tension between the islamic middle east and the...

Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.9, No. 2, 2015

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Africa or Morocco? A Historical

Perspective on the Resolution of the

Contrived Stalemate over the Western

Sahara Decolonization Process

Emmanuel Nwafor MORDI①

（Department of History & International Studies,

Delta State University, Nigeria）

Abstract: The stalemated decolonization process in Africa’s last

colony, Western Sahara, was investigated in its historical context.

Deploying the critical-analytic methodology of contemporary history

and examining available sources on the subject, the paper posits the

Saharawi right to self-determination and independence, within the

framework of the UN Charter as a non-self-governing territory which

is not in dispute. It concludes that the stalemate is Morocco’s

contrivance to further its dream of a “Greater Morocco”, and that the

reactivation of Saharawi armed struggle, complemented with

diplomatic efforts under the strategic leadership of the African Union,

would present the United Nations with a choice between Africa and

Morocco, and reinvest the world body with the political will for its

early resolution.

① Dr. Emmanuel Nwafor MORDI, Department of History & International Studies, Delta State University, Nigeria. This is a revised version of paper presented at the International Conference on the Decolonization of Western Sahara on the Theme “Towards the Liberation of the Last Colony in Africa” organized by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), held at the Shehu Musa Yar’ Adua Conference Centre, Abuja, June 2-4, 2015.

Africa or Morocco? A Historical Perspective on the Resolution of the Contrived Stalemate

over the Western Sahara Decolonization Process

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Key Words: Decolonization Process; Greater Morocco Strategy;

Diplomatic Solidarity; Contemporary History; African Nationalism;

Maghreb Studies

I. Introduction

It has been three decades after its admission into the full

membership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the

African Union which also made its president one of the continental

body’s eight vice presidents in the Saharawi Arab Democratic

Republic (SADR), since 1984, remains a nation in search of statehood.

It thus finds itself in the paradox of an independent country which

continues to bear the unenviable appellation of Africa’s last colony.

Western Sahara was the Spanish colonial territory of Spanish West

Africa, later known as Spanish Sahara which was gravely neglected.

For many of the colonial periods, from 1884 to the 1960s, it was “not

under the de facto control of the Spanish administration”. Nor was it

controlled by Morocco. The evidence shows that the Saharawi,

bellicose people who fiercely defended their independence, earned the

respect of their Spanish colonizers as “a minefield of explosive people,

distrustful and ready to fight” (Martin, S., 2010:24-29).This readiness

to fight for their independence was brought to bear in 1976, after

Morocco, capitalizing on the weakness of the Spanish colonial power,

occupied the Saharawi territory and annexed it. The Saharawi

proclaimed an independent Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic

(SADR), led by a government-in-exile. The formation of a

government-in-exile in 1976 was a signal that the Saharawi had

crossed the Rubicon in their struggle, and that SADR could only

materialize as the homeland of the “refugee nation” whose leaders,

recognizing the transient nature of their current status have sought to

transform camp life in Tindouf, Algeria into a symbol of the Saharawi

state and of their capacity to manage their affairs independently.


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So much has been written on the Western Sahara conflict, yet, the

impasse over the conduct of the UN sanctioned referendum on the

self-determination of the territory which has been the major

preoccupation of the world body since 1992, remains an albatross.

Indeed, opinions are divided on the interpretation of the conflict and

the most viable and enduring approach to its resolution. For instance,

Darbouche sees what appeared to be some movements around the

‘frozen’ conflict in Western Sahara early in 2007 (Darbouche, H., 2007:

I), while Zoubir insists that the reality of the conflict is that “it now

belongs to the category of ‘forgotten’ or ‘frozen’ conflicts” (Zoubir, Y.,

2010: 85). Such categorizations, however, tend to ignore or at best

down play the continued exertions of the thousands of ethnic

Saharawi through sustained defiance campaigns against Moroccan

occupation, termed an intifada or ‘shaking off,’ which climaxed in 2005.

Stephen and Mundy are of the view that such “desert uprising

represents a dramatic turning point in the Saharawi people’s struggle

for national self-determination”, being “a new asymmetric resistance

strategy between talking and killing has refocused international

attention on a conflict that has destabilized this important

geo-strategic region for three decades” (Stephen, M. & Mundy, J., 2006:

1-2). Thus Mordi suggests that the conflict is better appreciated in the

context of the principle of Saharawi struggle for national

self-determination which guarantees the subject people the liberty to

“freely decide where they want to belong via a referendum organized

by the United Nations” (Mordi, E., 2015: 10), even though the principle

does not explain why the issue remains unresolved. Daadaoui,

therefore, posits that “the self-determination theory and practice are

unable to account for the intricate nature of the conflict” because they

deemphasize the colonial legacy, as well as the issue of the identity of

the indigenous Western Saharawi. What is suggested, then, is a

rethink “of the prevalent UN’s views on identity and indigenousness

apart from its rigid legalistic and positivist framework”. The paper

highlights that “Morocco has historical claims to the territory”, and



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its attempt to deconstruct the structure and reality of SADR, and

question the Saharawi right to self-determination on the grounds that

“it legitimizes colonial structures that were imposed in the first place”,

making it an apologia for Moroccan intransigence. This is especially

true, given its spurious assertion that Saharawi identity dates only to

1975, “when Morocco annexed the territory”. An identity which

further spuriously claimed is difficult to determine with accuracy, as it

“has been shaped and influenced by its interaction with the more

urban and less nomadic Moroccan society since 1975”(Daadaoui, M.,

2008: 143-44, 152-54).

On this part, Epstein emphasizes the “unresolved situation” of the

complexity surrounding the issue of the legal status of the Western

Sahara, the Saharawi right to self-determination and the “legitimate

expansion to include human rights and national resource protection”.

This could give rise to the failure of the UN to implement a free and

fair referendum to resolve the stalemate over the Saharawi conflict,

which would have crippled “the credibility of the current international

legal system and the UN’s role within it” (Epstein, P., 2009: 108).

However, reducing the fundamental issue of the Saharawi

independence aspiration to a mere legality and credibility contest

trivializes a life and death struggle that has lingered and defied the

world for over four decades. Indeed, as Theofilopoulou aptly notes,

the Saharawi continued reference to legality does not advance its

cause because “If the issue were to be resolved based on legal

arguments, this would have happened” (Theofilopoulou, A., 2013: 5).

Given this background, it is clearly a historical appreciation of the

issues that have stalled the UN’s exercise of its simple mandate to

conduct a mere referendum for less than half a million people,

occupying a territory of 266,000 square kilometers, the size of New

Zealand, or three-fifths the area of Sweden (Leite, P., 2006: 12), which

holds the key to a resolution of the Western Sahara impasse. This

paper, therefore, sets out to examine the issues in their historical

context, by deploying the critical-analytic method of contemporary


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history to interrogate the available, relevant sources on the subject and

to point the way out of the quagmire. It argues that the conflict has

been resolved up to the point of identifying the conduct of a

referendum for the identified Saharawi, based on the UN’

decolonization principle of self-determination as a result of the cease

fire approved by the world body in 1991.

The issue of referendum was facilitated by the ruling of the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975, which acknowledged

historic connections between Morocco and the Western Sahara, but

dismissed Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the territory as

untenable. Although the ICJ’s advisory opinion had been given at the

instance of Morocco which had sought its adjudication on the matter,

and did not reject the ruling, the Kingdom of Morocco in defiance of

the ruling invaded the territory in 1975, with 350,000 Moroccans. It

subsequently consolidated its occupation through the construction of

a 2,700 kilometer warfare wall, guarded by over 120,000 soldiers,

maintained at huge costs of about $1million per day (Campbell, P.,

2003:47-50; Mordi, E., 2015), thereby taking physical possession of

two-thirds of Western Sahara. Thus Morocco’s refusal of the matter

to the ICJ was a ploy to buy time to stall the half-hearted move of

Spain, the colonial power to grant independence to the Saharawi

people, who in 1973, had formally embarked on their struggle for

independence. The Saharawi launched their national liberation war,

and made giant strides until the UN effected a cease –fire between the

two warring parties, in order to facilitate the organization of a

mutually agreed referendum which would advance the

non-self-governing territory on its way to self-determination and

independence (Mordi, E., 2015). The efforts to resolve the issue must,

therefore, focus mainly on the MINURSO mandate and dismantling

the impediments to the discharge of that mandate, if the UN is to

remain a credible, relevant and viable world body with respect to

decolonization, of which it is provided with a rich tradition.



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II. Issues in the Deadlocked Referendum on the Saharawi

Self-Determination

At the core of the deadlock over the issue of self-determination for

the existing Saharawi state, which has already been a member of the

African Union for over 30 years, is the UN’s abandonment of its

responsibility to organize an overdue referendum through its Mission

for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara

(MINURSO). It can be conceived that two unequally endowed

brothers are at each other’s throat, who mutually refer to their

powerful father for resolution in line with his own laid down

procedure, in which their dispute over a parcel of land flowing

literally with milk and honey, abandoned in a disorderly manner by a

fleeing former owner that refused to hand it over to the legally

acclaimed rightful owner. That would have the matter referred back to

them with a plea to provide him with the framework of its amicable

resolution. To be sure, when the UN in April 1991, resolved to set up

MINURSO to conduct a referendum mutually agreed by Morocco and

SADR, there was no provision that both parties should, in turn, begin

to guide MINURSO on the exercise of its clearly defined mandate, or

that the UN should submit its instrument to the interpretation of the

two parties.

On August 30, 1988, both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente

Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamray de Rio de Oro

(POLISARIO) mutually in principle agreed on the proposals for the

OAU-UNO organized referendum for self-determination of the people

of Western Sahara, to allow them to choose either independence or

integration with Morocco. The plan had proposed by MINURSO,

containing that civilians, police and the military were assigned tasks

that would culminate in the referendum; a ceasefire, and a subsequent

exchange of prisoners of war (POWS), reduction of Moroccan military

presence in the territory, and restriction of the combatants of both

parties to designated areas in the territory. These were to be followed


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by the proclamation of amnesty and by the release of POLISARIO

political prisoners from Morocco, as well as suspension of all laws and

regulations which could impede the conduct of a free and fair

referendum. A general amnesty and release of all refugees, including

those outside the territory wishing to return after the UN had

established their right to vote, were to follow. The UN Secretary

General was proposed also to appoint his special representative,

empowered to exercise sole and exclusive authority on all issues

related to the conduct of the referendum, including MINURSO. The

UN was shared the responsibility for the maintenance of law and

order by the settlement plan which also stipulated that the cooperation

of the two parties and their neighbors was fundamental for

MINURSO’s impartial, effective and successful execution of its

mandate. These proposals which were based on earlier OAU

proposals became effective on April 29, 1991, when the UN Security

Council approved them. UN Secretary General appreciated his pivotal

role in the onerous responsibility and affirmed that “The two parties,

namely the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO,shall

recognize in the settlement proposals that sole and exclusive

responsibility is for the organization and conduct of the referendum is

vested in the United Nations” (Security Council, 1991: 4, par.9).

In effect, the UN was expected to be guided by its own timelines

of 20-26 weeks within which was to conclude and proclaim the result

of the referendum. MINURSO was established with the approval of

the settlement plan, but any optimism that its prompt establishment

signaled the UN’s intention to speedily concluded that the SADR case

turned out to be misplaced. It took the world body 68 weeks from

April 29, 1990 to September 6, 1991 to achieve a ceasefire between the

warring parties, followed by the resignation of Johannes Manz, the

UN Special Envoy, who mandated to lead MINURSO to conduct the

approved referendum. The Secretary General capped it all by

proposing the postponement of the referendum. As it is well known,

whereas the population to participate in the referendum had ab initio



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been agreed to be those who captured in the 1974 election conducted

by the departing colonial power, the UN decided, on the insistence of

its Secretary General, to change the eligibility criteria, ostensibly to

extend voting rights to refugees who had fled from the denials

imposed by colonial domination. It had proposed to delete the names

of the dead and to include those whose names were omitted from the

1974 census, a tall order indeed. Nothing that was done subsequently

to insert names, including that applicants previously rejected by the

Identification Commission could be acceptable to the Kingdom of

Morocco, which, in April 2007, rejected independence as a possible

outcome of self-determination for the Saharawi, instead, sought to

impose its own decision of integration of the Saharawi into an

“autonomous region” within Morocco whose indivisibility and

sovereignty were non-negotiable (Mordi, E., 2015).

The evidence suggests that autonomy as a solution to disputes

involving minority groups and indigenous peoples is not new, and

has been adopted worldwide since 1900s but with limited success,

either as a temporary or permanent solution to decolonization cases.

In Africa, autonomy as a solution to self-determination cases has been

an unmitigated failure in Eritrea, and South Sudan, for instance, which

forcibly broke out of autocratic states into which it was forcibly

integrated. In effect, as in the Saharawi case with Morocco, “autonomy

in autocracy” is unworkable. The autocracy of the Moroccan

monarchy cannot provide a fertile ground on which Saharawi

autonomy can sprout and grow. Indeed, successful autonomy

arrangements are dependent on democracy both within the

autonomous region and the state in which it is located that grants

autonomy (Khakee, A., 2011:2-3). There is no evidence, despite its new

constitution of 2011, that Morocco is inclined to resolve the Western

Sahara conflict by democratic means (Theofilopoulou, A., 2012).The

admission of the new Moroccan King, Muhammad VI in 2000 that

“Morocco has a lot to do in terms of democracy” (Campbell, P.,

2003:48), mirrors the difficulty of the democratic culture emerging and


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taking root in a society steeped in monarchical culture and tradition.

Morocco’s opposition to a referendum for the Saharawi is a reflection

of its deeply rooted anti-democratic culture, which saw opposition to

monarchical rule brutally suppressed between 1972 and 1999, through

arrests, kidnapping, disappearance, torture and murder of opponents

of the king (Campbell, P., 2003:41). Rather than rebuke Morocco for

frustrating the organization of the referendum, the UN surrendered its

mandate as it sought to pamper the kingdom, calling on both parties

to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions, so as to

guarantee a mutually acceptable political solution, with

self-determination for the Saharawi as its outcome. In fact, the

Kingdom of Morocco further rejected referendum as a means of

achieving self-determination for the Saharawi. How did the UN expect

two unequal powers pursuing mutually exclusive goals of territorial

aggrandizement on one hand, and independence on the other to arrive

at a mutually acceptable settlement through direct negotiations in

which the world body initially assigned that responsibility would play

the role of a biased spectator?

The answer is clear. By political solution the UN was engaging in

a double-speak of accepting the Moroccan position that Western

Sahara was an integral part of a “Greater Morocco”. As the

International Crisis Group (2007) aptly observed, the UN tacitly

abandoned its earlier position based on the principle of

self-determination, but by showing the ability to arbitrate in the

dispute, it merely encouraged the two parties to look up to it as if

having a favor to dispense in the final determination of the issue. The

tendency manifested early at the beginning of UN’s involvement with

the organization of a referendum in Western Sahara in the form of

confusion, delays, and resignation of the UN Secretary General’s

Personal Envoy who was saddled with the responsibility of ensuring

its success. This pattern was followed by successive personal envoys,

who demonstrated an inclination towards upholding Morocco’s view

of the conflict, and the strategy for resolving it, against the



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actualization of Saharawi independent statehood. In fact, officers and

institutions charged with the onerous task of assisting to midwife the

Saharawi state succumbed to Morocco’s blockages, and thereby

“created a pattern that the Secretariat was unwilling or unable to

break” (Theofilopoulou, A., 2013:2). This was a clear demonstration of

the failure of political will on the part of the world body, which

continued to prove impotent in the face of Moroccan government’s

blatant refusal to cooperate with the process of the UN approved

referendum. The failure of the Security Council to “impose its binding

arbitration at Morocco’s expense” undermined MINURSO and its

capacity to conduct any referendum (Theofilopoulou, A., 2013: 5). The

world body and its involvement in the Western Sahara have thus

become discredited.

The question that readily comes to mind is, why the UN Security

Council is so incapacitated to implement its plans on Western Sahara,

and why Morocco so bent on holding on to the territory and

apparently had its way? The reasons are not far-fetched. Firstly, as the

Urhobo of Nigeria would say, when a juju, or traditional guardian

deity loses its potency, its votaries serve it with ordinary water.

Similarly, the POLISARIO Front seems to have lost its fire power, and

is waiting on the world to grant it independence on a platter of

political solution. Conversely, Morocco feels that it has won the war

and has no need to negotiate any political solution that does not

confirm the political reality on ground of a defeated POLISARIO and

the incorporation of the SADR into its Saharan Provinces. As James

Baker puts it:

This is a really low intensity, and low-level dispute. Look, there’s no

enforcement action on the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco has won the

war. She’s in possession. Why should she agree to anything? And so she

is disinclined to do so. Nevertheless, there’s one very good reason why she

should, because she will never receive the imprimatur of international

legitimacy for her occupation of the territory unless she works out some

arrangements that are blessed by the Security Council, or acceptable to


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the other party. That’s why we work so hard on the idea of an initial

autonomy arrangement with self-government and then a referendum at

the end of the test, which is the requirement of the Security Council for

self- determination (Mordi, E., 2015: 9).

In fact, the Security Council is focused on making Morocco

autonomous for the Saharawi and their eventual incorporation into a

“Greater Morocco” acceptable to the POLISARIO.

Secondly, major powers, either as permanent members of the UN

Security Council or on the world stage, could have played decisive

roles in bringing about the resolution of the conflict in favor of the

established tradition which could further enhance the credibility of the

UN and peaceful resolution of conflicts but have strangely lost their

nerves to do so. Boukhars suggests that such powers, including the

United States and most “Western governments, fear the possibility of

another weak state, almost the size of Britain, appearing in an area

already afflicted by many fragile or failing states”. Therefore, “they

wish that the disputed territory remains in Moroccan” (Boukhars, A.,

2013: 1). Given the volatility of the region and its proximity to

southern Europe, they would seem to be comfortable with

coordinating ceasefire in the Western Sahara rather than provoke

Morocco and risk the outbreak of renewed fighting, or face the

prospects of independence for the SADR which has no major military

capability to ensure security, even within its borders (Theofilopoulou,

A., 2006). This position has become the trump card of the Kingdom of

Morocco whose officials seize every opportunity to trumpet for all to

hear that “There is no room for a failed state in the region”, which

“will fall into the hands of extremists” (Morris, L., 2013:2). The claim

should, therefore, be taken with a pinch of salt. On the contrary, it is

Morocco that needs to cling to its hold on Western Sahara to ensure its

stability, the absence of which can turn into a failed state that would

compromise the stability of Northwest Africa.

Thirdly, economic interests are also a major contributory factor in

the impasse over the Western Sahara crisis. In fact, the prospects of



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benefits from the rich phosphate and fishery resources of the Western

Sahara, including recent prospects of oil exploitation, have always in

line with Spanish, French, Moroccan, and even Russian interests in the

territory (Mordi, E., 2015), and hold an attraction to other European

Union States which are anxious to have their fishing activities off the

coast of Western Sahara legalized (Ghettas, G., 2010). In particular,

Morocco is focused on its control of a major chunk of the phosphate

mines of the Western Sahara not only to boost its income, but also to

place it in an advantage position to determine the global price of the

world’s largest reserves of phosphate over which it has about 40% of

exports in the world (Eiran, E., 2008: 23).There is evidence too, that the

Moroccan King Mohammed VI, as well as some well placed Moroccan

conglomerates and French multinationals own giant agribusinesses in

the occupied areas of Western Sahara which produce tomatoes,

unethically labeled product of Morocco , and sell them in Britain by

Tesco and Morrisons, thriving supermarkets. Morocco thus

unethically gains from tax breaks from the tomatoes produced in an

occupied territory (Black, I., 2015:1).Wealth from these sources boosts

Moroccan intransigence, facilitates the dispensing of royal patronage

to the clients of the monarchy and helps to sustain the patriotic

sentiments of Moroccans over their attachment to the Western Sahara,

termed the goose that lays the golden eggs.

Fourth, there are issues of strategic interests influencing policy

decisions and inclinations of the major powers which hold the

leverage to speedily end the crisis if they choose to pull it. Morocco is

a valuable ally of the United States of America with centuries-old

relationships, dating back to 1787, when the US signed its oldest peace

treaty with the ancient kingdom, which is a major beneficiary of

American aid in Africa and the Arab world. The kingdom sits astride

the Mediterranean Sea, the entrance to Northwest Africa and hosts

transit facilities for US’ rapid deployment force at its air bases in the

region, affording the US Air Force refueling, as well as landing and

over flight privileges. In addition, Morocco which was a US trusted


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ally in the Cold War era and during America’s invasion of Iraq,

continues to enjoy US confidence as a major ally in the latter’s

anti-terrorism war, providing the US with intelligence information on

the activities of Islamists, and helping to facilitate policy in the Middle

East, including ironically the US democratic reform agenda in the

Arab world (Campbell, P., 2003; Mordi, E., 2015). This partly explains

US’ volte- face in its proposal to the Security Council that MINURSO

be empowered to monitor human rights in the Moroccan occupied

Saharawi territory as a protest, when Morocco cancelled a scheduled

joint military exercise between the two countries (Morris, L., 2013).

Fifth, it is an irony and also an explanation of the lingering

impasse that the US should prefer a monarchy which withdrew its

membership of OAU in 1984, and remains, till date, a non member of

the African Union to the larger continental body whose members,

including Nigeria and South Africa, two stabilizing democracies that

support the SADR, a member of the African Union. It was the OAU’s

resolution AHG 104 that had laid the foundation of the current UN

attempts to conduct a peaceful and fair referendum in the Western

Sahara, preconditioned on a ceasefire, direct negotiations and the

prevalence of an enabling environment to bring it about.

Subsequently, the AU has tended to conform to the UN actions

over the Western Sahara, expressing its “support to the UN efforts to

overcome the impasse in the peace process”, including all relevant UN

Security Council resolutions calling for direct negotiations between

the two parties, with the object of “achieving a just, lasting and

mutually acceptable political solution.” The AU adopted the position

that such a course of action had the potential to culminate in “the

self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, in the context of

arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN

Charter” by exercising their right to choose between independence

and their integration into the Kingdom of Morocco. The communiqué

of its Peace and Security Council 496th meeting held in Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia on March 27, 2015, however, showed the continental body’s



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“deep concern” over “the failure to achieve the expected results” in

the process of decolonization in the Western Sahara, “four decades

after the onset of the conflict and 50 years after the decision of

decolonization”. The AU therefore expressed “the urgency of renewed

efforts to overcome the current impasse”. Accordingly, the Council of

the AU, while appealing for coordinated and enhanced international

action towards the early organization of the referendum on the

self-determination of the Sahrawi, urged the UN Security Council “to

make all necessary efforts to ensure progress in the search for a

solution to the conflict”, considering the principles and purposes of

the UN Charter (African Union, 2015:2). Thus rather than follow the

course of its seeming ultimatum to the logical presentation of a clear

option to the Security Council to make a choice between Africa and

the intransigent Morocco, the AU tended to relapse to its diplomatic

ritual of kowtowing. Needless to stress, this ritual has not yielded the

desired result of the Western Saharawi independence since 1984, when

the Kingdom of Morocco withdrew its membership of the continental

body.

When, therefore, the UN Security Council met on April 29, 2015,

it roundly ignored the AU Peace and Security Council communiqué in

its resolution 2218. Instead, it performed the ritual of reaffirming all

failed resolutions on the Western Sahara ,dating back to 2007,

including its worn cliché about “a just, lasting, and mutually

acceptable political solution”, as well as Morocco’s discredited 2007

autonomy proposals, in which resolution 2218 singled out to extol as

“serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward

towards resolution”. Even though the Special Envoy was inactive

during the end of the year , resolution 2218 affirmed full support for

him and “his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties”,

meanwhile, as had become the tradition, renewing the mandate of

MINURSO for one year, ending on April 30, 2016 (Security Council

S/RES/2218; what’s in Blue).


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III. Towards a Historical Resolution of the Stalemate

The impression, and, in fact, the reality of the UN implementation

of its self determination program on Western Sahara is that the

exercise is a charade, programmed to fail, and the stalemate contrived.

Its objective is not conscientiously focused on the decolonization of

Africa’s last colony. The singling out of Moroccan actions, which have

only stalled the steady movement of the Saharawi to their palpably

demonstrated preference for independence and adulation, instead of

condemnation of the world body shutting out the African voice on the

issue, is a clear affirmation of our contention. When the UN Security

Council met on April 30, 2015, the African voice was shut out, even

though the AU Peace and Security Council had requested that the AU

Special Envoy for the Western Sahara, former Mozambican President

Joaquim Chissano who was allowed to address the body on AU’s

position on the current status of the Western Sahara. Such an action

failed to reflect years of efforts and spirit of the strategic partnership

on the conflict between the two bodies which had paved the way for

the self determination process since 1991. It also ignores the urgency of

“an enhanced international engagement”, including a close

partnership between AU-UN to bring about an early resolution of the

issue of independence for the Saharawi, which has been stalemated for

over four decades (African Union PSC/PR/Comm.2 (DIII)).

The current manifestation of the UN is a fair reflection of its

history in the movement of African peoples to independence after the

Second World War. To be sure, the UN General Assembly through its

Resolution 1514(xv) of 1960 provided both the political impetus and

legal justification and canopy for African colonies to intensify their

struggles for independence, at a time when 17 African countries were

independent. The resolution promulgated the “Declaration on the

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”,

proclaiming the entitlement of affected non-self- governing territories

to self-determination and independence (Wikipedia). The evidence



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shows, however, that it was the principle of international

accountability enshrined in chapters XI-XIII of the UN Charter that

imposed certain obligations on the colonial powers. Specifically,

Articles 73 and 74 of chapter XI, or “Declarations Regarding Non-

Self-Governing Territories” charged them “to ensure, with due to

respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political,

economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment,

and their protection against abuses”; as well as “to develop

self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the

peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their

free political institutions...” Colonial authorities did not provide the

political information required of them incidental to the above.

However, by insisting on the periodic provision of such information,

“the UN showed an interest in the building up of national forces that

were ultimately to undermine the basis of colonialism”, even though it

thereby merely provided a favorable environment that accelerated a

decolonization process which had already been set in motion (Aluko,

O., 1974:624-625).

Indeed, the UN Charter and chapters therein, as well as

resolutions cannot guarantee the Saharawi their independent

statehood, and personal wellbeing. As Santos demonstrates with

respect to Portuguese colonies fighting for national liberation, the UN

could not compel Portugal to implement the principle of

self-determination and independence. However, in the face of lack of

cooperation with Portugal, the appropriate UN committee on

decolonization embarked on a valid engagement in the issue, which

put the liberation movements in a favorable position to combine

armed struggle with positive discussion on independence with the

colonial power (Santos, A., 2012: 254-56). The problem with current

handling of the Saharawi self-determination issue is that it vests an

individual, rather than a Security Council committee with the

responsibility. Such individuals, various personal envoys of the UN

Secretary General have been easily pressured to resign, thereby


114

further complicating the issue.

With respect to human rights , it is clear that in spite of Articles 73

and 74 of chapter XI of the UN Charter which predate the Saharawi

conflict, not even the Security Council could take its initiative to

enquire into the socio-economic advancement of over 160,000

Saharawi who live in refugee camps, or under the circumstances of the

human rights abuses suffered by those in the occupied territories,

where they were imprisoned, and tortured by Moroccan authorities

(Abdelaziz, M. & Orback, J., 2010), who also had many others tried

and sentenced to long prison terms by military courts on the basis of

confessions obtained under tortured, disappeared , or extra

judicially murdered (All-Party Parliamentary Group, 2014) . A study

of human rights and decolonization in UN Trust Territories has

recently found that the colonized were fooled into thinking that the

UN watches over the entire world. Activists among the subject

peoples had to invoke human rights as a weapon to de-legitimize

colonial domination, thereby deploying the human rights was a

weapon in their arsenal of liberation strategy. In doing this, however,

they took their cue from the UN Charter, guided by their belief in the

world body “as an arbiter of world affairs” (Terretta, M., 2012:332-33).

Otherwise, the UN’s inability to uphold the legal, moral and ethical

principles enshrined in its guiding documents would breed

widespread disappointment in the world body, and diminish the

importance attached to the human rights weapon in the nationalist

movement. The current tone on human rights abuses is thus a

welcome addition to the strategy of criminalizing and de-legitimizing

Moroccan colonial domination of the Western Sahara, but

empowering MINURSO to monitor human rights abuses in the

occupied territory , even if the body has the will and capacity to

deliver, it cannot bring about the resolution of the conflict. At best, it

will scratch in the surface the effect rather than the cause of the

impasse, and in no way alter fundamentally the underlying dynamics

of the conflict (Soler, R., 2011). The goal of the Saharawi struggle is



115

independence, not human rights in which the Kingdom of Morocco

equally denies its own citizens.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the UN, being an omnibus

body has its own limitations, but it cannot repudiate its principles,

which could guide the decolonization process. The right to

self-determination and independence is inalienable, but it is fought by

the affected group who enlist the support of world opinion, as is

happened in the African case, of the African Union and its members,

collectively and individually. The Kingdom of Morocco enjoys an

advantage in the conflict because it controls 80% of the disputed

territory, and is settling Moroccans inside the territory with the hope

of outnumbering and outflanking the indigenous Saharawi. The

ultimate objective is to weaken the resolve of the Saharawi, and

present their autonomy within a Greater Morocco as a fait accompli.

Saharawi national resistance must therefore be reawakened, militarily

and diplomatically, and the African Union has a pivotal role to play in

the renewed struggle. The Saharawi have history on their side. The

Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union,

while Morocco is not. The Saharawi right to self-determination and

independence is widely recognized, and the two issues in the principle

are better stated pari passu; independence as the goal of the Saharawi

struggle should never be in doubt. Besides, perhaps from France,

nobody recognizes Moroccan pretensions to historic ownership of any

centimeter of Saharawi territory.

At this point, it is necessary to stress that the African Union along

with its member states, which lays the foundation and has been the

sustaining force of Saharawi advance to nationhood, should provide

its traditional leadership and supportive role to break the stalemate,

which has been contrived by Morocco to an early end. Strategic

leadership should take the form of a fundamental, policy position to

offer the UN a choice between the African continent and the Kingdom

of Morocco on an early resolution of the Saharawi question. This is the

logical follow of the communiqué of the 496th meeting of the AU Peace


116

and Security Committee. AU and indeed, other African nations’

support, solid and unequivocal support for the early organization of

the Saharawi referendum will mark a turning point in the resolution

of the stalemate, and if needed to be determined by capacity

supplemented with the activation of the Saharawi military

engagements, It may be pertinent to recall that national liberation

movements in Lusophone countries, as well as southern Africa

benefited from a similar strategy. Mazrui notes that “broader

diplomatic support at the United Nations and in world politics”

achieved the two goals of eroding the legitimacy of white minority

rule and increasing the legitimacy of those engaged in armed struggle

against white rule. It was such demonstration of support and

solidarity that denied the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia of

much needed British support, and dissuaded the United States from

remaining with the status quo in southern Africa. The same show of

solidarity and resolve pressured France to end its arms dealings and

trading with apartheid South Africa provided the UN with the much

needed political will to impose an arms embargo on the apartheid

enclave in 1977 (Mazrui, A., 1981).

IV. Conclusion

The stalemated Western Sahara decolonization process can be

adequately understood and appreciated when examined in its

historical context. It is a case for self-determination and independence

by a non-self-governing territory which the UN Charter recognizes

that will have to be decided by the Saharawi through a free and fair

referendum. The process has already been set in motion by the body

charged with the responsibility. Morocco’s intransigence in defiance of

the ICJ advisory opinion and relevant UN and AU resolutions due to

its illegal annexation of 80% of Saharawi territory is sustained by UN’s

lack of political will and self-centered calculations of the major powers.

The UN Charter and resolutions lack the wherewithal to confer



117

independence with the Saharawi who must resume armed struggle,

supplemented with diplomatic action. With the solidarity and support

of the AU and other African states, in a strategic cooperation to isolate

Morocco, if criminalized and delegitimized its occupation of and

activities in the Western Sahara, the contrived impasse would end.

The independence of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)

which has been in a state of suspended animation would thus be

proclaimed by the UN Organization which could have rediscovered

its political will to act.

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