telling it like it is - the delegitimation of the second palestinian intifada in thomas friedman's...

7/24/2019 Telling It Like It is - The Delegitimation of the Second Palestinian Intifada in Thomas Friedman's Discourse

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2009 20: 5Discourse Society M. Mosheer Amer

Thomas Friedman's discourse`Telling-it-like-it-is': the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada in

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Amer: Telling-it-like-it-is: the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada 5A RT I C L E

Discourse & Society Copyright 2009SAGE Publications

(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi,Singapore and Washington DC)

www.sagepublications.comVol 20(1): 531

10.1177/0957926508097093

Telling-it-like-it-is: the delegitimationof the second Palestinian Intifada inThomas Friedmans discourse

M . M O S H E E R A M E RT H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F M E L B O U R N E, A U S T R A L I A

A B S T R A C T The concept of legitimation is essentially social and political(Martin Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997). That is, what or who is legitimizeddepends to a large extent on who speaks and in what capacity, social statusand role he/she speaks from. Legitimation, in this sense, is linked to power,with which comes the authority to define the situation (Parsons, 1986),and consequently the authority to determine what is right and wrong, andwhat is legitimate and justifiable and what is not. In this paper I examinethe delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada in Thomas Friedmansdiscourse by analysing how the Intifada is discursively constructed in acolumn which Friedman contributed to the op-ed page of the New York Times.I aim to do this by (1) analysing the columns argumentative structure andmoves employed in Friedmans delegitimizing construction of the Intifada,and (2) showing how the legitimation of political actors, includingself-legitimation, is closely linked to Friedmans argumentation. I also reporton the results of a critical discourse analysis of a corpus of Friedmanscolumns which support the analysis findings of the main text.

K E Y W O R D S : argumentation, deictic centre, (de)legitimation, dominant themes,ingroup/outgroup presentation, Israel, NYT, Palestinian Intifada, Thomas Friedman

Human conflict begins and ends via talk and text. We generate, shape, implement,remember and forget violent behavior between individuals, communities or statesthrough a specific discourse. It is discourse that prepares for sacrifice, justifiesinhumanity, absolves from guilt, and demonizes the enemy.

(Nelson, 2003: 449)

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6 Discourse & Society 20(1)

IntroductionOn 29 September 2000, the second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifada) brokeout when then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, escorted by a large securityentourage, staged a right-of-ownership walk-about at what Jews and others

call the Temple Mount, and what Muslims and others refer to as al-Aqsa and theDome of the Rock (Hirst, 2003: 25). The provocative march triggered violentprotests, the result of which was that at least five people died in Jerusalem afterbeing shot by Israeli security forces and more than 200 were wounded afterstones were thrown over the Western Wall after Friday prayers at the al-AqsaMosque (Amnesty International, 2000). Popular Palestinian protests againstthe killings spread to other occupied Palestinian territories and in Arab townsinside Israel proper. Violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli army forcescharacterized the early weeks of the uprising such that between 29 September

2000 and 2 December 2000, according to The Israeli Information Centre forHuman Rights, BTselem (2000: 4):

Israeli security forces killed 204 Palestinian civilians and 24 Palestinian securityforces, and wounded approximately 10,000 Palestinians. At least three Palestinianswere killed by Israeli civilians. Thirteen Israeli civilians and eleven members of theIsraeli security forces have been killed by Palestinian civilians. Five Israeli securityforce personnel were killed by Palestinian security forces.

Then the level of violence grew more deadly with Israeli military attacks andincursions into Palestinian areas on the one hand, and Palestinian attacks against

Israeli military and civilians on the other. The events of this most recent episodeof the PalestinianIsraeli conflict have had serious political reverberations acrossthe Middle East and worldwide to the present day. 1 Predictably, media outlets allover the world devoted much attention to reporting and commenting on thismomentous event.

Discourses of and about war and conflict are profoundly interconnected withlegitimation. This is because discursive acts of legitimation have socio-cognitive,political and ideological functions through which powerful social playersseek to justify, explain or discredit particular social actors and actions. Such

legitimation is often done by virtue of conforming to a system of law, acceptablenorms or a social or moral order (see Chilton, 2004; Habermas, 1975; MartinRojo and Van Dijk, 1997; Parsons, 1986; Van Leeuwen, 2007; Van Leeuwenand Wodak, 1999). Legitimation in news media is a case in point as the mediaplay an influential role in the formation of public opinion and the transmissionand promotion of particular beliefs and ideologies about particular events andsocial groups.

This paper examines the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada inthe discourse of the well-known American journalist Thomas Friedman of theNew York Times

(henceforth NYT). Friedman is an influential media voice whoenjoys a readership of possibly millions of readers through his foreign affairscolumn, which appears twice a week in the opinion-editorial (alternatively,op-ed) section of the NYT, and is syndicated to 700 other newspapers worldwide. 2

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Amer: Telling-it-like-it-is: the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada 7

He is also a three-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize: the first two he won mainlyfor reporting on the Middle East while he won the third in 2002 for commentaryfor his clarity of vision, based on extensive reporting, in commenting on theworldwide impact of the terrorist threat. 3 According to Herman (2003),Friedman is an institution at the NYT, while Robert Fisk characterizes him asan increasingly messianic columnist for the New York Times (2005: 589).

Friedmans power does not simply come from his wide readership, but morecrucially from his likely influence on politicians and foreign policy circles inthe US, and his position in a powerful institution like the NYT. Also, Friedmansinfluence is based on a complex web of relations he has with the Bush admin-istration (Herman, 2003), with Israel, and with other powerful social actors(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). It is from this perspective that Friedmansdiscourse can exercise hegemony, gain authority and credibility as it travels, andconstitute what Kress (1985: 15) calls a paradigm example for pertinentdiscourses to draw upon, confer authority on and function continuously to re-produce and reconstitute the group around the discourse(s).

For the purposes of analysis, the large part of this paper provides a detailedexamination of a column contributed by Friedman to the op-ed page of the NYTand published on 13 October 2000, two weeks into the Intifada, and is selectedas representative of Friedmans discourse on the Intifada (see Appendix). Thiscolumn is particularly interesting for it was published when it was still unclearwhether the ongoing confrontations were going in the direction of a new violentphase of IsraeliPalestinian relations, or were just another temporary breakdownin the already faltering Oslo peace process. Hence, this column represents a primecase in point of how Friedman sought to define the situation and explain theactions of the political actors involved in it. Another reason for the importanceof this key text is that it conspicuously showcases many of the themes and textualfeatures characterizing Friedmans discourse on the Intifada.

My analysis involves examining the columns argumentative structure andmoves employed in Friedmans delegitimizing construction of the Intifada anddemonstrating throughout how the legitimation and delegitimation of politicalactors, including self-legitimation, is closely linked to Friedmans argumentationand his discursive representation of the Intifada. The analysis is done within theframework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which aims at denaturalizingand exposing opaque and explicit discourse structures and strategies in dominantdiscourses responsible for enacting and perpetuating domination and control ofless powerful social groups (e.g. see Fairclough, 1989, 2003; Reisigl and Wodak,2001; Van Dijk, 1993, 1998).

In the remainder of the paper, I summarize findings from my critical discourseanalysis of a corpus of 20 columns written by Friedman which were publishedover a six-month period between 2000 and 2003 in the NYTs op-ed page. Thissummary aims to allow us to gain a comprehensive overview of the dominantthemes and their textual realizations underlying Friedmans commentary onthe second Intifada.



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Theoretical background DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMATIONThe concept of legitimation is essentially social and political (Martin Rojo andVan Dijk, 1997). That is, what or who is legitimized depends to a large measure

on who speaks and in what capacity, social status and role he/she speaks.Legitimation, in this sense, is linked to power, with which comes the authorityto define the situation (Parsons, 1986), and consequently the authority todetermine what is right or wrong, and what is legitimate and justifiable andwhat is not. Hence, both speakers and hearers (or writers and readers) orient tosuch authority, be it moral, political, institutional or legal; authority such thathearers bring assumptions and knowledge about the authority and legitimacy ofthe speaker while the speaker draws on this authority in their discourse.

Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) hold that sociopolitical legitimation is

largely realized through persuasive, and sometimes manipulative, discursivestructures and strategies. They propose that acts of legitimation may, therefore, beanalysed in three dimensions: a pragmatic dimension which involves the speakerslegitimation of the controversial event itself; a semantic one which involves asubjective representation of the action as truthful and credible as opposed toother representations offered by opponent groups; and a sociopolitical dimensionwhereby the authority of the speaker interacts with and influences the first twoin legitimating ones discourse and delegitimating others discourses. In this way,the authority to perform acts of legitimation and its symbolic efficacy, according

to Bourdieu (1991: 111), depend on the interdependent relationship between theproperties of discourses, the properties of the person who pronounces them andthe properties of the institution which authorizes him to pronounce them.

Taking the cognitive dimension of legitimation into account, it may beinstructive to consider Chiltons (2004) discourse processing model, whichis particularly useful for the analysis presented here because of its capacityto explain how legitimation is produced by utilizing the persuasive power ofproximization (Cap, 2006: 3), and how such legitimation is indexed explicitlyand implicitly in various linguistic expressions. Chilton suggests that in process-ing any discourse, people generate mental representations about what entities,locations, etc. exist and what relationships are established between them. Suchrepresentations present conventional shared understandings about the structureof society, groups and relations with other societies (2004: 56).

Thus, Chilton (2004) proposes a deictic centre along the space ( s), time ( t)and modality ( m) axes (see Figure 1 opposite). All entities and the relationshipsbetween them are anchored in these three axes which are defined relative to thecentre s (i.e. self, the speaker or we) location, time of uttering, and beliefs andvalues. He argues that spatial representation conceptualized either in terms ofphysical space or social relations is fundamental to this centre such that the pos-itioning of people or things is scaled according to their relative closeness (here)to or remoteness (there) from self .

On the temporal axis, the anchoring point is the time of speaking, or looselynow , and is conceptualized in terms of motion through space relative to the self,



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i.e. events, which carry a time of happening as part of their conceptualization,can be located as near or distant (Chilton, 2004: 58), as one may find inreferences such as the revolution is getting closer, time has arrived, remote,a long way into the future, etc.

Further, the entities, which have a geopolitical proximization plotted ontoa friendenemy scale, also have a corresponding modality scale that is alsobased on a spatial representation. The modality scale has to do with epistemicmodality which involves degrees of certainty, deontic modality which has to dowith permission and obligation, and negation. The epistemic and deontic modalscales are closely related in that what is conceptually close to self is both truth-conditionally true and morally right, and correspondingly what is placedfurther away from self may be construed as both untrue and wrong. In manyinstances of political discourse, this modal proximization seems to be underlain,according to Chilton (2004: 60), by a common perception which alwaysassociates the self with truth and rightness, and the other with untruth andwrongness. Drawing on Chiltons (2004) model, I will suggest a similar modelfor processing Friedmans text by proposing a similar deictic centre along spatial,temporal and modal axes. I locate the two main entities in the text the Israelisand Palestinians and the legitimatory values assigned to them on these axes.

ARGUMENTATION AND OPINION DISCOURSESeeking to legitimize by invoking moral, political or institutional authority islargely linked to argumentation or at least contains elements of argumentativediscourse. This is because the speaker anticipates some difference of opinionon the part of the addressees or otherwise they will need to be persuaded thatthere is a reasonable justification for attributing legitimatory values to the entity

in question. It is in this sense that legitimizing discourses are quintessentiallyargumentative as the speaker resorts to various argumentative structures andmoves to convince their addressees of their viewpoint and consequently win theiragreement. Examining legitimation in discourse, therefore, requires probing into

t-past

s

m

t-future

deictic centreHere, now, I/we

F I G U R E 1 .

Dimensions of deictic centre adapted from Chilton (2004: 58).



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the argumentative elements which are explicitly invoked or implicitly embeddedin discourse.

Argumentative discourse can be defined as an exchange of verbal movesideally intended to resolve a difference of opinions (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser,1999: 480). The raison detre of argumentation is to convince a reasonablecritic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation ofpropositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint(Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 1). Taking into account the rhetoricaldimension of argumentative discourse, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser suggestthree strategic manoeuvres which speakers may use to secure their audiencesagreement: (1) exploiting the topical potential by selecting from the availabletopics the materials the speakers find best serve their argumentative purposes;(2) adapting to audience demand by appealing to the audiences commonsense andpreferences; and (3) exploiting the appropriate presentational devices such thattheir contributions are systematically attuned to their discursive and stylisticeffectiveness (p. 485).

The rhetorical objective of persuasion is often combined with a dialectical oneby which arguers typically maintain appropriate standards of reasonableness andexpecting others to comply with the same critical standards (Van Eemeren andHoutlosser, 1999: 481). This dialectical objective, according to Richardson (2004:228), performs a laundering function for the rhetorical argument throughthe appearance of fairness and even-handedness. In this way, explicit viru-lent or racist attitudes and opinions are disguised through using various movesand strategies in order to preclude the possibility of being seen as biased, racistor prejudiced. Van Dijk mentions several of these moves (1991: 18798):

Apparent concession: most of them are law-abiding citizens, but . . .; Contrast: we are not intolerant, but they are; Reversal/blame the victim: they act in such a way that prejudice or unequal

treatment is justified; Mitigation and excuse: the police were forced to act in this harsh way; Ridicule: using ridicule and sarcasm to discredit the opponent.

Van Dijk relates these moves to an overall strategy of positive self-presentationand negative other-presentation. Speakers use such moves primarily to saveface and manage peoples impressions, to assert ingroup allegiances andsolidarity and to attribute moral superiority to the ingroup members. Positiveself-presentation and negative other presentation is a powerful argumentativestrategy which is recurrently used in various dominant discourses. In much ofhis work on dominant everyday and elite discourses on ethnic groups, Van Dijk(1988, 1991, 1993, 1998) demonstrates that an overall discourse strategyof positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation permeates thesediscourses. He refers to this strategy as the ideological square model by whichour positive actions and their negative actions are emphasized on the one hand,and our negative actions and their positive actions are hedged, mitigated orexcluded on the other.



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Opinion discourse, to which the present column belongs, is fundamentallyargumentative and has the function of public, group persuasion (Van Dijk,1992: 248). It is evidently a genre whose principal function is the expressionof ideological beliefs and opinions. Here one would anticipate that the speakeradvances a standpoint and supports it by various structures and strategies inorder to persuade the audience of the validity of his or her point. The followinganalysis will attend to the various argumentative properties of Friedmanscolumn pertinent to the construction of political actors and the legitimationsassociated with them. My point of departure is an examination of the textsargumentative structure.

Argumentative structure of the columnThe text has a complex argumentative structure at the centre of which is adiscourse strategy of positive ingroup presentation and negative outgrouppresentation associated with Israelis and Palestinians respectively. Aspects ofthis argumentative structure include, inter alia, making explicit evaluations andauthoritative statements, positing controversial propositions as categorical andabsolute, selecting highly charged lexical items and using various moves suchas apparent concession, mitigation and appealing to voices of authority. Thesevarious aspects enhance the binary opposition set up between the Palestiniansand Israelis and support Friedmans argumentation. Let us examine thisargumentation by first teasing out the meanings communicated in the title.

THE TITLEThe title 4 Arafats War encapsulates the gist of Friedmans argumentation andrepresents the top of the texts thematic hierarchy. It is ideologically significantfor it not only involves a negative definition of the situation and the implicationswhich arise from it, but it also positions political actors in relation to each otherand according to Friedmans polarizing characterization of the situation, as I willexplain in a moment. At a first glance, the title explicitly states how the two weeksof raging clashes between the Israeli army and Palestinians are to be viewed: itis a war that is caused, planned or directed by the Palestinian leader Arafat.The categorical assertion communicated in the title, which is in the possessivecase, signals Friedmans delegitimation of Arafat from the very early days of thePalestinian Intifada, 5 and is in fact consistent with the Israeli official positionswhich pinned blame on Arafat for the ongoing confrontations (for an analysis ofIsraeli press coverage during the first month of the Intifada, see Dor, 2004).

Note that framing the violence between Palestinians and Israelis as ArafatsWar has ideological implications in terms of causal agency, responsibility andblame attribution. Here Arafat and the Palestinians are cast in the negative agent role of the attacker and the transgressor, and therefore are held responsibleand blameworthy for the events. By implication, this attribution of negativeagency and responsibility to the Palestinian side is likely to position Israel in thesemantic patient role of the victim, which is facing Arafats transgression andwar. The reader is drawn to confirm this inference as the text unfolds.



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The attribution of blame and responsibility to Arafat and the Palestiniansis revealing of Friedmans perspective, especially when put against the contextof the overwhelming power of the Israeli military vis-a-vis largely unarmedPalestinian civilian demonstrators. This characterization appears to not take intoaccount numerous reports on the heavy Palestinian casualties resulting fromthe Israeli armys excessive use of lethal force in circumstances in which neitherthe lives of the security forces nor others were in imminent danger, resulting inunlawful killings (Amnesty International, 2000), and that [Israeli] violationsof human rights during recent weeks could constitute war crimes 6 (accordingto an Amnesty International report cited in The Guardian , 2 November 2000). The delegitimatory definition of the situation and attribution of blame to thePalestinians become demonstrably manifest in the remainder of the text, as Ishow in the following section.

ARGUMENTATION IN THE TEXTIn this section, I provide an informal analysis of the texts argumentativestructure by reconstructing the argumentation advanced in the text. Then I turnto discuss some of the main argumentative moves that Friedman uses to sup-port his argumentation. For purposes of illustration, the headings in Table 1opposite point to the argumentative function of each paragraph, while the rightcolumn names the argumentative move which corresponds to its bolded segmentin the text.

The headline spells out the argumentative conclusion of the whole article. Inthe first paragraph, Friedman subjectively defines the situation as war and asan explosion of violence. The contrast he sets up between the first and secondIntifadas serves as a general background against which the second Intifada isdelegitimized as an explosion of violence, embarrassing, inexplicable and hasno name. In the following four paragraphs, Friedman sets out to argue why thesecond Intifada is the way he describes.

For instance, in the second paragraph, Friedman states his main claim thatthe situation is a violent outburst and selectively traces it back to the CampDavid summit. He explicitly lists the main premises of his argument, which are

based on an indirect representation of a statement by US President Clinton.What is interesting here is that he begins the paragraph with the clause Hereswhy:, thereby implying that he simply aims to explain and show to the readerwhy this current situation is different. In this way, Friedman attempts very earlyon to assert categorically his claim to knowledge and truth, as I will explainbelow. Having defined the situation as an explosion and established a binarypositive/negative division between the compromising and peaceable IsraeliPrime Minister at the time, Ehud Barak, on the one hand, and the inflexible andviolent Arafat, on the other, in paragraphs three, four and five, Friedman develops

further his premises by exemplifying, hypothesizing, making claims and derivingconclusions. In the sixth paragraph, Friedman states the main conclusion of hisargument that the current violence is to be blamed on Arafat and subsequentlyon the Palestinians: Thats why this is Arafats war. Thats its real name.



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(Continued )

TA B L E 1 . Argumentative structure of Friedmans article

Argumentative functions Argumentative moves

A definition of the situation; a general historical background

[1] . . . The intifada, the Palistinian uprisingof the late 1980s, got its name almostimmediately. Intifada means shaking off, andPalestinians were said to be trying to sjhakeoff the Israeli occupation . . . But the violence ofthe last two weeks still has no name . . .

delegitimation throughcontrast

Selective reference to historical events; stating premises

[2] Heres why . . . At that time, Mr Clintonpointedly, deliberately and rightly statedthat Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak hadoffered unprecedented compromises at thesummit . . . and that Yasir Arafat had notresponded in kind, or at all.

appeal to politicalauthority

polarized representation

Developing premises further

[3] Palestinians were shocked by Mr Clintonsassessment . . . that they were stunned andunprepared for the seriousness of Mr Baraksoffer and the bluntness of Mr Clintonsassessment . . .

presupposition of Israelsgenerous offer

Hypothesizing; stating claim

[4] Mr Arafat had a dilemma . . . or provoke theIsraelis into brutalizing Palestinians again. . . So instead of responding to Mr Barakspeacemaking overture, he and his boysresponded to Ariel Sharons peace-destroying provocation . In short, the Palestinians couldnot deal with Barak, so they had to turn himinto Sharon. And they did.

blaming the victimridiculing and blamingblaming the victim

Developing premises further; hypothesizing[5] Of course, the Palestinians couldnt explain it

in those terms, so instead they unfurled allthe old complaints about the brutality of thecontinued Israeli occupation and settlement-building. Frankly, the Israeli checkpoints andcontinued settlement-building are oppressive.But what the Palestinians and Arabs refuseto acknowledge is that todays Israeli primeminister was offering them a dignified exit . . .Imagine if when Mr Sharon visited the TempleMount, Mr Arafat had ordered his people towelcome him with open arms and say . . .

mitigationapparent concessionsappeal to reasoning and

rationality



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TA B L E 1 . (Continued )

Argumentative functions Argumentative moves

Argumentative conclusion

[6] But that would have been an act of statesmanshipand real peaceful intentions . . . It came in thecontext of a serious Israeli peace overture,which Mr Arafat has chosen to spurn. Thatswhy this is Arafats war. Thats its real name.

presupposition of a seriousoffer

Stating claim by providing quotation

[7] If you want to know how confused thePalestinians are, consider this quotation fromtheir senior negotiator, Hasan Asfour: Thereblaming the victim, can be no resumption

of peace talks without an internationalinvestigation into the latest the outgroupsmembers violence . . .

blaming the victimattacking the rationality of

the outgroups members

Elaborating on previous claim

[8] I see. These Palestinians died so there can bean international investigation into why theywere killed. Sad. What a totally messed up setof priorities.

ridicule

Supporting main argument by quotation

[9] Basically, said Stephen P. Cohen, a MiddleEast expert at the Israel Policy Forum, theArabs and Palestinians have spent so manyyears, . . .

appeal to expert authority

Selective selection of facts and sources

[10] With the gleeful, savage mob murder ofIsraeli soldiers in Ramallah . . . Moderatescannot continue to argue that . . . The iron firstis not a sustainable solution for a state of

six million Jews living in a sea of one billionangry Muslims.

amplification of theothers

negative actionevoking orientalist

discoursesempathizing with ingroup

members

Pragmatic conclusion

[11] So what do you do when there is no partner forpeace and there is no alternative to peace? . . . Mourn the dead and pray that after thisexplosion of hatred is over, the parties willfind a way to live apart. Otherwise the futureis just endless killing and dying,

. . .

evoking fear and alarm



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While the first six paragraphs focus on Arafats negative role and establishthe texts argumentative conclusion, in the remaining paragraphs Friedmanelaborates on this conclusion by providing further examples of the failedPalestinian leadership and the Arabs inability to make peace with Israel. Forinstance, in paragraphs seven and eight, Friedman uses a common strategytypically used in persuasive argumentation, which is to quote a member of theoutgroup. The rhetorical aim of this move appears to pass negative judgementon the Palestinians as naive, confused and irresponsible.

Unlike this seemingly unfavourable quotation of a Palestinian official,Friedman directly represents the voice of an Israeli expert in paragraph nine,which reinforces Friedmans evaluation of the situation. Paragraph 10 isparticularly interesting for it involves Friedmans selective mention of a glaringincident of Palestinian violence in referring to the mob lynching of two Israelisoldiers, which happened one day before the column was printed. Similarly, the

indirect representation of the discourses of Israeli moderates and hard-linersgalvanizes Friedmans polarized formulation whereby the Palestinians arepresented as not ready yet for making peace with the Israelis.

Note the use of the reference hard-liners which is an expression that refers topeople who are part of the ingroup, unlike other expressions such as radicals,fanatics or extremists, which are only ascribed to the outgroup members(Van Dijk, 1995). Drawing upon Israeli discourses indicates that Friedman bothprivileges and sees the situation through Israeli perspectives and definitions.The final paragraph registers Friedmans pragmatic conclusion in the form of

an indirect speech act of warning (or predicting) of a bleak and violent futurefor the region.

ARGUMENTATIVE MOVESThus far, we have seen that the text is predominantly argumentative and elementsof argumentation are manifested by means of stating claims, listing premises,reaching a conclusion and justifying this conclusion by providing varioustypes of evidence. One central feature of this argumentation is the variousrhetorical moves Friedman strategically deploys in order to achieve optimal

persuasive results. In what follows, I discuss some of the key moves which seemto be dominant in the text and underlie a discourse strategy of positive ingrouppresentation and negative outgroup presentation associated with Israelis andPalestinians respectively.

Blaming the victimBlaming the victim is a common argumentative move in dominant discoursesby which the outgroup members are blamed on the argument that theyacted in a way that justifies their negative treatment by the ingroup members(Van Dijk, 1991, 1993; Wodak et al., 1999). Evidence of this blame reversal canbe observed in paragraph four in the clauses or provoke the Israelis into brutalizingPalestinians again and so they had to turn him into Sharon. And they did. Theseclauses perform an indirect speech act of blaming directed at the Palestinians fortheir own suffering by pushing Barak into brutalizing them and turning him



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into Sharon. An informed reader is likely to supply the background informationthat Sharon is an Israeli army general and politician who is linked to acts ofviolence against the Palestinians (see Fisk, 2001).

Of significance here is that Friedman appears to conjure up the image thatIsrael is in a predicament where it has no choice but to suppress the Palestinians.This formulation makes available the inference that Baraks actions againstPalestinians are provoked rather than deliberate or pre-planned. The iterativeagain is particularly interesting for it intertextually presupposes that thePalestinians provoked the Israelis into committing brutalities against themin the past. This formulation accords with what Van Teeffelen (1981, cited inVan Teeffelen, 1994: 385) posits that one application of the concept of tragedyon the PalestinianIsraeli conflict is that it can also be employed, as in muchIsraeli discourse, to underline that Israel finds itself in a tragic position since itis presumably forced to repress Palestinians. It can be added further that this

formulation presents Israel as the moral victim of IsraeliPalestinian violence,i.e. even though Israel engages in oppressive actions, it is the Palestinians faultsince they brought it on themselves. It therefore has the function of mitigating,if not excusing, Israels violent actions (see Finkelstein, 2003: 11020, whodiscusses this notion of moral anxiety, victimhood and the effects of violence inIsraeli discourses).

In paragraphs seven and eight, Friedman seems to ridicule and question therationality of the Palestinians:

[7] If you want to know how confused the Palestinians are, consider this quotationfrom their senior negotiator, Hasan Asfour: There can be no resumption of peacetalks without an international investigation into the latest violence. Our people didnot die for nothing.

[8] I see. These Palestinians died so there can be an international investigation intowhy they were killed. Sad. What a totally messed up set of priorities.

Note that Friedman quotes the Palestinians in an overtly disqualifying mannerby registering his negative evaluation of the wisdom of Palestinian leaders.The ridicule expressed in Friedmans direct quote of the Palestinian negotiator

Asfour dismisses the Palestinian demand for an international inquiry committeeinvestigating the heavy Palestinian casualties caused by Israeli forces as merelyfoolish and incomprehensible. It might have carried a more favourable meaninghad Friedman alternatively indicated that the large number of Palestinians killedand wounded by Israel would have been a cause for the Palestinian demand for aninternational inquiry committee into the killings. The image of the Palestiniansacting immaturely is similarly evoked in his reference in paragraph four to thePalestinians as boys in the clause he [Arafat] and his boys responded to ArielSharons peace-destroying provocation.

Amplifying the others negative actionsNot only does the writer blame the Palestinians for rejecting Baraks offer andresorting to violence, but he also seems to accentuate their responsibility fornegative actions. The emphasis attached to Palestinian violence can be observed,



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for instance, in the transitivity selections in the text in that Palestinian actorsincluding Arafat are predominantly presented as semantic agents of negativeprocess types such as material processes ( he and his boys responded to ArielSharons peace-destroying provocation ), verbal processes ( They unfurled all the old complaints . . .), relational processes ( Mr. Arafat, its now clear, possesses neither )and mental processes ( Mr Arafat chose the latter ). They are also thematized inthe whole text as the responsible agents of causing violence, provoking Barak,rejecting a peaceful offer and making irrational and unwise decisions (for adiscussion of transitivity, see Fairclough, 1989; Halliday, 1994; Hodge andKress, 1993).

MitigationContrary to the amplified negative role of Arafat and the Palestinians, Friedmanengages in mitigating moves which background or minimize Israeli negative

agency. In paragraph five, for instance, Friedman uses the verb unfurled andthe nominal phrase all the old complaints to play down Palestinian grievancesat the Israeli occupation and settlements. These expressions might leave theimpression that the issues of ending Israeli occupation and illegal settlementbuilding on Palestinian confiscated land had been archived, rolled up, buried andare no longer relevant to the present situation. They might equally imply thatthe Palestinians have been trotting out these issues over and over again with nochange or solution to the status quo.

The distribution of thematic roles to Israeli and Palestinian actors helps to

reinforce Friedmans ideological construction of the situation. Unlike Palestinianactors, Israelis on the whole are predominately assigned a patient role as in withthe gleeful, savage mob murder of Israeli soldiers in Ramallah or They hadto turn him [Barak] into Sharon. In cases where Israeli actors, mainly Barak,occupy an agentive role, they are assigned positive verb processes such as Barakhad offered unprecedented compromises, todays prime minister was offeringthem a dignified exit and Moderates cannot continue to argue that if Israel went far enough, where Palestinian actors act as the beneficiary of such actions.

Apparent concessionA common move in the discourse strategy of positive self-presentation involvesmaking apparent concessions which speakers may use for managing theiraudiences impressions and avoiding being seen as biased and prejudicial. A clearinstance of an apparent concession from the text is in paragraph five, whereFriedman criticizes Israeli occupation and settlement building in the clauses:

Frankly, the Israeli checkpoints and continued settlement-building are oppressive. Butwhat the Palestinians and Arabs refuse to acknowledge is that todays Israeli primeminister was offering them a dignified exit.

Note that a logical relation of concession is established here in these two clauses,i.e. the conceded proposition in the clause beginning with the disjunct Franklysignals Friedmans admission that Israels actions are oppressive and brutal,while the second clause beginning with the conjunction but is presented as a



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factual statement and categorical assertion to be taken for granted: Barak offeredArabs and Palestinians an honourable way out of their embarrassment, i.e. aserious peace deal. This apparent admission of the brutality of Israeli checkpointsand settlements may also imply that Friedman recognizes the existence ofcounterarguments which explain Palestinian actions as resulting from oppressiveIsraeli measures. Nonetheless, Friedman immediately shifts blame back to thePalestinians and Arabs by his explicit emphasis on their short-sighted decisionsand actions in turning down a serious offer by Barak.

Appeal to authority Perhaps it needs little argument that journalists generally aim to be persuasivein constructing meanings in such a way that they are not only comprehendedby the readers but also accepted as factual and plausible. One effective means forthe appearance of truth and objectivity, according to Van Dijk (1988), involvesusing quotes from reliable sources such as authorities and respectable people,especially when opinions are given. White (2006: 64) refers to the strategy ofquoting elite sources as evidential standing by which the social status andauthority of the source quoted enhances the warrantability and credibility ofthe material quoted.

The authoritative voices which Friedman draws upon are intertextuallysignificant in that they are stitched into the overall argumentative fabric of thetext and reinforce Friedmans dichotomous representation of the situation. Inparagraph two, for instance, Friedman appeals to political authority in favourably

representing the discourse of US President Clinton. Friedmans endorsementof Clintons discourse is manifest linguistically in the adverbs pointedly,deliberately and rightly. Note that Friedmans indirect representation ofMr. Clintons discourse is intertextually ambivalent since it leaves a sense ofambiguity as to whether the compromises listed between hyphens are what Mr.Clinton has stated elsewhere, or they are Friedmans recontextualization andown clarification of Clintons statement. Nonetheless, the categorical assertionby which he presents these claims induces the reader to take the materialquoted as highly credible and reliable. As I pointed out earlier, Friedman uses

these listed compromises as premises on the basis of which he reaches his mainargumentative conclusion.Similarly, Friedman appeals to expert authority in a long direct quotation

(93 words in total) of the Middle East expert Stephen Cohen at an Israeli policycentre. The quotation is used to confirm Friedmans ideological polarization be-tween Israel and the Arabs in that it passes a negative judgement about the latteras uncompromising and having no energy to make peace. It also presupposes thatIsrael had offered serious compromises to peace including 90 per cent of whatthey wanted. Here Friedman aligns himself with, and appeals to the authority

of, these two sources in credentialing his representation of reality.So far, I have provided an informal analysis of the argumentative structuresand moves that Friedman draws upon in his column. Thus far it has becomeclear that Friedman recurrently draws on Baraks offer at Camp David II in his



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polarized representation of the situation. Therefore, in the two following sections,I illustrate how this event functions as Friedmans main argumentative resourceand how it is used to construct and evaluate the participants in it.

CAMP DAVIDS OFFER AS THE MAIN ARGUMENTATIVE RESOURCEAt the centre of the texts argumentation is the presentation of controversialpropositions as factual statements which are assumed to be shared with, or at leastknown to, the hearers. The main presumption on the basis of which Friedmanestablishes his argumentation is that Barak offered a serious peace proposal atCamp David which Arafat inexcusably rejected. Friedman frequently refers to thispresumption in the text as can be observed in the following clauses:

1. It came in the context of a serious Israeli peace overture.2. That they were unprepared for the seriousness of Mr. Baraks offer.

3. Other world leaders told Mr. Arafat the same thing: Barak deserves a seriouscounteroffer.4. But what the Palestinians and Arabs refuse to accept is that todays Israeli

prime minister was offering them a dignified exit.5. This explosion of violence would be totally understandable if the Palestinians

had no alternative.6. Moderates cannot continue to argue that if Israel went far enough, it would

have a Palestinian partner.

Of significance here is that he repeatedly and authoritatively presents his

presumption of a serious Israeli offer as a given (a position he consistentlyadopted throughout, e.g. see his columns on 17 October 2000; 24 August 2001;7 April 2002; 2 October 2003), although the seriousness of Baraks offer hasbeen contested and more nuanced explanations of the Camp David talks havebeen alternatively provided in a large body of scholarly and journalistic work(e.g. see Carter, 2007: 14952; Chomsky, 2003; Dor, 2004: 1534; Friel andFalk, 2007; Halper, 2000; Hirst, 2003; Malley and Agha, 2001; Mearsheimerand Walt, 2007; Philo and Berry, 2004: 838; Pundak, 2001; Reinhart, 2002;Said, 2004: 1023; Slater, 2007; Special Document, 2003).

For instance, Malley and Agha (2001) question the claim of a seriousproposal as remarkably shallow. It ignores h istory, the dynamics of thenegotiations, and the relationships among the three parties [Palestinians, Israelisand Americans]. Halper (2000) shows that regardless of what Barak offered tohand back to the Palestinians at Camp David, Israel would continue to exerciseits control over Palestinian territories through a matrix of control, which isan interlocking series of mechanisms, only a few of which require physicaloccupation of territory, that allow Israel to control every aspect of Palestinianlife in the Occupied Territories (p. 5).

More relevant for the present analysis is that the repeated reference to thispresumption of a serious offer by Barak has significant political implicationsconcerning issues of causal agency, responsibility and blame attribution, andconsequentially the legitimation and delegitimation of Israeli and Palestinian



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actions respectively. In the following section, I illustrate this further by con-ceptualizing a deictic space whereby the Camp David offer is essential to theattribution of legitimizing values to the two main entities, Palestinians andIsraelis, in this event.

Legitimation and the conceptualization of a deictic centreCognitively speaking, Friedmans representation of the situation allows thepossibility of conceptualizing a deictic centre model along spatial, temporal andmodal dimensions similar to the deictic model proposed in Chilton (2004). UnlikeChiltons model where self is the deictic centre, Friedmans text may promptthe reader to conceptualize peace or, more accurately, the prospect of peace,as the central point of reference with the two main entities, i.e. Israelis andPalestinians, appearing as points mapped onto these three ontological dimensionsand scaled relative to the peace centre (see Figure 2 below).

The conceptualization of the prospect of peace as the deictic centre seemsto be both conceptually and linguistically invoked by frequent references in thetext which posit the prospect of achieving peace as at the core of the relationshipbetween the Israelis and Palestinians. In fact, there are 10 instances in whichthe word peace is mentioned in the text. Here two main time periods can beidentified; each period has the prospect of peace at its centre. The first period

F I G U R E 2 . Deictic centre of Friedmans text .

Palestinian

territories/Israel

m1t-past

1 s t I n t i f a d a

p r o s p e c

t

o

f p

e a c e

Camp DavidReal/possible

B a r a k a n d

I s r a e l i s

Prospectof peace

Now/2nd Intifadauntrue/fading away

m2

A r a f a t a n d

P a l e s t i n i a n s

t-future

d y i n g a n d

k i l l i n g



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is at the Camp David summit at which point the prospect of peace was real or possible. This is communicated in Friedmans favourable reference to Baraksoffer as in So instead of responding to Mr. Baraks peacemaking overture . . .,and It came in the context of a serious Israeli peace overture. Here Friedmanauthoritatively maintains that a serious opportunity for making peace wasclose and possible through Baraks offer at Camp David.

The second time period refers to the time of speaking, or loosely now, withthe prospect of peace looking unreal , illusive or fading away . The fading awayor illusiveness of peace is linguistically generated by reference to the currentsituation as explosion of violence, Arafats War and the whole region iscoming unglued. It is also prominently and visually expressed in the sketchaccompanying the column which shows a hand drawing the word peace inthe sand with traces of a sandstorm in the background about to blow awaypeace. A third time period which can be further located in this deictic spaceis the future in which there seems to be no prospects of peace, but endlesskilling and dying.

On the space dimension(s), we need to assume two levels of spatialrepresentations: the first refers to the same geopolitical space (i.e. occupiedPalestinian territories/Israel proper), which is fixed relative to peace prospect.The proximity or distance of this physical space to the writer and readerslocation (presumably the US) seems to be irrelevant to peace prospect, or at leastit is not linguistically invoked in the text. The second relates to the conceptualspace where the two main entities are positioned relative to their proximity to,or distance from, the prospect of peace in the two main time periods (i.e. CampDavid summit and now).

Fundamentally, this discourse processing model enables us to determinehow Friedman imputes legitimizing and delegitimizing values to Israeli andPalestinian actors respectively. On one hand, in both time periods, Barak andIsraelis are conceptually located close to the peace centre and hence maybe conceptualized as right and moral. They can be situated on the deonticmodal scales (m1) and (m2) closer to the peace centre in both periods. Thisconceptualization is linguistically triggered by frequent references to Barak asoffering a serious peaceful overture, thereby occupying a moral high ground.Note further that this conceptual processing of the column makes available theinference that Friedman, President Clinton, and by extension the US, can all besituated close to the peace centre. Though this is not explicitly referred to inthe text, the inference seems to be activated meta-discursively by the readersbackground knowledge about the central role of President Clinton and the USas a peace broker between the two parties. On the other hand, Arafat and thePalestinians are placed further away from the centre in the two time periodson the deontic modality scales for gratuitously refusing the peace offered byBarak at Camp David II, and for currently resorting to a violent course of actions.This conceptualization also seems to be triggered in the various delegitimizinglinguistic structures associated with them, as I have shown earlier.



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Power, authority and self-legitimationMuch of my discussion so far has focused on the discursive delegitimation of theIntifada. Nonetheless, legitimation as a discursive process cannot be separatedfrom the actual or perceived power of the speaker and the institution in which

he/she functions. That is, legitimation as a speech act can only be felicitous(in a Grecian sense) in as much as the authority and social power of the speakerare not questioned or challenged, or at least they need to be recognized byothers. In Bourdieus words, What creates the power of words and slogans, apower capable of maintaining and subverting the social order, is the belief in thelegitimacy of power and of those who utter them (1991: 170, emphasis added).Legitimation is a dynamic, transactive process whereby speakers continuouslyenact, reproduce and rearticulate their legitimacy in relation to the (shared)assumptions, values or expectations of their audiences and to the discursiveevent in question.

It is important to note that the (de)legitimation of the main actors in theIntifada is established alongside a self-legitimating discourse through whichFriedman legitimizes himself, textures his identity (Fairclough, 2003), andauthoritatively positions himself in relation to his truth claims and to thereaders. This is largely done both meta-discursively by means of evoked orshared assumptions about the social status and authority of Friedman and theinstitution in which he works, i.e. the NYT, and discursively in the linguisticproperties of modality and style.

As I have noted earlier, the authority with which Friedman speaks is partly

achieved by the way others have deferred to him as an authoritative andinfluential American voice on the Middle East. Most notably, for instance, theArab Peace Initiative proposed by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 2002 was firstrevealed to Friedman who made it public in his column on 17 February 2002.This perceived authority of Friedman may also be augmented by the influenceand stature of the NYT as the nations newspaper of record (Cotter, 2003: 416).The newspapers standing would contribute considerably to crediting Friedmansdiscourse as reliable and authoritative; that is, the authority and legitimacy of theinstitution are transferred to the persons representing it rendering their discourse

trustworthy and credible (Martin Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997).Such sociopolitical self-legitimation generally is not accepted by hearers orreaders at face value, but needs to be validated and enacted in part discursivelythrough a range of structures and resources. Two main discourse structureswhich have self-legitimating functions include modality and style throughwhich Friedman presents himself as categorical, rational and authoritative whilesimultaneously delegating to himself a monopoly over knowledge and truth(see Martin Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997: 5504).

Modality relates to the interpersonal and pragmatic function of language andindicates the degree of probability, commitment or authority a speaker attachesto a proposition (Fairclough, 2003; Hodge and Kress, 1993). Though relativelyfew modalized clauses are used, the text is clearly characterized by an overallclaim to truth and a general tone of telling-it-like-it-is. It expresses a highdegree of modality and categorical assertion. For instance, Friedman frequently



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makes categorical, authoritative assertions in the simple present tense, mainlyrelational processes, e.g. Its because even the participants cant explain what itsabout and that is why this is Arafats war. Fowler and Kress (1979: 207) pointout that the present tense is not a modally neutral form, but rather it is a powerfulform that reflects the authors certainty, unquestionableness, continuity, anduniversality.

Strong modality is also expressed by the use of categorical adverbials(pointedly, deliberately, rightly, of course, frankly), italics, value-laden adjectives(stunned, unprepared, shocked, brutalized, peace-destroying, messed up, savage)and by what Friedman argues as the real causes of violence, who is responsiblefor it and what he anticipates for the future. In a similar vein, self-legitimation isalso conveyed in the texts style. The style is clearly conversational and featuresof informality and casualness of delivery are characteristically manifestedin a reliance on a host of textual features. For example, one feature of a con-

versational, dialogic style involves the use of the imperative verb form as inimagine if when Mr. Sharon visited . . ., imagine the impact that would haveon Israelis and consider this quotation from their senior negotiator . . .

Closely linked to the casualness of his style is the way Friedman self-legitimizes himself as someone who is open and blunt, i.e. as someone who just says what is on his mind rather than carefully planning and advancing hisarguments as typically found in written discourse. For example, he appears todialogue with the reader using informal, ad-libbed lexis as in heres why, inshort, of course, frankly, I see, sad and whats scary. In fact, one can

sense that Friedman is projecting himself as an angry, exasperated speakerwho is emotionally involved with the situation and who does not refrain fromunreservedly criticizing and assigning blame to those he deems responsible for thesituation (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 825 for strategies of involvement anddetachment). Lexical style also seems to reflect Friedmans emotional intensityin expressions like stunned, shocked, deep down, but that was not the case,messed up, unfurled, oppressive, he and his boys, sad and savage, mobmurder. Similarly, the repetition in the last paragraph registers a rhetoricalmove whose function is to project a sense of emotional involvement and urgency

on the part of Friedman. Herman (2003) also critically observes these stylisticfeatures of Friedmans discourse:

He [Thomas Friedman] differs from his predecessors mainly in his brashness, name-dropping, and self-promotion, and with his aggressive, bullying tone . . . In theserespects he brings a now fashionable, Geraldo Rivera in-your-face touch to the NYT ,which has borne his effusions stoically for the last three decades.

Perhaps one possible explanation for using this informal, dialogic style andfeatures of spontaneous, unscripted and emotionally-charged delivery is thatit can be quite legitimately an effective rhetorical resource to appeal to thereaders by signalling an equal relationship with them which positions him notso much as the provider of knowledge speaking from his high tower an elitistposition but rather as a like-minded person who supposedly shares with thereaders their moral outrage, mutual fears and concerns about the situation.



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Summary of previous findingsIn this final section I seek to extend our understanding of Friedmans discourseon the Intifada by summarizing the main findings of my critical discourseanalysis of a corpus of 20 articles which he contributed to the op-ed section

of the NYT over six months 7 between 2000 and 2003. The main questionsguiding the analysis focused on the way Friedman constructed the Intifadaincluding his representation of political actors and their actions. In particular,what are the dominant themes used to frame Friedmans discourse on theIntifada? and what are the textual realizations of these themes?. Salient textualproperties (argumentative moves, lexical and syntactic selections, metaphors,modality, style, intertextual traces of other voices and discourses, and particularprocesses of exclusion, inclusion, mitigation and emphasis) of each theme wereexamined.

Analysis shows that six recurrent themes underpin Friedmans discourse onthe second Palestinian Intifada:

1. Claiming that Barak offered a serious peace proposal at Camp David whichArafat inexcusably rejected and resorted to violence to extract more Israeliconcessions.

2. Blaming Arafat and the Palestinians for engaging in violence and terrorismand for not being ready yet to make peace with Israel.

3. Criticizing the illegitimate Arab regimes for not pressuring Arafat tocompromise or for exploiting the Palestinian cause to deflect attention fromtheir internal failures.

4. Blaming Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Israeli Right for theirideological commitment to colonial settlements in the occupied territoriesand for lacking a peace strategy.

5. Supporting Israels exiting Palestinian territories it occupied in 1967 butgiving Palestinians partial control over these territories.

6. Emphasizing the central role the US must play in the Middle East conflict givenits power and leverage on the other parties.

These themes appear in most or all of the texts and are recurrently drawn upon toestablish the overall coherence of Friedmans argumentation. The first theme, forinstance, potently dominates Friedmans discourse whereby he consistently treatsas given the presumption that Barak presented Arafat with a serious peacefuloffer, which should not have been rejected: Yasir, thats whats on the table! Isit perfect from your point of view? . . . My God, man, cant you keep your eye onthe prize? (6 October 2000). The Camp David proposal is repeatedly referredto as serious offer and the best opportunity ever which Arafat spurned anddeliberately chose to use military pressure, instead of diplomacy or nonviolence,

to extract more out of Israel, and Israelis turned to Mr. Sharon as their revenge(7 April 2002). The categorical assertion of this presumption is combined with ananti-Arafat rhetoric characterizing Friedmans discourse as evidenced in part byassociating Arafat with highly negative lexical expressions: Who is Yasir Arafat?



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Hes a terrorist bum, Arafat and his boys, the corrupt tyranny of Yasir Arafat,Yasir Arafat & Company and utterly corrupt and inept leadership.

The binary opposition between Arafat and Barak, which is based largely onthe Camp David event, is also realized in charging that the Palestinians are notyet ready for making sufficient compromises for making peace with Israel: He[Arafat] showed himself at Camp David, and after, as a man who would ratherget nothing for his people than look them in the eye and say, we are going to getsome things [at Camp David] and not others (7 August, 2001). A closely relatedtheme is his criticism of the Arab regimes in the region which he characterizesas illegitimate and unelected autocrats who provide cover for Arafat andexploit their peoples anger by letting them let off steam on Israel in order todivert attention from their internal problems.

Another dominant theme centres on blaming Israels Prime MinisterSharon and the Israeli Right for their commitment to colonial settlements in theterritories, which he refers to as a huge strategic-political problem, insaneand an obstacle to peace. Others, however, have criticized colonial settlementson legal grounds as built illegally on confiscated Palestinian land in violationof international law and United Nations resolutions (see Friel and Falk, 2007:17; Philo and Berry, 2004: 39). In the same vein, Friedman is also critical ofSharon for his militancy, lack of pragmatic wisdom and for having no peacestrategy, no roadmap beyond his iron fist. A final recurring theme involves theargument that Israel should get out of the occupied Palestinian territories, yethe calls for giving the Palestinians partial control over those territories since thePalestinians cannot, at this moment, be trusted to run those territories on theirown without making them a base of future operations against Israel (3 April2002). He therefore proposes bringing NATO and US forces into the territoriesto help the Palestinians run their state.

Friedman draws upon a range of metaphorical conceptualizationswhich he uses to support his themes. Most notable of these metaphors is theconceptualization of the relation between the Israelis and the Palestiniansin terms of what Van Teeffelen (1994: 385) refers to as intense personalantagonism, whereby each side is pitted against the other, and both parties areseen as being blind to each others rights and therefore as drawing each otherinto a negative spiral of violence, as in:

You feel as if you are watching a modern form of ritual sacrifice. The Palestinians seemto have no qualms about putting up their youths to be shot at, and the Israeli soldiersseem to have no qualms about shooting them. (31 October 2000)

In this respect, a rhetoric of tutelage tends to be evoked in explaining the rolethe US has taken or should take towards the parties involved. Thus, the US ismetaphorized as a father-figure or the guardian who has the privileged power and

moral responsibility to intervene and stop the two reeling sides from consumingeach other: A firm US hand in redrawing all the fudged lines is our only hope(7 April 2002); Their leaders dont know how to move, so America has to chartthe way with a big idea (28 April 2002).



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A particularly noticeable feature of intertextuality in Friedmans discourseis his overwhelming reliance on Israeli voices (Israeli left and right, experts,politicians and Israeli public in general) whom Friedman dialogues with, respondsto, approves and disapproves of or draws upon to support his deliberation on thesituation. Indeed, such a prevalence of Israeli voices in Friedmans discourseshows that more than any other major perspectives and points of view, e.g.international law, human rights organizations, academics, Arab or other MiddleEast experts, etc., Friedman largely anchors his construction of the situation inrelation to Israeli explanations and positions on how to deal with the Palestinians.Finally, textual properties such as his emotionally intense language, informalstyle, categorical modality and authoritative delivery, which I have discussedin the analysis of the column above, are characteristic features of Friedmansdiscourse.

CodaIn this paper, I have largely focused on Friedmans delegitimation of thesecond Intifada in a key text he contributed to the NYT. I demonstrated thatan overall discourse strategy of positive in-group presentation and negativeout-group presentation dominates the text and takes place within an overallargumentative structure which delegitimizes the Palestinians as violent,confused and irresponsible and legitimizes Israeli actors as peaceable, rationaland flexible. The combination of thematic contents, argumentative moves,intertextual references and a range of linguistic properties reinforces Friedmansargumentation and his dichotomous representation of the situation. Friedmansargumentation is also anchored in a self-legitimation whereby he positionshimself as more rational and objective, and as having better knowledge aboutthe situation than his assumed opponents. He seems to do so meta-discursivelyby appealing to his presupposed or perceived social status as an authoritativevoice on the Middle East and his position in an influential media institution.I demonstrated that this sociopolitical self-legitimation is realized discursivelyin his conversational style and the categorical modality he attaches to his truthclaims and propositions. The themes and textual features revealed in this detailedanalysis of Friedmans column are largely reflected in my critical discourseanalysis of a corpus of texts written by Friedman in the NYT. It shows theresilience of common themes underpinning Friedmans discourse.

Underlying this analysis is a sensitized awareness of the role of languagein times of war and conflict. As Daniel Nelson noted in the epigraph at thebeginning of this paper, conflicts and wars begin and end with words . Beforeguns are fired and bombs start falling, words commit the first act of war.It ultimately has serious material consequences on individual lives and societies.

The role of language is something one cannot afford to neglect, and this couldnot be more relevant than in subjecting the discourses of those in positions ofpower to critical analysis with the aim of sensitizing readers consciousness tothe ways in which language can be used to normalize and sustain domination



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and control, since in Faircloughs (1989: 1) words: consciousness is the firststep towards emancipation.

N O T E S

1. It is important to realize that to account for the causes and contexts which led to thismost recent episode of the PalestinianIsraeli conflict, one needs to go well beyondthe immediate contexts of this present event and expound on the major events whichhave shaped and defined this decades-long conflict. However, a thorough and nuancedhistory of this complex and multi-layered conflict goes well beyond the space limits ofthis paper.

2. Available at: http://www.thomaslfriedman.com3. Available at: http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2002/commentary4. In most cases an editor is assigned the task of writing headlines, though some writers

might retain that right.5. See, for instance, Friedmans earlier column entitled Time to choose, Yasir, 6 October

2000.6. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0 ,,391262,00.

html#article_continue7. The months are October 2000, November 2000, August 2001, March 2002, April

2002 and October 2003.

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A P P E N D I X

ARAFATS WAR

October 13, 2000, Friday

Thomas L. Friedman [1] Maybe the most revealing feature of this latest explosion in IsraeliPalestinian

violence is the fact that this war has no name. The intifada, the Palestinian uprisingof the late 1980s, got its name almost immediately. Intifada loosely means shakingoff, and Palestinians were said to be trying to shake off the Israeli occupation.The name made so much sense that even Israelis used it. But the violence of thelast two weeks still has no name. And that is not an accident. Its because eventhe participants cant explain what its about, or, deep down, theyre embarrassedto do so.

[2] Heres why: The roots of this latest violent outburst can be traced directly back toPresident Clintons press conference after the breakdown of the Camp David summit.At that time, Mr. Clinton pointedly, deliberately and rightly stated that IsraeliPrime Minister Ehud Barak had offered unprecedented compromises at the summit more than 90 percent of the West Bank for a Palestinian state, a partial resolutionof the Palestinian refugee problem and Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslimand Christian quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem and that Yasir Arafat had notresponded in kind, or at all.

[3] Palestinians were shocked by Mr. Clintons assessment. For the first time in a longtime, Mr. Arafat no longer had the moral high ground. He, and the Arab leaders,



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had grown so comfortable with Bibi Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel a manthe world always blamed for any peace breakdown that they were stunned andunprepared for the seriousness of Mr. Baraks offer and the bluntness of Mr. Clintonsassessment. Other world leaders told Mr. Arafat the same thing: Barak deserves aserious counteroffer.

[4] Mr. Arafat had a dilemma: make some compromises, build on Mr. Baraks openingbid and try to get it closer to 100 percent and regain the moral high ground thatway or provoke the Israelis into brutalizing Palestinians again, and regain themoral high ground that way. Mr. Arafat chose the latter. So instead of respondingto Mr. Baraks peacemaking overture, he and his boys responded to Ariel Sharonspeace-destroying provocation. In short, the Palestinians could not deal with Barak,so they had to turn him into Sharon. And they did.

[5] Of course, the Palestinians couldnt explain it in those terms, so instead they unfurledall the old complaints about the brutality of the continued Israeli occupation andsettlement-building. Frankly, the Israeli checkpoints and continued settlement-

building are oppressive. But what the Palestinians and Arabs refuse to acknowledgeis that todays Israeli prime minister was offering them a dignified exit. It was far fromperfect for Palestinians, but it was a proposal that, with the right approach, couldhave been built upon and widened. Imagine if when Mr. Sharon visited the TempleMount, Mr. Arafat had ordered his people to welcome him with open arms and say,When this area is under Palestinian sovereignty, every Jew will be welcome, even you,Mr. Sharon. Imagine the impact that would have had on Israelis.

[6] But that would have been an act of statesmanship and real peaceful intentions, andMr. Arafat, its now clear, possesses neither. He prefers to play the victim rather thanthe statesman. This explosion of violence would be totally understandable if the

Palestinians had no alternative. But that was not the case. Whats new here is not theviolence, but the context. It came in the context of a serious Israeli peace overture,which Mr. Arafat has chosen to spurn. Thats why this is Arafats war. Thats its realname.

[7] If you want to know how confused the Palestinians are, consider this quotation fromtheir senior negotiator, Hasan Asfour: There can be no resumption of peace talkswithout an international investigation into the latest violence. Our people did notdie for nothing.

[8] I see. These Palestinians died so there can be an international investigation into whythey were killed

telling it like it is - the delegitimation of the second palestinian intifada in thomas friedman's...

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