes. No onecould bypass him; every decision went through him.Before the film was shot, for example, Hitchcockwould set out in detail the look of the leading lady'scostumes. If the costume designer wanted to changeanything, she would have to go through him or becaught out in rank insubordination. In essence, he waslike Rome: all roads led to Hitchcock.

Within your group, factions may emerge quite subtlyby virtue of the fact that people who are experts intheir area may not tell you everything they're doing.Remember: they see only the small picture; you are incharge of the whole production. If you are to lead, youmust occupy the center. Everything must flow throughyou. If information is to be withheld, you are the one todo it. That is divide and rule: if the different parts ofthe operation lack access to all the information, theywill have to come to you to get it. It is not that youmicromanage but that you keep overall control ofeverything vital and isolate any potential rival powerbase.

Throughout the 1950s and '60s, Major GeneralEdward Lansdale was considered America'sprincipal expert in counterinsurgency. Working withPresident Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines, hehad crafted a plan that had defeated the country's Hukguerrilla movement in the early 1950s.Counterinsurgency requires a deft hand, morepolitical than military, and for Lansdale the key tosuccess was to stamp out government corruption andbring the people close to the government through

various popular programs. That would deny theinsurgents their cause, and they would die of isolation.Lansdale thought it folly to imagine that leftist rebelscould be defeated by force; in fact, force just playedinto their hands, giving them a cause they could use torally support. For insurgents, isolation from the peopleis death.

Think of the people in your group who are workingprimarily for their own interests as insurgents. Theyare Cassius types who thrive on discontent in theorganization, fanning it into dissension andfactionalism. You can always work to divide suchfactions once you know about them, but the bettersolution is to keep your soldiers satisfied andcontented, giving the insurgents nothing to feed on.Bitter and isolated, they will die off on their own.

The divide-and-rule strategy is invaluable in tryingto influence people verbally. Start by seeming to takeyour opponents' side on some issue, occupying theirflank. Once there, however, create doubt about somepart of their argument, tweaking and diverting it a bit.This will lower their resistance and maybe create alittle inner conflict about a cherished idea or belief.That conflict will weaken them, making themvulnerable to further suggestion and guidance.

Japan's great seventeenth-century swordsmanMiyamoto Musashi on several occasions faced bandsof warriors determined to kill him. The sight of such agroup would intimidate most people, or at least makethem hesitate--a fatal flaw in a samurai. Anothertendency would be to lash out violently, trying to kill as

many of the attackers as possible all at once, but atthe risk of losing control of the situation. Musashi,however, was above all else a strategist, and hesolved these dilemmas in the most rational waypossible. He would place himself so that the menwould have to come at him in a line or at an angle.Then he would focus on killing the first man and moveswiftly down the line. Instead of being overwhelmed ortrying too hard, he would break the band into parts.Then he just had to kill opponent number one, whileleaving himself in position to deal with opponentnumber two and preventing his mind from beingclouded and confused by the other attackers awaitinghim. The effect was that he could retain his focuswhile keeping his opponents off balance, for as heproceeded down the line, they would become theones who were intimidated and flustered.

Whether you are beset by many small problems orby one giant problem, make Musashi the model foryour mental process. If you let the complexity of thesituation confuse you and either hesitate or lash outwithout thought, you will lose mental control, which willonly add momentum to the negative force coming atyou. Always divide up the issue at hand, first placingyourself in a central position, then proceeding downthe line, killing off your problems one by one. It is oftenwise to begin with the smallest problem while keepingthe most dangerous one at bay. Solving that one willhelp you create momentum, both physical andpsychological, that will help you overwhelm all the rest.

The most important thing is to move quickly against

your enemies, as the Athenians did at Marathon.Waiting for troubles to come to you will only multiplythem and give them a deadly momentum.

REVERSALDividing your forces as a way of creating mobility canbe a powerful strategy, as Napoleon demonstratedwith his flexible system of corps, which let him hit hisenemy unpredictably from many different angles. But

to make his system work, Napoleon needed precisecoordination of its parts and overall control over theirmovements--and his goal was ultimately to bring theparts together to strike a major blow. In guerrillawarfare a commander will disperse his forces tomake them harder to hit, but this, too, demandscoordination: a guerrilla army cannot succeed if theparts are unable to communicate with each other. Ingeneral, any division of your forces must betemporary, strategic, and controlled.

THE PLOUGHMAN'S QUARRELSOME SONSA ploughman's sons were always quarrelling.He scolded them to no avail--his words didnothing to change their ways. So he decided toteach them a practical lesson. He asked themto bring him a load of firewood. As soon as theyhad done this he gave a bundle to each andtold them to break it all up for him. But, in spiteof all their efforts, they were unable to do so.The ploughman therefore undid the bundlesand handed each of his sons a stick at a time.These they broke without any trouble. "So!" saidthe father, "you too, my children, if you staybound together, can be invincible to yourenemies. But if you are divided you will be easyto defeat."

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

In attacking a group in order to sow division, becareful that your blow is not too strong, for it can have

careful that your blow is not too strong, for it can havethe opposite effect, causing people to unite in timesof great danger. That was Hitler's miscalculationduring the London Blitz, his bombing campaigndesigned to push England out of World War II.Intended to demoralize the British public, the Blitz onlymade them more determined: they were willing tosuffer short-term danger in order to beat him in thelong run. This bonding effect was partly the result ofHitler's brutality, partly the phenomenon of a culturewilling to suffer for the greater good.

Finally, in a divided world, power will come fromkeeping your own group united and cohesive, andyour own mind clear and focused on your goals. Thebest way to maintain unity may seem to be thecreation of enthusiasm and high morale, but whileenthusiasm is important, in time it will naturally wane,and if you have come to depend on it, you will fail. Fargreater defenses against the forces of division areknowledge and strategic thinking. No army or groupcan be divided if it is aware of the enemy's intentionsand makes an intelligent response. As SamuelAdams discovered, strategy is your only dependablesword and shield.

EXPOSE AND ATTACK YOUROPPONENT'S SOFT FLANK

THE TURNING STRATEGY

When you attack people directly, you stiffen theirresistance and make your task that much harder.There is a better way: distract your opponents'attention to the front, then attack them from the side,where they least expect it. By hitting them where theyare soft, tender, and unprotected, you create ashock, a moment of weakness for you to exploit. Baitpeople into going out on a limb, exposing theirweakness, then rake them with fire from the side.The only way to get stubborn opponents to move isto approach them indirectly.

The Emperor [Napoleon Bonaparte] , while hewas quite prepared "to break eggs to makeomelettes," as von Clausewitz puts it, wasalways eager to gain total victory for a minimumexpenditure of manpower and effort.Consequently he disliked having to force a full-scale, fully arrayed frontal battle--that is to say,marching directly against the enemy to fighthim on ground of his (the adversary's)choosing, for such battles were inevitablyexpensive and rarely conclusive (Borodino in

1812 is a case in point). Instead, wheneverpossible, after pinning the foe frontally by a feintattack, he marched his main army by thequickest possible "safe" route, hidden by thecavalry screen and natural obstacles, to placehimself on the rear or flank of his opponent.Once this move had been successfullyachieved, he occupied a natural barrier or"strategical curtain" (usually a river line ormountain range), ordered the blocking of allcrossings, and thus isolated his intended victimfrom his rear depots and reduced his chancesof reinforcement. Thereafter, Napoleonadvanced relentlessly toward the foe's army,offering him only two alternatives--to fight forsurvival on ground not of his own choosing, or tosurrender. The advantages afforded by such astrategy are obvious. The enemy army would beboth taken by surprise and almost certainlydemoralized by the sudden apparition of theenemy army in its rear, cutting itscommunications.THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON, DAVID G.

CHANDLER, 1966

TURNING THE FLANKIn 1793, Louis XIV and his wife, Marie Antoinette, theking and queen of France, were beheaded by orderof the new government put in place after the FrenchRevolution. Marie Antoinette was the daughter of

Maria Theresa, the empress of Austria, and as aresult of her death the Austrians became determinedenemies of France. Early in 1796 they prepared toinvade the country from northern Italy, which at thetime was an Austrian possession.

In April of that year, the twenty-six-year-oldNapoleon Bonaparte was given command of theFrench army in Italy and charged with a simplemission: to prevent these Austrian armies fromentering France. Under Napoleon, for the first timesince the revolution not only were the French able tohold a defensive position, but they successfully wenton the offensive, pushing the Austrians steadily east.Shocking as it was to lose to the revolutionary army, itwas downright humiliating to be defeated by anunknown general on his first campaign. For sixmonths the Austrians sent armies to defeat Napoleon,but he forced each one to retreat into the fortress ofMantua, until finally this stronghold was crammed withAustrian soldiers.

Leaving a force at Mantua to pin down theAustrians, Napoleon established his base to thenorth, in the pivotal city of Verona. If the Austrianswere to win the war, they would somehow have topush him out of Verona and free up the starvingsoldiers trapped in Mantua. And they were running outof time.

In October 1796, Baron Joseph d'Alvintzi was givencommand of some 50,000 Austrian soldiers and theurgent mission of expelling the French from Verona.An experienced commander and clever strategist,

d'Alvintzi studied Napoleon's Italian campaigncarefully and came to respect his enemy. To defeatthis brilliant young general, the Austrians would haveto be more flexible, and d'Alvintzi thought he had thesolution: he would divide his army into two columns,one under himself, the other under the Russiangeneral Paul Davidovich. The columns wouldseparately march south, converging at Verona. At thesame time, d'Alvintzi would launch a campaign ofdeception to make Napoleon think that Davidovich'sarmy was small (it was in fact 18,000 men strong),merely a holding force to protect the Austrian lines ofcommunication. If Napoleon underestimatedDavidovich, the Russian general would face lessopposition and his way to Verona would be smooth.D'Alvintzi's plan was to trap Napoleon between thejaws of these two armies.

The Austrians entered northern Italy in earlyNovember. To d'Alvintzi's delight, Napoleon seemedto have fallen for their trick; he sent a relatively lightforce against Davidovich, who promptly gave theFrench in Italy their first real defeat and began hisadvance toward Verona. Meanwhile d'Alvintzi himselfadvanced all the way to a point not far from Veronaand was poised to fall on the city from the east. As hepored over his maps, d'Alvintzi took pleasure in hisplan. If Napoleon sent more men to stop Davidovich,he would weaken Verona against d'Alvintzi. If he triedto block d'Alvintzi's entrance from the east, he wouldweaken Verona against Davidovich. If he soughtreinforcements from his troops at Mantua, he would

free up the 20,000 Austrian soldiers trapped thereand they would gobble him up from the south.D'Alvintzi also knew that Napoleon's men wereexhausted and hungry. Having fought for six monthswithout rest, they were at a breaking point. Not even ayoung genius like Napoleon could escape this trap.

A few days later, d'Alvintzi advanced to the villageof Caldiero, at Verona's doorstep. There he inflictedanother defeat on the French troops sent to stop him.After a string of victories, Napoleon had now lost twobattles in a row; the pendulum had swung against him.

As d'Alvintzi prepared for his final pounce onVerona, he received confusing news: against allprediction Napoleon had in fact divided his army inVerona, but instead of sending parts of it againsteither d'Alvintzi or Davidovich, he had marched asizable force somewhere to the southeast. The nextday this army appeared outside the town of Arcola. Ifthe French crossed the river to Arcola and advanceda few miles north, they would directly cross d'Alvintzi'sline of communications and of retreat, and they wouldbe able to seize his supply depots at Villa Nova.Having this large French army to his rear was morethan alarming; d'Alvintzi was forced to forget aboutVerona for the moment and hastily marched east.

He had retreated in the nick of time and was able tohalt the French before they could cross the river andattack Villa Nova. For several days the two armiessettled into a fiercely contested battle for the bridge atArcola. Napoleon himself led several charges andwas nearly killed. A portion of the troops blocking

Mantua were dispatched north to reinforce the Frenchat Arcola, but d'Alvintzi's army hunkered down, andthe battle turned into a stalemate.

On the third day of fighting, d'Alvintzi's soldiers--their lines thinned by relentless French attacks--werepreparing for another battle for the bridge when theysuddenly heard trumpets blaring from their southernflank. A French force had somehow crossed the riverbelow the bridge and was marching toward theAustrian flank at Arcola. The sound of trumpets wasquickly replaced by shouts and the whizzing of bullets.The sudden appearance of the French on their flankwas too much for the wearied Austrians; not waiting tosee the size of the French force, they panicked andfled the scene. The French poured across the river.D'Alvintzi gathered up his men as best he could andmanaged to lead them east to safety. But the battlefor Verona was lost, and with it the doom of Mantuawas sealed.

Somehow Napoleon had managed to snatchvictory from defeat. The battle of Arcola helped forgethe legend of his invincibility.

Now came the critical problem of judging thecorrect moment for the enveloping force toreveal its disconcerting position on the enemyflank. For maximum effect, it was important thatthis should not occur before the enemy hadcommitted all or most of his reserves to thefrontal battle, and this need for accurate timingof the flank attack called for the greatest

judgment on the part of Napoleon and his keysubordinates. The former had to judge themoment when all the enemy troops were indeedcommitted to the frontal battle (and with thebillowing clouds of black-powder smokeobliterating the scene this was no easy matter);the latter had the task of keeping their eagertroops "on the leash" so as to avoid anypremature attack disclosing their presence.Then, when the exact moment came, Napoleonwould give the signal.... Then the attaquedebordante would spring to life. A roar ofcannon away on his hitherto secure flank wouldcause the enemy to look apprehensively overhis shoulder, and before long the spyglasses ofhis anxious staff would be able to detect a lineof dust and smoke crawling ever nearer from theflank or rear. This threat to his communicationsand line of retreat could not be ignored. Theenemy general might now theoretically adoptone of two courses (but in practice only one). Hecould either order an immediate general retreatto slip out of the trap before it shut behind hisarmy (although this was generally out of thequestion, as Napoleon would of course launch ageneral frontal attack against all sectors of theenemy line to coincide with the unmasking ofhis flanking force and thus pin the foe stilltighter to the ground he was holding); or he

would be compelled to find troops fromsomewhere to form a new line at right angles tohis main position to face the new onslaught andprotect his flank. As all reserves were (ideally)already committed to battle, this could be easilyand quickly effected only by deliberatelyweakening those frontal sectors closest to thenew threat. This thinning out of the enemy frontis what Napoleon termed "the Event"--and wasof course exactly what he intended to havehappen. The curtain on the first act would nowfall; the enemy was reacting as required; thedestruction of the cohesion of his line, the finalruination of his equilibrium, could now beundertaken with practically a guarantee ofultimate success.THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON, DAVID G.

CHANDLER, 1966

InterpretationNapoleon was no magician, and his defeat of theAustrians in Italy was deceptively simple. Facing twoarmies converging on him, he calculated thatd'Alvintzi's was the more imminent danger. The fightfor Caldiero encouraged the Austrians to think thatVerona would be defended through direct, frontalconfrontation. But Napoleon instead divided his armyand sent the larger portion of it to threaten theAustrian supply depot and lines of communicationand retreat. Had d'Alvintzi ignored the threat and

advanced on Verona, he would have moved fartheraway from his critical base of operations and puthimself in great jeopardy; had he stayed put,Napoleon would have squeezed him between twoarmies. In fact, Napoleon knew d'Alvintzi would haveto retreat--the threat was too real--and once he haddone so, he would have relinquished the initiative. AtArcola, sensing that the enemy was tiring, Napoleonsent a small contingent to cross the river to the southand march on the Austrian flank, with instructions tomake as much noise as possible--trumpets, shouts,gunfire. The presence of this attacking force, smallthough it was, would induce panic and collapse. Theruse worked.

This maneuver--the manoeuvre sur les derrieres,Napoleon called it--would become a favorite strategyof his. Its success was based on two truths: First,generals like to place their armies in a strong frontalposition, whether to make an attack or to meet one.Napoleon would often play on this tendency to faceforward in battle by seeming to engage the enemyfrontally; in the fog of battle, it was hard to tell thatreally only half of his army was deployed here, andmeanwhile he would sneak the other half to the sideor rear. Second, an army sensing attack from theflank is alarmed and vulnerable and must turn to facethe threat. This moment of turning contains greatweakness and confusion. Even an army in thestronger position, like d'Alvintzi's at Verona, willalmost always lose cohesion and balance as it turns.

Learn from the great master himself: attacking from

the front is rarely wise. The soldiers facing you will betightly packed in, a concentration of force that willamplify their power to resist you. Go for their flank,their vulnerable side. This principle is applicable toconflicts or encounters of any scale.

Individuals often show their flank, signal theirvulnerability, by its opposite, the front they show mostvisibly to the world. This front can be an aggressivepersonality, a way of dealing with people by pushingthem around. Or it can be some obvious defensemechanism, a focus on keeping out intruders tomaintain stability in their lives. It can be their mostcherished beliefs and ideas; it can be the way theymake themselves liked. The more you get people toexpose this front, to show more of themselves and thedirections they tend to move in, the more theirunprotected flanks will come into focus--unconsciousdesires, gaping insecurities, precarious alliances,uncontrollable compulsions. Once you move on theirflanks, your targets will turn to face you and lose theirequilibrium. All enemies are vulnerable from theirsides. There is no defense against a well-designedflanking maneuver.

Opposition to the truth is inevitable, especially ifit takes the form of a new idea, but the degree of

resistance can be diminished--by givingthought not only to the aim but to the method of

approach. Avoid a frontal attack on a long-established position; instead, seek to turn it by

flank movement, so that a more penetrable side

is exposed to the thrust of truth.--B. H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970)

OCCUPYING THE FLANKAs a young man, Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.) wasonce captured by pirates. They asked for a ransom oftwenty talents; laughing, he replied that a man of hisnobility was worth fifty talents, and he volunteered topay that sum. His attendants were sent for the money,and Caesar was left alone with these bloodthirstypirates. For the weeks he remained among them, heparticipated in their games and revelry, even playinga little rough with them, joking that he would have themcrucified someday.

Amused by this spirited yet affectionate young man,the pirates practically adopted him as their own. Butonce the ransom was paid and Caesar was freed, heproceeded to the nearest port, manned some ships athis own expense, then went after the pirates andsurprised them in their lair. At first they welcomed himback--but Caesar had them arrested, took back themoney he had given them, and, as promised, hadthem crucified. In the years to come, many wouldlearn--whether to their delight or to their horror--thatthis was how Caesar did battle.

Caesar, however, did not always exact retribution.In 62 B.C., during a religious ceremony in Caesar'shome, a young man named Publius Clodius wascaught among the female celebrants, dressed as awoman and cavorting with Caesar's wife, Pompeia.This was considered an outrage, and Caesar

immediately divorced Pompeia, saying, "My wifemust be above suspicion." Yet when Clodius wasarrested and tried for sacrilege, Caesar used hismoney and influence to get the youth acquitted. Hewas more than repaid a few years later, when he waspreparing to leave Rome for wars in Gaul and neededsomeone to protect his interests while he was away.He used his clout to get Clodius named to the politicaloffice of tribune, and in that position Clodius doggedlysupported Caesar's interests, stirring up so muchtrouble in the Senate with his obnoxious maneuversthat no one had the time or inclination to intrigueagainst the absent general.

During this survey one impression becameincreasingly strong--that, throughout the ages,effective results in war have rarely been attainedunless the approach has had such indirectnessas to ensure the opponent's unreadiness tomeet it. The indirectness has usually beenphysical, and always psychological. In strategy,the longest way round is often the shortest wayhome. More and more clearly has the lessonemerged that a direct approach to one's mentalobject, or physical objective, along the "line ofnatural expectation" for the opponent, tends toproduce negative results. The reason has beenexpressed vividly in Napoleon's dictum that"the moral is to the physical as three to one." Itmay be expressed scientifically by saying that,

while the strength of an opposing force orcountry lies outwardly in its numbers andresources, these are fundamentally dependentupon stability of control, morale, and supply. Tomove along the line of natural expectationconsolidates the opponent's balance and thusincreases his resisting power. In war, as inwrestling, the attempt to throw the opponentwithout loosening his foothold and upsetting hisbalance results in self-exhaustion, increasing indisproportionate ratio to the effective strain putupon him. Success by such a method onlybecomes possible through an immense marginof superior strength in some form--and, even so,tends to lose decisiveness. In most campaignsthe dislocation of the enemy's psychologicaland physical balance has been the vital preludeto a successful attempt at his overthrow.

STRATEGY, B. H. LIDDELL HART, 1954

The three most powerful men in Rome at the timewere Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey. FearingPompey, a popular and famously successful general,Crassus tried to form a secret alliance with Caesar,but Caesar balked; instead, a few years later, heapproached the wary Pompey (who was suspiciousof and hostile toward Caesar as a possible futurerival) and suggested they form their own alliance. Inreturn he promised to support some of Pompey'spolitical proposals, which had been stalled in the

Senate. Surprised, Pompey agreed, and Crassus,not wanting to be left out, agreed to join the group toform the First Triumvirate, which was to rule Rome forthe next several years.

In 53 B.C., Crassus was killed in battle in Syria, anda power struggle quickly emerged between Pompeyand Caesar. Civil war seemed inevitable, andPompey had more support in the Senate. In 50 B.C.,the Senate ordered that both Caesar (who wasfighting in Gaul at the time) and Pompey should sendone of their legions to Syria to support the Romanarmy fighting there. But since Pompey had alreadylent Caesar a legion for the war in Gaul, he proposedto send that one to Syria--so that Caesar would havelost two legions instead of one, weakening him for theimpending war.

Caesar did not complain. He sent off the twolegions, one of which, however--as he had expected--did not go to Syria but was conveniently quarterednear Rome, at Pompey's disposal. Before the twolegions left, Caesar paid each soldier handsomely.He also instructed their officers to spread the rumor inRome that his troops still in Gaul were exhausted andthat, should he dare to send them against Pompey,they would switch sides as soon as they had crossedthe Alps. Coming to believe these false reports, andexpecting massive defections, Pompey did nottrouble to recruit more soldiers for the imminent war,which he would later regret.

In January of 49 B.C., Caesar crossed the Rubicon,the river between Gaul and Italy, a dramatic,

unexpected move that initiated the Civil War. Caughtby surprise, Pompey fled with his legions to Greece,where he began to prepare a major operation. AsCaesar marched south, many of Pompey'ssupporters, left behind in Rome, were terrified.Caesar had established a reputation in Gaul for brutaltreatment of the enemy, leveling whole towns andkilling their inhabitants. Yet when Caesar took the keytown of Corfinium, capturing important senators andarmy officers who had fought there alongside troopsloyal to Pompey, he did not punish these men; in fact,he returned to them the monies his soldiers hadlooted in taking the town. This remarkable act ofclemency became the model for his treatment ofPompey's supporters. Instead of Caesar's menswitching allegiance to Pompey, it was Pompey'swho now became the most ardent followers ofCaesar. As a result, Caesar's march on Rome wasquick and bloodless.

Next, although Pompey had established his base inGreece, Caesar decided to first attack his flank: thelarge army he had quartered in Spain. Over severalmonths of campaigning, he completelyoutmaneuvered this force, led by Pompey's generalsAfranius and Petreius, and finally cornered them. Theywere surrounded, the situation was hopeless, andAfranius and many of the soldiers, knowing ofCaesar's gentle treatment of his enemies, sent wordthat they were ready to surrender; but Petreius,horrified at this betrayal, ordered that any soldier whosupported Caesar be slaughtered. Then, determined

to go down fighting, he led his remaining men out ofthe camp for battle--but Caesar refused to engage.The soldiers were unable to fight.

Finally, desperately low in supplies, Pompey's mensurrendered. This time they could expect the worst, forCaesar knew about the massacre in the camp--yetonce again he pardoned Petreius and Afranius andsimply disbanded their army, giving the soldierssupplies and money for their return to Rome. Hearingof this, the Spanish cities still loyal to Pompey quicklychanged sides. In a matter of three months, RomanSpain had been conquered through a combination ofmaneuver and diplomacy, and with barely a drop ofblood spilled.

In the following months, Pompey's political supportin Rome evaporated. All he had left was his army. Hisdefeat by Caesar at the Battle of Pharsalus, innorthern Greece, a year later merely put the seal onhis inevitable destruction.

InterpretationCaesar discovered early on in his political life thatthere are many ways to conquer. Most peopleadvance more or less directly, attempting tooverpower their opponents. But unless they kill thefoes they beat this way, they are merely creating long-term enemies who harbor deep resentment and willeventually make trouble. Enough such enemies andlife becomes dangerous.

Caesar found another way to do battle, taking thefight out of his enemies through strategic and cunning

generosity. Disarmed like this, enemy becomes ally,negative becomes positive. Later on, if necessary,when the former foe's guard is down, you can exactretribution, as Caesar did with the pirates. Behavemore gently, though, and your enemy may becomeyour best follower. So it was with Publius Clodius,who, after disgracing Caesar's home, became thedevoted agent of the general's dirty work.

When the Civil War broke out, Caesar understoodthat it was a political phenomenon as much as amilitary one--in fact, what mattered most was thesupport of the Senate and the Romans. His acts ofmercy were part of a calculated campaign to disarmhis enemies and isolate Pompey. In essence, whatCaesar was doing here was occupying his enemies'flank. Instead of attacking them frontally and engagingthem directly in battle, he would take their side,support their causes, give them gifts, charm them withwords and favors. With Caesar apparently on theirside, both politically and psychologically they had nofront to fight against, nothing to oppose. In contactwith Caesar, all hostility toward him melted away. Thisway of waging war allowed him to defeat the militarilysuperior Pompey.

THE TENTH LABOUR: THE CATTLE OFGERYONHeracles' Tenth Labour was to fetch the famouscattle of Geryon from Erytheia, an island nearthe Ocean stream, without either demand orpayment. Geryon, a son of Chrysaor and

Callirrhoe, a daughter of the Titan Oceanus,was the King of Tartessus in Spain, andreputedly the strongest man alive. He had beenborn with three heads, six hands, and threebodies joined together at the waist. Geryon'sshambling red cattle, beasts of marvellousbeauty, were guarded by the herdsmanEurytion, son of Ares, and by the two-headedwatchdog Orthrus--formerly Atlas' property--bornof Typhoon and Echidne.... On his arrival,[Hercules] ascended Mount Abas. The dogOrthrus rushed at him, barking, but Heracles'club struck him lifeless; and Eurytion, Geryon'sherdsman, hurrying to Orthrus' aid, died in thesame manner. Heracles then proceeded todrive away the cattle. Menoetes, who waspasturing the cattle of Hades near by--butHeracles had left these untouched--took thenews to Geryon. Challenged to battle, Heraclesran to Geryon's flank and shot him sidewaysthrough all three bodies with a single arrow.... AsHera hastened to Geryon's assistance,Heracles wounded her with an arrow in the rightbreast, and she fled. Thus he won the cattle,without either demand or payment.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

Life is full of hostility--some of it overt, some cleverand under-handed. Conflict is inevitable; you will

never have total peace. Instead of imagining you canavoid these clashes of will, accept them and knowthat the way you deal with them will decide yoursuccess in life. What good is it to win little battles, tosucceed in pushing people around here and there, ifin the long run you create silent enemies who willsabotage you later? At all cost you must gain controlof the impulse to fight your opponents directly. Insteadoccupy their flank. Disarm them and make them yourally; you can decide later whether to keep them onyour side or to exact revenge. Taking the fight out ofpeople through strategic acts of kindness, generosity,and charm will clear your path, helping you to saveenergy for the fights you cannot avoid. Find their flank--the support people crave, the kindness they willrespond to, the favor that will disarm them. In thepolitical world we live in, the flank is the path to power.

Your gentleness shall force More than yourforce move us to gentleness.

AS YOU LIKE IT, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,1564-1616

Let us see if by moderation we can win all heartsand secure a lasting victory, since by cruelty

others have been unable to escape from hatredand maintain their victory for any length oftime.... This is a new way of conquering, tostrengthen one's position by kindness and

generosity.--Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.)

--Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.)

KEYS TO WARFAREThe conflict and struggle we go through today areastounding--far greater than those faced by ourancestors. In war the passages of armies are markedwith arrows on maps. If we had to map the battles ofour own daily lives, we would draw thousands of thosearrows, a constant traffic of moves and maneuvers--not to speak of the arrows actually hitting us, thepeople trying to persuade us of one thing or another,to move us in a particular direction, to bend us to theirwill, their product, their cause.

Because so many people are constantly shifting forpower, our social world becomes blanketed in barelydisguised aggression. In this situation it requires timeand patience to be indirect; in the daily rush to moveand influence people, the subtle approach is toodifficult and time-consuming, so people tend to takethe direct route to what they want. To convince us ofthe correctness of their ideas, they use argument andrhetoric, growing ever louder and more emotional.They push and pull with words, actions, and orders.Even those more passive players who use the tools ofmanipulation and guilt are quite direct, not in the leastsubtle, in the paths they choose; witness a few of theirmaneuvers and they are rather easy to figure out.

When, in the course of studying a long series ofmilitary campaigns, I first came to perceive thesuperiority of the indirect over the directapproach, I was looking merely for light upon

strategy. With deepened reflection, however, Ibegan to realize that the indirect approach hada much wider application--that it was a law of lifein all spheres: a truth of philosophy. Itsfulfillment was seen to be the key to practicalachievement in dealing with any problem wherethe human factor predominates, and a conflictof wills tends to spring from an underlyingconcern for all interests. In all such cases, thedirect assault of new ideas provokes a stubbornresistance, thus intensifying the difficulty ofproducing a change of outlook. Conversion isachieved more easily and rapidly byunsuspected infiltration of a different idea or byan argument that turns the flank of instinctiveopposition. The indirect approach is asfundamental to the realm of politics as to therealm of sex. In commerce, the suggestion thatthere is a bargain to be secured is far moreimportant than any direct appeal to buy. And inany sphere, it is proverbial that the surest way ofgaining a superior's acceptance of a new idea isto weaken resistance before attempting toovercome it; and the effect is best attained bydrawing the other party out of his defences.

STRATEGY, B. H. LIDDELL HART, 1954

The result of all of this is twofold: we have allbecome more defensive, resistant to change. Tomaintain some peace and stability in our lives, we

build our castle walls ever higher and thicker. Evenso, the increasingly direct brutality of daily life isimpossible to avoid. All those arrows hitting us infectus with their energy; we cannot help but try to giveback what we get. Reacting to direct maneuvers, wefind ourselves dragged into head-to-head argumentsand battles. It takes effort to step away from thisvicious arena and consider another approach.

You must ask yourself this question: what is thepoint of being direct and frontal if it only increasespeople's resistance, and makes them more certain oftheir own ideas? Directness and honesty may giveyou a feeling of relief, but they also stir upantagonism. As tactics they are ineffective. In waritself--blood war, not the interpersonal wars ofeveryday life--frontal battles have become rare.Military officers have come to realize that direct attackincreases resistance, while indirection lowers it.

The people who win true power in the difficultmodern world are those who have learned indirection.They know the value of approaching at an angle,disguising their intentions, lowering the enemy'sresistance, hitting the soft, exposed flank instead ofbutting horns. Rather than try to push or pull people,they coax them to turn in the direction they desire.This takes effort but pays dividends down the road inreduced conflict and greater results.

The key to any flanking maneuver is to proceed insteps. Your initial move cannot reveal your intentionsor true line of attack. Make Napoleon's manoeuvresur les derrieres your model: First hit them directly, as

Napoleon did the Austrians at Caldiero, to hold theirattention to the front. Let them come at you mano amano. An attack from the side now will be unexpectedand hard to combat.

At a palace reception in Paris in 1856, all eyeswere on a new arrival on the scene: an eighteen-year-old Italian aristocrat called the Countess deCastiglione. She was stunningly beautiful and more:she carried herself like a Greek statue come to life.Emperor Napoleon II, a notorious womanizer, couldnot help but take notice and be fascinated, but for themoment that was all--he tended to prefer more hot-blooded women. Yet as he saw her again over themonths that followed, he became intrigued despitehimself.

In events at court, Napoleon and the countesswould exchange glances and occasional remarks.She always left before he could engage her inconversation. She wore stunning dresses, and longafter the evening was over, her image would return tohis mind.

What drove the emperor crazy was that heapparently didn't excite her--she seemed onlymodestly interested in him. He began to court herassiduously, and after weeks of assault, she finallysuccumbed. Yet even now that she was his mistress,he still sensed her coldness, still had to pursue her,was never sure of her feelings. At parties, too, shewould draw men's attention like a magnet, makinghim furiously jealous. The affair went on, but beforetoo long the emperor naturally tired of the countess

and moved on to another woman. Even so, while itlasted, he could think of no one else.

Six in the fifth place means: The tusk of agelded boar. Good fortune. Here the restrainingof the impetuous forward drive is achieved in anindirect way. A boar's tusk is in itself dangerous,but if the boar's nature is altered, the tusk is nolonger a menace. Thus also where men areconcerned, wild force should not be combateddirectly.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

In Paris at the time was Victor-Emmanuel, the kingof Piedmont, the countess's home. Italy was dividedinto small states like this one at the time, but withFrance's support it would soon become a unifiednation, and Victor-Emmanuel harbored the secretdesire to become its first king. In her conversationswith Napoleon, the countess would occasionally talkof the king of Piedmont, praising his character anddescribing his love of France and his strength as aleader. The emperor could only agree: Victor-Emmanuel would make the perfect king of Italy. SoonNapoleon was broaching this idea with his advisers,then actively promoting Victor-Emmanuel for thethrone as if it were his own idea--and eventually hemade this happen. Little did he know: his affair withthe countess had been set up by Victor-Emmanueland his clever adviser, the Count di Cavour. They had

planted her in Paris to seduce Napoleon and slowlyinsinuate the idea of Victor-Emmanuel's promotion.

After this meeting a story about Mao's methodswent the rounds of Shanghai's remainingexecutive suites. Mao called in Liu [Shaoqi] andZhou [Enlai] . He had a question for them: "Howwould you make a cat eat pepper?" Liu spokeup first. "That's easy," said the number-two man."You get somebody to hold the cat, stuff thepepper in its mouth, and push it down with achopstick." Mao raised his hands in horror atsuch a made-in-Moscow solution. "Never useforce.... Everything must be voluntary." Zhouhad been listening. Mao inquired what thepremier would do with the cat. "I would starve thecat," replied the man who had often walked thetightrope of opportunity. "Then I would wrap thepepper with a slice of meat. If the cat issufficiently hungry it will swallow it whole." Maodid not agree with Zhou any more than with Liu."One must not use deceit either--never fool thepeople." What, then would the Chairmanhimself do? "Easy," he said--concurring with Liuat least on that. "You rub the pepper thoroughlyinto the cat's backside. When it burns, the catwill lick it off--and be happy that it is permitted todo so."

MAO: A BIOGRAPHY, ROSS TERRILL, 1999

The countess's seduction of the emperor had beenplanned like an elaborate military campaign, rightdown to the dresses she would wear, the words shewould say, the glances she would throw. Her discreetway of roping him in was a classic flanking attack, aseducti ve manoeuvre sur les derrieres. Thecountess's cold beauty and fascinating manner drewthe emperor on until he had advanced so far that hewas convinced it was he who was the aggressor.Holding his attention to the front, the countess workedto the side, subtly conjuring the idea of crowningVictor-Emmanuel. Had she pursued the emperordirectly or suggested the crowning of the king in somany words, not only would she have failed, but shewould have pushed the emperor in the oppositedirection. Drawn forward frontally by his weakness fora beautiful woman, he was vulnerable to gentlepersuasion on his flank.

Maneuvers like this one should be the model foryour attempts at persuasion. Never reveal yourintentions or goals; instead use charm, pleasantconversation, humor, flattery--whatever works--to holdpeople's attention to the front. Their focus elsewhere,their flank is exposed, and now when you drop hints orsuggest subtle changes in direction, the gates areopen and the walls are down. They are disarmed andmaneuverable.

Think of people's ego and vanity as a kind of front.When they are attacking you and you don't know why,it is often because you have inadvertently threatenedtheir ego, their sense of importance in the world.

Whenever possible, you must work to make peoplefeel secure about themselves. Again, use whateverworks: subtle flattery, a gift, an unexpected promotion,an offer of alliance, a presentation of you and they asequals, a mirroring of their ideas and values. All thesethings will make them feel anchored in their frontalposition relative to the world, lowering their defensesand making them like you. Secure and comfortable,they are now set up for a flanking maneuver. This isparticularly devastating with a target whose ego isdelicate.

A common way of using the flanking maneuver inwar is to get your enemies to expose themselves on aweak salient. This means maneuvering them ontoground or luring them to advance in such a way thattheir front is narrow and their flanks are long--adelicious target for a side attack.

In 1519, Hernan Cortes landed with a small army ineastern Mexico, planning to realize his dream ofconquering the Aztec Empire. But first he had toconquer his own men, particularly a small yet vocalgroup of supporters of Diego de Velazquez, thegovernor of Cuba, who had sent Cortes on no morethan a scouting mission and who coveted theconquest of Mexico himself. Velazquez's supporterscaused trouble for Cortes at every step, constantlyconspiring against him. One bone of contention wasgold, which the Spanish were to collect for delivery tothe king of Spain. Cortes had been letting his soldiersbarter for gold but then had been using that gold tobuy food. This practice, Velazquez's men argued,

must end.Appearing to concede, Cortes suggested the

Velazquez men appoint a treasurer. They quicklynamed one of their own, and with their help this manbegan to collect everyone's gold. This policy, naturally,proved extremely unpopular with the soldiers, whowere braving enormous dangers for little benefit. Theycomplained bitterly--but Cortes just pointed to themen who had insisted on this policy in the name of thegovernor of Cuba. He personally, of course, had neverbeen in favor of it. Soon the Velazquez men wereuniversally hated, and Cortes, at the urgent request ofthe other soldiers, gladly rescinded the policy. Fromthen on, the conspirators could get nowhere with themen. They were exposed and despised.

Cortes used this strategy often to deal withdissenters and troublemakers. At first he would seemto go along with their ideas, would even encouragethem to take things further. In essence, he would gethis enemies to expose themselves on a weak salient,where their selfish or unpopular ideas could berevealed. Now he had a target to hit.

When people present their ideas and arguments,they often censor themselves, trying to appear moreconciliatory and flexible than is actually the case. If youattack them directly from the front, you end up notgetting very far, because there isn't much there to aimat. Instead try to make them go further with their ideas,giving you a bigger target. Do this by standing back,seeming to go along, and baiting them into movingrashly ahead. (You can also make them emotional,

pushing their buttons, getting them to say more thanthey had wanted to.) They will expose themselves ona weak salient, advancing an indefensible argumentor position that will make them look ridiculous. Thekey is never to strike too early. Give your opponentstime to hang themselves.

Inner truth. Pigs and fishes. Good fortune. Itfurthers one to cross the great water.Perseverance furthers. Pigs and fishes are theleast intelligent of all animals and therefore themost difficult to influence. The force of innertruth must grow great indeed before its influencecan extend to such creatures. In dealing withpersons as intractable and as difficult toinfluence as a pig or a fish, the whole secret ofsuccess depends on finding the right way ofapproach. One must first rid oneself of allprejudice and, so to speak, let the psyche of theother person act on one without restraint. Thenone will establish contact with him, understandand gain power over him. When a door hasbeen thus opened, the force of one's personalitywill influence him. If in this way one finds noobstacles insurmountable, one can undertakeeven the most dangerous things, such ascrossing the great water, and succeed.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

In a political world, people are dependent on theirsocial position. They need support from as manysources as possible. That support, the base of mostpeople's power, presents a rich flank to expose andattack. Franklin D. Roosevelt knew that a politician'svulnerable flank was the electorate, the people whomight or might not vote for him in his next race.Roosevelt could get a politician to sign off on a bill orsupport a nomination, whatever his real thoughtsabout the issues, by threatening a maneuver thatwould injure the other man's popularity with hisconstituents. A flanking attack on someone's socialstatus and reputation will make him or her turn to facethis menace, giving you ample room to maneuver theopponent in other directions.

The Book of Changes (I Ching) is oftenconsidered the Oriental apotheosis ofadaptation, of flexibility. In this book therecurring theme is one of observing life andblending with its flow in order to survive anddevelop. In effect, the theme of this work is thateverything in existence can be a source ofconflict, of danger, and, ultimately, of violence ifopposed from the wrong angle or in the wrongmanner--that is, if confronted directly at thepoint of its maximum strength, since thisapproach renders the encounter potentiallydevastating. By the same token, any and everyoccurrence can be dealt with by approaching it

from the right angle and in the proper manner--that is, at its source, before it can develop fullpower, or from the sides (the vulnerable "flanksof a tiger").SECRETS OF THE SAMURAI, OSCAR RATTI

AND ADELE WESTBROOK, 1973

The more subtle and indirect your maneuvers in life,the better. In 1801, Napoleon suddenly offered Russiathe chance to become the protector of the island ofMalta, then under French control. That would give theRussians an important base in the Mediterranean.The offer seemed generous, but Napoleon knew thatthe English would soon take control of the island, forthey coveted it and had the forces in place to take it,and the French navy was too weak to hold it. TheEnglish and the Russians were allies, but theiralliance would be endangered by a squabble overMalta. That discord was Napoleon's goal all along.

The ultimate evolution of strategy is toward moreand more indirection. An opponent who cannot seewhere you are heading is at a severe disadvantage.The more angles you use--like a cue ball in billiardscaroming off several sides of the table--the harder itwill be for your opponents to defend themselves.Whenever possible, calculate your moves to producethis caroming effect. It is the perfect disguise for youraggression.

Authority: It is by turning the enemy, byattacking his flank, that battles are won.

--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

REVERSALIn politics, occupying the flank by taking a similarposition to the other side, co-opting its ideas for yourown purposes, is a powerful ploy, one that PresidentClinton used to great effect in his triangulations withthe Republicans. This gives the opponent nothing tostrike at, no room to maneuver. But staying too longon the opponent's flank can bring a price: the public--the real soft flank for any politician--loses its sense ofwhat the triangulator stands for, what sets him and hisparty apart from the other side. Over time this canprove dangerous; polarity (see chapter 1)--creatingthe appearance of sharp differences--is moreeffective in the long run. Beware of occupying theopponent's flank at the expense of exposing your own.

ENVELOP THE ENEMYTHE ANNIHILATION STRATEGY

People will use any kind of gap in your defenses toattack you or revenge themselves on you. So offerno gaps. The secret is to envelop your opponents--create relentless pressure on them from all sides,dominate their attention, and close off their accessto the outside world. Make your attacksunpredictable to create a vaporous feeling ofvulnerability. Finally, as you sense their weakeningresolve, crush their willpower by tightening thenoose. The best encirclements are psychological--you have surrounded their minds.

THE HORNS OF THE BEASTIn December 1878 the British declared war on theZulus, the warrior tribe of present-day South Africa.The rather flimsy pretext was border troubles betweenZululand and the British state of Natal; the real aimwas to destroy the Zulu army, the last remaining nativeforce threatening British interests in the area, and toabsorb Zulu territories into a British-run confederationof states. The British commander, Lieutenant GeneralLord Chelmsford, drafted a plan to invade Zululandwith three columns, the central one aimed at thecapital of Ulundi, the heart of the kingdom.

Legend has it that Shaka altered the nature offighting in the region for ever, by inventing aheavy, broad-bladed spear designed towithstand the stresses of close-quarter combat.Perhaps he did: certainly both Zulu sources andthe accounts of white travellers and officials inthe nineteenth century credit him with thisachievement.... His military innovations madean impact on Zulu folklore, if nothing else, forShaka certainly developed fighting techniquesto an unprecedented degree, and there is awealth of stories concerning his prowess as awarrior: he may, indeed, have been one of thegreat military geniuses of his age. In place ofthe loose skirmishing tactics with light throwingspears, Shaka trained his warriors to advancerapidly in tight formations and engage hand-to-hand, battering the enemy with larger war-shields, then skewering their foes with the newspear as they were thrown off balance. If theresults are anything to judge by, Shaka'scapacity for conquest must have been dramatic.By 1824 the Zulus had eclipsed all their rivals,and had extended their influence over an areamany times larger than their original homeland.

THE ANATOMY OF THE ZULU ARMY, IANKNIGHT, 1995

Many Englishmen in Natal were thrilled at theprospect of war and at the potential benefits of taking

over Zululand, but no one was as excited as forty-eight-year-old Colonel Anthony William Durnford. Foryears Durnford had bounced from one lonely BritishEmpire outpost to another, finally ending up in Natal.In all his years of military service, Durnford had notonce seen action. He yearned to prove his valor andworth as a soldier, but he was approaching the agewhen such youthful dreams could no longer be fulfilled.Now, suddenly, the impending war was sending theopportunity his way.

Eager to impress, Durnford volunteered to organizean elite force of native soldiers from Natal to fightalongside the British. His offer was accepted, but asthe British invaded Zululand in early January 1879, hefound himself cut out of the main action. LordChelmsford did not trust him, thinking his hunger forglory made him impetuous; also, for someone with nobattle experience, he was old. So Durnford and hiscompany were stationed at Rorke's Drift, in westernZululand, to help monitor the border areas with Natal.Dutifully but bitterly, Durnford followed his orders.

In the first days after the invasion, the British failedto locate the main Zulu army, only trickles of men hereand there. They were growing frustrated. On January21, Chelmsford took half of the central column, whichwas encamped at the foot of a mountain calledIsandlwana, and led it east in search of the Zulus.Once he had found the enemy, he would bring the restof his army forward--but the elusive Zulus might attackthe camp while he was away, and the men at Rorke'sDrift were the closest reserves. Needing to reinforce

Isandlwana, he sent word to Durnford to bring hiscompany there. As colonel, Durnford would now bethe highest-ranking officer at the camp, butChelmsford could not worry about Durnford'sleadership qualities--the impending battle was theonly thing on his mind.

Early on the morning of January 22, Durnfordreceived the news he had been waiting for all his life.Barely able to contain his excitement, he lead his fourhundred men east to Isandlwana, arriving at the campat around 10:00 A.M. Surveying the land, heunderstood why Chelmsford had put his main camphere: to the east and south were miles of rollinggrassland--Zulus approaching from that directionwould be seen well in advance. To the north wasIsandlwana, and beyond it the plains of Nqutu. Thisside was a little less secure, but scouts had beenplaced at key points in the plains and at the mountainpasses; attack from that direction would almostcertainly be detected in time.

Shortly after his arrival, Durnford received a reportthat a seemingly large Zulu force had been spotted onthe plains of Nqutu heading east, perhaps to attackChelmsford's half of the central column from the rear.Chelmsford had left explicit orders to keep the 1,800men at Isandlwana together. In case of attack, theyhad enough firepower to defeat the entire Zulu army--as long as they stayed concentrated and kept theirlines in order. But to Durnford it was more importantto find the main Zulu force. The British soldiers werebeginning to grow edgy, not knowing where this

vaporous enemy was. The Zulus had no cavalry, andmany of them fought with spears; once their hidingplace was uncovered, the rest would be easy--thesuperior weaponry and discipline of the Britishsoldiers would prevail. Durnford thought Chelmsfordwas too cautious. As senior officer at the camp, hedecided to disobey orders and lead his 400 mennortheast, parallel to the plains of Nqutu, to find outwhat the Zulus were up to.

As Durnford marched out of the camp, a scout onthe plains of Nqutu saw a few Zulus herding cattlesome four miles away. He gave chase on his horse,but the Zulus disappeared into thin air. Riding to thepoint where they had vanished, he stopped his horsejust in time: below him lay a wide, deep ravine,completely hidden from the surface of the plains, andcrowded into the ravine, as far as he could see in bothdirections, were Zulu warriors in full war regalia, aneerie intensity in their eyes. They seemed to havebeen meditating on the imminent battle. For a secondthe horseman was too stunned to move, but ashundreds of spears were suddenly aimed at him, heturned and galloped away. The Zulus quickly rose andbegan clambering out of the ravine.

Soon the other scouts on the plains saw the sameterrifying sight: a wide line of Zulus filling the horizon,some 20,000 men strong. Even from a distance, itwas clear that they were moving in formation, eachend of their line coming forward in a shaperesembling horns. The scouts quickly brought word tothe camp that the Zulus were coming. By the time

Durnford received the news, he could look up to theridge above him and see a line of Zulus streamingdown the slope. He quickly formed his own men intolines to fight them off while retreating to the camp. TheZulus maneuvered with incredible precision. WhatDurnford could not see was that the men in the left tipof the horn were moving through the tall grass towardthe rear of the camp, to link up with the other end ofthe horn and complete the encirclement.

The Zulus facing Durnford and his men seemed togrow out of the earth, emerging from behind bouldersor from out of the grass in ever-greater numbers. Aknot of five or six of them would suddenly charge,throwing spears or firing rifles, then disappear backinto the grass. Whenever the British stopped toreload, the Zulus would advance ever closer,occasionally one reaching Durnford's lines anddisemboweling a British soldier with the powerful Zuluspear, which made an unbearable sucking sound as itwent in and out.

The careful use by the Zulus of cover duringtheir advance was observed time and again bythe British. Another anonymous survivor ofIsandlwana noted that as the Zulus crested theNyoni ridge and came within sight of camp, they"appeared almost to grow out of the earth. Fromrock and bush on the heights above startedscores of men; some with rifles, others withshields and assegais." Lieutenant EdwardHutton of the 60th left a rather more complete

description of the Zulu army deploying for theattack at Gingindlovu: "The dark masses ofmen, in open order and under admirablediscipline, followed each other in quicksuccession, running at a steady pace throughthe long grass. Having moved steadily round soas exactly to face our front, the larger portion ofthe Zulus broke into three lines, in knots andgroups of from five to ten men, and advancedtowards us.... [They] continued to advance, stillat a run, until they were about 800 yards fromus, when they began to open fire. In spite of theexcitement of the moment we could not butadmire the perfect manner in which these Zulusskirmished. A knot of five or six would rise anddart through the long grass, dodging from sideto side with heads down, rifles and shields keptlow and out of sight. They would then suddenlysink into the long grass, and nothing but puffs ofcurling smoke would show their whereabouts.Then they advance again...." The speed of thisfinal advance was terrifying. When the Britishgave the order to cease firing and fall back atIsandlwana, the Zulus were pinned down sometwo or three hundred yards from the Britishposition. Lieutenant Curling of the Artillerynoted that in the time it took for his experiencedmen to limber his guns, the Zulus had rushed inso quickly that one gunner had actually been

stabbed as he mounted the axle-tree seat. AZulu veteran of the battle, uMhoti of theuKhandempemvu, thought the final charge soswift that "like a flame the whole Zulu forcesprang to its feet and darted upon them."

THE ANATOMY OF THE ZULU ARMY, IANKNIGHT, 1995

Durnford managed to get his men back into camp.The British were surrounded, but they closed ranksand fired away, killing scores of Zulus and keepingthem at bay. It was like target practice: as Durnfordhad predicted, their superior weaponry was makingthe difference. He looked around; the fight had turnedinto a stalemate, and his soldiers were respondingwith relative confidence. Almost imperceptibly,though, Durnford noticed a slight slackening in theirfire. Soldiers were running out of ammunition, and inthe time it took them to open a new crate and reload,the Zulus would tighten the circle and a wave of fearwould ripple through the men as here and there asoldier in the front lines would be impaled. The Zulusfought with an intensity the British had never seen;rushing forward as if bullets could not harm them, theyseemed to be in a trance.

Suddenly, sensing the turning point in the battle, theZulus began to rattle their spears against their shieldsand emit their war cry: "Usuthu!" It was a terrifying din.At the northern end of the camp, a group of Britishsoldiers gave way--just a few, panicking at the sightand sound of the Zulus, now only a few yards distant,

but the Zulus poured through the gap. As if on cue,those in the circle between the two horns rainedspears on the British, killing many and making havocof their lines. From out of nowhere, a reserve forcerushed forward, fanning around the circle anddoubling its squeezing power. Durnford tried tomaintain order, but it was too late: in a matter ofseconds, panic. Now it was every man for himself.

Durnford ran to the one gap in the encirclement andtried to keep it open so that his remaining men couldretreat to Rorke's Drift. Minutes later he was impaledby a Zulu spear. Soon the battle at Isandlwana wasover. A few hundred managed to escape through thegap that Durnford had died in securing; the rest, overfourteen hundred men, were killed.

After such a devastating defeat, the British forcesquickly retreated out of Zululand. For the time being,the war was indeed over, but not as the British hadexpected.

InterpretationA few months after the defeat at Isandlwana, theBritish mounted a larger invasion and finally defeatedthe Zulus. But the lesson of Isandlwana remainsinstructive, particularly considering the incrediblediscrepancy in technology.

The Zulu way of fighting had been perfected earlierin the nineteenth century by King Shaka Zulu, who bythe 1820s had transformed what had been a relativelyminor tribe into the region's greatest fighting force.Shaka invented the heavy, broad-bladed Zulu spear,

the assegai, that was so devastating in battle. Heimposed a rigorous discipline, training the Zulus toadvance and encircle their enemies with machinelikeprecision. The circle was extremely important in Zuluculture--as a symbol of their national unity, a motif intheir artwork, and their dominant pattern in warfare.The Zulus could not fight for extended periods, sincetheir culture required lengthy cleansing rituals after theshedding of blood in battle. During these rituals theywere completely vulnerable to attack--no Zulu couldfight again, or even rejoin the tribe, until he had beencleansed. The immense Zulu army was also costly tomaintain in the field. Once mobilized, then, the armynot only had to defeat its enemies in battle, it had toannihilate every last one of them, eliminating thepossibility of a counterattack during the vulnerablecleansing period and allowing a speedydemobilization. Encirclement was the Zulu method ofobtaining this complete kind of victory.

Before any battle, the Zulus would scout the terrainfor places to hide. As one looks out over thegrasslands and plains of South Africa, they seem tooffer wide visibility, but they often conceal ravines andgullies undetectable from any distance. Even upclose, grasses and boulders provide excellentcoverage. The Zulus would move quickly to theirhiding places, their feet tough as leather from years ofrunning over the grasslands. They would send outscouting parties as distractions to hide themovements of the main force.

Once they emerged from their hiding place and

headed into battle, the Zulus would form what theycalled the "horns, chest, and loins." The chest was thecentral part of the line, which would hold and pin theenemy force. Meanwhile the horns to either sidewould encircle it, moving in to the sides and rear.Often the tip of one horn would stay hidden behind tallgrass or boulders; when it emerged to complete theencirclement it would at the same time give theenemy a nasty psychological shock. The loins were areserve force kept back to be thrown in for the coupde grace. These men often actually stood with theirbacks to the battle, so as not to grow overly excitedand rush in before the right moment.

Years after Isandlwana a commission laid theblame for the disaster on Durnford, but in reality it wasnot his fault. It was true that the British had letthemselves be surrounded, but they managed to formlines in decent order and fought back bravely andwell. What destroyed them was what destroyed everyopponent of the Zulus: the terror created by theprecision of their movements, the feeling of beingencircled in an ever-tightening space, the occasionalsight of a fellow soldier succumbing to the horribleZulu spear, the war cries, the spears that rained downat the moment of greatest weakness, the nightmarishsight of a reserve force suddenly joining the circle. Forall the superiority of their weaponry, the Britishcollapsed under this calculated psychologicalpressure.

As soon as it grew light, Hannibal sent forward

the Balearics and the other light infantry. Hethen crossed the river in person and as eachdivision was brought across he assigned it itsplace in the line. The Gaulish and Spanishhorse he posted near the bank on the left wingin front of the Roman cavalry; the right wing wasassigned to the Numidian troopers. The centreconsisted of a strong force of infantry, the Gaulsand Spaniards in the middle, the Africans ateither end of them.... These nations, more thanany other, inspired terror by the vastness of theirstature and their frightful appearance: the Gaulswere naked above the waist, the Spaniards hadtaken up their position wearing white tunicsembroidered with purple, of dazzling brilliancy.The total number of infantry in the field [atCannae] was 40,000, and there were 10,000cavalry. Hasdrubal was in command of the leftwing, Marhabal of the right; Hannibal himselfwith his brother Mago commanded the centre. Itwas a great convenience to both armies that thesun shone obliquely on them, whether it wasthat they purposely so placed themselves, orwhether it happened by accident, since theRomans faced the north, the Carthaginians thesouth. The wind, called by the inhabitants theVulturnus, was against the Romans, and blewgreat clouds of dust into their faces, making itimpossible for them to see in front of them.

When the battle [at Cannae] was raised, theauxiliaries ran forward, and the battle began withthe light infantry. Then the Gauls and Spaniardson the left engaged the Roman cavalry on theright; the battle was not at all like a cavalry fight,for there was no room for maneuvering, the riveron the one side and the infantry on the otherhemming them in, compelled them to fight faceto face. Each side tried to force their way straightforward, till at last the horses were standing in aclosely pressed mass, and the riders seizedtheir opponents and tried to drag them fromtheir horses. It had become mainly a struggle ofinfantry, fierce but short, and the Roman cavalrywas repulsed and fled. Just as this battle of thecavalry was finished, the infantry becameengaged, and as long as the Gauls andSpaniards kept their ranks unbroken, both sideswere equally matched in strength and courage.At length after long and repeated efforts theRomans closed up their ranks, echeloned theirfront, and by the sheer weight of their deepcolumn bore down the division of the enemywhich was stationed in front of Hannibal's line,and was too thin and weak to resist the pressure.Without a moment's pause they followed uptheir broken and hastily retreating foe till theytook to headlong flight. Cutting their way throughto the mass of fugitives, who offered no

resistance, they penetrated as far as theAfricans who were stationed on both wings,somewhat further back than the Gauls andSpaniards who had formed the advancedcentre. As the latter fell back, the whole frontbecame level, and as they continued to giveground, it became concave and crescent-shaped, the Africans at either end forming thehorns. As the Romans rushed on incautiouslybetween them, they were enfiladed by the twowings, which extended and closed round themin the rear. On this, the Romans, who had foughtone battle to no purpose, left the Gauls andSpaniards, whose rear they had beenslaughtering, and commenced a fresh strugglewith the Africans. The contest was a very one-sided one, for not only were they hemmed in onall sides, but wearied with the previous fightingthey were meeting fresh and vigorousopponents.

THE HISTORY OF ROME, LIVY, 59 B.C.-A.D.17

We humans are extremely clever creatures: indisaster or setback, we often find a way to adapt, toturn the situation around. We look for any gap andoften find it; we thrive on hope, craftiness, and will.The history of war is littered with stories of dramaticadjustments and reversals, except in one place: theenvelopment. Whether physical or psychological, this

is the only true exception to the possibility of turningthings around.

When properly executed, this strategy gives youropponents no gaps to exploit, no hope. They aresurrounded, and the circle is tightening. In the abstractspace of social and political warfare, encirclementcan be any maneuver that gives your opponents thefeeling of being attacked from all sides, being pushedinto a corner and denied hope of making acounterattack. Feeling surrounded, their willpower willweaken. Like the Zulus, keep a force in reserve, theloins to work with your horns--you hit them with theseforces when you sense their weakness growing. Letthe hopelessness of their situation encircle theirminds.

You must make your opponent acknowledgedefeat from the bottom of his heart.--Miyamoto Musashi (1584-1645)

KEYS TO WARFAREThousands of years ago, we humans lived a nomadiclife, wandering across deserts and plains, hunting andgathering. Then we shifted into living in settlementsand cultivating our food. The change brought uscomfort and control, but in a part of our spirit weremain nomads: we cannot help but associate theroom to roam and wander with a feeling of freedom.To a cat, tight, enclosed spaces may mean comfort,but to us they conjure suffocation. Over the centuriesthis reflex has become more psychological: the

feeling that we have options in a situation, a futurewith prospects, translates into something like thefeeling of open space. Our minds thrive on the sensethat there is possibility and strategic room tomaneuver.

Conversely, the sense of psychological enclosure isdeeply disturbing to us, often making us overreact.When someone or something encircles us--narrowingour options, besieging us from all sides--we losecontrol of our emotions and make the kinds ofmistakes that render the situation more hopeless. Inhistory's great military sieges, the greater dangeralmost always comes from the panic and confusionwithin. Unable to see what is happening beyond thesiege, losing contact with the outside world, thedefenders also lose their grip on reality. An animalthat cannot observe the world around it is doomed.When all you can see are Zulus closing in, yousuccumb to panic and confusion.

The battles of daily life occur not on a map but in akind of abstract space defined by people's ability tomaneuver, act against you, limit your power, and cutinto your time to respond. Give your opponents anyroom in this abstract or psychological space and theywill exploit it, no matter how powerful you are or howbrilliant your strategies--so make them feelsurrounded. Shrink their possibilities of action andclose off their escape routes. Just as the inhabitantsof a city under siege may slowly lose their minds, youropponents will be maddened by their lack of room tomaneuver against you.

There are many ways to envelop your opponents,but perhaps the simplest is to put whatever strength oradvantage you naturally have to maximum use in astrategy of enclosure.

In his struggle to gain control of the chaoticAmerican oil industry in the 1870s, John D.Rockefeller--founder and president of Standard Oil--worked first to gain a monopoly on the railroads,which were then oil's main transport. Next he movedto gain control over the pipelines that connected therefineries to the railroads. Independent oil producersresponded by banding together to fund a pipeline oftheir own that would run from Pennsylvania to thecoast, bypassing the need for railroads andRockefeller's network of pipelines. Rockefeller triedbuying up the land that lay in the path of the project,being built by a company called Tidewater, but hisopponents worked around him, building a zigzagpipeline all the way to the sea.

Rockefeller was faced with a classic paradigm inwar: a motivated enemy was utilizing every gap in hisdefenses to avoid his control, adjusting and learninghow to fight him along the way. His solution was anenveloping maneuver. First, Rockefeller built his ownpipeline to the sea, a larger one than Tidewater's.Then he began a campaign to buy up stock in theTidewater company, gaining a minority interest in itand working from within to damage its credit and stirdissension. He initiated a price war, undermininginterest in the Tidewater pipeline. And he purchasedrefineries before they could become Tidewater

clients. By 1882 his envelopment was complete:Tidewater was forced to work out a deal that gaveStandard Oil even more control over the shipping ofoil than it had had before this war.

Rockefeller's method was to create relentlesspressure from as many directions as possible. Theresult was confusion on the part of the independent oilproducers--they could not tell how far his controlextended, but it seemed enormous. They still hadoptions at the point when they surrendered, but theyhad been worn down and made to believe the fightwas hopeless. The Tidewater envelopment was madepossible by the immense resources at Rockefeller'sdisposal, but he used these resources not justpractically but psychologically, generating animpression of himself as a relentless foe who wouldleave no gaps for the enemy to sneak through. Hewon not only by how much he spent but by his use ofhis resources to create psychological pressure.

To envelop your enemies, you must use whateveryou have in abundance. If you have a large army, useit to create the appearance that your forces areeverywhere, an encircling pressure. That is howToussaint l'Ouverture ended slavery in what today iscalled Haiti, at the end of the eighteenth century, andliberated the island from France: he used his greaternumbers to create the feeling among the whites onthe island that they were hopelessly engulfed by ahostile force. No minority can withstand such a feelingfor long.

That night Ren Fu stationed the [Song army]troops by the Haoshui River, while Zhu Guanand Wu Ying made camp on a tributary of theriver. They were about five li apart. Scoutsreported that the Xia forces were inferior innumber and seemed rather fearful. At this RenFu lost his vigilance and grew contemptuous ofthe men of Xia. He did not stop his officers andmen from pursuing the Xia army and capturingits abandoned provisions. Geng Fu remindedhim that the men of Xia had always beendeceptive and advised him to bring the troopsunder discipline and advance slowly in aregular formation. Scouts should also bedispatched to probe further into the surroundingareas in order to find out what tricks the enemywas up to. However, Ren Fu ignored this advice.He made arrangements with Zhu Guan toproceed by separate routes to pursue theenemy and join forces at the mouth of HaoshuiRiver the next day. The Xia horsemen feigneddefeat, emerging now and then four or five li infront of the Song army. Ren Fu and Zhu Guanmarched swiftly in a hot pursuit, eventuallyarriving to the north of the city of Longgan.There the Xia soldiers suddenly vanished fromsight. Ren Fu realized at last that he had beendeceived and decided to pull the troops out ofthe mountainous region. The next day Ren Fu

led his men to move westward along theHaoshui River. They finally got out of theLiupan Mountains and proceeded towards thecity of Yangmulong. At this juncture Ren Fu gotreports of enemy activity in the vicinity. He hadto call the troops to a halt about five li from thecity and array them in a defensive formation.Just then, several large wooden boxes werediscovered lying by the road. The boxes weretightly sealed and rustling sound came fromwithin. Curiously, Ren Fu ordered the boxes tobe opened. All of a sudden, dozens of pigeonsfluttered out of the boxes and flew high into thesky, with loud tinkling sounds coming from thesmall bells attached to their claws. All the Songsoldiers looked up in astonishment, when largehosts of Xia soldiers appeared in everydirection to form a complete encirclement. Onhearing the pigeon bells, Yuanhao knew thatthe Song army had entered his ambush ring.Thereupon he sent an assistant general withfifty thousand men to surround and assault theband of troops led by Zhu Guan and led theother half of his troops in person to attack RenFu, whom he considered a tougher opponentthan Zhu Guan.... The Song soldiers failed topenetrate the encirclement and were compelledto continue the tangled fight. Many were killedand some even threw themselves down the

precipice in despair. Ren Fu himself was hit byover a dozen arrows. One of his guards urgedhim to surrender, which seemed the only way tosave his life and the remnants of his men. ButRen Fu sighed and said, "I am a general of theSong and shall pay for this defeat with my life."With this he brandished his mace and foughtfiercely until he was mortally injured on the faceby a spear. Then he took his own life bystrangling himself. All of Ren Fu's subordinateofficers died in combat, and his army wascompletely wiped out.

THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARYSTRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

Remember: the power of envelopment is ultimatelypsychological. Making the other side feel vulnerableto attack on many sides is as good as envelopingthem physically.

In the Ismaili Shiite sect during the eleventh andtwelfth centuries A.D., a group later known as theAssassins developed the strategy of killing keyIslamic leaders who had tried to persecute the sect.Their method was to infiltrate an Assassin into thetarget's inner circle, perhaps even joining hisbodyguard. Patient and efficient, the Assassins wereable over the years to instill the fear that they couldstrike at any time and at any person. No caliph orvizier felt secure. The technique was a masterpiece of

economy, for in the end the Assassins actually killedquite a few people, yet the threat they posed gave theIsmailis great political power.

A few well-timed blows to make your enemies feelvulnerable in multiple ways and from multipledirections will do the same thing for you. Often, in fact,less is more here: too many blows will give you ashape, a personality--something for the other side torespond to and develop a strategy to combat. Insteadseem vaporous. Make your maneuvers impossible toanticipate. Your psychological encirclement will be allthe more sinister and complete.

The best encirclements are those that prey on theenemy's preexisting, inherent vulnerabilities. Beattentive, then, to signs of arrogance, rashness, orother psychological weakness. Once WinstonChurchill saw the paranoid streak in Adolf Hitler, heworked to create the impression that the Axis mightbe attacked from anywhere--the Balkans, Italy,western France. Churchill's resources were meager;he could only hint at these possibilities throughdeception. But that was enough: a man like Hitlercould not bear the thought of being vulnerable fromany direction. By 1942 his forces were stretchedacross vast parts of Europe, and Churchill's ploysmade him stretch them even thinner. At one point amere feint at the Balkans made him hold back forcesfrom the invasion of Russia, which in the end cost himdearly. Feed the fears of the paranoid and they willstart to imagine attacks you hadn't even thought of;their overheated brains will do much of the

encirclement for you.When the Carthaginian general Hannibal was

planning what turned out to be perhaps the mostdevastating envelopment in history--his victory at theBattle of Cannae in 216 B.C.--he heard from his spiesthat one of the opposing Roman generals, Varro, wasa hothead, arrogant and contemptuous. Hannibal wasoutnumbered two to one, but he made two strategicdecisions that turned this around. First, he lured theRomans onto tight terrain, where their greaternumbers would find it hard to maneuver. Second, heweakened the center of his lines, placing his besttroops and cavalry at the lines' outer ends. Led by therash Varro, the Romans charged into the center,which gave way. The Romans pushed farther andfarther. Then, just as the Zulus would encircle theBritish within two horns, the outer ends of theCarthaginian line pushed inward, enclosing theRomans in a tight and fatal embrace.

The impetuous, violent, and arrogant areparticularly easy to lure into the traps of envelopmentstrategies: play weak or dumb and they will chargeahead without stopping to think where they're going.But any emotional weakness on the opponent's part,or any great desire or unrealized wish, can be madean ingredient of encirclement.

That is how the Iranians enveloped theadministration of President Ronald Reagan in 1985-86, in what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair.America was leading an international embargo on thesale of weapons to Iran. In fighting this boycott, the

Iranians saw two American weaknesses: first,Congress had cut off U.S. funding for the war of theContras against the Sandinista government inNicaragua--a cause dear to the Reagan government--and second, the administration was deeply disturbedabout the growing number of Americans held hostagein the Middle East. Playing on these desires, theIranians were able to lure the Americans into aCannae-like trap: they would work for the release ofhostages and secretly fund the Contras, in exchangefor weapons.

It seemed too good to resist, but as the Americansentered further into this web of duplicity (backroomdeals, secret meetings), they could sense their roomto maneuver slowly narrowing: the Iranians were ableto ask for more in exchange for less. In the end theygot plenty of weapons, while the Americans got only ahandful of hostages and not enough money to make adifference in Nicaragua. Worse, the Iranians openlytold other diplomats about these "secret" dealings,closing their encirclement by ensuring that it would berevealed to the American public. For the governmentofficials who had been involved in the affair, there wasno possible escape route from the mess they hadbeen drawn into. Feeling intense pressure from allsides as news of the deal became public, theirattempts to cover it up or explain it away only madethe situation worse.

In luring your enemies into such a trap, always try tomake them feel as if they are in control of thesituation. They will advance as far as you want them

to. Many of the Americans involved in Iran-Contrabelieved they were the ones conning the naiveIranians.

Finally, do not simply work to envelop youropponents' forces or immediate emotions, but ratherenvelop their whole strategy--indeed, their wholeconceptual framework. This ultimate form ofenvelopment involves first studying the rigid,predictable parts of your opponents' strategy, thencrafting a novel strategy of your own that goes outsidetheir experience. Taking on the armies of Islam,Russia, Poland, Hungary, and the Teutonic Order, theMongols did not merely defeat them, they annihilatedthem--by inventing a new brand of mobile warfare touse against an enemy mired in centuries-old methodsof fighting. This kind of strategic mismatch can lead tovictory not just in any given battle but in large-scalecampaigns--the ultimate goal in any form of war.

Authority: Place a monkey in a cage, and itis the same as a pig, not because it isn't

clever and quick, but because it has noplace to freely exercise its capabilities.

--Huainanzi (second century B.C.)

REVERSALThe danger of envelopment is that unless it iscompletely successful, it may leave you in avulnerable position. You have announced your plans.The enemy knows that you are trying to annihilate it,and unless you can quickly deliver your knockoutpunch, it will work furiously not only to defend itself butto destroy you--for now your destruction is its onlysafeguard. Some armies that have failed in theirenvelopments have found themselves later encircledby their enemies. Use this strategy only when youhave a reasonable chance of bringing it to theconclusion you desire.

MANEUVER THEM INTO WEAKNESSTHE RIPENING-FOR-THE-SICKLE STRATEGY

No matter how strong you are, fighting endlessbattles with people is exhausting, costly, andunimaginative. Wise strategists generally prefer theart of maneuver: before the battle even begins, theyfind ways to put their opponents in positions of suchweakness that victory is easy and quick. Baitenemies into taking positions that may seemalluring but are actually traps and blind alleys. Iftheir position is strong, get them to abandon it byleading them on a wild-goose chase. Createdilemmas: devise maneuvers that give them achoice of ways to respond--all of them bad. Channelchaos and disorder in their direction. Confused,frustrated, and angry opponents are like ripe fruit onthe bough: the slightest breeze will make them fall.

MANEUVER WARFAREThroughout history two distinct styles of warfare canbe identified. The most ancient is the war of attrition:the enemy surrenders because you have killed somany of its men. A general fighting a war of attritionwill calculate ways to overwhelm the other side withlarger numbers, or with the battle formation that will dothe most damage, or with superior military technology.In any event, victory depends on wearing down the

other side in battle. Even with today's extraordinarytechnology, attrition warfare is remarkablyunsophisticated, playing into humanity's most violentinstincts.

Warfare is like hunting. Wild animals are takenby scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking,by circling around, and by other suchstratagems rather than by sheer force. In wagingwar we should proceed in the same way, whetherthe enemy be many or few. To try simply tooverpower the enemy in the open, hand to handand face to face, even though you might appearto win, is an enterprise which is very risky andcan result in serious harm. Apart from extremeemergency, it is ridiculous to try to gain a victorywhich is so costly and brings only empty glory....BYZANTINE EMPEROR MAURIKIOS, A.D. 539-

602

Over many centuries, and most notably in ancientChina, a second method of waging war developed.The emphasis here was not destroying the other sidein battle but weakening and unbalancing it before thebattle began. The leader would maneuver to confuseand infuriate and to put the enemy in a bad position--having to fight uphill, or with the sun or wind in its face,or in a cramped space. In this kind of war, an armywith mobility could be more effective than one withmuscle.

The maneuver-warfare philosophy was codified by

Sun-tzu in his Art of War, written in China's WarringStates period, in the fifth to third century B.C.--overtwo hundred years of escalating cycles of warfare inwhich a state's very survival depended on its armyand strategists. To Sun-tzu and his contemporaries, itwas obvious that the costs of war went far beyond itsbody counts: it entailed a loss of resources andpolitical goodwill and a lowering of morale amongsoldiers and citizens. These costs would mount overtime until eventually even the greatest warrior nationwould succumb to exhaustion. But through adroitmaneuvering a state could spare itself such highcosts and still emerge victorious. An enemy who hadbeen maneuvered into a weak position wouldsuccumb more easily to psychological pressure; evenbefore the battle had begun, it had imperceptiblystarted to collapse and would surrender with less of afight.

Several strategists outside Asia--most notablyNapoleon Bonaparte--have made brilliant use ofmaneuver warfare. But in general, attrition warfare isdeeply engrained in the Western way of thinking--fromthe ancient Greeks to modern America. In an attritionculture, thoughts naturally gravitate toward how tooverpower problems, obstacles, those who resist us.In the media, emphasis is placed on big battles,whether in politics or in the arts--static situations inwhich there are winners and losers. People are drawnto the emotional and dramatic quality in anyconfrontation, not the many steps that lead to suchconfrontation. The stories that are told in such cultures

are all geared toward such battlelike moments, amoral message preached through the ending (asopposed to the more telling details). On top of it all,this way of fighting is deemed more manly, honorable,honest.

More than anything, maneuver war is a differentway of thinking. What matters here is process--thesteps toward battle and how to manipulate them tomake the confrontation less costly and violent. In themaneuver universe, nothing is static. Battles are infact dramatic illusions, short moments in the largerflow of events, which is fluid, dynamic, andsusceptible to alteration through careful strategy. Thisway of thinking finds no honor or morality in wastingtime, energy, and lives in battles. Instead wars ofattrition are seen as lazy, reflecting the primitivehuman tendency to fight back reactively, withoutthinking.

In a society full of attrition fighters, you will gain aninstant advantage by converting to maneuver. Yourthought process will become more fluid, more on theside of life, and you will be able to thrive off the rigid,battle-obsessed tendencies of the people around you.By always thinking first about the overall situation andabout how to maneuver people into positions ofweakness rather than fight them, you will make yourbattles less bloody--which, since life is long andconflict is endless, is wise if you want a fruitful andenduring career. And a war of maneuver is just asdecisive as a war of attrition. Think of weakening yourenemies as ripening them like grain, ready to be cut

down at the right moment.The following are the four main principles of

maneuver warfare:

Craft a plan with branches. Maneuver warfaredepends on planning, and the plan has to be right.Too rigid and you leave yourself no room to adjust tothe inevitable chaos and friction of war; too loose andunforeseen events will confuse and overwhelm you.The perfect plan stems from a detailed analysis of thesituation, which allows you to decide on the bestdirection to follow or the perfect position to occupyand suggests several effective options (branches) totake, depending on what the enemy throws at you. Aplan with branches lets you outmaneuver your enemybecause your responses to changing circumstancesare faster and more rational.

Give yourself room to maneuver. You cannot bemobile, you cannot maneuver freely, if you put yourselfin cramped spaces or tie yourself down to positionsthat do not allow you to move. Consider the ability tomove and keeping open more options than yourenemy has as more important than holding territoriesor possessions. You want open space, not deadpositions. This means not burdening yourself withcommitments that will limit your options. It means nottaking stances that leave you nowhere to go. Theneed for space is psychological as well as physical:you must have an unfettered mind to create anythingworthwhile.

Give your enemy dilemmas, not problems. Mostof your opponents are likely to be clever andresourceful; if your maneuvers simply present themwith a problem, they will inevitably solve it. But adilemma is different: whatever they do, however theyrespond--retreat, advance, stay still--they are still introuble. Make every option bad: if you maneuverquickly to a point, for instance, you can force yourenemies either to fight before they are ready or toretreat. Try constantly to put them in positions thatseem alluring but are traps.

Create maximum disorder. Your enemy dependson being able to read you, to get some sense of yourintentions. The goal of your maneuvers should be tomake that impossible, to send the enemy on a wild-goose chase for meaningless information, to createambiguity as to which way you are going to jump. Themore you break down people's ability to reason aboutyou, the more disorder you inject into their system.The disorder you create is controlled and purposeful,at least for you. The disorder the enemy suffers isdebilitating and destructive.

So to win a hundred victories in a hundredbattles is not the highest excellence; the highest

excellence is to subdue the enemy's armywithout fighting at all.

--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

1. On November 10, 1799, Napoleon Bonapartecompleted the coup d'etat that brought him to poweras first consul, giving him near-complete control of theFrench state. For over ten years, France had beenconvulsed with revolution and war. Now that Napoleonwas leader, his most pressing need was peace, togive the country time to recoup and himself time toconsolidate his power--but peace would not comeeasily.

France had a bitter enemy in Austria, which had puttwo large armies in the field, ready to move againstNapoleon: one to the east of the Rhine and the otherin northern Italy under General Michael Melas. TheAustrians were clearly planning a major campaign.Waiting was too dangerous; Napoleon had to seizethe initiative. He had to defeat at least one of thesearmies if he were to force Austria to negotiate peaceon his terms. The one trump card he had was thatseveral months earlier a French army had gainedcontrol of Switzerland. There were also French troopsin northern Italy, which Napoleon had taken from theAustrians several years earlier.

To plan for the first real campaign under hisdirection, Napoleon holed himself up in his office forseveral days. His secretary, Louis de Bourienne,would recall seeing him lying on giant maps ofGermany, Switzerland, and Italy laid out wall to wall onthe floor. The desks were piled high withreconnaissance reports. On hundreds of note cardsorganized into boxes, Napoleon had calculated theAustrians' reactions to the feints he was planning.

Muttering to himself on the floor, he mulled over everypermutation of attack and counterattack.

"Addicts of attrition," as Simpkin calls them,generally cannot think beyond the battle, andthey consider that the only way--or at least thepreferred way--to defeat an enemy is to destroythe physical components of his army,especially the combat portions (armoredfighting vehicles, troops, guns, etc.). If theattrition addict appreciates war's intangibles atall (such as morale, initiative, and shock), hesees them only as combat multipliers with whichto fight the attrition battle better. If the attritionwarrior learns about maneuver, he sees itprimarily as a way to get to the fight. In otherwords, he moves in order to fight. Maneuvertheory, on the other hand, attempts to defeat theenemy through means other than simpledestruction of his mass. Indeed, the highest andpurest application of maneuver theory is topreempt the enemy, that is, to disarm orneutralize him before the fight. If such is notpossible, the maneuver warrior seeks todislocate the enemy forces, i.e., removing theenemy from the decisive point, or vice versa,thus rendering them useless and irrelevant tothe fight. If the enemy cannot be preempted ordislocated, then the maneuver-warfarepractitioner will attempt to disrupt the enemy,

i.e., destroy or neutralize his center of gravity,preferably by attacking with friendly strengthsthrough enemy weaknesses.

THE ART OF MANEUVER, ROBERT R.LEONHARD, 1991

By the end of March 1800, Napoleon had emergedfrom his office with a plan for a campaign in northernItaly that went far beyond anything his lieutenants hadever seen before. In the middle of April, a Frencharmy under General Jean Moreau would cross theRhine and push the eastern Austrian army back intoBavaria. Then Napoleon would lead a 50,000-manforce, already in place in Switzerland, into northernItaly through several different passes in the Alps.Moreau would then release one of his divisions tomove south and follow Napoleon into Italy. Moreau'sinitial move into Bavaria, and the subsequentscattered dispatch of divisions into Italy, wouldconfuse the Austrians as to Napoleon's intentions.And if the Austrian army at the Rhine was pushedeast, it would be too distant to support the Austrianarmy in northern Italy.

Once across the Alps, Napoleon would concentratehis forces and link up with the divisions under GeneralAndre Massena already stationed in northern Italy. Hewould then move much of his army to the town ofStradella, cutting off communications between Melasin northern Italy and command headquarters inAustria. With Melas's troops now isolated and themobile French army within reach of them, Napoleon

would have many excellent options for dislocating anddestroying them. At one point, as he described thisplan to Bourienne, Napoleon lay down on the giantmap on his floor and stuck a pin next to the town ofMarengo, in the center of the Italian theater of war. "Iwill fight him here," he said.

A few weeks later, as Napoleon began to positionhis armies, he received some troubling news: Melashad beaten him to the punch by attacking Massena'sarmy in Northern Italy. Massena was forced back toGenoa, where the Austrians quickly surrounded him.The danger here was great: if Massena surrendered,the Austrians could sweep into southern France. Also,Napoleon had been counting on Massena's army tohelp him beat Melas. Yet he took the news withsurprising calm and simply made some adjustments:he transferred more men to Switzerland and sentword to Massena that he must do whatever he couldto hold out for at least eight weeks, keeping Melasbusy while Napoleon moved into Italy.

Within a week there was more irritating news. AfterMoreau had begun the campaign to push theAustrians back from the Rhine, he refused to transferthe division that Napoleon had counted on for Italy,claiming he could not spare it. Instead he sent asmaller, less experienced division. The French armyin Switzerland had already begun the dangerouscrossings through the Alps. Napoleon had no choicebut to take what Moreau gave him.

By May 24, Napoleon had brought his army safelyinto Italy. Absorbed with the siege at Genoa, Melas

ignored reports of French movements to the north.Next Napoleon advanced to Milan, close to Stradella,where he cut Austrian communications as planned.Now, like a cat stealing up on its prey, he could waitfor Melas to notice the trap he was in and try to fighthis way out of it near Milan.

On June 8, however, once again more bad newsreached Napoleon: two weeks before he had hoped,Massena had surrendered. Napoleon now had fewermen to work with, and Melas had won a strong basein Genoa. Since its inception the campaign had beenplagued with mistakes and unforeseen events--theAustrians attacking early, Massena retreating into atrap at Genoa, Moreau disobeying orders, and nowMassena's surrender. Yet while Napoleon'slieutenants feared the worst, Napoleon himself notonly stayed cool, he seemed oddly excited by thesesudden twists of fortune. Somehow he could discernopportunities in them that were invisible to everyoneelse--and with the loss of Genoa, he sensed thegreatest opportunity of all. He quickly altered his plan;instead of waiting at Milan for Melas to come to him,he suddenly cast his divisions in a wide net to thewest.

Watching his prey closely, Napoleon sensed thatMelas was mesmerized by the movements of theFrench divisions--a fatal hesitation. Napoleon movedone division west to Marengo, close to the Austriansat Genoa, almost baiting them to attack. Suddenly, onthe morning of June 14, they took the bait, and insurprising force. This time it was Napoleon who had

erred; he had not expected the Austrian attack forseveral days, and his divisions were scattered toowidely to support him. The Austrians at Marengooutnumbered him two to one. He dispatched urgentmessages in all directions for reinforcements, thensettled into battle, hoping to make his small forceshold ground until they came.

The hours went by with no sign of aid. Napoleon'slines grew weaker, and at three in the afternoon theAustrians finally broke through, forcing the French toretreat. This was the ultimate downturn in thecampaign, and it was yet again Napoleon's momentto shine. He seemed encouraged by the way theretreat was going, the French scattering and theAustrians pursuing them, without discipline orcohesion. Riding among the men who had retreatedthe farthest, he rallied them and prepared them tocounterattack, promising them that reinforcementswould arrive within minutes--and he was right. NowFrench divisions were coming in from all directions.The Austrians, meanwhile, had let their ranks fall intodisorder, and, stunned to find themselves facing newforces in this condition, they halted and then gaveground to a quickly organized French counterattack.By 9:00 P.M. the French had routed them.

Just as Napoleon had predicted with his pin on themap, he met and defeated the enemy at Marengo. Afew months later, a treaty was signed that gaveFrance the peace it so desperately needed, a peacethat was to last nearly four years.

Aptitude for maneuver is the supreme skill in ageneral; it is the most useful and rarest of giftsby which genius is estimated.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, 1769-1821

InterpretationNapoleon's victory at Marengo might seem to havedepended on a fair amount of luck and intuition. Butthat is not at all the case. Napoleon believed that asuperior strategist could create his own luck--throughcalculation, careful planning, and staying open tochange in a dynamic situation. Instead of letting badfortune face him down, Napoleon incorporated it intohis plans. When he learned that Massena had beenforced back to Genoa, he saw that the fight for the citywould lock Melas into a static position, givingNapoleon time to move his men into place. WhenMoreau sent him a smaller division, Napoleon sent itthrough the Alps by a narrower, more obscure route,throwing more sand in the eyes of the Austrians tryingto figure out how many men he had available. WhenMassena unexpectedly surrendered, Napoleonrealized that it would be easier now to bait Melas intoattacking his divisions, particularly if he moved themcloser. At Marengo itself he knew all along that hisfirst reinforcements would arrive sometime after threein the afternoon. The more disorderly the Austrianpursuit of the French, the more devastating thecounterattack would be.

Napoleon's power to adjust and maneuver on therun was based in his novel way of planning. First, he

spent days studying maps and using them to make adetailed analysis. This was what told him, forexample, that putting his army at Stradella would posea dilemma for the Austrians and give him manychoices of ways to destroy them. Then he calculatedcontingencies: if the enemy did x, how would herespond? If part y of his plan misfired, how would herecover? The plan was so fluid, and gave him somany options, that he could adapt it infinitely towhatever situation developed. He had anticipated somany possible problems that he could come up with arapid answer to any of them. His plan was a mix ofdetail and fluidity, and even when he made a mistake,as he did in the early part of the encounter atMarengo, his quick adjustments kept the Austriansfrom taking advantage of it--before they'd figured outwhat to do, he was already somewhere else. Hisdevastating freedom of maneuver cannot beseparated from his methodical planning.

Understand: in life as in war, nothing ever happensjust as you expect it to. People's responses are oddor surprising, your staff commits outrageous acts ofstupidity, on and on. If you meet the dynamicsituations of life with plans that are rigid, if you think ofonly holding static positions, if you rely on technologyto control any friction that comes your way, you aredoomed: events will change faster than you can adjustto them, and chaos will enter your system.

In an increasingly complex world, Napoleon's wayof planning and maneuvering is the only rationalsolution. You absorb as much information and as

many details as possible; you analyze situations indepth, trying to imagine the enemy's responses andthe accidents that might happen. You do not get lost inthis maze of analysis but rather use it to formulate afree-flowing plan with branches, one that puts you inpositions with the possibility of maneuver. You keepthings loose and adjustable. Any chaos that comesyour way is channeled toward the enemy. In practicingthis policy, you will come to understand Napoleon'sdictum that luck is something you create.

Now the army's disposition of force (hsing) islike water. Water's configuration (hsing) avoidsheights and races downward.... Water configures(hsing) its flow in accord with the terrain; thearmy controls its victory in accord with theenemy. Thus the army does not maintain anyconstant strategic configuration of power (shih),water has no constant shape (hsing). One who isable to change and transform in accord with theenemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual.

THE ART OF WAR, SUN-TZU, FOURTHCENTURY B.C.

THE REED AND THE OLIVEThe reed and the olive tree were arguing overtheir steadfastness, strength and ease. Theolive taunted the reed for his powerlessnessand pliancy in the face of all the winds. The reedkept quiet and didn't say a word. Then, not long

after this, the wind blew violently. The reed,shaken and bent, escaped easily from it, but theolive tree, resisting the wind, was snapped by itsforce. The story shows that people who yield tocircumstances and to superior power have theadvantage over their stronger rivals.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

2. As the Republicans prepared their convention topick a presidential candidate in 1936, they hadreason to hope. The sitting president, the DemocratFranklin D. Roosevelt, was certainly popular, butAmerica was still in the Depression, unemploymentwas high, the budget deficit was growing, and manyof Roosevelt's New Deal programs were mired ininefficiency. Most promising of all, many Americanshad become disenchanted with Roosevelt as aperson--in fact, they had even come to hate him,thinking him dictatorial, untrustworthy, a socialist atheart, perhaps even un-American.

Roosevelt was vulnerable, and the Republicanswere desperate to win the election. They decided totone down their rhetoric and appeal to traditionalAmerican values. Claiming to support the spirit of theNew Deal but not the man behind it, they pledged todeliver the needed reforms more efficiently and fairlythan Roosevelt had. Stressing party unity, theynominated Alf M. Landon, the governor of Kansas, astheir presidential candidate. Landon was the perfectmoderate. His speeches tended to be a little dull, buthe seemed so solid, so middle class, a comfortable

choice, and this was no time to be promoting aradical. He had supported much of the New Deal, butthat was fine--the New Deal was popular. TheRepublicans nominated Landon because they thoughthe had the best chance to defeat Roosevelt, and thatwas all that mattered to them.

During the nominating ceremony, the Republicansstaged a western pageant with cowboys, cowgirls,and covered wagons. In his acceptance speech,Landon did not talk about specific plans or policy butabout himself and his American values. WhereRoosevelt was associated with unpleasant dramas,he would bring stability. It was a feel-good convention.

The Republicans waited for Roosevelt to make hismove. As expected, he played the part of the manabove the fray, keeping his public appearances to aminimum and projecting a presidential image. Hetalked in vague generalities and struck an optimisticnote. After the Democratic convention, he departedfor a long vacation, leaving the field open to theRepublicans, who were only too happy to fill the void:they sent Landon out on the campaign trail, where hemade stump speeches about how he was the one toenact reforms in a measured, rational way. Thecontrast between Landon and Roosevelt was one oftemperament and character, and it seemed toresonate: in the polls, Landon pulled into the lead.

Sensing that the election would be close andfeeling that this was their great chance, theRepublicans escalated their attacks, accusingRoosevelt of class warfare and painting a bleak

picture of his next term. The anti-Rooseveltnewspapers published a slew of editorials attackinghim in personal terms. The chorus of criticism grew,and the Republicans watched gleefully as many inRoosevelt's camp seemed to panic. One poll hadLandon building a substantial lead.

Not until late September, a mere six weeks beforethe election, did Roosevelt finally start his campaign--and then, to everyone's shock, he dropped thenonpartisan, presidential air that he had worn sonaturally. Positioning himself clearly to Landon's left,he drew a sharp contrast between the twocandidates. He quoted with great sarcasm Landon'sspeeches supporting the New Deal but claiming to beable to do it better: why vote for a man with basicallythe same ideas and approach but with no experiencein making them work? As the days went by,Roosevelt's voice grew louder and clearer, hisgestures more animated, his oratory even biblical intone: he was David facing the Goliath of the big-business interests that wanted to return the country tothe era of monopolies and robber barons.

The Republicans watched in horror as Roosevelt'scrowds swelled. All those whom the New Deal hadhelped in any way showed up in the tens ofthousands, and their response to Roosevelt wasalmost religious in its fervor. In one particularly rousingspeech, Roosevelt catalogued the moneyed interestsarrayed against him: "Never before in our history," heconcluded, "have these forces been so united againstone candidate as they stand today. They are

unanimous in their hate for me--and I welcome theirhatred.... I should like to have it said of my secondadministration that in it these forces met their master."

Landon, sensing the great change in the tide of theelection, came out with sharper attacks and tried todistance himself from the New Deal, which he hadearlier claimed to support--but all of this only seemedto dig him a deeper hole. He had changed too late,and clearly in reaction to his waning fortunes.

On Election Day, Roosevelt won by what at the timewas the greatest popular margin in U.S. electoralhistory; he won all but two states, and the Republicanswere reduced to sixteen seats in the Senate. Moreamazing than the size of his unprecedented victorywas the speed with which he had turned the tide.

InterpretationAs Roosevelt followed the Republican convention, heclearly saw the line they would take in the months tocome--a centrist line, emphasizing values andcharacter over policy. Now he could lay the perfecttrap by abandoning the field. Over the weeks to come,Landon would pound his moderate position into thepublic's mind, committing himself to it further andfurther. Meanwhile the more right-wing Republicanswould attack the president in bitter, personal terms.Roosevelt knew that a time would come whenLandon's poll numbers would peak. The public wouldhave had its fill of his bland message and the right'svitriolic attacks.

Sensing that moment in late September, he

returned to the stage and positioned himself clearly toLandon's left. The choice was strategic, notideological; it let him draw a sharp distinctionbetween Landon and himself. In a time of crisis likethe Depression, it was best to look resolute andstrong, to stand for something firm, to oppose a clearenemy. The attacks from the right gave him that clearenemy, while Landon's milquetoast posturing madehim look strong by contrast. Either way he won.

Of course this beautiful simplicity of strategicmovement, with its infinite flexibility, isextremely deceptive. The task of correlatingand coordinating the daily movements of adozen or more major formations, all movingalong separate routes, of ensuring that everycomponent is within one or, at most, two days'marching distance of its immediate neighbors,and yet at the same time preserving theappearance of an arbitrary and ill-coordinated"scatter" of large units in order to deceive thefoe concerning the true gravity of his situation--this is the work of a mathematical mind of nocommon caliber. It is in fact the hallmark ofgenius--that "infinite capacity for takingpains."...The ultimate aim of all this carefullyconsidered activity was to produce the greatestpossible number of men on the battlefield,which on occasion had been chosen months inadvance of the actual event. Bourienne gives

his celebrated...eyewitness account of the FirstConsul, in the early days of the ItalianCampaign of 1800, lying full-length on the floor,pushing colored pins into his maps, and saying,"I shall fight him here--on the plain of theScrivia," with that uncanny prescience whichwas in reality the product of mental calculationsof computer-like complexity. After consideringevery possible course of action open to theAustrian Melas, Bonaparte eliminated themone by one, made allowance for the effect ofchance on events, and came up with theanswer--subsequently borne out by the eventsof June 14 on the field of Marengo, which lies,surely enough, on the plain bounded by therivers Bormida and Scrivia.THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON, DAVID G.

CHANDLER, 1966

Now Landon was presented with a dilemma. If hekept going with his centrist appeal, he would bore thepublic and seem weak. If he moved to the right--thechoice he actually took--he would be inconsistent andlook desperate. This was pure maneuver warfare:Begin by taking a position of strength--in Roosevelt'scase his initial, presidential, bipartisan pose--thatleaves you with open options and room to maneuver.Then let your enemies show their direction. Once theycommit to a position, let them hold it--in fact, let themtrumpet it. Now that they are fixed in place, maneuver

to the side that will crowd them, leaving them only badoptions. By waiting to make this maneuver until thelast six weeks of the presidential race, Roosevelt bothdenied the Republicans any time to adjust and kepthis own strident appeal from wearing thin.

Everything is political in the world today, andpolitics is all about positioning. In any political battle,the best way to stake out a position is to draw a sharpcontrast with the other side. If you have to resort tospeeches to make this contrast, you are on shakyground: people distrust words. Insisting that you arestrong or well qualified rings as self-promotion.Instead make the opposing side talk and take the firstmove. Once they have committed to a position andfixed it in other people's minds, they are ripe for thesickle. Now you can create a contrast by quoting theirwords back at them, showing how different you are--intone, in attitude, in action. Make the contrast deep. Ifthey commit to some radical position, do not respondby being moderate (moderation is generally weak);attack them for promoting instability, for being power-hungry revolutionaries. If they respond by toning downtheir appeal, nail them for being inconsistent. If theystay the course, their message will wear thin. If theybecome more strident in self-defense, you make yourpoint about their instability.

Use this strategy in the battles of daily life, lettingpeople commit themselves to a position you can turninto a dead end. Never say you are strong, show youare, by making a contrast between yourself and yourinconsistent or moderate opponents.

3. The Turks entered World War I on the side ofGermany. Their main enemies in the Middle Easterntheater were the British, who were based in Egypt, butby 1917 they had arrived at a comfortable stalemate:the Turks controlled a strategic eight-hundred-milestretch of railway that ran from Syria in the north to theHejaz (the southwestern part of Arabia) in the south.Due west of the central part of this railway line was thetown of Aqaba, on the Red Sea, a key Turkishposition from which they could quickly move armiesnorth and south to protect the railway.

The Turks had already beaten back the British atGallipoli (see chapter 5), a huge boost to their morale.Their commanders in the Middle East felt secure. TheEnglish had tried to stir up a revolt against the Turksamong the Arabs of the Hejaz, hoping the revolt wouldspread north; the Arabs had managed a few raidshere and there but had fought more amongthemselves than against the Turks. The British clearlycoveted Aqaba and plotted to take it from the seawith their powerful navy, but behind Aqaba was amountain wall marked by deep gorges. The Turks hadconverted the mountain into a fortress. The Britishknew that even if their navy took Aqaba, they would beunable to advance inland, rendering the city's captureuseless. Both the British and the Turks saw thesituation the same way, and the stalemate endured.

In June 1917 the Turkish commanders of the fortsguarding Aqaba received reports of strange enemymovements in the Syrian deserts to the northeast. It

seemed that a twenty-nine-year-old British liaisonofficer to the Arabs named T. E. Lawrence hadtrekked across hundreds of miles of desolate terrainto recruit an army among the Howeitat, a Syrian triberenowned for fighting on camels. The Turksdispatched scouts to find out more. They alreadyknew a little about Lawrence: unusually for Britishofficers of the time, he spoke Arabic, mixed well withthe local people, and even dressed in their style. Hehad also befriended Sherif Feisal, a leader of theArab revolt. Could he be raising an army to attackAqaba? To the extent that this was possible, he wasworth watching carefully. Then word came thatLawrence had imprudently told an Arab chief, secretlyin Turkish pay, that he was heading for Damascus tospread the Arab revolt. This was the Turks' great fear,for a revolt in the more populated areas of the northwould be unmanageable.

The army Lawrence had recruited could not havenumbered more than 500, but the Howeitat weregreat fighters on camel, fierce and mobile. The Turksalerted their colleagues in Damascus and dispatchedtroops to hunt Lawrence down, a difficult task giventhe mobility of the Arabs and the vastness of thedesert.

In the next few weeks, the Englishman's movementswere baffling, to say the least: his troops moved notnorth toward Damascus but south toward the railwaytown of Ma'an, site of a storage depot used to supplyAqaba, forty miles away. No sooner had Lawrenceappeared in the area of Ma'an, however, than he

disappeared, reemerging over a hundred miles northto lead a series of raids on the railway line betweenAmman and Damascus. Now the Turks were doublyalarmed and sent 400 cavalry from Amman to findhim.

For a few days, there was no sign of Lawrence. Inthe meantime an uprising several miles to the south ofMa'an surprised the Turks. An Arab tribe called theDhumaniyeh had seized control of the town of Abu elLissal, directly along the route from Ma'an to Aqaba.A Turkish battalion dispatched to take the town backfound the blockhouse guarding it destroyed and theArabs gone. Then, suddenly, something unexpectedand quite disturbing occurred: out of nowhereLawrence's Howeitat army emerged on the hill aboveAbu el Lissal.

The warrior and the statesman, like the skillfulgambler, do not make their luck but prepare forit, attract it, and seem almost to determine theirluck. Not only are they, unlike the fool and thecoward, adept at making use of opportunitieswhen these occur; they know furthermore how totake advantage, by means of precautions andwise measures, of such and such anopportunity, or of several at once. If one thinghappens, they win; if another, they are still thewinners; the same circumstance often makesthem win in a variety of ways. These prudentmen may be praised for their good fortune as

well as their good management, and rewardedfor their luck as well as for their merits.

CHARACTERS, JEAN DE LA BRUYERE,1645-1696

Distracted by the local uprising, the Turks had losttrack of Lawrence. Now, linking up with theDhumaniyeh, he had trapped a Turkish army at Abu elLissal. The Arabs rode along the hill with enormousspeed and dexterity, goading the Turks into wastingammunition by firing on them. Meanwhile the middayheat took its toll on the Turkish riflemen, and, havingwaited until the Turks were sufficiently tired, theArabs, Lawrence among them, charged down the hill.The Turks closed their ranks, but the swift-movingcamel cavalry took them from the flank and rear. Itwas a massacre: 300 Turkish soldiers were killed andthe rest taken prisoner.

Now the Turkish commanders at Aqaba finally sawLawrence's game: he had cut them off from therailway line on which they depended for supplies.Also, seeing the Howeitat's success, other Arabtribes around Aqaba joined up with Lawrence,creating a powerful army that began to wend its waythrough the narrow gorges toward Aqaba. The Turkshad never imagined an army coming from thisdirection; their fortifications faced the other way,toward the sea and the British. The Arabs had areputation for ruthlessness with enemies whoresisted, and the commanders of the forts in back ofAqaba began to surrender. The Turks sent out their

300-man garrison from Aqaba to put a stop to thisadvance, but they were quickly surrounded by theswelling number of Arabs.

On July 6 the Turks finally surrendered, and theircommanders watched in shock as Lawrence's ragtagarmy rushed to the sea to take what had been thoughtto be an impregnable position. With this one blow,Lawrence had completely altered the balance ofpower in the Middle East.

InterpretationThe fight between Britain and Turkey during WorldWar I superbly demonstrates the difference betweena war of attrition and a war of maneuver. BeforeLawrence's brilliant move, the British, fighting by therules of attrition warfare, had been directing the Arabsto capture key points along the railway line. Thisstrategy had played into Turkish hands: the Turks hadtoo few men to patrol the entire line, but once theysaw the Arabs attacking at any one place, they couldquickly move the men they had and use their superiorfirepower to either defend it or take it back.Lawrence--a man with no military background, butblessed with common sense--saw the stupidity in thisright away. Around the railway line were thousands ofsquare miles of desert unoccupied by the Turks. TheArabs had been masters at a mobile form of warfareon camelback since the days of the prophetMohammed; vast space at their disposal gave theminfinite possibilities for maneuvers that would createthreats everywhere, forcing the Turks to bunker

themselves in their forts. Frozen in place, the Turkswould wither from lack of supplies and would beunable to defend the surrounding region. The key tothe overall war was to spread the revolt north, towardDamascus, allowing the Arabs to threaten the entirerailway line. But to spread the revolt north, theyneeded a base in the center. That base was Aqaba.

The British were as hidebound as the Turks andsimply could not picture a campaign of a group ofArabs led by a liaison officer. Lawrence would have todo it on his own. Tracing a series of great loops in thevast spaces of the desert, he left the Turks bewilderedas to his purpose. Knowing that the Turks feared anattack on Damascus, he deliberately spread the liethat he was aiming for it, making the Turks sendtroops on a wild-goose chase to the north. Then,exploiting their inability to imagine an Arab attack onAqaba from the landward side (a failing they sharedwith his British countrymen), he caught them off guard.Lawrence's subsequent capture of Aqaba was amasterpiece of economy: only two men died, on hisside. (Compare this to the unsuccessful Britishattempt to take Gaza from the Turks that same year inhead-on battle, in which over three thousand Britishsoldiers were killed.) The capture of Aqaba was theturning point in Britain's eventual defeat of the Turks inthe Middle East.

The greatest power you can have in any conflict isthe ability to confuse your opponent about yourintentions. Confused opponents do not know how orwhere to defend themselves; hit them with a surprise

attack and they are pushed off balance and fall. Toaccomplish this you must maneuver with just onepurpose: to keep them guessing. You get them tochase you in circles; you say the opposite of what youmean to do; you threaten one area while shooting foranother. You create maximum disorder. But to pull thisoff, you need room to maneuver. If you crowd yourselfwith alliances that force your hand, if you takepositions that box you into corners, if you commityourself to defending one fixed position, you lose thepower of maneuver. You become predictable. You arelike the British and the Turks, moving in straight linesin defined areas, ignoring the vast desert around you.People who fight this way deserve the bloody battlesthey face.

4. Early in 1937, Harry Cohn, longtime chief ofColumbia Pictures, faced a crisis. His mostsuccessful director, Frank Capra, had just left thestudio, and profits were down. Cohn needed a hit anda replacement for Capra. And he believed he hadfound the right formula with a comedy called TheAwful Truth and a thirty-nine-year-old director namedLeo McCarey. McCarey had directed Duck Soup,with the Marx Brothers, and Ruggles of Red Gap,with Charles Laughton, two different but successfulcomedies. Cohn offered McCarey The Awful Truth.

McCarey said he did not like the script, but hewould do the picture anyway for a hundred thousanddollars--a huge sum in 1937 dollars. Cohn, who ranColumbia like Mussolini (in fact, he kept a picture of Il

Duce in his office), exploded at the price. McCareygot up to go, but as he was leaving, he noticed theproducer's office piano. McCarey was a frustratedsongwriter. He sat down and began to play a showtune. Cohn had a weakness for such music, and hewas entranced: "Anybody who likes music like thathas got to be a talented man," he said. "I'll pay thatexorbitant fee. Report to work tomorrow."

Expanding on the issue of directive control,Lind introduces the reader to a decision-makingmodel known as the Boyd cycle. Named for Col.John Boyd, the term refers to the understandingthat war consists of the repeated cycle ofobservation, orientation, decision, and action.Colonel Boyd constructed his model as a resultof his observations of fighter combat in theKorean War. He had been investigating whyAmerican fighter pilots had been consistentlyable to best enemy pilots in dogfights. Hisanalysis of opposing aircraft led to somestartling discoveries. Enemy fighters typicallyoutperformed their American counterparts inspeed, climb, and turning ability. But theAmericans had the advantage in two subtlycritical aspects. First, the hydraulic controlsallowed for faster transition from one maneuverto another. Second, the cockpit allowed for awide field of view for the pilot. The result was thatthe American pilots could more rapidly observe

and orient to the tactical situation moment bymoment. Then, having decided what to do next,they could quickly change maneuvers. In battle,this ability to rapidly pass through theobservation-orientation-decision-action loop(the Boyd cycle) gave the American pilots aslight time advantage. If one views a dogfight asa series of Boyd cycles, one sees that theAmericans would repeatedly gain a timeadvantage each cycle, until the enemy's actionsbecome totally inappropriate to the changingsituations. Hence, the American pilots wereable to "out-Boyd cycle" the enemy, thusoutmaneuvering him and finally shooting himdown. Colonel Boyd and others then began toquestion whether this pattern might beapplicable to other forms of warfare as well.

THE ART OF MANEUVER, ROBERT R.LEONHARD, 1991

In the days to come, Cohn was going to regret hisdecision.

Three stars were cast for The Awful Truth --CaryGrant, Irene Dunne, and Ralph Bellamy. All hadproblems with their roles as written in the script, noneof them wanted to do the picture, and, as time wentby, their unhappiness only grew. Revisions to thescript began to come in: McCarey had apparentlyjunked the original and was starting over, but hiscreative process was peculiar--he would sit in a

parked car on Hollywood Boulevard with thescreenwriter Vina Delmar and verbally improvisescenes with her. Later, when shooting began, hewould walk on the beach and scribble the next day'ssetups on torn pieces of brown paper. His style ofdirecting was equally upsetting to the actors. One day,for instance, he asked Dunne whether she played thepiano and Bellamy whether he could sing. Bothanswered, "Not very well," but McCarey's next stepwas to have Dunne play "Home on the Range" asbest she could while Bellamy sang off key. The actorsdid not enjoy this rather humiliating exercise, butMcCarey was delighted and filmed the entire song.None of this was in the script, but all of it ended up inthe film.

Sometimes the actors would wait on set whileMcCarey would mess around on the piano, thensuddenly come up with an idea for what to shoot thatday. One morning Cohn visited the set and witnessedthis odd process. "I hired you to make a greatcomedy so I could show up Frank Capra. The onlyone who's going to laugh at this picture is Capra!" heexclaimed. Cohn was disgusted and basically wrotethe whole thing off. His irritation grew daily, but he wascontractually bound to pay Dunne forty thousanddollars for the film, whether it was shot or not. Hecould not fire McCarey at this point without creatinggreater problems, nor could he have him go back tothe original script, since McCarey had already begunshooting and only he seemed to know where the filmwas going.

Yet as the days went on, the actors began to seesome method in McCarey's madness. He wouldshoot them in long takes in which much of their workwas only loosely guided; the scenes had spontaneityand liveliness. Casual as he seemed, he knew whathe wanted and would reshoot the simplest shot if thelook on the actors' faces was not loving enough. Hisshoot days were short and to the point.

One day, after many days' absence, Cohn showedup on set to find McCarey serving drinks to the cast.Cohn was about to explode when the director told himthey were drinking to celebrate--they had just finishedshooting. Cohn was shocked and delighted; McCareyhad finished ahead of schedule and two hundredthousand dollars under budget. Then, to his surpriseas well, the picture came together in the editing roomlike a strange puzzle. It was good, very good. Testaudiences roared with laughter. Premiering in 1937,The Awful Truth was a complete success and wonMcCarey the best director Oscar. Cohn had found hisnew Frank Capra.

Unfortunately, McCarey had seen his boss'sdictatorial tendencies all too clearly, and though Cohnmade lucrative offers, McCarey never worked forColumbia again.

InterpretationLeo McCarey, one of the great directors ofHollywood's golden era, was essentially a frustratedcomposer and songwriter. He had gone to workdirecting slapstick comedies--McCarey was the man

who paired Laurel with Hardy--only because he wasunable to make a living in music. The Awful Truth isconsidered one of the greatest screwball comediesever made, and both its style and the way McCareyworked on it stemmed from his musical instincts: hecomposed the film in his head in just the same looseyet logical way that he would tinker with a tune on thepiano. To create a film this way required two things:room to maneuver and the ability to channel chaosand confusion into the creative process.

McCarey kept his distance from Cohn, the actors,the screenwriters--in fact, everyone--as best he could.He would not let himself be boxed in by anyone's ideaof how to shoot a film. Given room to maneuver, hecould improvise, experiment, move fluidly in differentdirections in any scene, yet keep everything perfectlycontrolled--he always seemed to know what hewanted and what worked. And because filmmakingthis way made every day a fresh challenge, the actorshad to respond with their own energy, rather thansimply regurgitating words from a script. McCareyallowed room for chance and the random events oflife to enter his creative scheme without beingoverwhelmed by chaos. The scene he was inspired tocreate when he learned of Dunne's and Bellamy's lackof musical skill, for example, seems unrehearsed andlifelike because it really was. Had it been scripted, itwould have been far less funny.

Directing a film--or any project, artistic orprofessional or scientific--is like fighting a war. Thereis a certain strategic logic to the way you attack a

problem, shape your work, deal with friction and thediscrepancy between what you want and what youget. Directors or artists often start out with great ideasbut in the planning create such a straitjacket forthemselves, such a rigid script to follow and form to fitin, that the process loses all joy; there's nothing left toexplore in the creation itself, and the end result seemslifeless and disappointing. On the other side, artistsmay start with a loose idea that seems promising, butthey are too lazy or undisciplined to give it shape andform. They create so much space and confusion thatin the end nothing coheres.

The solution is to plan, to have a clear idea whatyou want, then put yourself in open space and giveyourself options to work with. You direct the situationbut leave room for unexpected opportunities andrandom events. Both generals and artists can bejudged by the way they handle chaos and confusion,embracing it yet guiding it for their own purposes.

5. One day in the Japan of the 1540s, in a ferryboatcrowded with farmers, merchants, and craftsmen, ayoung samurai regaled all who would listen with talesof his great victories as a swordsman, wielding histhree-foot-long sword as he spoke to demonstrate hisprowess. The other passengers were a little afraid ofthis athletic young man, so they feigned interest in hisstories to avoid trouble. But one older man sat to theside, ignoring the young boaster. The older man wasobviously a samurai himself--he carried two swords--but no one knew that this was in fact Tsukahara

Bokuden, perhaps the greatest swordsman of histime. He was in his fifties by then and liked to travelalone and incognito.

Mobility, defined as the ability to project powerover distance, is another characteristic of goodchess. It is the goal of a good chess player toensure that each of his pieces can exertpressure upon a maximum number of squares,rather than being bottled up in a corner,surrounded by other pieces. Hence, the chessmaster looks forward to pawn exchanges(infantry battles, if you will), not because he istrying to wear down the enemy, but because heknows that he can project the power of his rooks(mechanized forces) down the resulting openfiles. In this manner, the chess master fights inorder to move. This idea is central to maneuver-warfare theory.THE ART OF MANEUVER, ROBERT R. LEON-

HARD, 1991

Bokuden sat with his eyes closed, seemingly deepin meditation. His stillness and silence began toannoy the young samurai, who finally called out, "Don'tyou like this kind of talk? You don't even know how towield a sword, old man, do you?" "I most certainlydo," answered Bokuden. "My way, however, is not towield my sword in such inconsequentialcircumstances as these." "A way of using a swordthat doesn't use a sword," said the young samurai.

that doesn't use a sword," said the young samurai."Don't talk gibberish. What is your school of fightingcalled?" "It is called Mutekatsu-ryu [style that winswithout swords or fighting]," replied Bokuden. "What?Mutekatsu-ryu? Don't be ridiculous. How can youdefeat an opponent without fighting?"

By now the young samurai was angry and irritated,and he demanded that Bokuden demonstrate hisstyle, challenging him to a fight then and there.Bokuden refused to duel in the crowded boat but saidhe would show the samurai Mutekatsu-ryu at thenearest shore, and he asked the ferryman to guidethe boat to a tiny nearby island. The young man beganto swing his sword to loosen up. Bokuden continuedto sit with his eyes closed. As they approached theisland, the impatient challenger shouted, "Come! Youare as good as dead. I will show you how sharp mysword is!" He then leaped onto the shore.

Bokuden took his time, further infuriating the youngsamurai, who began to hurl insults. Bokuden finallyhanded the ferryman his swords, saying, "My style isMutekatsu-ryu. I have no need for a sword"--and withthose words he took the ferryman's long oar andpushed it hard against the shore, sending the boatquickly out into the water and away from the island.The samurai screamed, demanding the boat's return.Bokuden shouted back to him, "This is what is calledvictory without fighting. I dare you to jump into thewater and swim here!"

Now the passengers on the boat could look back atthe young samurai receding into the distance,stranded on the island, jumping up and down, flailing

his arms as his cries became fainter and fainter. Theybegan to laugh: Bokuden had clearly demonstratedMutekatsu-ryu.

InterpretationThe minute Bokuden heard the arrogant youngsamurai's voice, he knew there would be trouble. Aduel on a crowded boat would be a disaster, and atotally unnecessary one; he had to get the young manoff the boat without a fight, and to make the defeathumiliating. He would do this through maneuver. First,he remained still and quiet, drawing the man'sattention away from the innocent passengers anddrawing him toward Bokuden like a magnet. Then heconfused the man with a rather irrational name for aschool of fighting, overheating the samurai's rathersimple mind with a perplexing concept. The flusteredsamurai tried to cover up with bluster. He was now soangry and mentally off balance that he leaped to theshore alone, failing to consider the rather obviousmeaning of Mutekatsu-ryu even once he got there.Bokuden was a samurai who always depended onsetting up his opponents first and winning the victoryeasily, by maneuver rather than brute force. This wasthe ultimate demonstration of his art.

The goal of maneuver is to give you easy victories,which you do by luring opponents into leaving theirfortified positions of strength for unfamiliar terrainwhere they must fight off balance. Since youropponents' strength is inseparable from their ability tothink straight, your maneuvers must be designed to

make them emotional and befuddled. If you are toodirect in this maneuvering, you run the risk ofrevealing your game; you must be subtle, drawingopponents toward you with enigmatic behavior, slowlygetting under their skin with provocative commentsand actions, then suddenly stepping back. When youfeel that their emotions are engaged, that theirfrustration and anger are mounting, you can speed upthe tempo of your maneuvers. Properly set up, youropponents will leap onto the island and strandthemselves, giving you the easy victory.

NO. 71. THE VICTORY IN THE MIDST OF AHUNDRED ENEMIESTo priest Yozan, the 28th teacher at Enkakuji,came for an interview a samurai namedRyozan, who practised Zen. The teacher said:"You are going into the bath-tub, stark nakedwithout a stitch on. Now a hundred enemies inarmour, with bows and swords, appear allaround you. How will you meet them? Will youcrawl before them and beg for mercy? Will youshow your warrior birth by dying in combatagainst them? Or does a man of the Way getsome special holy grace?" Ryozan said, "Letme win without surrendering and withoutfighting."

TestCaught in the midst of the hundred enemies,how will you manage to win without surrendering

and without fighting?AMURAI ZEN: THE WARRIOR KOANS,

TREVOR LEGGETT, 1985

Authority: Battles are won by slaughter andmaneuver. The greater the general, the morehe contributes in maneuver, the less hedemands in slaughter.... Nearly all the battleswhich are regarded as masterpieces of themilitary art...have been battles of maneuverin which very often the enemy has foundhimself defeated by some novel expedientor device, some queer, swift, unexpectedthrust or stratagem. In such battles thelosses of the victors have been small.

--Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

REVERSALThere is neither point nor honor in seeking directbattle for its own sake. That kind of fighting, however,may have value as part of a maneuver or strategy. Asudden envelopment or powerful frontal blow when theenemy is least expecting it can be crushing.

The only danger in maneuver is that you giveyourself so many options that you yourself getconfused. Keep it simple--limit yourself to the optionsyou can control.

NEGOTIATE WHILE ADVANCINGTHE DIPLOMATIC-WAR STRATEGY

People will always try to take from you in negotiationwhat they could not get from you in battle or directconfrontation. They will even use appeals to fairnessand morality as a cover to advance their position.Do not be taken in: negotiation is aboutmaneuvering for power or placement, and you mustalways put yourself in the kind of strong position thatmakes it impossible for the other side to nibble awayat you during your talks. Before and duringnegotiations, you must keep advancing, creatingrelentless pressure and compelling the other side tosettle on your terms. The more you take, the moreyou can give back in meaningless concessions.Create a reputation for being tough anduncompromising, so that people are back on theirheels before they even meet you.

WAR BY OTHER MEANSAfter Athens was finally defeated by Sparta in thePeloponnesian War of 404 B.C., the great city-statefell into steady decline. In the decades that followed,many citizens, including the great oratorDemosthenes, began to dream of a revival of theonce dominant Athens.

In 359 B.C. the king of Macedonia, Perdiccas, was

In 359 B.C. the king of Macedonia, Perdiccas, waskilled in battle, and a power struggle emerged for hissuccession. The Athenians saw Macedonia as abarbaric land to the north, its only importance itsproximity to Athenian outposts that helped securetheir supplies of corn from Asia and of gold from localmines. One such outpost was the city of Amphipolis, aformer Athenian colony, which, however, had latelyfallen into Macedonian hands. A plan emergedamong the politicians of Athens to support one of theclaimants to the Macedonian throne (a man namedArgaeus) with ships and soldiers. If he won, he wouldbe indebted to Athens and would return to them thevaluable city of Amphipolis.

Unfortunately, the Athenians backed the wronghorse: Perdiccas's twenty-four-year-old brother,Philip, easily defeated Argaeus in battle and becameking. To the Athenians' surprise, however, Philip didnot push his advantage but stepped back, renouncingall claim to Amphipolis and making the cityindependent. He also released without ransom all theAthenian soldiers he had captured in battle. He evendiscussed forming an alliance with Athens, his recentenemy, and in secret negotiations proposed toreconquer Amphipolis in a few years and deliver it toAthens in exchange for another city still underAthenian control, an offer too good to refuse.

The Athenian delegates at the talks reported thatPhilip was an amiable sort and that beneath his rudeexterior he was clearly an admirer of Athenian culture--indeed, he invited Athens's most renownedphilosophers and artists to reside in his capital.

Overnight, it seemed, the Athenians had gained animportant ally to the north. Philip set about fightingbarbaric tribes on other borders, and peace ruledbetween the two powers.

A few years later, as Athens was racked by aninternal power struggle of its own, Philip marched onand captured Amphipolis. Following their agreement,the Athenians dispatched envoys to negotiate, only tofind, to their surprise, that Philip no longer offeredthem the city but merely made vague promises for thefuture. Distracted by their problems at home, theenvoys had no choice but to accept this. Now, withAmphipolis securely under his control, Philip hadunlimited access to the gold mines and rich forests inthe area. It seemed that he had been playing them allalong.

Now Demosthenes came forward to rail against theduplicitous Philip and warn of the danger he posed toall of Greece. Urging the citizens of Athens to raise anarmy to meet the threat, the orator recalled theirvictories in the past over other tyrants. Nothinghappened then, but a few years later, when Philipmaneuvered to take the pass at Thermopylae--thenarrow gateway that controlled movement from centralto southern Greece--Athens indeed sent an army todefend it. Philip retreated, and the Athenianscongratulated themselves on their victory.

In the years to come, the Athenians watched warilyas Philip extended his domain to the north, the east,and well into central Greece. Then, in 346 B.C., hesuddenly proposed to negotiate a treaty with Athens.

He had proved he could not be trusted, of course, andmany of the city's politicians had sworn never to dealwith him again, but the alternative was to risk war withMacedonia at a time when Athens was ill prepared forit. And Philip seemed absolutely sincere in his desirefor a solid alliance, which, at the very least, would buyAthens a period of peace. So, despite theirreservations, the Athenians sent ambassadors toMacedonia to sign a treaty called the Peace ofPhilocrates. By this agreement Athens relinquishedits rights to Amphipolis and in exchange receivedpromises of security for its remaining outposts in thenorth.

The ambassadors left satisfied, but on the wayhome they received news that Philip had marched onand taken Thermopylae. Challenged to explainhimself, Philip responded that he had acted to securehis interests in central Greece from a temporary threatby a rival power, and he quickly abandoned the pass.But the Athenians had had enough--they had beenhumiliated. Time and time again, Philip had usednegotiations and treaties to cover nefariousadvances. He was not honorable. He might haveabandoned Thermopylae, but it did not matter: he wasalways taking control over larger territories, thenmaking himself look conciliatory by giving some of hisacquisitions back--but only some, and he often retookthe conceded lands later anyway. The net effect wasinevitably to enlarge his domain. Mixing war withdeceptive diplomacy, he had slowly made Macedoniathe dominant power in Greece.

Demosthenes and his followers were now on theascendant. The Peace of Philocrates was obviously adisgrace, and everyone involved in it was thrown outof office. The Athenians began to make trouble in thecountry to the east of Amphipolis, trying to securemore outposts there, even provoking quarrels withMacedonia. In 338 B.C. they engaged in an alliancewith Thebes to prepare for a great war against Philip.The two allies met the Macedonians in battle atChaeronea, in central Greece--but Philip won thebattle decisively, his son Alexander playing a key role.

Now the Athenians were in panic: barbarians fromthe north were about to descend on their city and burnit to the ground. And yet again they were provedwrong. In a most generous peace offer, Philippromised not to invade Athenian lands. In exchangehe would take over the disputed outposts in the east,and Athens would become an ally of Macedonia. Asproof of his word, Philip released his Athenianprisoners from the recent war without asking forpayment of any ransom. He also had his sonAlexander lead a delegation to Athens bearing theashes of all the Athenian soldiers who had died atChaeronea. Overwhelmed with gratitude, theAthenians granted citizenship to both Alexander andhis father and erected a statue of Philip in their agora.

Lord Aberdeen, the British ambassador toAustria, proved even easier to deal with. Onlytwenty-nine years old, barely able to speakFrench, he was not a match for a diplomat of

Metternich's subtlety. His stiffness and self-confidence only played into Metternich's hands."Metternich is extremely attentive to LordAberdeen," reported Cathcart. The results werenot long delayed. Metternich had oncedescribed the diplomat's task as the art ofseeming a dupe, without being one, and hepractised it to the fullest on the high-mindedAberdeen. "Do not think Metternich such aformidable personage...," Aberdeen wrote toCastlereagh. "Living with him at all times..., is itpossible I should not know him? If indeed hewere the most subtle of mankind, he mightcertainly impose on one little used to deceive,but this is not his character. He is, I repeat it toyou, not a very clever man. He is vain...but he isto be trusted...." For his mixture ofcondescension and gullibility, Aberdeen earnedhimself Metternich's sarcastic epithet as the"dear simpleton of diplomacy."

A WORLD RESTORED, HENRY KISSINGER,1957

Later that year Philip convened a congress of allthe Greek city-states (except for Sparta, whichrefused to attend) to discuss an alliance to form whatwould be called the Hellenic League. For the firsttime, the Greek city-states were united in a singleconfederation. Soon after the terms of the alliancewere agreed upon, Philip proposed a united war

against the hated Persians. The proposal was happilyaccepted, with Athens leading the way. Somehoweveryone had forgotten how dishonorable Philip hadbeen; they only remembered the king who hadrecently been so generous.

In 336 B.C., before the war against Persia gotunder way, Philip was assassinated. It would be hisson Alexander who would lead the league into warand the creation of an empire. And through it all,Athens would remain Macedonia's most loyal ally, itscritical anchor of stability within the Hellenic League.

InterpretationOn one level, war is a relatively simple affair: youmaneuver your army to defeat your enemy by killingenough of its soldiers, taking enough of its land, ormaking yourself secure enough to proclaim victory.You may have to retreat here and there, but yourintention is eventually to advance as far as possible.Negotiation, on the other hand, is almost alwaysawkward. On the one hand, you need both to secureyour existing interests and to get as much on top ofthem as you can; on the other hand, you need tobargain in good faith, make concessions, and gainthe opposing side's trust. To mix these needs is anart, and an almost impossible one, for you can neverbe sure that the other side is acting in good faith. Inthis awkward realm between war and peace, it iseasy to misread the opponent, leading to a settlementthat is not in your long-term interest.

Philip's solution was to see negotiation not as

separate from war but rather as an extension of it.Negotiation, like war, involved maneuver, strategy,and deception, and it required you to keep advancing,just as you would on the battlefield. It was thisunderstanding of negotiation that led Philip to offer toleave Amphipolis independent while promising totake it for Athens later on, a promise he never meantto keep. This opening maneuver bought himfriendship and time, and kept the pesky Athenians outof his hair while he dealt with his enemies elsewhere.The Peace of Philocrates similarly covered his movesin central Greece and kept the Athenians off balance.Having decided at some point that his ultimate goalwas to unite all of Greece and lead it on a crusadeagainst Persia, Philip determined that Athens--with itsnoble history--would have to function as a symboliccenter of the Hellenic League. His generous peaceterms were calculated to purchase the city's loyalty.

Philip never worried about breaking his word. Whyshould he sheepishly honor his agreements when heknew the Athenians would find some excuse later onto extend their outposts to the north at his expense?Trust is not a matter of ethics, it is another maneuver.Philip saw trust and friendship as qualities for sale.He would buy them from Athens later on, when he waspowerful and had things to offer it in exchange.

Like Philip, you must see any negotiating situationin which your vital interests are at stake as a realm ofpure maneuver, warfare by other means. Earningpeople's trust and confidence is not a moral issue buta strategic one: sometimes it is necessary,

sometimes it isn't. People will break their word if itserves their interests, and they will find any moral orlegal excuse to justify their moves, sometimes tothemselves as well as to others.

Just as you must always put yourself in thestrongest position before battle, so it is withnegotiation. If you are weak, use negotiations to buyyourself time, to delay battle until you are ready; beconciliatory not to be nice but to maneuver. If you arestrong, take as much as you can before and duringnegotiations--then later you can give back some ofwhat you took, conceding the things you least value tomake yourself look generous. Do not worry about yourreputation or about creating distrust. It is amazing howquickly people will forget your broken promises whenyou are strong and in a position to offer themsomething in their self-interest.

Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keepfaith when by so doing it would be against hisinterest.... If men were all good, this precept

would not be a good one; but as they are bad,and would not observe their faith with you, so

you are not bound to keep faith with them. Norhave legitimate grounds ever failed a princewho wished to show colorable excuse for the

nonfulfillment of his promise.--Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1469-1527)

JADE FOR TILEEarly in 1821 the Russian foreign minister, Capo

d'Istria, heard news he had long been awaiting: agroup of Greek patriots had begun a rebellion againstthe Turks (Greece was then part of the OttomanEmpire), aiming to throw them out and establish aliberal government. D'Istria, a Greek nobleman bybirth, had long dreamed of involving Russia in Greekaffairs. Russia was a growing military power; bysupporting the revolution--assuming the rebels won--itwould gain influence over an independent Greece andMediterranean ports for its navy. The Russians alsosaw themselves as the protectors of the GreekOrthodox Church, and Czar Alexander I was a deeplyreligious man; leading a crusade against the IslamicTurks would satisfy his moral consciousness as wellas Russian political interests. It was all too good to betrue.

Only one obstacle stood in d'Istria's way: PrinceKlemens von Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister.A few years earlier, Metternich had brought Russiainto an alliance with Austria and Prussia called theHoly Alliance. Its goal was to protect these nations'governments from the threat of revolution and tomaintain peace in Europe after the turmoil of theNapoleonic Wars. Metternich had befriendedAlexander I. Sensing that the Russians mightintervene in Greece, he had sent the czar hundreds ofreports claiming that the revolution was part of aEurope-wide conspiracy to get rid of the continent'smonarchies. If Alexander came to Greece's aid, hewould be the revolutionaries' dupe and would beviolating the purpose of the Holy Alliance.

D'Istria was no fool: he knew that what Metternichreally wanted was to prevent Russia from expandingits influence in the Mediterranean, which would upsetEngland and destabilize Europe, Metternich'sgreatest fear. To d'Istria it was simple: he andMetternich were at war over who would have ultimateinfluence over the czar. And d'Istria had theadvantage: he saw the czar often and couldcounteract Metternich's persuasive powers throughconstant personal contact.

The Turks inevitably moved to suppress the Greekrebellion, and as their atrocities against the Greeksmounted, it seemed almost certain that the czar wouldintervene. But in February 1822, as the revolution wasreaching a boiling point, the czar made what ind'Istria's eyes was a fatal mistake: he agreed to sendan envoy to Vienna to discuss the crisis withMetternich. The prince loved to lure negotiators toVienna, where he would charm them to death. D'Istriafelt the situation slipping out of his hands. Now he hadjust one option: to choose the envoy who would go toVienna and brief him in detail.

D'Istria's choice was a man called Taticheff, whohad been Russia's ambassador to Spain. Taticheffwas a shrewd, experienced negotiator. Called in for ameeting shortly before he was to leave, he listenedcarefully as d'Istria laid out the dangers: Metternichwould try to charm and seduce Taticheff; to preventthe czar from intervening, he would offer to negotiatea settlement between the Russians and Turks; and, ofcourse, he would call for a European conference to

discuss the issue. This last was Metternich's favoriteploy: he was always able to dominate theseconferences and somehow get what he wanted.Taticheff was not to fall under his spell. He was to giveMetternich a note from d'Istria arguing that Russia hada right to come to the aid of fellow Christians sufferingat the hands of the Turks. And on no account was heto agree to Russia's participation in a conference.

On the eve of his departure for Vienna, Taticheffwas unexpectedly called in for a meeting with the czarhimself. Alexander was nervous and conflicted.Unaware of d'Istria's instructions, he told Taticheff totell Metternich that he wanted both to act inaccordance with the alliance and to meet his moralobligation in Greece. Taticheff decided he would haveto delay giving this message as long as he could--itwould make his work far too confusing.

In his first meeting with Metternich in Vienna,Taticheff took measure of the Austrian minister. Hesaw him as rather vain, apparently more interested infancy-dress balls and young girls than in Greece.Metternich seemed detached and somewhat ill-informed; the little he said about the situation inGreece betrayed confusion. Taticheff read d'Istria'snote to him, and, as if without thinking, Metternichasked if these were the czar's instructions as well. Puton the spot, Taticheff could not lie. His hope now wasthat the czar's rather contradictory instructions wouldfurther confuse the prince, letting Taticheff stay onestep ahead.

In the days to come, Taticheff had a splendid time

in the delightful city of Vienna. Then he had anothermeeting with Metternich, who asked him if they couldbegin negotiations based on the instructions of theczar. Before Taticheff could think, Metternich nextasked what Russia's demands might be in thissituation. That seemed fair, and Taticheff replied thatthe Russians wanted to make Greece a protectoratestate, to get the alliance's approval for Russianintervention in Greece, on and on. Metternich turneddown every proposal, saying his government wouldnever agree to such things, so Taticheff asked him tosuggest alternate ideas. Instead Metternich launchedinto an abstract discussion of revolution, of theimportance of the Holy Alliance, and otherirrelevancies. Taticheff left confused and ratherannoyed. He had wanted to stake out a position, butthese discussions were informal and shapeless;feeling lost, he had been unable to steer them in thedirection he wanted.

A few days later, Metternich called Taticheff inagain. He looked uncomfortable, even pained: theTurks, he said, had just sent him a note claiming thatthe Russians were behind the trouble in Greece andasking him to convey to the czar their determination tofight to the death to hold on to what was theirs. Insolemn tones suggesting that he was angry at theTurks' lack of diplomacy, Metternich said he thought itbeneath his country's dignity to pass this disgracefulmessage to the czar. He added that the Austriansconsidered Russia their staunchest ally and wouldsupport Russia's conditions for resolving the crisis.

Finally, if the Turks refused to concede, Austria wouldbreak off relations with them.

Taticheff was quite moved by this suddenemotional display of solidarity. Perhaps the Russianshad misread the prince--perhaps he was really ontheir side. Fearing that d'Istria would misunderstand,Taticheff reported this meeting to the czar alone. Afew days later, Alexander responded that from nowon, Taticheff was to report only to him; d'Istria was tobe excluded from the negotiations.

The pace of the meetings with Metternich pickedup. Somehow the two men discussed only diplomaticsolutions to the crisis; Russia's right to intervene inGreece militarily was no longer mentioned. Finally,Metternich invited the czar to attend a conference onthe question in Verona, Italy, a few months later. HereRussia would lead the debate on how best to settlethe matter; it would be at the center of attention, withthe czar rightly celebrated as Europe's savior in thecrusade against revolution. The czar happily agreedto attend.

Back in St. Petersburg, d'Istria fumed and ranted toanyone who would listen, but shortly after Taticheff gothome, the Russian foreign minister was kicked out ofoffice for good. And at the later conference in Verona,just as he had predicted, the Greek crisis wasresolved in precisely the way that best servedAustria's interests. The czar was the star of the show,but apparently he did not care or notice that he hadsigned a document essentially precluding Russiafrom intervening unilaterally in the Balkans, thereby

conceding a right insisted upon by every Russianleader since Peter the Great. Metternich had won thewar with d'Istria more completely than the formerminister had ever imagined possible.

InterpretationMetternich's goal was always a settlement that wouldbest serve Austria's long-term interests. Thoseinterests, he decided, involved not just preventingRussian intervention in Greece but maneuvering theczar into permanently relinquishing the right to sendtroops into the Balkans, an enduring source ofinstability in Europe. So Metternich looked at therelative forces on both sides. What leverage did hehave over the Russians? Very little; in fact, he had theweaker hand. But Metternich possessed a trumpcard: his years-long study of the czar's rather strangepersonality. Alexander was a highly emotional manwho would act only in a state of exaltation; he had toturn everything into a crusade. So, right at thebeginning of the crisis, Metternich planted the seedthat the real crusade here was one not of Christiansagainst Turks but of monarchies against revolution.

Metternich also understood that his main enemywas d'Istria and that he would have to drive a wedgebetween d'Istria and the czar. So he lured an envoy toVienna. In one-on-one negotiations, Metternich was achess player on the grand-master level. With Taticheffas with so many others, he first lowered hisopponent's suspicions by playing the foppish, evendim-witted aristocrat. Next he drew out the

negotiations, miring them in abstract, legalisticdiscussions. That made him seem even more stupid,further misleading Taticheff but also confusing andirritating him. A confused and riled negotiator is proneto make mistakes--such as reveal too much aboutwhat he is after, always a fatal error. A confusednegotiator is also more easily seduced by emotionaldemonstrations. In this case Metternich used the notefrom the Turks to stage a little drama in which heappeared to reveal a sudden change in hissympathies. That put Taticheff--and through him theczar--completely under his spell.

From then on, it was child's play to reframe thediscussion to suit Metternich's purpose. The offer tostage a conference at which the czar would shine wasdazzling and alluring, and it also seemed to offerRussia the chance of greater influence in Europeanaffairs (one of Alexander's deepest desires). In factthe result was the opposite: Alexander ended upsigning a document that cut Russia out of theBalkans--Metternich's goal all along. Knowing howeasily people are seduced by appearances, theAustrian minister gave the czar the appearance ofpower (being the center of attention at theconference), while he himself retained its substance(having the signed document). It is what the Chinesecall giving someone a gaudy piece of painted tile inexchange for jade.

As Metternich so often demonstrated, success innegotiation depends on the level of preparation. If youenter with vague notions as to what you want, you will

find yourself shifting from position to positiondepending on what the other side brings to the table.You may drift to a position that seems appropriate butdoes not serve your interests in the end. Unless youcarefully analyze what leverage you have, yourmaneuvers are likely to be counterproductive.

Before anything else you must anchor yourself bydetermining with utmost clarity your long-term goalsand the leverage you have for reaching them. Thatclarity will keep you patient and calm. It will also letyou toss people meaningless concessions that seemgenerous but actually come cheap, for they do not hurtyour real goals. Before the negotiations begin, studyyour opponents. Uncovering their weaknesses andunfulfilled desires will give you a different kind ofleverage: the ability to confuse them, make thememotional, seduce them with pieces of tile. If possible,play a bit of the fool: the less people understand youand where you are headed, the more room you haveto maneuver them into corners.

Everyone wants something without having anyidea how to obtain it, and the really intriguingaspect of the situation is that nobody quiteknows how to achieve what he desires. But

because I know what I want and what the othersare capable of I am completely prepared.

--Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859)

KEYS TO WARFAREConflict and confrontation are generally unpleasant

affairs that churn up unpleasant emotions. Out of adesire to avoid such unpleasantness, people will oftentry to be nice and conciliatory to those around them, inthe belief that that will elicit the same response inreturn. But so often experience proves this logic to bewrong: over time, the people you treat nicely will takeyou for granted. They will see you as weak andexploitable. Being generous does not elicit gratitudebut creates either a spoiled child or someone whoresents behavior perceived as charity.

In gratitude for his acquittal, Orestes dedicatedan altar to Warlike Athene; but the Erinnyesthreatened, if the judgement were not reversed,to let fall a drop of their own hearts' blood whichwould bring barrenness upon the soil, blight thecrops, and destroy all the offspring of Athens.Athene nevertheless soothed their anger byflattery: acknowledging them to be far wiser thanherself, she suggested that they should take upresidence in a grotto at Athens, where theywould gather such throngs of worshippers asthey could never hope to find elsewhere.Hearth-altars proper to Underworld deitiesshould be theirs, as well as sober sacrifices,torchlight libations, first-fruits offered after theconsummation of marriage or the birth ofchildren, and even seats in the Erechtheum. Ifthey accepted this invitation she would decreethat no house where worship was withheld from

them might prosper; but they, in return, mustundertake to invoke fair winds for her ships,fertility for her land, and fruitful marriages for herpeople--also rooting out the impious, so thatshe might see fit to grant Athens victory in war.The Erinnyes, after a short deliberation,graciously agreed to these proposals.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

Those who believe against the evidence thatniceness breeds niceness in return are doomed tofailure in any kind of negotiation, let alone in the gameof life. People respond in a nice and conciliatory wayonly when it is in their interest and when they have todo so. Your goal is to create that imperative bymaking it painful for them to fight. If you ease up thepressure out of a desire to be conciliatory and gaintheir trust, you only give them an opening toprocrastinate, deceive, and take advantage of yourniceness. That is human nature. Over the centuriesthose who have fought wars have learned this lessonthe hard way.

When nations have violated this principle, theresults are often tragic. In June 1951, for example, theU.S. military halted its extremely effective offensiveagainst the Chinese People's Liberation Army inKorea because the Chinese and the North Koreanshad signaled they were ready to negotiate. Insteadthey drew out the talks as long as they could whilethey recovered their forces and strengthened their

defenses. When the negotiation failed and the warwas resumed, the American forces found that theirbattlefield advantage was lost. This pattern wasrepeated in the Vietnam War and to some extent inthe Gulf War of 1991 as well. The Americans actedpartly out of a desire to reduce casualties, partly to beseen as trying to bring these wars to an end as soonas possible, to appear conciliatory. What they did notrealize was that the enemy's incentive to negotiate ingood faith was lost in the process. In this case, tryingto be conciliatory and save lives led to much longerwars, more bloodshed, real tragedy. Had the UnitedStates continued to advance in Korea in 1951, itcould have compelled the Koreans and Chinese tonegotiate on its own terms; had it continued itsbombing campaigns in Vietnam, it could have forcedthe North Vietnamese to negotiate instead ofprocrastinate; had it continued its march all the way toBaghdad in 1991, it could have forced SaddamHussein out of office as a condition of peace,preventing a future war and saving countless lives.

The lesson is simple: by continuing to advance, bykeeping up unrelenting pressure, you force yourenemies to respond and ultimately to negotiate. If youadvance a little further every day, attempts to delaynegotiation only make their position weaker. You aredemonstrating your resolve and determination, notthrough symbolic gestures but by administering realpain. You do not continue to advance in order to grabland or possessions but to put yourself in thestrongest possible position and win the war. Once you

have forced them to settle, you have room to makeconcessions and give back some of what you'vetaken. In the process you might even seem nice andconciliatory.

Sometimes in life you will find yourself holding theweak hand, the hand without any real leverage. Atthose times it is even more important to keepadvancing. By demonstrating strength and resolveand maintaining the pressure, you cover up yourweaknesses and gain footholds that will let youmanufacture leverage for yourself.

In June 1940, shortly after the German blitzkrieghad destroyed France's defenses and the Frenchgovernment had surrendered, General Charles deGaulle fled to England. He hoped to establish himselfthere as the leader of Free France, the legitimategovernment in exile, as opposed to the German-dominated Vichy government that now ruled much ofthe country. The odds were stacked heavily againstde Gaulle: he had never been a high-profile figurewithin France. Many better-known French soldiersand politicians could claim the role he wanted; he hadno leverage to make the allies recognize him as theleader of Free France, and without their recognitionhe would be powerless.

From the beginning de Gaulle ignored the oddsand presented himself to one and all as the only manwho could save France after its disgraceful surrender.He broadcast stirring speeches to France over theradio. He toured England and the United States,making a show of his sense of purpose, casting

himself as a kind of latter-day Joan of Arc. He madeimportant contacts within the French Resistance.Winston Churchill admired de Gaulle but often foundhim unbearably arrogant, and Franklin Rooseveltdespised him; time and again the two leaders tried topersuade him to accept shared control of FreeFrance. But his response was always the same: hewould not compromise. He would not accept anythingless than sole leadership. In negotiating sessions hewas downright rude, to the point where he wouldsometimes walk out, making it clear that for him it wasall or nothing.

Churchill and Roosevelt cursed de Gaulle's name,ruing the day they had let him take any position at all.They even talked about demoting him and forcing himout of the picture. But they always backed down, andin the end they gave him what he wanted. To dootherwise would mean a public scandal in delicatetimes and would disrupt their relations with the Frenchunderground. They would be demoting a man whommuch of the public had come to revere.

Understand: if you are weak and ask for little, littleis what you will get. But if you act strong, making firm,even outrageous demands, you will create theopposite impression: people will think that yourconfidence must be based on something real. You willearn respect, which in turn will translate into leverage.Once you are able to establish yourself in a strongerposition, you can take this further by refusing tocompromise, making it clear that you are willing towalk away from the table--an effective form of

coercion. The other side may call your bluff, but youmake sure there's a price to pay for this--badpublicity, for instance. And if in the end you docompromise a little, it will still be a lot less than thecompromises they would have forced on you if theycould.

The great British diplomat and writer HaroldNicholson believed there were two kinds ofnegotiators: warriors and shopkeepers. Warriors usenegotiations as a way to gain time and a strongerposition. Shopkeepers operate on the principle that itis more important to establish trust, to moderate eachside's demands and come to a mutually satisfyingsettlement. Whether in diplomacy or in business, theproblem arises when shopkeepers assume they aredealing with another shopkeeper only to find they arefacing a warrior.

It would be helpful to know beforehand which kind ofnegotiator you face. The difficulty is that skillfulwarriors will make themselves masters of disguise: atfirst they will seem sincere and friendly, then willreveal their warrior nature when it is too late. Inresolving a conflict with an enemy you do not knowwell, it is always best to protect yourself by playing thewarrior yourself: negotiate while advancing. There willalways be time to back off and fix things if you go toofar. But if you fall prey to a warrior, you will be unableto recoup anything. In a world in which there are moreand more warriors, you must be willing to wield thesword as well, even if you are a shopkeeper at heart.

Authority: Let us not consider ourselvesvictorious until the day after battle, nordefeated until four days later.... Let usalways carry the sword in one hand and theolive branch in the other, always ready tonegotiate but negotiating only whileadvancing.

--Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859)

REVERSALIn negotiation as in war, you must not let yourself getcarried away: there is a danger in advancing too far,taking too much, to the point where you create anembittered enemy who will work for revenge. So itwas after World War I with the Allies, who imposedsuch harsh conditions on Germany in negotiating thepeace that they arguably laid the foundations forWorld War II. A century earlier, on the other hand,when Metternich negotiated, it was always his goal toprevent the other side from feeling wronged. Yourpurpose in any settlement you negotiate is never tosatisfy greed or to punish the other side but to secureyour own interests. In the long run, a punitivesettlement will only win you insecurity.

KNOW HOW TO END THINGSTHE EXIT STRATEGY

You are judged in this world by how well you bringthings to an end. A messy or incomplete conclusioncan reverberate for years to come, ruining yourreputation in the process. The art of ending thingswell is knowing when to stop, never going so far thatyou exhaust yourself or create bitter enemies thatembroil you in conflict in the future. It also entailsending on the right note, with energy and flair. It isnot a question of simply winning the war but the wayyou win it, the way your victory sets you up for thenext round. The height of strategic wisdom is toavoid all conflicts and entanglements from whichthere are no realistic exits.

NO EXITFor the most senior members of the Soviet Politburo--General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, KGB head YuriAndropov, and Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov--thelate 1960s and early '70s seemed a golden era.These men had survived the nightmare of the Stalinyears and the bumbling reign of Khrushchev. Now,finally, there was some stability in the Soviet empire.Its satellite states in Eastern Europe were relativelydocile, particularly after an uprising in Czechoslovakiain 1968 had been squashed. Its archnemesis, the

United States, had received a black eye from theVietnam War. And, most promising of all, theRussians had slowly been able to expand theirinfluence in the Third World. The future looked bright.

If one overshoots the goal, one cannot hit it. If abird will not come to its nest but flies higher andhigher, it eventually falls into the hunter's net.He who in times of extraordinary salience ofsmall things does not know how to call a halt,but restlessly seeks to press on and on, drawsupon himself misfortune at the hands of godsand men, because he deviates from the order ofnature.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

A key country in the Russians' plans for expansionwas Afghanistan, on their southern border.Afghanistan was rich in natural gas and otherminerals and had ports on the Indian Ocean; to makeit a Soviet satellite would be a dream come true. TheRussians had been insinuating themselves into thecountry since the 1950s, helping to train its army,building the Salang Highway from Kabul north to theSoviet Union, and trying to modernize this backwardnation. All was going according to plan until the earlyto mid 1970s, when Islamic fundamentalism began tobecome a political force across Afghanistan. TheRussians saw two dangers: first, that thefundamentalists would come to power and, seeing

communism as godless and loathsome, would cut offties with the Soviets; and second, that fundamentalistunrest would spill over from Afghanistan into thesouthern Soviet Union, which had a large Islamicpopulation.

In 1978, to prevent such a nightmare scenario,Brezhnev secretly supported a coup that brought theAfghan Communist Party to power. But the AfghanCommunists were hopelessly factionalized, and onlyafter a long power struggle did a leader emerge:Hafizullah Amin, whom the Soviets distrusted. On topof that, the Communists were not popular inAfghanistan, and Amin resorted to the most brutalmeans to maintain his party's power. This only fed thefundamentalist cause. All around the country,insurgents--the mujahideen--began to rebel, andthousands of Afghan soldiers defected from the armyto them.

By December 1979 the Communist government inAfghanistan was on the verge of collapse. In Russiathe senior members of the Politburo met to discussthe crisis. To lose Afghanistan would be a devastatingblow and a source of instability after so muchprogress had been made. They blamed Amin for theirproblems; he had to go. Ustinov proposed a plan:Repeating what the Soviets had done in quellingrebellions in Eastern Europe, he advocated alightning strike by a relatively small Soviet force thatwould secure Kabul and the Salang Highway. Aminwould then be ousted, and a Communist namedBabrak Karmal would take his place. The Soviet army

would assume a low profile, and the Afghan armywould be beefed up to take over from it. During thecourse of some ten years, Afghanistan would bemodernized and would slowly become a stablemember of the Soviet Bloc. Blessed with peace andprosperity, the Afghan people would see the greatbenefits of socialism and embrace it.

A few days after the meeting, Ustinov presented hisplan to the army's chief of staff, Nikolai Orgakov. Toldthat the invading army would not exceed 75,000 men,Orgakov was shocked: that force, he said, was far toosmall to secure the large, mountainous expanses ofAfghanistan, a very different world from EasternEurope. Ustinov countered that a giant invading forcewould generate bad publicity for the Soviets in theThird World and would give the insurgents a richtarget. Orgakov responded that the fractious Afghanshad a tradition of suddenly uniting to throw out aninvader--and that they were fierce fighters. Calling theplan reckless, he said it would be better to attempt apolitical solution to the problem. His warnings wereignored.

The plan was approved by the Politburo and onDecember 24 was put in motion. Some Red Armyforces flew into Kabul while others marched down theSalang Highway. Amin was quietly taken away andkilled while Karmal was shuffled into power.Condemnation poured in from all over the world, butthe Soviets figured that would eventually die down--itusually did.

In February 1980, Andropov met with Karmal and

instructed him on the importance of winning thesupport of the Afghan masses. Presenting a plan forthat purpose, he also promised aid in money andexpertise. He told Karmal that once the borders weresecured, the Afghan army built up, and the peoplereasonably satisfied with the government, Karmalshould politely ask the Soviets to leave.

Solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant (Theycreate desolation and call it peace).

TACITUS, CIRCA A.D. 55-CIRCA 120

The invasion itself went more easily than theSoviets had expected, and for this military phase theirleaders could confidently declare "missionaccomplished." But within weeks of Andropov's visit,they had to adjust this assessment: the mujahideenwere not intimidated by the Soviet army, as theEastern Europeans had been. In fact, since theinvasion their power only seemed to grow, their ranksswelling with both Afghan recruits and outsiders.Ustinov funneled more soldiers into Afghanistan andordered a series of offensives in parts of the countrythat were sheltering the mujahideen. The Soviets' firstmajor operation was that spring, when they movedinto the Kunar Valley with heavy weaponry, levelingentire villages and forcing the inhabitants to flee torefugee camps in Pakistan. Having cleared the areaof rebels, they withdrew.

A few weeks later, reports came in that themujahideen had quietly returned to the Kunar Valley.

All the Soviets had done was leave the Afghans moreembittered and enraged, making it easier for themujahideen to recruit. But what could the Soviets do?To let the rebels alone was to give the mujahideen thetime and space to grow more dangerous, yet thearmy was too small to occupy whole regions. Itsanswer was to repeat its police operations again andagain, but with more violence, hoping to intimidate theAfghans--but, as Orgakov had predicted, this onlyemboldened them.

ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL:still the fine's the crown; Whate'er the course,the end is the renown.

ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, WILLIAMSHAKESPEARE, 1564-1616

Ten thousand Muslims then marched throughthe mountain valleys upon Mecca. Muhammaddivided his force into four columns....Muhammad gave strict orders that no violencewas to be used. His own tent was pitched onhigh ground immediately overlooking the town.Eight years before, he had fled from Meccaunder cover of darkness, and lain hidden threedays in a cave on Mount Thor, which from histent he could now see rising beyond the city.Now ten thousand warriors were ready to obeyhis least command and his native town layhelpless at his feet. After a brief rest, he

remounted his camel and entered the town,reverently touched the black stone andperformed the seven ritual circuits of thekaaba.... Muhammad the Conqueror was notvindictive. A general amnesty was proclaimed,from which less than a dozen persons wereexcluded, only four being actually executed.Ikrima, the son of Abu Jahal, escaped to theYemen, but his wife appealed to the Apostle,who agreed to forgive him.... The Muslimoccupation of Mecca was thus virtuallybloodless. The fiery Khalid ibn al Waleed killeda few people at the southern gate and wassharply reprimanded by Muhammad for doingso. Although the Apostle had himself beenpersecuted in the city and although many of hisbitterest opponents were still living there, he wonall hearts by his clemency on his day oftriumph. Such generosity, or statesmanship,was particularly remarkable among Arabs, arace to whom revenge has always been dear.His success had been won by policy anddiplomacy rather than by military action. In anage of violence and bloodshed, he had realizedthat ideas are more powerful than force.

THE GREAT ARAB CONQUESTS, JOHNBAGOT GLUBB, 1963

Meanwhile Karmal initiated programs to teachliteracy, to give more power to women, to develop

and modernize the country--all to peel off support fromthe rebels. But the Afghans preferred their traditionalway of life by a vast majority, and the CommunistParty's attempts to expand its influence had theopposite effect.

Most ominous of all, Afghanistan quickly became amagnet for other countries eager to exploit thesituation there against the Soviets. The United Statesin particular saw an opportunity to revenge itself onRussia for supplying the North Vietnamese during theVietnam War. The CIA funneled vast sums of moneyand materiel to the mujahideen. In neighboringPakistan, President Zia ul-Haq viewed the invasionas a gift from heaven: having come to power a fewyears earlier in a military coup, and having recentlyearned worldwide condemnation by executing hisprime minister, Zia saw a way to gain favor with boththe United States and the Arab nations by allowingPakistan to serve as a base for the mujahideen. TheEgyptian president Anwar Sadat, who had recentlysigned a controversial peace treaty with Israel,likewise saw a golden opportunity to shore up hisIslamic support by sending aid to fellow Muslims.

With Soviet armies stretched thin in EasternEurope and around the world, Ustinov refused to sendin more men; instead he armed his soldiers with thelatest weaponry and worked to enlarge andstrengthen the Afghan army. But none of thistranslated into progress. The mujahideen improvedtheir ambushes of Soviet transports and used thelatest Stinger missiles acquired from the Americans

to great effect. Years passed, and morale in theSoviet army dropped precipitously: the soldiers feltthe hatred of the local population and were stuckguarding static positions, never knowing when thenext ambush would come. Abuse of drugs and alcoholbecame widespread.

As the costs of the war rose, the Russian publicbegan to turn against it. But the Soviet leaders couldnot afford to pull out: besides creating a dangerouspower vacuum in Afghanistan, that would deliver asharp blow to their global reputation as a superpower.And so they stayed, each year supposedly the last.The senior members of the Politburo slowly died off--Brezhnev in 1982, Andropov and Ustinov in 1984--without seeing the slightest progress.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became generalsecretary of the Soviet Union. Having opposed thewar from the beginning, Gorbachev started phasedwithdrawals of troops from Afghanistan. The lastsoldiers left early in 1989. In all, over 14,000 Sovietsoldiers died in the conflict, but the hidden costs--tothe delicate Russian economy, to the people'sslender faith in their government--were far greater.Only a few years later, the entire system would cometumbling down.

InterpretationThe great German general Erwin Rommel once madea distinction between a gamble and a risk. Bothcases involve an action with only a chance ofsuccess, a chance that is heightened by acting with

boldness. The difference is that with a risk, if you lose,you can recover: your reputation will suffer no long-term damage, your resources will not be depleted,and you can return to your original position withacceptable losses. With a gamble, on the other hand,defeat can lead to a slew of problems that are likely tospiral out of control. With a gamble there tend to betoo many variables to complicate the picture down theroad if things go wrong. The problem goes further: ifyou encounter difficulties in a gamble, it becomesharder to pull out--you realize that the stakes are toohigh; you cannot afford to lose. So you try harder torescue the situation, often making it worse andsinking deeper into a hole that you cannot get out of.People are drawn into gambles by their emotions:they see only the glittering prospects if they win andignore the ominous consequences if they lose. Takingrisks is essential; gambling is foolhardy. It can beyears before you recover from a gamble, if yourecover at all.

The invasion of Afghanistan was a classic gamble.The Soviets were drawn in by the irresistible lure ofpossessing a client state in the region. Dazzled bythat prospect, they ignored the reality: the mujahideenand outside powers had too much at stake to everallow the Soviets to leave behind a secureAfghanistan. There were too many variables beyondtheir control: the actions of the United States andPakistan, the mountainous border areas impossibleto seal off, and more. An occupying army inAfghanistan involved a double bind: the larger the

military presence, the more it would be hated, and themore it was hated, the larger it would have to be toprotect itself, and so on indefinitely.

Yet the Soviets took their gamble and made theirmess. Now, too late, they realized that the stakes hadbeen raised: to pull out--to lose--would be adevastating blow to their prestige. It would mean theexpansion of American interests and a cancerousinsurgency on their border. Since they should neverhave invaded in the first place, they had no rationalexit strategy. The best they could do would be to cuttheir losses and run--but that is nearly impossible witha gamble, for gambling is governed by emotions, andonce the emotions are engaged, it is difficult toretreat.

The worst way to end anything--a war, a conflict, arelationship--is slowly and painfully. The costs of suchan ending run deep: loss of self-confidence,unconscious avoidance of conflict the next timearound, the bitterness and animosity left breeding--itis all an absurd waste of time. Before entering anyaction, you must calculate in precise terms your exitstrategy. How exactly will the engagement end, andwhere it will leave you? If the answers to thosequestions seem vague and full of speculation, ifsuccess seems all too alluring and failure somewhatdangerous, you are more than likely taking a gamble.Your emotions are leading you into a situation thatcould end up a quagmire.

Before that happens, catch yourself. And if you dofind you have made this mistake, you have only two

rational solutions: either end the conflict as quickly asyou can, with a strong, violent blow aimed to win,accepting the costs and knowing they are better thana slow and painful death, or cut your losses and quitwithout delay. Never let pride or concern for yourreputation pull you farther into the morass; both willsuffer far greater blows by your persistence. Short-term defeat is better than long-term disaster. Wisdomis knowing when to end.

Aut non tentaris, aut perfice (Either don'tattempt it, or carry it through to the end).

OVID, 43 B.C.-A.D. 17

To go too far is as bad as to fall short.--Confucius (551?-479 B.C.)

ENDING AS BEGINNINGAs a young man, Lyndon B. Johnson had just onedream: to climb the ladder of politics and becomepresident. When Johnson was in his mid-twenties, thegoal was starting to seem unreachable. A job as thesecretary of a Texas congressman had allowed himto meet and make an impression on PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt, who had named him the Texasdirector of the National Youth Administration, a postpromising excellent political connections. But Texasvoters were extremely loyal, often returningcongressmen to their seats for decades, or until theydied. Johnson urgently wanted a seat in Congress. Ifhe did not get one soon enough, he would be too old

to climb the ladder, and he burned with ambition.On February 22, 1937, out of the blue, the chance

of a lifetime opened up: the Texas congressmanJames Buchanan suddenly died. The seat he leftempty, that of Texas's Tenth District, was a rareopportunity, and the state's eligible politicalheavyweights immediately threw their hats in the ring.The many contenders included Sam Stone, a popularcounty judge; Shelton Polk, an ambitious young Austinattorney; and C. N. Avery, Buchanan's formercampaign manager, the favorite to win. Avery had thesupport of Tom Miller, mayor of Austin, the TenthDistrict's only large city. With Miller's backing he couldcount on almost enough votes to win the election.

Johnson was faced with a terrible predicament. Ifhe entered the race, the odds would be absurdlyagainst him: he was young--only twenty-eight--and inthe district he was unknown and poorly connected. Abad loss would damage his reputation and set him farback on the road to his long-term goal. If he chose notto run, on the other hand, he might wait ten years foranother chance. With all this in mind, he threw cautionto the winds and entered the race.

Indeed, deepening study of past experienceleads to the conclusion that nations might oftenhave come nearer to their object by takingadvantage of a lull in the struggle to discuss asettlement than by pursuing the war with the aimof "victory." History reveals, also, that in manycases a beneficial peace could have been

obtained if the statesmen of the warring nationshad shown more understanding of the elementsof psychology in their peace "feelers." Theirattitude has commonly been too akin to thatseen in the typical domestic quarrel; each partyis afraid to appear yielding, with the result thatwhen one of them shows any inclination towardsconciliation this is usually expressed inlanguage that is too stiff, while the other is apt tobe slow to respond--partly from pride orobstinacy and partly from a tendency tointerpret such a gesture as a sign of weakeningwhen it may be a sign of returning commonsense. Thus the fateful moment passes, andconflict continues--to the common damage.Rarely does a continuation serve any goodpurpose where the two parties are bound to goon living under the same roof. This applieseven more to modern war than to domesticconflict, since the industrialization of nationshas made their fortunes inseparable.

STRATEGY, B. H. LIDDELL HART, 1954

Johnson's first step was to call to his side thedozens of young men and women whom he hadhelped or hired over the years. His campaign strategywas simple: he would separate himself from the othercontenders by presenting himself as Roosevelt'sstaunchest supporter. A vote for Johnson was a votefor the president, the popular architect of the New

Deal. And since Johnson could not compete in Austin,he decided to aim his army of volunteers at thecountryside, the sparsely populated Hill Country. Thiswas the district's poorest area, a place wherecandidates rarely ventured. Johnson wanted to meetevery last farmer and sharecropper, shake everypossible hand, win the votes of people who had nevervoted before. It was the strategy of a desperate manwho recognized that this was his best and onlychance for victory.

One of Johnson's most loyal followers was CarrollKeach, who would serve as his chauffeur. Togetherthe two men drove every square mile of the HillCountry, tracing every dirt path and cow trail. Spottingsome out-of-the-way farmhouse, Johnson would getout of the car, walk to the door, introduce himself tothe startled inhabitants, listen patiently to theirproblems, then leave with a hearty handshake and agentle plea for their vote. Convening meetings industy towns consisting mainly of a church and a gasstation, he would deliver his speech, then mingle withthe audience and spend at least a few minutes witheveryone present. He had an incredible memory forfaces and names: if he happened to meet the sameperson twice, he could recall everything he or she hadsaid the first time around, and he often impressedstrangers by knowing someone who knew them. Helistened intensely and was always careful to leavepeople with the feeling that they would see him again,and that if he won they would finally have someonelooking out for their interests in Washington. In bars,

grocery stores, and gas stations all through the HillCountry, he would talk with the locals as if he hadnothing else to do. On leaving he would make sure tobuy something--candy, groceries, gasoline--a gesturethey greatly appreciated. He had the gift of creating aconnection.

As the race ran on, Johnson went days withoutsleep, his voice turning hoarse, his eyes drooping. AsKeach drove the length of the district, he would listenin amazement as the exhausted candidate in the carmuttered to himself about the people he had just met,the impression he had made, what he could havedone better. Johnson never wanted to seemdesperate or patronizing. It was that last handshakeand look in the eye that mattered.

The polls were deceptive: they continued to showJohnson behind, but he knew he had won votes thatno poll would register. And in any case he was slowlycatching up--by the last week he had crept into thirdplace. Now, suddenly, the other candidates tooknotice. The election turned nasty: Johnson wasattacked for his youth, for his blind support ofRoosevelt, for anything that could be dug up. Trying towin a few votes in Austin, Johnson came up againstthe political machine of Mayor Miller, who disliked himand did everything possible to sabotage hiscampaign. Undeterred, Johnson personally visited themayor several times in that last week to broker somekind of truce. But Miller saw through his charm. Hispersonal appeal might have won over the district'spoorest voters, but the other candidates saw a

different side of him: he was ruthless and capable ofslinging mud. As he rose in the polls, he made moreand more enemies.

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with nothought for the after-effect, you may be tooexhausted to profit by the peace, while it isalmost certain that the peace will be a bad one,containing the germs of another war. This is alesson supported by abundant experience.

STRATEGY, B. H. LIDDELL HART, 1954

On Election Day, Johnson pulled off one of thegreatest upsets in American political history,outdistancing his nearest rival by three thousandvotes. Exhausted by the grueling pace he had set, hewas hospitalized, but the day after his victory he wasback at work--he had something extremely importantto do. From his hospital bed, Johnson dictated lettersto his rivals in the race. He congratulated them forrunning a great campaign; he also described his ownvictory as a fluke, a vote for Roosevelt more than forhimself. Learning that Miller was visiting Washington,Johnson telegraphed his connections in the city tochaperone the mayor and treat him like royalty. Assoon as Johnson left the hospital, he paid visits to hisrivals and acted with almost embarrassing humility.He even befriended Polk's brother, driving him aroundtown to run errands.

A mere eighteen months later, Johnson had tostand for reelection, and these onetime opponents

and bitter enemies suddenly turned into the mostfervent Johnson believers, donating money, evencampaigning on his behalf. And Mayor Miller, the oneman who had hated Johnson the most, now becamehis strongest supporter and remained so for years tocome.

InterpretationFor most of us, the conclusion of anything--a project, acampaign, an attempt at persuasion--represents akind of wall: our work is done, and it is time to tally ourgains and losses and move on. Lyndon Johnsonlooked at the world much differently: an ending wasnot like a wall but more like a door, leading to the nextphase or battle. What mattered to him was notgaining a victory but where it left him, how it openedonto the next round. What good would it do to win theelection of 1937 if he were thrown out of officeeighteen months later? That would be a devastatingsetback to his dream of the presidency. If, after theelection, he had basked in his moment of triumph, hewould have sown the seeds of failure in the nextelection. He had made too many enemies--if theydidn't run against him in 1938, they would stir uptrouble while he was away in Washington. SoJohnson immediately worked to win these men over,whether with charm, with meaningful gestures, or withclever appeals to their self-interest. He kept his eyeon the future, and on the kind of success that wouldkeep him moving forward.

It is even possible that the attacker, reinforcedby the psychological forces peculiar to attack,will in spite of his exhaustion find it less difficultto go on than to stop--like a horse pulling a loaduphill. We believe that this demonstrateswithout inconsistency how an attacker canovershoot the point at which, if he stopped andassumed the defensive, there would still be achance of success--that is, of equilibrium. It istherefore important to calculate this pointcorrectly when planning the campaign. Anattacker may otherwise take on more than hecan manage and, as it were, get into debt; adefender must be able to recognize this error ifthe enemy commits it, and exploit it to the full.In reviewing the whole array of factors a generalmust weigh before making his decision, wemust remember that he can gauge the directionand value of the most important ones only byconsidering numerous other possibilities--someimmediate, some remote. He must guess, so tospeak: guess whether the first shock of battle willsteel the enemy's resolve and stiffen hisresistance, or whether, like a Bologna flask, itwill shatter as soon as its surface is scratched;guess the extent of debilitation and paralysisthat the drying-up of the particular sources ofsupply and the severing of certain lines ofcommunication will cause in the enemy; guess

whether the burning pain of the injury he hasbeen dealt will make the enemy collapse withexhaustion or, like a wounded bull, arouse hisrage; guess whether the other powers will befrightened or indignant, and whether and whichpolitical alliances will be dissolved or formed.When we realize that he must hit upon all thisand much more by means of his discreetjudgement, as a marks-man hits a target, wemust admit that such an accomplishment of thehuman mind is no small achievement.Thousands of wrong turns running in alldirections tempt his perception; and if therange, confusion and complexity of the issuesare not enough to overwhelm him, the dangersand responsibilities may. This is why the greatmajority of generals will prefer to stop well shortof their objective rather than risk approaching ittoo closely, and why those with high courageand an enterprising spirit will often overshoot itand so fail to attain their purpose. Only the manwho can achieve great results with limitedmeans has really hit the mark.

ON WAR, CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1780-1831

Johnson used the same approach in his efforts towin over voters. Instead of trying to persuade peopleto support him with speeches and fancy words (hewas not a good orator anyway), he focused on the

feeling he left people with. He knew that persuasion isultimately a process of the emotions: words cansound nice, but if a politician leaves peoplesuspecting him of being insincere, of merely pluggingfor votes, they will close off to him and forget him. SoJohnson worked to establish an emotional connectionwith voters, and he would close his conversations withthem with a hearty handshake and with a look in hiseye, a tremor in his voice, that sealed the bondbetween them. He left them feeling that they wouldsee him again, and he stirred emotions that woulderase any suspicion he might be insincere. The endof the conversation was in fact a kind of beginning, forit stayed in their minds and translated into votes.

Understand: in any venture, your tendency to think interms of winning or losing, success or failure, isdangerous. Your mind comes to a stop, instead oflooking ahead. Emotions dominate the moment: asmug elation in winning, dejection and bitterness inlosing. What you need is a more fluid and strategicoutlook on life. Nothing ever really ends; how youfinish something will influence and even determinewhat you do next. Some victories are negative--theylead nowhere--and some defeats are positive,working as a wake-up call or lesson. This fluid kind ofthinking will force you to put more strategic emphasison the quality and mood of the ending. It will make youlook at your opponents and decide whether you mightdo better to be generous to them at the end, taking astep back and transforming them into allies, playingon the emotions of the moment. Keeping your eyes on

the aftermath of any encounter, you will think more ofthe feeling you leave people with--a feeling that mighttranslate into a desire to see more of you. Byunderstanding that any victory or defeat is temporary,and that what matters is what you do with them, youwill find it easier to keep yourself balanced during thethousands of battles that life entails. The only realending is death. Everything else is a transition.

As Yasuda Ukyo said about offering up the lastwine cup, only the end of things is important.

One's whole life should be like this. Whenguests are leaving, the mood of being reluctant

to say farewell is essential.--Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Hagakure: The Book

of the Samurai (1659-1720)

KEYS TO WARFAREThere are three kinds of people in the world. First,there are the dreamers and talkers, who begin theirprojects with a burst of enthusiasm. But this burst ofenergy quickly peters out as they encounter the realworld and the hard work needed to bring any projectto an end. They are emotional creatures who livemainly in the moment; they easily lose interest assomething new grabs their attention. Their lives arelittered with half-finished projects, including some thatbarely make it beyond a daydream.

Then there are those who bring whatever they do toa conclusion, either because they have to or becausethey can manage the effort. But they cross the finish

line with distinctly less enthusiasm and energy thanthey had starting out. This mars the end of thecampaign. Because they are impatient to finish, theending seems hurried and patched together. And itleaves other people feeling slightly unsatisfied; it isnot memorable, does not last, has no resonance.

Both of these types begin each project without afirm idea of how to end it. And as the projectprogresses, inevitably differing from what they hadimagined it would be, they become unsure how to getout of it and either give up or simply rush to the end.

The great prizefighter Jack Dempsey was onceasked, "When you are about to hit a man, doyou aim for his chin or his nose?" "Neither,"Dempsey replied. "I aim for the back of hishead."

QUOTED IN THE MIND OF WAR, GRANT T.HAMMOND, 2001

The third group comprises those who understand aprimary law of power and strategy: the end ofsomething--a project, a campaign, a conversation--has inordinate importance for people. It resonates inthe mind. A war can begin with great fanfare and canbring many victories, but if it ends badly, that is allanyone remembers. Knowing the importance and theemotional resonance of the ending of anything,people of the third type understand that the issue isnot simply finishing what they have started butfinishing it well--with energy, a clear head, and an eye

on the afterglow, the way the event will linger inpeople's minds. These types invariably begin with aclear plan. When setbacks come, as setbacks will,they are able to stay patient and think rationally. Theyplan not just to the end but past it, to the aftermath.These are the ones who create things that last--ameaningful peace, a memorable work of art, a longand fruitful career.

The reason it is hard to end things well is simple:endings inspire overpowering emotions. At the end ofa bitter conflict, we have a deep desire for peace, animpatience for the truce. If the conflict is bringing usvictory, we often succumb to delusions of grandeur orare swept by greed and grab for more than we need.If the conflict has been nasty, anger moves us to finishwith a violent, punitive strike. If we lose, we are leftwith a burning desire for revenge. Emotions like thesecan ruin all of our prior good work. There is in factnothing harder in the realm of strategy than keepingour head on straight all the way to the end and pastthe end--yet nothing is more necessary.

Napoleon Bonaparte was perhaps the greatestgeneral that ever lived. His strategies were marvels ofcombined flexibility and detail, and he planned all theway to the end. But after defeating the Austrians atAusterlitz and then the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt--his two greatest victories--he imposed on thesenations harsh terms intended to make themweakened satellites of France. Accordingly, in theyears after the treaties, both countries harbored apowerful desire for revenge. They secretly built up

their armies and waited for the day when Napoleonwould be vulnerable. That moment came after hisdisastrous retreat from Russia in 1812, when theypounced on him with horrible fervor.

Napoleon had allowed petty emotion--the desire tohumiliate, revenge himself, and force obedience--toinfect his strategy. Had he stayed focused on his long-term interests, he would have known that it was betterto weaken Prussia and Austria psychologically ratherthan physically--to seduce them with apparentlygenerous terms, transforming them into devoted alliesinstead of resentful satellites. Many in Prussia hadinitially seen Napoleon as a great liberator. Had heonly kept Prussia as a happy ally, he would havesurvived the debacle in Russia and there would havebeen no Waterloo.

Learn the lesson well: brilliant plans and piled-upconquests are not enough. You can become thevictim of your own success, letting victory seduce youinto going too far, creating hard-bitten enemies,winning the battle but losing the political game after it.What you need is a strategic third eye: the ability tostay focused on the future while operating in thepresent and ending your actions in a way that willserve your interests for the next round of war. Thisthird eye will help you counteract the emotions thatcan insidiously infect your clever strategies,particularly anger and the desire for revenge.

Victory seems to have been achieved. Thereremains merely a remnant of the evil resolutely

to be eradicated as the time demands.Everything looks easy. Just there, however, liesthe danger. If we are not on guard, evil willsucceed in escaping by means of concealment,and when it has eluded us new misfortunes willdevelop from the remaining seeds, for evil doesnot die easily.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

The critical question in war is knowing when tostop, when to make your exit and come to terms. Stoptoo soon and you lose whatever you might havegained by advancing; you allow too little time for theconflict to show you where it is heading. Stop too lateand you sacrifice your gains by exhausting yourself,grabbing more than you can handle, creating an angryand vengeful enemy. The great philosopher of warCarl von Clausewitz analyzed this problem,discussing what he called "the culminating point ofvictory"--the optimum moment to end the war. Torecognize the culminating point of victory, you mustknow your own resources, how much you can handle,the morale of your soldiers, any signs of a slackeningeffort. Fail to recognize that moment, keep fightingpast it, and you bring on yourself all kinds of unwantedconsequences: exhaustion, escalating cycles ofviolence, and worse.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Japanesewatched as Russia made advances into China andKorea. In 1904, hoping to stem Russian expansion,

they launched a surprise attack on the Russian-heldtown of Port Arthur, on the coast of Manchuria. Sincethey were clearly the smaller country and had fewermilitary resources, they hoped that a quick offensivewould work in their favor. The strategy--the brainchildof Baron Gentaro Kodama, vice chief of Japan'sgeneral staff--was effective: by stealing the initiative,the Japanese were able to bottle up the Russian fleetat Port Arthur while they landed armies in Korea. Thatallowed them to defeat the Russians in key battles onland and at sea. Momentum was clearly on their side.

In April 1905, however, Kodama began to seegreat danger in his own success. Japan's manpowerand resources were limited; Russia's were vast.Kodama convinced the Japanese leaders toconsolidate the gains they had made and sue forpeace. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed later thatyear, granted Russia more-than-generous terms, butJapan solidified its position: the Russians moved outof Manchuria and Korea and left Port Arthur to Japan.Had the Japanese been carried along by theirmomentum, they would surely have passed theculminating point of victory and had all their gainswiped out by the inevitable counterattack.

On the other side of the scale, the Americansended the Gulf War of 1991 too soon, allowing muchof the Iraqi army to escape its encirclement. That leftSaddam Hussein still strong enough to brutally putdown the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings that eruptedafter his defeat in Kuwait and to hang on to power.The allied forces were held back from completing the

victory by their desire not to appear to be beating upon an Arab nation and by the fear of a power vacuumin Iraq. Their failure to finish led to far greater violencein the long run.

Imagine that everything you do has a moment ofperfection and fruition. Your goal is to end your projectthere, at such a peak. Succumb to tiredness,boredom, or impatience for the end and you fall shortof that peak. Greed and delusions of grandeur willmake you go too far. To conclude at this moment ofperfection, you must have the clearest possible senseof your goals, of what you really want. You must alsocommand an in-depth knowledge of your resources--how far can you practicably go? This kind ofawareness will give you an intuitive feel for theculminating point.

CENTCOM's lightning war [Desert Storm] wasover. It had been billed as a 100-hour blitz, butthree years later it was still an unfinished war.Recalled Gordon Brown, the foreign serviceofficer who served as Schwarzkopf's chiefforeign policy advisor at CENTCOM, "We neverdid have a plan to terminate the war."THE GENERAL'S WAR: THE INSIDE STORYOF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF, MICHAEL

R. GORDON AND GENERAL BERNARD E.TRAINOR, 1995

Endings in purely social relationships demand asense of the culminating point as much as those in

war. A conversation or story that goes on too longalways ends badly. Overstaying your welcome, boringpeople with your presence, is the deepest failing: youshould leave them wanting more of you, not less. Youcan accomplish this by bringing the conversation orencounter to an end a moment before the other sideexpects it. Leave too soon and you may seem timidor rude, but do your departure right, at the peak ofenjoyment and liveliness (the culminating point), andyou create a devastatingly positive afterglow. Peoplewill still be thinking of you long after you are gone. Ingeneral, it is always best to end with energy and flair,on a high note.

Victory and defeat are what you make of them; it ishow you deal with them that matters. Since defeat isinevitable in life, you must master the art of losing welland strategically. First, think of your own mentaloutlook, how you absorb defeat psychologically. Seeit as a temporary setback, something to wake you upand teach you a lesson, and even as you lose, youend on a high note and with an edge: you are mentallyprepared to go on the offensive in the next round. Sooften, those who have success become soft andimprudent; you must welcome defeat as a way tomake yourself stronger.

Second, you must see any defeat as a way todemonstrate something positive about yourself andyour character to other people. This means standingtall, not showing signs of bitterness or becomingdefensive. Early in his term as president, John F.Kennedy embroiled the country in the Bay of Pigs

fiasco, a failed invasion of Cuba. While he acceptedfull responsibility for the debacle, he did not overdohis apologies; instead he went to work on correctingthe mistake, making sure it would not happen again.He kept his composure, showing remorse but alsostrength. In doing so he won public and politicalsupport that helped him immensely in his future fights.

Third, if you see that defeat is inevitable, it is oftenbest to go down swinging. That way you end on a highnote even as you lose. This helps to rally the troops,giving them hope for the future. At the Battle of theAlamo in 1836, every last American fighting theMexican army died--but they died heroically, refusingto surrender. The battle became a rallying cry--"Remember the Alamo!"--and an inspired Americanforce under Sam Houston finally defeated theMexicans for good. You do not have to experiencephysical martyrdom, but a display of heroism andenergy makes defeat into a moral victory that willsoon enough translate into a concrete one. Plantingthe seeds of future victory in present defeat isstrategic brilliance of the highest order.

Knowing how to end. Masters of the first rank arerecognized by the fact that in matters great andsmall they know how to find an end perfectly, beit at the end of a melody or a thought; of atragedy's fifth act or an act of state. The best ofthe second rank always get restless toward theend, and do not fall into the sea with such proudand calm balance as do, for example, the

mountains at Portofino--where the bay of Genoafinishes its melody.THE GAY SCIENCE, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,

1882

Finally, since any ending is a kind of beginning ofthe next phase, it is often wise strategy to end on anambivalent note. If you are reconciling with an enemyafter a fight, subtly hint that you still have a residue ofdoubt--that the other side must still prove itself to you.When a campaign or project comes to an end, leavepeople feeling that they cannot foresee what you willdo next--keep them in suspense, toying with theirattention. By ending on a note of mystery andambiguity--a mixed signal, an insinuating comment, atouch of doubt--you gain the upper hand for the nextround in a most subtle and insidious fashion.

Authority: To conquer is nothing. One mustprofit from one's success.

--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

REVERSALThere can be no value in ending anything badly. There

is no reversal.

PART V

UNCONVENTIONAL (DIRTY)WARFARE

A general fighting a war must constantly search for anadvantage over the opponent. The greatestadvantage comes from the element of surprise, fromhitting enemies with strategies that are novel, outsidetheir experience, completely unconventional. It is inthe nature of war, however, that over time any strategywith any possible application will be tried and tested,so that the search for the new and unconventional hasan innate tendency to become more and moreextreme. At the same time, moral and ethical codesthat governed warfare for centuries have graduallyloosened. These two effects dovetail into what wetoday call "dirty war," where anything goes, down tothe killing of thousands of unwarned civilians. Dirtywar is political, deceptive, and supremelymanipulative. Often the last recourse of the weak anddesperate, it uses any means available to level theplaying field.

The dynamic of the dirty has filtered into societyand the culture at large. Whether in politics, business,or society, the way to defeat your opponents is tosurprise them, to come at them from an unexpectedangle. And the increasing pressures of these dailywars make dirty strategies inevitable. People gounderground: they seem nice and decent but use

slippery, devious methods behind the scenes.The unconventional has its own logic that you must

understand. First, nothing stays new for long. Thosewho depend on novelty must constantly come up withsome fresh idea that goes against the orthodoxies ofthe time. Second, people who use unconventionalmethods are very hard to fight. The classic, directroute--the use of force and strength--does not work.You must use indirect methods to combat indirection,fight fire with fire, even at the cost of going dirtyyourself. To try to stay clean out of a sense of moralityis to risk defeat.

The chapters in this section will initiate you into thevarious forms of the unorthodox. Some of these arestrictly unconventional: deceiving your opponents andworking against their expectations. Others are morepolitical and slippery: making morality a strategicweapon, applying the arts of guerrilla warfare to dailylife, mastering the insidious forms of passiveaggression. And some are unapologetically dirty:destroying the enemy from within, inflicting terror andpanic. These chapters are designed to give you agreater understanding of the diabolical psychologyinvolved in each strategy, helping to arm you with theproper defense.

WEAVE A SEAMLESS BLEND OFFACT AND FICTION

MISPERCEPTION STRATEGIES

Since no creature can survive without the ability tosee or sense what is going on around it, you mustmake it hard for your enemies to know what is goingon around them, including what you are doing.Disturb their focus and you weaken their strategicpowers. People's perceptions are filtered throughtheir emotions; they tend to interpret the worldaccording to what they want to see. Feed theirexpectations, manufacture a reality to match theirdesires, and they will fool themselves. The bestdeceptions are based on ambiguity, mixing fact andfiction so that the one cannot be disentangled fromthe other. Control people's perceptions of reality andyou control them.

THE FALSE MIRROROn November 3, 1943, Adolf Hitler had a documentdistributed to his top generals: Directive 51, whichdiscussed his conviction that the Allies would invadeFrance the following year and explained how to beatthem. For years Hitler had depended on a kind ofintuition in making his most important strategicdecisions, and time and again his instincts had been

right; the Allies had tried before to make him believethat an invasion of France was imminent, but eachtime Hitler had seen through the deception. This timehe was not only sure that the invasion was coming, hefelt he knew exactly where it would come: the Pas deCalais, the region of France along the EnglishChannel that was the country's closest point to Britain.

In war-time, truth is so precious that she shouldalways be attended by a bodyguard of lies.

WINSTON CHURCHILL, 1874-1965

The Pas de Calais had a number of major ports,and the Allies would need a port to land their troops.The region was also where Hitler planned to place hisV-1 and V-2 rockets, soon to be operational; withthese jet-propelled unmanned missiles so close toLondon, he could bomb Britain into submission. TheEnglish knew he was putting missiles there, and thatprovided them yet another reason to invade France atthe Pas de Calais, before Hitler could begin hisbombing campaign.

Dudley Clarke was always clear--and a littlelater it will be shewn to have been a pity thatothers were not equally so--that you can never,by deception, persuade an enemy of anythingnot according with his own expectations, whichusually are not far removed from his hopes. It isonly by using your knowledge of them that youare able to hypnotize him, not just into thinking,

but doing what you want.MASTER OF DECEPTION, DAVID MURE,

1980

In Directive 51, Hitler warned his commanders toexpect the Allies to wage a major deceptioncampaign to cloak the time and place of the invasion.The Germans had to see through these deceptionsand repel the landing, and despite recent setbacks inthe German war effort, Hitler felt supremely confidentthey could. Several years earlier he hadcommissioned the construction of the Atlantic Wall, aline of forts up and down the coast from France toNorway, and he had over 10 million soldiers at hisdisposal, a million of them in France alone. TheGerman armaments industry was churning out evermore and better weapons. Hitler also controlled mostof Europe, giving him enormous resources andendless options for moving his troops here and there.

Finally, to invade France the Allies would need amassive armada, which, once assembled, would beimpossible to conceal. Hitler had infiltrated agentsinto all levels of the British military, who supplied himwith excellent intelligence--they would forward to himthe time and location of the invasion. The Allies wouldnot surprise him. And once he had defeated them onthe shores of France, England would have to sue forpeace; Roosevelt would certainly lose the upcomingU.S. presidential election. Hitler could thenconcentrate his entire army against the Soviet Unionand finally defeat it. In truth, the invasion of France

was the opportunity he craved to turn the war around.

Themistocles therefore had two urgent andsimultaneous problems to solve. He must takeeffective action, not only to block any projectedwithdrawal by the Peloponnesian contingents,but also to ensure that they fought where andwhen he planned that they should; and he mustsomehow tempt Xerxes into making the onemove which might lead to a Greek victory--thatis, ordering his fleet to attack in the Salamischannel.... The device Themistocles finallyadopted--what Plutarch calls "his celebratedtrick with Sicinnus"--is one of the mostenigmatic episodes in all Greek history.Evidence for it goes back as far as Aeschylus'sPersians, performed only eight years afterSalamis.... What seems to have happened wasthis. At some point during the long argumentover final strategy, Themistocles, anticipatingdefeat, slipped away from the conference andsent for his children's tutor, "the most faithful ofhis slaves," an Asiatic Greek named Sicinnus.This man was given a carefully preparedmessage, or letter, to deliver to Xerxes, andsent off across the straits in a small boat,probably just before dawn on 19 September....The substance of the message was as follows.Themistocles sent it under his own name, ascommander of the Athenian contingent: he had,

he told Xerxes, changed sides, and was nowardently desirous of a Persian victory. (No realreason is given for this volte-face, thoughdisgust at the attitude of the Peloponnesiancontingents would provide a strong enoughmotive to carry conviction.) The Greek allieswere at each other's throats, and would offer noserious opposition--"on the contrary, you willsee the pro-Persians amongst them fighting therest." Furthermore, they were planning ageneral withdrawal from Salamis under cover ofdarkness, to be carried out the following night....If Xerxes struck at once, on the divide-and-ruleprinciple, he could forestall such a move."Attack them and destroy their naval power,while they are still disorganized and before theyhave joined forces with their land army" [Plut.Them. 12.4]. The conquest of the Peloponnesewould then become a comparatively simplematter. On the other hand, if Xerxes allowed thevarious Greek contingents to slip through hisfingers and disperse homewards, the war mightdrag on indefinitely, since he would have to dealwith each separate city-state in turn. Sicinnus'sarguments impressed the Persian admirals,and they duly passed them on to the Great Kinghimself. Xerxes, we are told, believed the reportbecause it "was in itself plausible"--and alsobecause it was just what he wanted to hear:

there was trouble brewing in Ionia and theempire, and the sooner this Greek expeditionwas wound up, the better. Themistocles, alwaysa shrewd judge of human nature, knew very wellthat after so many days of delay and frustration,the Great King would grasp at anything whichseemed to offer a quick solution to his problem.

THE GRECO-PERSIAN WARS, PETERGREEN, 1996

Hitler's commander in Western Europe was FieldMarshal Gerd von Runstedt, Germany's mostrespected general. To further solidify the defensiveposition in France, Hitler made General ErwinRommel the commander of the forces along theFrench coast. Rommel proceeded to makeimprovements in the Atlantic Wall, turning it into a"devil's garden" of minefields and fire zones. Rommeland Runstedt also asked for more troops to ensurethat the Germans could repel the Allies at the water'sedge. But the Fuhrer denied their request.

Hitler had lately come to mistrust his top staff. In thepast few years, he had survived several assassinationattempts that had clearly originated among hisofficers. His generals were increasingly arguing withhis strategies, and in his mind they had botchedseveral battles in the Russian campaign; he sawmany of them as incompetents or traitors. He beganto spend less time with his officers and more timeholed up in his Bavarian mountain retreat atBerchtesgaden, with his mistress, Eva Braun, and his

beloved dog, Biondi. There he pored over maps andintelligence reports, determined to make theimportant decisions himself and to manage the entirewar effort more directly.

This caused a change in his way of thinking:instead of making quick, intuitive choices, he wastrying to foresee every possibility and was takinglonger to make up his mind. Now he thought Rommeland Runstedt--in their request for more troops to betransferred to France--were being overly cautious andeven panicky. He alone would have to foil the Alliedinvasion; it was up to him to see through his generals'weaknesses and the enemy's deceptions. The onlydownside to this was that his workload had increasedtenfold, and he was more tired than ever. At night hetook sleeping pills, by day whatever he could get hishands on to keep him alert.

Early in 1944 key information arrived in Hitler'shands: a German agent in Turkey stole classifieddocuments confirming that the Allies would invadeFrance that year. The documents also indicated plansfor an imminent invasion of the Balkans. Hitler wasparticularly sensitive to any threats to the Balkans, avaluable source of resources for Germany; a lossthere would be devastating. The threat of such anattack made it impossible to transfer troops fromthere to France. Hitler's agents in England alsodiscovered plans to invade Norway, and here Hitleractually reinforced his troops to ward off the threat.

By April, as Hitler pored over intelligence reports,he began to feel increasingly excited: he discerned a

pattern in the enemy activity. As he had thought,everything pointed toward an invasion of the Pas deCalais. One sign particularly stood out: indications ofan enormous army forming in southeastern Englandunder the command of General George Patton. Thisarmy, called FUSAG (First United States ArmyGroup), was clearly positioned for a crossing to thePas de Calais. Of all the Allies' generals, Hitler fearedPatton the most. He had proven his military skill inNorth Africa and Sicily. He would be the perfectcommander for the invasion.

Hitler demanded more information on Patton'sarmy. High-flying reconnaissance planesphotographed enormous military camps, dockingequipment, thousands of tanks moving through thecountryside, a pipeline being built to the coast. Whena captured German general who had beenimprisoned in England was finally repatriated, hecaught glimpses of massive activity in the FUSAGarea on his trip from his internment camp to London.Agents in Switzerland reported that every map of thePas de Calais area had been mysteriously bought up.The pieces of a giant puzzle were coming together.

Now only one question remained: when would ithappen? As April turned to May, Hitler was delugedwith all kinds of conflicting reports, rumors, andsightings. The information was confusing, taxing hisstrained mind, but two nuggets of intelligence seemedto clarify the picture. First, a German agent in Englandreported that the Allies would attack Normandy,southeast of the Pas de Calais, between June 5 and

7. But the Germans had strong indications that thisman was operating as a double agent, and his reportwas clearly part of an Allied disinformation campaign.The attack would probably be coming at the end ofJune or beginning of July, when the weather wasgenerally more predictable. Then, later in May, aseries of more reliable German spies spottedBritain's top general, Sir Bernard Montgomery, inGibraltar and then in Algiers. Montgomery wouldcertainly command a large part of any invading force.The invasion could not be imminent if he was so faraway.

On the night of June 5, Hitler pored over the maps.Maybe he was wrong--maybe the plan was forNormandy all along. He had to consider both options;he would not be fooled in what might be the mostdecisive battle of his life. The British were tricky; hehad to keep his forces mobile in case it wasNormandy after all. He would not commit himself untilhe knew for sure. Reading the weather reports for theChannel--stormy that evening--he took his usualsleeping pill and went to bed.

Early the next morning, Hitler woke to startlingnews: a massive invasion was under way--in southernNormandy. A large armada had left England in themiddle of the night, and hundreds of parachutists hadbeen dropped near the Normandy coast. As the dayprogressed, the reports became more exact: theAllies had landed on the beaches southeast ofCherbourg.

A critical moment had come. If some of the forces

stationed in the Pas de Calais were hurried to thebeaches of Normandy, the Allies could be pinned andthrown back into the sea. This was therecommendation of Rommel and Runstedt, whoanxiously awaited Hitler's approval. But through thenight and into the following day, Hitler hesitated. Then,just as he was on the verge of sending reinforcementsto Normandy, he received word of increased Alliedactivity in the FUSAG area. Was Normandy in fact agiant diversion? If he moved his reserves there, wouldPatton immediately cross the Channel to the Pas deCalais? No, Hitler would wait to see if the attack wasreal. And so the days went by, with Rommel andRunstedt fuming at his indecision.

After several weeks Hitler finally accepted thatNormandy was the real destination. But by then hewas too late. The Allies had established abeachhead. In August they broke out of Normandy,sending the Germans into full retreat. To Hitler thedisaster was yet another indication of theincompetence of those around him. He had no ideahow deeply and decisively he had been fooled.

InterpretationIn trying to deceive Hitler about the Normandyinvasions, the Allies were faced with a problem: notonly was the Fuhrer suspicious and wary by nature, heknew of previous attempts to mislead him and knewthat the Allies would have to try to deceive him again.How could the Allies possibly disguise the actual goalof a vast armada from a man who had reason to

believe they would try to mislead him and wasscrutinizing their every move?

Fortunately, British intelligence had been able toprovide the planners of the D-Day landings, includingPrime Minister Winston Churchill, with information thatwould prove invaluable to them. First, they knew thatHitler was growing paranoid; he was isolated andoverworked, his imagination overheated. He wasprone to emotional outbursts, and he was suspiciousof everyone and everything. Second, they knew of hisbelief that the Allies would try to invade the Balkansbefore France and that the landing site in Francewould be in the Pas de Calais. He almost seemed towant these invasions to happen, as proof of hissuperior reasoning powers and foresight.

Fooling Hitler into keeping his forces dispersedacross Europe and France would give the Allies aslim margin of time in which to establish abeachhead. The key was to present him a picture,composed of many different kinds of evidence, thatwould tell him the Allies were doing just what he hadthought they would. But this picture could not be madeup of all kinds of flashing signs pointing to the Balkansand the Pas de Calais--that would reek of deception.Instead they had to create something that had theweight and feel of reality. It had to be subtle, a mix ofbanal truths with little falsehoods stitched in. If Hitlersaw that in its outlines it supported his expectations,his overactive mind would fill in the rest. This is howthe Allies wove such a picture.

At the end of the war, Allied Intelligence Officersdiscovered in captured files of the GermanSecret Service the text of two hundred and fiftymessages received from agents and othersources before D-Day. Nearly all mentionedJuly and the Calais sector. One message alonegave the exact date and place of the invasion. Ithad come from a French colonel in Algiers. TheAllies had discovered this officer was working forthe Abwehr and he was arrested andsubsequently turned round. He too was used tomislead Berlin--used and abused. TheGermans were so often deceived by him thatthey ended by treating all his information asvalueless. But they kept in contact, for it isalways useful to know what the enemy wants youto believe. Allied Intelligence, with greatboldness and truly remarkable perversity, hadthe colonel announce that the Invasion wouldtake place on the coast of Normandy on the 5th,6th or 7th June. For the Germans, his messagewas absolute proof that the invasion was to beon any day except the 5th, 6th or 7th June, andon any part of the coast except Normandy.

THE SECRETS OF D-DAY, GILLESPERRAULT, 1965

By late 1943 the British had secretly identified all ofthe German agents active in England. The next stepwas to turn them into unwitting double agents by

feeding them false information--about Allied plans foran attack on the Balkans and Norway, say, and themassing of a fictional army--commanded by Patton,the American general Hitler so feared--opposite thePas de Calais. (This army, FUSAG, existed only inpiles of phony paperwork and wireless transmissionsthat mimicked a normal army.) German agents wereallowed to steal FUSAG documents and intercepttransmissions--carefully misleading messages but atthe same time banal and bureaucratic ones, too banalto be seen as fake. Working with film designers, theAllies built an elaborate set of rubber, plastic, andwood that from German reconnaissance planes wouldlook like an enormous camp of tents, airplanes, andtanks. The German general who saw FUSAG with hisown eyes was misled about the direction he wastaking toward London: he had actually passed the realarmy to the west of FUSAG's supposed site, massingfor the invasion of Normandy.

Now Ravana said to himself, "These are allpetty weapons. I should really get down toproper business." And he invoked the onecalled "Maya"--a weapon which createdillusions and confused the enemy. With properincantations and worship, he sent off thisweapon and it created an illusion of reviving allthe armies and its leaders--Kumbakarna andIndrajit and the others--and bringing them backto the battlefield. Presently Rama found allthose who, he thought, were no more, coming

on with battle cries and surrounding him. Everyman in the enemy's army was again up in arms.They seemed to fall on Rama with victoriouscries. This was very confusing and Rama askedMatali, whom he had by now revived, "What ishappening now? How are all these comingback? They were dead." Matali explained, "Inyour original identity you are the creator ofillusions in this universe. Please know thatRavana has created phantoms to confuse you.If you make up your mind, you can dispel themimmediately." Matali's explanation was a greathelp. Rama at once invoked a weapon called"Gnana"--which means "wisdom" or"perception." This was a very rare weapon, andhe sent it forth. And all the terrifying armies whoseemed to have come on in such a great masssuddenly evaporated into thin air.

THE RAMAYANA, VALMIKI, INDIA, CIRCAFOURTH CENTURY B.C.

As the date of the invasion drew near, the Allies leftclues combining fact and fiction still more intricately.The real time and place of the invasion were plantedwith an agent whom the Germans completelymistrusted, giving Hitler the feeling that he had seenthrough a deception when in fact he was staring at thetruth. Now, if real information on the timing of theinvasion somehow leaked out, Hitler would not knowwhat to believe. The Allies knew that reports on the

buying up of Pas de Calais maps in Switzerlandwould reach Hitler, and this would have its ownrealistic logic. As for the Montgomery sightings inGibraltar, little did the German agents know they wereseeing a look-alike, a man trained to act like thegeneral. In the end the picture the Allies painted wasso real to Hitler that well into July he believed in it,long after D-Day had actually happened. Throughsuch subtle deceptions they had compelled him tokeep his forces dispersed--perhaps the decisivefactor in the success of the invasion.

In a competitive world, deception is a vital weaponthat can give you a constant advantage. You can useit to distract your opponents, send them on goosechases, waste valuable time and resources indefending attacks that never come. But more thanlikely your concept of deception is wrong. It does notentail elaborate illusions or all sorts of showydistractions. People are too sophisticated to fall forsuch things. Deception should mirror reality. It can beelaborate, as the British deception around D-Daywas, but the effect should be of reality only subtly,slightly altered, not completely transformed.

To mirror reality you must understand its nature.Above all, reality is subjective: we filter events throughour emotions and preconceptions, seeing what wewant to see. Your false mirror must conform topeople's desires and expectations, lulling them tosleep. (If the Allies had wanted to attack the Pas deCalais, as Hitler suspected, and tried to convinceHitler the attack was coming to Normandy, that would

have been a great deal harder than playing on hispreexisting belief.) Your false mirror must incorporatethings that are visibly true. It must seem somewhatbanal, like life itself. It can have contradictoryelements, as the D-Day deception did; reality is oftencontradictory. In the end, like an Escher painting, youmust blend truth and illusion to the point where theybecome indistinguishable, and your false mirror istaken for reality.

What we wish, we readily believe, and what weourselves think, we imagine others think also.

--Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.)

KEYS TO WARFAREIn the early history of warfare, military leaders werefaced with the following predicament: The success ofany war effort depended on the ability to know asmuch about the other side--its intentions, its strengthsand weaknesses--as possible. But the enemy wouldnever willingly disclose this information. In addition,the enemy often came from an alien culture, with itspeculiar ways of thinking and behaving. A generalcould not really know what was going on in the mind ofthe opposing general. From the outside the enemyrepresented something of an impenetrable mystery.And yet, lacking some understanding of the otherside, a general would be operating in the dark.

The only solution was to scrutinize the enemy foroutward signs of what was going on within. Astrategist might count the cooking fires in the enemy

camp, for example, and the changes in that numberover time; that would show the army's size andwhether it was increasing as reserves arrived ordecreasing as it was split, or perhaps as soldiersdeserted. To see where the army was heading, orwhether it was readying for battle, he would look forsigns of movement or changes in its formation. Hewould try to get agents and spies to report on itsactivities from within. A leader who picked up enoughof these signs and deciphered them correctly couldpiece together a reasonably clear picture.

The leader also knew that just as he was watchingthe other side, the other side was doing the same withhim. In pondering this back-and-forth game of readingappearances, certain enlightened strategists incultures around the world had a similar epiphany: Whynot deliberately distort the signs the enemy waslooking at? Why not mislead by playing withappearances? If the enemy is counting our cookingfires, just as we are counting theirs, why not light morefires, or fewer, to create a false impression of ourstrength? If they are following our army's every move,why not move it in deceptive patterns or send part of itin a direction as a decoy? If the enemy has sent spiesand agents into our ranks, why not feed them falseinformation? An enemy that thinks it knows our sizeand intentions, and is unaware that it has beenmisled, will act on its false knowledge and commit allkinds of mistakes. It will move its men to fight anenemy that is not there. It will fight with shadows.

Thinking in this way, these ancient strategists

created the art of organized deception, an art thatwould eventually filter beyond warfare into politics andsociety at large. In essence, military deception isabout subtly manipulating and distorting signs of ouridentity and purpose to control the enemy's vision ofreality and get them to act on their misperceptions. Itis the art of managing appearances, and it can createa decisive advantage for whichever side uses itbetter.

The real impact of such a strategy is thedissipation of resources, the creation of bothself-fulfilling and suicidal prophecies, and thedestruction of truth and trust. It maximizesconfusion and disorder and destroys theorganization's resilience, adaptability, corevalues, and ability to respond. The key to sucha strategy, says [Colonel John] Boyd, is lessdeception (the creation of a false order) andmore ambiguity (confusion about reality itself).You want to combine fact and fiction to createambiguity for an adversary, for the combinationcreates more problems, requires longer to sortout, and calls more into question than merelyinserting false information. As an example, herecalled the story of a group of Germans afterthe Normandy invasion who had stolen someAmerican uniforms and jeeps. They wentaround the French countryside changing all theroad signs to confuse the allies as they

advanced through the area. Soon, theAmericans figured out that the directions hadbeen reversed and simply did the opposite ofwhatever the signs indicated. How much moreeffective it would have been if the Germans hadchanged only a portion of the signs, a third to ahalf, and created even more problems for theAmericans. Creating ambiguity about the signs'accuracy and prolonging the time it would taketo discover the problem would have been farmore effective than changing all the signs in aconsistent fashion.

THE MIND OF WAR, GRANT T. HAMMOND,2001

In war, where the stakes are so high, there is nomoral taint in using deception. It is simply an addedweapon to create an advantage, much as someanimals use camouflage and other tricks to help themsurvive. To refuse this weapon is a form of unilateraldisarmament, giving the other side a clearer view ofthe field--an advantage that can translate into victory.And there is no morality or goodness in losing a war.

We face a similar dynamic in our daily battles inlife. We are social creatures, and our happiness, evenour survival, depends on our ability to understandwhat other people are intending and thinking. Butbecause we cannot get inside their heads, we areforced to read the signs in their outward behavior. Weponder their past actions as indications of what they

might do in the future. We examine their words, theirlooks, the tone in their voice, certain actions thatseem laden with significance. Everything a persondoes in the social realm is a sign of some sort. At thesame time, we are aware that a thousand pairs ofeyes are in turn watching us, reading us, and trying tosense our intentions.

It is a never-ending battle over appearance andperception. If other people can read what we are upto, predict what we are going to do, while we have noclue about them, they have a constant advantage overus that they cannot help but exploit. That is why, in thesocial realm, we learn from an early age to usedeception--we tell others what they want to hear,concealing our real thoughts, hedging with the truth,misleading to make a better impression. Many ofthese deceptions are entirely unconscious.

Since appearances are critical and deception isinevitable, what you want is to elevate your game--tomake your deceptions more conscious and skillful.You need the power to cloak your maneuvers, to keeppeople off balance by controlling the perceptions theyhave of you and the signs you give out. In this sensethere is a lot you can learn from the military arts ofdeception, which are based on timeless laws ofpsychology and are infinitely applicable to the battlesof daily life.

To master this art, you must embrace its necessityand find creative pleasure in manipulatingappearances--as if you were directing a film. Thefollowing are the six main forms of military deception,

each with its own advantage.

The false front. This is the oldest form of militarydeception. It originally involved making the enemybelieve that one was weaker than in fact was thecase. A leader would feign a retreat, say, baiting atrap for the enemy to rush into, luring it into anambush. This was a favorite tactic of Sun-tzu's. Theappearance of weakness often brings out people'saggressive side, making them drop strategy andprudence for an emotional and violent attack. WhenNapoleon found himself outnumbered and in avulnerable strategic position before the Battle ofAusterlitz, he deliberately showed signs of beingpanicked, indecisive, and scared. The enemy armiesabandoned their strong position to attack him andrushed into a trap. It was his greatest victory.

And the Lord said to Joshua, "Do not fear or bedismayed; take all the fighting men with you,and arise, go up to Ai; see, I have given intoyour hand the king of Ai, and his people, hiscity, and his land; and you shall do to Ai and itsking as you did to Jericho and its king; only itsspoil and its cattle you shall take as booty foryourselves; lay an ambush against the city,behind it."...So Joshua arose, and all thefighting men, to go up to Ai; and Joshua chosethirty thousand mighty men of valor, and sentthem forth by night. And he commanded them,"Behold, you shall lie in ambush against the

city, behind it; do not go very far from the city,but hold yourselves all in readiness; and I, andall the people who are with me, will approach thecity. And when they come out against us, asbefore, we shall flee before them; and they willcome out after us, till we have drawn them awayfrom the city; for they will say, 'They are fleeingfrom us, as before.' So we will flee from them;then you shall rise up from the ambush, andseize the city; for the Lord your God will give itinto your hand. And when you have taken thecity, you shall set the city on fire, doing as theLord has bidden; see, I have commandedyou."......And when the king of Ai saw this, heand all his people, the men of the city, madehaste and went out early to the descent towardthe Arabah to meet Israel in battle; but he didnot know that there was an ambush against himbehind the city. And Joshua and all Israel madea pretense of being beaten before them, andfled in the direction of the wilderness. So all thepeople who were in the city were called togetherto pursue them, and as they pursued Joshuathey were drawn away from the city. There wasnot a man left in Ai or Bethel, who did not go outafter Israel; they left the city open, and pursuedIsrael.... And the ambush rose quickly out oftheir place, and...they ran and entered the cityand took it; and they made haste to set the city

on fire. So when the men of Ai looked back,behold, the smoke of the city went up to heaven;and they had no power to flee this way or that,for the people that fled to the wilderness turnedback upon the pursuers. And when Joshua andall Israel saw that the ambush had taken thecity, and that the smoke of the city went up, thenthey turned back and smote the men of Ai.

JOSHUA 8: 1-9, 14-23

Controlling the front you present to the world is themost critical deceptive skill. People respond mostdirectly to what they see, to what is most visible totheir eyes. If you seem clever--if you seem deceptive--their guard will be up and it will be impossible tomislead them. Instead you need to present a front thatdoes the opposite--disarms suspicions. The bestfront here is weakness, which will make the other sidefeel superior to you, so that they either ignore you(and being ignored is very valuable at times) or arebaited into an aggressive action at the wrongmoment. Once it is too late, once they are committed,they can find out the hard way that you are not soweak after all.

In the battles of daily life, making people think theyare better than you are--smarter, stronger, morecompetent--is often wise. It gives you breathing spaceto lay your plans, to manipulate. In a variation on thisstrategy, the front of virtue, honesty, and uprightnessis often the perfect cover in a political world. Thesequalities may not seem weak but serve the same

function: they disarm people's suspicions. In thatsituation, though, it is important not to get caughtdoing something underhanded. Appearing as ahypocrite will set you far back in the deception game.

In general, as strategists advocated in the days ofancient China, you should present a face to the worldthat promises the opposite of what you are actuallyplanning. If you are getting ready to attack, seemunprepared for a fight or too comfortable and relaxedto be plotting war. Appear calm and friendly. Doingthis will help you gain control over your appearanceand sharpen your ability to keep your opponents in thedark.

The decoy attack. This is another ruse dating backto ancient times, and it remains perhaps the military'smost common deceptive ploy. It began as a solutionto a problem: if the enemy knew you were going toattack point A, they would put all their defenses thereand make your job too difficult. But to deceive themon that score was not easy: even if before battle youwere able to disguise your intentions and fool themout of concentrating their forces at point A, the minutethey actually saw your army headed there, they wouldrush to its defense. The only answer was to marchyour army toward point B or, better, to send part ofyour army in that direction while holding troops inreserve for your real objective. The enemy would nowhave to move some or all of its army to defend pointB. Do the same with points C and D and the enemywould have to disperse all over the map.

The key to this tactic is that instead of relying onwords or rumors or planted information, the armyreally moves. It makes a concrete action. The enemyforces cannot afford to guess whether a deception isin the works: if they guess wrong, the consequencesare disastrous. They have to move to cover point B,no matter what. It is in any case almost impossible todoubt the reality of actual troop movements, with allthe time and energy those involve. So the decoyattack keeps the enemy dispersed and ignorant ofyour intentions--the ultimate dream of any general.

The decoy attack is also a critical strategy in dailylife, where you must retain the power to hide yourintentions. To keep people from defending the pointsyou want to attack, you must follow the military modeland make real gestures toward a goal that does notinterest you. You must seem to be investing time andenergy to attack that point, as opposed to simplytrying to signal the intention with words. Actions carrysuch weight and seem so real that people willnaturally assume that is your real goal. Their attentionis distracted from your actual objective; their defensesare dispersed and weakened.

The principle is also employed in less tortuouscircumstances, but with the same purpose ofgetting an individual to act naturally in a rolebecause, in fact, he does not know that he isplaying a false one. For example, take thedesign of the "Man Who Never Was" operationduring World War II--wherein a high-level

courier carrying secret papers containingmisdirections regarding the Mediterraneaninvasion was to be washed up on the coast ofSpain. After the "Major" was dropped inSpanish waters, the British attache in Spain was"confidentially" told that papers of greatimportance had been lost, and that he shoulddiscreetly determine whether the courier'sbriefcase had been recovered. The attache wasthus able to act out his part in the fake-out in avery convincing manner by virtue of the fact thatfor him it wasn't an act.

THE SECRETS OF D DAY, GILLESPERRAULT, 1965

Camouflage. The ability to blend into theenvironment is one of the most terrifying forms ofmilitary deception. In modern times Asian armieshave proven particularly adept in this art: at the battlesof Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima during World War II,American soldiers were astounded at the ability oftheir Japanese foes to blend into the various terrainsof the Pacific theater. By sewing grass, leaves, twigs,and foliage to their uniforms and helmets, theJapanese would merge with the forest--but the forestwould incrementally advance, undetected until it wastoo late. Nor could the Americans pinpoint theJapanese guns, for their barrels were concealed innatural rock crevices or were hidden under removablecamouflage covers. The North Vietnamese were

equally brilliant at camouflage, reinforcing their skillsby the use of tunnels and underground chambers thatallowed armed men to pop up seemingly anywhere.Worse, in a different kind of camouflage, they couldblend into the civilian population. Preventing yourenemies from seeing you until it is too late is adevastating way to control their perceptions.

The camouflage strategy can be applied to daily lifein two ways. First, it is always good to be able toblend into the social landscape, to avoid callingattention to yourself unless you choose to do so.When you talk and act like everyone else, mimickingtheir belief systems, when you blend into the crowd,you make it impossible for people to read anythingparticular in your behavior. (Appearances are all thatcount here--dress and talk like a businessman andyou must be a businessman.) That gives you greatroom to move and plot without being noticed. Like agrasshopper on a leaf, you cannot be picked fromyour context--an excellent defense in times ofweakness. Second, if you are preparing an attack ofsome sort and begin by blending into theenvironment, showing no sign of activity, your attackwill seem to come out of nowhere, doubling its power.

The hypnotic pattern: According to Machiavelli,human beings naturally tend to think in terms ofpatterns. They like to see events conforming to theirexpectations by fitting into a pattern or scheme, forschemes, whatever their actual content, comfort us bysuggesting that the chaos of life is predictable. This

mental habit offers excellent ground for deception,using a strategy that Machiavelli calls"acclimatization"--deliberately creating some patternto make your enemies believe that your next actionwill follow true to form. Having lulled them intocomplacency, you now have room to work againsttheir expectations, break the pattern, and take themby surprise.

In the Six-Day War of 1967, the Israelis submittedtheir Arab enemies to a devastating and lightning-fastdefeat. In doing so they confirmed all their preexistingmilitary beliefs: the Arabs were undisciplined, theirweaponry was outdated, and their strategies werestale. Six years later the Egyptian president AnwarSadat exploited these prejudices in signaling that hisarmy was in disarray and still humbled by its defeat in1967, and that he was squabbling with his Sovietpatrons. When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel onYom Kippur in 1973, the Israelis were caught almosttotally by surprise. Sadat had tricked them into lettingdown their guard.

Betrayer's masterpiece. --To express to a fellowconspirator the grievous suspicion that one isgoing to be betrayed by him, and to do so atprecisely the moment one is oneself engagedin betrayal, is a masterpiece of malice, becauseit keeps the other occupied with himself andcompels him for a time to behave very openlyand unsuspiciously, thus giving the actualbetrayer full freedom of action.

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE, 1878

This tactic can be extended indefinitely. Oncepeople feel you have deceived them, they will expectyou to mislead them again, but they usually think you'lltry something different next time. No one, they will tellthemselves, is so stupid as to repeat the exact sametrick on the same person. That, of course, is just whento repeat it, following the principle of always workingagainst your enemy's expectations. Remember theexample of Edgar Allan Poe's short story "ThePurloined Letter": hide something in the most obviousplace, because that is where no one will look.

Planted information. People are much more likely tobelieve something they see with their own eyes thansomething they are told. They are more likely tobelieve something they discover than somethingpushed at them. If you plant the false information youdesire them to have--with third parties, in neutralterritory--when they pick up the clues, they have theimpression they are the ones discovering the truth.The more you can make them dig for theirinformation, the more deeply they will deludethemselves.

During World War I, in addition to the infamousstandoff on the Western Front, the Germans and theBritish fought a lesser-known battle for control of EastAfrica, where both sides had colonies. The man incharge of English intelligence in the area was Colonel

Richard Meinhertzhagen, and his main rival on theGerman side was an educated Arab.Meinhertzhagen's job included feeding the Germansmisinformation, and he tried hard to deceive thisArab, but nothing seemed to work--the two men wereequals at the game. Finally Meinhertzhagen sent hisopponent a letter. He thanked the Arab for hisservices as a double agent and for the valuableinformation he had supplied to the British. Heenclosed a large sum of money and entrusted theletter's delivery to his most incompetent agent. Sureenough, the Germans captured this agent en routeand found the letter. The agent, under torture, assuredthem that his mission was genuine--because hebelieved it was; Meinhertzhagen had kept him out ofthe loop. The agent was not acting, so he was morethan believable. The Germans quietly had the Arabshot.

Agamemnon had sent Odysseus on a foragingexpedition to Thrace, and when he came backempty-handed, Palamedes son of Naupliusupbraided him for his sloth and cowardice. "Itwas not my fault," cried Odysseus, "that no corncould be found. If Agamemnon had sent you inmy stead, you would have had no greatersuccess." Thus challenged, Palamedes set sailat once and presently reappeared with a ship-load of grain.... After days of tortuous thought,Odysseus at last hit upon a plan by which hemight be revenged on Palamedes; for his

honour was wounded. He sent word toAgamemnon: "The gods have warned me in adream that treachery is afoot: the camp must bemoved for a day and a night." WhenAgamemnon gave immediate orders to havethis done, Odysseus secretly buried a sackfullof gold at the place where Palamedes's tent hadbeen pitched. He then forced a Phrygianprisoner to write a letter, as if from Priam toPalamedes, which read: "The gold that I havesent is the price you asked for betraying theGreek camp." Having then ordered the prisonerto hand Palamedes this letter, Odysseus hadhim killed just outside the camp, before hecould deliver it. Next day, when the armyreturned to the old site, someone found theprisoner's corpse and took the letter toAgamemnon. Palamedes was court-martialledand, when he hotly denied having received goldfrom Priam or anyone else, Odysseussuggested that his tent should be searched.The gold was discovered, and the whole armystoned Palamedes to death as a traitor.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

No matter how good a liar you are, when youdeceive, it is hard to be completely natural. Yourtendency is to try so hard to seem natural and sincerethat it stands out and can be read. That is why it is so

effective to spread your deceptions through peoplewhom you keep ignorant of the truth--people whobelieve the lie themselves. When working with doubleagents of this kind, it is always wise to initially feedthem some true information--this will establish thecredibility of the intelligence they pass along. Afterthat they will be the perfect conduits for your lies.

Shadows within shadows. Deceptive maneuversare like shadows deliberately cast: the enemyresponds to them as if they were solid and real, whichin and of itself is a mistake. In a sophisticated,competitive world, however, both sides know thegame, and the alert enemy will not necessarily graspat the shadow you have thrown. So you have to takethe art of deception to a level higher, casting shadowswithin shadows, making it impossible for yourenemies to distinguish between fact and fiction. Youmake everything so ambiguous and uncertain, spreadso much fog, that even if you are suspected of deceit,it does not matter--the truth cannot be unraveled fromthe lies, and all their suspicion gives them is torment.Meanwhile, as they strain to figure out what you are upto, they waste valuable time and resources.

During the World War II desert battles in NorthAfrica, the English lieutenant Dudley Clarke ran acampaign to deceive the Germans. One of his tacticswas to use props--dummy tanks and artillery--to makeit impossible for the Germans to figure out the sizeand location of the English army. From high-flyingreconnaissance aircraft, these dummy weapons

would photograph like the real thing. A prop thatworked particularly well was the fake airplane madeof wood; Clarke dotted bogus landing fields filled upwith rows of these around the landscape. At one pointa worried officer told him that intelligence had beenintercepted revealing that the Germans had figuredout a way to distinguish the fake planes from the realones: they simply looked for the wooden struts holdingup the wings of the dummy planes (enlarged photoscould reveal this). They would now have to stop usingthe dummies, said the officer. But Clarke, one of thegreat geniuses of modern deception, had a betteridea: he decided to put struts under the wings of realaircraft as well as phony ones. With the originaldeception, the Germans were confused but couldeventually uncover the truth. Now, however, Clarketook the game to a higher level: the enemy could notdistinguish the real from the fake in general, whichwas even more disconcerting.

If you are trying to mislead your enemies, it is oftenbetter to concoct something ambiguous and hard toread, as opposed to an outright deception--thatdeception can be uncovered and enemies can turntheir discovery to their advantage, especially if youthink they are still fooled and act under that belief. Youare the one doubly deceived. By creating somethingthat is simply ambiguous, though, by makingeverything blurry, there is no deception to uncover.They are simply lost in a mist of uncertainty, wheretruth and falsehood, good and bad, all merge intoone, and it is impossible to get one's bearings

straight.

Authority: One who is good at combatingthe enemy fools it with inscrutable moves,confuses it with false intelligence, makes itrelax by concealing one'sstrength,...deafens its ears by jumblingone's orders and signals, blinds its eyes byconverting one's banners andinsignias,...confounds its battle plan byproviding distorted facts.--Tou Bi Fu Tan, A Scholar's Dilettante Remarks

on War (16th century A.D.)

Appearance and intention inevitably ensnarepeople when artfully used, even if people sensethat there is an ulterior intention behind theovert appearance. When you set up ploys andopponents fall for them, then you win by letting

them act on your ruse. As for those who do notfall for a ploy, when you see they won't fall forthe open trap, you have another set. Then evenif opponents haven't fallen for your original ploy,in effect they actually have.

FAMILY BOOK ON THE ART OF WAR,YAGYU MUNENORI, 1571-1646

REVERSALTo be caught in a deception is dangerous. If you don'tknow that your cover is blown, now, suddenly, yourenemies have more information than you do and youbecome their tool. If the discovery of your deceit ispublic, on the other hand, your reputation takes ablow, or worse: the punishments for spying aresevere. You must use deception with utmost caution,then, employing the least amount of people aspossible, to avoid the inevitable leaks. You shouldalways leave yourself an escape route, a cover storyto protect you should you be exposed. Be careful notto fall in love with the power that deception brings; theuse of it must always be subordinate to your overallstrategy and kept under control. If you become knownas a deceiver, try being straightforward and honest fora change. That will confuse people--because theywon't know how to read you, your honesty will becomea higher form of deception.

TAKE THE LINE OF LEASTEXPECTATION

THE ORDINARY-EXTRAORDINARY STRATEGY

People expect your behavior to conform to knownpatterns and conventions. Your task as a strategistis to upset their expectations. Surprise them andchaos and unpredictability--which they trydesperately to keep at bay--enter their world, and inthe ensuing mental disturbance, their defenses aredown and they are vulnerable. First, do somethingordinary and conventional to fix their image of you,then hit them with the extraordinary. The terror isgreater for being so sudden. Never rely on anunorthodox strategy that worked before--it isconventional the second time around. Sometimesthe ordinary is extraordinary because it isunexpected.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFAREThousands of years ago, military leaders--aware ofthe incredibly high stakes involved in war--wouldsearch high and low for anything that could bring theirarmy an advantage on the battlefield. Some generalswho were particularly clever would devise novel troopformations or an innovative use of infantry or cavalry:the newness of the tactic would prevent the enemy

from anticipating it. Being unexpected, it would createconfusion in the enemy. An army that gained theadvantage of surprise in this way could often leverageit into victory on the battlefield and perhaps a string ofvictories.

The enemy, however, would work hard to come upwith a defense against the new strategy, whatever itwas, and would often find one quite fast. So whatonce brought brilliant success and was the epitome ofinnovation soon no longer worked and in fact becameconventional. Furthermore, in the process of workingout a defense against a novel strategy, the enemyitself would often be forced to innovate; now it wastheir turn to introduce something surprising andhorribly effective. And so the cycle would go on. Warhas always been ruthless; nothing staysunconventional for long. It is either innovate or die.

In the eighteenth century, nothing was more startlingthan the tactics of the Prussian king Frederick theGreat. To top Frederick's success, French militarytheorists devised radical new ideas that were finallytested on the battlefield by Napoleon. In 1806,Napoleon crushed the Prussians--who were still usingthe once unconventional tactics of Frederick theGreat, now grown stale--at the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt. The Prussians were humiliated by theirdefeat; now it was up to them to innovate. Theystudied in depth Napoleon's success, adapted hisbest strategies, and took them further, creating theseeds for the formation of the German General Staff.This new Prussian army played a large role in the

defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo and went on todominate the military scene for decades.

In modern times the constant challenge to top theenemy with something new and unconventional hastaken a turn into dirty warfare. Loosening the codes ofhonor and morality that in the past limited what ageneral could do (at least to some extent), modernarmies have slowly embraced the idea that anythinggoes. Guerrilla and terrorist tactics have been knownsince ancient times; now they have become not onlymore common but more strategic and refined.Propaganda, disinformation, psychological warfare,deception, and political means of waging war have allbecome active ingredients in any unconventionalstrategy. A counterstrategy usually develops to dealwith the latest in dirty warfare, but it often involvesfalling to the enemy's level, fighting fire with fire. Thedirty enemy adapts by sinking to a dirtier level still,creating a downward spiral.

This dynamic is particularly intense in warfare but itpermeates every aspect of human activity. If you arein politics and business and your opponents orcompetitors come up with a novel strategy, you mustadapt it for your own purposes or, better, top it. Theironce new tactic becomes conventional and ultimatelyuseless. Our world is so fiercely competitive that oneside will almost always end up resorting to somethingdirty, something outside earlier codes of acceptedbehavior. Ignore this spiral out of a sense of moralityor pride and you put yourself at a severedisadvantage; you are called to respond--in all

likelihood to fight a little dirty yourself.

Everything which the enemy least expects willsucceed the best. If he relies for security on achain of mountains that he believesimpracticable, and you pass these mountainsby roads unknown to him, he is confused to startwith, and if you press him he will not have timeto recover from his consternation. In the sameway, if he places himself behind a river todefend the crossing and you find some fordabove or below on which to cross unknown tohim, this surprise will derange and confusehim....

FREDERICK THE GREAT, 1712-86

The spiral dominates not just politics or businessbut culture as well, with its desperate search for theshocking and novel to gain attention and winmomentary acclaim. Anything goes. The speed of theprocess has grown exponentially with time; what wasunconventional in the arts a few years ago now seemsunbearably trite and the height of conformity.

What we consider unconventional has changedover the years, but the laws that makeunconventionality effective, being based on elementalpsychology, are timeless. And these immutable lawsare revealed in the history of warfare. Almost twenty-five hundred years ago, the great Chinese strategistSun-tzu expressed their essence in his discussion ofordinary and extraordinary means; his analysis is as

relevant to modern politics and culture as it is towarfare, whether clean or dirty. And once youunderstand the essence of unconventional warfare,you will be able to use it in your daily life.

Unconventional warfare has four main principles, asgleaned from the great practitioners of the art.

Work outside the enemy's experience. Principlesof war are based on precedent: a kind of canon ofstrategies and counterstrategies develops over thecenturies, and since war is so dangerously chaotic,strategists come to rely on these principles for lack ofanything else. They filter what's happening nowthrough what happened in the past. The armies thathave shaken the world, though, have always found away to operate outside the canon, and thus outsidethe enemy's experience. This ability imposes chaosand disorder on the enemy, which cannot orient itselfto novelty and collapses in the process.

Your task as a strategist is to know your enemieswell, then use your knowledge to contrive a strategythat goes outside their experience. What they mighthave read or heard about matters less than theirpersonal experience, which dominates theiremotional lives and determines their responses.When the Germans invaded France in 1940, theFrench had secondhand knowledge of their blitzkriegstyle of warfare from their invasion of Poland the yearbefore but had never experienced it personally andwere overwhelmed. Once a strategy is used and is nolonger outside your enemy's experience, though, it will

not have the same effect if repeated.

Unfold the extraordinary out of the ordinary. ToSun-tzu and the ancient Chinese, doing somethingextraordinary had little effect without a setup ofsomething ordinary. You had to mix the two--to fix youropponents' expectations with some banal, ordinarymaneuver, a comfortable pattern that they would thenexpect you to follow. With the enemy sufficientlymesmerized, you would then hit it with theextraordinary, a show of stunning force from anentirely new angle. Framed by the predictable, theblow would have double the impact.

Make a false move, not to pass it for a genuineone but to transform it into a genuine one afterthe enemy has been convinced of its falsity.

THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARYSTRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

The unconventional maneuver that confusedenemies, though, would have become conventionalthe second or third time around. So the wily generalmight then go back to the ordinary strategy that hehad used earlier to fix their attention and use it for hismain attack, for that would be the last thing the enemywould expect. And so the ordinary and theextraordinary are effective only if they play off eachother in a constant spiraling manner. This applies toculture as much as to war: to gain attention with somecultural product, you have to create something new,

but something with no reference to ordinary life is notin fact unconventional, but merely strange. What istruly shocking and extraordinary unfolds out of theordinary. The intertwining of the ordinary andextraordinary is the very definition of surrealism.

Act crazy like a fox. Despite appearances, a lot ofdisorder and irrationality lurks beneath the surface ofsociety and individuals. That is why we so desperatelystrain to maintain order and why people actingirrationally can be terrifying: they are demonstratingthat they have lost the walls we build to keep out theirrational. We cannot predict what they will do next,and we tend to give them a wide berth--it is not worthmixing it up with such sources of chaos. On the otherhand, these people can also inspire a kind of aweand respect, for secretly we all desire access to theirrational seas churning inside us. In ancient times theinsane were seen as divinely possessed; a residue ofthat attitude survives. The greatest generals have allhad a touch of divine, strategic madness.

The secret is to keep this streak under control.Upon occasion you allow yourself to operate in a waythat is deliberately irrational, but less is more--do thistoo much and you may be locked up. You will in anycase frighten people more by showing an occasionalflash of insanity, just enough to keep everyone offbalance and wondering what will come next. As analternative, act somewhat randomly, as if what you didwere determined by a roll of the dice. Randomness isthoroughly disturbing to humans. Think of this

behavior as a kind of therapy--a chance to indulgeoccasionally in the irrational, as a relief from theoppressive need to always seem normal.

Keep the wheels in constant motion. Theunconventional is generally the province of the young,who are not comfortable with conventions and takegreat pleasure in flouting them. The danger is that aswe age, we need more comfort and predictability andlose our taste for the unorthodox. This is howNapoleon declined as a strategist: he came to relymore on the size of his army and on its superiority inweapons than on novel strategies and fluidmaneuvers. He lost his taste for the spirit of strategyand succumbed to the growing weight of hisaccumulating years. You must fight the psychologicalaging process even more than the physical one, for amind full of stratagems, tricks, and fluid maneuverswill keep you young. Make a point of breaking thehabits you have developed, of acting in a way that iscontrary to how you have operated in the past;practice a kind of unconventional warfare on your ownmind. Keep the wheels turning and churning the soilso that nothing settles and clumps into theconventional.

No one is so brave that he is not disturbed bysomething unexpected.

--Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES1. In 219 B.C., Rome decided it had had enough of

the Carthaginians, who had been stirring up trouble inSpain, where both city-states had valuable colonies.The Romans declared war on Carthage and preparedto send an army to Spain, where the enemy forceswere led by the twenty-eight-year-old generalHannibal. Before the Romans could reach Hannibal,though, they received the startling news that he wascoming to them--he had already marched east,crossing the most treacherous part of the Alps intonorthern Italy. Because Rome had never imaginedthat an enemy would attack from that direction, therewere no garrisons in the area, and Hannibal's marchsouth toward Rome was unimpeded.

His army was relatively small; only some 26,000soldiers had survived the crossing of the Alps. TheRomans and their allies could field an army of close to750,000 men; their legions were the most disciplinedand feared fighters in the world, and they had alreadydefeated Carthage in the First Punic War, twenty-oddyears earlier. But an alien army marching into Italywas a novel surprise, and it stirred the rawestemotions. They had to teach these barbarians alesson for their brazen invasion.

Legions were quickly dispatched to the north todestroy Hannibal. After a few skirmishes, an armyunder the Roman consul Sempronius Longusprepared to meet the Carthaginians in direct battlenear the river Trebia. Sempronius burned with bothhatred and ambition: he wanted to crush Hannibal andalso to be seen as the savior of Rome. But Hannibalwas acting strangely. His light cavalry would cross the

river as if to attack the Romans, then retreat back:Were the Carthaginians afraid? Were they ready tomake only minor raids and sorties? FinallySempronius had had enough and went in pursuit. Tomake sure he had sufficient forces to defeat theenemy, he brought his entire army across thefreezing-cold river (it was wintertime), all of which tookhours and was exhausting. Finally, however, the twoarmies met just to the west of the river.

It is assumed that Alexander encamped atHaranpur; opposite him on the eastern back ofthe Hydaspes was Porus, who was seen to havewith him a large number of elephants.......Because all fords were held by pickets andelephants, Alexander realized that his horsescould neither be swum nor rafted across theriver, because they would not face thetrumpeting of the elephants and would becomefrantic when in the water or on their rafts. Heresorted to a series of feints. While small partieswere dispatched to reconnoitre all possiblecrossing places, he divided his army intocolumns, which he marched up and down theriver as if he sought a place of crossing. Then,when shortly before the summer solstice therains set in and the river became swollen, hehad corn conveyed from all quarters to hiscamp so that Porus might believe that he hadresolved to remain where he was until the dry

weather. In the meantime he reconnoitred theriver with his ships and ordered tent skins to bestuffed with hay and converted into rafts. Yet, asArrian writes, "all the time he was waiting inambush to see whether by rapidity of movementhe could not steal a passage anywhere withoutbeing observed." At length, and we may becertain after a close personal reconnaissance,Alexander resolved to make the attempt at theheadland and island described by Arrian, andin preparation he decided on a manoeuvrealmost identical with that adopted by GeneralWolfe in his 1759 Quebec campaign. Undercover of night he sent out his cavalry to variouspoints along the western bank of the river withorders to make a clamour, and from time totime to raise the battle-cry; for several nightsPorus marched his elephants up and down theeastern bank to block an attempted crossinguntil he got tired of it, kept his elephants incamp, and posted scouts along the easternbank. Then "when Alexander had brought itabout that the mind of Porus no longerentertained any fear of his nocturnal attempts,he devised the following stratagem": Upstreamand along the western bank he posted a chainof sentries, each post in sight and hearing of thenext one, with orders to raise a din and keeptheir picket fires burning, while visible

preparations were made at the camp to effect acrossing....... When Porus had been lulled into asense of false security and all preparations werecompleted at the camp and the crossing place,Alexander set out secretly and kept at somedistance from the western bank of the river sothat his march would not be observed....

THE GENERALSHIP OF ALEXANDER THEGREAT, J. F. C. FULLER, 1960

At first, as Sempronius had expected, his tough,disciplined legions fared well against theCarthaginians. But on one side the Roman lines weremade up of Gallic tribesmen fighting for the Romans,and here, suddenly, the Carthaginians unleashed agroup of elephants ridden by archers. The tribesmenhad never seen such beasts; they panicked and fellinto a chaotic retreat. At the same time, as if out ofnowhere, some 2,000 Carthaginians, hidden in densevegetation near the river, fell on the Romans' rear. TheRomans fought bravely to get out of the trap thatHannibal had laid for them, but thousands of themdrowned in the frigid waters of the Trebia.

The battle was a disaster, and back in Romeemotions turned from outrage to anxiety. Legionswere quickly dispatched to block the most accessiblepasses in the Apennines, the mountains that runacross central Italy, but once again Hannibal defiedexpectations: he crossed the Apennines at their mostunlikely, most inhospitable point, one that no army hadever passed through before because of the

ever passed through before because of thetreacherous marshes on the other side. But after fourdays of trudging through soft mud, Hannibal broughtthe Carthaginians to safe ground. Then, in yet anotherclever ambush, he defeated a Roman army at LakeTrasimene, in present-day Umbria. Now his path toRome was clear. In a state of near panic, the Romanrepublic resorted to the ancient tradition of appointinga dictator to lead them through the crisis. Their newleader, Fabius Maximus, quickly built up the city'swalls and enlarged the Roman army, then watchedperplexed as Hannibal bypassed Rome and headedsouth into Apulia, the most fertile part of Italy, andbegan to devastate the countryside.

Determined first and foremost to protect Rome,Fabius came up with a novel strategy: he would posthis legions in mountainous areas where Hannibal'scavalry would be harmless, and he would harass theCarthaginians in a guerrilla-style campaign, denyingthem supplies and isolating them in their position sofar from home. Avoiding direct battle with theirformidable leader at all costs, he would defeat themby exhausting them. But many Romans saw Fabius'sstrategy as disgraceful and unmanly. Worse, asHannibal continued to raid the countryside, he hitnone of Fabius's many properties, making it seem asif the two were in cahoots. Fabius became more andmore unpopular.

Having razed Apulia, Hannibal entered a fertileplain in Campania, to Rome's south--terrain thatFabius knew well. Finally deciding he had to act or bethrown out of power, the dictator devised a trap: he

stationed Roman armies at all the exit points from theplain, each army close enough to support the other.But Hannibal had entered Campania through theeastern mountain pass of Allifae, and Fabius hadnoticed that he never left by the same route heentered. Although Fabius kept a sufficiently largeRoman garrison at Allifae just in case, he reinforcedthe other passes in greater numbers. The beast, hethought, was caged. Eventually Hannibal's supplieswould run out, and he would be forced to try to breakthrough. Fabius would wait.

In the weeks to come, Hannibal sent his cavalrynorth, perhaps trying to break out in that direction. Healso plundered the richest farms in the area. Fabiussaw through his tricks: he was trying to bait theRomans into a battle of his choice. But Fabius wasdetermined to fight on his own terms, and only whenthe enemy tried to retreat from the trap. Anyway, heknew Hannibal would try to break through to the east,the only direction that afforded him a clean break, intocountry the Romans did not control.

One night the Roman soldiers guarding the pass atAllifae saw sights and heard sounds that made themthink they were losing their minds: an enormous army,signaled by thousands of torches, seemed to beheading up the pass, covering its slopes,accompanied by loud bellowing sounds as ifpossessed by some evil demon. The army seemedirresistible--far larger than the maximum estimate ofHannibal's strength. Afraid that it would climb abovethem and surround them, the Romans fled from their

garrison, abandoning the pass, too scared even tolook behind them. And a few hours later, Hannibal'sarmy came through, escaping from Fabius's cordon.

No Roman leader could figure out what Hannibalhad conjured up on the slopes that night--and by thefollowing year Fabius was out of power. The consulTerentius Varro burned to avenge the disgrace ofAllifae. The Carthaginians were encamped nearCannae, in southeastern Italy not far from modernBari. Varro marched to face them there, and as thetwo armies arrayed themselves in ranks to meet inbattle, he could only have felt supremely confident: theterrain was clear, the enemy was in full view, therecould be no hidden armies or last-minute tricks--andthe Romans outnumbered the Carthaginians by two toone.

The battle began. At first the Romans seemed tohave the edge: the center of the Carthaginian lineproved surprisingly weak and easily gave ground. TheRomans attacked this center with force, hoping tobreak through and indeed pushing forward--when, totheir shock and horror, they looked behind them andsaw the two outer ends of the Carthaginian linesmoving around to encircle them. They were trapped ina lethal embrace; it was a slaughter. Cannae wouldgo down in history as Rome's most devastating andhumiliating defeat.

The war with Hannibal would drag on for years.Carthage never sent him the reinforcements thatmight have turned the tide, and the much larger andmore powerful Roman army was able to recover from

its many defeats at his hands. But Hannibal hadearned a terrifying reputation. Despite their superiornumbers, the Romans became so frightened ofHannibal that they avoided battle with him like theplague.

InterpretationHannibal must be considered the ancient master ofthe military art of the unorthodox. In attacking theRomans on their own soil, he never intended to takeRome itself; that would have been impossible. Itswalls were high, its people fierce and united in theirhatred of him, and his forces were small. Rather,Hannibal's goal was to wreak havoc on the Italianpeninsula and to undermine Rome's alliances withneighboring city-states. Weakened at home, Romewould have to leave Carthage alone and put a stop toits imperial expansion.

To cross the sea without heaven's knowledge,one had to move openly over the sea but act asif one did not intend to cross it. Each militarymaneuver has two aspects: the superficial moveand the underlying purpose. By concealingboth, one can take the enemy completely bysurprise.... [If] it is highly unlikely that the enemycan be kept ignorant of one's actions, one cansometimes play tricks right under its nose.

THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARYSTRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

To sow this kind of chaos with the tiny army he hadbeen able to bring over the Alps, Hannibal had tomake his every action unexpected. A psychologistbefore his time, he understood that an enemy that iscaught by surprise loses its discipline and sense ofsecurity. (When chaos strikes those who areparticularly rigid and orderly to begin with, such as thepeople and armies of Rome, it has double thedestructive power.) And surprise can never bemechanical, repetitive, or routine; that would be acontradiction in terms. Surprise takes constantadaptation, creativity, and a mischievous pleasure inplaying the trickster.

So Hannibal always took the route that Rome leastexpected him to take--the road through the Alps, forexample, considered impassable to an army andtherefore unguarded. Eventually, inevitably, theRomans caught on and began to expect him to takethe least obvious route; at that point it was the obviousthat was unexpected, as at Allifae. In battle, Hannibalwould fix the enemy's attention on a frontal assault--the ordinary, usual way armies fought at the time--thenunleash the extraordinary in the form of elephants or areserve force hidden to the enemy's rear. In his raidsin the Roman countryside, he deliberately protectedFabius's property, creating the impression that thetwo men were in collusion and ultimately forcing theembarrassed leader to take action--an unorthodoxuse of politics and extramilitary means in war. AtAllifae, Hannibal had bundles of kindling tied to the

horns of oxen, then lit them and sent the terrified,bellowing animals up the slopes to the pass at night--creating an indecipherable image to the Romansentries, literally in the dark, and a terrifying one.

At Cannae, where the Romans were by this timeexpecting the unorthodox, Hannibal disguised hisstratagem in broad daylight, lining up his army likeany other army of the period. The Roman force wasalready impelled by the violence of the moment andthe desire for revenge; he let them make quickprogress through his deliberately weak center, wherethey became crowded together. Then the swift-moving outer wings of his line closed in and chokedthem. On and on he went, each one of Hannibal'singeniously unorthodox maneuvers flowering out of theother in a constant alternation between the uncannyand the banal, the hidden and the obvious.

Adapting Hannibal's method to your own dailybattles will bring you untold power. Using yourknowledge of your enemies' psychology and way ofthinking, you must calculate your opening moves to bewhat they least expect. The line of least expectation isthe line of least resistance; people cannot defendthemselves against what they cannot foresee. Withless resistance in your path, the progress you makewill inflate their impression of your power; Hannibal'ssmall army seemed to the Romans much larger than itreally was. Once they come to expect someextraordinary maneuver on your part, hit them with theordinary. Establish a reputation for the unconventionaland you set your opponents on their heels: knowing to

anticipate the unexpected is not the same thing asknowing what the unexpected will be. Before long youropponents will give way to your reputation alone.

2. In 1962, Sonny Liston became the heavyweightboxing champion of the world by defeating FloydPatterson. Shortly afterward he turned up to watch ayoung hotshot on the scene, Cassius Clay, take onand beat rather decisively the veteran Archie Moore.After the fight, Liston paid a visit to Clay's dressingroom. He put his arm around the boy's shoulder--attwenty, Clay was ten years younger than Liston--andtold him, "Take care, kid. I'm gonna need you. But I'mgonna have to beat you like I'm your daddy." Listonwas the biggest, baddest fighter in the world, and tothose who understood the sport, he seemedinvincible. But Liston recognized Clay as a boxer justcrazy enough to want to fight him down the road. Itwas best to instill a touch of fear in him now.

Chaos--where brilliant dreams are born.THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTH

CENTURY B.C.

The fear did not take: as Liston had guessed hewould, Clay soon began to clamor for a fight with thechampion and to brag to one and all that he wouldbeat him in eight rounds. On television and radioshows, he taunted the older boxer: maybe it wasListon who was afraid to take on Cassius Clay. Listontried to ignore the upstart; "If they ever make the fight,"he said, "I'll be locked up for murder." He considered

Clay too pretty, even effeminate, to be a heavyweightchampion.

Time passed, and Clay's antics provoked a desirefor the fight in the public: most people wanted to seeListon beat the daylights out of Clay and shut him up.Late in 1963 the two men met to sign on for achampionship fight in Miami Beach the followingFebruary. Afterward Clay told reporters, "I'm not afraidof Liston. He's an old man. I'll give him talking lessonsand boxing lessons. What he needs most is falling-down lessons." As the fight grew closer, Clay'srhetoric became still more insulting and shrill.

Of the sportswriters polled on the upcoming fight,most of them predicted that Clay would not be able towalk on his own after it was over. Some worried thathe would be permanently injured. "I guess it's quitehard to tell Clay not to fight this monster now," said theboxer Rocky Marciano, "but I'm sure he'll be morereceptive after he's been there with Liston." Whatworried the experts most of all was Cassius Clay'sunusual fighting style. He was not the typicalheavyweight bruiser: he would dance in place with hishands down at his side; he rarely put his full body intohis punches, instead hitting just from the arms; hishead was constantly moving, as if he wanted to keephis pretty face unscathed; he was reluctant to goinside, to brawl and pummel the body--the usual wayto wear down a heavyweight. Instead Clay preferredto dance and shuffle, as if his fights were ballet, notboxing. He was too small to be a heavyweight, lackedthe requisite killer instinct--the press critique ran on.

At the weigh-in on the morning of the bout,everyone was waiting for Clay's usual prefight antics.He exceeded their expectations. When Liston got offthe scales, Clay began to shout at him: "Hey, sucker,you're a chump. You've been tricked, chump.... Youare too ugly.... I'm going to whup you so bad." Clayjumped and screamed, his whole body shaking, hiseyes popping, his voice quivering. He seemedpossessed. Was he afraid or downright crazy? ForListon this was quite simply the last straw. He wantedto kill Clay and shut the challenger up for good.

As they stood in the ring before the opening bell,Liston tried to stare down Clay as he had stared downothers, giving him the evil eye. But unlike other boxersClay stared back. Bobbing up and down in place, herepeated, "Now I've got you, chump." The fight began,and Liston charged forward at his prey, throwing along left jab that missed by a mile. He kept coming, alook of intense anger on his face--but Clay shuffledback from each punch, even taunting Liston at onepoint by lowering his hands. He seemed able toanticipate Liston's every move. And he returnedListon's stare: even after the round ended and bothmen were in their corners, his eyes never left hisopponent's.

The second round was more of the same, exceptthat Liston, instead of looking murderous, began tolook frustrated. The pace was far faster than in any ofhis earlier fights, and Clay's head kept bobbing andorbiting in disturbing patterns. Liston would move in tostrike his chin, only to miss or find Clay hitting Liston's

chin instead, with a lightning-quick jab that made himwobble on his feet. At the end of the third round, aflurry of punches came out of nowhere and opened adeep gash under Liston's left eye.

Now Clay was the aggressor and Liston wasfighting to survive. In the sixth round, he began takingpunches from all angles, opening more wounds andmaking Liston look weak and sad. When the bell forthe seventh round rang, the mighty Liston just sat onhis stool and stared--he refused to get up. The fightwas over. The boxing world was stunned: Was it afluke? Or--since Liston had seemed to fight as ifunder some spell, his punches missing, hismovements tired and listless--had he just had an offnight? The world would have to wait some fifteenmonths to find out, until the two boxers' rematch inLewiston, Maine, in May 1965.

Consumed with a hunger for revenge, Listontrained like a demon for this second fight. In theopening round, he went on the attack, but he seemedwary. He followed Clay--or rather Muhammad Ali, ashe was now known--around the ring, trying to reachhim with jabs. One of these jabs finally grazed Ali'sface as he stepped back, but, in a move so fast thatfew in the audience even saw it, Ali countered with ahard right that sent Liston to the canvas. He lay therefor a while, then staggered to his feet, but too late--hehad been down for more than ten seconds, and thereferee called the fight. Many in the crowd yelled fix,claiming that no punch had landed. Liston knewotherwise. It may not have been the most powerful

blow, but it caught him completely by surprise, beforehe could tense his muscles and prepare himself.Coming from nowhere, it floored him.

Liston would continue to fight for another five years,but he was never the same man again.

One who studies ancient tactics and employsthe army in accord with their methods is nodifferent from someone who glues up the tuningstops and yet tries to play a zither. I have neverheard of anyone being successful. The acumenof strategists lies in penetrating the subtle amidunfolding change and discerning theconcordant and contrary. Now whenevermobilizing you must first employ spies toinvestigate whether the enemy's commandinggeneral is talented or not. If instead ofimplementing tactics, he merely relies oncourage to employ the army, you can resort toancient methods to conquer him. However, ifthe commanding general excels in employingancient tactics, you should use tactics thatcontradict the ancient methods to defeat him.

HSU TUNG, CHINA, 976-1018

InterpretationEven as a child, Muhammad Ali got perversepleasure out of being different. He liked the attention itgot him, but most of all he just liked being himself: oddand independent. When he began to train as a boxer,

at the age of twelve, he was already refusing to fight inthe usual way, flouting the rules. A boxer usually keepshis gloves up toward his head and upper body, readyto parry a blow. Ali liked to keep his hands low,apparently inviting attack--but he had discovered earlyon that he was quicker than other boxers, and the bestway to make his speed work for him was to lure theopponent's chin just close enough for Ali to snap a jabat him that would cause a lot more pain for being soclose and so quick. As Ali developed, he also made itharder for the other boxer to reach him by working onhis legs, even more than on the power of his punch.Instead of retreating the way most fighters did, onefoot at a time, Ali kept on his toes, shuffling back anddancing, in perpetual motion to his own peculiarrhythm. More than any other boxer, he was a movingtarget. Unable to land a punch, the other boxer wouldgrow frustrated, and the more frustrated he was, themore he would reach for Ali, opening up his guardand exposing himself to the jab from nowhere thatmight knock him out. Ali's style ran counter toconventional boxing wisdom in almost every way, yetits unorthodoxy was exactly what made it so difficult tocombat.

Ali's unconventional tactics in the first Liston fightbegan well before the bout. His irritating antics andpublic taunts--a form of dirty warfare--were designedto infuriate the champion, cloud his mind, fill him witha murderous hatred that would make him come closeenough for Ali to knock him out. Ali's behavior at theweigh-in, which seemed genuinely insane, was later

revealed as pure performance. Its effect was to makeListon unconsciously defensive, unsure of what thisman would do in the ring. In the opening round, as inso many of his subsequent fights, Ali lulled Liston byfighting defensively, an ordinary tactic when facing aboxer like Liston. That drew Liston in closer andcloser--and now the extraordinary move, the speedypunch out of nowhere, had double the force. Unable toreach Ali with his punches, disconcerted by thedancing, the lowering of the hands, the irritatingtaunting, Liston made mistake after mistake. And Alifeasted on his opponents' mistakes.

Understand: as children and young adults, we aretaught to conform to certain codes of behavior andways of doing things. We learn that being differentcomes with a social price. But there is a greater priceto pay for slavishly conforming: we lose the power thatcomes from our individuality, from a way of doingthings that is authentically our own. We fight likeeveryone else, which makes us predictable andconventional.

The chief characteristic of fashion is to imposeand suddenly to accept as a new rule or normwhat was, until a minute before, an exception orwhim, then to abandon it again after it hasbecome a commonplace, everybody's "thing."Fashion's task, in brief, is to maintain acontinual process of standardization: putting ararity or novelty into general and universal use,then passing on to another rarity or novelty

when the first has ceased to be such.... Onlymodern art, because it expresses the avant-garde as its own extreme or supreme moment,or simply because it is the child of the romanticaesthetic of originality and novelty, canconsider as the typical--and perhaps sole--formof the ugly what we might call ci-devant beauty,the beauty of the ancien regime, ex-beauty.Classical art, through the method of imitationand the practice of repetition, tends toward theideal of renewing, in the sense of integrationand perfection. But for the modern art ingeneral, and for avant-garde in particular, theonly irremediable and absolute aesthetic erroris a traditional artistic creation, an art thatimitates and repeats itself. From the anxiousmodern longing for what Remy de Gourmontchose to call, suggestively, "le beau inedit"derives that sleepless and feveredexperimentation which is one of the mostcharacteristic manifestations of the avant-garde;its assiduous labor is an eternal web ofPenelope, with the weave of its forms remadeevery day and unmade every night. PerhapsEzra Pound intended to suggest both thenecessity and the difficulty of such anundertaking when he once defined the beauty ofart as "a brief gasp between one cliche andanother." The connection between the avant-

garde and fashion is therefore evident: fashiontoo is a Penelope's web; fashion too passesthrough the phase of novelty and strangeness,surprise and scandal, before abandoning thenew forms when they become cliche, kitsch,stereotype. Hence the profound truth ofBaudelaire's paradox, which gives to genius thetask of creating stereotypes. And from thatfollows, by the principle of contradiction inherentin the obsessive cult of genius in modernculture, that the avant-garde is condemned toconquer, through the influence of fashion, thatvery popularity it once disdained--and this is thebeginning of its end. In fact, this is theinevitable, inexorable destiny of eachmovement: to rise up against the newlyoutstripped fashion of an old avant-garde and todie when a new fashion, movement, or avant-garde appears.

THE THEORY OF THE AVANT-GARDE,RENATO POGGIOLI, 1968

The way to be truly unorthodox is to imitate no one,to fight and operate according to your own rhythms,adapting strategies to your idiosyncrasies, not theother way around. Refusing to follow commonpatterns will make it hard for people to guess whatyou'll do next. You are truly an individual. Yourunorthodox approach may infuriate and upset, butemotional people are vulnerable people over whom

you can easily exert power. If your peculiarity isauthentic enough, it will bring you attention andrespect--the kind the crowd always has for theunconventional and extraordinary.

3. Late in 1862, during the American Civil War,General Ulysses S. Grant made several efforts to takethe Confederate fortress at Vicksburg. The fortresswas at a critical point in the Mississippi River, thelifeline of the South. If Grant's Union army tookVicksburg, it would gain control of the river, cutting theSouth in half. Victory here could be the turning point ofthe war. Yet by January 1863 the fortress'scommander, General James Pemberton, feltconfident he had weathered the storm. Grant had triedto take the fort from several angles to the north andhad failed. It seemed that he had exhausted allpossibilities and would give up the effort.

The fortress was located at the top of a two-hundred-foot escarpment on the riverbank, where anyboat that tried to pass was exposed to its heavyartillery. To its west lay the river and the cliffs. To thenorth, where Grant was encamped, it was protectedby virtually impassable swamp. Not far east lay thetown of Jackson, a railroad hub where supplies andreinforcements could easily be brought in--andJackson was firmly in Southern hands, giving theConfederacy control of the entire corridor, north andsouth, on the river's eastern bank. Vicksburg seemedsecure from all directions, and the failure of Grant'sattacks only made Pemberton more comfortable.

What more could the Northern general do? Besides,he was in political hot water among PresidentAbraham Lincoln's enemies, who saw his Vicksburgcampaign as a monumental waste of money andmanpower. The newspapers were portraying Grant asan incompetent drunk. The pressure was tremendousfor him to give it up and retreat back to Memphis tothe north.

Grant, however, was a stubborn man. As the winterdragged on, he tried every kind of maneuver, withnothing working--until, on the moonless night of April16, Confederate scouts reported a Union flotilla oftransport ships and gunboats, lights off, trying to makea run past the batteries at Vicksburg. The cannonsroared, but somehow the ships got past them withminimal damage. The next few weeks saw severalmore runs down the river. At the same time, Unionforces on the western side of the river were reportedheading south. Now it was clear: Grant would use thetransport ships he had sneaked past Vicksburg tocross the Mississippi some thirty miles downriver.Then he would march on the fortress from the south.

Pemberton called for reinforcements, but in truth hewas not overly concerned. Even if Grant gotthousands of men across the river, what could he doonce there? If he moved north toward Vicksburg, theConfederacy could send armies from Jackson andpoints south to take him from the flank and rear.Defeat in this corridor would be a disaster, for Grantwould have no line of retreat. He had committedhimself to a foolhardy venture. Pemberton waited

patiently for his next move.Grant did cross the river south of Vicksburg, and in

a few days his army was moving northeast, headingfor the rail line from Vicksburg to Jackson. This washis most audacious move so far: if he weresuccessful, he would cut Vicksburg off from its lifeline.But Grant's army, no different from any other, neededlines of communication and supply. These lines wouldhave to connect to a base on the eastern side of theriver, which Grant had indeed established at the townof Grand Gulf. All Pemberton had to do was sendforces south from Vicksburg to destroy or even justthreaten Grand Gulf, endangering Grant's supply lines.He would be forced to retreat south or risk being cutoff. It was a game of chess that Pemberton could notlose.

And so, as the Northern general maneuvered hisarmies with speed toward the rail line betweenJackson and Vicksburg, Pemberton moved on GrandGulf. To Pemberton's utter dismay, Grant ignored him.Indeed, so far from dealing with the threat to his rear,he pushed straight on to Jackson, taking it on May 14.Instead of relying on supply lines to feed his army, heplundered the area's rich farmlands. More, he movedso swiftly and changed direction so fluidly thatPemberton could not tell which part of his army wasthe front, rear, or flank. Rather than struggle to defendlines of communication or supply, Grant kept none. Noone had ever seen an army behave in such a manner,breaking every rule in the military playbook.

A few days later, with Jackson under his control,

Grant wheeled his troops toward Vicksburg.Pemberton rushed his men back from Grand Gulf toblock the Union general, but it was too late: beaten atthe Battle of Champion Hill, he was forced back intothe fortress, where his army was quickly besieged bythe Union forces. On July 4, Pemberton surrenderedVicksburg, a blow the South would never recoverfrom.

InterpretationWe humans are conventional by nature. Once anyonesucceeds at something with a specific strategy ormethod, it is quickly adopted by others and becomeshardened into principle--often to everyone's detrimentwhen it is applied indiscriminately. This habit is aparticular problem in war, for war is such riskybusiness that generals are often tempted to take theroad well traveled. When so much is necessarilyunsafe, what has proven safe in the past hasamplified appeal. And thus for centuries the ruleshave been that an army must have lines ofcommunication and supply and, in battle, mustassume a formation with flanks and a front. Napoleonloosened these principles, but their hold on militarythinkers remained so strong that during the AmericanCivil War, some forty years after Napoleon's death,officers like Pemberton could not imagine an armybehaving according to any other plan.

I have forced myself to contradict myself inorder to avoid conforming to my own taste.

MARCEL DUCHAMP, 1887-1968

It took great courage for Grant to disobey theseconventions and cut himself loose from any base,living instead off the rich lands of the MississippiBasin. It took great courage for him to move his armywithout forming a front. (Even his own generals,including William Tecumseh Sherman, thought he hadlost his mind.) This strategy was hidden fromPemberton's view because Grant kept up ordinaryappearances by establishing a base at Grand Gulfand forming front and rear to march toward the railline. By the time Pemberton had grasped theextraordinary nature of Grant's free-flowing attack, hehad been taken by surprise and the game was over.To our eyes Grant's strategy might seem obvious, butit was completely outside Pemberton's experience.

To follow convention, to give inordinate weight towhat has worked in the past, is a natural tendency.We often ignore some simple yet unconventional ideathat in every sense would upset our opponents. It is amatter sometimes of cutting ourselves loose from thepast and roaming freely. Going without a securityblanket is dangerous and uncomfortable, but thepower to startle people with the unexpected is morethan worth the risk. This is particularly important whenwe are on the defensive or in a weakened state. Ournatural tendency at such times is to be conservative,which only makes it easier for our enemies toanticipate our moves and crush us with their superiorstrength; we play into their hands. It is when the tide is

against us that we must forget the books, theprecedents, the conventional wisdom, and riskeverything on the untried and unexpected.

4. The Ojibwa tribe of the North American plainscontained a warrior society known as the Windigokan(No-flight Contraries). Only the bravest men, who haddemonstrated bravery by their utter disregard fordanger on the battlefield, were admitted to theWindigokan. In fact, because they had no fear ofdeath, they were considered no longer among theliving: they slept and ate separately and were not heldto the usual codes of behavior. As creatures whowere alive but among the dead, they spoke and actedcontrarily: they called a young person an old man, andwhen one of them told the others to stand still, hemeant charge forward. They were glum in times ofprosperity, happy in the depths of winter. Althoughthere was a clownish side to their behavior, theWindigokan could inspire great fear. No one everknew what they would do next.

The Windigokan were believed to be inhabited byterrifying spirits called Thunderers, which appeared inthe form of giant birds. That made them somehowinhuman. On the battlefield they were disruptive andunpredictable, and in raiding parties downrightterrifying. In one such raid, witnessed by an outsider,they gathered first in front of the Ojibwa chief's lodgeand yelled, "We are not going to war! We shall not killthe Sioux! We shall not scalp four of them and let therest escape! We shall go in daytime!" They left camp

that night, wearing costumes of rags and scraps, theirbodies plastered with mud and painted with splotchesof weird color, their faces covered by frighteningmasks with giant, beak-like noses. They made theirway through the darkness, stumbling over themselves--it was hard to see through the masks--until they cameupon a large Sioux war party. Although outnumbered,they did not flee but danced into the enemy's center.The grotesqueness of their dance made them seemto be possessed by demons. Some of the Siouxbacked away; others drew close, curious andconfused. The leader of the Windigokan shouted,"Don't shoot!" The Ojibwa warriors then pulled outguns hidden under their rags, killed four Sioux, andscalped them. Then they danced away, the enemy tooterrified by this apparition to pursue them.

After such an action, the mere appearance of theWindigokan was enough for the enemy to give them awide berth and not risk any kind of encounter.

InterpretationWhat made the Windigokan so frightening was thefact that, like the forces of nature from which theyclaimed to derive their powers, they could bedestructive for no apparent reason. Their mounting ofa raid was not governed by need or ordered by thechief; their appearance bore no relation to anythingknown, as if they had rolled on the ground or in traysof paint. They might wander in the dark until theychanced on an enemy. Their dancing was like nothinganyone had seen or imagined. They might suddenly

start to kill and scalp, then stop at an arbitrary number.In a tribal society governed by the strictest of codes,these were spirits of random destruction andirrationality.

The use of the unconventional can startle and giveyou an advantage, but it does not often create asense of terror. What will bring you ultimate power inthis strategy is to follow the Windigokan and adapt akind of randomness that goes beyond rationalprocesses, as if you were possessed by a spirit ofnature. Do this all the time and you'll be locked up, butdo it right, dropping hints of the irrational and randomat the opportune moment, and those around you willalways have to wonder what you'll do next. You willinspire a respect and fear that will give you greatpower. An ordinary appearance spiced by a touch ofdivine madness is more shocking and alarming thanan out-and-out crazy person. Remember: yourmadness, like Hamlet's, must be strategic. Realmadness is all too predictable.

5. In April 1917, New York's Society of IndependentArtists prepared for its first exhibition. This was to bea grand showcase of modern art, the largest in theUnited States to date. The exhibition was open to anyartist who had joined the society (whose dues wereminimal), and the response had been overwhelming,with over twelve hundred artists contributing over twothousand pieces.

A similar vision among the Siouan tribes turnsthe warrior into a Heyoka, who also exhibits the

clown-like behavior of the Windigokan, the useof sacking as a war shirt, and plastering thebody with mud....... Psychologically the Heyokawas of immense importance, as were similarcharacters among numerous other tribes.During periods of happiness and plenty he sawonly gloom and despair, and could be goadedinto providing hours of harmless amusementwhen he gorged himself on buffalo ribs whilecomplaining there was no food in the camp, ordeclared he was dirty and proceeded to wash ina bath of mud....... Yet behind this benign faceof the Heyoka there lurked the ever-present fearthat he was possessed by the spirit of Iktomi,and was therefore unpredictable and potentiallydangerous. He, after all, was the only personwho dared challenge the super-naturals even ifhe was in dread of a common camp dog andwould run screaming in fright if one approachedtoo close. Thus he made a mockery of thepretensions of some of the warriors, but at thesame time emphasized the fact that the powerswhich guided and protected them in battle wereof such strength that only a Heyoka mightoppose them.

WARRIORS: WARFARE AND THE NATIVEAMERICAN INDIAN, NORMAN BANCROFT

HUNT, 1995

The society's board of directors included collectors

like Walter Arensberg and artists like Man Ray andthe twenty-nine-year-old Marcel Duchamp, aFrenchman then living in New York. It was Duchamp,as head of the Hanging Committee, who decided tomake the exhibition radically democratic: he hung theworks in alphabetical order, beginning with a letterdrawn from a hat. The system led to cubist still lifesbeing hung next to traditional landscapes, amateurphotographs, and the occasional lewd work bysomeone apparently insane. Some of the organizersloved this plan, others were disgusted and quit.

A few days before the exhibition was to open, thesociety received the strangest work so far: a urinalmounted on its back, with the words R. MUTT 1917painted in large black letters on its rim. The work wascalled Fountain, and it was apparently submitted by aMr. Mutt, along with the requisite membership fee. Inviewing the piece for the first time, the painter GeorgeBellows, a member of the society's board, claimed itwas indecent and that the society could not exhibit it.Arensberg disagreed: he said he could discern aninteresting work of art in its shape and presentation."This is what the whole exhibit is about," he toldBellows. "An opportunity to allow the artist to send inanything he chooses, for the artist to decide what isart, not someone else."

Bellows was unmoved. Hours before the exhibitionopened, the board met and voted by a slim marginnot to show the piece. Arensberg and Duchampimmediately resigned. In newspaper articles reportingthis controversy, the object was politely referred to as

a "bathroom fixture." It piqued a lot of curiosity, and anair of mystery pervaded the entire affair.

At the time of the exhibition, Duchamp was one of agroup of artists who published a magazine called TheBlind Man. The magazine's second issue included aphotograph of Fountain taken by the greatphotographer Alfred Stieglitz, who lit the urinalbeautifully so that a shadow fell over it like a kind ofveil, giving it a slightly religious appearance, alongwith something vaguely sexual in the arguably vaginalshape of the urinal when laid on its back. The BlindMan also ran an editorial, "The Richard Mutt Case,"that defended the work and criticized its exclusionfrom the show: "Mr. Mutt's fountain is not immoral...nomore than a bathtub is immoral.... Whether Mr. Muttwith his own hands made the fountain or not has noimportance. He CHOSE it. He took an ordinary articleof life, placed it so that its useful significancedisappeared under the new title and point of view--created a new thought for that object."

It soon became clear that the "creator" of Fountainwas none other than Duchamp. And over the yearsthe work began to assume a life of its own, eventhough it mysteriously disappeared from Stieglitz'sstudio and was never found again. For some reasonthe photograph and the story of Fountain inspiredendless ideas about art and artmaking. The workitself had strange powers to shock and compel. In1953 the Sidney Janis Gallery, New York, wasauthorized by Duchamp to exhibit a replica of

Fountain over its entrance door, a sprig of mistletoeemerging from the bowl. Soon more replicas wereappearing in galleries, retrospective exhibitions ofDuchamp's work, and museum collections. Fountainbecame a fetish object, something to collect.Replicas of it have sold for over $1 million.

Everyone seems to see what they want to see inthe piece. Shown in museums, it often still outragesthe public, some disturbed by the urinal itself, othersby its presentation as art. Critics have writtenextended articles on the urinal, with all kinds ofinterpretations: in staging Fountain, Duchamp wasurinating on the art world; he was playing with notionsof gender; the piece is an elaborate verbal pun; onand on. What some of the organizers of the 1917show believed to be merely an indecent objectunworthy of being considered art has somehowturned into one of the most controversial, scandalous,and analyzed works of the twentieth century.

InterpretationThroughout the twentieth century, many artists wieldedinfluence by being unconventional: the Dadaists, thesurrealists, Pablo Picasso, Salvador Dali--the list islong. But of all of them, it is Marcel Duchamp who hasprobably had the greatest impact on modern art, andwhat he called his "readymades" are perhaps themost influential of all his works. The readymades areeveryday objects--sometimes exactly as they weremade (a snow shovel, a bottle rack), sometimesslightly altered (the urinal laid on its back, the

mustache and goatee drawn on a reproduction of TheMona Lisa)--"chosen" by the artist and then placed ina gallery or museum. Duchamp was giving the ideasof art priority over its images. His readymades, banaland uninteresting in themselves, inspired all kinds ofassociations, questions, and interpretations; a urinalmay be a seedy commonplace, but to present it as artwas utterly unconventional and stirred up angry,irritating, delirious ideas.

Understand: in war, politics, and culture, what isunconventional, whether it is Hannibal's elephants andoxen or Duchamp's urinal, is never material--or ratherit is never just material. The unconventional can onlyarise out of the mind: something surprises, is not whatwe expected. We usually base our expectations onfamiliar conventions, cliches, habits of seeing, theordinary. Many artists, writers, and other producers ofculture seem to believe it the height ofunconventionality to create images, texts, and otherworks that are merely weird, startling, or shocking insome way. These works may generate a momentarysplash, but they have none of the power of theunconventional and extraordinary because they haveno context to rub against; they do not work against ourexpectations. No more than strange, they quickly fadefrom memory.

When striving to create the extraordinary, alwaysremember: what is crucial is the mental process, notthe image or maneuver itself. What will truly shock andlinger long in the mind are those works and ideas thatgrow out of the soil of the ordinary and banal, that are

unexpected, that make us question and contest thevery nature of the reality we see around us. Mostdefinitely in art, the unconventional can only bestrategic.

Authority: In general, in battle one engagesthe enemy with the orthodox and gainsvictory through the unorthodox.... Theunorthodox and the orthodox mutuallyproduce each other, just like an endlesscycle. Who can exhaust them?

--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALThere is never any value in attacking opponents froma direction or in a way that they expect, allowing themto stiffen their resistance--that is, unless your strategyis suicide.

OCCUPY THE MORAL HIGH GROUNDTHE RIGHTEOUS STRATEGY

In a political world, the cause you are fighting formust seem more just than the enemy's. Think of thisas moral terrain that you and the other side arefighting over; by questioning your enemies' motivesand making them appear evil, you can narrow theirbase of support and room to maneuver. Aim at thesoft spots in their public image, exposing anyhypocrisies on their part. Never assume that thejustice of your cause is self-evident; publicize andpromote it. When you yourself come under moralattack from a clever enemy, do not whine or getangry; fight fire with fire. If possible, position yourselfas the underdog, the victim, the martyr. Learn toinflict guilt as a moral weapon.

THE MORAL OFFENSIVEIn 1513 the thirty-seven-year-old Giovanni de' Medici,son of the illustrious Florentine Lorenzo de' Medici,was elected pope and assumed the name Leo X. Thechurch that Leo now led was in many ways thedominant political and economic power in Europe,and Leo--a lover of poetry, theater, and painting, likeothers in his famous family--wanted to make it also agreat patron of the arts. Earlier popes had begun thebuilding of the basilica of St. Peter's in Rome, the

preeminent seat of the Catholic Church, but had leftthe structure unfinished. Leo wanted to complete thismighty project, permanently associating it with hisname, but he would need to raise a fair amount ofcapital to be able to pay for the best artists to work onit.

And so in 1517, Leo launched a campaign to sellindulgences. Then as now, it was Catholic practice forthe faithful to confess their sins to their priest, whowould enforce their contrition by assigning them apenance, a kind of worldly punishment. Today thismight simply be a prayer or a counting of the rosary,but penances were once more severe, including fastsand pilgrimages--or financial payments known asindulgences. The nobility might pay an indulgence inthe form of a saintly relic purchased for their church, alarge expense that would translate into the promise ofa reduced time spent in purgatory after death(purgatory being a kind of halfway house for those notevil enough for hell, not good enough for heaven, soforced to wait); the lower classes might pay a smallerfee to buy forgiveness for their sins. Indulgences werea major source of church income.

For this particular campaign, Leo unleashed asquadron of expert indulgence salesmen acrossEurope, and the money began to pour in. As his chiefarchitect for the completion of St. Peter's heappointed the great artist Raphael, who planned tomake the building a splendid work of art, Leo's lastinglegacy to the world. All was going well, until, inOctober 1517, news reached the pope that a priest

named Martin Luther (1483-1546)--some tiresomeGerman theologian--had tacked to the doors of thecastle church of Wittenberg a tract called The Ninety-five Theses. Like many important documents of thetime, the tract was originally in Latin, but it had beentranslated into German, printed up, and passed outamong the public--and within a few weeks allGermany seemed to have read it. The Ninety-fiveTheses was essentially an attack on the practice ofselling indulgences. It was up to God, not the church,to forgive sinners, Luther reasoned, and suchforgiveness could not be bought. The tract went on tosay that the ultimate authority was Scripture: if thepope could cite Scripture to refute Luther'sarguments, the priest would gladly recant them.

The pope did not read Luther's writings--hepreferred poetry to theological discussions. And asingle German priest surely posed no threat to theuse of indulgences to fund worthy projects, let alone tothe church itself. But Luther seemed to be challengingthe church's authority in a broad sense, and Leo knewthat an unchecked heresy could become the center ofa sect. Within recent centuries in Europe, the churchhad had to put down such dissident sects by the useof force; better to silence Luther before it was too late.

Leo began relatively gently, asking the respectedCatholic theologian Silvester Mazzolini, usually knownas Prieras, to write an official response to Luther thathe hoped would frighten the priest into submission.Prieras proclaimed that the pope was the highestauthority in the church, even higher than Scripture--in

fact, that the pope was infallible. He quoted varioustheological texts written over the centuries in supportof this claim. He also attacked Luther personally,calling him a bastard and questioning his motives:perhaps the German priest was angling for abishopric? Prieras concluded with the words,"Whoever says that the Church of Rome may not dowhat it is actually doing in the manner of indulgencesis a heretic." The warning was clear enough.

[Colonel John] Boyd paid particular attention tothe moral dimension and the effort to attack anadversary morally by showing the disjuncturebetween professed beliefs and deeds. Thename of the game for a moral design for grandstrategy is to use moral leverage to amplifyone's spirit and strength while exposing theflaws of competing adversary systems. In theprocess, one should influence theuncommitted, potential adversaries and currentadversaries so that they are drawn toward one'sphilosophy and are empathetic toward one'ssuccess.

THE MIND OF WAR: JOHN BOYD ANDAMERICAN SECURITY, GRANT T.

HAMMOND, 2001

Leo had much on his mind during these years,including turmoil in the Ottoman Empire and a plan tolaunch a new crusade, but Luther's response toPrieras got his attention right away. Luther wrote a

text in which he mercilessly took apart Prieras'swritings--the church, he argued, had failed to answerhis charges and to base its arguments on Scripture.Unless its authority in granting indulgences andexcommunicating heretics was rooted in the Bible, itwas not spiritual in nature but worldly, political, andthat kind of authority could and should be challenged.Luther published his text alongside Prieras's, allowingreaders to compare the two and come to their ownconclusions. His direct quotation of Prieras, hisaudacious and mocking tone, and his use of recentlydeveloped printing technology to spread his messagefar and wide--all this was quite shocking and new tochurch officials. They were dealing with a clever anddangerous man. It was now clear to Leo that the warbetween the church and Luther was a war to thedeath.

As the pope pondered how to get the Germanpriest to Rome and try him as a heretic, Lutheraccelerated his campaign, continuing to publish at analarming rate, his tone ever more vitriolic. In An OpenLetter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,he claimed that Rome had used its spurious authorityto bully and cow the German people for centuries,turning Germany's kingdoms into vassal states. Thechurch, he said again, was a political power, not aspiritual one, and to prop up its worldly rule it hadresorted to lies, forged documents, whatever meansnecessary. In On the Babylonian Captivity of theChurch, he railed against the pope's lavish lifestyle,the whoring among the church hierarchy, the

blasphemous art Leo funded. The pope had gone sofar as to have staged an immoral and bawdy play byMachiavelli, called Mandragola, within the Vaticanitself. Luther juxtaposed the righteous behavioradvocated by the church with the way its cardinalsactually lived. It was the pope and his entourage,Luther charged, who were the real heretics, not he; infact, the pope was the Antichrist.

The central feature of the "exterior maneuver" isto assure for oneself the maximum freedom ofaction while at the same time paralysing theenemy by a multitude of deterrent checks,somewhat as the Lilliputians tied up Gulliver. Aswith all operations designed to deter, action willof course be primarily psychological; political,economic, diplomatic and military measureswill all be combined towards the same end. Theprocedures employed to achieve this deterrenteffect range from the most subtle to the mostbrutal: appeal will be made to the legal formulaeof national and international law, play will bemade with moral and humanitariansusceptibilities and there will be attempts toprick the enemy's conscience by making himdoubtful of the justice of his cause. By thesemethods, opposition from some section of theenemy's internal public opinion will be rousedand at the same time some sector ofinternational public opinion will be whipped up;

the result will be a real moral coalition andattempts will be made to co-opt the moreunsophisticated sympathizers by argumentsbased upon their own preconceived ideas. Thisclimate of opinion will be exploited at the UnitedNations, for instance, or at other internationalgatherings; primarily, however, it will be used asa threat to prevent the enemy undertaking someparticular action.... It is a point worth noting that,just as in military operations one captures aposition on the ground and thereby denies it tothe enemy, on the psychological plane it ispossible to take over abstract positions andequally deny them to the other side. The[leaders of the] Soviet Union for instance,...haveturned into their own preserve the peaceplatform, that of the abolition of atomic weapons(while themselves continuing to develop them)and that of anti-colonialism while themselvesruling the only colonial empire still inexistence.... It may therefore be that theseideological positions occupied by the forces ofMarxism may one day be "conquered" by theWest; but this presupposes that the latter in theirindirect strategy have learned the value ofthinking and calculating instead of merely tryingto apply juridical or moral principles which theirenemy can use against them at every turn.

INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGY, ANDRE

BEAUFRE, 1963

It seemed to Leo that Luther had responded toPrieras's threat by raising the temperature. Clearly thethreat had been weak; the pope had been too lenient.It was time to show real force and end this war. SoLeo wrote a papal bull threatening Luther withexcommunication. He also sent church officials toGermany to negotiate the priest's arrest andimprisonment. These officials, however, came backwith shocking news that altered everything: in the fewshort years since the publication of The Ninety-fiveTheses, Martin Luther, an unknown German priest,had somehow become a sensation, a celebrity, abeloved figure throughout the country. Everywhere thepope's officials went, they were heckled, eventhreatened with stoning. Shop windows in almostevery German town contained paintings of Luther witha halo over his head. "Nine-tenths of the Germansshout 'Long live Luther,'" one official reported to Leo,"and the other tenth 'Death to Rome.'" Luther hadsomehow aroused the German public's latentresentment and hatred of the church. And hisreputation was impeccable: he was a bestsellingauthor, yet he refused the income from his writings,clearly practicing what he preached. The more thechurch attacked him, the more popular Lutherbecame. To make a martyr of him now could spark arevolution.

Nevertheless, in 1521, Leo ordered Luther toappear in the town of Worms before the Imperial Diet,

a gathering of German princes, nobles, and clergyorganized by the newly elected Holy Roman Emperor,Charles V. Leo hoped to get the Germans to do hisdirty work, and Charles was amenable: a politicalcreature, worried by the antiauthoritarian sentimentsthat Luther had sparked, he wanted the dispute over.At the Diet he demanded that the priest recant histeachings. But Luther, as usual, refused, and indramatic fashion, uttering the memorable line "Here Istand. I cannot do otherwise. God help me." Theemperor had no choice; he condemned Luther as aheretic and ordered him to return to Wittenberg toawait his fate. On the way home, however, Luther waskidnapped and taken to Warburg Castle. Thekidnapping had actually been planned and executedby his many supporters among the aristocracy; hewas safe. Living in the castle under an assumedname, he was able to ride out the storm.

Leo died that year, and within months of his death,Luther's ideas and the reforms that he had advocatedhad spread throughout Germany like wildfire. By 1526a Protestant party was officially recognized in differentparts of Europe. This was the birth of the Reformation,and with it the vast worldly power of the CatholicChurch, at least as Leo had inherited it, wasirrevocably broken. That obscure, pedanticWittenberg priest had somehow won the war.

InterpretationLuther's original intention in his Ninety-five Theseswas to discuss a point of theology: the relationship, or

lack of it, between God's forgiveness and papalindulgences. But when he read Prieras's response tohis argument, something changed in him. The popeand his men had failed to find justification forindulgences in the Bible. There was much more theycould not justify as well, such as the pope's unlimitedpower to excommunicate. Luther came to believe thatthe church needed drastic reform.

Reformation, however, would require politicalpower. If Luther simply railed at the church'swickedness from the pulpit or among his fellowpriests, he would get nowhere. The pope and his menhad attacked him personally, questioning his motives;now Luther in turn would go on the offensive, fightingfire with fire.

Luther's strategy was to make the war public,transforming his moral cause into a political one. Hedid this by exploiting the previous century's advancesin printing technology: his tracts, written in vigorous,angry language that appealed to the masses, werewidely disseminated. He chose points of attack thatwould particularly outrage the German people: thepope's decadent lifestyle, funded through the sale ofindulgences; the use of church power to meddle inGerman politics; on and on. Perhaps mostdevastating of all, Luther exposed the church'shypocrisies. Through these various tactics, he wasable to spark and stoke a moral anger that spreadlike fire, forever tainting the public's vision not just ofthe pope but of the church itself.

Luther knew that Leo would respond to him not with

arguments based on the Bible but with heavy-handedforce, which, he also knew, would only make hiscause shine all the brighter. And so with incendiarylanguage and arguments that questioned Leo'sauthority, he baited the pope into rash counterattacks.Luther already led an exemplary life, but he took itfurther by refusing all income from his writings. Thiswidely known move in effect made his goodnesstheatrical, a matter for public consumption. In a fewshort years, Luther gained so much support amongthe masses that the pope could not fight him withoutprovoking a revolution. By using morality soconsciously and publicly, he transformed it into astrategy for winning power. The Reformation was oneof the greatest political victories in history.

Understand: you cannot win wars without public andpolitical support, but people will balk at joining yourside or cause unless it seems righteous and just. Andas Luther realized, presenting your cause as justtakes strategy and showmanship. First, it is wise topick a fight with an enemy that you can portray asauthoritarian, hypocritical, and power-hungry. Using allavailable media, you strike first with a moral offensiveagainst the opponent's points of vulnerability. Youmake your language strong and appealing to themasses, and craft it, if you can, to give people theopportunity to express a hostility they already feel. Youquote your enemies' own words back at them to makeyour attacks seem fair, almost disinterested. Youcreate a moral taint that sticks to them like glue.Baiting them into a heavy-handed counterattack will

win you even more public support. Instead oftrumpeting your own goodness--which would makeyou seem smug and arrogant--you show it through thecontrast between their unreasonable actions and yourown crusading deeds. Aim at them the most witheringcharge of all--that they are after power, while you aremotivated by something higher and selfless.

Do not worry about the manipulations you will haveto resort to if you are to win this moral battle. Making apublic show that your cause is more just than theenemy's will amply distract people from the meansyou employ.

There always are concrete human groupingswhich fight other concrete human groupings inthe name of justice, humanity, order, or peace.

When being reproached for immorality andcynicism, the spectator of political phenomena

can always recognize in such reproaches apolitical weapon used in actual combat.

--Carl Schmitt (1888-1985)

KEYS TO WARFAREIn almost all cultures, morality--the definition of goodand evil--originated as a way to differentiate oneclass of people from another. In ancient Greece, forexample, the word for "good" was first associatedwith the nobility, the higher classes who served thestate and proved their bravery on the battlefield; thebad--the base, self-centered, and cowardly--weregenerally the lower classes. Over time a system of

ethics evolved that served a similar but moresophisticated function: to keep society orderly byseparating the antisocial and "evil" from the socialand "good." Societies use ideas about what is and isnot moral to create values that serve them well. Whenthese values fall behind the times or otherwise ceaseto fit, morality slowly shifts and evolves.

There are individuals and groups, however, whouse morality for a much different purpose--not tomaintain social order but to extract an advantage in acompetitive situation, such as war, politics orbusiness. In their hands morality becomes a weaponthey wield to attract attention to their cause whiledistracting attention from the nastier, less nobleactions inevitable in any power struggle. They tend toplay on the ambivalence we all have about conflictand power, exploiting our feelings of guilt for theirpurposes. For instance, they may position themselvesas victims of injustice, so that opposing them seemswicked or insensitive. Or they may make such a showof moral superiority that we feel ashamed to disagreewith them. They are masters at occupying the highground and translating it into some kind of power oradvantage.

How should a regime pursue a counterguerrillacampaign? [Colonel John] Boyd laid out anarray of tools: Undermine the guerrillas' causeand destroy their cohesion by demonstratingintegrity and competence of government torepresent and serve the needs of the people

rather than exploit and impoverish them for thebenefit of a greedy elite. (If you cannot realizesuch a political program, Boyd noted, you mightconsider changing sides now to avoid the rushlater!) Take political initiative to root out andvisibly punish corruption. Select new leaderswith recognized competence as well as popularappeal. Ensure that they deliver justice,eliminate major grievances, and connect thegovernment with its grass roots.

THE MIND OF WAR: JOHN BOYD ANDAMERICAN SECURITY, GRANT T.

HAMMOND, 2001

Let us call these strategists "moral warriors." Thereare generally two types: unconscious and conscious.Unconscious moral warriors tend to be motivated byfeelings of weakness. They may not be so good at thestraightforward game of power, so they function bymaking other people feel guilty and morally inferior--an unconscious, reflexive way of leveling the playingfield. Despite their apparent fragility, they aredangerous on an individual level, because they seemso sincere and can have great power over people'semotions. Conscious moral warriors are those whouse the strategy knowingly. They are most dangerouson a public level, where they can take the high groundby manipulating the media. Luther was a consciousmoral warrior, but, being also a genuine believer inthe morality he preached, he used the strategy only to

help him in his struggle with the pope; slipperier moralwarriors tend to use it indiscriminately, adapting it towhatever cause they decide to take on.

It is a world not of angels but of angles, wheremen speak of moral principles but act on powerprinciples; a world where we are always moraland our enemies always immoral.

RULES FOR RADICALS, SAUL D. ALINSKY,1909-1972

The way to combat moral warriors in general isindicated by certain strategies that have evolved inmodern warfare itself. The French officer and writerAndre Beaufre has analyzed the use of morality as amilitary strategy in the contexts of the French-Algerianwars of the 1950s and of the Vietnam wars fought byfirst France and then the United States. Both theAlgerians and the North Vietnamese worked hard toframe each of their respective conflicts as a war ofliberation fought by a nation struggling for its freedomagainst an imperialist power. Once this view wasdiffused in the media and accepted by many in theFrench and American publics, the insurgents wereable to court international support, which in turnserved to isolate France and the United States in theworld community. Appealing directly to groups withinthese countries that were latently or overtlysympathetic to or at least ambivalent about theircause, they were able to sap support for the war fromwithin. At the same time, they cleverly disguised the

many nasty maneuvers to which they themselvesresorted to fight their guerrilla wars. As a result, in theeyes of the world, they dominated the moralbattlefield, enormously inhibiting France's andAmerica's freedom of action. Stepping gingerlythrough a political and moral minefield, these powerscould not fight their wars in a winnable manner.

Beaufre calls the strategic use of morality an"exterior maneuver," for it lies outside the territorybeing fought over and outside battlefield strategy. Ittakes place in its own space--its own moral terrain.For Beaufre both France and the United States madethe mistake of ceding the high ground to the enemy.Because both countries had rich democratictraditions and saw their wars as justified, theyassumed that others would perceive these strugglesthe same way. They saw no need to fight for the moralterrain--and that was a fatal mistake. Nations todaymust play the public game, deflecting their enemies'attempts to portray them as evil. Without appearing towhine about what the other side is doing, they mustalso work to expose their enemies' hypocrisies,taking the war to the moral court themselves--fightingon apparently moral terms. Cede the moral terrain tothe other side and you limit your freedom of action:now anything you might have to do that ismanipulative yet necessary will feed the unjust imagethe enemy has publicized, and you will hesitate totake such action.

This has great relevance to all forms of conflict.When your enemies try to present themselves as

more justified than you are, and therefore more moral,you must see this move for what it most often is: not areflection of morality, of right and wrong, but a cleverstrategy, an exterior maneuver. You can recognize anexterior maneuver in a number of ways. First, themoral attack often comes out of left field, havingnothing to do with what you imagine the conflict isabout. Something you have done in a completelydifferent arena is dredged up as a way to drain yoursupport or inject you with guilt. Second, the attack isoften ad hominem; rational argument is met with theemotional and personal. Your character, rather thanthe issue you are fighting over, becomes the groundof the debate. Your motives are questioned and giventhe darkest turn.

Humanity as such cannot wage war because ithas no enemy, at least not on this planet. Theconcept of humanity excludes the concept ofthe enemy, because the enemy does not ceaseto be a human being--and hence there is nospecific differentiation in that concept. That warsare waged in the name of humanity is not acontradiction of this simple truth; quite thecontrary, it has an especially intensive politicalmeaning. When a state fights its political enemyin the name of humanity, it is not a war for thesake of humanity, but a war wherein a particularstate seeks to usurp a universal conceptagainst its military opponent. At the expense of

its opponent, it tries to identify itself withhumanity in the same way as one can misusepeace, justice, progress, and civilization inorder to claim these as one's own and to denythe same to the enemy. The concept ofhumanity is an especially useful ideologicalinstrument of imperialist expansion, and in itsethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicleof economic imperialism. Here one is remindedof a somewhat modified expression ofProudhon's: whoever invokes humanity wants tocheat. To confiscate the word humanity, toinvoke and monopolize such a term probablyhas certain incalculable effects, such asdenying the enemy the quality of being humanand declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity;and a war can thereby be driven to the mostextreme inhumanity.

THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, CARLSCHMITT, 1932

Once you realize you are under attack by a moralwarrior using the exterior maneuver, it is vital to keepcontrol of your emotions. If you complain or lash outangrily, you just look defensive, as if you hadsomething to hide. The moral warrior is beingstrategic; the only effective response is to bestrategic, too. Even if you know that your cause is just,you can never assume that the public sees it thesame way. Appearances and reputation rule in

today's world; letting the enemy frame these things toits liking is akin to letting it take the most favorableposition on the battlefield. Once the fight for moralterrain has begun, you must fight to occupy the highground in the same way you would in a shooting war.

Like any form of warfare, moral conflict has bothoffensive and defensive possibilities. When you areon the offense, you are actively working to destroy theenemy's reputation. Before and during the AmericanRevolution, the great propagandist Samuel Adamstook aim at England's reputation for being fair-minded, liberal, and civilized. He poked holes in thismoral image by publicizing England's exploitation ofthe colonies' resources and simultaneous exclusion oftheir people from democratic processes. Thecolonists had had a high opinion of the English, butnot after Adams's relentless campaign.

To succeed, Adams had to resort to exaggeration,picking out and emphasizing the cases in which theEnglish were heavy-handed. His was not a balancedpicture; he ignored the ways in which the English hadtreated the colonies rather well. His goal was not tobe fair but to spark a war, and he knew that thecolonists would not fight unless they saw the war asjust and the British as evil. In working to spoil yourenemy's moral reputation, do not be subtle. Makeyour language and distinctions of good and evil asstrong as possible; speak in terms of black and white.It is hard to get people to fight for a gray area.

Revealing your opponent's hypocrisies is perhapsthe most lethal offensive weapon in the moral arsenal:

people naturally hate hypocrites. This will work,however, only if the hypocrisy runs deep; it has toshow up in their values. Few will care about someinnocuous self-contradictory comment made or votetaken long ago, but enemies who trumpet certainvalues as inherent to their side yet who do not alwaysadhere to those values in reality make juicy targets.The Algerian and North Vietnamese propagandacampaigns were so destructive in part because of thediscrepancy they were able to show between thevalues of freedom and liberty espoused by Franceand the United States and the actions those countrieswere taking to squash national independencemovements. Both nations seemed hypocritical.

If a fight with your enemies is inevitable, alwayswork to make them start it. In 1861, PresidentAbraham Lincoln maneuvered carefully to make theSouth shoot first at Fort Sumter, initiating the CivilWar. That put Lincoln on the moral high ground andwon over many ambivalent Northerners to his side.Similarly, even if you are fighting a war of aggression,your goal to take from your enemy, find a way topresent yourself not as a conqueror but as a liberator.You are fighting not for land or money but to freepeople suffering under an oppressive regime.

In general, in a conflict that is potentially nasty, inwhich you are certain the enemy will resort to almostanything, it is best that you go on the offensive withyour moral campaign and not wait for their attacks.Poking holes in the other side's reputation is easierthan defending your own. The more you stay on the

offensive, the more you can distract the public fromyour own deficiencies and faults--and faults areinevitable in war. If you are physically and militarilyweaker than your enemy, all the more reason to mountan exterior maneuver. Move the battle to the moralterrain, where you can hamstring and beat a strongerfoe.

The best defense against moral warriors is to givethem no target. Live up to your good name; practicewhat you preach, at least in public; ally yourself withthe most just causes of the day. Make your opponentswork so hard to undermine your reputation that theyseem desperate, and their attacks blow up in theirfaces. If you have to do something nasty and not inharmony with your stated position or public image,use a cat's-paw--some agent to act for you and hideyour role in the action. If that is not possible, thinkahead and plan a moral self-defense. At all costsavoid actions that carry the taint of hypocrisy.

A stain on your moral reputation can spread like aninfection. As you scramble to repair the damage, youoften inadvertently publicize the doubts it has openedup, which simply makes things worse. So be prudent:the best defense against a moral attack is to haveinoculated yourself against it beforehand, byrecognizing where you may be vulnerable and takingpreventive measures. When Julius Caesar crossedthe Rubicon and initiated the Civil War againstPompey, he was highly vulnerable to the charge oftrying to usurp the authority of the Roman Senate inorder to become a dictator. He inoculated himself

against these charges by acting mercifully toward hisenemies in Rome, making important reforms, andgoing to the extreme in showing his respect for theRepublic. By embracing some of the principles of hisenemies, he kept their attempts at moral infectionfrom spreading.

Wars are most often fought out of self-interest: anation goes to war to protect itself against aninvading, or potentially dangerous, enemy or to seizea neighbor's land or resources. Morality is sometimesa component in the decision--in a holy war orcrusade, for example--but even here self-interestusually plays a role; morality is often just a cover forthe desire for more territory, more riches, morepower. During World War II, the Soviet Union becamea beloved ally of the United States, playing a key rolein the defeat of Hitler, but after the war it becameAmerica's darkest enemy. American self-interest, notthe Soviets, had changed.

Wars of self-interest usually end when the winner'sinterests are satisfied. Wars of morality are oftenlonger and bloodier: if the enemy is seen as evil, asthe infidel, it must be annihilated before the war canend. Wars of morality also churn up uncontrollableemotions. Luther's moral campaign against Romegenerated such hatred that in the subsequent invasionof the Holy City by the troops of Charles V, in 1527,German soldiers went on a six-month rampageagainst the church and its officials, committing manyatrocities in what came to be known as "the sack ofRome."

Successful wickedness hath obtained the namevirtue...when it is for the getting of the kingdom.

THOMAS HOBBES, 1588-1679

As in war, so in life. When you are involved in aconflict with another person or group, there issomething you are fighting over, something each sidewants. This could be money, power and position, onand on. Your interests are at stake, and there is noneed to feel guilty about defending them. Suchconflicts tend not to be too bloody; most people are atleast somewhat practical and see the point inpreventing a war from going on too long. But thosepeople who fight out of a moral sense can sometimesbe the most dangerous. They may be hungry forpower and are using morality as a cover; they may bemotivated by some dark and hidden grievance; but inany case they are after more than self-interest. Even ifyou beat them, or at least defend yourself againstthem successfully, discretion here may be the betterpart of valor. Avoid wars of morality if you can; theyare not worth the time and dirty feelings they churn up.

Authority: The pivot of war is nothing butname and righteousness. Secure a goodname for yourself and give the enemy a badname; proclaim your righteousness andreveal the unrighteousness of the enemy.Then your army can set forth in a greatmomentum, shaking heaven and earth.--Tou Bi Fu Tan, A Scholar's Dilettante Remarks

on War (sixteenth century A.D.)

REVERSALA moral offensive has a built-in danger: if people cantell what you are doing, your righteous stance maydisgust and alienate them. Unless you are facing avicious enemy, it is best to use this strategy with alight touch and never seem shrill. Moral battles are forpublic consumption, and you must constantly gaugetheir effect, lowering or raising the heat accordingly.

DENY THEM TARGETSTHE STRATEGY OF THE VOID

The feeling of emptiness or void--silence, isolation,nonengagement with others--is for most peopleintolerable. As a human weakness, that fear offersfertile ground for a powerful strategy: give yourenemies no target to attack, be dangerous butelusive and invisible, then watch as they chase youinto the void. This is the essence of guerrilla warfare.Instead of frontal battles, deliver irritating butdamaging side attacks and pinprick bites. Frustratedat their inability to use their strength against yourvaporous campaign, your opponents will growirrational and exhausted. Make your guerrilla warpart of a grand political cause--a people's war--thatcrests in an irresistible revolution.

THE LURE OF THE VOIDIn 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte of France and CzarAlexander I of Russia signed a treaty of alliance. Nowthe period's two great military powers were linked.But this treaty was unpopular with the Russian court--among other things it allowed Napoleon nearly freerein in Poland, Russia's traditional "front yard."Russian aristocrats worked to influence the czar torepudiate it. Before too long, Alexander began to takeactions that he knew would displease the French, and

by August 1811, Napoleon had had enough: it wastime to teach Russia a lesson. He began to lay plansfor an invasion. The acquisition of this vast territory tothe east would make him the ruler of the largestempire in history.

Some of Napoleon's ministers warned him of thedangers of invading such a vast country, but theemperor general felt supremely confident. TheRussian army was undisciplined, and its officers weresquabbling among themselves. Two forces inLithuania were positioned to block an invasion fromthe west, but intelligence had revealed that they wereunprepared. Napoleon would march into a centralposition between these forces and defeat them indetail. He would ensure victory by mobilizing an armythree times larger than any he had previously led:650,000 men would march into Russia, 450,000 aspart of the main attack force, the rest to secure linesof communication and supply. With an army this size,he could dominate even the large spaces of Russia,overwhelming the feeble enemy not only with his usualbrilliant maneuvers but with superior firepower.

Napoleon may have felt certain of victory, but hewas not a reckless man. As always, he studied thesituation from every angle. He knew, for instance, thatRussian roads were notoriously bad, local foodsupplies were meager, the climate tended toextremes of heat and cold, and the vast distancesmade it much harder to encircle the enemy--there wasalways room to retreat. He read up on the failedinvasion of Russia by the king of Sweden, Charles XII,

in 1709, and anticipated that the Russians mightrevert to a scorched-earth policy. His army wouldhave to be as self-sufficient as possible (thedistances were too great to have extended supplylines from Europe), but, given its size, that wouldrequire incredible planning and organization.

To help provide for his army, Napoleon had vaststorehouses close to the borders of Russia filled withwheat and rice. He knew it would be impossible toprovide fodder for the 150,000 horses of his army,and so, thinking ahead, he decided they would haveto wait until June for the invasion, when the grasses ofthe Russian plains would be rich and green. At thelast minute, he learned Russia had very few mills togrind grain into flour, so he added to his growing listthe need to bring materials to build mills along theway. With the logistical problems addressed and hisusual well-devised strategy in hand, Napoleon told hisministers that he foresaw complete victory within threeweeks. In the past, these predictions of Napoleon'shad been uncannily accurate.

In June 1812, Napoleon's vast armada of men andsupplies crossed into Russia. Napoleon alwaysplanned for the unexpected, but this timeunmanageable difficulties began to pile up almostimmediately: rain, the bad roads, the intense summerheat brought the army's movements to a crawl. Withindays more than 10,000 horses ate rank grass anddied. Supplies were failing to reach the forwardtroops fast enough, and they had to resort to foraging,but the uncooperative Russian peasants along the

march not only refused to sell their food at any pricebut burned their hay rather than let the French have it.More French horses died when they were forced tofeed off the thatch in the roofs of houses, only to findthe houses collapsing on them. The two Russianarmies in Lithuania retreated too fast to be caught,and as they went, they burned crops and destroyed allstorehouses of food. Dysentery quickly spreadthrough the French troops; some nine hundred mendied each day.

In his effort to catch and destroy at least a part ofhis elusive enemy, Napoleon was compelled to marchever farther east. At points he came tantalizingly closeto the more northern of the two Russian armies, buthis exhausted men and horses could not move fastenough to meet or encircle it, and it easily escapedhis traps each time. June bled into July. Now itbecame clear that the Russians would be able to jointheir two armies at Smolensk, over 200 miles east ofwhere Napoleon had intended to fight them and amere 280 miles from Moscow. Napoleon had to call ahalt and rethink his plan.

In addition to wasting an ever-increasingproportion of French manpower, the elusiveRussian tactics also contributed to the mentalas well as physical exhaustion of Napolean'sforces. Tip and run raids by small bands ofCossacks were continuous and exercised abaleful influence far in excess of the militarydanger they represented. The French army

became increasingly subject to fits of the jitters.Captain Roeder noted one typical example inhis diary. The Hessian troops were musteringfor parade before the Emperor's quarters atVitebsk on August 17, when "everything wassuddenly thrown into ridiculous uproar becausea few Cossacks had been sighted, who weresaid to have carried off a forager. The entiregarrison sprang to arms, and when they hadridden out it was discovered that we were reallysurrounded by only a few dozen Cossacks whowere dodging about hither and thither. In thisway they will be able to bring the whole garrisonto hospital in about fourteen days without losinga single man."THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON, DAVID G.

CHANDLER, 1966

Thousands of French soldiers had succumbed todisease and hunger without a single battle's beingfought. The army was strung out along a 500-mile line,parts of which were constantly harassed by smalltroops of Cossacks on horseback, sowing terror withtheir bloodthirsty raids. Napoleon could not allow thechase to go on any longer--he would march his men toSmolensk and fight the decisive battle there.Smolensk was a holy city, with great emotionalsignificance to the Russian people. Surely theRussians would fight to defend it rather than let it bedestroyed. He knew that if he could only meet the

Russians in battle, he would win.And so the French moved on Smolensk, arriving

there in mid-August, their 450,000-man attack forcereduced to 150,000 and worn down by the intenseheat. Finally, as Napoleon had predicted, theRussians made a stand here--but only briefly; afterseveral days of fighting, they retreated yet again,leaving behind a burned and ruined city with nothing init to feed on or plunder. Napoleon could notunderstand the Russian people, who seemed to himsuicidal--they would destroy their country rather thansurrender it.

Now he had to decide whether to march onMoscow itself. It might have seemed wise to waitthrough the winter at Smolensk, but that would givethe czar time to raise a larger army that would provetoo hard for Napoleon to handle with his own depletedforces. The French emperor felt certain the czar woulddefend Moscow, the very heart and soul of Russia.Once Moscow fell, Alexander would have to sue forpeace. So Napoleon marched his haggard troops stillfarther east.

Now, at last, the Russians turned to face the Frenchin battle, and on September 7 the two armies clashednear the village of Borodino, a mere seventy-fivemiles from Moscow. Napoleon no longer had enoughforces or cavalry to attempt his usual flankingmaneuver, so he was forced to attack the enemyhead-on. The Russians fought bitterly, harder than anyarmy Napoleon had ever faced. Even so, after hoursof brutal fighting, the Russians retreated yet again.

The road to Moscow lay open. But the Russian armywas still intact, and Napoleon's forces had sufferedhorrific casualties.

Seven days later Napoleon's army, now reduced to100,000 men, straggled into an undefended Moscow.A French marshal wrote to his wife that the emperor's"joy was overflowing. 'The Russians,' he thinks, 'willsue for peace, and I shall change the face of theworld.'" In earlier years, when he had marched intoVienna and Berlin, he had been met as a conqueringhero, with dignitaries turning over to him the keys totheir cities. But Moscow was empty: no citizens, nofood. A terrible fire broke out almost immediately andlasted five days; all of the city's water pumps hadbeen removed--an elaborate sabotage to makeMoscow still more inhospitable.

Napoleon sent letters to the czar, offering generousterms of peace. At first the Russians seemed willingto negotiate, but the weeks went by, and it finallybecame clear that they were dragging out the talks tobuy time to build up their army--and to let winter growcloser.

Napoleon could not risk staying in Moscow anotherday; the Russians would soon be able to encircle hisnow meager force. On October 19 he marched theremains of his army out of the Russian capital. Hisgoal was to get to Smolensk as fast as possible. Nowthose undisciplined bands of Cossacks that hadharassed him on the road east had formed into largerdivisions--guerrilla forces of 500 men--and every daythey killed off more and more French soldiers.

Marching in constant fear, Napoleon's men rarelyslept. Thousands succumbed to fatigue and hunger.Napoleon was forced to lead them past thenightmarish fields of Borodino, still crowded withFrench corpses, many half eaten by wolves. The snowbegan to fall--the Russian winter set in. The Frenchhorses died from the cold, and every last soldier hadto trudge through the snow on foot. Barely 40,000made it to Smolensk.

The cold was worsening. There was no time to tarryin Smolensk. Through some deft maneuvering,Napoleon managed to get his troops across theBerezina River, allowing them a clear line of retreat tothe west. Then, in early December, hearing of a failedcoup d'etat at home in France, he left his troopsbehind and headed for Paris. Of the 450,000 men inhis main attack force, some 25,000 made it back.Few among the rest of the army survived as well.Napoleon had miraculously escaped to fight morewars, but he would never recoup his losses inmanpower and horses. Russia was indeed his grave.

InterpretationBy the time Napoleon invaded Russia, CzarAlexander I had met him a number of times inprevious years and had come to know him quite well.The emperor, Alexander saw, was an aggressiveman who loved any kind of fight, even if the odds werestacked against him. He needed battles as a chanceto put his genius in play. By refusing to meet him inbattle, Alexander could frustrate him and lure him into

a void: vast but empty lands without food or forage,empty cities with nothing to plunder, emptynegotiations, empty time in which nothing happened,and finally the dead of winter. Russia's harsh climatewould make a shambles of Napoleon's organizationalgenius. And as it played out, Alexander's strategyworked to perfection. Napoleon's inability to engagehis enemy got under his skin: a few more miles east,one solid battle, and he could teach this cowardly foea lesson. His emotions--irritation, anger, confusion--overwhelmed his ability to strategize. How could hehave come to believe, for instance, that the fall ofMoscow would force the czar to surrender?Alexander's army was still intact, the French hadgrown frighteningly weak, and winter was coming.Napoleon's mind had succumbed to the powerful pullof the void that he had entered, and that led him farastray.

Alexander's strategy wreaked havoc on the Frenchsoldiers as well, who were renowned for their superiordiscipline and fighting spirit. A soldier can endurealmost anything except the expectation of a battle thatnever comes and a tension that is never relieved.Instead of battle, the French got endless raids andpinprick attacks that came out of nowhere, acontinuous threat that gradually built into panic. Whilethousands of soldiers fell to disease, many moresimply lost the will to fight.

It is human nature to not be able to endure any kindof void. We hate silence, long stretches of inactivity,loneliness. (Perhaps this is related to our fear of that

final void, our own death.) We have to fill and occupyempty space. By giving people nothing to hit, beingas vaporous as possible, you play upon this humanweakness. Infuriated at the absence not just of a fightbut of any kind of interaction at all, people will tend tochase madly after you, losing all power of strategicthought. It is the elusive side, no matter how weak orsmall its force, that controls the dynamic.

The bigger the enemy, the better this strategyworks: struggling to reach you, the oversize opponentpresents juicy targets for you to hit. To create themaximum psychological disturbance, you must makeyour attacks small but relentless, keeping yourenemy's anger and frustration at a constant boil.Make your void complete: empty negotiations, talksleading nowhere, time passing without either victoryor defeat. In a world of accelerated pace and activity,this strategy will have a powerfully debilitating effecton people's nerves. The less they can hit, the harderthey will fall.

Most wars are wars of contact, both forcesstriving to keep in touch.... The Arab war shouldbe a war of detachment: to contain the enemy

by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, notdisclosing themselves till the moment of

attack.... From this theory came to bedeveloped ultimately an unconscious habit ofnever engaging the enemy at all. This chimed

with the numerical plea of never giving theenemy's soldier a target.

--T. E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom(1926)

KEYS TO WARFAREOver the centuries organized war--in all its infinitevariations, from primitive to modern, Asian toWestern--has always tended to follow a certain logic,which is so universal as almost to seem inherent tothe process. The logic is as follows: A leader decidesto take his country to war and raises an army for thatpurpose. That army's goal is to meet and defeat theenemy in a decisive battle that will force a surrenderand favorable peace terms. The strategist guiding thecampaign must deal with a specific area, the theaterof war. This area is most often relatively limited;maneuvering in vast open spaces complicates thepossibility of bringing the war to closure. Workingwithin the theater of war, then, the strategist contrivesto bring his army to the decisive battle in a way thatwill surprise the enemy or put it at a disadvantage--itis cornered, or attacked from both front and rear, ormust fight uphill. To keep his forces strong enough todeliver a mortal blow, he concentrates them ratherthan dispersing them. Once battle begins, the armywill naturally form a flank and rear that it must protectagainst encirclement, as well as lines ofcommunication and supply. It may take several battlesto end the war, as each side works to dominate thekey positions that will give it control of the theater, butmilitary leaders must try to end it as quickly aspossible. The longer it drags on, the more the army's

resources are stretched to a breaking point where theability to fight collapses. Soldiers' morale declineswith time as well.

As with any human activity, however, this positive,orderly side generates a negative, shadow side thatcontains its own form of power and reverse logic. Theshadow side is guerrilla warfare. The rudiments ofguerrilla warfare originated thousands of years ago,when smaller nations found themselves invaded bymore powerful neighbors; to survive, their armieswere forced to flee the invader, for any directengagement would have destroyed them. It soonbecame clear that the longer they fled and eludedbattle, the more they ruined the enemy's strategiesand confused it by not conforming to the usual logic ofengagement.

Such was the system Spain used against us.One hundred and fifty to two hundred guerrillabands scattered all over Spain had sworn to killthirty or forty Frenchmen a month each: thatmade six to eight thousand men a month for allguerrilla bands together. The order was never toattack soldiers traveling as a body, unless theguerrillas outnumbered them. But they fired onall stragglers, attacked small escorts, andsought to lay hands on the enemy's funds,couriers, and especially convoys. As all theinhabitants acted as spies for their fellowcitizens, the guerrillas knew when the convoys

would leave and how strong their escorts wouldbe, and the bands would make sure they weretwice the size. They knew the country very well,and they would attack furiously in the mostfavorable spot. Success often crowned theundertaking; but they always killed a lot of men,and the goal was achieved. As there are twelvemonths in the year, we were losing about eightythousand men a year, without any pitchedbattles. The war in Spain lasted seven years, soover five hundred men were killed.... But thatincludes only those killed by the guerrillas. Addthe battles of Salamanca, Talavera, and Vitoria,and several others that our troops lost; thesieges,...the fruitless attack on Cadiz; add toothe invasion and evacuation of Portugal, thefevers and various illnesses that thetemperature caused our soldiers to suffer, andyou will see that we could add a further threehundred thousand men to that number duringthose seven years....... From what has beensaid, it will be apparent that the prime aim of thissort of war is to bring about the destruction of theenemy almost without him noticing it, and as adrop of water dripping on a stone will eventuallydig a hole in the stone, patience andperseverance are needed, always following thesame system. In the long run, the enemy willsuffer more from this than he would from losing

pitched battles.ON PARTISANS AND IRREGULAR FORCES,

J.F.A. LE MIERE DE CORVEY, 1823

The next step was to take this further: these earlyguerrilla warriors learned the value of operating insmall, dispersed bands as opposed to aconcentrated army, keeping in constant motion, neverforming a front, flank, or rear for the other side to hit.The enemy would want to keep the war confined to aparticular space; better, then, to extend it over asmuch territory as possible, melting into thecountryside, forcing the enemy to disperse itself in thechase, opening itself up to raids and pinprick attacks.The enemy would naturally want a quick end to thewar, so it was desirable to drag it out as long aspossible, making time an offensive weapon thatconsumed the enemy with friction and saggingmorale.

In this way, over thousands of years and throughtrial and error, the art of guerrilla warfare developedand was refined into its present-day form.Conventional military training and thought revolvearound concentrating for battle, maneuvering withinlimited areas, and straining for the quick kill. Guerrillawarfare's reversal of this natural order of war makes itimpossible for a conventional army to counter--henceits power. In the shadow land of reverse warfare,where none of the normal rules apply, the conventionalarmy flounders. Done right, guerrilla warfare is virtuallyunbeatable.

The word "guerrilla"--"small war" in Spanish--wascoined in reference to the Peninsular War of 1808-14,which began when Napoleon invaded Spain. Meltinginto their country's mountains and inhospitable terrain,the Spaniards tortured the French, making itimpossible for them to profit from their superiornumbers and weaponry. Napoleon was bedeviled byan enemy that attacked without forming a front or rear.The Cossack fighters who undid him in Russia in1812 had learned a lot from the Spanish andperfected the use of guerrilla warfare; theirharassment caused far more damage than anythingthe rather incompetent Russian army could inflict.

This strategy has become a more powerful andprevalent tool in modern warfare for several reasons:First, by exploiting technological advances inweaponry and explosives, a small guerrilla band cancause disproportionate damage. Second,Napoleonic warfare greatly expanded the size ofconventional armies, making them much morevulnerable to hit-and-run tactics from light and mobileforces. Finally, guerrilla war has been adopted forpolitical purposes, to great effect. By infusing localpeople with the fervor of a cause, a revolutionaryleader can covertly multiply his strength: his civiliansupporters can sabotage the enemy's invading force,provide valuable intelligence, and turn the countrysideinto an armed camp.

The power of guerrilla warfare is essentiallypsychological. In conventional warfare everythingconverges on the engagement of two armies in battle.

That is what all strategy is devised for and what themartial instinct requires as a kind of release fromtension. By postponing this natural convergenceindefinitely, the guerrilla strategist creates intensefrustration. The longer this mental corrosion continues,the more debilitating it gets. Napoleon lost to theRussians because his strategic bearings werepushed off course; his mind fell before his army did.

Because it is so psychological, guerrilla strategy isinfinitely applicable to social conflict. In life as in war,our thoughts and emotions naturally converge onmoments of contact and engagement with others. Wefind people who are deliberately elusive, who evadecontact, extremely disconcerting. Whether becausewe want to grab them and pin them down or becausewe are so annoyed with them that we want to hit them,they pull us toward them, so that either way the elusiveone controls the dynamic. Some people take thisfurther, attacking us in ways that are evasive andunpredictable. These opponents can gain a disturbingpower over our minds, and the longer they keep it up,the more we are sucked into fighting on their terms.With advances in technology that make it easier tomaintain a vaporous presence, and the use of themedia as both a screen and a kind of guerrillaadjunct, the power and effectiveness of this warfare inpolitical or social battle are greatly enhanced. Inheated political times, a guerrilla-style campaign--allied with some cause--can be used to wage apeople's war against large entities, corporations,entrenched powers. In this kind of public combat,

everyone loves to fight on the guerrillas' side becausethe participants are more deeply involved in thestruggle, not mere cogs in a giant machine.

Franklin Roosevelt was a kind of political guerrillawarrior. He liked to fight evasively and strategized todeny the Republicans any targets to hit. He used themedia to make himself seem to be everywhere and tobe waging a kind of people's war against moneyedinterests. In classic guerrilla manner, he alsoreorganized the Democratic Party to make it lesscentralized, more mobile and fluid for local battles.For Roosevelt, though, the guerrilla approach was notso much a coherent strategy as a style. As many do,he unconsciously sensed the power in being evasiveand fought that way to great effect--but to make thisstrategy really work, it is better to use it consciouslyand rationally. Guerrilla strategy may be the reverseside of war, but it has its own logic, backward yetrigorous. You cannot just improvise it anarchically; youmust think and plan in a new way--mobile,dimensional, and abstract.

The primary consideration should always bewhether a guerrilla-style campaign is appropriate forthe circumstances you are facing. It is especiallyeffective, for instance, against an opponent who isaggressive yet clever--a man like Napoleon. Thesetypes cannot stand lack of contact with an enemy.They live to maneuver, outwit, and outhit. Havingnothing to strike at neutralizes their cleverness, andtheir aggression becomes their downfall. It isinteresting to note that this strategy works in love as

well as in war and that here, too, Napoleon was itsvictim: it was by a guerrilla-style seduction--byenticing him to chase her, giving tantalizing lures butoffering him nothing solid to grasp--that EmpressJosephine made him her slave.

This strategy of the void works wonders on thosewho are used to conventional warfare. Lack of contactis so outside their experience that it warps anystrategic powers they have. Large bureaucracies areoften perfect targets for a guerrilla strategy for thesame reason: they are capable of responding only inthe most orthodox manner. In any event, guerrillawarriors generally need an opponent that is large,slow-footed, and with bullying tendencies.

Once you have determined that a guerrilla war isappropriate, take a look at the army you will use. Alarge, conventional army is never suitable; fluidity andthe ability to strike from many angles are what counts.The organizational model is the cell--a relatively smallgroup of men and women, tight-knit, dedicated, self-motivated, and spread out. These cells shouldpenetrate the enemy camp itself. This was how MaoTse-tung organized his army in the ChineseRevolution, infiltrating the Nationalist side, causingsabotage in the cities, leaving the deceptive andterrifying impression that his men were everywhere.

When U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd joined thePentagon in the late 1960s to help develop jetfighters, he faced a reactionary bureaucracydominated by commercial interests rather thanmilitary ones. The Pentagon was in dire need of

reform, but a traditional bureaucratic war--an attemptto convince key staff directly and frontally of theimportance of his cause--would have been ahopeless venture: Boyd would simply have beenisolated and funneled out of the system. He decidedto wage a guerrilla war instead. His first and mostimportant step was to organize cells within thePentagon. These cells were small and hard to detect,giving the reactionaries nothing to hit at when theyrealized they were in a war. Boyd recruited hisguerrillas from among those dissatisfied with thestatus quo, especially the young--young people arealways more receptive to change, and they love thisstyle of fighting.

With his cells in place, Boyd had constantintelligence as to what was going on in the Pentagonand could anticipate the timing and content of theattacks on him. He could also use these cells tospread his influence through word of mouth, infiltratingever deeper into the bureaucracy. The main point is toavoid an organization's formal channels and tendencyfor bigness and concentration. Opt for mobilityinstead; make your army light and clandestine. Youcan also attach your guerrilla cells to a regular army,much as the Russian Cossacks supported the armiesof Alexander. This mix of conventional andunconventional can prove highly effective.

Once you have organized your cells, you must find away to lure the enemy into attacking you. In war this isgenerally accomplished by retreating, then turning tostrike at the enemy with constant small raids and

ambushes that cannot be ignored. This was theclassic strategy pursued by T. E. Lawrence in Arabiaduring World War I. The nineteenth-century Americanfinancial wizard Jay Gould, a man who fought manyguerrilla wars in his business life, did somethingsimilar in his daily battles. His goal was to createmaximum disorder in the markets--disorder he couldanticipate and exploit. One of his main adversarieswas the highly aggressive mogul CommodoreCornelius Vanderbilt, whom he engaged in a war forcontrol of the Erie Railroad in the late 1860s. Gouldmaintained an incredibly elusive presence; he wouldwork back channels to gain influence in, for example,the New York State legislature, which then enactedlaws undermining Vanderbilt's interests. The furiousVanderbilt would go after Gould and counterattack,but Gould would by then have moved on to someother unexpected target. To deprive Vanderbilt of thestrategic initiative, Gould upset him, fed hiscompetitive and aggressive instincts, then goadedhim further by giving him no target to counterattack.

Gould also made skillful use of the media. He mightplant a newspaper article that would suddenlysideswipe Vanderbilt, portraying him as an evilmonopolist; Vanderbilt would have to respond, butthat would only publicize the charge--and meanwhileGould's name would be nowhere in evidence. Themedia in this instance are perfect as both the smokescreen concealing guerrilla tactics and the vehicleconveying them. Use the media to goad yourenemies, getting them to disperse their energies in

defending themselves while you watch, or find a newtarget to raid and ambush. Lacking a real battle todeal with, their frustration will mount and lead them tocostly mistakes.

In conventional warfare the way you supply yourarmy is a critical issue. In guerrilla warfare, on theother hand, you live off your enemies as much aspossible, using their resources, their energy, and theirpower as a kind of supply base. Mao supplied hisarmy mostly with captured equipment and food. Gouldactually started out by infiltrating Vanderbilt's innercircle as a financial partner, then using Vanderbilt'simmense resources to fund his mayhem. Using theenemy's materiel will help you to endure the longerlength of any successful guerrilla campaign. In anyevent, you must plan to live cheaply, marshaling whatyou have for the long run.

In most conflicts time is a danger, bringing Murphy'sLaw into play: if anything can go wrong, it will. If yourarmy is small and relatively self-sufficient, though,there is less to go wrong, and meanwhile you areworking to make sure that for the enemy the passageof time is a nightmare. Morale is sinking, resourcesare stretched, and even great planners like Napoleonare finding themselves with problems they could neverhave foreseen. The effect is exponential: asunexpected problems crop up, the enemy startsmaking mistakes, which lead to more problems--andso it goes.

Make time an offensive weapon in yourstrategizing. Design your maneuvers to keep your

enemies just barely going, always thinking that onemore battle will do the trick. You want them todeteriorate slowly; a sudden sharp setback, a clearview of the trap you are laying for them, and they willpull out before the damage is done. Let them take keypositions that give them the illusion of success. Theywill hold on to them tenaciously as your raids andpinprick attacks grow in number. Then, as theyweaken, increase the pace of these attacks. Let themhope, let them think it is all still worth it, until the trap isset. Then break their illusion.

Just as you are extending time, contrary toconvention, you are also extending space. You wantto bring the fight to areas outside the theater of war, toinclude public and international opinion, turning thewar into a political and global issue and giving theenemy too large a space to defend. Political supportis invaluable to an underdog guerrilla campaign; thelonger the fight is drawn out, the more the enemyseems morally unjustified and politically isolated.Always try to ally your guerrilla campaign with a causeyou can defend as just and worthy.

You will win your guerrilla war in one of two ways.The first route is to increase the level of your attacksas your enemies deteriorate, then finish them off, asthe Russians finished off Napoleon. The other methodis by turning sheer exhaustion to your advantage: youjust let the enemy give up, for the fight is no longerworth the aggravation. The latter way is the better one.It costs you less in resources, and it looks better: theenemy has fallen on his own sword. But even a

guerrilla campaign cannot go on forever; at a certainpoint time starts to work against you as well. If theending is taking too long, you must go on theoffensive and finish the enemy off. In the VietnamWar, the North Vietnamese drew out the war to apoint where it was also costing them too much. Thatwas why they launched the Tet Offensive in 1968--togreatly accelerate the deterioration of the U.S. wareffort.

The essence of guerrilla warfare is fluidity. Theenemy will always try to adjust to what you are doing,attempting to find its feet in this unfamiliar terrain. Youmust be prepared to change and adopt whatever iscontrary to expectation: this might mean occasionallyfighting in a conventional manner, concentrating yourarmy to attack here or there, then dispersing again.Your goal is maximum disorder and unfamiliarity.Remember: this war is psychological. It is more on thelevel of strategy than anything else that you give theenemy nothing to hold on to, nothing tangible tocounter. It is the enemies' minds that are grasping atair and their minds that fall first.

Authority: Anything that has form can beovercome; anything that takes shape can be

countered. This is why sages conceal theirforms in nothingness and let their mindssoar in the void.

--Huainanzi (second century B.C.)

REVERSALA guerrilla strategy is extremely hard to counter, whichis what makes it so effective. If you find yourself in afight with guerrillas and you use conventional methodsto fight them, you play into their hands; winning battlesand taking territory means nothing in this kind of war.The only effective counterstrategy is to reverse theguerrillas' reversal, neutralizing their advantages. Youmust refuse them the freedom of time and space theyneed for their mayhem. You must work to isolatethem--physically, politically, and morally. Above all,you must never respond in a graduated manner, bystepping up your forces bit by bit, as the UnitedStates did in the Vietnam War. You need a quick,decisive victory over such an opponent. If this seemsimpossible, it is better to pull out while you can than tosink into the protracted war the guerrilla fighter istrying to lure you into.

SEEM TO WORK FOR THEINTERESTS OF OTHERS WHILE

FURTHERING YOUR OWNTHE ALLIANCE STRATEGY

The best way to advance your cause with theminimum of effort and bloodshed is to create aconstantly shifting network of alliances, gettingothers to compensate for your deficiencies, do yourdirty work, fight your wars, spend energy pulling youforward. The art is in choosing those allies who fit theneeds of the moment and fill the gaps in your power.Give them gifts, offer them friendship, help them intime of need--all to blind them to reality and putthem under subtle obligation to you. At the sametime, work to sow dissension in the alliances ofothers, weakening your enemies by isolating them.While forming convenient coalitions, keep yourselffree of negative entanglements.

THE PERFECT ALLYIn 1467, Charles, the thirty-four-year-old Count ofCharlois, received the news he had secretly longedfor: his father, the Duke of Burgundy--known as Philipthe Good--had died, making Charles the new duke.Father and son had clashed over the years. Philipwas patient and practical and during his reign had

slowly managed to expand Burgundy's alreadyimpressive holdings. Charles was more ambitiousand more warlike. The empire he inherited wasimmense, including Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, andLuxembourg to the north of present-day France, andthe important duchy of Burgundy itself in northeasternFrance. Now, as duke, Charles had the power andresources at his command to realize his dreams ofconquest into Germany and beyond.

THE DOG, THE COCK AND THE FOXA dog and a cockerel, having made friends,were strolling along a road together. As eveningfell, the cockerel flew up into a tree to sleepthere, and the dog went to sleep at the foot ofthe tree, which was hollow. According to hishabit, the cockerel crowed just before daybreak.This alerted a fox nearby, who ran up to the treeand called up to the cockerel: "Do come down,sir, for I dearly wish to embrace a creature whocould have such a beautiful voice as you!" Thecockerel said: "I shall come down as soon asyou awaken the doorkeeper who is asleep at thefoot of the tree." Then, as the fox went to look forthe "doorkeeper," the dog pounced briskly onhim and tore him to pieces. This fable teachesus that sensible men, when their enemies attackthem, divert them to someone better able todefend them than they are themselves.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

Two obstacles stood in his path. The first was theindependent Swiss cantons to Burgundy's east.Charles would have to incorporate this territory, byforce, before moving into southern Germany. TheSwiss were fierce warriors who would not take kindlyto any invasion. But in the end they could hardly matchthe size and power of the duke's army. The secondobstacle was King Louis XI of France, Charles'scousin and archrival since childhood. France thenwas still a feudal state, composed of several duchieslike Burgundy, whose dukes owed allegiance to theking. But these duchies were in fact independentpowers and could form their own league if the kingdared provoke them. Burgundy was the most powerfulduchy of them all, and everyone knew Louis dreamedof swallowing it up and making France a unitedpower.

Charles, however, felt confident that he could besthis older cousin in both diplomacy and warfare. Afterall, Louis was weak, even a little soft in the head. Howelse to explain his strange infatuation with the Swisscantons? Almost from the beginning of his reign,Louis had courted them assiduously, treating themalmost like equals to France. There were many morepowerful states he could have allied himself with toincrease France's power, but he seemed obsessedwith the Swiss. Perhaps he felt an affinity to theirsimple lifestyle; for a king, he himself had ratherpeasant tastes. Louis also had an aversion towardwarfare, preferring to buy peace, even at a high price,than to fund an army.

It was imperative that Charles strike now, beforeLouis wised up and started acting more like a king.Charles formed a plan to realize his ambitions andthen some: he would first move into Alsace, betweenFrance and Germany, and swallow up the weakkingdoms in the area. Then he would form an alliancewith the great warrior king of England, Edward IV,whom he would persuade to land a large army atCalais. His own army would link up with the English atReims, in central France, where Edward would becrowned the country's new king. The duke andEdward would easily dispose of Louis's weak army.The duke could then march east, across the Swisscantons, while Edward would march south. Togetherthey would form the dominant power in Europe.

By 1474 everything was in place. Edward hadsigned on to the plan. The duke began by marchingon the upper Rhine, but just as he began hismaneuvers, he learned that a large Swiss army hadinvaded his home territory of Burgundy. This armywas funded by Louis XI himself. By this action Louisand the Swiss were clearly sending a warning to theduke that they would not look kindly on any futureinvasion of the cantons, but Charles had enoughforces in Burgundy to drive the Swiss out. He was nota man to provoke in such a way; both parties wouldmore than pay for their rash invasion.

In the summer of 1475, the English army--thelargest yet assembled for an invasion of France--landed at Calais under the personal leadership ofEdward IV. Charles went to meet Edward to finalize

their plans and toast their imminent conquests. Hethen quickly returned to his own troops, which weremarching south through Lorraine in preparation for thegreat linkup with the English forces at Reims.

Suddenly some disturbing news reached Charles inthe field: his spies at the French court reported thatLouis had opened up secret negotiations withEdward. Apparently Louis had persuaded the Englishking that Charles was using him and could not betrusted. Knowing that England's finances were weak,Louis had offered generous terms of peace,amounting to a large annual pension paid directly tothe king and his court. He had entertained the Englishwith great feasts of food and ale. And then, to theduke's utter disgust and amazement, Edward fell forit, signed the treaty, and took his forces home.

The duke had barely had time to get over this bitternews when Louis suddenly sent him envoys to brokera long-term truce between France and Burgundy. Thiswas typical of the king--everything he did wasinconsistent and contradictory. What was he thinking?Signing the truce would mean the duke could nowconfidently march against the Swiss, knowing thatFrance would not interfere. Perhaps the king wasguided by his great fear of war? Charles happilyapproved the truce.

The Swiss were outraged: Louis had been theirfriend, and now, at the moment of imminent peril, hehad abandoned them. But the Swiss were used tofighting on their own; they would simply have tomobilize every man available.

Since in all her decisions, whether by chance orby choice, Rome took all steps necessary tomake herself great, she did not overlook fraud.She could not at the start have been moredeceitful than she was in the means she took,as we were saying just now, to acquire allies,since under this title she made them all herservants, as was the case with the Latins andother peoples round about. For she first availedherself of their arms in order to subjugateneighbouring peoples and to build up herreputation as a state, and then, having subduedthem, she increased to such an extent that shecould beat anyone. Nor would the Latins everhave realised that in reality they were mereslaves, if they had not seen the Samnites twicedefeated and forced to accept Rome's terms.THE DISCOURSES, NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI,

1520

In the dead of the winter of 1477, the duke,impatient for victory, crossed the Jura Mountainsheading east. The Swiss were waiting for him nearthe town of Grandson. This was the first time the dukehad done battle with the Swiss, and he was caught offguard by what confronted him. It began with thealarming bellow of Swiss battle horns, which echoedin the mountains, creating a frightening din. Next,thousands of Swiss soldiers advanced down theslope toward the Burgundians. They marched with

perfect precision, packed tight in phalanxes fromwhich their enormous pikes stuck out like the spinesof a giant hedgehog in motion. Their flanks and rearwere protected by halberdiers swinging spiked battle-axes. It was a terrifying sight. The duke ordered attackafter attack with his cavalry to break up the phalanxes,only to watch them being slaughtered. His artillery washard to maneuver in the mountainous terrain. TheSwiss fought with incredible fierceness, and theirphalanxes were impenetrable.

A reserve Swiss force, hidden in the woods on theBurgundian right, suddenly emerged and attacked.The duke's army fell into a headlong retreat; the battleended in a slaughter, from which the duke, however,escaped.

A few months later, it was the turn of the Swiss togo on the offensive by marching into Lorraine. InJanuary 1478 the duke counterattacked with his nowenfeebled forces; again the Burgundians were routed,and this time the duke did not escape. His body wasfinally identified on the field of battle, his head clovenin two by a Swiss halberd, his body pierced by pikes.

In the months after Charles's death, Louis XIswallowed up Burgundy, eliminating the last greatfeudal threat to a unified France. The duke hadunknowingly fallen prey to Louis's elaborate plan todestroy him without wasting a single French soldier.

Six in the third place means: He finds acomrade. Now he beats the drum, now he stops.Now he sobs, now he sings. Here the source of

a man's strength lies not in himself but in hisrelation to other people. No matter how close tothem he may be, if his center of gravity dependson them, he is inevitably tossed to and frobetween joy and sorrow. Rejoicing to highheaven, then sad unto death--this is the fate ofthose who depend upon an inner accord withother persons whom they love....

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

InterpretationKing Louis XI would eventually become known as theSpider King, infamous for the elaborate webs hewould weave to ensnare his opponents. His geniuswas to think far ahead and plot an indirect path to hisgoals--and his greatest goal was to transform Francefrom a feudal state into a unified great power.Burgundy was his largest obstacle, and one he couldnot meet head-on: his army was weaker thanCharles's, and he did not want to provoke a civil war.Before he became king, though, Louis had fought ashort campaign against the Swiss and had seen thebrutal efficiency with which their phalanxes fought andhow they used their mountainous terrain to perfectadvantage. He thought them unbeatable in war. Louisformed a plan to bait Charles into invading thecantons, where his military machine would bedestroyed.

The strands of Louis's web were finely woven. First,

he spent years courting the Swiss, forging bonds thatblinded them to his ulterior purpose. This alliance alsobefuddled the arrogant duke, who could not imaginehow Louis planned to make use of such an ally. Theking also knew that by getting the Swiss to invadeBurgundy in 1474, he would make the duke soenraged as to lose all patience in his desire forrevenge.

When Edward landed at Calais, the king hadforeseen the invasion and was ready for it. Instead oftrying to fight off this mighty opponent, he worked tocoax the English king away from his alliance withBurgundy by appealing to his self-interest: withoutrisking a single battle so far from home, Edwardwould receive a financial payment too handsome torefuse. Again thinking far in advance, Louis knew thatwhen he eventually swallowed up the wealthy duchy ofBurgundy, he would more than recoup what he washaving to pay Edward. Abandoned by the English,Charles was isolated, yet still determined to avengethe invasion of Burgundy. At this point Louis moved tosign a treaty with the duke, getting rid of the lastpossible obstacle in Charles's path to the Swisscantons. This new treaty would infuriate his Swissfriends, but what did Louis care? Friendship meantlittle to him; the Swiss would fight to defend their landwith or without him. Patient and clear about his goals,Louis used alliances as a form of bloodless warfare,crushing his opponents by getting others to do hiswork for him.

Almost all of us instinctively understand the

importance of allies. Because we operate by feel andemotion more often than by strategy, however, wefrequently make the worst kinds of alliances. Acommon mistake is to think that the more allies wehave, the better; but quality is more important thanquantity. Having numerous allies increases thechances we will become entangled in other people'swars. Going to the other extreme, we sometimes thinka single powerful ally is all we need; but allies like thattend to get what they can from us and then drop uswhen our usefulness is exhausted, just as Louisdropped the Swiss. It is in any case a mistake tobecome dependent on one person. Finally, wesometimes choose those who seem the friendliest,who we think will be loyal. Our emotions lead usastray.

THE FOX AND THE BILLY-GOATA fox, having fallen into a well, was faced withthe prospect of being stuck there. But then abilly-goat came along to that same wellbecause he was thirsty and saw the fox. Heasked him if the water was good. The foxdecided to put a brave face on it and gave atremendous speech about how wonderful thewater was down there, so very excellent. So thebilly-goat climbed down the well, thinking only ofhis thirst. When he had a good drink, he askedthe fox what he thought was the best way to getback up again. The fox said: "Well, I have avery good way to do that. Of course, it will mean

very good way to do that. Of course, it will meanour working together. If you just push your frontfeet up against the wall and hold your horns upin the air as high as you can, I will climb up onto them, get out, and then I can pull you upbehind me." The billy-goat willingly consentedto this idea, and the fox briskly clambered upthe legs, the shoulders, and finally the horns ofhis companion. He found himself at the mouthof the well, pulled himself out, and immediatelyscampered off. The billy-goat shouted after him,reproaching him for breaking their agreement ofmutual assistance....

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

Understand: the perfect allies are those who giveyou something you cannot get on your own. They havethe resources you lack. They will do your dirty work foryou or fight your battles. Like the Swiss, they are notalways the most obvious or the most powerful. Becreative and look for allies to whom you in turn havesomething to offer as well, creating a link of self-interest. To lose such allies of convenience will notdestroy you or make you feel betrayed. You must thinkof them as temporary tools. When you no longer needsuch tools, there is no love lost in dumping them.

The forces of a powerful ally can be useful andgood to those who have recourse to them...butare perilous to those who become dependent

on them.

--Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1513)

FALSE ALLIANCESIn November 1966, Murray Bowen, a professor ofclinical psychiatry at Georgetown University and oneof the world's most influential family therapists, faceda brewing crisis within his own family back home inWaverly, Tennessee. Bowen was the oldest of fivechildren. His family had operated an importantbusiness in Waverly for several generations. Thethird-oldest sibling, a brother nicknamed June, hadbeen running the business for some time. Continuallyoverworked and feeling under-appreciated, June wasnow asking for a controlling interest in the business.Their father supported him, their mother did not.Members of the extended family were taking sides.The situation was tense.

At the same time, a death in the family of June'swife had made her so despondent that it wasbeginning to affect her husband's health. A rippleeffect was spreading to the rest of the family, andBowen's sister, the second-youngest and mostunstable sibling, was beginning to display all kinds ofnervous symptoms. Bowen feared most, though, forhis father, who had a weak heart. As a familytherapist, Bowen had studied a phenomenon hecalled an "anxiety wave," in which a peripheral eventcould spark enough emotional turmoil to lead to thedeath of the family's oldest or most vulnerablemember. Somehow Bowen had to find a way todefuse this anxiety wave in his own family.

Heracles had performed these Ten Labours inthe space of eight years and one month; butEurystheus, discounting the Second and theFifth, set him two more. The Eleventh Labourwas to fetch fruit from the golden apple-tree,Mother Earth's wedding gift to Hera, with whichshe had been so delighted that she planted it inher own divine garden. This garden lay on theslopes of Mount Atlas, where the pantingchariot-horses of the Sun complete theirjourney, and where Atlas's sheep and cattle,one thousand herds of each, wander over theirundisputed pastures. When Hera found, oneday, that Atlas's daughters, the Hesperides, towhom she had entrusted the tree, were pilferingthe apples, she set the ever-watchful dragonLadon to coil around the tree as its guardian.......When at last Heracles came to the Po, the river-nymphs, daughters of Zeus and Themis,showed him Nereus asleep. He seized thehoary old sea-god and, clinging to him despitehis many Protean changes, forced him toprophesy how the golden apples could bewon....... Nereus had advised Heracles not topluck the apples himself, but to employ Atlas ashis agent, meanwhile relieving him of hisfantastic burden; therefore, on arriving at theGarden of the Hesperides, he asked Atlas to dohim this favor. Atlas would have undertaken

almost any task for the sake of an hour'srespite, but he feared Ladon, whom Heraclesthereupon killed with an arrow shot over thegarden wall. Heracles now bent his back toreceive the weight of the celestial globe, andAtlas walked away, returning presently with threeapples plucked by his daughters. He found thesense of freedom delicious. "I will take theseapples to Eurystheus myself without fail," hesaid, "if you hold up the heavens for a fewmoments longer." Heracles pretended to agree,but, having been warned by Nereus not toaccept any such offer, begged Atlas to supportthe globe for only one moment more, while heput a pad on his head. Atlas, easily deceived,laid the apples on the ground and resumed hisburden; whereupon Heracles picked them upand went away with an ironical farewell.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

The problem for Bowen was that he was also goingthrough a kind of personal and professional crisis atthe time. One of his most influential theories held thatmembers of a family were healthy to the extent thatthey could differentiate themselves from their siblingsand parents, establishing their own identity, beingable to make decisions on their own, while also beingintegrated and actively involved with the rest of thefamily. He saw this as a difficult psychic task for

anyone. A family has a kind of group ego and aninterlocking emotional network; it requires a greatdeal of effort and practice to establish autonomyoutside this system. Yet doing so, Bowen believed,though crucial for everyone, was also professionallynecessary for family therapists, who could notproperly help others if they had been unable todifferentiate themselves from their own families. Theywould carry their personal problems into theirpractice.

And indeed here was Professor Bowen, a man inhis early fifties who had worked for years on hisrelationship to his family but who found himselfsucked into the group dynamic, regressingemotionally, unable to think straight, every time hewent home to Tennessee. That made him feelprofoundly frustrated and depressed. The time hadcome, he decided, to attempt a radical personalexperiment on his next visit home.

In late January 1967, June Bowen received a lengthyletter from his brother Murray. The two men had notwritten to each other for some time; in fact, Juneresented his brother and had avoided personalencounters with him for several years, for he felt thattheir mother always took Murray's side, even though itwas June who was running the business. In the letterMurray passed on many gossipy stories about Junethat family members had told him over the years,always careful to add that Murray had better not let his"sensitive" brother hear them. Murray said he was

tired of these stories and of being told how to managehis brother. It would be better, he thought, tocommunicate with June directly. He ended the letterby saying it would be unnecessary for the two of themto see each other on his next visit home, since he hadtold him everything he wanted to say. He signed theletter "Your Meddlesome Brother."

The more June thought about this letter, the angrierit made him. Murray had deliberately churned updivision between June and his family. Then, a fewdays later, the two men's younger sister also receiveda letter from Murray, saying he had heard about heremotional distress and had written asking June totake care of her until he got home. He signed theletter "Your Worried Brother." This letter was asupsetting to the sister as June's letter had been tohim: she was tired of people treating her as if shewere sick--that only made her more anxious than shealready was. After another short interval, Murray senta third letter, this time to his mother. He mentioned theletters he had written to the others. He was trying todefuse the family crisis, he said, by attracting allattention to himself. He wrote that he had wanted toget his brother all roiled up and that he had thematerial to push even more buttons if necessary; but,he warned, it is never wise to share intelligence with"the enemy," so his mother should keep all this toherself. He signed the letter "Your Strategic Son."Thinking he had lost his mind, his mother burned theletter.

News of these letters passed quickly through the

family, stirring up a hornet's nest of accusations,concerns, and anxieties. Everyone was in a tizzyabout them, but June was the center of the storm. Heshowed Murray's letter to his mother, whom it greatlydisturbed. June promised that on Murray's imminentvisit home he would not only not avoid him but wouldconfront him and really let him have it.

Murray arrived in Waverly in early February. On thesecond night of his visit, at a dinner at his sister's,June showed up with his wife; the brothers' father andmother were also present. The encounter lasted sometwo hours, its main participants Murray, June, andtheir mother. It was a bitter family confrontation. Afurious June threatened a lawsuit over Murray'sscurrilous stories and accused his mother ofconspiring with her favorite. When Murray confirmedthat he and his mother were in cahoots, that it had allbeen plotted years ago between him and Mom, shewas outraged, denied knowledge of any plot, andsaid she would never tell Murray anything again. Junetold his own stories about his professor brother;Murray responded that they were amusing, but heknew better ones. The entire conversation centeredon personal issues, and many repressed emotionscame to the surface. But Murray remained strangelydetached. He made sure he took no sides; no onewas quite happy with what he was saying.

The next day Murray showed up at June's house--and June, for some reason, was happy to see him.Murray told more gossipy stories, including one hehad heard about how well June was handling the

situation considering all the stress he was under.June, feeling quite emotional, started to open up tohis brother about his problems: he was really worriedabout their sister, he said, even thought she might beretarded. Later that day Murray visited the sister andtold her what June had said about her; she was morethan able to take care of herself, she replied, and hadhad enough of the family's intrusive concern. Morevisits followed with other family members. In eachcase, whenever someone tried to pass along somegossip or get Murray to take his or her side in thefamily constellation, he would either deflect theattempt with a neutral comment or pass it along to theperson involved.

The day Murray left, everyone came to say good-bye. The sister seemed more relaxed; so did thefather. The family mood was noticeably altered. Aweek later Murray's mother sent him a letter thatended, "With all its ups and downs, your last trip homewas the greatest ever." June now wrote regularly tohis brother. The conflict over controlling the familybusiness was defused and settled. Murray's visitshome now became things everyone looked forwardto, even though he was still up to his old tricks withstories and such.

I regarded most of the people I met solely andexclusively as creatures I could use as portersin my voyages of ambition. Almost all theseporters sooner or later became exhausted.Unable to endure the long marches that I forced

on them at top speed and under all climaticconditions, they died on the way. I took others.To attach them to my service, I promised to getthem to where I myself was going to that end-station of glory which climbers desperately wantto reach....

THE SECRET LIFE OF SALVADOR DALI,SALVADOR DALI, 1942

Murray later wrote about the incident andincorporated what it had taught him into his training ofother family therapists. He considered it the turningpoint in his career.

InterpretationBowen's strategy in the experiment he conducted onhis family was simple: he would make it impossiblefor any family member to make him take sides orhook him into any kind of alliance. He would alsodeliberately cause an emotional tempest to break upthe stale family dynamic, particularly targeting Juneand his mother, that dynamic's centrifugal forces. Hewould make his family see things anew by gettingthem to talk about personal matters rather thanavoiding them. He would work on himself to stay calmand rational, squelching any desire either to please orto run away from confrontation.

And in the midst of this experiment, Bowenexperienced an unbelievable feeling of lightness--anear euphoria. For the first time in his life, he feltconnected to the family without being submerged by

its emotional pulls. He could engage, argue, andbanter without either regressing into childish tantrumsor striving to be falsely agreeable. The more he dealtwith the family this way, the easier it became.

Bowen also noticed the effect his behavior had onothers. First, they could not interact in their usual way:June could not avoid him, his weak sister could notinternalize all the family's problems, the mother couldnot use him as a crutch. Next, they found themselvesdrawn to him. His refusal to take sides made it easierto open up to him. The stale family dynamic of gossip,secret communications, and irritating alliances wasbroken up in one visit. And, according to Bowen, itstayed that way for the rest of his life.

Bowen transferred his theory and practice beyondthe family. He thought about his workplace, which hada family-like group ego and emotional system thatinfected him every time he was there: people wouldpull him into alliances, criticize absent colleagues,make it impossible for him to stay detached. Avoidingthese conversations solved nothing; it meant he wasstill affected by the group dynamic, just unable to dealwith it. Listening patiently to people's gossip whilewishing they would stop was equally frustrating.Bowen had to take some kind of action to disrupt thedynamic--and he found he could apply the sametactics he had used on his family, to great success.He purposefully stirred things up while staying free ofalliances. And, as with his family, he noticed thetremendous power his autonomy gave him in thegroup.

No one can get far in life without allies. The trick,however, is to recognize the difference between falseallies and real ones. A false alliance is created out ofan immediate emotional need. It requires that yougive up something essential about yourself andmakes it impossible for you to make your owndecisions. A true alliance is formed out of mutual self-interest, each side supplying what the other cannotget alone. It does not require you to fuse your ownidentity with that of a group or pay attention toeveryone else's emotional needs. It allows youautonomy.

THE LION AND THE WILD ASSA lion and a wild ass entered into an agreementto hunt wild beasts together. The lion was to usehis great strength, while the ass would make useof his greater speed. When they had taken acertain number of animals, the lion divided upthe spoils into three portions. "I'll take the firstshare because I am the king," he said. "Thesecond share will be mine because I have beenyour partner in the chase," he said. "As for thethird share," he said to the wild ass, "this sharewill be a great source of harm to you, believeme, if you do not yield it up to me. And, by theway, get lost!" It is suitable always to calculateyour own strength, and not to enter into analliance with people stronger than yourself.

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

Throughout your life you will find yourself in groupsthat demand fusion, forcing you into all kinds of falsealliances that command your emotions. You must finda way to the position of strength and power: able tointeract and engage with people while stayingautonomous. You deftly avoid false alliances by takingprovocative actions that make it impossible forpeople to entrap you. You shake up the dynamic asmuch as possible, targeting the troublemakers andcontrollers. Once you are in a position where you areable to stay rational within the group, you can seem tojoin an alliance without worrying about your emotionsrunning away with you. And you will find that as theperson who is simultaneously autonomous and part ofthe group, you will become a center of gravity andattention.

Enter into action under the cover of helpinganother's interests, only to further your own inthe end.... This is the perfect stratagem anddisguise forrealizing your ambitions, for theadvantages you seem to offer only serve as

lures to influence the other person's will. Theythink their interests are being advanced when in

truth they are opening the way for yours.--Baltasar Gracian (1601-1658)

KEYS TO WARFARETo survive and advance at all in life, we find ourselvesconstantly having to use other people for somepurpose, some need--to obtain resources we cannot

get on our own, to give us protection of some sort, tocompensate for a skill or talent we do not possess.As a description of human relationships, however, theword "use" has ugly connotations, and in any case wealways like to make our actions seem nobler than theyare. We prefer to think of these interactions asrelationships of assistance, partnering, friendship.

This is not a matter of mere semantics; it is thesource of a dangerous confusion that will harm you inthe end. When you look for an ally, you have a need,an interest you want met. This is a practical, strategicmatter upon which your success depends. If you allowemotions and appearances to infect the kinds ofalliances you form, you are in danger. The art offorming alliances depends on your ability to separatefriendship from need.

The state of Jin, located in modern Shaanhsi,grew steadily in strength by swallowing smallneighbors. There were two small states, Hu andYu, to its south. In the spring of the nineteenthyear under King Hui of Zhou (658 B.C ), DukeXian of Jin sent for a trusted minister, Xun Xi,and declared his intention to attack Hu. "Wehave little chance to gain advantage," observedXun Xi after a pause. "Hu and Yu have alwaysbeen very close. When we attack one of them,the other will surely come to its rescue. Pitchedone to one, neither of them is our match, but theresult is far from certain if we fight both of them

at the same time." "Surely you are not sayingwe have no way to cope with these two smallstates?" asked the duke. Xun Xi thought for awhile before replying.... "I have thought up aplan by which we will be able to subdue both Huand Yu. For the first step we should present theDuke of Yu with handsome gifts and ask him tolend us a path by which we can attack Hu." Theduke asked, "But we have just offered gifts to Huand signed a friendly agreement with it. We canhardly make Yu believe that we want to attackHu instead of Yu itself." "That is not so difficultto work out," replied Xun Xi. "We may secretlyorder our men on the border to make raids onHu. When the men of Hu come to protest, wemay use that as a pretext to attack them. In thisway Yu will be convinced of our professedintention." The duke considered it a good plan.Before long, armed conflicts broke out along theJin-Hu border to the south. Thereupon the dukeasked, "Now we have good reason to convinceYu of our intention to attack Hu. But it will notlend the path to us unless it receives a goodprofit in return. So what shall we use to bribe theDuke of Yu?" Xun Xi replied, "Though the Dukeof Yu is known to be very greedy, he will not bemoved unless our gifts are extremely precious.So why not offer him fine horses from Qu andjade from Chuiji?" The duke looked reluctant.

"But these are the best treasures I have. I canhardly bring myself to part with them." "I am notsurprised by your doubts," said Xun Xi."Nevertheless, we are bound to subdue Hu nowthat it has lost the shield of Yu. After Hu isconquered, Yu will not be able to survive on itsown. Therefore, when you send these gifts to theDuke of Yu, you are simply consigning the jadeto your external mansion and the horses to yourexternal stable...."...When Xun Xi was usheredinto the court of Yu and presented the gifts, theDuke of Yu's eyes bulged.... "The men of Huhave repeatedly worked up disturbances alongour border," [said Xun Xi] . "To protect ourpeople from the calamity of war, we haveexerted the highest restraint and concluded apeace treaty with Hu. Nevertheless, theimpudent Hu takes our restraint for weaknessand is now creating new troubles by makinginvidious charges against us. Therefore my lordwas compelled to order a punitive expeditionagainst Hu, and he dispatched me to ask yourpermission to let our troops pass through yourland. This way, we can get around our borderwith Hu, where its defense is strong, and launcha surprise attack at its weak point. When wehave defeated the men of Hu, we shall presentyou with splendid trophies to testify to ourmutual alliance and friendship."...That summer

the Jin troops attacked Hu by way of Yu. TheDuke of Yu led a band of force in person to joinin the expedition. They defeated the Hu armyand captured Xiayang, one of Hu's two majorcities. The Duke of Yu received his share of thebooty and believed he had nothing to regretfor....... In autumn of the twenty-second yearunder King Hui of Zhou (655 B.C.), the Duke ofJin again sent an envoy to borrow a path fromYu [to Hu], and again the Duke of Yu gave hisconsent....... In the eighth month, the Duke of Jinled six hundred war chariots and proceeded byway of Yu to attack Hu. They laid siege toShangyang, the capital of Hu.... The city, afterholding out for nearly four months, finallyyielded. The Duke of Hu fled...and Hu as afeudal state was destroyed. On their way back,the Jin troops halted at Yu. The Duke of Yucame to welcome them, receiving the Duke ofJin into the capital. The Jin troops seized thechance to storm into the city. Taken totally offguard, the Yu army submitted with littleresistance, and the Duke of Yu was takenprisoner. Duke Xian of Jin was extremelypleased when Xun Xi returned to present himwith the horses and jade as well as the capturedDuke of Yu.

THE WILES OF WAR: 36 MILITARYSTRATEGIES FROM ANCIENT CHINA,

TRANSLATED BY SUN HAICHEN, 1991

The first step is to understand that all of usconstantly use other people to help and advanceourselves. (Bowen went so far as to use his ownfamily in an experiment to solve a professionaldilemma.) There is no shame in this, no need to everfeel guilty. Nor should we take it personally when werealize that someone else is using us; using people isa human and social necessity. Next, with thisunderstanding in mind, you must learn to make thesenecessary alliances strategic ones, aligning yourselfwith people who can give you something you cannotget on your own. This requires that you resist thetemptation to let your decisions about alliances begoverned by your emotions; your emotional needs arewhat your personal life is for, and you must leave thembehind when you enter the arena of social battle. Thealliances that will help you most are those involvingmutual self-interest. Alliances infected with emotions,or with ties of loyalty and friendship, are nothing buttrouble. Being strategic with your alliances will alsokeep you from the bad entanglements that are theundoing of so many.

Think of your alliances as stepping-stones toward agoal. Over the course of your life, you will beconstantly jumping from one stone to the next to suityour needs. When this particular river is crossed, youwill leave them behind you. We will call this constantshifting yet advancing use of allies the "AllianceGame."

Many key principles of the Alliance Gameoriginated in ancient China, which was composed ofnumerous states in continual flux--now weak, nowpowerful, now weak again. War was a dangerousaffair, for a state that invaded another would stir up alot of mistrust among the others and would often finditself losing ground in the long run. Meanwhile, a statethat remained too loyal to an ally might find itselfpulled into a war from which it could not break freeand would go down in the process. The formation ofproper alliances was in some ways a more importantart than that of warfare itself, and the statesmen adeptat this art were more powerful than military leaders.

It was through the Alliance Game that the state ofChin was able to slowly expand during the dangerousWarring States period of 403-221 B.C. Chin wouldmake alliances with distant states and attack nearbyones; the nearby state that Chin had invaded couldnot get help from its outlying neighbor because thatneighbor was now allied to Chin. If Chin faced anenemy that had a key ally, it would work first to disruptthe alliance--sowing dissension, spreading rumors,courting one of the two sides with money--until thealliance fell apart. Then Chin would invade first one ofthe two states, then the other. Gradually, bit by bit, itgobbled up neighboring states until, in the late thirdcentury B.C., it was able to unify China--a remarkablefeat.

To play the Alliance Game right, today as in ancientChina, you must be realistic to the core, thinking farahead and keeping the situation as fluid as possible.

The ally of today may be the enemy of tomorrow.Sentiment has no place in the picture. If you are weakbut clever, you can slowly leapfrog into a position ofstrength by bouncing from one alliance to another.The opposite approach is to make a key alliance andstick with it, valuing trust and an establishedrelationship. This can work well in stable times, but inperiods of flux, which are more common, it can proveto be your undoing: differences in interest willinevitably emerge, and at the same time it willbecome hard to disentangle yourself from arelationship in which so much emotion has beeninvested. It is safer to bank on change, to keep youroptions open and your alliances based on need, notloyalty or shared values.

In the golden age of Hollywood, actresses hadalmost the least amount of power of anyone. Careerswere short; even a great star would be replaced in afew years by someone younger. An actress wouldstay loyal to her studio, then watch helplessly as theroles dried up. The actress who best bucked the trendwas Joan Crawford, who played her own version ofthe Alliance Game. In 1933, for instance, she met thescreenwriter Joseph Mankiewicz, then a timid youngman just starting out on what would be an illustriouscareer. Crawford recognized his talent immediatelyand went out of her way to befriend him, much to hisamazement. He went on to write nine screenplays forher, greatly lengthening her career.

Crawford would also court cameramen andphotographers, who would then work overtime to light

her well and make her look good. She might do thesame with a producer who controlled a screenplaywith a role in it she coveted. Crawford would oftenmake alliances with up-and-coming young talent whovalued a relationship with the star. Then she wouldgracefully break or forget the connection when it nolonger served her needs. Nor would she stay loyal tothe studio, or indeed to anyone--only to herself. Herunsentimental approach to her own shifting network ofalliances allowed her to avoid the trap that mostactresses found embedded in the system.

The key to playing the game is to recognize whocan best advance your interests at that moment. Thisneed not be the most obviously powerful person onthe scene, the person who seems to be able to domost for you; alliances that meet specific needs oranswer particular deficiencies are often more useful.(Grand alliances between two great powers aregenerally the least effective.) Because Louis XI had aweak army, the Swiss, though minor players on theEuropean scene, were the allies he needed.Recognizing this years in advance, he cultivated analliance that bewildered his enemies. As anambitious young congressional assistant inWashington, Lyndon Johnson realized he lacked allkinds of powers and talents to get him to the top. Hebecame a clever user of other people's talents.Realizing the importance of information in Congress,he made a point of befriending and allying himselfwith those at key positions--whether high or low--in theinformation chain. He was particularly good with older

men who enjoyed the company of a lively young manand the role of the father figure giving advice. Slowly,from being a poor kid from Texas with noconnections, Johnson raised himself to the top,through his network of convenient alliances.

It is a common strategy in bicycle races not to goout in front but to stay right behind the leader, aposition that cuts down wind resistance--the leaderfaces the wind for you and saves you energy. At thelast minute, you sprint ahead. Letting other people cutresistance for you and waste their energy on yourbehalf is the height of economy and strategy.

One of the best stratagems in the Alliance Game isto begin by seeming to help another person in somecause or fight, only for the purpose of furthering yourown interests in the end. It is easy to find such people:they have a glaring need, a temporary weakness thatyou can help them to overcome. Now you have putthem under a subtle obligation to you, to use as youwill--to dominate their affairs, to divert their energiesin the direction you desire. The emotions you createwith your offer of help will blind the other person toyour ulterior purpose.

The artist Salvador Dali was particularly adept atthis version of the game: if someone needed to raisemoney, say, Dali would come to the rescue,organizing a charity ball or other fund-raising event.The person in need could hardly resist: Dali wasfriendly with royalty, Hollywood stars, socialites. Soonhe would be ordering all kinds of elaborate props forthe ball. For his infamous "Night in a Surrealist

Forest" in Pebble Beach, California, in 1941, whichwas intended to benefit starving artists in war-tornEurope, Dali requested a live giraffe, enough pinetrees to create a fake forest, the largest bed in theworld, a wrecked automobile, and thousands of pairsof shoes from which to serve the first course. In theend the party was a smash and got all kinds ofpublicity, but, as so often with Dali, the bills farexceeded the receipts; no money was left over for thestarving artists of Europe. And strangely enough, all ofthe publicity was focused on Dali, increasing his fameand winning him more powerful allies.

A variation on the Alliance Game is to play themediator, the center around which other powers pivot.While remaining covertly autonomous, you makethose around you fight for your allegiance. This wasessentially how Prince Klemens von Metternich, theAustrian foreign minister during the Napoleonic eraand afterward, restored Austria as Europe's principalpower. It helped that Austria is located in the center ofEurope and so is strategically vital to the nationsaround it. Even during the reign of Napoleon, whenAustria was at its weakest and Metternich had to cozyup to the French, he kept his country free of lastingentanglements. Without bonding Austria to France byany legal alliance, for example, he tied Napoleon tohim emotionally by arranging for the emperor to marryinto the Austrian royal family. Keeping all of the greatpowers--England, France, Russia--at arm's length, hemade everything revolve around Austria, even thoughAustria itself was no longer a great military power.

The brilliance of this variation is that merely byassuming a central position, you can wieldtremendous power. For instance, you place yourselfat a critical point in the information chain, giving youaccess to and control over it. Or you producesomething other people depend on, giving youincredible leverage. Or you play the mediatoreveryone needs to resolve a dispute. Whatever it is,you can maintain power in this central position only bykeeping yourself unentangled and courted by all. Themoment you enter into any kind of lasting alliance,your power is greatly reduced.

A key component of the Alliance Game is the abilityto manipulate other people's alliances and evendestroy them, sowing dissension among youropponents so that they fight among themselves.Breaking your enemy's alliances is as good asmaking alliances yourself. When Hernan Corteslanded in Mexico in 1519, he faced hundreds ofthousands of Aztecs with 500 men. Knowing thatmany smaller Mexican tribes resented the powerfulAztec Empire, he slowly worked to peel them awayfrom their alliances with the Aztecs. By filling a triballeader's ears with horrible stories about the Aztecemperor's plans, for example, he might bait the maninto arresting the Aztec envoys on their next visit. Thatof course would infuriate the emperor, and now thetribe would be isolated and in danger--and wouldappeal to Cortes for protection. On and on Corteswent with this negative version of the Alliance Game,until the Aztecs' allies had become his.

Your focus here is on stirring up mistrust. Make onepartner suspicious of the other, spread rumors, castdoubts on people's motives, be friendly to one ally tomake the other jealous. Divide and conquer. In thisway you will create a tide of emotions, hitting first thisside, then that, until the alliance totters. Now formermembers of the alliance will feel vulnerable. Throughmanipulation or outright invitation, make them turn toyou for protection.

In facing an enemy that is composed of allies, nomatter how large or formidable, do not be afraid. AsNapoleon said, "Give me allies to fight." In war, alliesgenerally have problems of command and control.The worst kind of leadership is divided leadership;compelled to debate and agree before they act, alliedgenerals usually move like snails. When fighting largegroups of allies, as he often did, Napoleon alwaysattacked first the weak link, the junior partner.Collapse here could make the whole fabric of thealliance fall apart. He would also seek quick victory inbattle, even a small one, for no force is more easilydiscouraged by a defeat than an allied one.

Finally, you will of course be attacked for playingthe Alliance Game. People will accuse you of beingfeckless, amoral, treacherous. Remember: thesecharges are strategic themselves. They are part of amoral offensive (see chapter 25). To advance theirown interests, your accusers are trying to make youfeel guilty or look bad. Do not let them get to you. Theonly real danger is that your reputation will eventuallykeep people from making alliances with you--but self-

interest rules the world. If you are seen to havebenefited others in the past and as capable of doingthe same in the present, you will have suitors andplaying partners. Besides, you are loyal andgenerous, as long as there is mutual need. And whenyou show that you cannot be had by the false lure ofpermanent loyalty and friendship, you will actually findyourself treated with greater respect. Many will bedrawn to your realistic and spirited way of playing thegame.

Authority: Beware of sentimental allianceswhere the consciousness of good deeds isthe only compensation for noble sacrifices.

--Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898)

REVERSALIf you play the Alliance Game, so will those aroundyou, and you cannot take their behavior personally--you must keep dealing with them. But there are sometypes with whom any kind of alliance will harm you.You can often recognize them by their overeagernessto pursue you: they will make the first move, trying toblind you with alluring offers and glittering promises.

To protect yourself from being used in a negative way,always look at the tangible benefits you will gain fromthis alliance. If the benefits seem vague or hard torealize, think twice about joining forces. Look at yourprospective allies' past for signs of greed or of usingpeople without giving in return. Be wary of people whospeak well, have apparently charming personalities,and talk about friendship, loyalty, and selflessness:they are most often con artists trying to prey on youremotions. Keep your eye on the interests involved onboth sides, and never let yourself be distracted fromthem.

GIVE YOUR RIVALS ENOUGH ROPETO HANG THEMSELVES

THE ONE-UPMANSHIP STRATEGY

Life's greatest dangers often come not from externalenemies but from our supposed colleagues andfriends, who pretend to work for the common causewhile scheming to sabotage us and steal our ideasfor their gain. Although, in the court in which youserve, you must maintain the appearance ofconsideration and civility, you also must learn todefeat these people. Work to instill doubts andinsecurities in such rivals, getting them to think toomuch and act defensively. Bait them with subtlechallenges that get under their skin, triggering anoverreaction, an embarrassing mistake. The victoryyou are after is to isolate them. Make them hangthemselves through their own self-destructivetendencies, leaving you blameless and clean.

THE ART OF ONE-UPMANSHIPThroughout your life you will find yourself fighting ontwo fronts. First is the external front, your inevitableenemies--but second and less obvious is the internalfront, your colleagues and fellow courtiers, many ofwhom will scheme against you, advancing their ownagendas at your expense. The worst of it is that you

will often have to fight on both fronts at once, facingyour external enemies while also working to secureyour internal position, an exhausting and debilitatingstruggle.

Life is war against the malice of men.BALTASAR GRACIAN, 1601-58

The solution is not to ignore the internal problem(you will have a short life if you do so) or to deal with itin a direct and conventional manner, by complaining,acting aggressively, or forming defensive alliances.Understand: internal warfare is by natureunconventional. Since people theoretically on thesame side usually do their best to maintain theappearance of being team players working for thegreater good, complaining about them or attackingthem will only make you look bad and isolate you. Yetat the same time, you can expect these ambitioustypes to operate underhandedly and indirectly.Outwardly charming and cooperative, behind thescenes they are manipulative and slippery.

You need to adopt a form of warfare suited to thesenebulous yet dangerous battles, which go on everyday. And the unconventional strategy that works bestin this arena is the art of one-upmanship. Developedby history's savviest courtiers, it is based on twosimple premises: first, your rivals harbor the seeds oftheir own self-destruction, and second, a rival who ismade to feel defensive and inferior, however subtly,will tend to act defensive and inferior, to his or her

detriment.People's personalities often form around

weaknesses, character flaws, uncontrollableemotions. People who feel needy, or who have asuperiority complex, or are afraid of chaos, ordesperately want order, will develop a personality--asocial mask--to cover up their flaws and make itpossible for them to present a confident, pleasant,responsible exterior to the world. But the mask is likethe scar tissue covering a wound: touch it the wrongway and it hurts. Your victims' responses start to goout of control: they complain, act defensive andparanoid, or show the arrogance they try so hard toconceal. For a moment the mask falls.

When you sense you have colleagues who mayprove dangerous--or are actually already plottingsomething--you must try first to gather intelligence onthem. Look at their everyday behavior, their pastactions, their mistakes, for signs of their flaws. Withthis knowledge in hand, you are ready for the game ofone-upmanship.

Begin by doing something to prick the underlyingwound, creating doubt, insecurity, and anxiety. It mightbe an offhand comment or something that your victimssense as a challenge to their position within the court.Your goal is not to challenge them blatantly, though,but to get under their skin: they feel attacked but arenot sure why or how. The result is a vague, troublingsensation. A feeling of inferiority creeps in.

You then follow up with secondary actions that feedtheir doubts. Here it is often best to work covertly,

getting other people, the media, or simple rumor to dothe job for you. The endgame is deceptively simple:having piled up enough self-doubt to trigger areaction, you stand back and let the target self-destruct. You must avoid the temptation to gloat or getin a last blow; at this point, in fact, it is best to actfriendly, even offering dubious assistance and advice.Your targets' reaction will be an overreaction. Eitherthey will lash out, make an embarrassing mistake, orreveal themselves too much, or they will get overlydefensive and try too hard to please others, workingall too obviously to secure their position and validatetheir self-esteem. Defensive people unconsciouslypush people away.

At this point your opening action, especially if it isonly subtly aggressive, will be forgotten. What willstand out will be your rivals' overreaction andhumiliation. Your hands are clean, your reputationunsullied. Their loss of position is your gain; you areone up and they are one down. If you had attackedthem directly, your advantage would be temporary ornonexistent; in fact, your political position would beprecarious: your pathetic, suffering rivals would winsympathy as your victims, and attention would focuson you as responsible for their undoing. Instead theymust fall on their swords. You may have given them alittle help, but to whatever extent possible in their owneyes, and certainly in everyone else's, they must haveonly themselves to blame. That will make their defeatdoubly galling and doubly effective.

To win without your victim's knowing how it

happened or just what you have done is the height ofunconventional warfare. Master the art and not onlywill you find it easier to fight on two fronts at the sametime, but your path to the highest ranks will be thatmuch smoother.

Never interfere with an enemy that is in theprocess of committing suicide.

--Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES1. John A. McClernand (1812-1900) watched withenvy as his friend and fellow lawyer Abraham Lincolnrose to the U.S. presidency. McClernand, a lawyerand congressman from Springfield, Illinois, had hadthis ambition himself. Shortly after the outbreak of theCivil War, in 1861, he resigned his congressionalseat to accept a commission as a brigadier generalin the Union army. He had no military experience, butthe Union needed leadership of any kind it could get,and if he proved himself in battle, he could rise fast.He saw this army position as his path to thepresidency.

First of all, a complete definition of the technicalterm "one-upmanship" would fill, and in fact hasfilled, a rather large encyclopedia. It can bedefined briefly here as the art of placing aperson "one-down." The term "one-down" istechnically defined as that psychological statewhich exists in an individual who is not "one-up"

on another person.... To phrase these terms inpopular language, at the risk of losing scientificrigor, it can be said that in any humanrelationship (and indeed among othermammals) one person is constantlymaneuvering to imply that he is in a "superiorposition" to the other person in the relationship.This "superior position" does not necessarilymean superior in social status or economicposition; many servants are masters at puttingtheir employers one-down. Nor does it implyintellectual superiority as any intellectual knowswho has been put "one-down" by a musculargarbage collector in a bout of Indian wrestling."Superior position" is a relative term which iscontinually being defined and redefined by theongoing relationship. Maneuvers to achievesuperior position may be crude or they may beinfinitely subtle. For example, one is not usuallyin a superior position if he must ask anotherperson for something. Yet he can ask for it insuch a way that he is implying, "This is, ofcourse, what I deserve."

THE STRATEGIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY,JAY HALEY, 1963

McClernand's first post was at the head of abrigade in Missouri under the overall command ofGeneral Ulysses S. Grant. Within a year he waspromoted to major general, still under Grant. But this

was not good enough for McClernand, who needed astage for his talents, a campaign to run and get creditfor. Grant had talked to him of his plans for capturingthe Confederate fort at Vicksburg, on the MississippiRiver. The fall of Vicksburg, according to Grant, couldbe the turning point in the war. McClernand decidedto sell a march on Vicksburg as his own idea and useit as a springboard for his career.

In September 1862, on leave in Washington, D.C.,McClernand paid a visit to President Lincoln. He was"tired of furnishing brains" for Grant's army, he said;he had proved himself on the battlefield and was abetter strategist than Grant, who was a little too fondof his whiskey. McClernand proposed to go back toIllinois, where he was well known and could recruit alarge army. Then he would follow the MississippiRiver south to Vicksburg and capture the fort.

Vicksburg was technically in Grant's department,but Lincoln was not sure the general could lead theaudacious attack necessary. He took McClernand tosee Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, another formerlawyer, who commiserated with his two visitors on thedifficulties of dealing with military brass. Stantonlistened to and liked McClernand's plan. That Octoberthe onetime congressman left Washington withconfidential orders, giving him approval for his marchon Vicksburg. The orders were a little vague, andGrant was not informed of them, but McClernandwould make the best of them.

McClernand quickly recruited more soldiers than hehad promised Lincoln he would. He sent his recruits

to Memphis, Tennessee, where he would soon jointhem to march on Vicksburg. But when he arrived inMemphis, in late December 1862, the thousands ofmen he had recruited were not there. A telegram fromGrant--dated ten days earlier and waiting for him inMemphis--informed him that the general was planningto attack Vicksburg. If McClernand arrived in time, hewould lead the attack; if not, his men would be led byGeneral William Tecumseh Sherman.

McClernand was livid. The situation had clearlybeen orchestrated to make it impossible for him toarrive in time to lead his own recruits; Grant musthave figured out his plan. The general's politetelegram covering his bases made the whole affairdoubly infuriating. Well, McClernand would show him:he would hurry downriver, catch up with Sherman,take over the campaign, and humiliate Grant bywinning the credit and honor for capturing Vicksburg.

McClernand did catch up with Sherman, on January2, 1863, and immediately assumed command of thearmy. He made an effort to be charming to Sherman,who, he learned, had been planning to raidConfederate outposts around Vicksburg to soften upthe approach to the fort. The idea was heaven-sent forMcClernand: he would take over these raids, winbattles without Grant's name over his, earn himselfsome publicity, and make his command of theVicksburg campaign a fait accompli. He followedSherman's plan to the letter, and the campaign was asuccess.

At this triumphant point, out of the blue, McClernand

received a telegram from Grant: he was to haltoperations and wait for a meeting with the general. Itwas time for McClernand to play his trump card, thepresident; he wrote Lincoln requesting more explicitorders, and specifically an independent command,but he got no reply. And now vague doubts began totrouble McClernand's peace of mind. Sherman andother officers seemed cool; somehow he had rubbedthem the wrong way. Perhaps they were conspiringwith Grant to get rid of him. Grant soon appeared onthe scene with detailed plans for a campaign againstVicksburg under his own direction. McClernand wouldlead a corps, which, however, was stationed at thefaraway outpost of Helena, Arkansas. Grant made apoint of treating him politely, but everything togetheradded up to a humiliating setback.

How to be one up--how to make the other manfeel that something has gone wrong, howeverslightly. The Lifeman is never caddish himself,but how simply and certainly, often, he canmake the other man feel a cad, and overprolonged periods.

THE COMPLETE UPMANSHIP, STEPHENPOTTER, 1950

Now McClernand exploded, writing letter after letterto Lincoln and Stanton to remind them of their earlierrapport and of the support they had once given him,and complaining bitterly about Grant. After days offuming and writing, McClernand finally received a

response from Lincoln--and, to his shock and dismay,the president had somehow turned against him. Therehad been too many family quarrels among hisgenerals, wrote Lincoln; for the sake of the Unioncause, McClernand should subordinate himself toGrant.

McClernand was crushed. He could not figure outwhat he had done or how it had all gone wrong. Bitterand frustrated, he continued to serve under Grant butquestioned his boss's abilities to anyone who wouldlisten, including journalists. In June 1863, after enoughnegative articles had been printed, Grant finally firedhim. McClernand's military career was over, and withit his dreams of personal glory.

InterpretationFrom the moment he met John McClernand, GeneralGrant knew he had a troublemaker on his hands.McClernand was the type of man who thought only ofhis own career--who would steal other people's ideasand plot behind their backs for the sake of personalglory. But Grant would have to be careful: McClernandwas popular with the public, a charmer. So whenGrant figured out on his own that McClernand wastrying to beat him to Vicksburg, he did not confronthim or complain. Instead he took action.

Knowing that McClernand had an oversensitiveego, Grant recognized that it would be relatively easyto push the man's buttons. By taking over hissubordinate's recruits (technically in his departmentanyway) while apparently covering his bases in the

telegram, he forced McClernand into a rash responsethat seemed like insubordination to other military menand made it clear how far he was using the war forpersonal purposes. Once McClernand had rushed totake his troops back from Sherman, Grant stoodaside. He knew that a man like this--vain andobnoxious--would irritate the hell out of his brotherofficers; they would inevitably complain about him toGrant, who, as a responsible officer, would have topass the complaints upward, apparently withoutpersonal feelings in play. Treating McClernandpolitely while indirectly checkmating him, Grant finallygot him to overreact in the worst possible way, withhis letters to Lincoln and Stanton. Grant knew thatLincoln was tired of squabbling within the Union highcommand. While Grant could be seen working quietlyto perfect his plans for taking Vicksburg, McClernandwas acting petty and throwing tantrums. Thedifference between the two men was all too clear.With this battle won, Grant repeated it, lettingMcClernand hang himself with his unwise complaintsto the press.

There are other ways to fray nerves. During theGulf War, President Bush kept pronouncing thename of the Iraqi leader as "SAD-am," whichloosely means "shoeshine boy." On CapitolHill, the ritual mispronunciation of a member'sname is a time-tested way to rattle opponents orhaze newcomers. Lyndon Johnson was amaster of the practice. When Johnson was

Senate majority leader, writes J. McIverWeatherford, he applied it with junior memberswho voted the wrong way: "While slapping theyoung chap on the back and telling him heunderstood, Johnson would break his name intoshreds as a metaphorical statement of whatwould happen if the disloyalty persisted."

THE ART OF POLITICAL WARFARE, JOHNPITNEY, JR., 2000

You will often come across McClernands in yourdaily battles--people who are outwardly charming buttreacherous behind the scenes. It does no good toconfront them directly; they are proficient at thepolitical game. But a subtle one-up campaign canwork wonders.

Your goal is to get these rivals to put their ambitionand selfishness on display. The way to do this is topique their latent but powerful insecurities--makethem worry that people do not like them, that theirposition is unstable, that their path to the top is notclear. Perhaps, like Grant, you can take action thatthwarts their plans in some way while hiding your ownbeneath a veneer of politeness. You are making themfeel defensive and disrespected. All the dark, uglyemotions they strive so hard to hide will boil up to thesurface; they will tend to lash out, over-playing theirhand. Work to make them grow emotional and losetheir habitual cool. The more they reveal ofthemselves, the more they will alienate other people,and isolation will be their doom.

2. The Academie Francaise, founded by CardinalRichelieu in 1635, is a highly select body of France'sforty most learned scholars, whose task it is tooversee the purity of the French language. It wascustomary in the early years of the academy that whena seat became empty, potential members wouldpetition to fill it, but on the occasion of a vacant seat in1694, King Louis XIV decided to go against protocoland nominated the bishop of Noyon. Louis'snomination certainly made sense. The bishop was alearned man, well respected, an excellent orator, anda fine writer.

The bishop, however, had another quality as well:an incredible sense of self-importance. Louis wasamused by this failing, but most in the court found itdownright insufferable: the bishop had a way ofmaking almost everyone feel inferior, in piety,erudition, family pedigree--whatever they had.

Because of his rank, for instance, the bishop wasaccorded the rare privilege of being able to have hiscoach drive up to the front door of the royal residence,while most others had to get out and walk from theentrance doors of the driveway. One time thearchbishop of Paris was walking along the drivewaywhen the bishop of Noyon passed. From his carriagethe bishop waved and signaled for the archbishop toapproach him. The archbishop expected him to alightand accompany him to the palace on foot. InsteadNoyon had the carriage slow down and continued hisdrive to the front door, leading the archbishop through

the window by the arm, as if he were a dog on aleash, meanwhile chatting away superciliously. Then,once the bishop did get out of the carriage and thetwo men started up the grand staircase, Noyondropped the archbishop as if he were nobody. Almosteveryone in the court had a story like this one to tell,and they all nursed secret grudges against thebishop.

With Louis's approval, however, it was impossibleto not vote Noyon into the academy. The king furtherinsisted that his courtiers attend the inauguration ofthe bishop, since this was his first nominee to theillustrious institution. At the inauguration, customarily,the nominee would deliver a speech, which would beanswered by the academy's director--who at the timewas a bold and witty man called the abbe deCaumartin. The abbe could not stand the bishop butparticularly disliked his florid style of writing. DeCaumartin conceived the idea of subtly mockingNoyon: he would compose his response in perfectimitation of the bishop, full of elaborate metaphorsand gushing praise for the newest academician. Tomake sure he could not get into trouble for this, hewould show his speech to the bishop beforehand.Noyon was delighted, read the text with great interest,and even went so far as to supplement it with moreeffusive words of praise and high-flying rhetoric.

On the day of the inauguration, the hall of theacademy was packed with the most eminentmembers of French society. (None dared incur theking's displeasure by not attending.) The bishop

appeared before them, monstrously pleased tocommand this prestigious audience. The speech hedelivered had a flowery pomposity exceeding any hehad given previously; it was tiresome in the extreme.Then came the abbe's response. It started slowly, andmany listeners began to squirm. But then it graduallytook off, as everyone realized that it was an elaborateyet subtle parody of the bishop's style. DeCaumartin's bold satire captivated everyone, andwhen it was over, the audience applauded, loudly andgratefully. But the bishop--intoxicated by the event andthe attention--thought that the applause was genuineand that in applauding the abbe's praise of him, theaudience was really applauding him. He left with hisvanity inflated beyond all proportion.

Soon Noyon was talking about the event to one andall, boring everyone to tears. Finally he had themisfortune to brag about it to the archbishop of Paris,who had never gotten over the carriage incident. Thearchbishop could not resist: he told Noyon that theabbe's speech was a joke on him and that everyonein the court was laughing at the bishop's expense.Noyon could not believe this, so he visited his friendand confessor Pere La Chaise, who confirmed that itwas true.

WHEN TO GIVE ADVICEIn my own view (but compare Motherwell) thereis only one correct time when the gamesmancan give advice: and that is when thegamesman has achieved a useful though not

necessarily a winning lead. Say three up andnine to play at golf, or, in billiards, sixty-five tohis opponent's thirty. Most of the acceptedmethods are effective. E.g. in billiards, the oldphrase serves. It runs like this: Gamesman:Look...may I say something? Layman: What?Gamesman: Take it easy. Layman: What doyou mean? Gamesman: I mean--you know howto make the strokes, but you're stretchingyourself on the rack all the time. Look. Walk upto the ball. Look at the line. And make yourstroke. Comfortable. Easy. It's as simple as that.In other words, the advice must be vague, tomake certain it is not helpful. But, in general, ifproperly managed, the mere giving of advice issufficient to place the gamesman in apractically invincible position.

THE COMPLETE UPMANSHIP, STEPHENPOTTER, 1950

Now the bishop's former delight turned to the mostbitter rage. He complained to the king and asked himto punish the abbe. The king tried to defuse theproblem, but he valued peace and quiet, and Noyon'salmost insane anger got on his nerves. Finally thebishop, wounded to the core, left the court andreturned to his diocese, where he remained for a longtime, humiliated and humbled.

THE LION, THE WOLF AND THE FOX

A very old lion lay ill in his cave. All of theanimals came to pay their respects to their kingexcept for the fox. The wolf, sensing anopportunity, accused the fox in front of the lion:"The fox has no respect for you or your rule.That's why he hasn't even come to visit you."Just as the wolf was saying this, the fox arrived,and he overheard these words. Then the lionroared in rage at him, but the fox managed tosay in his own defence: "And who, of all thosewho have gathered here, has rendered YourMajesty as much service as I have done? For Ihave traveled far and wide asking physicians fora remedy for your illness, and I have foundone." The lion demanded to know at once whatcure he had found, and the fox said: "It isnecessary for you to flay a wolf alive, and thentake his skin and wrap it around you while it isstill warm." The wolf was ordered to be takenaway immediately and flayed alive. As he wascarried off, the fox turned to him with a smileand said: "You should have spoken well of meto His Majesty rather than ill."

FABLES, AESOP, SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

InterpretationThe bishop of Noyon was not a harmless man. Hisconceit had made him think his power had no limits.He was grossly unaware of the offense he had givento so many people, but no one could confront him or

bring his behavior to his attention. The abbe hit uponthe only real way to bring such a man down. Had hisparody been too obvious, it would not have been veryentertaining, and the bishop, its poor victim, wouldhave won sympathy. By making it devilishly subtle,and making the bishop complicit in it as well, deCaumartin both entertained the court (alwaysimportant) and let Noyon dig his own grave with hisreaction--from the heights of vanity to the depths ofhumiliation and rage. Suddenly aware of how peoplesaw him, the bishop lost his balance, even alienatingthe king, who had once found his vanity amusing.Finally he had to absent himself from court, to manypeople's relief.

The worst colleagues and comrades are often theones with inflated egos, who think everything they dois right and worthy of praise. Subtle mockery anddisguised parody are brilliant ways of one-uppingthese types. You seem to be complimenting them,your style or ideas even imitating theirs, but the praisehas a sting in its tail: Are you imitating them to pokefun at them? Does your praise hide criticism? Thesequestions get under their skin, making them vaguelyinsecure about themselves. Maybe you think theyhave faults--and maybe that opinion is widely shared.You have disturbed their high sense of self, and theywill tend to respond by overreacting and overplayingtheir hand. This strategy works particularly well onthose who fancy themselves powerful intellectuals andwho are impossible to best in any kind of argument.By quoting their words and ideas back at them in

slightly grotesque form, you neutralize their verbalstrengths and leave them self-doubting and insecure.

3. Toward the middle of the sixteenth century, a youngsamurai, whose name history has left behind,developed a novel way of fighting: he could wield twoswords with equal dexterity in his right and left handsat the same time. This technique was formidable, andhe was eager to use it to make a name for himself, sohe decided to challenge the most famous swordsmanof his time, Tsukahara Bokuden, to a duel. Bokudenwas now middle-aged and in semiretirement. Heanswered the young man's challenge with a letter: asamurai who could use a sword in his left hand withthe same effectiveness as his right had an unfairadvantage. The young swordsman could notunderstand what he meant. "If you think my using asword with my left is unfair," he wrote back, "renouncethe match." Instead Bokuden sent off ten more letters,each repeating in slightly different words the chargeabout the left hand. Each letter only made thechallenger more annoyed. Finally, however, Bokudenagreed to fight.

The young samurai was used to fighting on instinctand with great speed, but as the duel began, he couldnot stop thinking about his left hand and Bokuden'sfear of it. With his left hand--he found himselfcalculating--he would stab here, slash there. His lefthand could not fail; it seemed possessed of its ownpower.... Then, suddenly, out of nowhere, Bokuden'ssword cut deeply across the challenger's right arm.

The duel was over. The young samurai recoveredphysically, but his mind was forever unhinged: hecould not fight by instinct anymore. He thought toomuch, and he soon gave up the sword.

In 1605, Genzaemon, head of the renownedYoshioka family of Kyoto swordsmen, received thestrangest challenge of his life. An unknown twenty-one-year-old samurai named Miyamoto Musashi,dressed like a beggar in dirty, ragged clothes,challenged him to a duel so haughtily that Musashimust have thought himself the more famousswordsman. Genzaemon did not feel he had to payattention to this youth; a man as illustrious as he couldnot go through life accepting challenges from everybumpkin who crossed his path. Yet something aboutMusashi's arrogance got under his skin. Genzaemonwould enjoy teaching this youth a lesson. The duelwas set for five o'clock the following morning in asuburban field.

Genzaemon arrived at the appointed time,accompanied by his students. Musashi was not there.Minutes turned into an hour. The young man hadprobably gotten cold feet and skipped town.Genzaemon sent a student to look for the youngsamurai at the inn where he was staying. The studentsoon returned: Musashi, he reported, had beenasleep when he arrived and, when awakened, hadrather impertinently ordered him to send Genzaemonhis regards and say he would be there shortly.Genzaemon was furious and began to pace the field.And Musashi still took his time. It was two more hours

before he appeared in the distance, saunteringtoward them across the field. He was wearing, too, ascarlet headband, not the traditional white headbandthat Genzaemon wore.

Genzaemon shouted angrily at Musashi andcharged forward, impatient to have done with thisirritating boor. But Musashi, looking almost bored,parried one blow after another. Each man was able toslash at the other's forehead, but where Genzaemon'swhite headband turned red with blood, Musashi'sstayed the same color. Finally, frustrated andconfused, Genzaemon charged forward yet again--right into Mushashi's sword, which struck his headand knocked him to the ground unconscious.Genzaemon would later recover, but he was sohumiliated by his defeat that he left the world ofswordsmanship and entered the priesthood, where hewould spend his remaining years.

[Christy] Mathewson in his later years recounteda knockdown incident from the first game of the1911 World Series, which he won for the Giants,defeating the Philadelphia Athletics 2 to 1.Charles Albert "Chief" Bender started for theAthletics, and Bender was throwing harder thatday than Mathewson had ever seen him throw.Twice Bender drilled Fred Snodgrass, theGiants' young center fielder. When Snodgrasscame to bat for the third time--in a "pinch"--Bender smiled at him. "Look out, Fred-die," hesaid, "you don't get hit this time." Then he threw

a fast ball at Snodgrass' head. Snodgrassducked. Ball one. "If you can't throw better thanthat," Snodgrass shouted, "I won't need to get ahit." Bender continued to smile. ("He hadperfect teeth," Mathewson remembered.) Thenhe threw a fast-ball strike that overpoweredSnodgrass. "You missed that a mile," Bendersaid, grinning again. Snodgrass set his jaw inanger and began overswinging. "Grinningchronically," in Mathewson's phrase, Benderstruck out Snodgrass with a curve that brokedown into the dirt. Snodgrass was not afraid ofChief Bender's pitches. He was a solid hitterwho finished with a lifetime average of .275.What happened, Mathewson said, was that acombiination, the knockdown pitches, thesarcastic banter, the condescending grin,distracted Snodgrass. Then, having struck outhis man, Bender pushed the needle deeper andtwisted it. "You ain't a batter, Freddie. You're abackstop. You can never get anywhere withoutbeing hit!" Although beaten that day, ChiefBender won two other games. The Athletics wonthe World Series, 4 games to 2. Across sixgames, the rattled Fred Snodgrass, a .294 hitterall season, batted .105. But as Mathewsoninterpreted the episode, he was a victim ofgamesmanship, obviously and distinctly quitedifferent from being terrorized. "Chief took

Fred's mind right out of the game," Mathewsonsaid.

THE HEAD GAME, ROGER KAHN, 2001

InterpretationFor a samurai, losing a duel could mean death orpublic humiliation. Swordsmen sought out anyadvantage--physical dexterity, a superior sword, theperfect technique--to avoid that fate. But the greatestsamurais, the Bokudens and Musashis, sought theiradvantage in being able to subtly push the opponentoff his game, messing with his mind. They might try tomake him self-conscious, a little too aware of histechnique and style--a deadly trap for anyone whomust react in the moment. They might trick him intofocusing on the wrong thing--the left hand, the scarletheadband. Particularly with conventional-mindedopponents, they might show up late, sparking afrustration that would upset their timing andconcentration. In all of these cases, a change in theenemy's focus or mood would lead to a mistake. Totry to repair this mistake in the heat of the momentwould lead to another, until the one-upped fightermight literally walk into the other man's sword.

Understand: what will yield the greatest effects inthe game of one-upmanship is a subtle disturbance inyour opponents' mood and mind-set. Be too direct--make an insulting comment, an obvious threat--andyou wake them to the danger you represent, stir theircompetitive juices, bring out the best in them. Insteadyou want to bring out the worst. A subtle comment that

makes them self-conscious and gets under their skinwill turn them inward, get them lost in the labyrinth oftheir own thoughts. A seemingly innocent action thatstirs an emotion like frustration, anger, or impatiencewill equally cloud their vision. In both cases they willtend to misfire and start making mistakes.

This works particularly well against rivals who mustperform in some way--deliver a speech, say, orpresent a project: the fixating thought or bad emotionyou create in them makes them lose touch with themoment and messes up their timing. Do this right,too, and no one will be aware of your involvement inthe bad performance, not even the rival you have one-upped.

4. In January 1988, Senator Robert Dole of Kansascould smell victory in his quest to become presidentof the United States. His main opponent for theRepublican nomination was George H. W. Bush, theincumbent vice president in the administration ofRonald Reagan. In the Iowa caucuses, the first test inthe primary season, Bush had been lackluster andhad finished a distant third, behind Dole andtelevangelist Pat Robertson. Dole's aggressivecampaigning had won him much attention--he had themomentum and was clearly the front-runner.

To Dole, however, there was one blemish to hisgreat victory in Iowa. Lee Atwater, Bush's thirty-six-year-old campaign strategist, had spread to themedia a story that questioned the integrity of thesenator's wife, former secretary of transportation

Elizabeth Dole. The senator was an elected politicianof nearly three decades' standing and had developedthe necessary thick skin, but attacks on his wife, hefelt, were beyond the pale. He had a temper that hisadvisers worked hard to keep under wraps, and whenthe story broke, he lashed out at reporters--givingAtwater the opportunity to say, "He can dish it out, butif someone hits him back, he starts whining." ThenAtwater sent Dole a ten-page letter enumerating themany times the Kansas senator had gone negative inthe campaign, and this letter, too, made its way intothe media. Dole was furious. Despite his victory inIowa, he could not get over seeing his wife draggedinto the dirt. He would get back at the Bush folk andAtwater.

Silence.--The way of replying to a polemicalattack the most unpleasant for both parties is toget annoyed and stay silent: for the attackerusually interprets the silence as a sign ofcontempt.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 1844-1900

Next up was the New Hampshire primary. Victoryhere would put Dole well on his way, and he wasahead in the polls, but this time Bush came outfighting and the race tightened up. The weekendbefore the vote, the Bush people ran an ad portrayingDole as a "straddler," a man with two faces whosesenate votes depended on expediency, not sincerebelief. Humorous, deceptive, bitingly negative, the ad

had Atwater's fingerprints all over it. And the timingwas perfect--too late for Dole to respond with an ad ofhis own. The ad helped propel Bush into the lead and,a few days later, to victory.

Shortly after the results of the New Hampshireprimary were in, NBC newsman Tom Brokaw caughtup with Bush and asked if he had any message for hisrival. "Naw," he replied with a smile, "just wish himwell." Then Brokaw found Dole and asked the samequestion. "Yeah," said Dole with a bitter scowl. "Stoplying about my record."

In the days to come, Dole's answer was rerun againand again on television and discussed in the papers.It made him look like a sore loser. The press began topile on, and Dole was ungracious--he seemed whiny.A few weeks later, he went down to a crushing defeatin South Carolina and shortly thereafter an evenworse string of losses in the Super Tuesday primariesthroughout the South. Somewhere along the line,Dole's campaign had crashed and burned. Little didhe suspect that it had all begun in Iowa.

InterpretationLee Atwater believed that adults could be divided intotwo groups: the overly mature and the childlike. Theoverly mature are inflexible and overserious, makingthem highly vulnerable in politics, particularly in theage of television. Dole was clearly the mature type,Atwater the child.

It didn't take Atwater much research to see thatDole was hypersensitive about attacks on his wife.

Replaying old charges against her in Iowa, Atwaterwas able to get under the senator's skin. He keptDole's blood boiling with the letter that accused him ofstarting the dirty campaigning, and he upped thepressure with the perfectly timed ad that mockedDole's record for New Hampshire voters. AlthoughAtwater was the one pushing buttons, Dole's outburstto Brokaw focused all attention on him and hisunsportsmanlike behavior. Atwater, a genius at one-upmanship, now stood back. Dole could only respondwith more sourness, compounding the problem andleading to electoral suicide.

Glaciation ...is the name for the set of gambitswhich are designed to induce an awkwardsilence, or at any rate a disinclination to talk, onthe part of possible opponents. The "freezing"effects of these gambits is sometimes ofimmense power:...If someone else tells a funnystory, do not, whatever happens, tell your ownfunny story in reply, but listen intently and notonly refrain from laughing or smiling, but makeno response, change of expression ormovement whatever. The teller of the funnystory, whatever the nature of his joke, will thensuddenly feel that what he has said is in badtaste. Press home your advantage. If he is astranger, and has told a story about a man withone leg, it is no bad thing to pretend that one ofyour own legs is false, or at any rate that you

have a severe limp. This will certainly silenceOpponent for the rest of the evening....... If, forinstance, someone is being really funny or wittyand there is a really pleasant atmosphere ofhearty and explosive laughter, then (a) join inthe laughter at first. Next (b) gradually becomesilent. Finally (c) at some pause in theconversation be overheard whispering, "Oh forsome real talk."

THE COMPLETE UPMANSHIP, STEPHENPOTTER 1950

The easiest types to one-up are those who arerigid. Being rigid does not necessarily mean beinghumorless or charmless, but it does mean beingintolerant of anything that breaks their code ofacceptable behavior. Being the target of someanarchic or unconventional antic will trigger anoverreaction that makes them look sour, vindictive,unleaderlike. The calm exterior of the mature adult ismomentarily blown away, revealing something ratherpeevish and puerile.

Do not discourage such targets from gettingpersonal: the more bitterly they protest and criticizeyou, the worse they look. They forget that the realissue is how they are perceived by the people aroundthem or, in an electoral race, by the public. Inflexible tothe core, they can be induced to make mistake aftermistake with the slightest push.

5. In 1939, Joan Crawford (1904-77) talked her way

into a relatively minor role in the film The Women: thelower-class perfume salesgirl who steals the husbandof an elegant woman played by Norma Shearer.Crawford and Shearer were also bitter rivals in reallife. Shearer was the wife of the movie producer IrvingThalberg, who always managed to get her the bestparts. Crawford hated her for that, and for her haughtymanner. Thalberg had died in 1936, but, toCrawford's disgust, the studio was still pamperingShearer. Everyone in Hollywood knew of their mutualdislike and was waiting for the showdown. ButCrawford was the consummate professional on theset, and she kept matters civil.

The Crawford and Shearer characters in TheWomen share only one scene: the climax of themovie, when Shearer finally confronts Crawford aboutthe affair with her husband. The rehearsal went well,as did the master shot showing the two actressesperforming together. Then it came time for close-ups.Of course Norma Shearer went first. Crawford sat in achair off camera, delivering her lines to Shearer.(Many actors would have an assistant or the directorfeed the lines while they retired to their dressingrooms, but Crawford always insisted on reading themherself.)

Crawford was knitting an afghan at the time, and asshe said her lines, she knitted furiously, then stoppedwhen it was time for Shearer to respond. She neverlooked Shearer in the eye. The needles made a loudclicking sound that began to drive Shearer crazy.Straining to stay polite, Shearer said, "Joan, darling, I

find your knitting distracting." Pretending not to hear,Crawford kept knitting. Finally Shearer, a womanfamous for her elegance, lost control: she screamedat Crawford, ordering her off the set and back to herdressing room. As Crawford walked away, still notlooking at Shearer, the film's director, George Cukor,ran to her side, but Shearer commanded him to comeback. Her voice had a bitter tone that no one therehad heard before and few would forget--it was sounlike her. Or was it?

In 1962, Crawford and Bette Davis, longtime starswho had never appeared in the same movie, werefinally to costar, in Robert Aldrich's film What EverHappened to Baby Jane? Crawford and Davis hadnever been thought to like each other too much, butCrawford had encouraged the pairing--as goodpublicity, it would help to extend their careers. Onceagain their behavior was civil on set, but after the filmcame out, it was Davis, not Crawford, who wasnominated for a Best Actress Oscar. Worse, sheimmediately started crowing about it, proudlyannouncing that she would be the first actress to winthree Oscars. Crawford had only one.

Davis was the center of attention at the Oscars.Backstage before the event, she was unusuallygracious to Crawford--after all, she could afford to be;this was her night. (Only three other actresses werenominated, and everyone expected Davis to get it.)Crawford was equally polite. During the ceremony,however, as Davis stood in the wings, waiting, shehoped, to accept the award, she got a shock: she lost.

Anne Bancroft won for her role in The MiracleWorker. And there was more: as Davis stood taking itin, she felt a hand on her arm. "Excuse me," saidCrawford, and she strode past the stunned Davis toaccept the award on Bancroft's behalf. (The Oscarwinner could not be there that night.) On what wassupposed to be Davis's night of glory, Crawford hadsomehow stolen the limelight, an unbearable affront.

InterpretationA Hollywood actress has to be thick-skinned, andJoan Crawford was the quintessence of theHollywood actress: she had a huge capacity toabsorb and deal with insults and disrespect.Whenever she could, though, she plotted to get thelast laugh on her various nemeses, leaving themhumiliated. Crawford knew that people thought of heras somewhat of a bitch, a tough, even unpleasantwoman. She felt this was unfair--she had been kind tomany--but she could live with it. What annoyed herwas how Shearer got away with playing the elegantlady when in fact, Crawford believed, she was a nastyspecimen beneath her charming exterior. SoCrawford maneuvered to get Shearer to expose aside of herself that few had seen. Just that glimmerwas memorable to the Hollywood community andhumiliating to Shearer.

With Davis it was all in the timing: Crawford ruinedher night of glory (which she had been gloating aboutfor months) without even saying a mean word.Crawford knew that Bancroft would be unable to

attend and learned from inside information that shewould win, so she happily volunteered to accept theprize on her behalf.

Inevitably a patient entering analysis begins touse ploys which have placed him one-up inprevious relationships (this is called a "neuroticpattern"). The analyst learns to devastate thesemaneuvers of the patient. A simple way, forexample, is to respond inappropriately to whatthe patient says. This places the patient indoubt about everything he has learned inrelationships with other people. The patient maysay, "Everyone should be truthful," hoping toget the analyst to agree with him and therebyfollow his lead. He who follows another lead isone-down. The analyst may reply with silence, arather weak ploy in this circumstance, or he maysay, "Oh?" The "Oh?" is given just the properinflection to imply, "How on earth could youhave ever conceived such an idea?" This notonly places the patient in doubt about hisstatement, but in doubt about what the analystmeans by "Oh?" Doubt is, of course, the firststep toward one-downness. When in doubt thepatient tends to lean on the analyst to resolvethe doubt, and we lean on those who aresuperior to us. Analytic maneuvers designed toarouse doubt in a patient are instituted early inanalysis. For example, the analyst may say, "I

wonder if that's really what you're feeling." Theuse of "really" is standard in analytic practice. Itimplies the patient has motivations of which heis not aware. Anyone feels shaken, andtherefore one-down, when this suspicion isplaced in his mind.

STRATEGIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, JAYHALEY, 1963

You will often find yourself nursing the desire torevenge yourself on those who have mistreated you.The temptation is to be direct, to say somethinghonest and mean, to let people know how you feel--but words are ineffective here. A verbal spat lowersyou to the other person's level and often leaves youwith a bad feeling. The sweeter revenge is an actionthat gives you the last laugh, leaving your victims witha sense of vague but corrosive inferiority. Provokethem into exposing a hidden, unpleasant side to theircharacter, steal their moment of glory--but make thisthe battle's last maneuver. That gives you the doubledelight of showing you are no one to mess with andinflicting a wound that sticks around. As they say,revenge is a dish best served cold.

"I wonder if that's really what you're feeling." Theuse of "really" is standard in analytic practice. Itimplies the patient has motivations of which heis not aware. Anyone feels shaken, andtherefore one-down, when this suspicion isplaced in his mind.

STRATEGIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, JAYHALEY, 1963

Authority: We often give our rivals themeans of our own destruction.

--Aesop (sixth century B.C.)

REVERSALSometimes outright war is best--when, for example,you can crush your enemies by encirclement. In theongoing relationships of daily life, though, one-upmanship is usually the wiser strategy. It maysometimes seem therapeutic to outfight your rivalsdirectly; it may sometimes be appealing to send anovertly intimidating message. But the momentarygains you may earn with a direct approach will beoffset by the suspicions you arouse in yourcolleagues, who will worry that someday you willstrong-arm them, too. In the long run, it is moreimportant to secure good feelings and maintain

appearances. Wise courtiers always seem to beparagons of civilized behavior, encasing their iron fistin a velvet glove.

TAKE SMALL BITESTHE FAIT ACCOMPLI STRATEGY

If you seem too ambitious, you stir up resentment inother people; overt power grabs and sharp rises tothe top are dangerous, creating envy, distrust, andsuspicion. Often the best solution is to take smallbites, swallow little territories, playing upon people'srelatively short attention spans. Stay under the radarand they won't see your moves. And if they do, itmay already be too late; the territory is yours, a faitaccompli. You can always claim you acted out ofself-defense. Before people realize it, you haveaccumulated an empire.

PIECEMEAL CONQUESTOn June 17, 1940, Winston Churchill, prime ministerof England, received a surprise visit from the Frenchgeneral Charles de Gaulle. The Germans had beguntheir blitzkrieg invasion of the Low Countries andFrance a mere five weeks earlier, and they hadadvanced so far so fast that not only France's militarybut its government as well had already collapsed. TheFrench authorities had fled, either to parts of Francenot yet occupied by the Germans or to Frenchcolonies in North Africa. None, however, had fled toEngland--but here was General de Gaulle, a solitaryexile seeking refuge and offering his services to the

Allied cause.The two men had met before, when de Gaulle had

briefly served as France's undersecretary of state forwar during the weeks of the blitzkrieg. Churchill hadadmired his courage and resolution at that difficultmoment, but de Gaulle was a strange fellow. At theage of fifty, he had a somewhat undistinguishedmilitary record and could hardly be considered animportant political figure. But he always acted as if hewere at the center of things. And here he was now,presenting himself as the man who could help rescueFrance, although many other Frenchmen could beconsidered more suitable for the role. Nevertheless,de Gaulle might be someone whom Churchill couldmold and use for his purposes.

Within hours of de Gaulle's arrival in England, theFrench military sued for peace with the Germans.Under the agreement the two nations worked out, theunoccupied parts of France were to be ruled by aFrench government friendly to the invaders and basedin Vichy. That same evening de Gaulle presentedChurchill with a plan: Broadcasting on BBC Radio, hewould address all Frenchmen still loyal to a freeFrance and would urge them to not lose heart. Hewould also call on any who had managed to get toEngland to contact him. Churchill was reluctant: he didnot want to offend the new French government, withwhich he might have to deal. But de Gaulle promisedto say nothing that could be read as treachery to theVichy government, and at the last minute he wasgiven permission.

De Gaulle delivered the speech much as he hadoutlined it--except that he ended it with the promise hewould be back on the air the next day. This was newsto Churchill, yet once the promise had been made, itmight look bad to keep de Gaulle off the air, andanything that would hearten the French during thesedark days seemed worthwhile.

In the next broadcast, de Gaulle was decidedlybolder. "Any Frenchman who still has weapons," heannounced, "has the absolute duty to continue theresistance." He even went so far as to instruct hisfellow generals still in France to disobey the enemy.Those who rallied to him in England, he said, wouldform part of a nation without territory to be called FreeFrance and of a new army to be called FightingFrance, the spearhead of an eventual liberation ofmainland France from the Germans.

Occupied with other matters and believing deGaulle's audience to be small, Churchill overlookedthe general's indiscretions and allowed him tocontinue his broadcasts--only to find that each newprogram made it harder to pull the plug. De Gaullewas transforming himself into a celebrity. Theperformance of the French military and governmentduring the blitzkrieg had been widely seen as adisgrace, and in the aftermath no one had steppedforward to alter this perception of cowardice--exceptde Gaulle. His voice radiated confidence, and hisface and tall figure stood out in photographs andnewsreels. Most important, his appeals had effect: hisFighting France grew from a few hundred soldiers in

July 1940 to several thousand a month later.Soon de Gaulle was clamoring to lead his forces on

a campaign to liberate French colonies in Central andEquatorial Africa from the Vichy government. Thearea was mostly desert and rain forest and was farfrom the more strategic regions of North Africa on theMediterranean, but it contained some seaports thatmight be useful, and so Churchill gave de Gaulle hisbacking. The French forces were able to take Chad,Cameroon, the French Congo, and Gabon withrelative ease.

When de Gaulle returned to England late in 1940,he now had thousands of square miles of territoryunder his control. His command meanwhile hadswelled to close to 20,000 soldiers, and his boldventure had captured the imagination of the Britishpublic. No longer the low-order general who hadsought refuge months before, he was now a militaryand political leader. And de Gaulle was equal to thischange in status: he was now making demands of theEnglish and acting in a rather aggressive manner.Churchill was beginning to regret giving him so muchleeway.

The following year British intelligence discoveredthat de Gaulle had been making important contactsamong the growing French Resistance movement.The Resistance, which was dominated bycommunists and socialists, had started off chaotic,lacking a coherent structure. De Gaulle had personallychosen an official in the prewar socialist government,Jean Moulin, who had come to England in October

1941, to help unify this underground force. Of all deGaulle's maneuverings, this was the one that couldbenefit the Allies most directly; an efficient Resistancewould be invaluable. So, with Churchill's blessing,Moulin was parachuted into southern France in early1942.

Chien/Development (Gradual Progress)This hexagram is made up of Sun (wood,penetration) above, i.e., without, and Ken(mountain, stillness) below, i.e., within. A tree ona mountain develops slowly according to the lawof its being and consequently stands firmlyrooted. This gives the idea of a developmentthat proceeds gradually, step by step. Theattributes of the trigrams also point to this: withinis tranquility, which guards against precipitateactions, and without is penetration, which makesdevelopment and progress possible.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

By the end of that year, the increasingly imperiousde Gaulle had so offended many within the Alliedgovernments and armies--particularly U.S. PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt--that a plan was discussed toreplace him with someone more malleable. TheAmericans believed they had found the perfect manfor the job: General Henri Giraud, one of France'smost respected military officials, a man with a recordfar more distinguished than de Gaulle's. Churchill

approved, and Giraud was named commander inchief of French forces in North Africa. Sensing theallied plot, de Gaulle requested a personal meetingwith Giraud to discuss the situation; after muchbureaucratic wrangling, he was granted permissionand arrived in Algiers in May 1943.

The two men were at each other's throats almostimmediately, each making demands to which theother could never agree. Finally de Gaullecompromised: proposing a committee that wouldprepare to lead a post-war France, he drafted adocument naming Giraud as commander in chief ofthe armed forces and copresident of France with deGaulle. In return de Gaulle got the committee to beexpanded in size and cleansed of officials with Vichyconnections. Giraud was satisfied and signed on.Shortly thereafter, however, Giraud left Algiers for avisit to the United States, and de Gaulle, in hisabsence, filled the expanded committee with Gaullistsympathizers and Resistance members. UponGiraud's return he discovered that he had beenstripped of much of his political power. Isolated on acommittee that he had helped to form, he had no wayto defend himself, and in a matter of months de Gaullewas named sole president, then commander in chief.Giraud was quietly retired.

Roosevelt and Churchill watched thesedevelopments with increasing alarm. They tried tointervene, making various threats, but in the end theywere powerless. Those BBC broadcasts that hadstarted out so innocently were now listened to avidly

by millions of Frenchmen. Through Moulin, de Gaullehad gained almost complete control of the FrenchResistance; a break with de Gaulle would put theAllies' relationship with the Resistance in jeopardy.And the committee that de Gaulle had helped form togovern postwar France was now recognized bygovernments around the world. To take on the generalin any kind of political struggle would be a public-relations nightmare destructive to the war effort.

Somehow this once undistinguished general hadforged a kind of empire under his control. And therewas nothing anyone could do about it.

InterpretationWhen General Charles de Gaulle fled to England, hehad one goal: to restore the honor of France. Heintended to do this by leading a military and politicalorganization that would work to liberate France. Hewanted his country to be seen as an equal among theAllies, rather than as a vanquished nation dependenton others to regain its freedom.

Had de Gaulle announced his intentions, he wouldhave been seen as a dangerous mix of delusion andambition. And had he grabbed for power too quickly,he would have shown those intentions. Instead,supremely patient and with an eye on his goal, hetook one small bite at a time. The first bite--always themost important--was to gain himself public exposurewith first one BBC broadcast, then, through clevermaneuvering, an ongoing series. Here, exploiting hiskeen dramatic instincts and hypnotic voice, he quickly

established a larger-than-life presence. This allowedhim to create and build up his military group FightingFrance.

He took his next bite by bringing those Africanterritories under the control of Fighting France. Hiscontrol over a large geographical area, no matter howisolated, gave him unassailable political power. Thenhe insinuated himself into the Resistance, taking overa group that had been a communist bastion. Finallyhe created--and, bite by bite, gained complete controlof--a committee to govern the free France of thefuture. Because he proceeded in such a piecemealfashion, no one really noticed what he was up to.When Churchill and Roosevelt realized how far he hadinsinuated himself into the Resistance, and into theminds of the British and American publics asFrance's destined postwar leader, it was too late tostop him. His preeminence was a fait accompli.

It is not easy to make one's way in this world, tostrive with energy to get what you want withoutincurring the envy or antipathy of others who may seeyou as aggressive and ambitious, someone to thwart.The answer is not to lower your ambitions but rather todisguise them. A piecemeal approach to conquest ofanything is perfect for these political times, theultimate mask of aggression. The key to making itwork is to have a clear sense of your objective, theempire you want to forge, and then to identify thesmall, outlying areas of the empire that you will firstgobble up. Each bite must have a logic in an overallstrategy but must be small enough that no one senses

your larger intentions. If your bites are too big, you willtake on more than you are ready for and find yourselfoverwhelmed by problems; if you bite too fast, otherpeople will see what you are up to. Let the passage oftime masterfully disguise your intentions and give youthe appearance of someone of modest ambition. Bythe time your rivals wake up to what you haveconsumed, they risk being consumed themselves ifthey stand in your way.

Ambition can creep as well as soar.--Edmund Burke (1729-1797)

KEYS TO WARFAREAt first glance we humans might seem hopelesslyviolent and aggressive. How else to account forhistory's endless series of wars, which continue intothe present? But in fact this is somewhat of an illusion.Standing out dramatically from daily life, war andconflict compel disproportionate attention. The samecan be said of those aggressive individuals in thepublic realm who are constantly grabbing for more.

The truth is that most people are conservative bynature. Desperate to keep what they have, they dreadthe unforeseen consequences and situations thatconflict inevitably brings. They hate confrontation andtry to avoid it. (That is why so many people resort topassive aggression to get what they want.) You mustalways remember this fact of human nature as youplot your way through life. It is also the foundation forany fait accompli strategy.

The strategy works as follows: Suppose there issomething you want or need for your security andpower. Take it without discussion or warning and yougive your enemies a choice, either to fight or toaccept the loss and leave you alone. Is whatever youhave taken, and your unilateral action in taking it,worth the bother, cost, and danger of waging war?Which costs more, the war (which might easilyescalate into something large) or the loss? Takesomething of real value and they will have to choosecarefully; they have a big decision to make. Takesomething small and marginal, though, and it isalmost impossible for your opponents to choosebattle. There are likely to be many more reasons forleaving you alone than for fighting over somethingsmall. You have played to your enemy's conservativeinstincts, which are generally stronger than theiracquisitive ones. And soon your ownership of thisproperty becomes a fait accompli, part of the statusquo, which is always best left alone.

Sooner or later, as part of this strategy, you will takeanother small bite. This time your rivals are warier;they are starting to see a pattern. But what you havetaken is once again small, and once again they mustask themselves if fighting you is worth the headache.They didn't to do it before--why now? Execute a faitaccompli strategy subtly and well, as de Gaulle did,and even though a time may come when your goalbecomes clear, and when they regret their previouspacifism and consider war, by that time you will havealtered the playing field: you are neither so small nor

so easy to defeat. To take you on now entails adifferent kind of risk; there is a different, morepowerful reason for avoiding conflict. Only nibble atwhat you want and you never spark enough anger,fear, or mistrust to make people overcome theirnatural reluctance to fight. Let enough time passbetween bites and you will also play to the shortnessof people's attention spans.

The key to the fait accompli strategy is to act fastand without discussion. If you reveal your intentionsbefore taking action, you will open yourself to a slewof criticisms, analyses, and questions: "How dare youthink of taking that bite! Be happy with what youhave!" It is part of people's conservatism to preferendless discussion to action. You must bypass thiswith a rapid seizure of your target. The discussion isforeclosed. No matter how small your bite, taking italso distinguishes you from the crowd and earns yourespect and weight.

When Frederick the Great became king of Prussiain 1740, Prussia was a minor European power.Frederick's father had built up the Prussian army, atgreat expense, but had never really used it; the minutehe put the army in play, he knew, the other Europeanpowers would have united against him, fearing anythreat to the status quo. Frederick, though massivelyambitious, understood what had kept his father incheck.

The same year he took the throne, however, anopportunity presented itself. Prussia's great nemesiswas Austria, where a new leader, Maria Theresa, had

recently become empress. There were many whoquestioned her legitimacy, though, and Frederickdecided to exploit this political instability by movinghis army into the small Austrian province of Silesia.Maria Theresa, wanting to prove her toughness,decided to fight to take it back. The war lastedseveral years--but Frederick had judged the momentwell; he finally threatened to take more territory thanSilesia alone, and in the end the empress sued forpeace.

All the conceptions born of impatience andaimed at obtaining speedy victory could only begross errors.... It was necessary to accumulatethousands of small victories to turn them into agreat success.

GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP, 1911-

Frederick would repeat this strategy again andagain, taking over small states here and there thatweren't worth fighting for, at least not hard. In this way,almost before anyone noticed, he made Prussia agreat power. Had he begun by invading some largerterritory, he would have shown his ambitions tooclearly and brought down upon himself an alliance ofpowers determined to maintain the status quo. Thekey to his piecemeal strategy was an opportunity thatfell into his lap. Austria was at a weak moment;Silesia was small, yet by incorporating thisneighboring state, Prussia enriched its resources andput itself in position for further growth. The two

combined gave him momentum and allowed himspace to slowly expand from small to large.

The problem that many of us face is that we havegreat dreams and ambitions. Caught up in theemotions of our dreams and the vastness of ourdesires, we find it very difficult to focus on the small,tedious steps usually necessary to attain them. Wetend to think in terms of giant leaps toward our goals.But in the social world as in nature, anything of sizeand stability grows slowly. The piecemeal strategy isthe perfect antidote to our natural impatience: itfocuses us on something small and immediate, a firstbite, then how and where a second bite can get uscloser to our ultimate objective. It forces us to think interms of a process, a sequence of connected stepsand actions, no matter how small, which hasimmeasurable psychological benefits as well. Toooften the magnitude of our desires overwhelms us;taking that small first step makes them seemrealizable. There is nothing more therapeutic thanaction.

In plotting this strategy, be attentive to suddenopportunities and to your enemies' momentary crisesand weaknesses. Do not be tempted, however, to tryto take anything large; bite off more than you canchew and you will be consumed with problems anddisproportionately discouraged if you fail to cope withthem.

The fait accompli strategy is often the best way totake control of a project that would be ruined bydivided leadership. In almost every film Alfred

Hitchcock made, he had to go through the same wars,gradually wresting control of the film from theproducer, the actors, and the rest of the team. Hisstruggles with screenwriters were a microcosm of thelarger war. Hitchcock always wanted his vision for afilm to be exactly reflected in the script, but too firm ahand on his writer's neck would get him nothingexcept resentment and mediocre work. So instead hemoved slowly, starting out by giving the writer room towork loosely off his notes, then asking for revisionsthat shaped the script his way. His control becameobvious only gradually, and by that time the writer wasemotionally tied to the project and, however frustrated,was working for his approval. A very patient man,Hitchcock let his power plays unfold over time, so thatproducer, writer, and stars understood thecompleteness of his domination only when the filmwas finished.

To gain control of any project, you must be willing tomake time your ally. If you start out with completecontrol, you sap people's spirit and stir up envy andresentment. So begin by generating the illusion thatyou're all working together on a team effort; thenslowly nibble away. If in the process you make peopleangry, do not worry. That's just a sign that theiremotions are engaged, which means they can bemanipulated.

Finally, the use of the piecemeal strategy todisguise your aggressive intentions is invaluable inthese political times, but in masking yourmanipulations you can never go too far. So when you

take a bite, even a small one, make a show of actingout of self-defense. It also helps to appear as theunderdog. Give the impression your objectives arelimited by taking a substantial pause between bites--exploiting people's short attention spans--whileproclaiming to one and all that you are a person ofpeace. In fact, it would be the height of wisdom tomake your bite a little larger upon occasion and thengiving back some of what you have taken. People seeonly your generosity and your limited actions, not thesteadily increasing empire you are amassing.

Authority: To multiply small successes isprecisely to build one treasure after another.In time one becomes rich without realizinghow it has come about.

--Frederick the Great (1712-1786)

REVERSAL

Should you see or suspect that you yourself are beingattacked bite by bite, your only counterstrategy is toprevent any further progress or faits accomplis. Aquick and forceful response will usually be enough todiscourage the nibblers, who often resort to thisstrategy out of weakness and cannot afford manybattles. If they are tougher and more ambitious, likeFrederick the Great, that forceful response becomesmore crucial still. Letting them get away with theirbites, however small, is too dangerous--nip them inthe bud.

PENETRATE THEIR MINDSCOMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

Communication is a kind of war, its field of battle theresistant and defensive minds of the people youwant to influence. The goal is to advance, topenetrate their defenses and occupy their minds.Anything else is ineffective communication, self-indulgent talk. Learn to infiltrate your ideas behindenemy lines, sending messages through littledetails, luring people into coming to the conclusionsyou desire and into thinking they've gotten there bythemselves. Some you can trick by cloaking yourextraordinary ideas in ordinary forms; others, moreresistant and dull, must be awoken with extremelanguage that bristles with newness. At all cost,avoid language that is static, preachy, and overlypersonal. Make your words a spark for action, notpassive contemplation.

VISCERAL COMMUNICATIONTo work with the film director Alfred Hitchcock for thefirst time was generally a disconcerting experience.He did not like to talk much on the sets of his movies--just the occasional sardonic and witty remark. Was hedeliberately secretive? Or just quiet? And how couldsomeone direct a film, which entails ordering so manypeople about, without talking a lot and giving explicit

people about, without talking a lot and giving explicitinstructions?

This peculiarity of Hitchcock's was mosttroublesome for his actors. Many of them were usedto film directors coddling them, discussing in detailthe characters they were to play and how to get intothe role. Hitchcock did none of this. In rehearsals hesaid very little; on the set, too, actors would glanceover at him for his approval only to find him napping orlooking bored. According to the actress ThelmaRitter, "If Hitchcock liked what you did, he saidnothing. If he didn't, he looked like he was going tothrow up." And yet somehow, in his own indirect way,he would get his actors to do precisely what hewanted.

The most superficial way of trying to influenceothers is through talk that has nothing realbehind it. The influence produced by such meretongue wagging must necessarily remaininsignificant.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

On the first day of shooting for The 39 Steps in1935, Hitchcock's two leads, Madeleine Carroll andRobert Donat, arrived on the set a little tense. Thatday they were to act in one of the movie's morecomplex scenes: playing relative strangers who,however, had gotten handcuffed together earlier in theplot and, still handcuffed, were forced to run throughthe Scottish countryside (actually a sound stage) to

escape the film's villains. Hitchcock had given themno real sign of how he wanted them to act the scene.Carroll in particular was bothered by the director'sbehavior. This English actress, one of the mostelegant film stars of the period, had spent much of hercareer in Hollywood, where directors had treated herlike royalty; Hitchcock, on the other hand, was distant,hard to figure out. She had decided to play the scenewith an air of dignity and reserve, the way she thoughta lady would respond to the situation of beinghandcuffed to a strange man. To get over hernervousness, she chatted warmly with Donat, trying toput both him and herself in a collaborative mood.

When Hitchcock arrived on set, he explained thescene to the two actors, snapped a pair of handcuffson them, and proceeded to lead them through the set,across a dummy bridge and among other props.Then, in the middle of this demonstration, he wassuddenly called away to attend to a technical matter.He would return soon; they should take a break. Hefelt in his pockets for the key to the handcuffs--but no,he must have mislaid it, and off he hurried, ostensiblyto find the key. Hours went by. Donat and Carrollbecame increasingly frustrated and embarrassed;suddenly they had no control, a most unusual feelingfor two stars on set. While even the humblest crewmembers were free to go about their business, thetwo stars were shackled together. Their forcedintimacy and discomfort made their earlier banterimpossible. They could not even go to the bathroom. Itwas humiliating.

Hitchcock returned in the afternoon--he had foundthe key. Shooting began, but as the actors went towork, it was hard for them to get over the experienceof that day; the movie stars' usual cool unflappabilitywas gone. Carroll had forgotten all her ideas abouthow to play the scene. And yet, despite her andDonat's anger, the scene seemed to flow withunexpected naturalness. Now they knew what it waslike to be tied together; they had felt theawkwardness, so there was no need to act it. It camefrom within.

Four years later Hitchcock made Rebecca, withJoan Fontaine and Laurence Olivier. Fontaine, attwenty-one, was taking her first leading role and washorribly nervous about playing opposite Olivier, whowas widely recognized as an actor of genius. Anotherdirector might have eased her insecurities, butHitchcock was seemingly doing the opposite. Hechose to pass along gossip from the rest of the castand crew: no one thought she was up to the job, hetold her, and Olivier had really wanted his wife, VivienLeigh, to get her part. Fontaine felt terrified, isolated,unsure--exactly the qualities of her character in thefilm. She hardly needed to act. And her memorableperformance in Rebecca was the start of a gloriouscareer.

When Hitchcock made The Paradine Case, in1947, his leading lady, Ann Todd, was appearing inher first Hollywood movie and found it hard to relax.So in the silence on set before the director called,"Action!" Hitchcock would tell her a particularly

salacious story that would make her laugh or gasp inshock. Before one scene in which she had to lie on abed in an elegant nightgown, Hitchcock suddenlyjumped on her, yelling, "Relax!" Antics like this madeit easy for her to let go of her inhibitions and be morenatural.

When you are trying to communicate and can'tfind the point in the experience of the otherparty at which he can receive and understand,then, you must create the experience for him. Iwas trying to explain to two staff organizers intraining how their problems in their communityarose because they had gone outside theexperience of their people: that when you gooutside anyone's experience not only do younot communicate, you cause confusion. Theyhad earnest, intelligent expressions on theirfaces and were verbally and visually agreeingand understanding, but I knew they really didn'tunderstand and that I was not communicating. Ihad not got into their experience. So I had togive them an experience.

RULES FOR RADICALS, SAUL D. ALINSKY,1971

When cast and crew were tired on set, or whenthey'd gotten too casual and were chatting rather thanconcentrating on their work, Hitchcock would neveryell or complain. Instead he might smash a lightbulb

with his fist or throw his teacup against a wall;everyone would quickly sober up and recover his orher focus.

Clearly Hitchcock mistrusted language andexplanation, preferring action to words as a way ofcommunicating, and this preference extended to theform and content of his films. That gave hisscreenwriters a particularly hard time; after all, puttingthe film into words was their job. In story meetingsHitchcock would discuss the ideas he was interestedin--themes like people's doubleness, their capacity forboth good and evil, the fact that no one in this world istruly innocent. The writers would produce pages ofdialog expressing these ideas elegantly and subtly,only to find them edited out in favor of actions andimages. In Vertigo (1958) and Psycho (1960), forexample, Hitchcock inserted mirrors in many scenes;i n Spellbound (1945) it was shots of ski tracks andother kinds of parallel lines; the murder in Strangerson a Train (1951) was revealed through its reflectionin a pair of glasses. For Hitchcock, evidently, imageslike these revealed his ideas of the doubleness in thehuman soul better than words did, but on paper thisseemed somewhat contrived.

On set, the producers of Hitchcock's films oftenwatched in bewilderment as the director moved thecamera, not the actors, to stage his scenes. Itseemed to make no sense, as if he loved thetechnical side of filmmaking more than dialog and thehuman presence. Nor could editors fathom hisobsession with sounds, colors, the size of the actors'

heads within the frame, the speed with which peoplemoved--he seemed to favor these endless visualdetails over the story itself.

The letter set Cyrus thinking of the means bywhich he could most effectively persuade thePersians to revolt, and his deliberations led himto adopt the following plan, which he found bestsuited to his purpose. He wrote on a roll ofparchment that Astyages had appointed him tocommand the Persian army; then hesummoned an assembly of the Persians,opened the roll in their presence and read outwhat he had written. "And now," he added, "Ihave an order for you: every man is to appearon parade with a billhook."...The order wasobeyed. All the men assembled with theirbillhooks, and Cyrus' next command was thatbefore the day was out they should clear acertain piece of rough land full of thorn bushes,about eighteen or twenty furlongs square. Thistoo was done, whereupon Cyrus issued thefurther order that they should presentthemselves again on the following day, afterhaving taken a bath. Meanwhile Cyrus collectedand slaughtered all his father's goats, sheep,and oxen in preparation for entertaining thewhole Persian army at a banquet, together withthe best wine and bread he could procure. Thenext day the guests assembled, and were told to

sit down on the grass and enjoy themselves.After the meal Cyrus asked them which theypreferred--yesterday's work or today'samusement; and they replied that it was indeeda far cry from the previous day's misery to theirpresent pleasures. This was the answer whichCyrus wanted; he seized upon it at once andproceeded to lay bare what he had in mind."Men of Persia," he said, "listen to me: obey myorders, and you will be able to enjoy a thousandpleasures as good as this without ever turningyour hands to menial labour; but, if you disobey,yesterday's task will be the pattern ofinnumerable others you will be forced toperform. Take my advice and win your freedom.I am the man destined to undertake yourliberation, and it is my belief that you are amatch for the Medes in war as in everythingelse. It is the truth I tell you. Do not delay, butfling off the yoke of Astyages at once." ThePersians had long resented their subjection tothe Medes. At last they had found a leader, andwelcomed with enthusiasm the prospect ofliberty.THE HISTORIES, HERODOTUS, 484-432 B.C.

And then the film would be a finished product, andsuddenly everything that had seemed peculiar abouthis method made perfect sense. Audiences oftenresponded to Hitchcock's films more deeply than they

did to the work of any other director. The images, thepacing, the camera movements, swept them alongand got under their skin. A Hitchcock film was not justseen, it was experienced, and it stayed in the mindlong after the viewing.

InterpretationIn interviews Hitchcock often told a story about hischildhood: When he was around six, his father, upsetat something he had done, sent him to the local policestation with a note. The officer on duty read the noteand locked little Alfred in a cell, telling him, "This iswhat we do to naughty boys." He was released afterjust a few minutes, but the experience marked himindelibly. Had his father yelled at him, as most boys'fathers did, he would have become defensive andrebellious. But leaving him alone, surrounded byfrightening authority figures, in a dark cell, with itsunfamiliar smells--that was a much more powerful wayto communicate. As Hitchcock discovered, to teachpeople a lesson, to really alter their behavior, youmust alter their experience, aim at their emotions,inject unforgettable images into their minds, shakethem up. Unless you are supremely eloquent, it is hardto accomplish this through words and directexpression. There are simply too many people talkingat us, trying to persuade us of this or that. Wordsbecome part of this noise, and we either tune themout or become even more resistant.

To communicate in a deep and real way, you mustbring people back to their childhood, when they were

less defensive and more impressed by sounds,images, actions, a world of preverbal communication.It requires speaking a kind of language composed ofactions, all strategically designed to effect people'smoods and emotions, what they can least control.That is precisely the language Hitchcock developedand perfected over the years. With actors he wantedto get the most natural performance out of them, inessence get them not to act. To tell them to relax orbe natural would have been absurd; it would only havemade them more awkward and defensive than theyalready were. Instead, just as his father had gottenhim to feel terror in a London police station, he gotthem to feel the emotions of the movie: frustration,isolation, loss of inhibition. (Of course he hadn'tmislaid the handcuffs' key somewhere on the set ofThe 39 Steps, as Donat later found out; the supposedloss was a strategy.) Instead of prodding actors withirritating words, which come from the outside and arepushed away, Hitchcock made these feelings part oftheir inner experience--and this communicatedimmediately onscreen. With audiences, too,Hitchcock never preached a message. Instead heused the visual power of film to return them to thatchildlike state when images and compelling symbolshad such a visceral effect.

It is imperative in life's battles to be able tocommunicate your ideas to people, to be able to altertheir behavior. Communication is a form of warfare.Your enemies here are defensive; they want to be leftalone with their preexisting prejudices and beliefs.

The more deeply you penetrate their defenses, themore you occupy their mental space, the moreeffectively you are communicating. In verbal terms,most people wage a kind of medieval warfare, usingwords, pleas, and calls for attention like battle-axesand clubs to hit people over the head. But in being sodirect, they only make their targets more resistant.Instead you must learn to fight indirectly andunconventionally, tricking people into lowering theirdefenses--hitting their emotions, altering theirexperience, dazzling them with images, powerfulsymbols, and visceral sensory cues. Bringing themback to that childlike state when they were morevulnerable and fluid, the communicated ideapenetrates deep behind their defenses. Because youare not fighting the usual way, you will have an unusualpower.

The priest Ryokan...asked Zen masterBukkan...for an explanation of the four Dharma-

worlds.... [Bukkan] said: "To explain the fourDharma-worlds should not need a lot of chatter."

He filled a white tea cup with tea, drank it up,and smashed the cup to pieces right in front ofthe priest, saying, "Have you got it?" The priestsaid: "Thanks to your here-and-now teaching, I

have penetrated right into the realm of Principleand Event."

--Trevor Leggett, Samurai Zen: The WarriorKoans (1985)

THE MASTERMINDIn 1498 the twenty-nine-year-old Niccolo Machiavelliwas appointed secretary of Florence's SecondChancery, which managed the city's foreign affairs.The choice was unusual: Machiavelli was of relativelylow birth, had no experience in politics, and lacked alaw degree or other professional qualification. He hada contact in the Florentine government, however, whoknew him personally and saw great potential in him.And indeed, over the next few years, Machiavellistood out from his colleagues in the Chancery for histireless energy, his incisive reports on politicalmatters, and his excellent advice to ambassadorsand ministers. He won prestigious assignments,traveling around Europe on diplomatic missions--tovarious parts of northern Italy to meet with CesareBorgia, to ferret out that ruthless statesman'sintentions on Florence; to France to meet with KingLouis XII; to Rome to confer with Pope Julius II. Heseemed to be at the start of a brilliant career.

Not all was well, however, in Machiavelli'sprofessional life. He complained to his friends aboutthe Chancery's low pay; he also described doing allthe hard work in various negotiations, only to seesome powerful senior minister brought on board atthe last moment to finish the job and take the credit.Many above him, he said, were stupid and lazy,appointed to their positions by virtue of birth andconnections. He was developing the art of dealingwith these men, he told his friends, finding a way touse them instead of being used.

Before Machiavelli's arrival in the Chancery,Florence had been ruled by the Medici family, who,however, had been unseated in 1494, when the citybecame a republic. In 1512, Pope Julius II financedan army to take Florence by force, overthrow therepublic, and restore the Medicis to power. The plansucceeded, and the Medicis took control, well inJulius's debt. A few weeks later, Machiavelli was sentto prison, vaguely implicated in a conspiracy againstthe Medicis. He was tortured but refused to talk,whether about his own involvement or that of others.Released from prison in March 1513, he retired indisgrace to a small farm owned by his family a fewmiles outside Florence.

Machiavelli had a close friend in a man calledFrancesco Vettori, who had managed to survive thechange in government and to ingratiate himself withthe Medicis. In the spring of 1513, Vettori began toreceive letters in which Machiavelli described his newlife. At night he would shut himself up in his study andconverse in his mind with great figures in history,trying to uncover the secrets of their power. Hewanted to distill the many things he himself hadlearned about politics and statecraft. And, he wrote toVettori, he was writing a little pamphlet called Deprincipatibus--later titled The Prince--"where I dive asdeep as I can into ideas about this subject,discussing the nature of princely rule, what forms ittakes, how these are acquired, how they aremaintained, how they are lost." The knowledge andadvice imparted in this pamphlet would be more

valuable to a prince than the largest army--perhapsVettori could show it to one of the Medicis, to whomMachiavelli would gladly dedicate the work? It couldbe of great use to this family of "new princes." It couldalso revive Machiavelli's career, for he wasdespondent at his isolation from politics.

Vettori passed the essay along to Lorenzo de'Medici, who accepted it with much less interest thanhe did two hunting dogs given to him at the sametime. Actually, The Prince perplexed even Vettori: itsadvice was sometimes starkly violent and amoral, yetits language was quite dispassionate and matter-of-fact--a strange and uncommon mix. The author wrotethe truth, but a little too boldly. Machiavelli also sentthe manuscript to other friends, who were equallyunsure what to make of it. Perhaps it was intended assatire? Machiavelli's disdain for aristocrats withpower but no brains was well known to his circle.

Soon Machiavelli wrote another book, later knowna s The Discourses, a distillation of his talks withfriends since his fall from grace. A series ofmeditations on politics, the book contained some ofthe same stark advice as the earlier work but wasmore geared toward the constitution of a republic thanto the actions of a single prince.

Even more foolish is one who clings to wordsand phrases and thus tries to achieveunderstanding. It is like trying to strike the moonwith a stick, or scratching a shoe because thereis an itchy spot on the foot. It has nothing to do

with the Truth.ZEN MASTER MUMON, 1183-1260

Over the next few years, Machiavelli slowly returnedto favor and was allowed to participate in Florentineaffairs. He wrote a play, Mandragola, which, thoughscandalous, was admired by the pope and staged atthe Vatican; he was also commissioned to write ahistory of Florence. The Prince and The Discoursesremained unpublished, but they circulated inmanuscript among the leaders and politicians of Italy.Their audience was small, and when Machiavelli diedin 1527, the former secretary to the republic seemeddestined to return to the obscurity from which hecame.

After Machiavelli's death, however, those twounpublished works of his began to circulate outsideItaly. In 1529, Thomas Cromwell, the crafty minister toHenry VIII of England, somehow got hold of a copy ofThe Prince and, unlike the flightier Lorenzo de'Medici, read it closely and carefully. To him the book'shistorical anecdotes made for a lively and entertainingread. The plain language was not bizarre butrefreshing. Most important, the amoral advice was infact indispensable: the writer explained not only whata leader had to do to hold on to power but how topresent his actions to the public. Cromwell could nothelp but adapt Machiavelli's counsel in his advice tothe king.

Published in several languages in the decadesafter Machiavelli's death, The Prince slowly spread

far and wide. As the centuries passed, it took on a lifeof its own, in fact a double life: widely condemned asamoral, yet avidly read in private by great politicalfigures down the ages. The French minister CardinalRichelieu made it a kind of political bible. Napoleonconsulted it often. The American president JohnAdams kept it by his bedside. With the help ofVoltaire, the Prussian king Frederick the Great wrotea tract called The Anti-Machiavel, yet he shamelesslypracticed many of Machiavelli's ideas to the letter.

As Machiavelli's books reached larger audiences,his influence extended beyond politics. Philosophersfrom Bacon to Hegel found in his writings confirmationfor many of their own theories. Romantic poets suchas Lord Byron admired the energy of his spirit. In Italy,Ireland, and Russia, young revolutionaries discoveredi n The Discourses an inspiring call to arms and ablueprint for a future society.

Over the centuries millions upon millions of readershave used Machiavelli's books for invaluable adviceon power. But could it possibly be the opposite--that itis Machiavelli who has been using his readers?Scattered through his writings and through his lettersto his friends, some of them uncovered centuries afterhis death, are signs that he pondered deeply thestrategy of writing itself and the power he could wieldafter his death by infiltrating his ideas indirectly anddeeply into his readers' minds, transforming them intounwitting disciples of his amoral philosophy.

Yoriyasu was a swaggering and aggressive

samurai.... In the spring of 1341 he wastransferred from Kofu to Kamakura, where hevisited Master Toden, the 45th teacher atKenchoji, to ask about Zen. The teacher said, "Itis to manifest directly the Great Action in thehundred concerns of life. When it is loyalty as asamurai, it is the loyalty of Zen. 'Loyalty' iswritten with the Chinese character made up of'centre' and 'heart,' so it means the lord in thecentre of the man. There must be no wrongpassions. But when this old priest looks at thesamurai today, there are some whose heartcentre leans towards name and money, andothers where it is towards wine and lust, and withothers it is inclined towards power and bravado.They are all on those slopes, and cannot havea centred heart; how could they have loyalty tothe state? If you, Sir, wish to practise Zen, first ofall practise loyalty and do not slip into wrongdesires." The warrior said, "Our loyalty is directGreat Action on the battlefield. What need havewe for sermons from a priest?" The teacherreplied, "You, Sir, are a hero in strife, I am agentleman of peace--we can have nothing tosay to each other." The warrior then drew hissword and said, "Loyalty is in the hero's sword,and if you do not know this, you should not talkof loyalty." The teacher replied, "This old priesthas the treasure sword of the Diamond King,

and if you do not know it, you should not talk ofthe source of loyalty." The samurai said,"Loyalty of your Diamond Sword--what is theuse of that sort of thing in actual fighting?" Theteacher jumped forward and gave one Katzu!shout, giving the samurai such a shock that helost consciousness. After some time the teachershouted again and the samurai at oncerecovered. The teacher said, "The loyalty in thehero's sword, where is it? Speak!" The samuraiwas over-awed; he apologized and took hisdeparture.

SAMURAI ZEN: THE WARRIOR KOANS,TREVOR LEGGETT, 1985

InterpretationOnce retired to his farm, Machiavelli had the requisitetime and distance to think deeply about those mattersthat concerned him most. First, he slowly formulatedthe political philosophy that had long been brewing inhis mind. To Machiavelli the ultimate good was aworld of dynamic change in which cities or republicswere reordering and revitalizing themselves inperpetual motion. The greatest evil was stagnationand complacency. The agents of healthy change werewhat he called "new princes"--young, ambitiouspeople, part lion, part fox, conscious or unconsciousenemies of the established order. Second,Machiavelli analyzed the process by which newprinces rose to the heights of power and, often, fell

from it. Certain patterns were clear: the need tomanage appearances, to play upon people's beliefsystems, and sometimes to take decidedly amoralaction.

Machiavelli craved the power to spread his ideasand advice. Denied this power through politics, he setout to win it through books: he would convert readersto his cause, and they would spread his ideas, wittingor unwitting carriers. Machiavelli knew that thepowerful are often reluctant to take advice, particularlyfrom someone apparently beneath them. He alsoknew that many of those not in power might befrightened by the dangerous aspects of hisphilosophy--that many readers would be attracted andrepelled at the same time. (The powerless wantpower but are afraid of what they might have to do toget it.) To win over the resistant and ambivalent,Machiavelli's books would have to be strategic,indirect and crafty. So he devised unconventionalrhetorical tactics to penetrate deep behind hisreaders' defenses.

First, he filled his books with indispensable advice--practical ideas on how to get power, stay in power,protect one's power. That draws in readers of allkinds, for all of us think first of our own self-interest.Also, no matter how much a reader resists, he or sherealizes that ignoring this book and its ideas might bedangerous.

Next, Machiavelli stitched historical anecdotesthroughout his writing to illustrate his ideas. Peoplelike to be shown ways to fancy themselves modern

Caesars or Medicis, and they like to be entertainedby a good story; and a mind captivated by a story isrelatively undefended and open to suggestion.Readers barely notice that in reading these stories--or, rather, in reading Machiavelli's cleverly alteredversions of them--they are absorbing ideas.Machiavelli also quoted classical writers, adjustingthe quotations to suit his purposes. His dangerouscounsels and ideas would be easier to accept if theyseemed to be emerging from the mouth of a Livy or aTacitus.

Finally, Machiavelli used stark, unadornedlanguage to give his writing movement. Instead offinding their minds slowing and stopping, his readersare infected with the desire to go beyond thought andtake action. His advice is often expressed in violentterms, but this works to rouse his readers from theirstupor. It also appeals to the young, the most fertileground from which new princes grow. He left hiswriting open-ended, never telling people exactly whatto do. They must use their own ideas and experienceswith power to fill in his writing, becoming complicitpartners in the text. Through these various devices,Machiavelli gained power over his readers whiledisguising the nature of his manipulations. It is hard toresist what you cannot see.

Understand: you may have brilliant ideas, the kindthat could revolutionize the world, but unless you canexpress them effectively, they will have no force, nopower to enter people's minds in a deep and lastingway. You must focus not on yourself or on the need

you feel to express what you have to say but on youraudience--as intently as a general focuses on theenemy he is strategizing to defeat. When dealing withpeople who are bored and have short attention spans,you must entertain them, sneaking your ideas inthrough the back door. With leaders you must becareful and indirect, perhaps using third parties todisguise the source of the ideas you are trying tospread. With the young your expression must be moreviolent. In general, your words must have movement,sweeping readers along, never calling attention totheir own cleverness. You are not after personalexpression, but power and influence. The less peopleconsciously focus on the communicative form youhave chosen, the less they realize how far yourdangerous ideas are burrowing into their minds.

The Lydian King Croesus had had Miltiadesmuch in this thoughts so when he learned of hiscapture, he sent a command to the people ofLampsacus to set him at liberty; if they refused,he was determined, he added, to "cut themdown like a pine-tree." The people of the townwere baffled by Croesus' threat, and at a loss tounderstand what being cut down like a pine-treemight mean, until at last the true significance ofthe phrase dawned upon a certain elderly man:the pine, he explained, was the only kind of treewhich sent up no new shoots after being felled--cut down a pine and it will die off completely.

The explanation made the Lampsacenes sofrightened of Croesus that they let Miltiades go.THE HISTORIES, HERODOTUS, 484-432 B.C.

For some time I have never said what Ibelieved, and never believed what I said, and if I

do sometimes happen to say what I think, Ialways hide it among so many lies that it is hard

to recover it.--Niccolo Machiavelli, letter to Francesco

Guicciardini (1521)

KEYS TO WARFAREFor centuries people have searched for the magicformula that would give them the power to influenceothers through words. This search has been mostlyelusive. Words have strange, paradoxical qualities:offer people advice, for instance, no matter howsound, and you imply that you know more than theydo. To the extent that this strikes at their insecurities,your wise words may merely have the effect ofentrenching them in the very habits you want tochange. Once your language has gone out into theworld, your audience will do what they want with it,interpreting it according to their own preconceptions.Often when people appear to listen, nod their heads,and seem persuaded, they are actually just trying tobe agreeable--or even just to get rid of you. There aresimply too many words inundating our lives for talk tohave any real, long-lasting effect.

This does not mean that the search for power

through language is futile, only that it must be muchmore strategic and based on knowledge offundamental psychology. What really changes us andour behavior is not the actual words uttered bysomeone else but our own experience, somethingthat comes not from without but from within. An eventoccurs that shakes us up emotionally, breaks up ourusual patterns of looking at the world, and has alasting impact on us. Something we read or hear froma great teacher makes us question what we know,causes us to meditate on the issue at hand, and in theprocess changes how we think. The ideas areinternalized and felt as personal experience. Imagesfrom a film penetrate our unconscious,communicating in a preverbal way, and become partof our dream life. Only what stirs deep within us,taking root in our minds as thought and experience,has the power to change what we do in any lastingway.

That same day Jesus went out of the house andsat beside the sea. And great crowds gatheredabout him, so that he got into a boat and satthere; and the whole crowd stood on the beach.And he told them many things in parables,saying: "A sower went out to sow. And as hesowed, some seeds fell along the path, and thebirds came and devoured them. Other seedsfell on rocky ground, where they had not muchsoil, and immediately they sprang up, sincethey had no depth of soil, but when the sun rose

they had no depth of soil, but when the sun rosethey were scorched; and since they had no rootthey withered away. Other seeds fell uponthorns, and the thorns grew up and chokedthem. Other seeds fell on good soil and broughtforth grain, some a hundred-fold, some sixty,some thirty. He who has ears, let him hear."Then the disciples came and said to him, "Whydo you speak to them in parables?" And heanswered them, "To you it has been given toknow the secrets of the kingdom of heaven, butto them it has not been given. For to him whohas will more be given, and he will haveabundance; but from him who has not, evenwhat he has will be taken away. This is why Ispeak to them in parables, because seeing theydo not see, and hearing they do not hear, nor dothey understand. With them indeed is fulfilledthe prophecy of Isaiah which says: 'You shallindeed hear but never understand, and youshall indeed see but never perceive.'"

MATTHEW 13:1-15

The historical figure who most deeply pondered thenature of communication was surely Socrates, thegreat philosopher of classical Athens. Socrates' goalwas simple: he wanted to make people realize thattheir knowledge of the world was superficial, if notdownright false. Had he tried to say this conventionallyand directly, though, he would only have made hisaudience more resistant and would have

strengthened their intellectual smugness. And so,pondering this phenomenon, and through much trialand error, Socrates came up with a method. Firstcame the setup: he would make a show of his ownignorance, telling his audience of mostly young menthat he himself knew little--that any wisdom he wasreputed to have was just talk. Meanwhile he wouldcompliment his listeners, feeding their vanity bypraising their ideas in an offhand way. Then, in aseries of questions constituting a dialog with amember of his audience, he would slowly tear apartthe very ideas he had just praised. He would neverdirectly say anything negative, but through hisquestions he would make the other person see theincompleteness or falsity of his ideas. This wasconfusing; he had just professed his own ignorance,and he had sincerely praised his interlocutors. Yet hehad somehow raised a lot of doubts about what theyhad claimed to know.

The dialog would lie in the minds of Socrates'targets for several days, leading them to questiontheir ideas about the world on their own. In this frameof mind, they would now be more open to realknowledge, to something new. Socrates broke downpeople's preconceptions about the world by adoptingwhat he called a "midwife" role: he did not implant hisideas, he simply helped to deliver the doubts that arelatent in everyone.

The success of the Socratic method wasstaggering: a whole generation of young Atheniansfell under his spell and were permanently altered by

his teachings. The most famous of these was Plato,who spread Socrates' ideas as if they were gospel.And Plato's influence over Western thought isperhaps greater than that of anyone else. Socrates'method was highly strategic. He began by tearinghimself down and building others up, a way ofdefusing his listeners' natural defensiveness,imperceptibly lowering their walls. Then he would lurethem into a labyrinth of discussion from which theycould find no exit and in which everything theybelieved was questioned. According to Alcibiades,one of the young men whom Socrates had bewitched,you never knew what he really believed or what hereally meant; everything he said was a rhetoricalstance, was ironic. And since you were unsure whathe was doing, what came to the surface in theseconversations were your own confusion and doubt. Healtered your experience of the world from within.

Think of this method as communication-in-depth.Normal discourse, and even fine writing and art,usually only hits people on the surface. Our attemptsto communicate with them become absorbed in all ofthe noise that fills their ears in daily life. Even ifsomething we say or do somehow touches anemotional chord and creates some kind ofconnection, it rarely stays in their minds long enoughto alter how they think and act. A lot of the time, thesesurface communications are fine; we cannot gothrough life straining to reach everyone--that would betoo exhausting. But the power to reach people moredeeply, to alter their ideas and unpleasant behavior,

is sometimes critical.What you need to pay attention to is not simply the

content of your communication but the form--the wayyou lead people to the conclusions you desire, ratherthan telling them the message in so many words. Ifyou want people to change a bad habit, for example,much more effective than simply trying to persuadethem to stop is to show them--perhaps by mirroringtheir bad behavior in some way--how annoying thathabi t feels to other people. If you want to makepeople with low self-esteem feel better aboutthemselves, praise has a superficial effect; insteadyou must prod them into accomplishing somethingtangible, giving them a real experience. That willtranslate into a much deeper feeling of confidence. Ifyou want to communicate an important idea, you mustnot preach; instead make your readers or listenersconnect the dots and come to the conclusion on theirown. Make them internalize the thought you are tryingto communicate; make it seem to emerge from theirown minds. Such indirect communication has thepower to penetrate deep behind people's defenses.

In speaking this new language, learn to expand yourvocabulary beyond explicit communication. Silence,for instance, can be used to great effect: by keepingquiet, not responding, you say a lot; by not mentioningsomething that people expect you to talk about, youcall attention to this ellipsis, make it communicate.Similarly, the details--what Machiavelli calls le cosepiccole (the little things)--in a text, speech, or work ofart have great expressive power. When the famous

Roman lawyer and orator Cicero wanted to defamethe character of someone he was prosecuting, hewould not accuse or rant; instead he would mentiondetails from the life of the accused--the incredibleluxury of his home (was it paid for out of illegalmeans?), the lavishness of his parties, the style of hisdress, the little signs that he considered himselfsuperior to the average Roman. Cicero would saythese things in passing, but the subtext was clear.Without hitting listeners over the head, it directedthem to a certain conclusion.

In any period it can be dangerous to express ideasthat go against the grain of public opinion or offendnotions of correctness. It is best to seem to conformto these norms, then, by parroting the acceptedwisdom, including the proper moral ending. But youcan use details here and there to say something else.If you are writing a novel, for instance, you might putyour dangerous opinions in the mouth of the villain butexpress them with such energy and color that theybecome more interesting than the speeches of thehero. Not everyone will understand your innuendosand layers of meaning, but some certainly will, at leastthose with the proper discernment; and mixedmessages will excite your audience: indirect forms ofexpression--silence, innuendo, loaded details,deliberate blunders--make people feel as if they wereparticipating, uncovering the meaning on their own.The more that people participate in thecommunication process, the more deeply theyinternalize its ideas.

Irony. --Irony is in place only as a pedagogictool, employed by a teacher in dealing with anykind of pupil: its objective is humiliation, makingashamed, but of that salutary sort whichawakens good resolutions and inspires respectand gratitude towards him who treats us thus ofthe kind we feel for a physician. The ironistposes as unknowing, and does so so well thatthe pupils in discussion with him are deceived,grow bold in their belief they know better andexpose themselves in every way; they abandoncircumspection and reveal themselves as theyare--up to the moment when the lamp they havebeen holding up to the face of the teachersends its beams very humiliatingly back on tothemselves.--Where such a relationship as thatbetween teacher and pupil does not obtain,irony is ill-breeding, a vulgar affectation. Allironical writers depend on the foolish species ofmen who together with the author would like tofeel themselves superior to all others and whoregard the author as the mouthpiece of theirpresumption.--Habituation to irony, moreover,like habituation to sarcasm, spoils thecharacter, to which it gradually lends the qualityof a malicious and jeering superiority: in theend one comes to resemble a snapping dogwhich has learned how to laugh but forgottenhow to bite.

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE, 1878

In putting this strategy into practice, avoid thecommon mistake of straining to get people's attentionby using a form that is shocking or strange. Theattention you get this way will be superficial and short-lived. By using a form that alienates a wide public, younarrow your audience; you will end up preaching tothe converted. As the case of Machiavellidemonstrates, using a conventional form is moreeffective in the long run, because it attracts a largeraudience. Once you have that audience, you caninsinuate your real (and even shocking) contentthrough details and subtext.

In war almost everything is judged by its result. If ageneral leads his army to defeat, his noble intentionsdo not matter; nor does the fact that unforeseenfactors may have thrown him off course. He lost; noexcuse will do. One of Machiavelli's mostrevolutionary ideas was to apply this standard topolitics: what matters is not what people say or intendbut the results of their actions, whether power isincreased or decreased. This is what Machiavellicalled the "effective truth"--the real truth, in otherwords, what happens in fact, not in words or theories.In examining the career of a pope, for instance,Machiavelli would look at the alliances he had builtand the wealth and territory he had acquired, not athis character or religious proclamations. Deeds andresults do not lie. You must learn to apply the same

barometer to your attempts at communication, and tothose of other people.

If a man says or writes something that he considersrevolutionary and that he hopes will change the worldand improve mankind, but in the end hardly anyone isaffected in any real way, then it is not revolutionary orprogressive at all. Communication that does notadvance its cause or produce a desired result is justself-indulgent talk, reflecting no more than people'slove of their own voice and of playing the role of themoral crusader. The effective truth of what they havewritten or said is that nothing has been changed. Theability to reach people and alter their opinions is aserious affair, as serious and strategic as war. Youmust be harsher on yourself and on others: failure tocommunicate is the fault not of the dull-wittedaudience but of the unstrategic communicator.

Authority: I cannot give birth to wisdommyself and the accusation that many makeagainst me, that while I question others, Imyself bring nothing wise to light due to mylack of wisdom, is accurate. The reason forthis is as follows: God forces me to serve asa midwife and prevents me from giving birth.

--Socrates (470-399 B.C.)

--Socrates (470-399 B.C.)

REVERSALEven as you plan your communications to make themmore consciously strategic, you must develop thereverse ability to decode the subtexts, hiddenmessages, and unconscious signals in what otherpeople say. When people speak in vaguegeneralities, for example, and use a lot of abstractterms like "justice," "morality," "liberty," and so on,without really ever explaining the specifics of whatthey are talking about, they are almost always hidingsomething. This is often their own nasty but necessaryactions, which they prefer to cover up under a screenof righteous verbiage. When you hear such talk, besuspicious.

Meanwhile people who use cutesy, colloquiallanguage, brimming with cliches and slang, may betrying to distract you from the thinness of their ideas,trying to win you over not by the soundness of theirarguments but by making you feel chummy and warmtoward them. And people who use pretentious,flowery language, crammed with clever metaphors,are often more interested in the sound of their ownvoices than in reaching the audience with a genuinethought. In general, you must pay attention to theforms in which people express themselves; nevertake their content at face value.

DESTROY FROM WITHINTHE INNER-FRONT STRATEGY

A war can only really be fought against an enemywho shows himself. By infiltrating your opponents'ranks, working from within to bring them down, yougive them nothing to see or react against--theultimate advantage. From within, you also learn theirweaknesses and open up possibilities of sowinginternal dissension. So hide your hostile intentions.To take something you want, do not fight those whohave it, but rather join them--then either slowly makeit your own or wait for the moment to stage a coupd'etat. No structure can stand for long when it rotsfrom within.

Athene now inspired Prylis, son of Hermes, tosuggest that entry should be gained into Troyby means of a wooden horse; and Epeius, sonof Panopeus, a Phocian from Parnassus,volunteered to build one under Athene'ssupervision. Afterwards, of course, Odysseusclaimed all the credit for this stratagem......[Epeius] built an enormous hollow horse of firplanks, with a trap-door fitted into one flank, andlarge letters cut on the other which consecratedit to Athene: "In thankful anticipation of a safe

return to their homes, the Greeks dedicate thisoffering to the Goddess." Odysseus persuadedthe bravest of the Greeks to climb fully armedup a rope-ladder and through the trap-door intothe belly of the horse.... Among them wereMenelaus, Odysseus, Diomedes, Sthenelus,Acamas, Thoas, and Neoptolemus. Coaxed,threatened, and bribed, Epeius himself joinedthe party. He climbed up last, drew the ladder inafter him and, since he alone knew how to workthe trap-door, took his seat beside the lock. Atnightfall, the remaining Greeks underAgamemnon followed Odysseus's instructions,which were to burn their camp, put out to seaand wait off Tenedos and the Calydnian Islandsuntil the following evening....... At the break ofday, Trojan scouts reported that the camp lay inashes and that the Greeks had departed,leaving a huge horse on the seashore. Priamand several of his sons went out to view it and,as they stood staring in wonder, Thymoetes wasthe first to break the silence. "Since this is a giftto Athene," he said, "I propose that we take itinto Troy and haul it up to her citadel." "No, no!"cried Capys. "Athene favoured the Greeks toolong; we must either burn it at once or break itopen to see what the belly contains." But Priamdeclared: "Thymoetes is right. We will fetch it inon rollers. Let nobody desecrate Athene's

property." The horse proved too broad to besqueezed through the gates. Even when the wallhad been breached, it stuck four times. Withenormous efforts the Trojans then hauled it upto the citadel; but at least took the precaution ofrepairing the breach behind them.... Atmidnight...Odysseus ordered Epeius to unlockthe trapdoor.... Now the Greeks poured silentlythrough the moonlit streets, broke into theunguarded houses, and cut the throats of theTrojans as they slept.

THE GREEK MYTHS, VOL. 2, ROBERTGRAVES, 1955

THE INVISIBLE ENEMYLate in 1933, Adolf Hitler appointed the forty-six-year-old Rear Admiral Wilhelm Canaris chief of theAbwehr, the secret intelligence and counter-espionage service of the German General Staff. Hitlerhad recently won dictatorial powers as the ruler ofGermany, and, with an eye on future conquests inEurope, he wanted Canaris to make the Abwehr anagency as efficient as the British Secret Service.Canaris was a slightly odd choice for the position. Hecame from the aristocracy, was not a member of theNazi Party, and had not had a particularly outstandingmilitary career. But Hitler saw traits in Canaris thatwould make him a superior spymaster: cunning in theextreme, a man made for intrigue and deception, heknew how to get results. He would also owe his

promotion exclusively to Hitler.In the years to come, Hitler would have reason to

feel proud of his choice. Canaris rigorouslyreorganized the Abwehr and extended its spynetworks throughout Europe. Then, in May 1940, heprovided exceptional intelligence for the blitzkrieginvasion of France and the Low Countries early inWorld War II. And so, in the summer of that sameyear, Hitler gave Canaris his most important task todate: providing intelligence for Operation Sealion, aplan to conquer England. After the blitzkrieg and theevacuation of the Allied army at Dunkirk, the Britishseemed deeply vulnerable, and knocking them out ofthe war at this point would ensure Hitler's conquest ofEurope.

A few weeks into the job, however, Canarisreported that the Germans had underestimated thesize of the English army and air force. Sealion wouldrequire resources much larger than the Fuhrer hadanticipated; unless Hitler was willing to commit manymore troops, it could turn into a mess. This was highlydisappointing news for Hitler, who had wanted toknock out England in one quick blow. With his eye onan imminent invasion of Russia, he was unwilling tocommit large numbers to Sealion or to spend yearssubduing the British. Having come to trust Canaris, heabandoned the planned invasion.

That same summer General Alfred Jodl came upwith a brilliant plan to damage England in anotherway: using Spain as a base of operations, he wouldinvade the British-owned island of Gibraltar, cutting off

England's sea routes through the Mediterranean andthe Suez Canal to its empire in India and points east--a disastrous blow. But the Germans would have to actfast, before the English caught on to the threat.Excited by the prospect of ruining England in thisindirect way, Hitler once again asked Canaris toassess the plan. The Abwehr chief went to Spain,studied the situation, and reported back. The momenta German army moved into Spain, he said, theEnglish would see the plan, and Gibraltar hadelaborate defenses. The Germans would also needthe cooperation of Francisco Franco, dictator ofSpain, who Canaris believed would not be sufficientlyhelpful. In short: Gibraltar was not worth the effort.

There were many around Hitler who believed thattaking Gibraltar was eminently realizable and couldmean overall victory in the war against Britain.Shocked at Canaris's report, they vocally expressedtheir doubts about the intelligence he had beenproviding all along. His enigmatic nature--he spokelittle and was impossible to read--only fueled theirsuspicions that he was not to be trusted. Hitler heardhis staff out, but a meeting with Generalissimo Francoto discuss the Gibraltar plan indirectly corroboratedeverything Canaris had said. Franco was difficult andmade all kinds of silly demands; the Spanish wouldbe impossible to deal with; the logistics were toocomplicated. Hitler quickly lost interest in Jodl's plan.

In the years that followed, German officials inincreasing numbers would come to suspect Canarisof disloyalty to the Third Reich, but no one could pin

anything concrete on him. And Hitler himself had greatfaith in the Abwehr chief and sent him on critical top-secret missions. One such assignment occurred inthe summer of 1943, when Marshal Pietro Badoglio,the former chief of the Italian General Staff, arrestedBenito Mussolini, dictator of Italy and Hitler'sstaunchest ally. The Germans feared that Badogliomight secretly open talks with General Dwight D.Eisenhower for Italy's surrender--a devastating blowto the Axis that Hitler could forestall, if necessary, bysending an army to Rome, arresting Badoglio, andoccupying the capital. But was it necessary?

Hitler's armies were needed elsewhere, so Canariswas dispatched to assess the likelihood of Italy'ssurrender. He met with his counterpart in the Italiangovernment, General Cesare Ame, then arranged fora meeting between high-ranking members of bothcountries' intelligence services. At the meeting, Ameemphatically denied that Badoglio had any intentionof betraying Germany; in fact, the marshal was fiercelyloyal to the cause. And Ame was very convincing.Hitler accordingly left Italy alone. A few weeks later,however, Badoglio indeed surrendered toEisenhower, and the valuable Italian fleet moved intoAllied hands. Canaris had been fooled--or was itCanaris who had done the fooling?

General Walter Schellenberg, chief of the foreignintelligence branch of the SS, began to investigate theBadoglio fiasco and found two men in Ame's servicewho had listened in on one of Canaris's talks withtheir boss. Canaris, they reported, had known of

Badoglio's intentions to surrender all along and hadcollaborated with Ame to deceive Hitler. Surely thistime the Abwehr chief had been caught in the act andwould pay with his life. Schellenberg accumulated athick dossier of other actions that cast more doubtson Canaris. He presented it to Heinrich Himmler,head of the SS, who, however, told his subordinate tokeep quiet--he would present the dossier to Hitlerwhen the time was right. Yet, to Schellenberg'sdismay, months went by and Himmler did nothing,except eventually to retire Canaris with honors fromthe service.

Shortly after Canaris's retirement, his diaries fellinto the hands of the SS. They revealed that he hadconspired against Hitler from the beginning of hisservice as Abwehr chief, even plotting to assassinatethe Fuhrer in schemes that had only barely misfired.Canaris was sent to a concentration camp, where, inApril 1945, he was tortured and killed.

InterpretationWilhelm Canaris was a devoutly patriotic andconservative man. In the earliest days of the NaziParty's rise to power, he had come to believe thatHitler would lead his beloved Germany to destruction.But what could he do? He was just one man, and toraise his voice against Hitler would get him no morethan a little publicity and an early death. Canariscared only about results. So he kept quiet, and, whenoffered the job of Abwehr chief, he seized hisopportunity. At first he bided his time, gaining

credibility by his work in the Abwehr and getting tounderstand the inner workings of the Nazigovernment. Meanwhile he secretly organized agroup of like-minded conspirators, the SchwarzeKapelle (Black Orchestra), who would hatch severalplots to kill Hitler. From his position in the Abwehr,Canaris was to some extent able to protect theSchwarze Kapelle from investigation. He also quietlygathered intelligence on the dirtiest secrets of high-ranking Nazis like Himmler and let them know that anymove against him would result in revelations thatwould ruin them.

Assigned to prepare for Operation Sealion,Canaris doctored the intelligence to make Englandlook much more formidable than it was. Assigned toinvestigate an invasion of Gibraltar, he secretly toldthe Spanish that to let Germany use their countrywould spell disaster: Germany would never leave.Hence Franco's alienating treatment of Hitler. In bothof these cases, Canaris exploited Hitler's impatiencefor quick and easy victories to discourage him fromventures that could have easily and irrevocably turnedthe war in his favor. Finally, in the case of Badoglio,Canaris understood Hitler's weak spot--a paranoidconcern with the loyalty of others--and coached Ameon how to appeal to this weakness and make a showof Italy's devotion to the Axis cause. The results ofCanaris's work from the inside are astounding: oneman played a major role in saving England, Spain,and Italy from disaster, arguably turning the tide of thewar. The resources of the German war machine were

essentially at his disposal, to disrupt and derail itsefforts.

As the story of Canaris demonstrates, if there issomething you want to fight or destroy, it is often bestto repress your desire to act out your hostility,revealing your position and letting the other side knowyour intentions. What you gain in publicity, andperhaps in feeling good about expressing yourselfopenly, you lose in a curtailment of your power tocause real damage, particularly if the enemy is strong.

Instead the ultimate strategy is to seem to stay onthe enemy side, burrowing deep into its heart. Fromthere you can gather valuable information:weaknesses to attack, incriminating evidence topublicize. Here subtle maneuvers, like passing alongfalse information or steering your opponent into a self-destructive policy, can have large effects--much largerthan anything you could do from the outside. Theenemy's powers become weapons you can useagainst it, a kind of turncoat armory at your disposal. Itis hard for most people to imagine that someone whooutwardly plays the part of a loyal supporter or friendcan secretly be a foe. This makes your hostileintentions and maneuvers relatively easy to cloak.When you are invisible to the enemy, there is no limitto the destructive powers at your command.

Speak deferentially, listen respectfully, followhis command, and accord with him in

everything. He will never imagine you might bein conflict with him. Our treacherous measures

will then be settled.--Tai Kung, Six Secret Teachings (circa fourth

century B.C.)

THE FRIENDLY TAKEOVERIn the summer of 1929, Andre Breton, the thirty-three-year-old leader of Paris's avant-garde surrealistmovement, saw a private screening of a film calledUn Chien Andalou. It was directed by a Spanishmember of the group, Luis Bunuel, and its first imageshowed a man slicing open a woman's eye with aknife. This, Breton exclaimed, was the first surrealistfilm. Un Chien Andalou generated excitement in partbecause of the contribution to it of a new artist on thescene, Salvador Dali, a friend and collaborator ofBunuel's. The director spoke highly to Breton of hisfellow Spaniard, whose paintings, he said, couldcertainly be considered surrealist and whosepersonality was supremely peculiar. Soon others, too,were talking about Dali, discussing what he called his"paranoid-critical" method of painting: he delveddeep into his dreams and unconscious andinterpreted the images he found there, no matter whattheir content, in delirious detail. Dali still lived inSpain, but Breton was suddenly seeing his nameeverywhere he went. Then, in November 1929, thetwenty-five-year-old Dali had his first major show in aParis gallery, and Breton was transfixed by theimages. He wrote of the exhibition, "For the first timethe windows of the mind had opened wide."

The late 1920s were a difficult period for Breton.

The movement he had founded some five yearsearlier was stagnating, its members constantlybickering over ideological points that bored Breton totears. In truth, surrealism was on the verge ofbecoming passe. Perhaps Dali could offer the freshblood it needed: his art, his ideas, and hisprovocative character might make surrealismsomething people talked about again. With all this inmind, Breton invited Dali into the movement, and theSpaniard happily accepted. Dali moved to Paris andestablished himself there.

For the next few years, Breton's strategy seemed tobe working. Dali's scandalous paintings were the talkof Paris. His exhibitions caused riots. Suddenlyeveryone was interested in surrealism again, evenyounger artists. But by 1933, Breton was beginning torue his inclusion of Dali. He had begun to get lettersfrom the Spaniard expressing great interest in Hitleras a source of paranoiac inspiration. Only thesurrealists, Dali felt, were capable of "saying prettythings on the subject" of Hitler; he even wrote ofsexually charged dreams about Hitler. As news ofDali's infatuation with the Fuhrer spread within themovement, it provoked a great deal of argument.Many surrealists had communist sympathies andwere disgusted by the Spanish artist's musings. Tomake matters worse, he included in one enormouspainting an image of Lenin in a grotesque pose--exposing oversized buttocks (nine feet long), proppedon a crutch. Many in the surrealist group admiredLenin; was Dali being deliberately provocative? After

Breton told Dali he disliked this rendition of the humanbuttocks and anus, a delirious profusion of anusimages suddenly began to populate the artist'spaintings.

Throughout his revolutionary and missionarytravels, Hasan [leader of the Nizari Ismailis] wassearching for an impregnable fortress fromwhich to conduct his resistance to the Seljukempire. In about 1088, he finally chose thecastle of Alamut, built on a narrow ridge on ahigh rock in the heart of the Elburz Mountains ina region known as the Rudbar. The castledominated an enclosed cultivated valley thirtymiles long and three miles across at its widest,approximately six thousand feet above sealevel. Several villages dotted the valley, andtheir inhabitants were particularly receptive tothe ascetic piety of Hasan. The castle wasaccessible only with the greatest difficultythrough a narrow gorge of the Alamut River....Hasan employed a careful strategy to take overthe castle, which had been granted to its currentShiite owner, named Mahdi, by the Seljuksultan Malikshah. First, Hasan sent his trustedd a i Husayn Qai-ni and two others to winconverts in the neighboring villages. Next,many of the residents and soldiers of Alamutwere secretly converted to Ismailism. Finally, inSeptember 1090, Hasan himself was secretly

smuggled into the castle. When Mahdi realizedthat Hasan had in fact quietly taken over hisfortress, he left peacefully....

THE TEMPLARS AND THE ASSASSINS,JAMES WASSERMAN, 2001

By early 1934, Breton could stand no more, and heissued a statement, cosigned by several members,proposing Dali's expulsion from the surrealist group.The movement was split down the middle; Dali hadboth supporters and enemies. Finally a meeting wascalled to debate the issue. Dali had a fever and asore throat; he came to the meeting wearing half adozen layers of clothing and with a thermometer in hismouth. As Breton paced the room, listing the reasonsfor his banishment, Dali began to take off and put onhis overcoat, jacket, and sweaters, trying to regulatehis temperature. It was hard for anyone to payattention to Breton.

Finally Dali was asked to respond. "I had paintedboth Lenin and Hitler on the basis of dreams," hesaid, the thermometer in his mouth making him spitmany of his words. "Lenin's anamorphic buttock wasnot insulting, but the very proof of my fidelity tosurrealism." He continued to put on and take offclothing. "All taboos are forbidden, or else a list has tobe made of those to be observed, and let Bretonformally state that the kingdom of surrealist poetry isnothing but a little domain used for the house arrest ofthose convicted felons placed under surveillance bythe vice squad or the Communist Party."

The members of the circle were perplexed to saythe least: Dali had turned their meeting into a kind ofsurrealist performance, both making fun of thecreative freedom they advocated and claiming it forhimself. He had also made them laugh. A vote toexclude him would only confirm the accusations hehad leveled at them. For the time being, they decidedto leave him alone, but in the meeting's aftermath itwas clear that the surrealist movement was now moredivided than ever.

At the end of that year, Dali disappeared to NewYork. Word came back to Paris that he hadcompletely conquered the art world in America,making surrealism the hottest movement around. Inthe years to come, he would actually emigrate to theUnited States, and his face would grace the cover ofTime magazine. From New York his fame spread far,wide, and around the world. Meanwhile the surrealiststhemselves faded quietly from public view,marginalized by other art movements. In 1939,Breton, disgusted by his lack of control over Dali,finally expelled the Spanish artist from the group, butby then it hardly mattered: Dali himself had becomesynonymous with surrealism, and it would stay thatway long after the surrealist movement had died.

InterpretationSalvador Dali was an extremely ambitious man.Although he appeared eccentric to say the least, hisdiaries show the extent to which he applied strategyto get what he wanted. Languishing in Spain early on

in his career, he saw the importance of capturing theParis art world, the center of the modern-artmovement, if he were to rise to the heights of fame.And if he were to make it in Paris, his name wouldhave to be attached to some kind of movement--thatwould demonstrate his avant-garde status and givehim free publicity. Considering the nature of his workand paranoiac-critical method, surrealism was theonly logical choice. Of course it helped that Dali'sgood friend Bunuel was already a member of thegroup and that his lover, Gala, was also the wife ofPaul Eluard, one of surrealism's principal authors andthinkers. Through Bunuel, Gala, and a few others(people Dali called "messengers" and "porters"), hespread his name strategically throughout Paris andaimed himself directly at Breton. In truth, Dalidespised any kind of organized group and activelydisliked Breton, but both could be useful to him. Byinsinuating his presence through others andsuggesting that he was a surrealist avant la lettre, hecleverly managed to get Breton to invite him into thegroup.

Now, as a true surrealist, an official insider, Dalicould continue to wage his insidious war. At first hemade a show of being a loyal member of the group,the platform from which he spent several yearswinning over Paris with his striking paintings. Thesurrealists were grateful for the new life he had giventhem, but in reality he was using their name andpresence to propel his career. Then, once his famewas secure, he proceeded to dynamite the group

from the inside. The weaker the surrealists wereinternally, the more he could dominate them publicly.Dali deliberately chose Hitler and Lenin as images heknew would disgust many in the group. That wouldboth bring out Breton's totalitarian side and cause amajor split among the members. Dali's "performance"at the meeting to expel him was a surrealistmasterpiece in itself, and a strategic blow to anyvestiges of group unity. Finally, when the movementwas riven with division, he scampered off to New Yorkto complete his campaign. Appropriating theseductive name of surrealism for himself, he would godown in history as its most famous member, far morefamous than Breton.

It is hard to make your way in the world alone.Alliances can help, but if you are starting out, it is hardto get the right people interested in an alliance withyou; there is nothing in it for them. The wisest strategyis often to join the group that can best serve your long-term interests, or the one with which you have themost affinity. Instead of trying to conquer this groupfrom the outside, you burrow your way into it. As aninsider you can gather valuable information about howit functions and particularly about its members'hypocrisies and weaknesses--knowledge you canuse to wage insidious intraorganizational warfare.From the inside you can divide and conquer.

Remember: your advantage here is that, unlike theother members, you have no sentimental attachmentto the group; your only allegiance is to yourself. Thatgives you the freedom you need to make the

manipulative and destructive maneuvers that willpropel you to the fore at the others' expense.

If you decide to wage a war for the total triumphof your individuality, you must begin by

inexorably destroying those who have thegreatest affinity with you.

--Salvador Dali (1904-1989)

KEYS TO WARFAREThe most common form of defense in old-fashionedwarfare was the fortress or walled city, and militaryleaders strategized for centuries about how to takesuch structures. The fortress presented a simpleproblem: it was designed to be impenetrable, torequire such an effort to take it that unless doing sowas strategically essential, an army would tend topass it by. The conventional strategy against thefortress was to scale or breach its walls, using siegeengines and battering rams. Often that meant firstbesieging it, creating around it circles known as "linesof circumvallation and contravallation" that wouldprevent supplies and reinforcements from coming inand the defenders from leaving. The city's inhabitantswould slowly starve and weaken, making it possibleeventually to breach the walls and take the castle.These sieges tended to be quite long and bloody.

Over the centuries, however, certain enlightenedstrategists hit upon a different way to bring down thewalls. Their strategy was based on a simple premise:the apparent strength of the fortress is an illusion, for

behind its walls are people who are trapped, afraid,even desperate. The city's leaders have essentiallyrun out of options; they can only put their faith in thefortress's architecture. To lay siege to these walls is tomistake the appearance of strength for reality. If infact the walls are hiding great weakness within, thenthe proper strategy is to bypass them and aim for theinterior. This can be done literally, by digging tunnelsbeneath the walls, undermining their strength--aconventional military strategy. A better, more deviousroute is to infiltrate people inside them or to work withthe city's disaffected inhabitants. This is known as"opening an inner front"--finding a group on the insidewho will work on your behalf to spread discontent andwill eventually betray the fortress into your hands,sparing you a long siege.

In late January 1968, the North Vietnameselaunched the famous Tet Offensive against the SouthVietnamese and American armies. Among theirtargets was Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam and acity of great religious significance for the Vietnamesepeople. In the center of Hue is a massive fort calledthe Citadel, and within the Citadel is the ImperialPalace compound, the heart and soul of Hue. TheCitadel has incredibly thick and high walls and issurrounded on all sides by water. In 1968 it wasguarded by American soldiers and their allies. Yet theNorth Vietnamese were somehow able to take theCitadel with remarkable ease. They held it for severalweeks, then disappeared from Hue as if by magicafter a massive U.S. counterattack. The Citadel was

unimportant to them as a physical or strategicpossession; what they were after was the symbolismof being able to take it, showing the world thatAmerican invincibility was a myth.

The capture of the Citadel was a remarkable feat,and this is how it was done. Months before Tet, theNorth Vietnamese began to infiltrate men into the cityand to organize those of their sympathizers whoalready lived in Hue and worked inside the Citadel.They got hold of detailed plans of the fortress, whichallowed them to dig elaborate tunnels under its walls.They were also able to leave stockpiles of weaponsat key points. During the Tet holiday, they infiltratedeven more of their men into the city, dressed aspeasants. Confederates inside the fortress helpedthem to overrun some of the guard posts and openthe gates. Melting into the local population, they madeit impossible for the Citadel's defenders to distinguishfriend from foe. Finally, having reconnoitered thelocation of the concentrated command structureinside the Citadel, the North Vietnamese were able totake it out right away, leaving the defenders unable tocommunicate with one another. This created massconfusion, and in the process the defense of theCitadel collapsed.

The North Vietnamese called this strategy the"blooming lotus." It has deep roots in Asian militarythinking, and its applications go far beyond war.Instead of focusing on the enemy's formidable front,on capturing key points in the periphery of itsdefenses and finding a way through them (the

traditional Western approach), the lotus strategy aimsfirst and foremost at the center--the soft andvulnerable parts within. The goal is to funnel soldiersand confederates into this central area by whatevermeans possible and to attack it first in order tospread confusion. Rather than trying to penetratedefenses, it infiltrates them. This includes the minds ofthe enemy soldiers and officers--strategizing to getunder their skin, to unbalance their reasoning powers,to soften them up from within. As with the lotus flower,everything unfolds from the center of the target.

To attack or to intervene. --We often make themistake of actively opposing a tendency orparty or age because we happen to have seenonly its external side, its deliquescence or the"faults of its virtues" necessarily adhering to it--perhaps because we ourselves haveparticipated in them to a marked degree. Thenwe turn our back on them and go off in anopposite direction; but it would be better if wesought out their good and strong side instead orevolved and developed it in ourself. It requires,to be sure, a more penetrating eye and a morefavorable inclination to advance what isimperfect and evolving than to see through it inits imperfection and deny it.

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE, 1878

The basic principle here is that it is easiest to

The basic principle here is that it is easiest totopple a structure--a wall, a group, a defensive mind--from the inside out. When something begins to rot orfall apart from within, it collapses of its own weight--afar better way to bring it down than ramming yourselfagainst its walls. In attacking any group, the lotusstrategist thinks first of opening an inner front.Confederates on the inside will provide valuableintelligence on the enemy's vulnerabilities. They willsilently and subtly sabotage him. They will spreadinternal dissension and division. The strategy canweaken the enemy to the point where you can finishhim off with a penetrating blow; it can also bring downthe enemy in and of itself.

A variation on the lotus strategy is to befriend yourenemies, worming your way into their hearts andminds. As your targets' friend, you will naturally learntheir needs and insecurities, the soft interior they tryso hard to hide. Their guard will come down with afriend. And even later on, when you play out yourtreacherous intentions, the lingering resonance ofyour friendship will still confuse them, letting you keepon manipulating them by toying with their emotions orpushing them into overreactions. For a moreimmediate effect, you can try a sudden act ofkindness and generosity that gets people to lowertheir defenses--the Trojan Horse strategy. (For tenlong years, the Greeks battered the walls of Troy to noeffect; the simple gift of a wooden horse let themsneak a few men into Troy and open the gates fromwithin.)

The lotus strategy is widely applicable. When

confronted by something difficult or thorny, do not bedistracted or discouraged by its formidable outerappearance; think your way into the soft core, thecenter from which the problem blossoms. Perhaps thesource of your problem is a particular person;perhaps it is yourself and your own stale ideas;perhaps it is the dysfunctional organization of a group.Knowing the problem's core gives you great power tochange it from the inside out. Your first thought mustalways be to infiltrate to the center--whether in thoughtor in action--never to whale away at the periphery orjust pound at the walls.

If there is someone on the inside whom you need toget rid of or thwart, the natural tendency is to considerconspiring with others in your group who feel thesame way. In most conspiracies the goal is somelarge-scale action to topple the leader and seizepower. The stakes are high, which is whyconspiracies are so often difficult and dangerous. Themain weakness in any conspiracy is usually humannature: the higher the number of people who are in onthe plot, the higher the odds that someone will revealit, whether deliberately or accidentally. As BenjaminFranklin said, "Three may keep a secret if two of themare dead." No matter how confident you may be ofyour fellow conspirators, you cannot know for certainwhat is going on in their minds--the doubts they maybe having, the people they may be talking to.

A prince need trouble little about conspiracieswhen the people are well disposed, but when

they are hostile and hold him in hatred, then hemust fear everything and everybody.

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, 1469-1527

There are a few precautions you can take. Keepthe number of conspirators as small as possible.Involve them in the details of the plot only asnecessary; the less they know, the less they have toblab. Revealing the schedule of your plan as late aspossible before you all act will give them no time toback out. Then, once the plan is described, stick to it.Nothing sows more doubts in conspirators' mindsthan last-minute changes. Even given all thisinsurance, keep in mind that most conspiracies failand, in their failure, create all kinds of unintendedconsequences. Even the successful plot toassassinate Julius Caesar led not to the restoration ofthe Roman Republic, as the conspirators intended,but eventually to the undemocratic regime of theemperor Augustus. Too few conspirators and you lackthe strength to control the consequences; too manyand the conspiracy will be exposed before it bearsfruit.

In destroying anything from within, you must bepatient and resist the lure of large-scale, dramaticaction. As Canaris showed, the placement of littlewrenches in the machinery is just as destructive in thelong run, and safer because harder to trace. Considerthe ability to dissuade your opponents from actingaggressively or to make their plans misfire as a kindof battlefield victory, even if your triumph is

surreptitious. A few such victories and your enemy willfall apart from within.

Finally, morale plays a crucial part in any war, and itis always wise to work to undermine the morale of theenemy troops. The Chinese call this "removing thefirewood from under the cauldron." You can attemptthis from the outside, through propaganda, but thatoften has the opposite effect, reinforcing the cohesionof soldiers and civilians in the face of an alien forcetrying to win them over. It is much more effective tofind sympathizers within their ranks, who will spreaddiscontent among them like a disease. When soldierssee those on their own side having doubts about thecause they are fighting for, they are generallydemoralized and vulnerable to more disaffection. Iftheir leaders overreact to this threat by punishinggrumblers, they play into your hands, representingthemselves as unjust and heavy-handed; if they leavethe problem alone, it will only spread; and if they startto see enemies everywhere around them, theirparanoia will cloud their strategic abilities. Using aninner front to spread dissension is often enough togive you the advantage you need to overwhelm theenemy.

Authority: The worst [military policy is] toassault walled cities.... If your commander,unable to control his temper, sends yourtroops swarming at the walls, yourcasualties will be one in three and still youwill not have taken the city.... Therefore theexpert in using the military subdues theenemy's forces without going to battle,takes the enemy's walled cities withoutlaunching an attack.

--Sun-tzu (fourth century B.C.)

REVERSALThere are always likely to be disgruntled people inyour own group who will be liable to turning againstyou from the inside. The worst mistake is to beparanoid, suspecting one and all and trying to monitortheir every move. Your only real safeguard againstconspiracies and saboteurs is to keep your troopssatisfied, engaged in their work, and united by their

cause. They will tend to police themselves and turn inany grumblers who are trying to foment trouble fromwithin. It is only in unhealthy and decaying bodies thatcancerous cells can take root.

DOMINATE WHILE SEEMING TOSUBMIT

THE PASSIVE-AGGRESSION STRATEGY

Any attempt to bend people to your will is a form ofaggression. And in a world where politicalconsiderations are paramount, the most effectiveform of aggression is the best-hidden one:aggression behind a compliant, even loving exterior.To follow the passive-aggressive strategy, you mustseem to go along with people, offering no resistance.But actually you dominate the situation. You arenoncommittal, even a little helpless, but that onlymeans that everything revolves around you. Somepeople may sense what you are up to and get angry.Don't worry--just make sure you have disguised youraggression enough that you can deny it exists. Do itright and they will feel guilty for accusing you.Passive aggression is a popular strategy; you mustlearn how to defend yourself against the vast legionsof passive-aggressive warriors who will assail you inyour daily life.

Gandhi and his associates repeatedly deploredthe inability of their people to give organized,effective, violent resistance against injusticeand tyranny. His own experience was

corroborated by an unbroken series ofreiterations from all the leaders of India--thatIndia could not practice physical warfare againsther enemies. Many reasons were given,including weakness, lack of arms, having beenbeaten into submission, and other arguments ofa similar nature....... Confronted with the issue ofwhat means he could employ against theBritish, we come to the other criteria previouslymentioned; that the kind of means selected andhow they can be used is significantly dependentupon the face of the enemy, or the character ofhis opposition. Gandhi's opposition not onlymade the effective use of passive resistancepossible but practically invited it. His enemywas a British administration characterized by anold, aristocratic, liberal tradition, one whichgranted a good deal of freedom to its colonialsand which always had operated on a pattern ofusing, absorbing, seducing, or destroying,through flattery or corruption, the revolutionaryleaders who arose from the colonial ranks. Thiswas the kind of opposition that would havetolerated and ultimately capitulated before thetactic of passive resistance.

RULES FOR RADICALS, SAUL D. ALINSKY,1971

THE GUILT WEAPONIn December 1929 the group of Englishmen who

governed India were feeling a little nervous. TheIndian National Congress--the country's mainindependence movement--had just broken off talksover the proposal that Britain would gradually returnautonomous rule to the subcontinent. Instead theCongress was now calling for nothing less thanimmediate and total independence, and it had askedMahatma Gandhi to lead a civil-disobediencecampaign to initiate this struggle. Gandhi, who hadstudied law in London years before, had invented aform of passive-resistant protest in 1906, whileworking as a barrister in South Africa. In India in theearly 1920s, he had led civil-disobediencecampaigns against the British that had created quitea stir, had landed him in prison, and had made himthe most revered man in the country. For the British,dealing with him was never easy; despite his frailappearance, he was uncompromising and relentless.

Although Gandhi believed in and practiced arigorous form of non-violence, the colonial officers ofthe British Raj were fearful: at a time when the Englisheconomy was weak, they imagined him organizing aboycott of British goods, not to mention massdemonstrations in the streets of India's cities, a policenightmare.

The man in charge of the Raj's strategy incombating the independence movement was theviceroy of India, Lord Edward Irwin. Although Irwinadmired Gandhi personally, he had decided torespond to him rapidly and with force--he could not letthe situation get out of hand. He waited anxiously to

see what Gandhi would do. The weeks went by, andfinally, on March 2, Irwin received a letter fromGandhi--rather touching in its honesty--that revealedthe details of the civil-disobedience campaign he wasabout to launch. It was to be a protest against the salttax. The British held a monopoly on India's productionof salt, even though it could easily be gathered byanyone on the coast. They also levied a rather hightax on it. This was quite a burden for the poorest ofthe poor in India, for whom salt was their onlycondiment. Gandhi planned to lead a march of hisfollowers from his ashram near Bombay (present-dayMumbai) to the coastal town of Dandi, where hewould gather sea salt left on the shore by the wavesand encourage Indians everywhere to do the same.All this could be prevented, he wrote to Irwin, if theviceroy would immediately repeal the salt tax.

Irwin read this letter with a sense of relief. Heimagined the sixty-year-old Gandhi, rather fragile andleaning on a bamboo cane, leading his ragtagfollowers from his ashram--fewer than eighty people--on a two-hundred-mile march to the sea, where hewould gather some salt from the sands. Compared towhat Irwin and his staff had been expecting, theprotest seemed almost ludicrously small in scale.What was Gandhi thinking? Had he lost touch withreality? Even some members of the Indian NationalCongress were deeply disappointed by his choice ofprotest. In any event, Irwin had to rethink his strategy. Itsimply would not do to harass or arrest this saintly oldman and his followers (many of them women). That

would look very bad. It would be better to leave himalone, avoiding the appearance of a heavy-handedresponse and letting the crisis play out and die down.In the end the ineffectiveness of this campaign wouldsomewhat discredit Gandhi, breaking his spell overthe Indian masses. The independence movementmight fracture or at least lose some momentum,leaving England in a stronger position in the long run.

As Irwin watched Gandhi's preparations for themarch, he became still more convinced that he hadchosen the right strategy. Gandhi was framing theevent as almost religious in quality, like LordBuddha's famous march to attain divine wisdom, orLord Rama's retreat in the Ramayana. His languagebecame increasingly apocalyptic: "We are enteringupon a life-and-death struggle, a holy war." Thisseemed to resonate with the poor, who began to flockto Gandhi's ashram to hear him speak. He called infilm crews from all over the world to record the march,as if it were a momentous historical event. Irwinhimself was a religious man and saw himself as therepresentative of a God-fearing, civilized nation. Itwould redound to England's credit to be seen to leavethis saintly man untouched on his procession to thesea.

Gandhi and his followers left their ashram on March12, 1930. As the group passed from village to village,their ranks began to swell. With each passing day,Gandhi was bolder. He called on students throughoutIndia to leave their studies and join him in the march.Thousands responded. Large crowds gathered along

the way to see him pass; his speeches to them grewmore and more inflammatory. He seemed to be tryingto bait the English into arresting him. On April 6 he ledhis followers into the sea to purify themselves, thencollected some salt from the shore. Word quicklyspread throughout India that Gandhi had broken thesalt law.

Irwin followed these events with increasing alarm. Itdawned on him that Gandhi had tricked him: insteadof responding quickly and decisively to this seeminglyinnocent march to the sea, the viceroy had left Gandhialone, allowing the march to gain momentum. Thereligious symbolism that seemed so harmless hadstirred the masses, and the salt issue had somehowbecome a lightning rod for disaffection with Englishpolicy. Gandhi had shrewdly chosen an issue that theEnglish would not recognize as threatening but thatwould resonate with Indians. Had Irwin responded byarresting Gandhi immediately, the whole thing mighthave died down. Now it was too late; to arrest him atthis point would only add fuel to the fire. Yet to leavehim alone would show weakness and cede him theinitiative. Meanwhile nonviolent demonstrations werebreaking out in cities and villages all over India, and torespond to them with violence would only make thedemonstrators more sympathetic to moderateIndians. Whatever Irwin did, it seemed, would makethings worse. And so he fretted, held endlessmeetings, and did nothing.

It is impossible to win a contest with a helpless

opponent since if you win you have won nothing.Each blow you strike is unreturned so that allyou can feel is guilt for having struck while at thesame time experiencing the uneasy suspicionthat the helplessness is calculated.

STRATEGIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, JAYHALEY, 1 963

In the days to come, the cause rippled outward.Thousands of Indians traveled to India's coasts tocollect salt as Gandhi had. Large cities saw massdemonstrations in which this illegal salt was givenaway or sold at a minimal price. One form ofnonviolent protest cascaded into another--aCongress-led boycott of British goods, for one.Finally, on Irwin's orders, the British began to respondto the demonstrations with force. And on May 4 theyarrested Gandhi and took him to prison, where hewould stay for nine months without trial.

Huang Ti, the legendary Yellow Emperor andreputed ancestor of the Chou dynasty, thehistorical paradigm of concord and civilization,is said to have brought harmony from chaos,tamed the barbarians and wild beasts, clearedthe forests and marshes, and invented the "fiveharmonious sounds," not through an act of epicbloodshed, but through his superior virtue, byadapting and yielding to "natural conditions"and to the Will of Heaven. Confucianism

henceforth repudiates as unworkable the idea ofmilitary solutions to human problems. HuangTi's most notable heir, we are told, was Ti Yao, agentleman who "naturally and without effort,"embraced reverence, courteousness, andintelligence. Nevertheless, during his reign, theDeluge, mythology's universal symbol ofanomie, threatened to inundate the land. Thus itfell upon him to appoint a successor to preservethe order of his own son. Ti Yao chose the mostqualified man for the job, the venerable Shun,who had in various tests already demonstrateda capacity to harmonize human affairs throughrighteousness....... Shun in turn selected Yu theSage to engineer an end to the flood. BecauseYu refused wine and always acted appropriately,moving with and not resisting nature, the Way ofHeaven (T'ien Tao) was revealed to him. Hesubsequently harnessed the river waters not byfighting against them with a dam, but by yieldingto them and clearing for them a wider channelwithin which to run. Were it not for Yu, so thestory goes, who herein personified the wisdomof both Confucius and Lao-tzu, the Taoistprophet, we would all be fish.RELIGIOUS MYTHOLOGY AND THE ART OF

WAR, JAMES A. AHO, 1981

Gandhi's arrest sparked a conflagration of protest.On May 21 a group of 2,500 Indians marched

peacefully on the government's Dharasana SaltWorks, which was defended by armed Indianconstables and British officers. When the marchersadvanced on the factory, they were struck down withsteel-plated clubs. Instructed in Gandhi's methods ofnonviolence, the demonstrators made no attempt todefend themselves, simply submitting to the blowsthat rained down on them. Those who had not been hitcontinued to march until almost every last one hadbeen clubbed. It was a nauseating scene that got agreat deal of play in the press. Similar incidents allover India helped to destroy the last sentimentalattachment any Indians still had toward England.

To end the spiraling unrest, Irwin was finally forcedto negotiate with Gandhi, and, on several issues, togive ground--an unprecedented event for an Englishimperialist viceroy. Although the end of the Raj wouldtake several years, the Salt March would prove to bethe beginning of the end, and in 1947 the Englishfinally left India without a fight.

InterpretationGandhi was a deceptively clever strategist whosefrail, even saintly appearance constantly misled hisadversaries into underestimating him. The key to anysuccessful strategy is to know both one's enemy andoneself, and Gandhi, educated in London, understoodthe English well. He judged them to be essentiallyliberal people who saw themselves as upholdingtraditions of political freedom and civilized behavior.This self-image--though riddled with contradictions,

as indicated by their sometimes brutal behavior intheir colonies--was deeply important to the English.The Indians, on the other hand, had been humiliatedby many years of subservience to their Englishoverlords. They were largely unarmed and in noposition to engage in an insurrection or guerrilla war.If they rebelled violently, as other colonies had done,the English would crush them and claim to be actingout of self-defense; their civilized self-image wouldsuffer no damage. The use of nonviolence, on theother hand--an ideal and philosophy that Gandhideeply valued and one that had a rich tradition inIndia--would exploit to perfection the Englishreluctance to respond with force unless absolutelynecessary. To attack people who were protestingpeacefully would not jibe with the Englishman's senseof his own moral purity. Made to feel confused andguilty, the English would be paralyzed withambivalence and would relinquish the strategicinitiative.

The Salt March is perhaps the quintessentialexample of Gandhi's strategic brilliance. First, hedeliberately chose an issue that the British wouldconsider harmless, even laughable. To respond withforce to a march about salt would have given anEnglishman trouble. Then, by identifying hisapparently trivial issue in his letter to Irwin, Gandhimade space for himself in which to develop the marchwithout fear of repression. He used that space toframe the march in an Indian context that would give itwide appeal. The religious symbolism he found for it

had another function as well: it heightened theparalysis of the British, who were quite religiousthemselves in their own way and could notcountenance repressing a spiritual event. Finally, likeany good showman, Gandhi made the marchdramatically visual and used the press to give itmaximum exposure.

Once the march gained momentum, it was too lateto stop it. Gandhi had sparked a fire, and the masseswere now deeply engaged in the struggle. WhateverIrwin did at this point would make the situation worse.Not only did the Salt March become the model forfuture protests, but it was clearly the turning point inIndia's struggle for independence.

Many people today are as ambivalent as theEnglish were about having power and authority. Theyneed power to survive, yet at the same time they havean equally great need to believe in their owngoodness. In this context to fight people with any kindof violence makes you look aggressive and ugly. Andif they are stronger than you are, in effect you areplaying into their hands, justifying a heavy-handedresponse from them. Instead it is the height ofstrategic wisdom to prey upon people's latent guiltand liberal ambivalence by making yourself lookbenign, gentle, even passive. That will disarm themand get past their defenses. If you take action tochallenge and resist them, you must do it morally,righteously, peacefully. If they cannot help themselvesand respond with force, they will look and feel bad; ifthey hesitate, you have the upper hand and an

opening to determine the whole dynamic of the war. Itis almost impossible to fight people who throw uptheir hands and do not resist in the usual aggressiveway. It is completely confusing and disabling.Operating in this way, you inflict guilt as if it were akind of weapon. In a political world, your passive,moralistic resistance will paralyze the enemy.

I was a believer in the politics of petitions,deputations and friendly negotiations. But all

these have gone to dogs. I know that these arenot the ways to bring this Government round.Sedition has become my religion. Ours is a

nonviolent war.--Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1947)

PASSIVE POWEREarly in 1820 a revolution broke out in Spain, followeda few months later by one in Naples, which at thattime was a city-state incorporated within the AustrianEmpire. Forced to accept liberal constitutionsmodeled on that of revolutionary France some thirtyyears earlier, the kings of both countries had reasonto fear that they also faced the same fate as theFrench king of that period, Louis XVI, beheaded in1793. Meanwhile the leaders of Europe's greatpowers--England, Austria, and Prussia--quaked at thethought of unrest and radicalism spreading acrosstheir borders, which had only recently been stabilizedby the defeat of Napoleon. They all wanted to protectthemselves and halt the tide of revolution.

The devotion of his soldiers to him, affirmed inmany stories, must be a fact. [Julius Caesar]could not have done what he did without it. Thespeech in which it is always said he quelled amutiny with a single word, calling his men notfellow-soldiers as was his custom, but citizens,civilians, shows a great deal more about hismethods than the mere clever use of a term. Itwas a most critical moment for him. He was inRome after Pompey's defeat, on the point ofsailing for Africa, to put down the powerfulsenatorial army there. In the city he wassurrounded by bitter enemies. His wholedependence was his army, and the best andmost trusted legion in it mutinied. They nearlykilled their officer; they marched to Rome andclaimed their discharge; they would serveCaesar no longer. He sent for them, tellingthem to bring their swords with them, a directionperfectly characteristic of him. Everything told ofhim shows his unconcern about danger tohimself. Face to face with them, he asked themto state their case and listened while they toldhim all they had done and suffered and beenpoorly rewarded for, and demanded to bedischarged. His speech in answer was alsocharacteristic, very gentle, very brief, exactly tothe point: "You say well, citizens. You haveworked hard--you have suffered much. You

desire your discharge. You have it. I dischargeyou all. You shall have your recompense. Itshall never be said of me that I made use of youwhen I was in danger, and was ungrateful to youwhen danger was past." That was all, yet thelegionaries listening were completely broken tohis will. They cried out that they would neverleave him; they implored him to forgive them, toreceive them again as his soldiers. Back of thewords was his personality, and although that cannever be recaptured, something of it yet comesthrough the brief, bald sentences: the strengththat faced tranquilly desertion at a moment ofgreat need; the pride that would not utter a wordof appeal or reproach; the mild tolerance of onewho knew men and counted upon nothing fromthem.

THE ROMAN WAY, EDITH HAMILTON, 1932

In the midst of this general unease, Czar AlexanderI of Russia (1777-1825) suddenly proposed a planthat to many seemed a cure more dangerous than thedisease. The Russian army was the largest and mostfeared in Europe; Alexander wanted to send it to bothSpain and Naples, crushing the two rebellions. Inexchange he would insist that the kings of both realmsenact liberal reforms that would grant their citizensgreater freedoms, making them more content anddiluting their desire for revolution.

Alexander saw his proposal as more than a

practical program to safeguard Europe's monarchies;it was part of a great crusade, a dream he hadnurtured since the earliest days of his reign. A deeplyreligious man who saw everything in terms of goodand evil, he wanted the monarchies of Europe toreform themselves and create a kind of Christianbrotherhood of wise, gentle rulers with himself, theczar, at their helm. Although the powerful consideredAlexander a kind of Russian madman, many liberalsand even revolutionaries throughout Europe saw himas their friend and protector, the rare leadersympathetic to their cause. It was even rumored thathe had made contacts with various men of the left andhad intrigued with them.

The czar went further with his idea: now he wanteda conference of the major powers to discuss thefuture of Spain, Naples, and Europe itself. TheEnglish foreign minister, Lord Castlereagh, wroteletter after letter trying to dissuade him of the need forthe meeting. It was never wise to meddle in the affairsof other countries, Castlereagh said; Alexandershould leave England to help stop the unrest in Spain,its close ally, while Austria did the same for Naples.Other ministers and rulers wrote to Alexander as well,using similar arguments. It was critical to show aunited front against his plan. Yet one man--theAustrian foreign minister, Prince Klemens vonMetternich--responded to the czar in a much differentfashion, and it was shocking to say the least.

Metternich was the most powerful and respectedminister in Europe. The quintessential realist, he was

always slow to take bold action or to involve Austria inany kind of adventure; security and order were hisprimary concerns. He was a conservative, a man whobelieved in the virtues of the status quo. If change hadto come, it should come slowly. But Metternich wasalso something of an enigma--an elegant courtier, hespoke little yet always seemed to get his way. Nownot only was he supporting Alexander's call for aconference, but he also seemed open to the czar'sother ideas. Perhaps he had undergone a change ofheart and was moving to the left in his later years? Inany event, he personally organized the conference forOctober of that year in the Austrian-held city ofTroppau, in the modern-day Czech Republic.

Alexander was delighted: with Metternich on hisside, he could realize his ambitions and then some.When he arrived in Troppau for the conference,however, the representatives of the other powers inattendance were less than friendly. The French andthe Prussians were cool; Castlereagh had refused tocome altogether. Feeling somewhat isolated,Alexander was delighted again when Metternichproposed they hold private meetings to discuss theczar's ideas. For several days, and for hours on end,they holed themselves up together in a room. The czardid most of the talking; Metternich listened with hisusual attentive air, agreeing and nodding. The czar,whose thinking was somewhat vague, strained toexplain his vision of Europe as best he could, and theneed for the leaders at the conference to display theirmoral unity. He could not help but feel frustrated at his

inability to make his ideas more specific.Several days into these discussions, Metternich

finally confessed to the czar that he, too, saw a moraldanger brewing in Europe. Godless revolution wasthe scourge of the time; giving in to the radical spirit,showing any sign of compromise, would eventuallylead to destruction at the hands of these satanicforces. During the Troppau conference, a mutiny hadbroken out in a regiment of Russian guards;Metternich warned Alexander that this was the firstsymptom of a revolutionary infection attacking Russiaitself. Thank God the czar, a pillar of moral strength,would not give in. Alexander would have to serve asthe leader of this counterrevolutionary crusade. Thiswas why Metternich had become so excited by theczar's ideas about Naples and Spain and how he hadinterpreted them.

The czar was swept up in Metternich's enthusiasm:together they would stand firm against the radicals.Somehow, though, the result of their conversation wasnot a plan for Russia to invade Naples and Spain;indeed, Alexander speculated instead that it might notbe the time to press the kings of those countries toreform their governments--that would just weaken bothmonarchs. For the time being, the leaders' energyshould go into halting the revolutionary tide. In fact, theczar began to repent of some of his more liberalideas, and he confessed as much to Metternich. Theconference ended with a statement of grand commonpurpose among the powers--much of its language theczar's--and an agreement that Austrian troops, not

Russian ones, would return the king of Naples to fullpower, then leave him to pursue the policies of hischoice.

After Alexander returned to Russia, Metternichwrote to praise him for leading the way. The czarwrote back in fervor: "We are engaged in a combatwith the realm of Satan. Ambassadors do not sufficefor this task. Only those whom the Lord has placed atthe head of their peoples may, if He gives Hisblessings, survive the contest...with this diabolicforce." In fact, the czar wanted to go further; he hadreturned to the idea of marching his army into Spainto put down the revolution there. Metternichresponded that that would not be necessary--theBritish were handling the situation--but a conferencenext year could readdress the issue.

In early 1821 another revolution broke out, this timein Piedmont, the one Italian state outside Austriancontrol. The king was forced to abdicate. In thisinstance Metternich welcomed Russian intervention,and 90,000 Russian troops became reserves in anAustrian army heading for Piedmont. A Russianmilitary presence so close to their borders greatlydampened the spirits of the rebels and of theirsympathizers throughout Italy--all those leftists whohad seen the czar as their friend and protector. Theythought that no more.

The Austrian army crushed the revolution within afew weeks. At Metternich's request, the Russianspolitely withdrew their forces. The czar was proud ofhis growing influence in Europe, but somehow he had

embarked on the very opposite of his original plansfor a crusade: instead of being in the forefront of thefight for progress and reform, he had become aguardian of the status quo, a conservative in the moldof Metternich himself. Those around him could notunderstand how this had happened.

InterpretationPrince Metternich may have been history's mosteffective public practitioner of passive aggression.Other diplomats sometimes thought him cautious,even weak, but in the end, as if by magic, he alwaysgot what he wanted. The key to his success was hisability to hide his aggression to the point where it wasinvisible.

Metternich was always careful to take the measureof his opponent. In the case of Czar Alexander, hewas dealing with a man governed by emotion andsubject to wild mood swings. Yet the czar, behind hismoralistic Christian facade, was also aggressive inhis own way, and ambitious; he itched to lead acrusade. In Metternich's eyes he was as dangerousas Napoleon had been: in the name of doing good forEurope, such a man might march his troops from oneend of the continent to the other, creating untoldchaos.

To stand in the way of Alexander's powerful armywould be destructive in itself. But the canny Metternichknew that to try to persuade the czar that he waswrong would have the unintended effect of feeding hisinsecurities and pushing him to the left, making him

more prone to take dangerous action on his own.Instead the prince would have to handle him like achild, diverting his energies to the right through apassive-aggressive campaign.

At times one has to deal with hidden enemies,intangible influences that slink into dark cornersand from this hiding affect people bysuggestion. In instances like this, it is necessaryto trace these things back to the most secretrecesses, in order to determine the nature of theinfluences to be dealt with.... The veryanonymity of such plotting requires anespecially vigorous and indefatigable effort, butthis is well worth while. For when such elusiveinfluences are brought into the light andbranded, they lose their power over people.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

The passive part was simple: Metternich presentedhimself as compliant, going along with ideas that heactually disagreed with to the extreme. He acceptedAlexander's request for a congress, for example,although he personally opposed it. Then, in his privatediscussions with the czar at Troppau, he at first justlistened, then enthusiastically agreed. The czarbelieved in demonstrating moral unity? Then so didMetternich--although his own policies had alwaysbeen more practical than moral; he was the master ofrealpolitik. He flattered personal qualities in the czar--

moral fervor, for example--that he actually thoughtdangerous. He also encouraged the czar to go furtherwith his ideas.

Having disarmed Alexander's suspicions andresistance this way, Metternich at the same timeoperated aggressively. At Troppau he worked behindthe scenes to isolate the czar from the other powers,so that the Russian leader became dependent onhim. Next he cleverly arranged those long hours ofprivate meetings, in which he subtly infected the czarwith the idea that revolution was far more dangerousthan the status quo and diverted the Russian's radicalChristian crusade into an attack on liberalism itself.Finally, having mirrored Alexander's energy, hismoods, his fervor, and his language, Metternichmanaged to lure him into sending troops against therebellion in Piedmont. That action both committedAlexander in deed to the conservative cause andalienated him from the liberals of Europe. No longercould he spout vague, ambiguous pronouncementson the left; he had finally taken action, and it was in theopposite direction. Metternich's triumph wascomplete.

In those days force and arms did prevail; butnow the wit of the fox is everywhere on foot, sohardly a faithful or virtuous man may be found.

QUEEN ELIZABETH I, 1533-1603

Although the phrase "passive aggression" hasnegative connotations for most of us, as conscious

strategy passive-aggressive behavior offers aninsidiously powerful way of manipulating people andwaging personal war. Like Metternich, you mustoperate on two fronts. You are outwardly agreeable,apparently bending to people's ideas, energy, andwill, changing shape like Proteus himself. Remember:people are willful and perverse. Opposing themdirectly or trying to change their ideas will often havethe contrary effect. A passive, compliant front, on theother hand, gives them nothing to fight against orresist. Going along with their energy gives you thepower to divert it in the direction you want, as if youwere channeling a river rather than trying to dam it.Meanwhile the aggressive part of your strategy takesthe form of infecting people with subtle changes intheir ideas and with an energy that will make them acton your behalf. Their inability to get what you aredoing in focus gives you room to work behind thescenes, checking their progress, isolating them fromother people, luring them into dangerous moves thatmake them dependent on your support. They think youare their ally. Behind a pleasant, compliant, evenweak front, you are pulling the strings.

This was the real achievement of Metternich'spolicy, that it had killed Russian liberalism and

achieved a measure of domination overAustria's most dangerous rival in the guise of

submitting to him.--Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (1957)

In this postscript on the solution of Caesar'sproblem, it is not our intention to traceOctavian's rise to power from the time he arrivedin Rome to claim his inheritance until, in 31B.C., with the aid of Vipsanius Agrippa, hedefeated Antony and Cleopatra at Actium andbecame master of the Roman world. Instead, itis to describe in brief how as such he solvedCaesar's problem and established a peacewhich was to last for over 200 years. When hecontemplated the empire he had won and itsheterogeneous local governments and peoples,he realized that it was far too large and complexto be ruled by the council of a city state; thatinstead it demanded some form of one-manrule, and that his problem was how to disguise it.From the outset he decided not to tamper withthe constitution of the Republic, or contemplatemonarchy....... Firstly, in 28 B.C. he declined allhonours calculated to remind the Romans ofthe kingly power; adopted the title of princeps("first citizen"), and called his system thePrincipate. Secondly, he accepted all the oldconventions--consuls, tribunes, magistrates,elections, etc. Thirdly, instead of ignoring theSenate and insulting its members as Caesarhad done, he went out of his way to consult itand placate them. Lastly, on January 13, 27B.C., at a session of the Senate, he renounced

all his extraordinary powers and placed them atthe disposal of the Senate and the people. Andwhen the senators begged him to resume themand not to abandon the Commonwealth he hadsaved, he yielded to their request andconsented to assume proconsular authorityover an enlarged province, which includedSpain, Gaul, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus, whilethe Senate was left with the remainingprovinces. Thus in semblance the sovereigntyof the Senate and the people was restored; butin fact, because his enlarged provincecomprised the majority of the legions, andEgypt, over which he ruled as king...the basis ofpolitical power passed into his hands. Threedays later the Senate decreed that the title"Augustus" (the Revered) should be conferredupon him.

JULIUS CAESAR, J.F.C. FULLER, 1965

KEYS TO WARFAREWe humans have a particular limitation to ourreasoning powers that causes us endless problems:when we are thinking about someone or aboutsomething that has happened to us, we generally optfor the simplest, most easily digestible interpretation.An acquaintance is good or bad, nice or mean, his orher intentions noble or nefarious; an event is positiveor negative, beneficial or harmful; we are happy orsad. The truth is that nothing in life is ever so simple.

People are invariably a mix of good and badqualities, strengths and weaknesses. Their intentionsin doing something can be helpful and harmful to us atthe same time, a result of their ambivalent feelingstoward us. Even the most positive event has adownside. And we often feel happy and sad at thesame time. Reducing things to simpler terms makesthem easier for us to handle, but because it is notrelated to reality, it also means we are constantlymisunderstanding and misreading. It would be ofinfinite benefit for us to allow more nuances andambiguity into our judgments of people and events.

This tendency of ours to judge things in simpleterms explains why passive aggression is sodevilishly effective as a strategy and why so manypeople use it--consciously and unconsciously. Bydefinition, people who are acting passive-aggressively are being passive and aggressivesimultaneously. They are outwardly compliant, friendly,obedient, even loving. At the same time, they inwardlyplot and take hostile action. Their aggression is oftenquite subtle--little acts of sabotage, remarks designedto get under your skin. It can also be blatantly harmful.

When we are the victims of this behavior, we find ithard to imagine that both things are happening at thesame time. We can manage the idea that someonecan be nice one day and nasty the next; that is justcalled being moody. But to be nasty and nicesimultaneously--that confuses us. We tend to takethese people's passive exterior for reality, becomingemotionally engaged with their pleasant,

nonthreatening appearance. If we notice thatsomething is not quite right, that while seemingfriendly they might be doing something hostile, we aregenuinely bewildered. Our confusion gives thepassive-aggressive warrior great manipulative powerover us.

There are two kinds of passive aggression. Thefirst is conscious strategy as practiced by Metternich.The second is a semiconscious or even unconsciousbehavior that people use all the time in the petty andnot-so-petty matters of daily life. You may be temptedto forgive this second passive-aggressive type, whoseems unaware of the effects of his or her actions orhelpless to stop, but people often understand whatthey are doing far better than you imagine, and youare more than likely being taken in by their friendlyand helpless exterior. We are generally too lenientwith this second variety.

The key to using passive aggression as aconscious, positive strategy is the front you present toyour enemies. They must never be able to detect thesullen, defiant thoughts that are going on inside ofyou.

In 1802 what today is Haiti was a Frenchpossession riven by a revolt of the country's blackslaves under the leadership of Toussaint-L'ouverture.That year an army sent by Napoleon to crush therebellion managed to seize Toussaint throughtreachery and ship him off to France, where he wouldeventually die in prison. Among Toussaint's most-decorated generals was a man named Jean-Jacques

Dessalines, who now surrendered to the French andeven served in their army, helping them to put downisolated pockets of revolt and winning from themmuch appreciation. But it was all a ploy: asDessalines squashed these remnants of the rebellion,he would hand over the weapons he captured to theFrench, but secretly he always kept some of themback, stashing them away until he had quite a largearmory. Meanwhile he built up and trained a new rebelarmy in the remote areas where his assignment ledhim. Then, choosing a moment when an outbreak ofyellow fever had decimated the French army, heresumed hostilities. Within a few years, he haddefeated the French and liberated Haiti for good fromcolonial control.

Dessalines's use of passive aggression has deeproots in military strategy, in what can be called the"false surrender." In war your enemies can never readyour thoughts. They must make your appearance theirguide, reading the signs you give off to decipher whatyou are thinking and planning. Meanwhile thesurrender of an army tends to be followed by a greatflood of emotion and a lowering of everyone's guard.The victor will keep an eye on the beaten troops but,exhausted by the effort it took to win, will be hugelytempted to be less wary than before. A cleverstrategist, then, may falsely surrender--announce thathe is defeated in body and spirit. Seeing noindication otherwise, and unable to read his mind, theenemy is likely to take his submission at face value.Now the false surrenderer has time and space to plot

new hostilities.In war as in life, the false surrender depends on the

seamless appearance of submission. Dessalines didnot just give in, he actively served his former enemies.To make this work, you must do likewise: play up yourweakness, your crushed spirit, your desire to befriends--an emotional ploy with great power todistract. You must also be something of an actor. Anysign of ambivalence will ruin the effect.

In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt faced adilemma. He was nearing the end of his second termin office, and it was an unwritten tradition in Americanpolitics that no president would run for a third term.But Roosevelt had much unfinished business.Abroad, Europe was deep in a war that would almostcertainly end up involving the United States; at home,the country had been going through difficult times, andRoosevelt wanted to bring his programs to remedythem to completion. If he revealed his desire for athird term, though, he would stir up opposition evenwithin his own party. Many had already accused himof dictatorial tendencies. So Roosevelt decided to getwhat he wanted through a form of passiveaggression.

In the months leading up to the DemocraticConvention, which was to choose which candidate theparty would run in the race, Roosevelt repeatedlystated his lack of interest in a third term. He alsoactively encouraged others in the party to seek thenomination to replace him. At the same time, hecarefully crafted his language so that he never

completely closed the door on running himself, and hepushed enough candidates into the nomination racethat no single one of them could come to theconvention as the favorite. Then, as the conventionopened, Roosevelt withdrew from the scene, makinghis large presence known by his absence: without himthe proceedings were incomparably dull. Reportscame back to him that people on the floor werebeginning to clamor for him to appear. Letting thatdesire reach its peak, the president then had hisfriend Senator Alben Barkley insert into his ownconvention speech a message from Roosevelt: "Thepresident has never had, and has not today, anydesire or purpose to continue in the office ofpresident, to be a candidate for that office, or to benominated by the convention for that office." After amoment of silence, the convention floor began to ringwith the delegates' cry: "WE WANT ROOSEVELT!"The appeal went on for an hour. The next day thedelegates were to vote, and chants of"ROOSEVELT!" again filled the hall. The president'sname was entered for the nomination, and he won bya landslide on the first ballot.

It is not an enemy who taunts me--then I couldbear it; it is not an adversary who dealsinsolently with me--then I could hide from him.But it is you, my equal, my companion, myfamiliar friend....... My companion stretched outhis hand against his friends, he violated hiscovenant. His speech was smoother than butter,

yet war was in his heart; his words were softerthan oil, yet they were drawn swords.

PSALMS, 55:12-15, 20-21

Remember: it is never wise to seem too eager forpower, wealth, or fame. Your ambition may carry youto the top, but you will not be liked and will find yourunpopularity a problem. Better to disguise yourmaneuvers for power: you do not want it but havefound it forced upon you. Being passive and makingothers come to you is a brilliant form of aggression.

Subtle acts of sabotage can work wonders in thepassive-aggressive strategy because you cancamouflage them under your friendly, compliant front.That was how the film director Alfred Hitchcock wouldoutmaneuver the meddlesome producer David O.Selznick, who used to alter the script to his liking, thenshow up on set to make sure it was shot the way hewanted it. On these occasions Hitchcock mightarrange for the camera to malfunction or let it runwithout any film in it--by the time Selznick saw the edit,reshooting would be expensive and impossible.Meanwhile the director would make a show of beinghappy to see Selznick on set and bewildered if thecamera didn't roll or rolled but recorded no film.

Passive aggression is so common in daily life thatyou have to know how to play defense as well asoffense. By all means use the strategy yourself; it istoo effective to drop from your armory. But you mustalso know how to deal with those semiconsciouspassive-aggressive types so prevalent in the modern

world, recognizing what they are up to before they getunder your skin and being able to defend yourselfagainst this strange form of attack.

First, you must understand why passive aggressionhas become so omnipresent. In the world today, theexpression of overt criticism or negative feelingstoward others has become increasingly discouraged.People tend to take criticism far too personally.Furthermore, conflict is something to be avoided at allcosts. There is great societal pressure to please andbe liked by as many people as possible. Yet it ishuman nature to have aggressive impulses, negativefeelings, and critical thoughts about people. Unable toexpress these feelings openly, without fear of beingdisliked, more and more people resort to a kind ofconstant, just-below-the-surface passive aggression.

The idiom represents an archetype in worldliterature: a person with a smiling face and acruel heart, dubbed a "smiling tiger" in Chinesefolklore.THE WILES OF WAR, TRANSLATED BY SUN

HAICHEN, 1991

Most often their behavior is relatively harmless:perhaps they are chronically late, or make flatteringcomments that hide a sarcastic sting, or offer help butnever follow through. These common tactics are bestignored; just let them wash over you as part of thecurrent of modern life, and never take thempersonally. You have more important battles to fight.

There are, however, stronger, more harmfulversions of passive aggression, acts of sabotage thatdo real damage. A colleague is warm to your face butsays things behind your back that cause youproblems. You let someone into your life whoproceeds to steal something valuable of yours. Anemployee takes on an important job for you but doesit slowly and badly. These types do harm but areexcellent at avoiding any kind of blame. Their modusoperandi is to create enough doubt that they were theones who did the aggressive act; it is never their fault.Somehow they are innocent bystanders, helpless, thereal victims in the whole dynamic. Their denials ofresponsibility are confusing: you suspect they havedone something, but you cannot prove it, or, worse, ifthey are really skillful, you feel guilty for even thinkingthem at fault. And if in your frustration you lash out atthem, you pay a high price: they will focus attention onyour angry, aggressive response, your overreaction,distracting your thoughts from the passive-aggressivemaneuvers that got you so irritated in the first place.The guilt you feel is a sign of the power they have overyou. Indeed, you can virtually recognize the harmfulvariety of passive aggression by the strength ofemotions it churns up in you: not superficialannoyance but confusion, paranoia, insecurity, andanger.

To defeat the passive-aggressive warrior, you mustfirst work on yourself. This means being acutely awareof the blame-shifting tactic as it happens. Squash anyfeelings of guilt it might begin to make you feel. These

types can be very ingratiating, using flattery to drawyou into their web, preying on your insecurities. It isoften your own weakness that sucks you into thepassive-aggressive dynamic. Be alert to this.

Second, once you realize you are dealing with thedangerous variety, the smartest move is todisengage, at best to get the person out of your life, orat the least to not flare up and cause a scene, all ofwhich plays into his hands. You need to stay calm. If ithappens to be a partner in a relationship in which youcannot disengage, the only solution is to find a way tomake the person feel comfortable in expressing anynegative feelings toward you and encouraging it. Thismay be hard to take initially, but it may defuse his orher need to be underhanded; and open criticisms areeasier to deal with than covert sabotage.

The Spaniard Hernan Cortes had many passive-aggressive soldiers in the army with which heconquered Mexico, men who outwardly accepted hisleadership but were inwardly treacherous. Cortesnever confronted or accused these people, neverlashed out at them at all; instead he quietly figured outwho they were and what they were up to, then foughtfire with fire, maintaining a friendly front but workingbehind the scenes to isolate them and bait them intoattacks in which they revealed themselves. The mosteffective counterstrategy with the passive-aggressiveis often to be subtle and underhanded right back atthem, neutralizing their powers. You can also try thiswith the less harmful types--the ones who arechronically late, for instance: giving them a taste of

their own medicine may open their eyes to theirritating effects of their behavior.

In any event, you must never leave the passive-aggressive time and space in which to operate. Letthem take root and they will find all kinds of sly ways topull you here and there. Your best defense is to besensitive to any passive-aggressive manifestations inthose around you and to keep your mind as free aspossible from their insidious influence.

Authority: As dripping water wears throughrock, so the weak and yielding can subduethe firm and strong.

--Sun Haichen, Wiles of War (1991)

It is not pathological to attempt to gain control ofa relationship, we all do this, but when oneattempts to gain that control while denying it,then such a person is exhibiting symptomaticbehavior. In any relationship that stabilizes,such as that between a husband and wife, thetwo people work out agreements about who is tocontrol what area of the relationship.... Arelationship becomes psychopathological whenone of the two people will maneuver to

circumscribe the other's behavior whileindicating he is not. The wife in such arelationship will force her husband to take careof the house in such a way that she denies sheis doing so. She may, for example, haveobscure dizzy spells, an allergy to soap, orvarious types of attacks which require her to liedown regularly. Such a wife is circumscribingher husband's behavior while denying that sheis doing this; after all, she cannot help her dizzyspells. When one person circumscribes thebehavior of another while denying that he isdoing so, the relationship begins to be ratherpeculiar. For example, when a wife requires herhusband to be home every night because shehas anxiety attacks when she is left alone, hecannot acknowledge that she is controlling hisbehavior because she is not requiring him to behome--the anxiety is and her behavior isinvoluntary. Neither can he refuse to let hercontrol his behavior for the same reason.

STRATEGIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, JAYHALEY, 1963

REVERSALThe reversal of passive aggression is aggressivepassivity, presenting an apparently hostile face whileinwardly staying calm and taking no unfriendly action.The purpose here is intimidation: perhaps you knowyou are the weaker of the two sides and hope to

discourage your enemies from attacking you bypresenting a blustery front. Taken in by yourappearance, they will find it hard to believe that youdo not intend to do anything. In general, presentingyourself as the opposite of what you really are andintend can be a useful way of disguising yourstrategies.

SOW UNCERTAINTY AND PANICTHROUGH ACTS OF TERROR

THE CHAIN-REACTION STRATEGY

Terror is the ultimate way to paralyze a people's willto resist and destroy their ability to plan a strategicresponse. Such power is gained through sporadicacts of violence that create a constant feeling ofthreat, incubating a fear that spreads throughout thepublic sphere. The goal in a terror campaign is notbattlefield victory but causing maximum chaos andprovoking the other side into desperateoverreaction. Melting invisibly into the population,tailoring their actions for the mass media, thestrategists of terror create the illusion that they areeverywhere and therefore that they are far morepowerful than they really are. It is a war of nerves.The victims of terror must not succumb to fear oreven anger; to plot the most effectivecounterstrategy, they must stay balanced. In the faceof a terror campaign, one's rationality is the last lineof defense.

THE ANATOMY OF PANICIn Isfahan (in present-day Iran) toward the end of theeleventh century, Nizam al-Mulk, the powerful vizier toSultan Malik Shah, ruler of the great Islamic empire of

the period, became aware of a small yet irritatingthreat. In northern Persia lived a sect called the NizariIsmailis, followers of a religion combining mysticismwith the Koran. Their leader, the charismatic Hasan-i-Sabah, had recruited thousands of converts alienatedby the tight control the empire exercised overreligious and political practices. The influence of theIsmailis was growing, and what was most disturbingto Nizam al-Mulk was the utter secrecy in which theyoperated: it was impossible to know who hadconverted to the sect, for its members did so inprivate and kept their allegiance hidden.

"Brothers," says an Ismaili poet, "when the timeof triumph comes, with good fortune from bothworlds as our companion, then by one singlewarrior on foot a king may be stricken with terror,though he own more than a hundred thousandhorsemen."

QUOTED IN THE ASSASSINS, BERNARDLEWIS, 1967

The vizier monitored their activities as best hecould, until finally he heard some news that rousedhim to action. Over the years, it seemed, thousands ofthese secret Ismaili converts had managed to infiltratekey castles, and now they had taken them over in thename of Hasan-i-Sabah. This gave them control overpart of northern Persia, a kind of independent statewithin the empire. Nizam al-Mulk was a benevolentadministrator, but he knew the danger of allowing

sects like the Ismailis to flourish. Better to snuff themout early on than face revolution. So, in 1092, thevizier convinced the sultan to send two armies to bringdown the castles and destroy the Nizari Ismailis.

The castles were strongly defended, and thecountryside around them teemed with sympathizers.The war turned into a stalemate, and eventually thesultan's armies were forced to come home. Nizam al-Mulk would have to find some other solution, perhapsan occupying force for the region--but a few monthslater, as he was traveling from Isfahan to Baghdad, aSufi monk approached the litter on which he wascarried, pulled out a dagger from under his clothes,and stabbed the vizier to death. The killer wasrevealed to be an Ismaili dressed as a peaceful Sufi,and he confessed to his captors that Hasan himselfhad assigned him to do the job.

The death of Nizam al-Mulk was followed withinweeks by the death, from natural causes, of MalikShah. His loss would have been a blow at any time,but without his crafty vizier to oversee the succession,the empire fell into a period of chaos that lastedseveral years. By 1105, however, a degree of stabilityhad been reestablished and attention again focusedon the Ismailis. With one murder they had managed tomake the entire empire tremble. They had to bedestroyed. A new and vigorous campaign waslaunched against the sect. And soon it was revealedthat the assassination of Nizam al-Mulk was not asingle act of revenge, as it had seemed at the time,but an Ismaili policy, a strange and frightening new

way of waging war. Over the next few years, keymembers of the administration of the new sultan,Muhammad Tapar, were assassinated in the sameritualistic fashion: a killer would emerge from a crowdto deliver a deadly blow with a dagger. The deed wasmost often done in public and in broad daylight;sometimes, though, it took place while the victim wasin bed, a secret Ismaili having infiltrated his householdstaff.

A wave of fear fanned out among the empire'shierarchy. It was impossible to tell who was an Ismaili:the sect's adherents were patient, disciplined, andhad mastered the art of keeping their beliefs tothemselves and fitting in anywhere. It did not help thatwhen the assassins were captured and tortured, theywould accuse various people within the sultan's innercircle of being either paid spies for the Ismailis orsecret converts. No one could know for certain if theywere telling the truth, but suspicion was cast oneveryone.

Losses to which we are accustomed affect usless deeply.JUVENAL, FIRST TO SECOND CENTURY A.D.

Now viziers, judges, and local officials had to travelsurrounded by bodyguards. Many of them began towear thick, uncomfortable shirts of mail. In certaincities no one could move from house to house withouta permit, which spread disaffection among thecitizenry and made it easier for the Ismailis to recruit

converts. Many found it hard to sleep at night or totrust their closest friends. All kinds of wild rumorswere spread by those who had grown delirious withparanoia. Bitter divisions sprang up within thehierarchy, as some argued for a hard-line approach toHasan, while others preached accommodation as theonly answer.

Meanwhile, as the empire struggled to somehowrepress the Ismailis, the killings went on--but theywere highly sporadic. Months would pass without one,and then suddenly there would be two within a week.There was no real rhyme or reason to when ithappened or which high administrator was singledout. Officials would talk endlessly about a pattern,analyzing every Ismaili move. Without their realizing it,this little sect had come to dominate their thoughts.

In 1120, Sanjar, the new sultan, decided to takeaction, planning a military campaign to capture theIsmaili castles with overwhelming force and turn theregion around them into an armed camp. He tookextra precautions to prevent any attempt on his life,changing his sleeping arrangements and allowingonly those he knew well to approach him. By makinghimself personally secure, he believed he could stayfree of the panic around him.

As preparations for the war got under way, Hasan-i-Sabah sent ambassador after ambassador to Sanjaroffering to negotiate an end to the killings. They wereall turned away. The tables seemed to have turned:now it was the Ismailis who were frightened.

Shortly before the campaign was to be launched,

the sultan awoke one morning to find a dagger thrustneatly in the ground a few feet away from the positionwhere his breast lay on the bed. How did it get there?What did it mean? The more he thought about it, themore he began to literally tremble with fear--it wasclearly a message. He told no one about this, forwhom could he trust? Even his wives were suspect.By the end of the day, he was an emotional wreck.That evening he received a message from Hasanhimself: "Did I not wish the sultan well, that daggerwhich was struck into the hard ground would havebeen planted in his soft breast."

On their voyage Pisander and the othersabolished the democracies in the [Greek] cities,as had been decided. From some places theyalso took hoplites to add to their forces, and socame to Athens. Here they found that most ofthe work had already been done by members oftheir [antidemocratic] party. Some of theyounger men had formed a group amongthemselves and had murdered without beingdetected a certain Androcles, who was one ofthe chief leaders of the [democratic] party....There were also some other people whom theyregarded as undesirable and did away withsecretly....... [Athenians] were afraid when theysaw their numbers, and no one now dared tospeak in opposition to them. If anyone didventure to do so, some appropriate method was

soon found for having him killed, and no onetried to investigate such crimes or take actionagainst those suspected of them. Instead thepeople kept quiet, and were in such a state ofterror that they thought themselves luckyenough to be left unmolested even if they hadsaid nothing at all. They imagined that therevolutionary party was much bigger than itreally was, and they lost all confidence inthemselves, being unable to find out the factsbecause of the size of the city and because theyhad insufficient knowledge of each other....Throughout the democratic party peopleapproached each other suspiciously, everyonethinking that the next man had something to dowith what was going on.

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR,THUCYDIDES, CIRCA 460-CIRCA 399 B.C.

Sanjar had had enough. He could not spendanother day like this. He was not willing to live inconstant fear, his mind deranged by uncertainty andsuspicion. It was better, he thought, to negotiate withthis demon. He called off his campaign and madepeace with Hasan.

Over the years, as the Ismailis' political power grewand the sect expanded into Syria, its killers becamealmost mythic. The assassins had never tried toescape; their killing done, they were caught, tortured,and executed to a man, but new ones kept on coming,

and nothing seemed to deter them from completingtheir task. They seemed possessed, utterly devotedto their cause. Some called them hashshashin, fromthe Arabic word hashish, because they acted as ifthey were drugged. European crusaders to the HolyLand heard stories about these devilish hashshashinand passed them on, the word slowly transforminginto "assassins," passing forever into the language.

InterpretationHasan-i-Sabah had one goal: to carve out a state forhis sect in northern Persia, allowing it to survive andthrive within the Islamic empire. Given his relativelysmall numbers and the powers arrayed against him,he could not hope for more, so he devised a strategythat was surely history's first organized terroristcampaign for political power. Hasan's plan wasdeceptively simple. In the Islamic world, a leader whohad won respect was invested with considerableauthority, and to the extent that he had authority, hisdeath could sow chaos. Accordingly Hasan chose tostrike these leaders, but in a somewhat random way:it was impossible to see any pattern in his choices,and the possibility of being the next victim was moredisturbing than many could bear. In truth, except forthe castles they held, the Ismailis were quite weakand vulnerable, but by patiently infiltrating his mendeep into the heart of the sultan's administration,Hasan was able to create the illusion they wereeverywhere. Only fifty or so assassinations arerecorded in his entire lifetime, and yet he won as

much political power through them as if he had anenormous army.

This power could not come by merely makingindividuals feel afraid. It depended on the effect thekillings would have on the entire social group. Theweakest officials in the hierarchy were the ones whowould succumb to paranoia and voice doubts andrumors that would spread and infect those who wereless weak. The result was a ripple effect--wild swingsof emotion, from anger to surrender, up and down theline. A group caught by this kind of panic cannot findits balance and can fall with the slightest push. Eventhe strongest and most determined will be infected inthe end, as Sultan Sanjar was: his attempts atsecurity, and the harsh life to which he subjectedhimself as protection, revealed that he was under theinfluence of this panic. One simple dagger in theground was enough to push him over the edge.

Understand: we are all are extremely susceptible tothe emotions of those around us. It is often hard for usto perceive how deeply we are affected by the moodsthat can pass through a group. This is what makes theuse of terror so effective and so dangerous: with afew well-timed acts of violence, a handful of assassinscan spark all kinds of corrosive thoughts anduncertainties. The weakest members of the targetgroup will succumb to the greatest fear, spreadingrumors and anxieties that slowly overcome the rest.The strong may respond angrily and violently to theterror campaign, but that only shows how influencedthey are by the panic; they are reacting rather than

strategizing--a sign of weakness, not strength. Innormal circumstances individuals who becomefrightened in some way can often regain their mentalbalance over time, especially when they are aroundothers who are calm. But this is almost impossiblewithin a panicked group.

As the public's imagination runs wild, the assassinsbecome something much larger, seeming omnipotentand omnipresent. As Hasan proved, a handful ofterrorists can hold an entire empire hostage with afew well-calibrated blows against the group psyche.And once the group's leaders succumb to theemotional pull--whether by surrendering or launchingan unstrategic counterattack--the success of the terrorcampaign is complete.

Victory is gained not by the number killed butby the number frightened.

--Arab proverb

KEYS TO WARFAREIn the course of our daily lives, we are subject to fearsof many kinds. These fears are generally related tosomething specific: someone might harm us, aparticular problem is brewing, we are threatened bydisease or even death itself. In the throes of any deepfear, our willpower is momentarily paralyzed as wecontemplate the bad that could happen to us. If thiscondition lasted too long or were too intense, it wouldmake life unbearable, so we find ways to avoid thesethoughts and ease our fears. Maybe we turn to the

distractions of daily life: work, social routines,activities with friends. Religion or some other beliefsystem, such as faith in technology or science, mightalso offer hope. These distractions and beliefsbecome the ground beneath us, keeping us uprightand able to walk on without the paralysis that fear canbring.

Under certain circumstances, however, this groundcan fall away from under us, and then there is nothingwe can do to steady ourselves. In the course ofhistory, we can track a kind of madness thatovercomes humans during certain disasters--a greatearthquake, a ferocious plague, a violent civil war.What troubles us most in these situations is not anyspecific dreadful event that happened in the recentpast; we have a tremendous capacity to overcomeand adapt to anything horrible. It is the uncertainfuture, the fear that more terrible things are comingand that we might soon suffer some unpredictabletragedy--that is what unnerves us. We cannot crowdout these thoughts with routines or religion. Fearbecomes chronic and intense, our minds besieged byall kinds of irrational thoughts. The specific fearsbecome more general. Among a group, panic will setin.

Six at the top means: Shock brings ruin andterrified gazing around. Going ahead bringsmisfortune. If it has not yet touched one's ownbody But has reached one's neighbor first,There is no blame. One's comrades have

something to talk about. When inner shock is atits height, it robs a man of reflection and clarityof vision. In such a state of shock it is of courseimpossible to act with presence of mind. Thenthe right thing is to keep still until composureand clarity are restored. But this a man can doonly when he himself is not yet infected by theagitation, although its disastrous effects arealready visible in those around him. If hewithdraws from the affair in time, he remains freeof mistakes and injury. But his comrades, whono longer heed any warning, will in theirexcitement certainly be displeased with him.However, he must not take this into account.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

In essence, this is terror: an intense, overpoweringfear that we cannot manage or get rid of in the normalway. There is too much uncertainty, too many badthings that can happen to us.

During World War II, when the Germans bombedLondon, psychologists noted that when the bombingwas frequent and somewhat regular, the people of thecity became numb to it; they grew accustomed to thenoise, discomfort, and carnage. But when thebombing was irregular and sporadic, fear becameterror. It was much harder to deal with the uncertaintyof when the next one would land.

It is a law of war and strategy that in the search for

an advantage, anything will be tried and tested. Andso it is that groups and individuals, seeing theimmense power that terror can have over humans,have found a way to use terror as a strategy. Peopleare crafty, resourceful, and adaptable creatures. Theway to paralyze their will and destroy their capacity tothink straight is to consciously create uncertainty,confusion, and an unmanageable fear.

Such strategic terror can take the form ofexemplary acts of destruction. The masters of this artwere the Mongols. They would level a few cities hereand there, in as horrible a manner as possible. Theterrifying legend of the Mongol Horde spread quickly.At its very approach to a city, panic would ensue asthe inhabitants could only imagine the worst. Moreoften than not, the city would surrender without a fight--the Mongols' goal all along. A relatively small army farfrom home, they could not afford long sieges orprotracted wars.

This strategic terror can also be used for politicalpurposes, to hold a group or nation together. In 1792the French Revolution was spinning out of control.Foreign armies were on the verge of invading France;the country was hopelessly factionalized. Theradicals, led by Robespierre, confronted this threat byinitiating a war against the moderates, the Reign ofTerror. Accused of counterrevolution, thousands weresent to the guillotine. No one knew who would be next.Although the radicals were relatively small in number,by creating such uncertainty and fear they were ableto paralyze their opponents' will. Paradoxically, the

Reign of Terror--which gives us the first recordedinstance of the use of the words "terrorism" and"terrorist"--produced a degree of stability.

Although terror as a strategy can be employed bylarge armies and indeed whole states, it is mosteffectively practiced by those small in number. Thereason is simple: the use of terror usually requires awillingness to kill innocent civilians in the name of agreater good and for a strategic purpose. Forcenturies, with a few notable exceptions such as theMongols, military leaders were unwilling to go so far.Meanwhile a state that inflicted mass terror on its ownpopulace would unleash demons and create a chaosit might find hard to control. But small groups have nosuch problems. Being so few in number, they cannothope to wage a conventional war or even a guerrillacampaign. Terror is their strategy of last resort.Taking on a much larger enemy, they are oftendesperate, and they have a cause to which they areutterly committed. Ethical considerations pale incomparison. And creating chaos is part of theirstrategy.

Terrorism was limited for many centuries by itstools: the sword, the knife, the gun, all agents ofindividual killing. Then, in the nineteenth century, asingle campaign produced a radical innovation,giving birth to terrorism as we know it today.

In the late 1870s, a group of Russian radicals,mostly from the intelligentsia, had been agitating for apeasant-led revolution. Eventually they realized thattheir cause was hopeless: the peasants were

unprepared to take this kind of action, and, moreimportant, the czarist regime and its repressive forceswere far too powerful. Czar Alexander II had recentlyinitiated what became known as the White Terror, abrutal crackdown on any form of dissidence. It wasalmost impossible for the radicals to operate in theopen, let alone spread their influence. Yet if they didnothing, the czar's strength would only grow.

And so from among these radicals, a groupemerged bent on waging a terrorist war. They calledthemselves Narodnaya Volia, or "People's Will." Tokeep their organization clandestine, they kept it small.They dressed inconspicuously, melting into the crowd.And they began to make bombs. Once they hadassassinated a number of government ministers, theczar became a virtual prisoner in his palace.Deranged with the desire to hunt the terrorists down,he directed all of his energies toward this goal, withthe result that much of his administration becamedysfunctional.

The basis of Mongol warfare was unadulteratedterror. Massacre, rapine and torture were theprice of defeat, whether enforced ornegotiated.... The whole apparatus of terror wasremorselessly applied to sap the victim's will toresist, and in practical terms this policy of"frightfulness" certainly paid short-termdividends. Whole armies were known todissolve into fear-ridden fragments at the newsof the approach of the toumans .... Many

enemies were paralysed...before a [Mongol]army crossed their frontiers.

THE ART OF WARFARE ON LAND, DAVIDCHANDLER, 1974

In 1880 the radicals were able to explode a bombin the Winter Palace, the czar's residence in St.Petersburg. Then, finally, the following year anotherbomb killed Alexander himself. The governmentnaturally responded with repression still harsher thanthe policy already in place, erecting a virtual policestate. In spite of this, in 1888, Alexander Ulianov--thebrother of Vladimir Lenin and a member ofNarodnaya Volia--nearly succeeded in killingAlexander's successor, Czar Alexander III.

The capture and execution of Ulianov brought theactivities of Narodnaya Volia to a close, but the grouphad already begun to inspire a wave of terroriststrikes internationally, including the anarchistassassinations of the American presidents James A.Garfield in 1881 and William McKinley in 1901. Andwith Narodnaya all the elements of modern terrorismare in place. The group thought bombs better thanguns, being more dramatic and more frightening.They believed that if they killed enough ministers ofthe government, extending upward to the czar himself,the regime would either collapse or go to extremes totry to defend itself. That repressive reaction, though,would in the long run play into the radicals' hands,fomenting a discontent that would eventually spark arevolution. Meanwhile the bombing campaign would

win the group coverage in the press, indirectlypublicizing their cause to sympathizers around theworld. They called this "the propaganda of the deed."

"This is what you should try for. An attempt upona crowned head or on a president is sensationalenough in a way, but not so much as it used tobe. It has entered into a general conception ofthe existence of all chiefs of state. It's almostconventional--especially since so manypresidents have been assassinated. Now let ustake an outrage upon--say a church. Horribleenough at first sight, no doubt, and yet not soeffective as a person of an ordinary mind mightthink. No matter how revolutionary andanarchist in inception, there would be foolsenough to give such an outrage the character ofa religious manifestation. And that would detractfrom the especial alarming significance we wishto give to the act. A murderous attempt on arestaurant or a theatre would suffer in the sameway from the suggestion of non-politicalpassion; the exasperation of a hungry man, anact of social revenge. All this is used up; it is nolonger instructive as an object lesson inrevolutionary anarchism. Every newspaper hasready-made phrases to explain suchmanifestations away. I am about to give you thephilosophy of bomb throwing from my point ofview; from the point of view you pretend to have

been serving for the last eleven years. I will trynot to talk above your head. The sensibilities ofthe class you are attacking are soon blunted.Property seems to them an indestructible thing.You can't count upon their emotions either ofpity or fear for very long. A bomb outrage tohave any influence on public opinion now mustgo beyond the intention of vengeance orterrorism. It must be purely destructive. It mustbe that, and only that, beyond the faintestsuspicion of any other object. You anarchistsshould make it clear that you are perfectlydetermined to make a clean sweep of the wholesocial creation......What is one to say to an act ofdestructive ferocity so absurd as to beincomprehensible, inexplicable, almostunthinkable, in fact, mad? Madness alone istruly terrifying, inasmuch as you cannot placateit either by threats, persuasion, or bribes.Moreover, I am a civilized man. I would neverdream of directing you to organize a merebutchery even if I expected the best results fromit. But I wouldn't expect from a butchery theresults I want. Murder is always with us. It isalmost an institution. The demonstration mustbe against learning--science. But not everyscience will do. The attack must have all theshocking senselessness of gratuitousblasphemy...."

THE SECRET AGENT, JOSEPH CONRAD,1857-1924

Narodnaya Volia aimed principally at thegovernment but was willing to kill civilians in theprocess. The fall of the czarist government was wortha few lives lost, and in the end the bombs were lessdeadly than their alternative, which was civil war. Atthe very least, Narodnaya Volia would show theRussian people that the government was not theuntouchable monolithic power that it made itselfseem; it was vulnerable. The group's membersunderstood that the regime was quite likely to be ableto liquidate them in time, but they were willing to diefor their cause.

Narodnaya Volia saw that it could use one relativelysmall event--a bomb blast--to set off a chain reaction:fear in the administration would produce harshrepression, which would win the group publicity andsympathy and heighten the government's unpopularity,which would lead to more radicalism, which wouldlead to more repression, and so on until the wholecycle collapsed in turmoil. Narodnaya Volia was weakand small, yet simple but dramatic acts of violencecould give it a disproportionate power to sow chaosand uncertainty, creating the appearance of strengthamong police and public. In fact, its smallness andinconspicuousness gave it a tremendous edge: atenormous expense, a cumbersome force ofthousands of police would have to search out a tiny,clandestine band that had the advantages of mobility,

surprise, and relative invisibility. Besides giving theterrorists the chance to present themselves as heroicunderdogs, the asymmetry of forces made themalmost impossible to fight.

This asymmetry brings war to its ultimate extreme:the smallest number of people waging war against anenormous power, leveraging their smallness anddesperation into a potent weapon. The dilemma thatall terrorism presents, and the reason it attracts somany and is so potent, is that terrorists have a greatdeal less to lose than the armies arrayed againstthem, and a great deal to gain through terror.

It is often argued that terrorist groups likeNarodnaya Volia are doomed to failure: invitingsevere repression, they play into the hands of theauthorities, who can effectively claim carte blanche tofight this threat--and in the end they bring about noreal change. But this argument misses the point andmisreads terrorism. Narodnaya Volia awakenedmillions of Russians to its cause, and its techniqueswere copied around the world. It also profoundlyunbalanced the czarist regime, which respondedirrationally and heavy-handedly, devoting resources torepression that could have been better applied toreforms that might have prolonged its stay in power.The repression also incubated a much more potentrevolutionary group, the burgeoning communistmovement.

In essence, terrorists kick a rock in order to start anavalanche. If no landslide follows, little is lost, exceptperhaps their own lives, which they are willing to

sacrifice in their devotion to their cause. If mayhemand chaos ensue, though, they have great power toinfluence events. Terrorists are often reacting againstan extremely static situation in which change by anyroute is blocked. In their desperation they can oftenbreak up the status quo.

It is a mistake to judge war by the rubric of victory ordefeat: both states have shades and gradations. Fewvictories in history are total or bring about lastingpeace; few defeats lead to permanent destruction.The ability to effect some kind of change, to attain alimited goal, is what makes terrorism so alluring,particularly to those who are otherwise powerless.

For instance, terrorism can be used quiteeffectively for the limited goal of gaining publicity for acause. Once this is achieved, a public presence isestablished that can be translated into political power.When Palestinian terrorists hijacked an El Al plane in1968, they captured the attention of the mass mediaall over the world. In the years to come, they wouldstage-manage other terrorist acts that played well ontelevision, including the infamous attack on the 1972Munich Olympics. Although such acts made themhated by most in non-Arab countries, they were willingto live with that--the publicity for their cause, and thepower that came from it, was all they were after. Asthe writer Brian Jenkins notes, "Insurgents fought inAngola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea forfourteen years using the standard tactics of ruralguerrilla warfare. The world hardly noticed theirstruggle, while an approximately equal number of

Palestinian commandos employing terrorist tacticshave in a few years become a primary concern to theworld."

In a world dominated by appearances, in whichvalue is determined by public presence, terrorism canoffer a spectacular shortcut to publicity--and terroristsaccordingly tailor their violence to the media,particularly television. They make it too gruesome, toocompelling, to ignore. Reporters and pundits canprofess to be shocked and disgusted, but they arehelpless: it is their job to spread the news, yet inessence they are spreading the virus that can only aidthe terrorists by giving them such presence. The effectdoes not go unnoticed among the small andpowerless, making the use of terrorism perverselyappealing to a new generation.

Yet for all its strengths, terrorism also haslimitations that have proved the death of many aviolent campaign, and those opposing it must knowand exploit this. The strategy's main weakness is theterrorists' lack of ties to the public or to a real politicalbase. Often isolated, living in hiding, they are prone tolose contact with reality, overestimating their ownpower and overplaying their hand. Although their useof violence must be strategic to succeed, theiralienation from the public makes it hard for them tomaintain a sense of balance. The members ofNarodnaya Volia had a somewhat developedunderstanding of the Russian serfs, but more recentterrorist groups, such as the Weathermen in theUnited States and the Red Brigades in Italy, have

been so divorced from the public as to verge on thedelusional. Accentuating the terrorists' isolation anddenying them a political base should be part of anyeffective counterstrategy against them.

When Odawara Castle fell to the attackers in theMeio period (the end of the fifteenth century),Akiko, who had been a maid in the service ofMori Fujiyori, the lord of the castle, escaped witha cat which had been her pet for years, and thenthe cat became a wild supernatural monsterwhich terrorized the people, finally even preyingon infants in the village. The local officialsjoined with the people in attempts to catch it, butwith its strange powers of appearing anddisappearing, the swordsmen and archers couldfind nothing to attack, and men and women wentin dread day and night. Then in December ofthe second year of Eisho (1505), priest Yakkokuwent up on to the dais at Hokokuji and drew thepicture of a cat, which he displayed to thecongregation with the words: "As I have drawn it,so I kill it with Katzu!, that the fears may beremoved from the hearts of the people." Hegave the shout, and tore to pieces the picture ofthe cat. On that day a woodcutter in the valleynear the Takuma villa heard a terrible screech;he guided a company of archers to the upperpart of the valley, where they found the body ofthe cat-monster, as big as a bear-cub, dead on

a rock. The people agreed that this had beenthe result of the master's Katzu!

Terrorism is usually born out of feelings ofweakness and despair, combined with a convictionthat the cause one stands for, whether public orpersonal, is worth both the inflicting and the sufferingof any kind of damage. A world in which the faces ofpower are often large and apparently invulnerable onlymakes the strategy more appealing. In this senseterrorism can become a kind of style, a mode ofbehavior that filters down into society itself.

In the 1920s and '30s, the French psychoanalystJacques Lacan butted heads with the extremelyconservative medical societies that dominated almostall aspects of psychoanalytic practice. Realizing thefutility of taking on these authorities in a conventionalway, Lacan developed a style that can fairly bedescribed as terroristic. His sessions with hispatients, for example, were often cut short before theusual fifty minutes were up; they could last any periodof time that he saw fit and were sometimes as briefas ten minutes. This deliberate provocation to themedical establishment caused a great deal ofscandal, setting off a chain reaction that shook thepsychoanalytic community for years. (These sessionswere also quite terrorizing for the patients, who couldnever be sure when Lacan would end them and sowere forced to concentrate and make every momentcount--all of which had great therapeutic value,according to Lacan.) Having gained much publicity

this way, Lacan kept stirring the pot with newprovocative acts, culminating in the creation of hisown rival school and professional society. His booksare written in a style to match this strategy: violent andarcane. It was as if he occasionally liked to throw littlebombs into the world, thriving on the terror andattention they got him.

People who feel weak and powerless are oftentempted into outbursts of anger or irrational behavior,which keeps those around them in suspense as towhen the next attack will come. These fits of temper,like other, more serious kinds of terror, can have achilling effect on their targets, sapping the will toresist; when the simplest dealings with these peopleare potentially so unpleasant, why fight? Why not justgive in? A violent temper or outlandish act, volcanicand startling, can also create the illusion of power,disguising actual weaknesses and insecurities. Andan emotional or out-of-control response to it just playsinto the other person's hands, creating the kind ofchaos and attention he or she thrives on. If you have todeal with a terroristic spouse or boss, it is best to fightback in a determined but dispassionate manner--theresponse such types least expect.

Although organized terrorism has evolved andtechnology has increased its capacity for violence, itsessential makeup does not seem to have changed--the elements developed by Narodnaya Volia are stillin effect. Yet the question many ask today is whethera new, more virulent kind of terrorism may bedeveloping, one far surpassing the classical version. If

terrorists could get hold of more potent armaments,for example--nuclear or biological weapons, say--andhad the stomach to use them, their kind of war and thepower it may bring them would make a qualitativeleap into a new, apocalyptic form. But perhaps a newform of terrorism has already emerged that does notneed the threat of dirty weapons to create a moredevastating result.

On September 11, 2001, a handful of terroristslinked to the Islamic Al Qaeda movement producedthe single deadliest terrorist action to date, in theirattacks on the World Trade Center in New York Cityand the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C. Theattack had many of the earmarks of classicalterrorism: a small group, with extremely limitedmeans, using the technology of the United States attheir disposal, was able to strike with maximum effect.Here was the familiar asymmetry of forces in whichsmallness becomes an asset, being inconspicuouswithin the larger population and accordingly quitedifficult to detect. The terror of the event itself set inmotion a paniclike reaction from which the UnitedStates has still not fully recovered. The drama andsymbolism of the Twin Towers themselves, not tomention the Pentagon, created a grotesquelycompelling spectacle that gave the terroristsmaximum exposure while incisively demonstrating thevulnerability of the United States, often described inrecent years as the world's only remainingsuperpower. There were those around the world whohad never imagined that America could be so quickly

and seriously harmed but were delighted to find theywere wrong.

Many deny that 9/11 was a new form of terrorism. Itsimply distinguished itself, they say, by the number ofits victims; the change was quantitative, notqualitative. And, as in classical terrorism, theseanalysts continue, Al Qaeda is ultimately doomed tofailure: the U.S. counterattack on Afghanistandestroyed their operational base, and they are nowthe targets of the unbending will of the Americangovernment, whose invasion of Iraq was a stage in agrand strategy to rid the region of terrorism in general.But there is another way to look at the attack, keepingin mind the chain reaction that is always the terrorist'sgoal.

Tests(1) How can tearing up a picture with a Katzu!destroy a living monster?(2) That devil-cat is right now rampaging amongthe people, bewitching and killing them. Kill itquickly with a Katzu! Show the proof!

SAMURAI ZEN: THE WARRIOR KOANS,TREVOR LEGGETT, 1985

When a man has learned within his heart whatfear and trembling mean, he is safeguardedagainst any terror produced by outsideinfluences. Let the thunder roll and spread terrora hundred miles around: he remains socomposed and reverent in spirit that the

sacrificial rite is not interrupted. This is the spiritthat must animate leaders and rulers of men--aprofound inner seriousness from which all outerterrors glance off harmlessly.

THE I CHING, CHINA, CIRCA EIGHTHCENTURY B.C.

The full economic impact of 9/11 is hard tomeasure, but the ripple effect of the attack is by anystandard immense and undeniable: substantialincreases in security costs, including the funding ofnew government programs for that purpose;enormous military expenditures on the invasions oftwo separate nations; a depressive effect on thestock market (always particularly susceptible to thepsychology of panic) and a consequent injury toconsumer confidence; hits on specific industries, suchas travel and tourism; and the reverberating effect ofall these on the global economy. The attack also hadtremendous political effects--in fact, the Americanelections of 2002 and 2004 were arguablydetermined by it. And as the chain reaction hascontinued to play out, a growing rift has emergedbetween the United States and its European allies.(Terrorism often implicitly aims to create such splits inalliances and in public opinion as well, where hawksand doves line up.) September 11 has also had adefinite and obvious impact on the American way oflife, leading directly to a curtailment of the civilliberties that are the distinguishing mark of ourcountry. Finally--though this is impossible to measure-

-it has had a depressive and chilling effect on theculture at large.

"It appears to me that this mystery is consideredinsoluble, for the very reason which shouldcause it to be regarded as easy of solution--Imean for the outre character of its features. Thepolice are confounded by the seeming absenceof motive--not for the murder itself--but for theatrocity of the murder.... They have fallen intothe gross but common error of confounding theunusual with the abstruse. But it is by thesedeviations from the plane of the ordinary, thatreason feels its way, if at all, in its search for thetrue. In investigations such as we are nowpursuing, it should not be so much asked 'whathas occurred,' as 'what has occurred that hasnever occurred before.' In fact, the facility withwhich I shall arrive, or have arrived, at thesolution of this mystery, is in the direct ratio ofits apparent insolubility in the eyes of thepolice."

AUGUSTE DUPIN IN "THE MURDERS IN THERUE MORGUE," EDGAR ALLAN POE, 1809-

1849

Perhaps the strategists of Al Qaeda neitherintended all this nor even imagined it; we will neverknow. But terrorism is by its nature a throw of the dice,and the terrorist always hopes for the maximum effect.

Creating as much chaos, uncertainty, and panic aspossible is the whole idea. In this sense the 9/11attack must be considered a success to such anextent that it does indeed represent a qualitative leapin terrorism's virulence. It may not have been asphysically destructive as the explosion of a nuclear orbiological weapon could be, but over time itsreverberating power has far surpassed that of anyterror attack before it. And this power comes from thealtered nature of the world. Given the deepinterconnections of the new global scene, whethercommercial, political, or cultural, a powerful attack ata single point can have a chain-reactive effect thatterrorists of earlier years could never have imagined.A system of interconnected markets that thrives onopen borders and networks is intensely vulnerable tothis intense ripple effect. The kind of panic that oncemight stir in a crowd or through a city can now spreadover the world, fed spectacularly by the media.

To consider the 9/11 attack a failure because it didnot achieve Al Qaeda's ultimate goal of pushing theUnited States out of the Middle East or spurring apan-Islamic revolution is to misread their strategy andto judge them by the standards of conventionalwarfare. Terrorists quite often have a large goal, butthey know that the chances of reaching it in one bloware fairly negligible. They just do what they can to startoff their chain reaction. Their enemy is the status quo,and their success can be measured by the impact oftheir actions as it plays out over the years.

To combat terrorism--classical or the new version

on the horizon--it is always tempting to resort to amilitary solution, fighting violence with violence,showing the enemy that your will is not broken andthat any future attacks on their part will come with aheavy price. The problem here is that terrorists bynature have much less to lose than you do. Acounterstrike may hurt them but will not deter them; infact, it may even embolden them and help them gainrecruits. Terrorists are often willing to spend yearsbringing you down. To hit them with a dramaticcounterstrike is only to show your impatience, yourneed for immediate results, your vulnerability toemotional responses--all signs not of strength but ofweakness.

Because of the extreme asymmetry of forces atplay in the terrorist strategy, the military solution isoften the least effective. Terrorists are vaporous,spread out, linked not physically but by some radicaland fanatic idea. As a frustrated Napoleon Bonapartesaid when he was struggling to deal with Germannationalist groups resorting to acts of terror againstthe French, "A sect cannot be destroyed bycannonballs."

We can no longer conceive of the idea of asymbolic calculation, as in poker or thepotlatch: minimum stake, maximum result. Thisis exactly what the terrorists have accomplishedwith their attack on Manhattan, which illustratesrather well the theory of chaos: an initial shock,provoking incalculable consequences.

THE SPIRIT OF TERRORISM, JEANBAUDRILLARD, 2002

The French writer Raymond Aron defines terrorismas an act of violence whose psychological impact farexceeds its physical one. This psychological impact,however, then translates into something physical--panic, chaos, political division--all of which makes theterrorists seem more powerful than they are in reality.Any effective counterstrategy must take this intoconsideration. In the aftermath of a terrorist blow, whatis most essential is stopping the psychological rippleeffect. And the effort here must begin with the leadersof the country or group under attack.

In 1944, near the end of World War II, the city ofLondon was subjected to a fierce campaign of terrorfrom Germany's V-1 and V-2 rockets, an act ofdesperation that Hitler hoped would spread internaldivision and paralyze the will of the British public tocontinue the war. Over six thousand people werekilled, many more were injured, and millions of homeswere damaged or destroyed. But instead of allowingdespondency and worry to set in, Prime MinisterWinston Churchill turned the bombing campaign to hisadvantage as an opportunity to rally and unify theBritish people. He designed his speeches andpolicies to calm panic and allay anxiety. Instead ofdrawing attention to the V-1 attacks, or to the moredreaded V-2s, he emphasized the need to stayresolved. The English would not give Germany thesatisfaction of seeing them bow to such terror.

In general, the most effective response tounconventional provocation is the leastresponse: do as little as possible and thatcunningly adjusted to the arena. Do no harm.Deny one's self, do less rather than more.These are uncongenial to Americans whoinstead desire to deploy great force, quickly, toachieve a swift and final result. What is neededis a shift in the perception of those responsiblein Washington: less can be more, others are notlike us, and a neat and tidy world is not worth thecost.

DRAGONWARS, J. BOWYER BELL, 1999

In 1961, when President Charles de Gaulle ofFrance faced a vicious right-wing terror campaign byFrench forces in Algeria opposed to his plan to grantthe colony its independence, he used a similarstrategy: he appeared on television to say that theFrench could not surrender to this campaign, that thecosts in lives were relatively small compared to whatthey had recently suffered in World War II, that theterrorists were few in number, and that to defeat themthe French must not succumb to panic but must simplyunite. In both these cases, a leader was able toprovide a steadying influence, a ballast against thelatent hysteria felt by the threatened citizenry andstoked by the media. The threat was real, Churchilland de Gaulle acknowledged; security measureswere being taken; but the important thing was to

channel public emotions away from fear and intosomething positive. The leaders turned the attacksinto rallying points, using them to unite a fracturedpublic--a crucial issue, for polarization is always agoal of terrorism. Instead of trying to mount a dramaticcounterstrike, Churchill and de Gaulle included thepublic in their strategic thinking and made thecitizenry active participants in the battle against thesedestructive forces.

And it is this uncontrollable chain reaction effectof reversals that is the true power of terrorism.This power is visible in the obvious and lessobvious aftereffects of the event--not only in theeconomic and political recession throughoutthe system, and the psychological recessionthat comes out of that, but also in the recessionin the value system, in the ideology of liberty,the freedom of movement, etc., which was thepride of the Western world and the source of itspower over the rest of the world. It has reached apoint where the idea of liberty, one that isrelatively recent, is in the process ofdisappearing from our customs andconsciences, and the globalization of liberalvalues is about to realize itself in its exactopposite form: a globalization of police forces,of total control, of a terror of security measures.This reversal moves towards a maximum ofrestrictions, resembling those of a

fundamentalist society.THE SPIRIT OF TERRORISM, JEAN

BAUDRILLARD, 2002

While working to halt the psychological damagefrom an attack, the leader must do everythingpossible to thwart a further strike. Terrorists oftenwork sporadically and with no pattern, partly becauseunpredictability is frightening, partly because they areoften in fact too weak to mount a sustained effort.Time must be taken to patiently uproot the terroristthreat. More valuable than military force here is solidintelligence, infiltration of the enemy ranks (working tofind dissidents from within), and slowly and steadilydrying up the money and resources on which theterrorist depends.

At the same time, it is important to occupy themoral high ground. As the victim of the attack, youhave the advantage here, but you may lose it if youcounterattack aggressively. The high ground is not aminor luxury but a critical strategic ploy: world opinionand alliances with other nations will prove crucial inisolating the terrorists and preventing them fromsowing division. All this requires the willingness towage the war over the course of many years, andmostly behind the scenes. Patient resolve and therefusal to overreact will serve as their own deterrents.Show you mean business and make your enemiesfeel it, not through the blustery front used for politicalpurposes--this is not a sign of strength--but throughthe cool and calculating strategies you employ to

corner them.In the end, in a world that is intimately interlinked

and dependent on open borders, there will never beperfect security. The question is, how much threat arewe willing to live with? Those who are strong can dealwith a certain acceptable level of insecurity. Feelingsof panic and hysteria reveal the degree to which theenemy has triumphed, as does an overly rigid attemptat defense, in which a society and culture at large aremade hostage to a handful of men.

Authority: There is no fate worse than beingcontinuously under guard, for it means youare always afraid.

--Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.)

REVERSALThe reverse of terrorism would be direct andsymmetrical war, a return to the very origins ofwarfare, to fighting that is up-front and honest, asimple test of strength against strength--essentially anarchaic and useless strategy for modern times.

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Wisdom. New York: Anchor Books,1991.Leonard, Maurice. Mae West: Empressof Sex. New York: A Birch Lane PressBook, 1992.Lewis, Bernard. The Assassins: ARadical Sect in Islam. New York:Oxford University Press, 1987.Madariaga, Salvador de. HernanCortes: Conqueror of Mexico. GardenCity, NY: Anchor Books, 1969.Mansfield, Harvey C. Machiavelli'sVirtue. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1998.Morris, Donald R. The Washing of theSpears: The Rise and Fall of the ZuluNation. New York: Da Capo Press,1998.Musashi, Miyamoto. The Way toVictory: The Annotated Book of FiveRings. Translated and commentary byHidy Ochiai. Woodstock, NY: OverlookPress, 2001.Nietzsche, Friedrich. Ecce Homo. R. J.Hollingdale, tr. London: Penguin Books,1992.Picq, Colonel Ardant du. BattleStudies: Ancient and Modern Battle.Colonel John N. Greely and MajorRobert C. Cotton, trs. New York:

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International, 1983.Wilden, Anthony. Man and Woman,War and Peace: The Strategist'sCompanion. London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1987.Wilhelm, Richard. The I Ching (or Bookof Changes ). Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1977.Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategiesfrom Ancient China, The. Compiledand translated by Sun Haichen. Beijing:Foreign Languages Press, 1991.Xenophon's Anabasis: The March UpCountry. W. H. D. Rouse, tr. New York:A Mentor Classic, 1959.Young, Desmond. Rommel. London:Collins, 1950.

INDEXAberdeen, LordAbu JahalabundanceAbwehr (German intelligence)Academie FrancaiseAcamasacclimatizationAchillesacting outaction(s)

inability to takeindirectjudging others bypreemptiveresults of, importance ofthrough inactiontiming ofunexpected. See unexpected strategies

Adams, JohnAdams, Samuelad-Din, JalaladviceAesopAfghanistan

British invasion ofIslamic fundamentalism inSoviet invasion of

Afranius, Lucius

Agamemnonaggressive impulses/ aggression

disguised or hiddenfriendship andholding back againstas naturalpassive. See passive-aggressionstrategy

aggressive passivityagingAgrippa, VipsaniusAho, James A.AjaxAkikoAlamo, Battle of theAlcibiadesAlcyoneusAldrich, RobertAlexander I, czar of Russia

Balkans andEuropean vision ofguerrilla warfare ofNapoleonic Wars andpersonality ofreligious fervour of

Alexander II, czar of RussiaAlexander III, czar of RussiaAlexander the Great (Alexander III), king of Macedon

Aristotle andcenter-of-gravity strategy andas grand strategist

mother andNapoleon onScythians andunconventional warfare of

Algeria, France andAli, Muhammad

boxing style ofFrazier andListon and

Alinsky, Saul D.alliance(s)

avoidingbreaking upDali onemotions andfalsefriendship andgame ofMachiavelli onmediator, role inNapoleon onquality of

Allies, World War IAllies, World War II. See also specific countries

blitzkrieg ofdeception used byunified command of

AllifaeAll's Well That Ends Well (Shakespeare)Al QaedaAlvintzi, Joseph d'

ambiguityambitionambivalence about having powerAme, CesareAmin, HafizullahAmphipolis, MacedoniaAnabasis: The March Upcountry (Xenophon)Anatomy of the Zulu Army (Knight)AndroclesAndropov, Yuriangeranimals, humans asannihilation strategyAntaeusAnti-Machiavel, The (Frederick the Great)ApachesApolloappearancesappeasementApulia, ItalyAqaba, battle forArabs, in World War IArcola, Battle ofArdant du Picq, CharlesAresAriovistus (Germanic chieftain)Aristotlearmy(ies). See also specific armies

chain of command inmind as amorale of. See morale (motivation)

richAron, RaymondArt of Maneuver, The (Leonhard)Art of Political Warfare, The (Pitney)Art of War, The (Machiavelli)Art of War, The (Sun-tzu)Art of Warfare on Land, The (Chandler)art world

center-of-gravity strategy ininner-front strategy inpolarity strategy inunconventional warfare in

Asculum, ApuliaAssassinsAssassins, The (Lewis)Assyrian armyAssyrian EmpireAstyages, king of the MedesAs You Like It (Shakespeare)AtaxerxesAthenaAthens/Athenians

Macedonia andPersians andPhilip II andSocrates' influence on

Atlanta, GeorgiaAtlantic WallAtlasattrition warfare

Atwater, LeeAuckland, LordAuftragstaktik (mission-oriented command system)AugustusAuld, ThomasAusterlitz, Battle ofAustria

in Napoleonic WarsPrussia andRussia andin Seven Years' War

authority, distrust ofautonomyavant-gardeAwful Truth, TheAztecs

Badeau, AdamBadoglio, PietroBaikenBancroft, AnneBancroft-Hunt, NormanBanks, NathanielBannockburn, Battle ofbarbariansBarkley, Albenbaseball

controlled-chaos strategy incounterattack strategy indeath-ground strategy indeterrence strategy in

intelligence-gathering strategy inone-upmanship inpresence of mind in

battlefieldelevating yourself aboveshifting

battles. See also specific battleselusivefrontalpicking

Baudrillard, JeanBay of PigsBeaufre, AndreBeauharnais, Josephine. See Josephine, empress ofFranceBell, J. BowyerBellamy, RalphBellows, Georgebelonging, sense ofBender, Charles Albert "Chief,"Bergman, IngmarBernhardi, Friedrich vonBhagavad Gita, The: Krishna's Counsel in Time ofWarbicycling, alliance strategy inBismarck, Otto vonBlind Man, Theblitzkrieg strategyblooming lotus. See inner-front strategyBokuden, TsukaharaBollate, Christopher da

Bollate, Christopher daBolsheviksBonaparte, Napoleon

on Alexander the Greaton alliancesblitzkrieg warfare ofon deathdecline ofdefeats ofdivide-and-conquer strategy ofearly career ofending errors ofexile offalse front andfinal defeat offirst command ofas grand strategistguerrilla warfare againston leadershipleadership style ofMachiavelli andon maneuvermaneuver warfare andmarriages ofMetternich andon motivationpersonality ofplanning byPrussians defeated bypunishments and rewards used byreorganization of French military byRussian invasion by

as a strategiston terrorismon timeturning strategy ofunconventional warfare ofon warwars ofwritten instructions of

Book of Five Rings, The (Musashi)boredomBorgia, CesareBorneo, tribes ofBoston MassacreBoston Red SoxBoston Tea PartyBourienne, Louis deBowen, JuneBowen, Murrayboxing

center-of-gravity strategy inperfect economy errors inunconventional warfare in

Boyd, JohnBoyd cycleBradley, OmarBraun, EvaBreton, AndreBrezhnev, LeonidBriareusBritain. See Great Britain Brokaw, TomBruyere, Jean de la

Brydon, WilliamBuchanan, JamesBukharaBulge, Battle of theBunkuro, SuwaBunuel, LuisBurgundyBurke, EdmondBurns, James MacGregorBush, George H. W.business

guerrilla warfare examples fromunconventional warfare in

Byzantines, Islam and

Caesar, Juliusassassination ofblitzkrieg strategy ofCrassus andkidnapping ofleadership style ofas moral warriorpassive-aggression strategy ofPompey andretribution andRubicon crossing ofturning strategy and

Caldiero, ItalyCallaghan, Jamescampaigning. See grand strategyCampaigns of Napoleon, The (Chandler)

Campanella, RoyCampania, ItalyCanaris, WilhelmCannae, Battle ofCao ShanCapo d'IstriaCapra, FrankCaro, RobertCarroll, MadeleineCarthage/Carthaginians. See also HannibalCastaneda, CarlosCastiglione, Countess deCastlereagh, Lordcasualties, reducingCatholic Church, Reformation's attack onCaumartin, abbe decause, need to believe inCavour, Count dicenter-of-gravity strategyChaeronea, battle atchain of command

communications alonghuman side of troops andmission-oriented

chameleon typeChampion Hill, Battle ofChandler, David G.Chapman, RayCharacters (de la Bruyere)Charles I, king of EnglandCharles V, holy Roman emperor

Charles XII, king of SwedenCharles the Bold, duke of BurgundycheapnessChelmsford, Lordchess, strategy examples fromch'i (energy)Chiang Kai-shekChieh HsuanChien Andalou, Unchildhood/child developmentchildlike strategiesChin (warring state of China)China

civil war inRussia andunification ofWarring States era

Chinese People's LiberationArmyChuko LiangChurchill, JohnChurchill, Winston

de Gaulle andencirclement andHitler andon truth

CiceroCicero: The Life and Times ofRome's Greatest Politician (Everitt)Citadel (Vietnamese fort)Civil War, British

Civil War, ChineseCivil War, RomanCivil War, U.S.

center-of-gravity example fromcontrolled chaos examples fromdeterrence examples fromforcing strategy examples fromas moral warone-upmanship inunexpected strategies in

Clarke, DudleyClaudius I, emperor of RomeClausewitz, Carl vonClausewitz on StrategyClay, Cassius. See Ali, MuhammadClearchus (Spartan soldier)Clinton, BillClodius, Publiusclose embraceCohn, HarryColumbia Picturescommand-and-control strategyCommand in War (van Creveld)command structure. See chain of commandcommitmentscommunication/ communication strategies

along the chain of commandchildlike state induced bydetails, use inindirectothers', defending against

overabundance ofresults ofshocking, avoiding

communication-in-depthCommunist Party, AfghanCommunist Party, Chinesecomplaints and discontentComplete Upmanship, The (Potter)compromiseConcept of the Political, The (Schimitt)Confederate armyconflict

avoidingimportance in child developmentinevitability ofseeking

conformityConfuciusConrad, JosephConservative Partyconspiracycontrol

fait accompli strategy to attainin husand-wife relationshipsindirectpassivepassive aggressiveof patient-therapist relationship

controlled chaos strategyconventionCortes, Hernan

center-of-gravity strategy anddeath-ground strategy anddefenses against passive aggressionpolarity strategy andturning strategy of

Corvey, J.F.A. Le Miere deCoughlin, Charlescounterattack strategycounterbalance strategycounterinsurgencyCourage (Crane)Covey, EdwardCox, JamesCrane, StephenCrassus, Marcus LiciniusCrawford, Joan

Davis anddeath-ground strategy ofone-upmanship ofShearer and

creativityCremony, JohnCroesus (last king of Lydia)Cromwell, OliverCromwell, ThomasCronkite, WalterCrook, GeorgeCukor, GeorgeCurtiz, MichaelCycnusCyrus II, king of Persia

Dali, Salvadoron alliancesBreton andcenter-of-gravity strategy andinner front strategy of

Dalton, GeorgiaDarius I, king of PersiaDarius III, king of PersiaDavidDavidovich, PaulDavis, BetteDavis, JeffersonD-Daydeath

fear ofimminent, as motivatorunreality of

death ground, psychologicaldeath-ground strategydeception strategies

in ancient warfarecamouflagedanger ofdecoy attackfalse fronthypnotic patternnecessity ofplanted informationshadows within shadows

defeat

acceptingblame forgradations ofseeds of victory in

Defeat into Victory (Slim)defeatismdefensivenessdefensive warfare

counterattack strategydeterrence strategiesnonengagement strategyperfect-economy strategy

Delmar, VinaDemocratic PartyDenmarkdesperation and urgency, creating a sense ofDessalines, Jean-JacquesD'Este, Carlodeterrence strategies

basic methodsexamples

Dewey, ThomasDial M for MurderDiamond LilDien Bien Phu, battle atdilemmasDiomedesdiplomacydiplomatic-war strategy. See negotiation dirtywarfare. See unconventional warfare disciplinediscontent. See complaints and discontent

discontent. See complaints and discontentDiscourses, The (Machiavelli)disorder, maximumdivide-and-conquer strategydivide-and-rule strategyDixit, AvinashiDole, ElizabethDole, RobertDonat, RobertDost Mahomed KhanDostoyevsky, Fyodor

epilepsy ofimprisonment ofwriting of

Douglass, FrederickDragonwars (Bell)Drake, Francisdreams/dreamingDuchamp, MarcelDudley, Robertdumb, playingDunne, IreneDupuy, T. N.Durckheim, Karlfried Graf vonDurnford, Anthony William

Eastern Europe, Soviet Union andEast India CompanyEcce Homo (Nietzche)Echidneeducation, as limiting factorEdward I, king of England

Edward II, king of EnglandEdward III, king of EnglandEdward IV, king of Englandeffective truthefficiencyego(s)

groupEgypt/Egyptians

Persians andin World War IIin Yom Kippur War

Eisenhower, Dwight D.El Al hijacking (1968)Elizabeth I, queen of England

divide-and-rule strategy ofleadership style ofSpanish Armada andspy network of

Elizabeth Petrovna, empress ofRussiaEluard, Paul and GalaEmerson, Ralph Waldoemotions. See also specific emotions alliances and

appealing tocontagiousness ofcontrollingduring endingsmanipulatingpassive-aggression strategy and

encirclement (envelopment)psychological

ultimate form ofendings. See exits and endingsenemy(ies)

adaptation bybefriendingchoosingconfusingdecentralizeddeclaring war ondilemmas forelusiveenvelopinghaving fewer resources than youridentifyinginfiltration of. See inner-front strategyinnerintelligence gathering onknowingLatin root of wordopen, rarity ofouterperceptions held bypowerfulpower sources ofrevealingsecretself-destruction ofuses forweaknesses, pinpointingweak salient, exposure on

England. See Great Britain

enthusiasm. See morale (motivation) envelopment.See encirclement (envelopment)EpeiusErickson, Milton H.Erie RailroadEssex, earl ofEtherington-Smith, MeredithEurystheusEurytionEveritt, Anthonyexits and endings

as beginningsemotional resonance ofimportance ofNietzsche ontiming ofworst method for

exterior maneuvermoral warfare as

extraordinary, ordinary and

Fabius (Roman general)fait accompli strategyFala (FDR's terrier)Falkland Islands, British war forfalse surrenderFamily Book on the Art of War (Munenori)family dynamicsfearfearlessness, cultivatingFeisal, Sherif

Fighting FranceFingerspitzengefuhl (fingertip feel)First Punic WarFirst Triumvirate, Romanflanking maneuvers. See turning strategy flexibilityFlorencefollowers. See soldiers (team members)Fontaine, Joanfools, sufferingfootball, strategy examples fromforcing strategiesforesightformulaic strategiesfortress defenseFountain (Duchamp)France

Algeria andAllied invasion ofAustria andblitzkrieg ofBurgundy andGermany andGreat Britain andHaiti andItaly andNapoleonic Wars ofoccupation ofPrussia andReign of Terror inRussia andin Seven Years' War

Spain andterrorism inunification ofVichy governmentVietnam andin World War Iin World War II

Francis I, emperor of AustriaFranco, FranciscoFranklin, BenjaminFrazier, JoeFrederick the Great (Frederick II), king of Prussia

fait accompli strategy ofinfluence ofMachiavelli andnonengagement strategy andin Seven Years' Waron the unexpected

freedom, as burdenFree FranceFrench-Algerian warsFrench ResistanceFrench RevolutionfrictionFriedrich Wilhelm III, king of Prussiafriendship/friendliness

alliances andas frontas negotiating tooltoward enemies

front

falsefriendship asinner. See inner-front strategy internalvs. externalleadership frompassive. See passive-aggressionstrategy frontal attack

Fuji-yori, MoriFuller, J.F.C.FUSAG (First United States Army Group)

Gallic WarGallipoli, Battle of

chain of command errors inperfect economy errors ingamble, risk compared withGandhi, Mahatma, passive-aggressionstrategy of, xviii

Ganryu, SasakiGarfield, James A.GaulGaulle, Charles de

fait accompli strategy ofone-upmanship ofRoosevelt andterrorism, response to

Gay Science, The (Nietzsche)Generalship of Alexander the Great, The (Fuller)General's War, The: The Inside Story of the Conflictin the Gulf (Gordon and Trainor)generosity (helping others)

Genghis Khanblitzkrieg strategy ofcontrolled chaos strategy ofdivide-and-conquer strategy and

Genius for War, A: The German Army and theGeneral Staff, 1807-1845 (Dupuy)GenzaemonGeorge III, king of EnglandGerman armyGermanic forces, Roman empire andGermany

blitzkrieg strategy ofFrance andGreat Britain and

Germanyduring ReformationSpain andterrorism ofin World War Iin World War II

GeryonGhilzye tribesGiap, Vo NguyenGibraltarGiraud, HenriGisgo (Carthaginian soldier)glaciationGlubb, John Bagotgoalsgods, Greek. See also specific godsGooch, John

good and evil, definition ofGorbachev, MikhailGordon, Michael R.Gould, JayGourmont, Remy deGracian, BaltasarGrande Armeegrand strategy

first move ingoals andperspective andpolitics andprinciples ofsevering the roots

Granicus, Battle of theGrant, CaryGrant, Ulysses S.

McClernand andone-upmanship ofself-reliance ofunexpected strategies of

Graves, RobertGreat Arab Conquests, The (Glubb)Great Britain

Afghanistan andBurgundy andcivil war incolonial U.S. andDenmark, war withFalkland Islands andFrance and

Germany andIndia andNapoleonic Wars andRussia andScotland, war withSpanish Armada defeated byTurkey andin World War Iin World War IIZulus, war with

Great Hunt, MongolGreco-Persian Wars, The (Green)Greece/Greeks. See also Athens/Athenians

good and evil inhumankind, understanding ofinner-front strategy ofPersia andPompey inRome andRussia andTrojan horse andTurks anduniting of

Greek Myths, The (Graves)Green, PeterGreen Bay Packersgroup mythgroup(s). See also specific groups collectivepersonality of

dynamicsego

factions withinimportance in human evolution

Groupthink, avoidingGroves, Leslie R.Guadalcanal, Battle ofGuderian, Heinzguerrilla warfare

cells incounterstrategy tohistory ofmedia andas psychologicalspace inSpanish origin of termtechnology andtime invoid, lure in

guerrilla-war-of-the-mind strategyguiltGulf War (1991)

exit errors inone-upmanship inas perfect economy example

Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai (Tsunetomo)HaitiHakamadareHaley, JayHamilton, EdithHamilton, IanHammersley, Frederick

Hammond, Grant T.Hannibal

annihilation strategy anddefeat by Scipio Africanusencirclement strategy andintelligence gathering bymorale strategies andperfect-economy strategy andRoman Empire, attacks onunconventional warfare of

Hara: The Vital Centre (von Durckheim)Harding, Warren G.Hardy, ThomasHasan i-SabahHasdrubal (Carthaginian general)hatredHead, EdithHead Game, The (Kahn)Hectorheels, keeping people on theirHegel, GeorgHelenHellenic Leaguehelping others. See generosity (helping others)Henry VIII, king of EnglandHeraHeracleaHeraclesHermesHernan Cortes: Conqueror of Mexico (deMadariaga)

HerodotusHesperidesHeyokaHimmler, HeinrichHippias, tyrant of AthensHistories, The (Herodotus)History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (Oman)History of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides)History of Rome, The (Livy)Hitchcock, Alfred

childhood ofcommunication strategies ofdetached-buddha style ofdivide-and-rule strategy offait accompli strategy ofpassive-aggression strategy ofSelznick and

Hitler, AdolfCanaris andDali anddeception ofDirective 51 ofemotional state of

Hitter: The Life and Turmoils of Ted Williams (Linn)Hobbes, ThomasHo Chi Minh TrailHodges, GilHohenlohe, Friedrich Ludwigholding back (patience)Hollywood

alliance examples from

alliance examples fromcommunication strategies incounterbalance strategy indeath-ground strategy individe-and-rule examples fromforcing strategies inmaneuver warfare inone-upmanship examples frompolarity strategy in

Holofernes (biblical general)Holy AllianceHomerhonestyHood, JohnHoover, HerbertHornung, Paulhostility. See aggressive impulses/aggression Houseat Pooh Corner (Milne)Houston, SamHoward, LordHoweitat (Syrian tribe)Hsu TungHuainanziHuang TiHue, battle atHuman, All Too Human (Nietzsche)human evolutionhuman nature. See also people

conservatism ofas conventionalimpatience of

as nomadicselfishness ofstudy of

Hussein, SaddamHutton, Edwardhypocrisy

I Ching, TheIemitsuIkrimaIktomiIliad, The (Homer)imaginationIndia, Great Britain andIndian National Congressindirect actionindirect approach. See turning strategyindirect communicationindirect controlIndrajitindulgences, selling ofinner-front strategy

conspiracydefending againstspreading dissension through

innovation, spiral ofinscrutability, cultivatingintelligence strategy. See also spying intimidation,avoidingIranIran-Contra Affair

ironyirrationalityIrwin, EdwardIsaiahIsandlwana, Battle ofIsfahan. See IranIslam

Nizari Ismailis andIsraelIsraelitesItaly

France andunder Mussoliniterrorism inin World War II

Iwo Jima, Battle of

Jackson, StonewallJapan

Russia andin World War II

Jebe, GeneralJena-Auerstadt, Battle ofJenkins, BrianJesusJewsJimenez, Juan RamonJob, Book ofJochi, GeneralJodl, AlfredJohnson, Lyndon Baines

alliance strategy ofcampaigning style ofexits and endings offirst run for office ofas grand strategistintelligence gathering ofleadership style ofone-upmanship ofRoosevelt andVietnam War and

Johnston, JohnJomini, Antoine-Henri deJonathanJones, L.E.Jordan, HenryJosephine, empress of FranceJoshua, Book ofJourney to Ixtlan: The Lessons of Don Juan(Castaneda)Judith, Book ofjujitsuJulius Caesar (Fuller)Julius II, popeJuvenal

Kahn, RogerKarmal, BabrakKeach, CarrollKennedy, John F.

Bay of Pigs andJohnson and

Kernstown, battle atKhalid ibn al WaleedKhan, AkbarKhe Sanh, battle atKhwarizm (ancient Asian state)King Henry IV, Part I (Shakespeare)King Henry V (Shakespeare)Kissinger, Henry A.Kleberg, RichardKnight, IanKodama, GentaroKorea

Russia andUnited States and

Krishnamurti, JidduKumbakarnaKutusov, Mikhail

Labour PartyLacan, JacquesLadonLandon, Alf M.language. See words Lansdale, EdwardLao-tzulast warLatimer, GeneLatin LeagueLavagetto, CookieLawrence, T.E.leadership

errors in. See leadership errors

flexibility infrom the frontNapoleon onthrough personal examplethrough remote (indirect) control

leadership errorsbroken chain of commanddivided leadership

League of NationsLe Baron, WilliamLee, Robert E.Legends of the Samurai (Sato)Leggett, TrevorLeigh, VivienLemon, BobLenin, VladimirLeonhard, Robert R.Leo X, popeLettow-Vorbeck, Paul vonLewis, BernardLewis, John L.Liddell Hart, B.H.limits, knowingLin BiaoLincoln, Abraham

Civil War andGrant andMcClernand andas moral warriorreelection of

Linn, Ed

Liston, SonnyLives of Master Swordsmen (Sugawara)LivyLocke, JohnLockman, WhiteyLodi, Bridge ofLombardi, VinceLondon BlitzLone Star Preacher (Thomason)Long, HueyLong MarchLongus, Semproniuslotus, blooming. See inner-front strategyLouis XI, king of FranceLouis XII, king of FranceLouis XIV, king of France

bishop of Noyon andloveLow CountriesloyaltyLuther, MartinLuttwak, Edward N.lying

MacArthur, DouglasMcCarey, LeoMcCarthy, EugeneMcClellan, George B.McClernand, JohnMcDougall, WilliamMcDowell, Irvin

Macedonia, Athens andMachiavelli, Niccolo

on acclimatizationon allianceson effective truthgoals ofpolitical career ofon Roman Empirewriting of

Mack, KarlMcKinley, WilliamMacnaghten, WilliamMcPherson, HarryMadariaga, Salvador deMaglie, SalMagoMagsaysay, RamonMahdiMalik ShahMaltaMandragola (Machiavelli)maneuver warfare

examples ofplanning inprinciples oftiming in

Mankiewicz, Josephman management. See morale (motivation)Mantua, fortress ofMao: A Biography (Terrill)Mao Tse-tung

in Chinese Civil Wardivide-and-conquer strategy andguerrilla tactics ofLin Biao andturning strategy ofon war

Marathon, Athenian victory atMarciano, RockyMarengo, Battle ofMarhabalMaria TheresaMarie AntoinetteMarie LouiseMarshall, George C.martyrdomMary, queen of ScotsMasinissa, king of NumibiaMassena, AndreMaster of Deception (Mure)Mastering the Art of War: Zhuge Liang's and Liu Ji'sCommentaries on the Classic by Sun TzuMataliMatashichiroMathewson, ChristyMatthew, Book ofMaurikios (Byzantine emperor)Maximus, FabiusMayo, Archie L.Mazzolini, Silvester. See PrierasMeasure for Measure (Shakespeare)media, guerrilla warfare and

mediator, role ofMedici, Lorenzo de'Medici familyMeinhertzhagen, RichardMein Kampf (Hitler)Melas, MichaelMencius (Confucian philosopher)MenelausMenoetesMetisMetternich, Klemens von

Alexander I andalliance strategy ofNapoleon andnegotiation style ofpassive-aggression strategy ofpersonality ofRussia andon victory

Mexico, Cortes's conquering ofMGMMilan, duke ofMildred Piercemilitary deception. See deception strategiesmilitary history. See war/warfare, history ofMilitary History of Ulysses S. Grant (Badeau)Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War(Cohen and Gooch)military thinking, Asianmilitary training

GermanMongolPrussianZulu

Miller, TomMilne, A.A.Miltiadesmind. See also thinking

as an armycontrollingfocusedguerrilla-war-of-thepenetrating. See communication/communication strategiespresence ofas a river

Mind of War, The: John Boyd and AmericanSecurity (Hammond)Miracle Worker, Themirroring peoplemistakes

compellingfear of making

mobility. See speed and mobilityMoctezuma II, emperor of MexicoMohammedMoltke, Helmuth vonMongols

annihilation bydivide-and-conquer strategy ofintelligence gathering by

intelligence gathering byKhwarizm andslow-slow-quick-quick strategy ofterrorism of

Montgomery, Bernardmorale (motivation)

contagiousness ofemotion manipulation andas insufficient alonesteps toundermining

moralitymoral terrainmoral warfare/warriors

avoidingdefending againstas exterior maneuverpublic opinion inself-interest war compared withtypes of

Moreau, JeanMorris, DickMoscow, Napoleon's attack onMosesMother Earthmotivation. See morale (motivation)Moulin, Jeanmovie making. See HollywoodMuhammad II, shah of KhwarizmMuhammad TaparmujahideenMumon, Zen Master

Munenori, YagyuMunich Olympics, attack onMurat, Caroline"Murders in the Rue Morgue, The" (Poe)Mure, DavidMurphy's LawMusashi, MiyamotoMussolini, BenitoMutekatsu-ryuMy Bondage and My Freedom (Douglass)myth, groupmythology

Nalebuff, Barry J.Naoshige, LordNaples, revolution of 1820 inNapoleon I. See Bonaparte, NapoleonNapoleon IInarcissismNarodnaya Volia (People's Will)Naseby, Battle ofNatalNationalists, ChineseNational Youth AdministrationNative Americans. See also specific tribes

counterattack strategy used againstintelligence strategy used byunconventional warfare of

negotiationfriendliness inwar and, comparison between

warrior vs. shopkeeper style ofNelson, HoratioNereusneurotic patternNew CarthageNew DealNew Model Army, BritishNew York GiantsNew York YankeesNicholas I, czar of RussiaNicholson, HaroldNietzsche, FriedrichNight After Night"Night in a Surrealist Forest" (Dali)Ninety-five Theses (Luther)NinevehNixon, RichardNizan al-Mulknonengagement strategyNorth Vietnamese army

camouflage used bygrand strategy ofinner-front strategy ofas moral warriorsunity of command in

Noyon, bishop of

objectivityOchiai, HidyOctavianOdawara Castle

OdysseusOdyssey, The (Homer)Oedipus Rex (Sophocles)offensive warfare

annihilation strategyblitzkrieg strategycenter-of-gravity strategydiplomatic. See negotiation divide-and-conquer strategyexit strategy. See exits and endingsforcing strategies

grand strategy. See grand strategyintelligence strategymaneuver. See maneuver warfareturning strategy

oil industry, strategy examples fromOjibwasOlivier, LawrenceOlmutz, AustriaOlympiasOman, Charles

one-upmanshipdirect approach toglaciation inthrough mockery

On Partisans and Irregular Forces (Corvey)On War (von Clausewitz)Operation Desert StormOperation Sealionopponents. See enemy(ies) Orestes

Orgakov, Nikolaiorganizational war. See also leadership

command-and-control strategycontrolled-chaos strategymorale strategies

OrthrusOtraroutflanking strategy. See turning strategy outsider,power of theOvid

pacifism (nonviolence)PakistanPalamedesPalestinian terroristspanicParadine Case, TheParamount Picturesparanoia

avoidingplaying on people's

ParisParis, archbishop ofParker, Hydeparodypassive-aggression strategy

confusion as result ofconscious vs. semiconsciousdefending againstemotions andpervasiveness of

sabotagepassivity. See holding back (patience) past, thePath to Power, The: The Years of Lyndon Johnson(Caro)patience. See holding back (patience)Patterson, FloydPatton, George S.Patton: A Genius for War (D'Este)Peace of PhilocratesPearl Harbor, attack onPeloponnesian WarPemberton, JamesPeninsular WarPentagon

9/11 attack onpeople readingreasoning power limitations intypes ofusing

Perdiccas, king of MacedoniaPere La Chaiseperfect-economy strategyPerrault, GillesPersia/Persians

Athens andPersia/Persians

Greece andIslam andMedes andRussia and

Persistence of Memory, The: A Biography of Dali

(Etherington-Smith)perspectivepersuasionPeter III, czar of RussiaPetrashevsky, MikhailPetreiusPhantom over Vietnam (Trotti) Pharsalus, Battle ofPhilip II, king of MacedonPhilip II, king of SpainPhilip the Good (Philip III), duke of BurgundyPhilippinesPiaget, JeanPicasso, Pablopiecemeal strategy. See fait accompli strategyPiedmont, revolution inPisander (Athenian politician)Pitney, John J., Jr.plans/planning

with branchesin maneuver warfare

PlatoPleasure Garden, ThePoe, Edgar AllanPoggioli, RenatoPolandpolarity strategypolitics

alliance strategy inexits and endings ingrand strategy andguerrilla warfare in

maneuver warfare inone-upmanship inpolarity strategy inturning strategy inunconventional warfare in

Polk, SheltonPompeiaPompeyPort Arthur, ManchuriaPorusPoseidonpotential force, position ofPotter, StephenpovertypowerPratzen Heightspreconceptionspreemptive actionpresence of mindpresent, the

attunement to. See mind, presence ofpresidential elections, U.S.

194019721988

PriamPrierasPrince, The (Machiavelli)Protestant Reformation

as political victoryProteus

PrussiaAustria andin Napoleonic WarsRussia and

Prussian army. See also German armyAuftragstaktik system ofgeneral staff ofmilitary traditions ofreform of

PrylisPsalms, Book ofPsychopsychoanalysis, terrorism example frompsychological agingpsychological pressurepsychological spacepsychological typespsychological weaknessesPtolemypublic opinion

in moral warfarein Roman civil waron Vietnam Warduring World War II

Publius Scipio the Younger. SeeScipio Africanus punishmentPyrrhic victoryPyrrhus, king of Epirus

Qi (warring state of China)

Raft, George

RamaRamayana, TheRaphaelrational fighting. See emotions, controllingRatti, OscarReagan, RonaldrealityRebeccaRecords of the Historian (Szuma) Red ArmyRed Badge of Courage, The (Crane)Red BrigadesReese, Pee WeeReign of Terrorreligious fervor

Alexander I'sCromwell's

Religious Mythology and the Art of War (Aho)religious retreatreligious symbolism, in

Gandhi's campaignRepublican Party

in 1936 presidential electionin 1972 presidential electionClinton and

reputationmoral

restless, remainingretreatrevengereverse intimidation. See deterrence strategies

Revolutionary War, U.S.Richelieu, Cardinalrighteous strategy. See moral warfare/warriorsrigidityrisk taking

gambling compared withRitter, Thelmarivals. See enemy(ies) Robert the Bruce (Robert I),king of ScotlandRobespierreRobinson, JackieRockefeller, John D.Roman Way, The (Hamilton)Rome/Roman Empire

Carthaginians andcenter-of-gravity strategy used bycivil wardivide-and-rule used byFirst Triumvirate ofGaul andGermanic forces andinner-front strategy inLatin League andmilitary style ofSpain andTarentum, war against

Rommel, ErwinRoosevelt, Franklin Delano

blitzkrieg strategy of"brain trust" ofcenter-of-gravity strategy and

de Gaulle andas guerrilla warriorJohnson andleadership style ofmaneuver warfare andMarshall andmental toughness ofpassive-aggression strategy ofas polarizerpresidential candidacy ofreelection ofthird-term campaign ofturning strategy of

Roosevelt, TheodoreRoosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (Burns)Rorke's Drift, ZululandRules for Radicals (Alinsky)Rules of War and BraveryRunstedt, Gerd vonRussia. See also Soviet Union

Austria andChina andcommunism, birth ofFrance andGreat Britain andGreece andJapan andKorea andMalta andNaples' revolution of 1820 andin Napoleonic Wars

Piedmont revolution andPrussia andin Seven Years' WarSpanish revolution of 1820 andterrorism inWhite Terror inin World War II

sabotageSadat, AnwarSaigonSt. Peter's BasilicaSalt March, Gandhi'sSamarkandSamuel, Book ofsamurai (swordsmen)

communication strategy ofcounterattack strategy ofcounterbalance strategy ofdeath, contemplation ofdeterrence strategy ofguerrilla-war-of-the-mind strategy ofintelligence strategy ofmaneuver warfare inone-upmanship examples fromspeed of

Samurai Zen: The Warrior Koans (Leggett)SanjarSardis (ancient city of Lydia)Sato, HiroakiSaul

Sawyer, Ralph D.Schlesinger, JamesSchmitt, CarlScholar's Dilettante Remarks on War, A (Tou)Schopenhauer, ArthurSchwarze Kapelle (Black Orchestra)Scipio AfricanusScotland, England and, war betweenScythiansSecret Agent, The (Conrad)Secret Life Salvador Dali, The (Dali)secretsSecrets of D-Day, The (Perrault)Secrets of the Samurai (Ratti and Westbrook)segmenting your forcesSelected Military Writings (Mao)self-directed warfare

counterbalance strategydeath-ground strategyguerrilla-war-of-the-mind strategypolarity strategyunconventional

self-doubt, inculcatingself-esteemself-identityself-interest

mutualself-interest warself-relianceSelznick, David O.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Lawrence)Seven Years' Warsexual stereotypesShah SoojahShaka (Zulu king)Shakespeare, WilliamShearer, NormaShenandoah ValleySherman, Williamshih (position of potential force)Shinkage swordsmanshipShostakovich, DmitryShunSidney Janis GallerysilenceSimmel, GeorgSinai DesertSiouxSix-Day WarSix Secret Teachings (Tai Kung)Skipworth, Alisonslavery, strategy examples fromSlim, WilliamSmolensk, RussiaSmuts, JanSnodgrass, Fredsocial relationshipsSociety of Independent ArtistsSocrates/Socratic methodsoldiers (team members)

ch'i of

discipline ofemotions ofmaterial needs ofmorale of. See morale (motivation)personalities ofpunishment ofrewards forselecting

Sons of LibertySophoclesSoviet Union

Afghanistan invasion byChinese Civil War andEastern Europe andUnited States andin World War II

spacein guerrilla warfarepsychological

SpainCarthaginians andEngland, war withGermany andguerrilla warfare inin Napoleonic WarsPompey inrevolution of 1820 inRoman Empire andin World War II

Spanish ArmadaSparta

speechesspeed and mobility. See also blitzkrieg strategySpellboundSpider King. See Louis XI, king of FranceSpirit of Terrorism (Baudrillard)spyingstalemateStalin, JosephStamp Act, Adams's campaign againstStandard OilStanton, EdwinStewart, JamesSthenelusStieglitz, AlfredSting Like a Bee (Torres and Sugar)Stone, SamStopford, FrederickStrangers on a TrainStrategic Advantage, The: Sun Zi and WesternApproaches to War (Cao)strategic depthStrategies of Psychotherapy, The (Haley)Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Luttwak)strategy(ies)

acting out asalliance. See alliance(s) annihilationblitzkriegcenter-of-gravitychain-reaction. See terrorismchildlike

command-and-controlcommunication. See communication/communication strategiescontrolled-chaoscounterattackcounterbalancedeath-grounddeterrencediplomatic-war. See negotiation divide-and-conquerdivide-and-ruleencirclement (envelopment). Seeencirclement (envelopment)exit. See exits and endings faitaccompliforcingformulaic

grand. See grand strategyGreek origin of wordguerrilla-war-of-the-mind

inner-front. See inner-front strategyintelligencemartyrdommilitarymisperception. See deceptionstrategiesmorale. See morale (motivation)nonengagementone-upmanship. See one-upmanshipordinary-extraordinary. See unexpected

strategiespassive-aggression. Seepassive-aggression strategyperfect economypolaritypsychologicalrighteous. See moral warfare/warriorsripening-for-the-sickle. See maneuverwarfaretactics vsturningunexpectedof the void. See guerrilla warfare

Strategy (Liddell Hart)Sugar, Bert RandolphSugawara, MakotoSun HaichenSun PinSun-tzusurrealist movementSuvla Bay, invasion ofSwitzerland, Burgundy andSword and the Mind, The (Sato)swordsmen. See samurai (swordsmen)Sydow, Max vonSyriaSzuma Chien

Tacitustactics

death-at-your-heels

detached Buddhahyperaggressiveno-return

Tai Kung (Six Secret Teachings)Takanobu, LordTakuanTaoismTao of Spycraft, The (Sawyer)Tao Te Ching (Lao-tzu)Tarentum, Rome's war withTaticheffTaylor, SamuelTea Actteachersteam members. See soldiers (team members)technology, guerrilla warfare andTekke Tepe, TurkeyTemplars and the Assassins, The (Wasserman)Tenochtitlanterrain. See battlefield Terrill, Ross

terrorismdefending againstfear of uncertainty andlimitations ofpsychological ripple effect ofpublicity throughby small groups

Tet OffensiveThalberg, IrvingThatcher, MargaretThebes

ThebesThemisThemistoclesTheory of the Avant-Garde, The (Poggioli)therapist-patient relationshipThermopylaethinking

conventional patterns offluidin maneuver warfare

military, AsianThinking Strategically (Dixit and Nalebuff)39 Steps, TheThomason, John W., Jr.ThucydidesThunderers, OjibwaTidewater pipelinetime

as commoditytime

in guerrilla warfareNapoleon on

Tissaphernes (Persian satrap)TityusTi YaoTodd, AnnToden, MasterTorres, JoseTou Bi Fu TanToussaint l'OuvertureTownshend SystemTrainor, Bernard E.

Trainor, Bernard E.TransoxianaTreaty of PortsmouthTroilusTrojan horseTrojanstroops. See soldiers (team members)Troppau conferenceTrotti, Johntrust, as negotiation toolTsunetomo, YamamotoTunisTunisia. See Carthage/Carthaginians Turks/Turkey

Great Britain andGreece andin World War Iturning strategy

TyphonTyphoon

Ulianov, AlexanderUlm, Battle ofuncertainty, fear ofunconventional warfare

alliance strategy. See alliance(s)chain-reaction strategy. See terrorismcommunication strategies. Seecommunication/ communicationstrategiescounterstrategies tofait accompli strategyguerrilla. See guerrilla warfare

inner-front strategy. See inner-frontstrategymain principles ofmisperception strategies. Seedeception strategiesone-upmanship strategy. See one-upmanship strategyordinary-extraordinary strategy. Seeunexpected strategiespassive-aggression strategy. Seepassive-aggression strategyrighteous strategy. See moralwarfare/warriors

unexpected strategiesanticipatingdealing withpower of the

Union armyUnited States. See also specific wars and events

Korea andSoviet Union andterrorism inin World War II

unpredictabilityunsatisfied, remainingurgency and desperation, sense ofUstinov, DmitriUtilization Technique

van Creveld, MartinVanderbilt, Commodore Cornelius

Varro, TerentiusVegetiusVelazquez, Diego deVerona, battle forVertigoVettori, FrancescoVicksburg, Union takeover ofVictor-Emmanuelvictory(ies)

cost ofculminating point ofgradations ofpsychological nature ofPyrrhicsmall, building on

VietcongVietnam

France andUnited States and. See Vietnam War

Vietnam Warcamouflage incenter-of-gravity example fromas grand strategy exampleJohnson andas morality warpublic opinion onTet Offensive

violence, avoidingvisualizationVo Nguyen Giap. See Giap, Vo Nguyenvulnerability. See weakness(es)

Wallace, WilliamWar Department, U.S.war/warfare. See also conflict; specific wars

ancientarguments againstof attritioncontrollingas crusadedeclaringdefensive. See defensive warfareending. See exits and endingsexternal vs. internal frontfortress defense infrontal battlesgods of. See also specific gods historyoflastmaneuver. See maneuver warfaremoral. See moral warfare/warriorsnegotiation and, comparison betweenorganizational. See organizational warpeasants'physical aspects ofas politics by other meanspresentwith the self. See self-directed warfareself-destructive patterns inof self-interestspeed and mobility inunconventional. See unconventional

warfareWarner Bros.Warriors: Warfare and the Native American Indian(Bancroft Hunt)Wasserman, JamesWavell, ArchibaldWay to Victory, A: The Annotated Book of FiveRings (Ochiai)weakness(es)

appearance ofdisguisingpinpointingpsychologicalsigns ofuse in envelopmentas virtues

WeathermenWei (warring state of China)wei wu (action through inaction)West, MaeWestbrook, AdeleWestmoreland, William C.What Ever Happened to Baby Jane?Wiles of War, The: 36 Military Strategies fromAncient China (Sun)Williams, DaveyWilliams, Ted

intelligence gathering byWilson, WoodrowWindigokan (Ojibwa warrior society)

Women, Thewords

lack of power ofpower through

workplace, group dynamics inWorld Restored, A (Kissinger)World Trade Center attack (2001)World War I

Arabs inEast African frontFrance inGermany inGreat Britain ininner-front strategy inMiddle Eastern theaterplanted information inTurkey in

World War IIAfrican frontcamouflage inD-Daydeception strategies inforcing strategy inFrance inGermany inGreat Britain inItaly inJapan inLondon BlitzPearl Harbor bombingpublic opinion during

Russia inSoviet Union inSpain inUnited States in

XenophonXerxes I, king of Persia

YakkokuYamanouchi, LordYang HuYawkey, TomYom Kippur WarYoriyasuYu the Sage

Zama, AfricaZeusZia ul-HaqZukor, AdolphZulus, British war with

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Table of ContentsPREFACEPART I SELF-DIRECTED WARFARE1 DECLARE WAR ON YOUR ENEMIES: THE

POLARITY STRATEGYLife is endless battle and conflict, and you cannot fight

effectively unless you can identify your enemies.Learn to smoke out your enemies, to spot them bythe signs and patterns that reveal hostility. Then,once you have them in your sights, inwardly declarewar. Your enemies can fill you with purpose anddirection.

2 DO NOT FIGHT THE LAST WAR: THEGUERRILLA-WAR-OF-THE-MIND STRATEGY

What most often weighs you down and brings youmisery is the past. You must consciously wage waragainst the past and force yourself to react to thepresent moment. Be ruthless on yourself; do notrepeat the same tired methods. Wage guerrilla waron your mind, allowing no static lines of defense —make everything fluid and mobile.

3 AMIDST THE TURMOIL OF EVENTS, DO NOTLOSE YOUR PRESENCE OF MIND: THECOUNTERBALANCE STRATEGY

In the heat of battle, the mind tends to lose itsbalance. It is vital to keep your presence of mind,maintaining your mental powers, whatever thecircumstances. Make the mind tougher by

exposing it to adversity. Learn to detach yourselffrom the chaos of the battlefield.

4 CREATE A SENSE OF URGENCY ANDDESPERATION: THE DEATH-GROUNDSTRATEGY

You are your own worst enemy. You waste precioustime dreaming of the future instead of engaging inthe present. Cut your ties to the past; enterunknown territory. Place yourself on “death ground,”where your back is against the wall and you have tofight like hell to get out alive.

PART II ORGANIZATIONAL (TEAM) WARFARE5 AVOID THE SNARES OF GROUPTHINK: THE

COMMAND-AND-CONTROL STRATEGYThe problem in leading any group is that people

inevitably have their own agendas. You have tocreate a chain of command in which they do notfeel constrained by your influence yet follow yourlead. Create a sense of participation, but do not fallinto groupthink — the irrationality of collectivedecision making.

6 SEGMENT YOUR FORCES: THE CONTROLLED-CHAOS STRATEGY

The critical elements in war are speed andadaptability — the ability to move and makedecisions faster than the enemy. Break your forcesinto independent groups that can operate on theirown. Make your forces elusive and unstoppable byinfusing them with the spirit of the campaign, givingthem a mission to accomplish, and then lettingthem run.

7 TRANSFORM YOUR WAR INTO A CRUSADE:MORALE STRATEGIES

The secret to motivating people and maintaining theirmorale is to get them to think less aboutthemselves and more about the group. Involve themin a cause, a crusade against a hated enemy.Make them see their survival as tied to the successof the army as a whole.

PART III DEFENSIVE WARFARE8 PICK YOUR BATTLES CAREFULLY: THE

PERFECT-ECONOMY STRATEGYWe all have limitations — our energies and skills will

take us only so far. You must know your limits andpick your battles carefully. Consider the hiddencosts of a war: time lost, political goodwillsquandered, an embittered enemy bent onrevenge. Sometimes it is better to wait, toundermine your enemies covertly rather than hittingthem straight on.

9 TURN THE TABLES: THE COUNTERATTACKSTRATEGY

Moving first — initiating the attack — will often put youat a disadvantage: You are exposing your strategyand limiting your options. Instead, discover thepower of holding back and letting the other sidemove first, giving you the flexibility to counterattackfrom any angle. If your opponents are aggressive,bait them into a rash attack that will leave them in aweak position.

10 CREATE A THREATENING PRESENCE:DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

The best way to fight off aggressors is to keep themfrom attacking you in the first place. Build up areputation: You’re a little crazy. Fighting you is notworth it. Uncertainty is sometimes better than overtthreat: If your opponents are never sure whatmessing with you will cost, they will not want to findout.

11 TRADE SPACE FOR TIME: THENONENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

Retreat in the face of a strong enemy is a sign not ofweakness but of strength. By resisting thetemptation to respond to an aggressor, you buyyourself valuable time — time to recover, to think,to gain perspective. Sometimes you canaccomplish most by doing nothing.

PART IV OFFENSIVE WARFARE12 LOSE BATTLES BUT WIN THE WAR: GRAND

STRATEGYGrand strategy is the art of looking beyond the battle

and calculating ahead. It requires that you focus onyour ultimate goal and plot to reach it. Let othersget caught up in the twists and turns of the battle,relishing their little victories. Grand strategy willbring you the ultimate reward: the last laugh.

13 KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE INTELLIGENCESTRATEGY

The target of your strategies should be less the armyyou face than the mind of the man or woman whoruns it. If you understand how that mind works, youhave the key to deceiving and controlling it. Trainyourself to read people, picking up the signals they

unconsciously send about their innermost thoughtsand intentions.

14 OVERWHELM RESISTANCE WITH SPEEDAND SUDDENNESS: THE BLITZKRIEGSTRATEGY

In a world in which many people are indecisive andoverly cautious, the use of speed will bring youuntold power. Striking first, before your opponentshave time to think or prepare, will make thememotional, unbalanced, and prone to error.

15 CONTROL THE DYNAMIC: FORCINGSTRATEGIES

People are constantly struggling to control you. Theonly way to get the upper hand is to make your playfor control more intelligent and insidious. Instead oftrying to dominate the other side’s every move,work to define the nature of the relationship itself.Maneuver to control your opponents’ minds,pushing their emotional buttons and compellingthem to make mistakes.

16 HIT THEM WHERE IT HURTS: THE CENTER-OF-GRAVITY STRATEGY

Everyone has a source of power on which he or shedepends. When you look at your rivals, searchbelow the surface for that source, the center ofgravity that holds the entire structure together.Hitting them there will inflict disproportionate pain.Find what the other side most cherishes andprotects — that is where you must strike.

17 DEFEAT THEM IN DETAIL: THE DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER STRATEGY

Never be intimidated by your enemy’s appearance.Instead, look at the parts that make up the whole.By separating the parts, sowing dissension anddivision, you can bring down even the mostformidable foe. When you are facing troubles orenemies, turn a large problem into small, eminentlydefeatable parts.

18 EXPOSE AND ATTACK YOUR OPPONENT’SSOFT FLANK: THE TURNING STRATEGY

When you attack people directly, you stiffen theirresistance and make your task that much harder.There is a better way: Distract your opponents’attention to the front, then attack them from theside, where they least expect it. Bait people intogoing out on a limb, exposing their weakness, thenrake them with fire from the side.

19 ENVELOP THE ENEMY: THE ANNIHILATIONSTRATEGY

People will use any kind of gap in your defenses toattack you. So offer no gaps. The secret is toenvelop your opponents — create relentlesspressure on them from all sides and close off theiraccess to the outside world. As you sense theirweakening resolve, crush their willpower bytightening the noose.

20 MANEUVER THEM INTO WEAKNESS: THERIPENING-FOR-THE-SICKLE STRATEGY

No matter how strong you are, fighting endless battleswith people is exhausting, costly, andunimaginative. Wise strategists prefer the art ofmaneuver: Before the battle even begins, they find

ways to put their opponents in positions of suchweakness that victory is easy and quick. Createdilemmas: Devise maneuvers that give them achoice of ways to respond-all of them bad.

21 NEGOTIATE WHILE ADVANCING: THEDIPLOMATIC-WAR STRATEGY

Before and during negotiations, you must keepadvancing, creating relentless pressure andcompelling the other side to settle on your terms.The more you take, the more you can give back inmeaningless concessions. Create a reputation forbeing tough and uncompromising, so that peopleare back on their heels before they even meet you.

22 KNOW HOW TO END THINGS: THE EXITSTRATEGY

You are judged in this world by how well you bringthings to an end. A messy or incomplete conclusioncan reverberate for years to come. The art ofending things well is knowing when to stop. Theheight of strategic wisdom is to avoid all conflictsand entanglements from which there are norealistic exits.

PART V UNCONVENTIONAL (DIRTY) WARFARE23 WEAVE A SEAMLESS BLEND OF FACT AND

FICTION: MISPERCEPTION STRATEGIESSince no creature can survive without the ability to

see or sense what is going on around it, make ithard for your enemies to know what is going onaround them, including what you are doing. Feedtheir expectations, manufacture a reality to matchtheir desires, and they will fool themselves. Control

people’s perceptions of reality and you controlthem.

24 TAKE THE LINE OF LEAST EXPECTATION:THE ORDINARY-EXTRAORDINARY STRATEGY

People expect your behavior to conform to knownpatterns and conventions. Your task as a strategistis to upset their expectations. First do somethingordinary and conventional to fix their image of you,then hit them with the extraordinary. The terror isgreater for being so sudden. Sometimes theordinary is extraordinary because it is unexpected.

25 OCCUPY THE MORAL HIGH GROUND: THERIGHTEOUS STRATEGY

In a political world, the cause you are fighting for mustseem more just than the enemy’s. By questioningyour opponents’ motives and making them appearevil, you can narrow their base of support and roomto maneuver. When you yourself come under moralattack from a clever enemy, do not whine or getangry; fight fire with fire.

26 DENY THEM TARGETS: THE STRATEGY OFTHE VOID

The feeling of emptiness or void — silence, isolation,nonengagement with others — is for most peopleintolerable. Give your enemies no target to attack,be dangerous but elusive, then watch as theychase you into the void. Instead of frontal battles,deliver irritating but damaging side attacks andpinprick bites.

27 SEEM TO WORK FOR THE INTERESTS OFOTHERS WHILE FURTHERING YOUR OWN: THE

ALLIANCE STRATEGYThe best way to advance your cause with the

minimum of effort and bloodshed is to create aconstantly shifting network of alliances, gettingothers to compensate for your deficiencies, do yourdirty work, fight your wars. At the same time, youmust work to sow dissension in the alliances ofothers, weakening your enemies by isolating them.

28 GIVE YOUR RIVALS ENOUGH ROPE TO HANGTHEMSELVES: THE ONE-UPMANSHIPSTRATEGY

Life’s greatest dangers often come not from externalenemies but from our supposed colleagues andfriends who pretend to work for the common causewhile scheming to sabotage us. Work to instilldoubts and insecurities in such rivals, getting themto think too much and act defensively. Make themhang themselves through their own self-destructivetendencies, leaving you blameless and clean.

29 TAKE SMALL BITES: THE FAIT ACCOMPLISTRATEGY

Overt power grabs and sharp rises to the top aredangerous, creating envy, distrust, and suspicion.Often the best solution is to take small bites,swallow little territories, playing upon people’srelatively short attention spans. Before peoplerealize it, you have accumulated an empire.

30 PENETRATE THEIR MINDS: COMMUNICATIONSTRATEGIES

Communication is a kind of war, its field of battle theresistant and defensive minds of the people you

want to influence. The goal is to penetrate theirdefenses and occupy their minds. Learn to infiltrateyour ideas behind enemy lines, sending messagesthrough little details, luring people into coming tothe conclusions you desire and into thinking they’vegotten there by themselves.

31 DESTROY FROM WITHIN: THE INNER-FRONTSTRATEGY

By infiltrating your opponents’ ranks, working fromwithin to bring them down, you give them nothing tosee or react against — the ultimate advantage. Totake something you want, do not fight those whohave it, but rather join them — then either slowlymake it your own or wait for the moment to stage acoup d’état.

32 DOMINATE WHILE SEEMING TO SUBMIT: THEPASSIVE-AGGRESSION STRATEGY

In a world where political considerations areparamount, the most effective form of aggressionis the best hidden one: aggression behind acompliant, even loving exterior. To follow thepassive-aggression strategy you must seem to goalong with people, offering no resistance. Butactually you dominate the situation. Just make sureyou have disguised your aggression enough thatyou can deny it exists.

33 SOW UNCERTAINTY AND PANIC THROUGHACTS OF TERROR: THE CHAIN-REACTIONSTRATEGY

Terror is the ultimate way to paralyze a people’s will toresist and destroy their ability to plan a strategic

response. The goal in a terror campaign is notbattlefield victory but causing maximum chaos andprovoking the other side into desperateoverreaction. To plot the most effectivecounterstrategy, victims of terror must staybalanced. One’s rationality is the last line ofdefense.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHYINDEX