1

Tamar Herzog – Harvard University

Frontiers of possession

States and Individul Actors in Portuguese and Spanish Expansion

Introduction

What I would like to do here today is to give you an overview of the first half of my new

book manuscript concerned with the formation of a territorial distinction between Spain and

Portugal in both Europe and the Americas. Responding to the call for this conference, In what

follows I will contrast two distinct narratives: the traditional one that centers on state and state

action, and a seconde, that centers on individual and individual action. In line with my work to-

date, in the background is the question what is the state, how it acts, what it is made of; and, on

the contrary, what are individuals, how they act and why.

I The standard story of what the Spanish-Portuguese territorial conflict in the Americas was

about

From late fifteenth to the early nineteenth century, Spain and Portugal struggled to define

the extension of their American domains. Having first secured papal bulls that gave them a

monopoly in certain areas and having signed a bilateral treaty (the Treaty of Tordesillas, 14941)

confirming, albeit with changes, this monopoly, for the next 500 years the authorities of the two

powers could not agree what this monopoly meant and how it was to be implemented. They

debated the meaning of terms, the relationship between rights stemming from bulls and rights

stemming from treaties (after the Treaty of Tordesillas, several other important treaties were

signed2). They debated scientific questions such as where the meridian mentioned in the bulls

and the Treaty of Tordesillas passed, they could not agree on whether certain territories that had

already been discovered were to the east or west of this meridian and, most of all, they could not

agree on the size and shape of earth.3 Also debated was the meaning of the doctrine of

occupation, one that, according to Roman law, now interpreted also as the Law of Nations, even

Natural law, gave rights to land: which type of occupation generated rights and what type of

rights.4 Last but not least, even if the parties could agree –which was rarely the case-- as to how

these questions should be resolved, they failed to arrive at a consensus regarding the factual

question who was present where, doing what, and since when.5

Because over time European penetration into the American interior grew exponentially, by

the eighteenth century Spaniards and Portuguse found themselves confronted in a vast area that

included parts of present-day Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia,

Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, that is, practically the entire south American interior. Disagreement

was often accompanied by warfare, sometimes even fairly large-scale war. It involved constant

attempts to find a negotiated, diplomatic solution that would satisfay both parties. Failure

however persisted: the conflict not only continued during the entire colonial period, it survived

colonialism and continues to haunt Latin American states even today.

If this is the standard story, let me now turn to what I think we can make of it. The quest to

understand (and affirm) territorial divisions was motivated mostly by local actors. Rather than

debated by the courts, most of the discussion regarding who was allowed to be where, doing

what, happened on the territory itself, as individual Spaniards wished to bar individual

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Portuguese from doing certain things, and as their rivals hoped to achieve the same. Because

most of the discussion happened on the border and involved neighbours, it confronted people

who knew (or believed they knew) one another. These people were often opinionated: they felt

very strongly about their rights and rejected vehemently what their rivals were saying.

Despite its richness, this story is largely untold. Most historians who studied the conflict

between Spain and Portugal in the Americas cared about its political and territorial implications.

They were interested in establishing who of the two parties was right, usually in order to make

claims to territory in the present.6 They inquired on the bilateral relations between the Spanish

and the Portuguese monarchs, and the geo-political and economic interests, which lead them to

pursue one policy or the other.7 Largely following what historians of borders did elsewhere, these

historians concentrated their attention of what monarchs did. In their minds, the border was tied

to the appearance, and territorialization, of the early modern state. According to their story, the

gradual extension of royal power and the will to imagine sovereignty as including not only

people but also territory, led to the negotiation, imposition and clarification of territorial

divisions. In the process, borders, which were either did not exist or demarcated large areas,

became linear. Also in the process, local divisions became “national.” Separating “internal

borders”(of occupation) from “external” borders (against neighbouring political entities).

Historians, in short, reduced what I hope to convince you was a very complex (and often untidy

history) into a foretold story about the coming of the Leviathan.

Rather than observing what kings wanted or planned, and whether they were successful or

not, what I did in my project was to ask why those living in the American interior got involved in

this conflict and how their involvement modified the right to land. Because I was uninterested in

distributing guilt or in endorsing a certain interpretation, I used both Spanish and Portuguese

sources (and when I can, indigenous ones). And, because the conflict purportedly involved

people belonging to different groups, I argued that at stake were not only territorial questions.

Early modern notions of territoriality, I demonstrated, were tightly connected to membership;

That is, according to contemporaries the right to land was never disassociated from the question

who was a member of which community. The conflict between Spain and Portugal involved

therefore not only territorial issues but also the definition of who Spaniards, Portuguese and

Indians were (which is where this present project intersects to my previous work).

I would like to begin my exposition by asking when and how did those living in the

Americas argued their right to the land and how these explanations affected what they did; how

issues of membership in the community determined the extension of land, and what was the role

of the religious orders, mainly the Jesuits, in the evolution of the dispute. I will end with a brief

conclusion regarding the larger implications of this talk.

II Looking at Imperial conflicts from the bottom up

When local records are examined, it becomes clear that despite the constant debate

regarding criteria and the highly complex nature of the controversy between Spain and Portugal,

people living in the Americas were convinced that what truly made the land “theirs” was their

presence on it. Bulls and treaties, they argued, may have given rights, but these rights meant

nothing if the parties did not proceed to acquire them by way of performance. Whether this

conclusion was linked to the theory of actual occupation, or whether it expressed a more general

understanding that unless you exercised your rights you had none, is hard to establish. What is

clear, however, is that contemporaries were convinced that (1) rights to the territory could be

established only by action and that (2) the most important issue was not what you did, but what

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you prevented others from doing. As if rights were truly performative, in order to aquire them,

they said, it took the respect of those watching.

Because of these convictions, questions of actual occupation were omnipresent in local

documentation. Although this documentation often mentioned rights by treaties, it was obsessed,

on the contrary, with verifying who was present, where, doing what. Contemporaries seemed to

understand actual occupation as a very wide doctrine, allowing the acquisition of rights by virtue

of practically any type of behavior. Some suggested that discovery and penetration constituted

occupation.8 Others sustained that occupation required cultivating the land permanently.9 Yet

another group indicated that in order to acquire rights it was sufficient to perform seasonal

activities such as letting your cattle pasture on the land, collecting wood or fruits, capturing

animals, fishing and so forth.10 Most tended to agree that performing jurisdiccional acts such as

distributing land, granting offices, collecting taxes or persecuting criminals were behaviors that

both demonstrated and established occupation.11 Navigation along the rivers and commerce with

their inhabitants could also establish rights. The same happened with land routes: roads

discovered or carved out in the jungle were both markers of and reasons for occupation.12

Because traveling through the territory, as well as commercial activities performed in it, could be

generators of territorial rights, contraband, for example, could have implications much wider and

more important than its economic significance. It could, in fact, lay ground to territorial claims.13

Because according to local understanding even the smallest, unauthorized, or illegal act

could have a territorial significance, locals felt as if they had to be extremely vigilant. They had

to make sure that no penetration occurred and that, when it did, response in the form of protest

would immediately follow. Both Spaniards and Portuguese living in the American interior were

acutely aware of these requirements. They constantly attested that if they remained silent, silence

would be interpreted as consent.14 Yet, the practical difficulties in knowing who was where doing

what were insumontable. The question whether the rivals penetrated certain areas haunted

contemporaries. Rumors circulated and information was sought after from both locals and native-

Americans. On occasions, expeditions were sent in order to verify such rumors. Yet the

information such forces gathered was extremely scarse. They easily mistook one river for the

other, or searched for the settlement where it did not exist.15 Verifying the intentions of rivals

was just as difficult.16 The general assumption was that all presence was meant to establish

territorial rights. Those wishing to argue otherwise carried the burden of proof: they had to

demonstrate that they roamed the territory with another intention in mind.17 Such demonstrations,

however, often met with resistence, as both Spaniards and Portuguese accused one another of

lying. They argued that those pretending to be merchants were in reality spies or explorers.18

They disbelieved the claim of individuals that they had immigrated to the rival territory for

personal reasons such as a family feuds, criminal prosecution or simply mistake. 19 Those

catching turtles or collecting Cacao in the mountains were thus accused of wanting to expand the

territories of their community despite their protest that all they wanted to do was to survive.20

The accumulated effect of all these factors was that although large scale war between

Spaniards and Portuguese in the American interior was a rare thing, struggle occurred daily.

Triggered by who sent their horses to pasture where, who built a hut, and who collected fruits,

preoccupation with what was happening on the territory was constant. Paranoia was such that in

1770, when a Portuguese military commander autoproclaimed himself governor of Río Grande

de San Pedro instead of Viamonte as he had called himself before, his Spanish correspondent

answered with determination.21 As far as he was concerned at stake was not a simple honorary

title: what the Portuguese was doing was trying to take possession of the land.

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III

Despite these convictions, contemporaries knew that in reality the American interior was

extremely porous. Not only was it large and uncontrollable, it was constantly raomed by Spanish

and Portuguese civilians, soldiers, deserters, criminals, outlaws and runaway slaves.22 This

constant flux, typical of many such situations, was further complicated by the presence of

Indians, both allied and enemies. This presence, or rather omnipresence, was often silenced in the

debates taking place in Europe, yet it greatly modified the dynamics of the confrontation.

There were several reasons why the presence of the Indians was so important. The clearest

among them was that this presence exasperated the conflict. Spaniards and Portuguese not only

faced one another in the American interior, they were also involved in repeating conflicts, often

open warfare, with the native population. Natives, so did contemporaries believe, carried out

their own guerilla warfare against Europeans and the Indians who had allied with them.23 Both

Portuguese and Spaniards wished to win the support, or at least the non belligerence, of local

Indians. They tried to convince them to ally with them (rather than with their rivals), offering

them gifts and the prospects of a better treatment.24 Although many such arrangements were oral,

on occasions, they were reproduced in written treaties that defined the obligations and rights of

both parties.25 These treaties required Europeans to imagine what the indigenous world was like:

how was it organized, what were its units and who headed them.26 Arranging this world

according to their own criteria, Spaniards thus concluded that the Indians of Rio de la Plata, for

example, were divided in tented camps (tolderías), each lead by a chief (cacique). Yet the wish

to find neat political divisions where those did not exist or were different than assumed, led to

confusion. Often, military commanders could not agree on who the correct party to a treaty

should be.27 On many such occasions it became clear that the treaty instituted rather than simply

recognized the authority that was about to sign it. Those signing for the indigenous part were

thereafter constituted – at least as Europeans were concerned—as indigenous leaders. At the end

of this process it was not always clear whether Spaniards and Portuguese used the Indians to

consolidate their territorial expansion or whether Indians utilized Europeans in order to gain

prominence in their relationship with other natives or perhaps both.28 What was obvious, at any

rate, was that, overtime, alliance making was responsible for the ethnogenesis of new groups.

Despite efforts, peace with Indians was rarely permanent. Contemporaries blamed natives;

they portrayed them as free agents whose activities were wholly dependent on their wishes.

Natives, they argued, initiated contact with Europeans, they chose whether to ally with the

Spanish or the Portuguese, and whether to change sides. Because they were barbarians, they did

not feel bound by these pacts. Presenting natives as agressors rather than victims, and as people

who were encroaching on European land and fighting against a legitimate European presence,

contemporaries silenced the fact that European presence pushed many native communities off

their land and forced them into what was to become a permanent migration. 29 They also failed to

mention that on most instances peace treaties were not voluntarily signed. Presented as an

alternative to war, natives were told that either they agreed to enter into them or they would be

annihilated.30

IV

Although archival documentation mentions Indians mainly in connection to their alliance

with or belligerence against Europeans, the role of natives in fixing the extension of Spain and

Portugal in the Americas was much larger: natives could become generators of, or –if you wish--

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foils against which, territorial claims could be made. In order to use natives for that end,

Europeans needed to (1) classify them as vassals and (2) claim that either their activities

constituted actual occupation by vassals or that their personal subjection to the king implied by

extension also the subjection of their lands to his jurisdiction.

Issues of vasallage were closely related to territorial ones because actual occupation

required that actions generating rights would be performed either by individuals commissioned

by the king or by his vassals. This requirement implied that those promoting territorial claims

had to prove the identity of occupayers. Although our modern bias may lead us to believe that

during the early modern period identities were clear, such was not always the case. In my last

book regarding citizens and immigrants I described some of the difficulties involved in knowing

who Spaniards were. In order not to repeat myself, I would like to address here not the question

who Spaniards and Portuguese were, but how Indians became vassals of one power or the other.

Acording to contemporary narratives, Indians who converted to Christianity also became by

extension vassals of the monarchy that had converted them.31 Espousing religious and civic

conversion, these visions transformed missionary activity into an activity likely to produce also

territorial effects. Wherever missionaries were present and Indians were converted, new members

were added to the state and, by extension, so were new territories.32

The Jesuit order, first and foremost in importance among the orders working in the

American interior, formally espoused these doctrines.33 Its members repeatedly argued that they

had augmented royal territories by conquering numerous Indigenous nations, founding villages,

and making natives both political and Christian beings.34 Referring to these Indians as

“Spaniards” or “Portuguese” Jesuits insisted that they be treated as such, their life, work, fidelity

and love to the king and obedience to his orders having made them worthy of this treatment.35

While instrumental in making Indians Spanish or Portuguese, Jesuits were also important in

the conversion of indigenous land into a European possession.36 This contribution was

recognized by contemporaries that called the Jesuits “explorers” and “conquistadors” and that

constantly expressed the hope (or the fear – depending on who was speaking) that missionary

work would lead also to the acquisition of territory.37 Because missionaries were also

conquistadors, attack on them – as those performed by slave traders from San Paolo--, could be

portrayed as a patriotic activity. Under this guise, Paolistas and bandeirantes were not simple

slave traders. They were also people concerned with the territorial extension of their kingdom

that were willing to fight to stop Spanish (in the form of Jesuit) penetration.

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the expousal between conversion, vassallage

and territory gave rise to new theories that sustained that the rights of Spain and Portugal to

certain terrritories only persisted as long as the Indians were pagans. Europeans could conquer

native territory in order to subject its peoples to both god and state. Yet, after the indigenous

converted, they could no longer do so, among other things, because the territory was already both

Christianized and Europeanized.

The accululated affect of these visions ensured a debate as to whether certain Indians had

already converted, and under which banner. It also lead to a fierceful competition as to who

would convert the natives first. Presenting yet again the Indians as free agents who could chose

who to ally with, missionaries working for Spain and Portugal therefore had to convince them

not only to convert, but also to convert under them, not their rivals.38 Rejecting the idea that

certain orders or monarchs could have a monopoly over the conversion effort in 1751 a

Portuguese military commender asked: “By which divine or positive law, by which right or papal

bull are the Indians living in these parts the property of Spain?39 If the Portuguese were heretics,

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such a claim would make sense, but given that they are not, and that they also pretend to convert

the Indians as they are now doing, why should they not be allowed to do so?”

V

Because missionary activities were vital to the acquisition of territorial rights, the question

who would establish missions where was highly conflictual. Not only did the different religious

orders disagree about who best converted the natives, the monarchies supporting their activities

constantly quarreled over who had the right to send missionaries where. Theoretically, Spain

could only send missionaries to Spanish territories, the same being true with the Portuguese. Yet,

contemporaries were aware of the fact that missions not only consecrated what had already been

achieved, they were also exteremely helpful in extending the jurisdiction and territory of the

community. I already eluded to one way by which they did: converting the Indians and thus

making their land and activities, the land and the activities of vassals. However, contemporary

documentation demonstrates that missions were also helpful in other important ways: not only

did missionaries convert Indians and their lands into Spanish or Portuguese, they often were the

only Europeans present in the territory. As delegates of the king working on the border, their

activities could constitute actual occupation.40

If missionaries and their activities were a reason and a justification to claim land, their

presence in the interior was also instrumental in other ways. Because they lived in the contested

area and had close contacts with the native population, missionaries were in a perfect position to

supply information on the whereabouts of enemies.41 Expert witnesses who knew the territory

well and cared about who would control it –Jesuits sent by Spain needed the territory to be

Spanish in order for their presence to be legitimate and viceversa-- Jesuits not only reported to

their superiors and to local authorities, they also gave advice. They wrote letters, missives,

pamphlets and treaties in defense of their respective monarchies and instructed local and

metropolitan individuals and authorities as to how they could best pursue their interests. It was

not rare to find missionaries discussing with military commanders or with friars working for the

other party, which were the rights of whom. Resisting demands that they evacute their missions

because they were founded in the territory of the other power, Jesuits protested that they knew

nothing about territorial rights but immediately proceeded to discuss these rights in great detail.

From as early as the 1630, Jesuits were also military commanders: having received permission

from the Spanish crown, they mobilized their mission Indians, trained them in the use of

European arms and even guided their actions. On the Spanish side, at least, native troops

constituted the the only military force present on the border.42

Yet the perils involved in entrusting friars with the creation, occupation, definition, and

defense of communal rights became clear in the mid-eighteenth century, when the Treaty of

Madrid required that Spanish natives and Jesuits evacuate seven missions whose territory was to

be handed over to Portugal. On that occasion, many Indians, perhaps backed by Jesuits perhaps

not (the debate still continues) refused to abandon their settlements, which they defended against

a mixed army of Spaniards and Portuguese.43 In the decades following these events, Indian

resistence, ecoes of which reached Europe, became a symbol for why it may not be wise to allow

missionaries to represent the interests of community and king vis a vis the native population.44

Did Jesuits truly convert the Indians into Spaniards, or did they create a republic of their own in

which obedience was only due to them in person? Could they be trusted to defend the interests

(also) of Spain? While pamphlets circulatd accusing the Jesuits of having unleashed a war

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against both Spain and Portugal, Jesuits and their apologetics responded by stressing the

faithfulness of both friars and Indians.45

Forming part of a larger European debate involving the Jesuits (a debate that began long

before the order was expelled and disbanded), Indian resistence and the role Jesuits may have

played in promoting it also generated speculations as what would happen next. In the 1750s and

1760s there were constant rumors that Indian armies, led by Jesuits, may attempt to invade

Portuguese territories.46 Rumors continued even after the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and

Spanish America (1767). They now sustained that some Jesuits may have remained in the

territory and may be living among natives, even acting as native chiefs (caciques).47 Fears of

friars controlling Indians and encouraging insubordination continued into the 1800s.

VII

Portuguese, Spaniards and Indians, as well as friars (most of which were German and Italian

anyway) thus co-habited a region, which they claimed as their own, but which neither the law nor

the practice adjudicated clearly to any of them. They feared territorial excursions by the other

Eurpean power –most of the documentation currently available in the archives engages with such

questions—but they were also very concerned with what Indians may do. In order to know if the

land was theirs they needed to establish occupation and make sure that their rivals would not. But

occupation was not easily established. The issue was not only what was happening on the

ground; at stake was also the question who was performing these activities and with what

intention. To know if the land belonged to Spain or Portugal, therefore, one needed to know who

was Spanish and who Portuguese; whether Indians belonged to one formation or the other, and

whether people who travelled through the territory meant to escape angry relatives, or to conquer

the land.

VIII

The story of how Portuguese and Spaniards – and to a lesser degree Indians—lived in the

American interior and how they believed they acquired rights to the land has a few larger

implications that I have not yet alluded to. To conclude my talk, I would like to address some of

them very very briefly. If my intention in this paper was to take the territorial dispute away from

diplomatic, military or even political history and bring it back to the ground, it is because, as the

organizers of this meeting, I believe that neither states nor networks had the form we once

believed they did. I am not quite sure that “seeing” like states (to use Scott’s term) is possible in

modernity, but certainly in the early modern period what states were like, and how they acted,

was a highly complicated affair. As I have attempted to demonstrate when I investigated the

criminal justice in quito (many years ago), or the categories of belonging and citizenship (a few

years later) or now with territory, I believe it is our anachronistic reading that attributes the early

modern state a being and an activity it never had. Rather than asking how Spain and Portugal

expanded, the appropriate question, I believe is how individuals imagined their relationship to

both land AND community. This imagining I would argue, had important consequences not only

for what they said, but also for what they did and what they accomplished. Kings and states may

have intervened in the process, legitimating or supporting certain practices, but territorial

divisions were above all experienced: they came alive and were relevant as individuals and

groups realized where they could pasture, collect wood or navigate and where the presence of

those they classified as their rivals was permissible or detrimental to their interests.

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Notes:

1 The Treaty of Tordesillas generated endless bibliography. See, for example, El tratado de Tordesillas y su

proyección. Segundas jornadas americanistas. Primer coloquio luso-español de historia ultramarina. Valladolid:

Universidad de Valladolid, 1973, 2 vols., Antonio Rumeu de Armas. El Tratado de Tordesillas. Rivalidad hispano-

lusa por el dominio de océanos y continentes. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992 and El Tratado de Tordesillas y su época.

Congreso internacional de historia. Madrid: Sociedad “V Centenario del Tratado de Tordesillas,” 1995 3 vols. 2 A complete list would include: 1715 (the Treaty of Utrecht), 1750 (the treaty of Madrid (signed 1750, cancelled

1761)), 1763 (the Treaty of Paris), and 1777 (the Treaty of San Idelfonso). 3 The scientific issues involved in determining the meridian were briefly described in W.G.L. Randles. “Portuguese

and Spanish Attempts to Measure Longitude in the Sixteenth Century.” The Mariner’s Mirror 81 (4) (1995): 402-8.

These questions arose as soon as the Treaty of Tordesillas had been signed and before actual discovery, possession

or occupation took place: Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa. Disertación histórica y geográfica sobre el meridiano de

demarcación. Madrid: Instituto Histórico de la Marina, 1972 [1749], pp.24-6. The scientific questions that were

debated, and the need to chose among different maps using different technologies are described on pp.54-65 and 69-

90. Belief in the ability of science to resolve the issue was expressed on pp.65-6. The difficulties in establishing a

definite answer, and the constant disagreement among the scientists of both sides were also evident in AHN, Estado,

Libro 677, which includes the votes of both Spanish and Portuguese scientists, dated 1681, regarding both the

location of the meridian and of Colonia de Sacramento. 4 Rights by discovery, occupation and evangelization were presented by Spaniards as part of divine law (derecho

divino), natural law (ley natural) as well as the law of nations (derecho de gentes) both civil and political: BNE,

Mss. 3042, Fol.. 42r-101v:Juan Carlos Bazán, “Examen jurídico y discurso historial sobre los fundamentos de las

sentencias pronunciadas en discordia en los confines de los reinos de Castilla y Portugal por los jueces comisarios de

una y otra corona en demonstración de los derechos claros, sólidos y legítimos de posesion y propiedad que

pertenecen a su magestad católica en el Río de la Plata,” undated, Fol. 50v. On the role of Roman law in the

European expansion see Bernardino Bravo Lira. Derecho común y derecho propio en el Nuevo Mundo. Santiago de

Chile: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1989 and Aldo Andrea Cassi. Ius commune tra vecchio e nuovo mondo. Mari,

terre, oro nel diritto della conquista (1492-1680). Milano: Giufrrè Editore, 2004. The Roman doctrine was upheld in

the Siete Partidas, Partida 3, title 28, law 30 that determined that the first person to reach a land that was abandoned

(both materially and with the intention to abandon it) may win control (señorío) over it. The difference between

actual occupation and discovery could consist at times in the question whether it is sufficient to gaze at the new

thing, or one needs to use it. The second interpretation was tied to the more general idea that what we title today as

property was always linked to use (see chapter… -- introduction). The Treaty of Madrid (1670) between Spain and

England, may have been the first occasion in which Spain agreed to recognize rights by possession in a territory that

according to papal bulls (Tordesillas being irrelevant in this case) it considered its own. 5 AGI, Patronato, 49, r.4: “Probaza recibida en Valladolid… sobre el derecho real a la Islas Molucas, 2.8.1527.” 6 This type of literature exist in most countries. See, for example, Guillermo F. Nevares. Cómo se desintegró el

virreinato del Río de la Plata (y se consolidó el Brasil). Buenos Aires: Editorial Plus Ultra, 1987, Luis Anibal

Mendoza. Derecho territorial ecuatoriano. Quito: Ediciones LUmarso, 1993, L.A. Moniz Bandeira. O

expansionismo brasileiro e a formação dos estados na bahia do Prata. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 1985. It was

even present in Britain during the debate on the fixing of the boundary between British Guiana and Brazil at the

beginning of the twentieth century: George Edmundson. “The Voyate of Pedro Texeira on the Amazon from Pará to

Quito and Back, 1637-39.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 4th series, vol.3 (1920): 52-71, pp.70-1. 7 Luís Ferrand de Almeida. Alexandre de Gusmão, o Brasil e o Tratado de Madrid (1735-1750). Coimbra:

Universidade de Coimbra, 1990, María Rosa de Muñoz. “La Guerra de Sucesión en el Río de la Plata y las

consecuencias del Tratado de Utrecht.” Revista Lotería 338-9 (1984): 114-129, Pedro navarro Floria, María Andrea

Nicoletti de la Quintana and Ricardo Evaristo dos Santos. “Las fronteras hispano-portuguesas en el área del Río de la

Plata, 1750-1800.” Revista de historia naval 6 (22) (1998): 27-51 and Jorge Couto. “O tratado de limites de 1750 na

perspectiva portuguesa,” Manuel Lucena Giraldo. “El tratado de limites de 1750 desde la perspectiva española,”

Ángel Sanz Tapia. “La delimitación definitiva de Tordesillas: el Tratado de San Idelfono (1777),” and Eugénio Dos

Santos. “A delimitação definitiva de Tordesilhas no Tratado de Santo Idelfono (1777).” In El Tratado de Tordesillas

y su época. Congreso internacional de historia. Madrid: Sociedad “V Centenario del Tratado de Tordesillas,” 1995,

v.III, pp.1593-1610, 1611-1625, 1653-1685 and 1687-1700. Such narratives were also contemporary to the events:

see, for example, AHN, Estado 3410-2 “historia de la demarcaciones en la America entre los dominios de espana y

Portugal compuesta por don vicente aguilar y jurado official Segundo e la secfetaria de estado y por don frnacisco

requena brigadier e ingeniero de los reales ejercitos para acompañaar el mapa general construido por este ultimo de

9

todos los paises por donde pasa la linea divisoria con arreglo al tratado preliminary d elimites de 1777. Madrid

1797.”

8 IX-4-3-6: Letter of Luis Antonio de Souza, governor general of the capitancy of Sao Paolo to Carlos Morphy,

governor of Paraguay, Sao Paolo, 17.7.1771. 9 AGN/BA, IX.4.3.5: letter of the Count of Bobadella to Pedro Cevallos, Rio de Janeiro 29.2.1762. Similarly, see

AGN/M, Archivos particulares, Caja 333, Colección de documentos de Mario Falcao Espalter, Carpeta 3-

“Documentos relativos a las luchas entre España y Portugal por la posesión de la banda oriental y proceso de

población de dicho territorio, 1685-1757,” Letter of Domingo Ortiz de Rosasa to Antonio Pedro de Vasconcelos sin

fecha, dealing with Portuguese illegal presence on Isla dos Hermanas in 1743. 10 Estado 4371: Letter of the Marqués de Valdelirios to the Marqués de Grimaldi, Madrid, 11.3.1776, p.33. 11 BNE, Mss. 3042, Fol.. 42r-101v:Juan Carlos Bazán, “Examen jurídico y discurso historial sobre los fundamentos

de las sentencias pronunciadas en discordia en los confines de los reinos de Castilla y Portugal por los jueces

comisarios de una y otra corona en demonstración de los derechos claros, sólidos y legítimos de posesion y

propiedad que pertenecen a su magestad católica en el Río de la Plata,” undated, Fol. 91r and

AMRE/MRE/R/G.1.2.1, G-46, Doc. No. 19: Madrid, 25.7.1779 – carta del rey al gobernador del paraguay andres de

robles f. 161-162v. The Spanish reaction was to look for that drawing and destroy it. 12 IX-4-3-6: “Copia de la carta que escribe al gobernador y capitán general de la capitanía de San Paolo (Luis

Antonio de Souza) el gobernador de la provincia de Paraguay (Carlos Morphy), Asunción, 18.9.1770” and IX-4-3-6:

Letter of Luis Antonio de Souza, governor general of the capitancy of Sao Paolo to Carlos Morphy, governor of

Paraguay, Sao Paolo, 17.7.1771. 13 Isuses of navigation were discussed, for example, in AGN/BA, IX.15.7.15: Juan Joseph de Vertiz al señor don

Miguel de Tejada, no. 7, fols.282v-285v, en 283r and AGN/BA, IX.4.3.5: The count of Acunha to Pedro Cevallos,

Rio de Janeyro 27.2.1764 and Pedro Medrano to the Count of de Acunha, Buenos Aires, 15.6.1764. 14 IX-4-3-6: “Copia de la carta que escribe al gobernador y capitán general de la capitanía de San Paolo (Luis

Antonio de Souza) el gobernador de la provincia de Paraguay (Carlos Morphy), Asunción, 18.9.1770.” 15 Example of such attempts to verify information regarding Portuguese establishments are included in AGN/BA,

IX.4.3.5, Copy of a letter of Antonio Catami to Pedro Cevallos, San Lorenzo del Río Yacui, 2.11.1764 (Copy dated

Buenos Aires 20.4.1774), AGN/BA, IX.4.3.5: copy of letter of Carlos Morphy a Francisco Bucarelli y Ursua,

Asunción 19.1.1768, in “Real orden para que los gobernadres del Tucumán y Paraguay estén a las de este gobierno,”

Fol. 5r-6r. IX.4.3.8 also incluyes many such rumors, and attempts to verify them as does IX.4.4.1: Letter of Joachin

Alos to viceroy Nicolás de Arrendondo, dated asunción, 13.6.1790 and sent together with an “Expediente sobre los

medios de verificar el reconocimiento en el río paraguay y banda del Igatimi para averiguar la existencia de

establecimientos portugueses en aquellos parajes, 1790. Also see AHN, Estado 4611, Letter of viceroy Nicolás

Arrendondo to Conde de Campo Alange, Buenos Aires, 21.1.1791. 16 The importante of intention was mentioned in IX.4.4.1: Lazaro de Ribera de Cayetano Pinto de Miranda

Montenegro, governor of Matogrosso in Villabella, 30.6.1797. On the question of intentions the viceroy of Nueva

Granada attested in his correspondance that “it is not the same ir looking for tortous eggs and settling in order to

make territorial claims” (no es lo mismo andar buscando huevos de tortuga que poblarse para la adquisición de

derecho): Estado 4554, No.1: Letter of Manuel Antonio Flores to Josef de Gálvez, Santa Fe, 28.2.1779. 17 AGN/BA, Bn 297, expediente 4704: “Reflexiones hechas a los artículos de la carta escrita por el gobernador de

Chiquitos al exmo señor virrey.” Sin fecha. The original version reads: “siempre este tránsito es de mala presunción

siendo por dominios ajenos y esto sin urgente necesidad.” 18 BRAH/M, 9-1663: Colección Mata Linares, Tomo 8, Fol.. 42-57: “Papel del señor regegnte de Buenos Aires

sobre asunto de la linea divisoria de los reinos de España y Portugal,” fol.44r. The importante of intention (ánimo de

adquirir derecho o posesión) was also mentioned in BNE, Mss. 3042, Fol.. 42r-101v:Juan Carlos Bazán, “Examen

jurídico y discurso historial sobre los fundamentos de las sentencias pronunciadas en discordia en los confines de los

reinos de Castilla y Portugal por los jueces comisarios de una y otra corona en demonstración de los derechos claros,

sólidos y legítimos de posesion y propiedad que pertenecen a su magestad católica en el Río de la Plata,” undated,

Fol. 94v. 19 AGN/BA, IX.4.3.5: Declaration of Antonio Franza, Gatimi, 30.12.1767 in “Real orden para que los gobernadres

del Tucumán y Paraguay estén a las de este gobierno,” Fol. 13r. 20 interrogatory elaborated by Juan Francisco Gómez de Villajufre y de Arce, governor of San Joaquin de Omagua

(Mainas) on 26.5.1775, ANQ, Fe 30, vol. 83, no. 3226, “Autos formados a consecuencia de una real cédula para que

se informe a su majestad sobre la conducente a la provincia de Mainas,” fols. 80r-275v. On the Portuguese side, see

10

the allegations against Fernando Roxas, a Spaniard, who allegedly only penetrated Portuguese territory to look for

provisions: Ângela Dominguez. When the Amerindians were Vassals. Power Equations in Northern Brazil (1750-

1800). New Delhi: TransBooks, 2007, pp.197. 21 IX-4-3-6: “copia de la minuta que remitió el coronel Joseph Marcelino de Figuereido gobernador de Viamonte al

teniente coronel Jopseh de Molina, comandante del Río Grande de San Pedro para formalizar el convenio de mutua

restitución de fugitivos que se le había propuesto por orden del exmo señor capitán generla de las provincias del Río

de la Plata con la adicción de las razones porque el citado comandante no amitió algunos capítulos y puntos en el

estilo de ella,” Río Grande de San Pedro, 26.7.1770 and IX.4.3.7: Letter of Joseph de Molina to Juan Joseph de

Vertiz, San Pedro, 24.2.1774. Another copy of this letter can be found in AGN/BA, BN 193, No. 2054. 22 It is possible that desertion was facilitated by the rival party: Spain may have encouraged Portuguese soldiers to

defect by giving them food, gifts, cloths and hospitality: AGN, IX-9-16-2-8, No.17: “Relación de las raciones dadas

a los desertores de los dominios de Portugal,” December 1774, no.23 of January 1775, and nos.41 and 42. 23 The espousal of struggle against the portuguese and fear of attacks by Indios infieles is expressed in AGN/BA,

IX.4.3.5: copy of letter of Carlos Morphy a Francisco Bucarelli y Ursua, Asunción 19.1.1768, in “Real orden para

que los gobernadres del Tucumán y Paraguay estén a las de este gobierno,” Fol. 5r. Also see AGN/BA, BN 185,

expediente 1436: Copy of a letter fo Juan Joseph de Vertiz to Jose de Gálvez, Madrid, 5.9.1784 and AGN/M,

Catálogo del ex Archivo y Museo Histórico Nacional, Papeles del doctor León Pereda de Saravia, Misclenanea, Caja

206, Carpeta 26: “Apuntes historicos sobre la demarcacion de limites de la banda oriental s/f.” AHN, Estado 4506-1,

includes many similar complains voiced by the inhabitants of Montevideo as late as 1803. For what was happening

on the other side of the border, in Quito, see ANQ, Indígenas 42 exp. No. 25 de 2.11.1729, expediente sobre la

representación de Pablo noa indio alcalde ordinario del pueblo de nr. Senora d eloreto anejo a la ciudad de avila

gobernadcion quijos y mision mainas and ANQ, Fondo especial 150 v.343 no. 8216 fols. 44r-47v Quito 15.7.1797 a

miguel hernandez vello de luis monuz de guzman. (presidente?) 47r-v. 24 ANQ, Fe 37, v. 102 n 3754-16 fols. 29r-32v, Oficio del presidente dibuja a jose de Galvez, Quito 18.7.1776 and

ANQ, Fe 40 v. 108 no. 3855-15fol 31r-35v Quito16.4.1777 presidente dibuja a jose de galves and Letter of Lazro de

Almiron, lieutenant of the city of Corrientes wrote to the governor of Buenos Aires, Corrientes, 22.2.1769: ANC/S,

Jesuitas, Vol. 159, pieza 7, fols.35r-36v. The Portuguese also divided the Indians among friends and foes:

“Memorial que o tenente coronel Alvaro José Serpa Soutomayor deu a su majestad na audiencia de 6.4.1728,” BA,

54-XIII-16 no. 152, noticia 6, p.5 and p.12 and letter of the governor of Marañón Bento Maciel to king Philippe II,

9.10.1637, Ahu acl cu 009 cx.1, d.116. They often used the Jesuits in order to obtain peace with the Indians: Jans-

Jürgen Prien. “O papel dos jesuitas portugueses no Brasil entre 1549 e 1640.” In A união ibérica e o mundo

atlântico. Segundas jornadas de história ibero-americana. Lisbon: Edições Colibrí, 1997, pp.217-240, on p.223.

Carlos Lázaro Ávila. “Conquista, control y convicción: El papel de los parlamentos indígenas en México, el Chaco y

Norteamérica.” Revista de Indias 59 (217) (1999): 645-673, pp.664-5 mentions, for example, that the border conflict

with Portugal forced the monarchy to re-think and re-organize its relationship with indigenous nations living on the

frontier. Also see Mary Karasch. “Rethinking the Conquest of Goias, 1775-1819.” Americas 61 (3) (2005): 462-492. 25 Abelardo levaggi. Paz en la frontera. Historia de las relaciones diplomáticas con las comunidades indígenas en la

Argentina (siglos XVI-XIX). Buenos Aires: Universidad del Museo Social Argentino, 2000 and in his Diplomacia

hispano-indígena en las fronteras de América. Historia de los tratados entre la monarquía española y las

comunidades aborígenes. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2002 and Eugenia A. Néspolo.

“Los tratados escritos con las sociedades indígenas en los bordes del río Salado durante el siglo XVIII. Un análisis

desde el derecho de gentes.” Memoria Americana. Cuadernos de etnohistoria 12 (2004): 237-276. We are currently,

thus, a long way away from the affirmation made by Charles Gibson in 1978 regarding the absence of such peace

treaties in the Americas: Charles Gibson. “Conquest, Capitulation, and Indian Treaties.” The American Historical

Review 83 (1) (1978): 1-15. 26 On Spanish attempts to understand the Indigenous world in order to assert who was whom and who merited which

treatment see Cecilia Sheridan. “Social Control and Native Territoriality in Northeastern New Spain.” In Jesús F. de

la Teha and Ross Frank. Choice, Persuasion, and Coercion. Social Control on Spain’s North American Frontiers.

Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp.121-148, pp.125 and 143 and Christophe Giudicelli. Pour

une géopolitique de la guerre des Tepehuán (1616-1619). Alliances indiennes, quadrillage colonial et texinomie

ethnographic au nord-ouest du Mexique. Paris : Universtié de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2003. 27 IX.24.4.6: Letter of Ramón García Pizarro to viceroy marqués de Sobremonte dated La Plata 25.8.1806 in

Expediente 39: “El gobernador intendente de La Plata Ramón García Pizarro comisiona a don Jorge Michel ante el

cacique Cumbay jefe de los indios chiriguanos para concretar una paz que asegure la tranquilidad de las fronteras,

1806.” These issues are also dealt with in IX.24.4.8: Expediente 50: “Expedición para contener las irrupciones de los

11

indios infieles de las fronteras de la cordillera de los Sauces provincia de Cochabamba y tartar de paces con el

cacique Cumbia.” Attempts to understand Indian “political divisions” are also evident in Estado 4548: letter of

Joaquin Alos to viceroy Nicolás Arrendondo, Asunción, 19.1.1793. 28 Margarita Gascón. Naturaleza e imperio. Araucanía, Patagonia, Pampas (1598-1740). Buenos Aires: Editorial

Dunken, 2007, pp.22-23, 27 and 33-4. Most of the documentation regarding these treaties is limited and it certainly

does not allow to reconstruct the “Indian point of view:” Florencia Roulet: “Con la pluma y la palabra. El lado

oscuro de las negociaciones de paz entre españoles e indígenas.” Revista de Indias 64 (231) (2004): 313-347. 29 AGN/BA, BN 189, Expediente 1882: Petition of Pedro Antonio Cervino, Buenos Aires, 25.6.1804. 30 See, for example, the negotiations between the “casique infiel Cumbay” and Jorge Michel, who was implementing

the orders of the president and captain general of La Plata, Ramón García Pizarro, in 1806: AGN/BA IX-24-04-06,

fol.6R. 31 These Indians were considered Spanish or “Castilian Indians.” See, for ecample, the letter of Bento da Fonseca,

Jesuit procurator general of Maranhão, dated collegio de Santo Antão, 14.6.1749, reproduced in Bernardo Pereira de

Berredo. Annaes historicos do estado do Maranhão. Iquitos: Monumenta Amazónica, 1989, pp.ci-ciii, on p.ciii. Juan

Nuix. Reflexiones imparciales sobre la humanidad de los españoles en las Indias, contra los pretendidos filósofos y

políticos para ilustrar las historias de mm. Raynal y Robertson. Madrid: Joachin Ibarra, 1782 (servicio de

reproducción de libros Paris-Valencia, Valencia, 1992). Copia facsiil., p.150 considers that Indians gladly became

royal vassals in gratitude for their religious instructions. 32 These perceptions continued in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. See, for example, Juan Carlos Bazán,

“Examen jurídico y discurso historial sobre los fundamentos de las sentencias pronunciadas en discordia en los

confines de los reinos de Castilla y Portugal por los jueces comisarios de una y otra corona en demonstración de los

derechos claros, sólidos y legítimos de posesion y propiedad que pertenecen a su magestad católica en el Río de la

Plata,” undated, BNE, Mss. 3042, Fol.. 42r-101v, Fol.. 96r. 33 Jesuits belonging to the provinces of Spain arrived to the Amazon region in the early 17th century and remained

present until their expulsion decreed in 1767 and effectuated in 1768. Their activity was particularly important in the

late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when their missions expanded rapidly, both in terms of number of

occupants, as the territory that they covered. On the Portuguese side Jesuits did not enjoy the same monopoly.

Although extremely important in the early period by the end of the seventeenth century and especially in the

eighteenth century their activities were rivaled by those of the Franciscans and Carmelites. See, for example, Sandra

Negro. “Maynas, una mission entre la illusion y el desencanto.” In Sandra Negro and Manuel M. Marzal eds. Un

reino en la frontera. Las misiones jesuitas en la América colonial. Lima and Quito: Pontificia Universidad Católica

del Perú-Abya Yala, 2000, pp.185-203, Mathias C. Kiemen. The Indian Policy of Portugal in the Amazon Region,

1614-1693. New York: Octagon Books, 1973, Jans-Jürgen Prien. “O papel dos jesuitas portugueses no Brasil entre

1549 e 1640.” In A união ibérica e o mundo atlântico. Segundas jornadas de história ibero-americana. Lisbon:

Edições Colibrí, 1997, pp.217-240 and Maria Adelina Amorin. Os franciscanos no Maranhão e Grão Pará. Missão

e cultura na primeira metade de seicentos. Lisbon: CLEPUL and CEHR, 2005. On the role of other missionaries in

expanding European territories, as well as knowledge of them see, for example, Mariano Cuesta Domingo.

“Descubrimientos geográficos durante el siglo XVIII: acción franciscana en la amplicación de las fronteras.”

Archivo Ibero-Americano 52 (205-208) (1992): 293-342. The Jesuits, although quantitatively and qualitatively the

most important order in the Amazon basin, at least on the Spanish side, was not the only religious order to engage in

these dynamics. The Maranon river, it was affirmed in 1780, was discovered in 1647 by Fransiscans belonging to the

province of Quito. AMRE/MRE/R/G.1.2.3, G-37 (copies of documents from AGI), No. 12 ; “Extracto de una

relacion por fray Francisco Alvarez de Villanueva de las doctrinas y pueblos de misiones…en todas las Indias…,

Madrid 29.2.1780, Fols..233-235v. (copiado. Indias estante 155 cajon 4, leg. 16), fol.234r. In 1642 Franciscan and

Jesuit friars informed the council of the Indies of the discovery of the river Marañon and requested permission to

return there in order to convert the natives: AMRE/MRE/R/G.1.6.3.4 (copies from AGI) no. 2 Fol.4-5.– 30.10.1642

– memorial de fray domingo de brieva, religioso lego de la orden de san francisco al rey. Agi-76-5-47. also see

BRAH/M, Jesuitas vol. CLXXXVII BRAH/M, Jesuitas vol. CLXXXVII no. 24 antiguo, no.30 moderno “Memorial

presentado en el real consejo de las Indias acerca del descubrimiento del rio de las Amazonas que se hizo en el año

de 1636 por el padre Cristóbal de Acuna de la compañía de Jesús y este memorial le vio después de la rebelión de

Portugal.” Another copy of this document can be found in Agi, quito, 158. In 1692, similar petitions were presented

by Jesuits, wishing to convert the Jívaros (AMRE/MRE/R/G.1.6.3.5 (copies from AGI) No.19 fol. 30-35– quito

7.6.1692 – informe del fiscal de la audiencia Antonio de ron sobre una petición del padre jesuita francisco de vivas

que trata de la conquista de los jivaros Agi, 76-6-10). For these petitioners conversion equaled conquest. Indeed, it

12

obeyed royal orders to conquer without violence through a spiritual, rather than military, means. A claim was made

that the orders acquired right to such a conquest. After all, they had discovered the territory and suffered martyrdom. 34 ARSI/Rome (Archivi Romani Societatis Iesu/Rome), Manuscripta antiquae societatis pars I. assistentiae et

provinciae, Provincial nr. Et quito n. 18, “Petición de respuesta a la que presentó el padre Diego de Urena procurador

de corte en esta audiencia de San Francisco de Quito en el pleito que tenemos con los padres dominicos entre otras

cosas que dice en su respuesta el padre fray Domingo de la Barrera,” fols. 14r-v 19.5.1684

The insistence that Indians converted by the Jesuits would also recognize their subjecton to the secular authorities,

was continuous. Indeed, even if the Jesuits were apt for the political and economic government of Indian settlements,

justice was still a matter for royal officials: ANQ, encomiendas 4, exp. 17 de 9.2.1750, Vista fiscal sobre el estado de

las misiones en Mainas, lujan y vedia, quito 2.3.1750 fol. 2v. Accusations that such was not the case were frequent.

See for example, ASV/Rome (Arquivio Segreto Vaticano/Rome), Fondo Gesuiti, vol. 2: “Relazione abbreviata della

republica che i Gesuiti della provincia di Portogallo e di Spagna hanno stabilita ne domni che le due sopradette

corone possiedono nel’America e della guerra da loro mantenuta contra gl’essertici spangoli e portoghesi, formata

permezzo de registri della segregarie de’due comisari principali stabilite nellistessa America ed altri averati

documente quivi aggiunti,” undated, anonymous manuscript. 35 The original version reads: “estos indios de esta nación deben ser tratados no como otros indios sino como

españoles porque su vida, obras, fidelidad y amor que tienen a vuestra majestad y obediencia a sus gobernadores

acudiendo a todo cuanto se les encarga del real servicio con grande puntualidad:” “Carta do governador de Buenos

Aires, Don Pedro Baigorri, para o rei de Espanha em defensa da compañía…, Buenos Aires, 15.3.1656, reproduced

in Jaime Cortesão ed. Jesuitas e bandeirantes no Itatim (1596-1760). Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1952,

pp.273-5, on pp.274-5. Somewhat similar was AGN/BA, IX.4.3.5, letter of the viceroy of Lima to the bishop of

Misque, Lima, 25.10.1765. 36 ASPF/Rome, SOCG, v. 257, “Relatione dello stato delle misioni del gesuiti nel Paraguay, Chile e Tucuman…,”

dated 16.5.1661, fols. 184r-185v, ASPF/Rome, SC, vol. 1, “Notizie circa lo stabilimento de pp gesuiti nel Paraguay,

undated, anonymous manuscript, fols. 98r-111r and AHN, Estado 4555, No.16, Letter fo the governor of Paraguay

to Nicolás Arrendondo, Asunción 8.2.1792. 37 BRAH/M, Jesuitas vol. CLXXXV, nos. 5, 6 and 8, anonymous undated manuscripts in Portuguese, and Jesuitas

CIX, no.73: “Relacao de alguas cousas tocantes a o Maranhon e Gran Para escrita pello padre Luis Figueroa da

companhia de Jesus.” Undated and BA, Cod. Ms. 51-VI-48: “Noticia e justificção do titulo e boa fe com que se

abrou na Nova Colonia do Sacramento,” anonymous undated manuscript, Fol.. 117r-146r, on fol.141r. The

contribution of Jesuits to the expansion of Portuguese America, mainly in the Amazon region was recognized by

both early modern and contemporary historians. See, for example, Andrés de Barros. Vida do apostolico padre

Antonio Vieyra da Companhia de Jesus…. Lisbon: Nova officina Sylviana, 1746, book 1, pp.93-95 and Basílio de

Maglhães. Expansão geográfica do Brasil colonial. São Paolo: Companhia Editoria Nacional, 1978, pp.155-164.

Also see F. Mateos. “Avances portugueses y misiones españolas en América del Sur.” Missionalia hispánica 5 (14)

(1958): 459-504, pp. 486-487 and Guy Martiniere. “Frontieres colonials en Amérique du sud: entre “Tierra Firme” et

“Maranhão » (1500-1800), » Cahiers des Amériques latines 17 (1978) : 147-181, pp.171 and 174. Jorge Cuoto. “O

poder temporal nas aldeias de índios do estado o Grão Pará e Maranhão no período pombalino: foco de conflicto

entre os jesuitas e a coroa (1751-1759).” In Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva ed. Cultura portuguesa na Terra de Santa

Cruz. Lisbon, Editorial Estampa, 1995, pp.53-77, p.56 38 Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa. Disertación histórica y geográfica sobre el meridiano de demarcación. Madrid:

Instituto Histórico de la Marina, 1972 [1749], pp.156-7. 39 “Copia de una carta del gobernador de Arayal o Matto Grosso [Antonio de Silva Guzman] al padre superior de

Moxos Nicolas Altogradi en respuesta de una suya, en que se le quejaba de algunos portugueses que entraban a

maloquear o hacer eslcavos a los indios, escrita en Arayal de Matogroso a 25.9.1751” ANC/S, Jesuitas, Vol. 202,

pieza 1, fols. 1r- v. The governor accused the Spanish Jesuits of pretending that “todo el gentilismo sea solo suyo.”

The original version reads: “ Por qué ley divina o positiva o por qué titulo pertenecen a los misioneros castellanos

los indios, que habitan estos desiertos? Tienen a caso algun decreto de la sentisima trinidad, o alguna bula pontificia,

para que ellos solos puedan conquistar? Si los portugueses fueran herejes, justa seria la disputa; pero siendo catolicos

romanos, si pretenden hacer lo mismo, que hoy hacen v. ras de catequizarlos y reducirlos a la fe, por qué razon han

de ser prohibidos?” citation on Fols.1r-v. The governor than goes on to say “lo que v ra pondera de que los tratan

mal y se amanceban, solo toca a dios castigarlos y a su rey, y ministros y ninguno da poder a los misioneros

espanoles, para zelar y enmendar esto; demas de que no hay muchos anos, que por esas indias se vio lo mismo y

peor, que ha dado ocasión de tantos volúmenes de historias, bastando su Solórzano y no menos a sus prelados, y asi

como alla tuvo enmienda, también aca lo tendra,” “ si como Espana no ha muchos anos que abrio los ojos para ese

13

celo de ponerles misioneros, por lo mucho que ganaba por ese modo de senorear tierras y alargar sus dominios; asi

Portugal ahora entra mano en eso, poniendolo en ejecución; y no debe ser extrano pues tiene el ejempo de un buen

vecino” and “digame v ra en qué v ras fundan, para que asi como v ras las iban poseyendo, no pudiesen los

portugueses hacer lo mismo?” : all citations on fol.1v. 40 Already in 1917 Herbert Bolton recognized the importance of missionaries as (1) explorers and diplomatic agents

(2) defendors of the frontier (3) people who had advocated further expansion of the frontier (4) and who were

responsible for integrating the Indians into the Spanish commonwealth: Herbert E. Bolton. “The Mission as a

Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies.” The American Historical Review 23 (1) (1917): 42-61. 41 IX-4-3-6: Letter of Francisco Bruno de Zavala to Jose Custodio de Sá y Jaria, San Marcos 18.11.1768 and

AMRE/MRE/R/G.1.2.1, G-46, No. 24 – al virrey del peru rey aranjuez 16.4.1725 fols. 185r-v. The role of both

Indians and “their Jesuits” as informers regarding the geography of the continent is mentioned, for example, in

AHN, Estado 3706: unsigned letter sent to the Marqués de Valdelirios, dated San Nicolás 1.12.1757 and AHN,

Estado 3706: “Copia de la que acabo de recibir de padre Miguel de Soto,” signed Juan de Echavarria, San Miguel,

22.4.1758. Jesuits continued to act as informants even after their expulsion: AMRE/MRE/R/G.1.2.2, G-47, No. 18,

fols. 62r-83r: “relacion de viaje que de la capital de Santa Fe de Bogota…hizo a las montanas de los Andaquines y

misiones de los rios Caqueta y Putumayo…don Sebastián Joseph Lopez Ruiz.” Signed Santa Fe, 30.9.1783,

fols.70v-71r. Also see the information supplied by Diego Altamirano, procurator of the Jesuit province in Río de la

Plata, Tucumán and Paraguay in Madrid, s/d, reproduced in Campaña del Brasil. Antecedentes coloniales. Buenos

Aires, Archivo General de la Nación, 1931, vol.I, pp.361-366. 42 “Informe e justificação juridical do uso de armas de fogo pelo índios, apresantados pelos jesuitas do Paraguai.”

1639, in Jaime Cortesão ed. Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Tape (1615-1641). Manuscritos da Coleção Angelis. Rio de

Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1969, pp.302-314. The authorization to use arms by mission Indians was given, for

example, in 1723 and 1724: “Provision por el Marques de Castelfuerte virrey y capitan general” and royal orders of

1.2 and 17.9.1723, ANC/S, Jesuitas, Vol. 197, pieza 6, Fols. 25r-42v. The gradual, yet constant, militarization of

mission Indians was studied by Magnus Mörner. The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the La Plata

Region. The Hapsburg Era. Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies, 1953, for example, pp.118-

120 and 147-8. Also see Constancio Eguía Ruiz. “El espíritu militar d elos jesuitas en el antiguo Paraguay español.”

Revista de Indias 5 (16) (1944): 266- 319 and F. Mateos. “Avances portugueses y misiones españolas en América

del Sur.” Missionalia hispánica 5 (14) (1958): 459-504, pp.480-483. 43 Many documents related to this resistance were reproduced in Campaña del Brasil. Antecedentes coloniales.

Buenos Aires, Archivo General de la Nación, 1939, vol.II, pp.128-215. AHN, Estado 4798 also has plenty of

information on what happened in Paraguay in the 1750s. The debate whether the Jesuits were responsable for this

resistente started almost immediately: see, for example, letters of Pedro de Cevallos to Ricardo Wall, minister of

state, San Borja, 15.2.1759 and 30.11.1759 (who thought the Jesuits were responsible) and letter of Marqués de

valdelirios to Pedro de Cevallos, San Nicolás, 9.1.1760 (who disagreed), all reproduced in Campaña del Brasil.

Antecedentes coloniales. Buenos Aires, Archivo General de la Nación, 1939, vol.II, pp.267-270, 275-277 and 286-

293. The continuation of the debate is described, for example, in José María Mariluz Urquijo. “Clima intellectual

rioplatense de mediados del setecientos. Los limites del poder real.” In Juan Baltasar Maziel. De la justicia del

tratado de límites de 1750. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1988, pp.15-55, pp.30-34 and in his

“La historiografía rioplatense sobre el Tratado de Madrid (1750-1850).” In El Tratado de Tordesillas y su época.

Congreso internacional de historia. Madrid: Sociedad “V Centenario del Tratado de Tordesillas,” 1995, v.III,

pp.1637-1651. Also see Félix Becker. “La guerra guaranítica desde una nueva perspective: historia, ficción e

historiografía.” Boletín Americanista 32 (1982): 7-37, Juan Molina Cortón. “El tratado de límites de 1750 y la

intervención jesuita.” Cuadernos de investigación histórica 16 (1995): 199-223 and Philip Caraman. The Lost

Paradise. The Jesuit Republic in South America. New York: The Seabury Press, 1976. 44 Comtemporary literature on these questions is enourmous. See, for example, the anonymous Relation abbreg’e

concernant la republique que les religieux, nommes jesuites, des provinces de Portugal et d’ Espagne, ont etablie

dans les pays et domaines d’ outre mer des ces duex monarchies et de la guerra qui’ils ont excitee et soutenue contre

les armees espagnoles et portuguaises. Amsterdam: Aux Depans de la Compagnie, 1758, Le gouvernement du

Paraguay sous les Jesuites. Ouvrage ou l’on expose les moyens que les Jesuites ont employes pour mantenir leur

roaute dans le Paraguay, Madrid, 1771, and I gesuiti accusati e convirti di spilorceria con due altre dissese

intitolate: l’ una apologia per il Rev. Padri della compagnia di Gesu… e l’ altra lettera sopra il leggera publiche

scritture e stampe malediche e infamatorie del prossimo. Venezia: per Gino Bottagrissi, 1760. 45 BRAH/M, 9-1663: Colección Mata Linares, Tomo 8, Fol.. 1-35: Joseph Cardiel, “Declaración de la verdad contra

un livelo inflamatorio impreso en portugués contra los padres jesuitas misioneros del Paraguay y Marañon, Pueblo

14

de Borja, 14.9.1758 and AGN/M, Archivos particulares, Caja 333, Colección de documentos de Mario Falcao

Espalter, Carpeta 6: documentos diversos sorbe la historia del Río de la Plata, 1747-1805, Informe con noticias sobre

las posesiones que los portugueses están tomando en la banda oriental del Uruguay, Antonio Pardo Rivadeneira,

Madrid 2.5.1805.” 46 IX.3.8.2: letter of Joseph de Andonaegue to Luis García de Vivar, Buenos Aires, 10.1.1750. 47 IX.1.5.6: Letter of Francisco Faijo y Noguera to viceroy Juan Joseph de Vertiz, Pergamino, 8.5.1772.