Cold War Strategies

Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation

What Never Changed

Goals:

1. Containment of USSR

2. Avoiding Nuclear War

The Dilemma: How do you contain the USSR without risking a nuclear war?

What Did ChangeStrategies1.Intervention (Korea and Vietnam)

– Containment by direct political-military involvement

2.Engagement (Détente)– Containment by management of Soviet

behavior

3.Confrontation (Reagan Doctrine)– Containment by challenging the Soviets

The Dynamic• Intervention was the logic of

containment in action

• Was engagement the result of the failures of intervention?

• Was confrontation the result of the failures of engagement?

1. Intervention1. Intervention

How do you fight communism and avoid nuclear war?

Korean War 1950-53Korean War 1950-53

• Limited WarLimited War– GoalsGoals

– WeaponsWeapons

– GeographyGeography

– Talk and FightTalk and Fight

Viet Nam (after 1954)Viet Nam (after 1954)

Strategic LogicStrategic Logic

Domino TheoryDomino Theory

Containment and Domestic Containment and Domestic PoliticsPolitics

JFKJFK LBJLBJ

The Dilemma of Viet NamThe Dilemma of Viet Nam

• Can’t lose South Viet NamCan’t lose South Viet Nam

• Can’t do what we need to winCan’t do what we need to win– Insurgency vs. counterinsurgencyInsurgency vs. counterinsurgency– WW III?WW III?

• SolutionSolution– Limited WarLimited War– Coercive Diplomacy (Bombing)Coercive Diplomacy (Bombing)

From LBJ to Nixon 1968-69From LBJ to Nixon 1968-69

LBJ says LBJ says Goodbye Nixon’s WarNixon’s War• More bombingMore bombing• WithdrawingWithdrawing

Post-Vietnam Changes

1. Congressional Power

2. Foreign Policy Consensus

3. Vietnam Syndrome

1. Congress Challenges 1. Congress Challenges President in Foreign PolicyPresident in Foreign Policy

• War Powers Resolution 1973 (PL 93-War Powers Resolution 1973 (PL 93-148) (from Federation of American 148) (from Federation of American Scientists , see Appendix 3)Scientists , see Appendix 3)

• The Use of ForceThe Use of Force

Congress finds its real power: $$Congress finds its real power: $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

• Clark Amendment Clark Amendment

to Arms Export to Arms Export

Control Act 1976Control Act 1976

2. End of US Foreign Policy 2. End of US Foreign Policy Consensus?Consensus?

Truman Doctrine: ConsensusTruman Doctrine: Consensus

LL R R

Post-Viet Nam: PolarizationPost-Viet Nam: Polarization

3. Viet Nam Syndrome3. Viet Nam Syndrome

http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/PublicOpinionVietWar.htmhttp://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/PublicOpinionVietWar.htm

2. Engagement The Post-Vietnam Dilemma

How do you

• contain and compete with the USSR while

• avoiding nuclear war and

• avoiding another Korea or Vietnam?

Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 1962

Nixon and Henry KissingerNixon and Henry Kissinger

Why Détente?Why Détente?

• Viet Nam SyndromeViet Nam Syndrome

• Strategic parityStrategic parity

• Sino-Soviet SplitSino-Soviet Split

Viet Nam SyndromeViet Nam Syndrome

Nixon recognizes this:Nixon recognizes this:

• Nixon Doctrine Nixon Doctrine – Remarks July 25, 1969 (see Q and A)(see Q and A)– Address to the nation, Nov. 3, 1969Address to the nation, Nov. 3, 1969

Strategic Parity

Sino-Soviet Conflict

DetenteDetente

1.1. Still containmentStill containment

2.2. New Goal: Change USSR New Goal: Change USSR behaviorbehavior

3.3. Old-school Balance of PowerOld-school Balance of Power

1.1. Arms Control PolicyArms Control PolicyStrategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 1972Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 1972• Interim Agreement on Offensive ArmsInterim Agreement on Offensive Arms• Anti-Ballistic Missile TreatyAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

2. Triangular Diplomacy2. Triangular Diplomacy

USUS

USSRUSSR PRCPRC

Kissinger to China, July 1971Kissinger to China, July 1971

Nixon-Mao Summit in China, Nixon-Mao Summit in China, February 1972February 1972

Shanghai CommuniqueShanghai Communique

China and TaiwanChina and Taiwan

Détente Collapses:Ford and Carter

SALT IISALT II

1979-1981 Crises

Détente Collapse

• Iran

• Afghanistan

Iranian RevolutionIranian Revolution

Shah of IranShah of Iran

Mohammed Reza PahleviMohammed Reza Pahlevi

Ayatollah Ruhollah Ayatollah Ruhollah KhomeiniKhomeini

November 4, 1979November 4, 1979

December 1979

““Arc of Crisis”Arc of Crisis”

Détente EndsDétente Ends

• Carter Gets ToughCarter Gets Tough

• SALT II DiesSALT II Dies

• Defense BuildupDefense Buildup

• Carter DoctrineCarter Doctrine

• Rescue MissionRescue Mission– Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resignsSecretary of State Cyrus Vance resigns

Rescue Mission April 1980Rescue Mission April 1980

3. Confrontation

The dilemma of

• containing the USSR,

• avoiding nuclear war,

• avoiding direct US intervention,

• but pressuring the USSR

Ronald Reagan

Reagan’s View of the USSR

“Evil Empire”

Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals

March 10, 1983

Realist Secretaries of State

Alexander Haig

1981-1982

George Shultz

1982-1989

The Problems

1. Third Wave of Marxism

2. Viet Nam Syndrome

3. Decade of Neglect

1. Third Wave of MarxismEthiopia 1974

Cambodia 1975

Vietnam 1975

Angola 1975

Mozambique 1975

Afghanistan 1979

Nicaragua 1979

Grenada 1979

Solution to Third Wave: Reagan Doctrine

NicaraguaContras

Contras

Afghanistan

Mujahadin

Angola• UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi

1980s Map of the Cold Warhttp://imgur.com/Ah9tS

2. Viet Nam Syndrome• Fall of Saigon, April 29, 1975

Solution to Viet Nam Syndrome: Use Force

• Libya 1981

Grenada 1983

Beirut 1983

3. Decade of Neglect

From: ARMING AMERICA: Attention and Inertia in U.S. National Security Spending http://dept.lamar.edu/polisci/TRUE/True_art_tlp.html

Soviet ICBMs 1980s-90s

• From, US Dept of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987: http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_87_ch2.htm

Solution to Decade of Neglect

• Source: Center for Defense Information 2004 Yearbook (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~jephrean/classweb/United%20States.html)

Strategic Defense InitiativeReagan’s SDI speech, March 23, 1983

From: http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/spacecom/sdi.gif

Political/Cultural Effects

When Reagan and Congress Disagree?

• Nicaragua: Boland Amendment restricts aid to Contras (1984)– Administration funds them covertly

• Iran: Legislation prohibiting US arms sales to Iran– Sells weapons to Iran in exchange for

hostages held by Hezbollah-related groups

Big Picture Issue

• Congress has the power to restrict US government spending– Can the President ignore those restrictions?– Can President ignore aspects of law President

does not agree with?– If so, does Congress have any role to shape

foreign policy?– If so, do we have checks and balances?

The Iran Contra Scandal(for reference only)

Private US $Foreign Gov’t $

$$$

Hostages

weapons

weapons

Swiss bank accounts;controlled by North

Contras

Israel

Iran

US

Key Phrase of 2nd Boland Amendment: (1984-1986)

( for reference only)

• ''No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.”

From: NY TIMES on line: http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/16/world/iran-contra-hearings-text-of-key-amendment.html?pagewanted=1; For Excerpts and explanation, from US Government Accountability Office – GAO, http://redbook.gao.gov/14/fl0067296.php

Legislative Limits on Arms Sales(for reference only)

Arms Export Control Acts• No arms sales to nations determined to be

sponsors of terrorism (US State Dept determines which nations fit into this category; it included Iran)

• No arms sales of over $25 m in value without congressional approval (1974); A 1976 bill lowered this to $14 m for sophisticated weaponry and $50 m for other items– Both the House and Senate would have to reject

the arms sales